



In Their Own Words: Foreign Military Thought

**Science of Campaigns
(2006)**



Printed in the United States of America
by the China Aerospace Studies Institute

ISBN 9798571072519

To request additional copies, please direct inquiries to
Director, China Aerospace Studies Institute,
Air University, 55 Lemay Plaza, Montgomery, AL 36112

All photos licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license,
or under the Fair Use Doctrine under Section 107 of the Copyright Act for nonprofit educational
and noncommercial use.

All other graphics created by or for China Aerospace Studies Institute

E-mail: Director@CASI-Research.ORG

Web: <http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/CASI>

[@CASI_Research](https://twitter.com/CASI_Research)

<https://www.facebook.com/CASI.Research.Org>

<https://www.linkedin.com/company/11049011>

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, *Intellectual Property, Patents, Patent Related Matters, Trademarks and Copyrights*; this work is the property of the US Government.

Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights

Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States. This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This publication is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal, academic, or governmental use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete however, it is requested that reproductions credit the author and China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI). Permission is required from the China Aerospace Studies Institute to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please contact the China Aerospace Studies Institute.

Cleared for Public Release, Distribution unlimited.

CASI would like to acknowledge the work and effort of Project Everest for their work on this series.

China Aerospace Studies Institute

CASI's mission is to advance understanding of the capabilities, development, operating concepts, strategy, doctrine, personnel, organization, and limitations of China's aerospace forces, which include: the PLA Air Force (PLAAF); PLA Naval Aviation (PLAN Aviation); PLA Rocket Force (PLARF); PLA Army (PLAA) Aviation; the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), and the civilian and commercial infrastructure that supports the above.

CASI supports the Secretary, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Chief of Space Operations, and other senior Air and Space leaders. CASI provides expert research and analysis supporting decision and policy makers in the Department of Defense and across the U.S. government. CASI can support the full range of units and organizations across the USAF, USSF, and the DoD. CASI accomplishes its mission through conducting the following activities:

- CASI primarily conducts open-source native-language research supporting its five main topic areas.
- CASI conducts conferences, workshops, roundtables, subject matter expert panels, and senior leader discussions to further its mission. CASI personnel attend such events, government, academic, and public, in support of its research and outreach efforts.
- CASI publishes research findings and papers, journal articles, monographs, and edited volumes for both public and government-only distribution as appropriate.
- CASI establishes and maintains institutional relationships with organizations and institutions in the PLA, the PRC writ large, and with partners and allies involved in the region.
- CASI maintains the ability to support senior leaders and policy decision makers across the full spectrum of topics and projects at all levels, related to Chinese aerospace.

CASI supports the U.S. Defense Department and the China research community writ-large by providing high quality, unclassified research on Chinese aerospace developments in the context of U.S. strategic imperatives in the Asia-Pacific region. Primarily focused on China's Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces, CASI capitalizes on publicly available native language resources to gain insights as to how the Chinese speak to and among one another on these topics.

PROJECT EVEREST

Department of Defense epicenter for human-centered strategic art

Overview

Project Everest is a strategy design start-up inspired by Andrew Marshall's call to cultivate comprehensive understanding of U.S. competitors in pursuit of national security. Project Everest contributes to this vision in two fundamental ways: by recurrently educating defense professionals on adversaries' ways of war and by facilitating the development of novel strategies that achieve competitive advantage over these adversaries. Founded in 2013, Project Everest has grown its membership to hundreds, and shaped policy and education campaigns at the national level.

The Problem

Project Everest tackles two significant national security problems for our nation. First, Project Everest seeks to cultivate understanding of an adversary over a career, rather than upon assignment to a given region or staff.

Project Everest seeks to invigorate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' 2013 charge to develop an officer cadre with deep regional expertise and to answer the 2018 National Defense Strategy's charge to "prioritize developing the intellectual firepower of our warfighters and workforce via education and training". We bring motivated individuals with subject-matter expertise in their primary specialty together to recurrently interrogate key strategic issues throughout their careers. Over time, Project Everest will generate a cadre of high-caliber officers familiar with the near-peers' ways of war and experienced in thinking through the toughest operational and strategic challenges.

Second, Project Everest seeks to inject creativity into stale strategy development methods for the Department of Defense, inspiring novel approaches to competition and warfighting.

Defense strategy development methods are outdated. Linear, industrial assembly-line approaches to strategy development overlook opportunities to understand how the adversary thinks about and plans for competition and war. Prevalent strategy development techniques fail to unlock the creative potential of functional experts.

Project Everest was founded by six SAASS graduates who range in gender, expertise, rank, status, ethnicity, and personality, but who have a shared vision to inspire change in the way our nation prepares to compete and fight.

In Their Own Words

The “In Their Own Words” series is dedicated to translations of Chinese documents in order to help non-Mandarin speaking audiences access and understand Chinese thinking. CASI would like to thank all of those involved in this effort, especially the teams from our “big brother”/ 大哥 at the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), Project Everest, and the CASI team at BluePath Labs.

In the “In Their Own Words” series, CASI and its collaborators aim to provide Chinese texts that illustrate thoughtful, clearly articulated, authoritative foreign perspectives on approaches to warfare at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Project Everest Comments

Science of Campaigns is part of Project Everest’s “Foreign Military Thought” series. This particular volume was translated under the auspices of Project Everest in conjunction with the China Aerospace Studies Institute. This text is a core document for Chinese military officer education. Almost all People’s Liberation Army officers in senior academies study this text. Prepared by the PRC’s National Defense University faculty, this is the second edition since 2000. This foundational text provides fundamental knowledge necessary for analysts and thinkers around the world to understand Chinese warfighting perspectives.

The U.S. editors apply a stringent vetting process to select foreign texts. Selected texts will help build a deep understanding of different approaches to warfare and clarify details of foreign perspectives that may have both commonalities and asymmetries to U.S. approaches. This series will stimulate thought on both the core elements of military strategy and operational concepts for force application during war. CASI and Project Everest believe that cultivating a holistic understanding of foreign perspectives by learning from high-quality original material articulated from a foreign perspective offers an invaluable starting point for the exchange of ideas and the development of military thought.

The translation and publication of *Science of Campaigns* does not constitute approval by any U.S. Government organization of the contents, inferences, findings, or conclusions contained therein. Publication is solely for the exchange of information and stimulation of ideas.

Translators' Notes

This translation of the original text aims to accurately capture the technical meanings, in both English and Chinese. This will ensure that the reader will not inadvertently draw the wrong substantive understanding based on inaccurate translations.

Note on Trouble Terms:

Throughout the text are certain terms that are translated with the Chinese pinyin modifying the terms. This convention allows the reader to distinguish nuances that exist in the Chinese terms.

Jihua and *guihua* plans. The *jihua* plan is a more specific plan, a plan that is meant to be carried out to the letter, whereas the *guihua* plan is a more general plan that is macroscopically focused. In order to retain the intended Chinese distinction, the *jihua* plan is rendered as “plan {*jihua*}” due to its prevalence in this translation. The *guihua* will be rendered in a more customary fashion of *guihua* plan.

Bushi and *bushu* dispositions. *Bushi* disposition is the *mission differentiation, organized grouping, and positioning* [deployment] accomplished for strengths within the campaign task-based organization. *Bushi* denotes the relationship between one's own military forces, the opponent's military forces, and the combat environment (e.g., terrain). *Bushu* disposition is the positioning of participating force-strengths for a fixed time and space on the basis of *mission differentiation* and the *organized grouping of campaign* and in accordance with operational conditions and the enemy's possible activities.

Xitong, tixi, tizhi, and zhidu systems. The system {*xitong*} is an elemental system, one that can operate on its own. The *tixi*-system is similar conceptually to a *System of Systems* as often seen in systems engineering; in Chinese, a *tixi*-system is understood to be composed of elemental systems {*xitong*} acting together as a larger whole. The *tizhi*-system is a large-scale system, typically a national-scale system and understood to be formalized embodiment of a *zhidu*-system. The *zhidu*-system describes a conformance system, one where all elements of that system conform to how that system is defined.

Note on Table of Contents:

The double pagination shown in the Table of Contents represents: 1) the original page numbers from *Science of Campaigns (2006)* followed by 2) the actual page number of this translation. Additionally, the headings throughout the document also reference original page numbers from the original-language text.

Science of Campaigns (2006)

战役学

{zhanyi xue}

Editors: Zhang Yuliang {张玉良}

Associate Editors: Yu Shusheng {郁树胜}, Zhou Xiaopeng {周晓鹏}

Cataloging in Publication (CIP) Data

The Science of Campaigns / Zhang Yuliang, Chief Editor
Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2006.

ISBN7-5626-1407-0

I. zhan... II. zhang... III. *The Science of Campaigns* IV. E82

China Edition Library CIP Data Verification (2006) Nr. 046601

Published by National Defense University Press
(A3 Hongshankou, Haidian District, Beijing)
Postal Code: 100091 Telephone: (010) 66772856

Printed by Beijing National Defense Printing Shop
Second Edition September 2006 First Printing September 2006
880 x 1230 mm A5 Font 15.875
Word Count: 529,000 3000 Copies Printed
Price: RMB40.00 Yuan (Paperback), 50.00 (Hardcover)
ISBN7-5626-1407-0

Editing Committee of the Science of Campaigns

Honorary Chief Editors: Wang Houqing, Zhang Xingye

Chief Editor: Zhang Yuliang

Associate Editor: Yu Shusheng, Zhou Xiaopeng

Writers (According to the number of strokes in the surname)

Yu Liming	Yu Guohua	Ma Xiushan	Wang Yiping
Wang Renzong	Wang Jun	Wang Jiyu	Wang Xuejin
Wang Houqing	Liu Xiaoli	Liu Shubin	Liu Shengru
Sun Jingwei	Li Tangjie	Li Jinglong	Lu Jianfei
Yang Yueqiang	Yang Gongkun	Yang Guochuan	Zhang Yuliang
Zhang Xingye	Zhang Zhanli	Yu Shusheng	Fan Chengbin
Zhou Guiliang	Zhou Xiaopeng	Zhou Xinsheng	Jia Junming
Yuan Jingwei	Tao Qian	Xu Jingnian	Zhan Xuexi
Tang Xuqi	Huang Bin	Cao Xiumin	Peng Xiwen
Dong Lianshan	Xiong Jiben		

Preface

The science of PLA campaigns has a long standing historical source. The older generation of military experts such as Mao Zedong combined Marxism with the practice of China's Revolutionary War and creatively established campaign theory with PLA characteristics on the basis of carrying forward Chinese traditional military thought. This theory underwent the baptism of the flames of war such as the Agrarian Revolution War, the War of Resistance against Japan, the Liberation War, and the War to Resist U. S. Aggression and Aid Korea and developed continuously during confrontation with powerful enemies. From the guerilla warfare and mobile warfare {yundongzhang} theories in the era of *millet and rifles*, it developed into the campaign theories of the mechanization and semi-mechanization eras, and now, it is making leap forward-mode development towards the campaign theory of the informationized era.

At present, a military transformation initiated by information technology is swiftly unfolding. With the aid of this military transformation, advancing informationized armed forces building and developing operational theory under informationized conditions are the core topics of armed forces building and military struggle preparation in each major country. Campaign operational theory is still the core of operational theory under informationized conditions. Even though the development of medium-long range precision strike weapons have entrusted even more important significance on tactical activities and allowed the course and outcome of campaign operations to have important supporting roles, it has even generated a specific effect on the overall war situation. However, because of limitations in combat scale, there are limitations in its ability to accomplish missions, so in a military struggle guarding national major strategic interests, a campaign is still the main activity pattern. It directly is in the service of military strategy and accomplishes the missions entrusted by military strategy through operational victory; it also unifies the overall planning and guidance for various battles and achieves the strategic goal[s] through correct application of great deal of tactical activities. Therefore, developing PLA campaign theory under informationized conditions and supporting the military strategic concept of the new era with advanced campaign theory has become the important work item in putting into effect Chairman Hu Jintao's thought on advancing military transformation with Chinese characteristics and making military struggle preparations practicable.

In order to develop our military campaign theory under informationized conditions, we should be guided by Chairman Hu Jintao's important instructions on armed forces building and be towed by current and real military struggle needs. [We should] have innovating campaign theory with PLA characteristics as the main mission and study with key points the main issues such as new campaign form-states, campaign patterns, campaign fighting methods, campaign guidance and command, coordination, and support. [We should] bring to light the objective laws and subjective guidance laws of a campaign under informationized conditions, tow reforms in areas such as the weapons and equipment development, the organizational structure *tizhi*-system, and military training with advanced campaign theory; and make a contribution for ensuring national military security.

Table of Contents

Introduction...1	1
Part I: Campaigns...17	19
Chapter 1 Overview...17	19
Section 1: Definition, Characteristics, and Classification of Campaigns...17.....	19
Section 2: Objective Essential Elements {keguan yaosu} of Campaigns...23.....	25
Chapter 2 The Creation and Development of Campaigns...63	69
Section 1: The Emergence and Development of Campaigns...63	69
Section 2: The Generation and Development of the PLA Campaign...69	75
Section 3: The Developmental Trend of Campaigns...72.....	78
Chapter 3 Campaign Guidance Thought and Basic Principles...80	87
Section 1: Campaign Guidance Thought...80.....	87
Section 2: Basic Principles of a Campaign...93.....	101
Chapter 4 Campaign Preparation and Implementation...102	113
Section 1: Campaign Preparations...102.....	113
Section 2: Campaign Implementation...112	125
Chapter 5 Campaign Command and Coordination...122	137
Section 1: Campaign Command...122.....	137
Section 2: Campaign Coordination...139	156
Chapter 6 Important Campaign Activities...155	175

Section 1: Campaign Information Warfare...155	175
Section 2: Campaign Firepower Assault...167	187
Section 3: Campaign Maneuver...180.....	200
Section 4: Campaign Special Operations...196	217
Section 5: Campaign Psychological Warfare...203	224
Chapter 7 Campaign Operational Support...212.....	235
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...212	235
Section 2: Contents and Methods...217	241
Chapter 8 Campaign Logistical Support...232.....	259
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...232	259
Section 2: Contents and Methods...239	267
Chapter 9 Campaign Equipment Support...250	281
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...250	281
Section 2: Contents and Methods...256	287
Chapter 10 Campaign Political Work...261	295
Section 1: Missions and Contents...262.....	295
Section 2: Organization and Implementation...266	301
Part II: Joint Campaigns...271.....	307
Chapter 11 Overview...271	307
Section 1: Definition, Categories, and Features of a Joint Campaign...271.....	307
Section 2: Joint Campaign Command...281	316
Section 3: Joint Campaign Coordination...285.....	321

Chapter 12 The Joint Blockade Campaign ...292	329
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...292	329
Section 2: Main Activities...297	335
Chapter 13 The Landing Campaign...310	351
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...310	351
Section 2: Main Activities...316	357
Chapter 14 The Anti Air Raid Campaign...331	375
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...331	375
Section 2: Main Activities...339	382
Part III: Army Campaigns...351	395
Chapter 15 Overview...351	395
Section 1: Definition, Status, and Classification of Army Campaigns...352	395
Section 2: Origin and Development of Army Campaigns...357	401
Section 3: Characteristics and Principles of Army Campaigns...366.....	410
Section 4: Army Campaign Preparation and Implementation...374.....	419
Chapter 16 The Maneuver Warfare Campaign...391	439
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...391	439
Section 2: Main Activities...396	444
Chapter 17 The Mountain Offensive Campaign...404	453
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...404	453
Section 2: Main Activities...410	459
Chapter 18 The Positional Offensive Campaign...426	481

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...426	481
Section 2: Main Activities...431	487
Chapter 19 The Positional Defensive Campaign...442	501
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...442	501
Section 2: Main Activities...450	510
Chapter 20 Anti-terrorism Maintaining-stability Operations...460	523
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...460	523
Section 2: Main Activities...468	531
Part IV: Naval Campaigns...500	567
Chapter 21 Overview...500	567
Section 1: Definition of a Naval Campaign, Classification of Naval Campaigns...500.....	567
Section 2: Birth and Development of the Naval Campaign...502	569
Section 3: Naval Campaign Characteristics and Principles...505	571
Section 4: Naval Campaign Preparations and Execution...511	579
Chapter 22 The Sea Force-Group Campaign to Eliminate the Enemy...523	593
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...523	593
Section 2: Main Activities...525	596
Chapter 23 The Sea-Line Interdiction Campaign...528	599
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...528	599
Section 2: Main Activities...532	603
Chapter 24 The Offensive Campaign against Coral Island Reefs...535	607
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...535	607

Section 2: Main Activities...537	610
Chapter 25 The Sea-line Guarding Campaign...539	613
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...539	613
Section 2: Main Activities...544	618
Chapter 26 The Naval Base Defense Campaign...547	623
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...548	623
Section 2: Main Activities...552	628
Part V: Air Force Campaigns...557	633
Chapter 27 Overview...557	633
Section 1: Definition and Classifications of the Air Force Campaign...557	633
Section 2: The Main Characteristics and Principles of the Air Force Campaign...559	635
Section 3: Air Force Campaign Command and Coordination...564.....	641
Section 4: Air Force Campaign Preparation and Implementation...568	646
Chapter 28 The Air Offensive Campaign...575.....	655
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...575	655
Section 2: Main Activities...579	659
Chapter 29 The Airborne Campaign...589.....	671
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...589	671
Section 2: Main Activities...594	676
Chapter 30 The Air Defense Campaign...602	685
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...602	685
Section 2: Main Activities...608	692

Part VI: Campaigns of the Second Artillery...616.....	701
Chapter 31 Overview...616.....	701
Section 1: Second Artillery Campaigns, Defined and Classified...616.....	701
Section 2: Characteristics and Principles of a Second Artillery Campaign...618..	704
Section 3: The Preparation for and Implementation of a Second Artillery Campaign...624	710
Chapter 32 The Second Artillery Conventional Missile Assault Campaign...629 .	719
Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...629	719
Section 2: Main Operational Activities...632	723
Postscript...637.....	729

Introduction...1

Campaign science is a discipline that studies campaign laws and guides campaign practice. It is an important component of military science. In order to provide a systematic, comprehensive and scientific theoretical basis for seizing future campaign victories, its tasks are to apply scientific methods, reveal campaign laws, and forecast campaign developments.

I. Objects, Contents and Methodology Studied in the Science of Campaigns...1

(1) Objects studied in the science of campaigns

The study object of campaign science is the campaign. The origination, development and pattern of movement of campaigns are inevitably tied with human civilization progress and development. To study campaigns, one must at the same time study the impact of various social factors on the development of campaigns; one must also study the basic laws regarding the origination and development of campaigns on the basis of inter-connection among the battle history, current state of affairs of as well as future development in campaigns.

Campaigns in the course of their developments have taken on different patterns. As a result of different conditional constraints and limits due to different historical phases of development, various patterns of campaigns have their own special laws. Therefore, the objects of the study of campaigns are not only focused on the general campaign and the universal laws governing the general campaign, but the objects also include the study of various different patterns of campaigns and the special laws of different campaigns. Furthermore, the objects of study are also targeted at how to correctly use such laws to resolve such issues as military planning, organization and implementation in future concrete campaign operations.

Campaign science of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the crystallization of the PLA's experience and theories gained through long-term armed struggles under the guidance of Mao Zedong's military thought. This is combined with the beneficial experience drawn from armed struggles in the past and present and both at home and abroad. It studies not only the laws governing campaigns in wars in general and in Chinese revolutionary wars, but also campaign theories in people's wars under modern conditions. Its long-term task is to study the thoughts, principles and fighting methods in defeating a superiorly equipped enemy by using inferior arms. At present time, PLA's campaign science is focused on exploring and developing theories aimed at winning campaigns waged with modern technology, particularly in local wars under high-tech conditions. This focus is premised on the real and potential threats of war that our country could face, and is based on inheriting past experience and traditions.

(2) Contents studied in the science of campaigns

1. The nature of campaigns

The nature of campaigns refers to the inherent attributes associated with campaigns that are different from those of wars and battles. It is the logical point of departure in the study of campaign science. Only by exploring in depth the nature of campaigns can one accurately steer the study of campaign science in the right direction, clearly understand its categorical difference from the science of strategy and tactics, and thus lay down the foundation for in-depth study of campaign science.

2. The characteristics of campaigns

Only by studying in-depth the characteristics of campaigns, particularly those of past eras, can one master the objective laws of campaigns and develop effective fighting methods that are appropriate for future campaigns.

3. The principles of campaigns

Campaign principles are a reflection and summary of the laws of campaigns as viewed from different angles. They are the activity standards of campaign operations. In the study of campaign principles, one should pay major attention to past campaign experience, so as to establish, in light of new changes and development in campaigns under modern conditions.

4. Campaign fighting methods

Campaign fighting methods operations are at the heart of the study of campaign science. Different types and patterns of campaigns undertaken by different services and arms under different conditions have different campaign fighting methods. Therefore, the study of campaign fighting methods should be focused on dealing with different campaign types and patterns, different operational objects, and under different environmental conditions. While inheriting traditional fighting methods, one must also attach great importance to developing new fighting methods and especially strengthening the exploration of campaign operations under modern technological conditions, in particular under high-tech conditions.

5. Campaign command

Campaign command is a major factor in deciding the outcome of a campaign. Campaign command must conform to the objective realities of campaigns. Therefore, in studying campaign command, one must study the general laws of campaign command. Even more importantly, one must attach greater importance to the study of special laws of concrete

campaign command and new problems one encounters during specific periods and under specific conditions.

6. Campaign coordination

Campaign coordination refers to the coordination and cooperation between various strengths participating in campaign operations in terms of mission, strength, space, timing and activities, and centered on a unified intention and based on unified planning. Different services and arms conducting different types and patterns of campaigns under different environmental conditions have different modes and methods of coordination. To study effective campaign coordination is to ensure the full employment of the total campaign force to carry out concerted operations against the enemy.

7. Campaign strength

Campaign strength is a general term that encompasses all the armed forces participating in campaign operations. Campaign strength is the material condition of and a prerequisite for the execution of campaigns. Its formation depends not only on the operational capabilities of various strength elements of a campaign, but it also depends on the organizational system of the campaign strength and the mode of composition. Therefore, campaign science not only studies the organizational structure of general campaign large formations, but also studies the formation, task organization, and application of campaign strengths in carrying out a specific campaign in order to form an integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli} to seize victory in a campaign.

8. Campaign support

Campaign support is an important guarantee that ensures the smooth execution of campaign operations. It includes campaign operation support, campaign logistical and technical support, as well as campaign political work etc. The importance and the role of campaign support have been markedly enhanced in modern campaigns. The study of the contents, characteristics and organization in execution etc. of campaign support under different conditions, and the search for effective campaign support measures have become important contents in the study of campaign science.

9. Campaign battlefield

The campaign battlefield is the place of engagement between opposing sides. As in the case of campaign strength, it is an important objective condition for the execution of campaigns. Under modern conditions, the campaign battlefield is a three-dimensional and multi-dimensioned spatial notion constituted from a multitude of factors. The study of campaign science focuses on the content and requisites in battlefield selection and preparation, particularly on the impact of the modern campaign battlefield environment on campaign operations.

10. Campaign operational objects

The study of campaign operational objects should be carried out according to national military strategy and campaign missions. Study should be conducted not only of immediate threats and main objects, but also of potential threats and potential objects. First, starting with their operational thoughts, organization, equipment, operational characteristics and possible activities, analyze their existing strong points and weaknesses. Then, seek out methods to use one's own pluses and avoid [one's own] shortcomings and defeat the enemy.

11. Campaign history

Studying the origin and development of campaigns not only would allow one to draw on experience and lessons of the past, but would also allow one to more accurately predict trends in future development in campaigns.

12. Campaign development trends

As a campaign evolves, its study also should look forward to future campaign development and conduct appropriate advance research and study on the basis of historical experience and current realities. Only by being able to scientifically forecast trends in campaign development can one master the laws of campaign development, and ensure that studies over different aspects of campaigns follow the right direction and that campaign theories are in the lead.

(3) Methodology for the study of campaign science

The methodology of the People's Liberation Army for studying campaign science is based on the methodology of dialectical materialism and historical materialism. Armed with military dialectics as the thought weapons, it studies the past, present and future in campaigns. From different angles and perspectives, a multitude of methods can be summarized in the study of campaign science. The most common methods of study are as follows:

1. Studying the relationship between campaigns and strategy and tactics

Strategy governs and guides a campaign. A campaign is subordinate to and at the service of strategy. The study of campaign science can only develop in the correct direction when it is conducted from the point of view taken at the commanding height of the overall strategic situation. A campaign is often made up of several battles, and its outcome is decided by the result of a series of battles. Hence, in this sense, the study of campaign science can not be conducted in divorce from studying tactics.

2. Studying development in science and technologies and weaponry

Weaponry and equipment are the materiel basis for campaign theories and practices. The rapid development in science and technology and their wide application in the military field have historically always been the fundamental impetus driving weapon and equipment modernization and changes in campaign operations. Thus to objectively analyze the impact of developments in science and technology and weapon systems on campaign operations and to explore campaign theories that are suited to the needs of future campaign operations are a basic consideration in the study of campaign science. Only by timely keeping abreast of the current conditions and future trends in the development of science and technology and weapon systems can one correctly discover the laws of campaigns, promote the development of campaign theories and practices, and deepen the study of campaign science.

3. Studying the development and changes in operational objects

A campaign is the operational activities of opposing sides. The origination and development of campaign science are also premised on the study of operational objects. The deeper and more thorough the study of operational objects is conducted, the more focused and more in keeping with objective realities campaign theories will be. Therefore, in studying campaign science, one must always keep abreast of the developments and changes in operational objects so as to sharpen the focus of the study.

4. Adopting the method of integrating quality and quantity

The science of campaigns is a highly practical discipline that embodies many social and natural sciences. It includes factors that can not be quantified (such as morale), but it also contains a great amount of quantifiable factors that can be calculated with digital precision. Hence the study of campaign science must adopt methods that integrate qualitative and quantitative analyses in order to make the study more scientific and more precise. It is particularly true when modern science and technology have provided an effective instrument for quantitative analyses in ever greater degree and precision. They have helped to increase the weight of quantitative analysis in the study of campaign science, making it one of the important methods used in such study. At the same time, this method of utilizing experiential data and the equipment and organizational structure of both sides to establish mathematical models and conduct calculations and analysis can test the practicality of PLA campaign theory from one side and strengthen the scientific quality PLA campaign theory.

5. Studying by adopting simulation methods

Advances in modern technologies, especially in computer technologies and the internet, have opened up new fields for the study of campaign science. The practice of campaigns, once impossible to duplicate, now can be repeatedly practiced under close-to-live battle conditions in “battle labs.” The use of advanced virtual technology shifts the pre-

determined operational space battlefield into the computer network space, where, based on the organized structure, equipment and operational thought of the operational object, one establishes a virtual simulation battlefield and conducts the method of war gaming. Not only does this save on cost, but it is also easier to organize, closer to reality, and has a stronger quality of confrontations. One can quickly discover existing problems, test the feasibility of campaign theories, and continuously enrich and enhance the study of campaign theories.

6. Assimilating advanced scientific achievements and methods

The science of campaigns has broad ties with military science and other disciplines and theories. Almost all of the different disciplines in military science, and all the most advanced scientific achievements and methods in other social and natural studies, can be applied in the study of campaign theories. Hence only by widely assimilating and applying these advanced scientific achievements and methods and by constantly opening up campaign science both in depth and scope can its study become more dynamic.

7. Studying the connection between history, present and future development

Campaigns are evolutionary, and the history, the present conditions and the future of campaigns are inevitable developments in campaigns. Hence, the study of campaign science must draw on lessons from history, and base itself on present realities while looking to the future. To draw lessons from history is to study the history of campaigns both in history and during the contemporary period, both in China and abroad, and to draw on useful experience of predecessors in exploring laws of development governing campaigns. To be based on present realities is to face squarely the real threats that our country presently faces, and the current conditions of our armed forces in order to make the study of campaign science conform to objective realities. To look to the future is to attach great importance to the study of future campaigns so as to be able to predict possible directions of development in campaigns and to ensure the science of campaigns stays in the lead and well in advance.

8. Drawing on useful experiences and of foreign militaries

Campaign science is an open discipline. Campaign science in the armed forces of various countries not only has its own special characteristics, but it also shares some commonalities. To draw on foreign military campaign theories and fruits of their practices, especially on the advanced campaign theories and practices by the armed forces of countries equipped with advanced science and technologies and superior weapon systems, would help keep us abreast of the new developments in foreign military campaign theories and practices and learn from them useful experience and practices. This endeavor is not only an important method in the study of campaign science but also an effective way to enrich and develop ourselves.

II. Origination and Development of the Science of Campaigns ...6

Campaign science becoming a discipline of scientific study is a historical phenomenon. Its origination and development are part of a historical development. Since the appearance of campaigns, people have begun to gain knowledge of campaign laws and laws of campaign guidance. With development in campaign practices, people's knowledge of campaigns constantly deepened. Such knowledge gradually became more systematic, thus giving rising to the science of campaigns, which continues to be developed in practice.

(1) Origination and development of campaign theory

In China, campaign theory came into being relatively early. During the Spring and Autumn period, wars were constantly fought; armies were greatly expanded, and operational scales continuously expanded. A number of books on the art of war that summed up contemporary and past war experiences were written to meet the need for operational guidance. During this period, for instance, there were the world-renowned *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu and other books on the art of war that had a rich content of military theories for the officer corps such as *The Rules of Sima*. These books revealed the many guidance laws used in campaigns, thus providing theories of a guidance nature for operations by large military formations. Overseas, around the 4th century B.C., some operational theoretical books based on war practices also appeared. One of them was Xenophon's *The Anabasis* in ancient Greece. Military writings during this era could not be called pure campaign theoretical works, although it is beyond any doubt that they contained substantial contents that would serve as guides to campaign operations.

Before the 12th century A.D., operational theories of the "cold weaponry" era did not distinguish strategy from campaign and tactics. There was no special campaign theory either. However some theoretical contents relating to campaigns appeared in military-related works. In China, in addition to Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and *The Rules of Sima* mentioned above, such works as *Wu Zi*, Sun Bin's *The Art of War*, *Wei Liao Zi*, *Six Strategies*, and *The Questions and Answers between Emperor Tai Zong of the Tang Dynasty and Lord Li Wei* have put forward a series of guidance thoughts, principles and fighting methods in operations, which collectively laid the foundation for future development in campaign theories. After the 12th century A.D., with the arrival of "hot weapons," came changes in operational methods. These spurred the development of campaign theories. In China, during the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, a substantial number of military works were written. During this period, there were two distinct characteristics in the development of campaign theories. First was to explain and study ancient military theories. Second was to focus on solving concrete problems. By combining lessons of victory and defeat in actual operations, such theories sought to explore ways to solve problems. Representative works included a number of books dealing with issues of large unit operations and training such as *The Record on Guarding the City* by Chen Gui of the South Song dynasty, *The New Book of Records and Comparison* and *An Actual Record of Military Training* by Qi Jiguang of the Ming

dynasty, and *The Collection of Questions and Answers Regarding Chariots and Camps* by Sun Chengzhong. Overseas, the early 16th century *Dell'arte della Guerra* by Italy's Niccolo Machiavelli touched on theories of major battles. Studies on operational theories during this period, to some extent, laid the theoretical foundation for the emergence of campaign science.

Following the Industrial Revolution of the 18th century, the development of the production power led to increased scale and varied patterns of wars and campaigns. In the early 19th century, Napoleon separated grand tactics from tactics in general. With the accumulation of campaign operational experience and a further division of the military science disciplines, the knowledge of the science of campaigns and systematic study of campaigns had greatly improved. In the 1780s, Henry Lloyd of Britain first put forward the notion of a campaign in his *Prologue to the History of the War of 1756 between Germany Prussian King and Austrian Queen and her allies* (General Lloyd's Military and Political Memoir). In the first half of the 19th century, Carl von Clausewitz of Prussia in his *On War* took major battles as something between a war and a battle and he expounded the laws of operational guidance, thus playing an important role in the development of campaign theories. Antoine Henri Jomini of Switzerland in his *Precis of the Art of War* began to distinguish grand tactics from strategy and tactics and explained in a relatively comprehensive manner the theory of grand tactics. In the middle of the 19th century, Engels not only provided an exact definition on major battles, but also summarized and revealed the methods and laws governing major campaigns. Hence, he further resolved the issues of how to understand and study campaigns, laying down the foundation for the establishment of campaign science. At the end of the 19th century, Russian military theorists in their military works further expounded the theoretical issues of campaigns such as campaign formation {zhanyi bingtuan} task organization, campaign *bushu* disposition and campaign command. During this period, China formulated operational rules for the new infantry army and some scholars started studying campaign history. Thus the main theoretical framework of campaign science was beginning to take shape.

During the late 19th century and early 20th century, armored steam ships, tanks and airplanes were introduced. They led to big strides in the development of campaign practices and theories. The infantry preparatory colleges at the end of China's Qing dynasty and the infantry colleges in the early Republic period taught *Advanced Military Studies* and *Dictates of Supreme Command* and conducted some relevant campaign theoretical research. After the 1920s, the Soviet military strengthened its systematic research on basic campaign theories. And for the first time, it put forward the notion of campaign science and established institutions for teaching and study of campaign science. The Soviet military at the same time published relevant rules and regulations as principles governing the preparation and execution of campaigns by group armies and front armies. In 1926, the Soviet military made strategy, campaign art (science), and tactics the three basic components of military academic learning. In the 1930s, the Soviets further advanced the theory of the great depth campaign. During the Second World War, campaign science made new strides with further division within the discipline, including infantry, naval, air force, and national air defense campaign science. After the Second World War, following the establishment of the strategic missile force,

the Soviet military put forward theories on campaigns under nuclear conditions. In its infantry *Operational Compendium* published in 1982, the U.S. military also listed strategy, campaign and tactics as three levels of war operational preparation and execution and it for the first time clearly made campaign science an independent discipline of study.

In recent years, the armed forces of the U.S., Russia and other countries have undergone in a comprehensive manner a revolution in military affairs. They have advanced, particularly in the field of campaigns, a series of campaign operational theories suited to new conditions. The U.S. military in particular, on the basis of “integrated air and ground operations,” advanced the operational theory of “integration” and set up digitalized armed forces, paving the way for campaign operational theories and practices needed in the information age.

(2) Origination and development of PLA’s campaign theory

The PLA’s campaign theory has come into being and developed through campaign practices during long years of revolutionary wars following its founding by the Chinese Communist Party. The older generation of proletarian military strategists led by Mao Zedong used the basic principles of Marxism to explore in depth campaign laws and command laws in the people’s war by drawing critically on past and present Chinese and foreign campaign theoretical knowledge. They have made outstanding contributions to the emergence and the development of the PLA’s campaign science.

During the Agrarian Revolutionary War period, the Chinese Worker-Peasant Red Army carried out some campaigns in efforts to break out of the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” drives and to open up new areas of operation. The main operational forms were guerrilla warfare {youjizhan} and guerrilla-style mobile warfare {youjixing yundongzhan}. Mao Zedong, based on a summary of operational experiences, put forward a general principle of operation for the Red Army during that time, namely “when the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy camps, we harass; when the enemy tires, we attack; and when the enemy retreats, we pursue” – also known as the sixteen-character dictum. After the third anti “encirclement and suppression” drive, the Red Army’s operational principles were basically formed. Among them, the principles involved with campaign operations include: full preparations-do not miss time opportunities; concentrate superiority of force strengths-fight by picking the weak and destroy them one by one; select desirable positions; fight an enemy in movement {yundong} or when he’s not yet consolidated his position; sudden raids-quick battle quick decision and strive for full annihilation. By the end of 1936, Mao Zedong in his work *On the Strategies of Chinese Revolutionary Wars*, summarized the experience gained during the Agrarian Revolutionary War and put forward the notion, principles and study method for campaign science; he also made clear the relationship between campaigns and wars and battles, and defined tasks for campaign science, thus laying down the foundation for the PLA’s campaign science.

During the period of the War of Resistance against Japan, tremendous changes occurred in the operational objects, missions and forms. The main form of the campaign was guerrilla warfare. The general concept of the campaign {zhanyi zongde fangzhen} was *carry out exterior-line quick decision offensive warfare during strategic interior-line protracted defensive warfare*. The theoretical manuscripts were: *The Strategic Issues of the Guerilla War to Resist Japan* {kangri youji zhanzheng de zhanlue wenti} and *On Protracted War* {lun chijiuzhan}, etc. The main experiences were: strategic interior line protracted defense, and campaign combat exterior line quick decision attack; in the face of a powerful enemy, executed the principle of preserving oneself and wiping out the enemy; combined the trinity of the main forces, local forces and militia and integration of military and civilian; mutual complementation and transitions of the three operational forms of mobile warfare {yundongzhan}, position warfare and guerrilla warfare; stressed the initiative, flexibility and planning {jihua}-quality of the campaign; created fighting methods such as raid-attack warfare {xiji zhan}, attack-destroy warfare {pojizhan}, ambush warfare {fujizhan}, tunnel warfare {didaozhan}, mine warfare {dileizhan}, and broad open-up sparrow warfare {guanfan kaizhan maquezhan} and use of a variety of means at the same time; and continuously expanded strengths and created conditions so as to develop towards normal mobile warfare {yundongzhan}. These valuable experiences not only enriched the contents of the PLA's campaign science, but also helped to lay a solid theoretical groundwork for the execution of a variety of campaigns during the War of Liberation.

The War of Liberation was a period of great development of campaign practice and theory. In terms of operational form, from the War of Resistance against Japan period with guerilla warfare in the lead, it developed into concentrating force-strengths and fighting mobile warfare {yundongzhan} in the lead. In the early days of the war, Mao Zedong penned the instruction *Concentrating Superiority of Force Strengths and Annihilating the Enemy One by One* and clearly stipulated the methods of campaign operations. Subsequently, Mao put forward *The Ten Major Military Principles*, in which he made a high-level theoretical summary on the operational concept, operational objectives, operational forms, operational methods and operational preparations, and added more systemization on the principles of campaign operations. During this period of time, the PLA's campaign theories and practices entered a period of maturity, and it became one of the most abundant and magnificent phases in PLA history in terms of operational types, operational patterns, operational experiences and command art. During this phase, the PLA explored and summarized a set of fighting ways and experiences for positional offensive campaigns including urban offensive campaigns; meanwhile we propelled the highly mobile {jidong} and big-strided advancing-retreating campaign pattern of mobile warfare {yundongzhan} towards its zenith. The experience gained in the three major campaigns – the Liao-Shen Campaign, Huai-Hai Campaign and Ping-Jin Campaign - greatly enriched and developed PLA's theories in campaign science.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China, in the Korean battlefield, the campaigns mounted by the Chinese People's Volunteer Army developed from combined arms campaigns toward combined service campaigns. The PLA accumulated rich experience in waging, under special terrain conditions, mobile warfare campaigns

{yundongzhan}, positional offensive and defensive campaigns, and campaign air defense operations against a highly modernized powerful enemy, as well as in campaign logistical and engineering support. In operations to safeguard socialist construction and in successive defending the border self-defense operations, the PLA also gained experience in tri-service joint sea-crossing landing operations and implementing campaign operations under special terrain and weather conditions against different operational objects where new contents were added to PLA campaign science. During this period, the PLA gradually established and strengthened institutions and contingents specially devoted to campaign theory research and teaching. The entire military has continuously summarized the experiences of campaign operations and widely opened-up development in campaign training. We have borrowed from foreign military experiences and conducted a large amount of campaign theory research activity. We have successively published a variety of special works on campaign science, and amongst them are: *General Principles of the Science of Campaigns*, *Anti-Landing Campaign*, *Air Defense Campaign* etc. These works have thoroughly explored the campaign laws for operations by one who is inferiorly equipped to defeat a superiorly equipped enemy under modern conditions. Various sciences of campaigns were successively established and campaign theories possessing distinctive PLA characteristics were improved. All of this indicates PLA campaign science has developed to a new phase. Since the 1970s, along with the continuous acceleration of the construction pace of revolutionization, regularization and modernization of the armed forces, relevant organizational-units across the PLA have universally conducted theoretical research suited for campaign operations under modern conditions and they have summarized many effective fighting methods and experiences. They have published a large number of special works and teaching materials in the area of campaign theory, repeatedly set off new rounds of surge in the study of campaign theory, and formed a relatively robust campaign discipline *tixi*-system. After several local wars at the turn of the century, the PLA, facing the serious challenge of dual historical missions, has made tremendous efforts on the study of campaign theory under information technology conditions and study of integrated joint operation theory. At present, these studies are still continuously deepening and will bear plentiful and substantial gains.

(3) The distinguishing features of PLA campaign science

The PLA's campaign science has originated and grown from the particular environment in which it has waged successively revolutionary wars and struggles to defend national frontiers. Thus it is a campaign science with PLA characteristics. In addition to some general characteristics of campaign science, the PLA's campaign science has the following characteristics.

1. Guided by Marxism and Mao Zedong thought

Marxism and Mao Zedong thought are the guidebook and theoretical bases for PLA campaign science studies. Their essence mainly includes: applying the tenets of materialism and dialectics, knowing and summarizing laws from campaign practice, and

applying these laws to guide campaign practice; subjective guidance must conform to objective realities; campaign principles and fighting methods are developed, and not only must one know the general laws of campaigns but one must also know the special laws of the struggle one is facing; study campaigns in a historical and a *seeking-truth-from-facts* manner, and critically draw on theories and experiences that are both ancient and current, Chinese as well as foreign; look at problems by applying developmental, interconnected and comprehensive viewpoints; weapons are important factors in war people are decisive factors; rely on realities, and flexibly apply principles; dialectically know and process the relationships such as strengths and weaknesses, attacking and guarding, advancing and retreating, etc. and correctly implement transitions at the appropriate times.

2. Based on the People's War

The people are the well from which abundant human and material resources flow. The will of the people is a fundamental condition that determines the outcome of a war. In terms of campaign guidance thought, the PLA has always attached great importance to the practice of relying on the masses, arousing the masses, and conducting people's war. In terms of campaign strength composition, carry out the triple-combination of the main forces, local forces and militia, and extensively mobilize the broad mass of the people in the theater to participate in and support the campaign. And in terms of battlefield set up, attach importance to the enemy rear battlefield and guerilla base and guerilla area construction, resulting in close operational cooperation with the front battlefield. In terms of campaign operational forms, mobile {yundong} (maneuver {jidong}) warfare, positional warfare, guerrilla warfare (special warfare) closely complement each other. In terms of fighting method application, based on different objects, environments and equipment, to continuously create various new campaign patterns, operational modes, and means.

3. A distinctive annihilation warfare thought

Based on the fundamental objective of a war – “to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy” and on the inheritance of traditional operational thought, Mao Zedong advocated the basic thought of annihilation warfare. As early as during the Agrarian Revolutionary War period, Mao Zedong put forward: “For the Red Army which draws nearly everything from the enemy, the basic concept is annihilation warfare.” During the War of Resistance against Japan, even though the PLA fought mainly guerrilla wars in the interior lines, Mao still stressed: “The correct requirement of War of Resistance against Japan should be: annihilation warfare as much as possible.” During the period of the War of Liberation, Mao Zedong in formulating the *Ten Major Military Principles* clearly stated: “The main objective is to annihilate the enemy's effective strength, [and] the main objective is not keeping or seizing cities and localities.” Under the special conditions of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, Mao Zedong put forward the operational guidance concept of “nibbling at beef jerky (fighting small annihilation warfare).” Mao Zedong later on repeatedly pointed out that in the future, when the enemy comes, we must still concentrate our force strengths to fight annihilation warfare.

Annihilation warfare thought and the principles and fighting methods with it as their core not only have become a distinctive characteristic of PLA campaign science, but also has a glorious position in the history of world campaign theory development.

4. Emphasis on the subjective initiative of man

The PLA has placed strong emphasis on the decisive role played by the man in campaign science. Its history of defeating better-armed enemies with inferior weapons has proven that among the numerous factors of campaign strengths, weapons are an important factor in a campaign and man is the decisive factor. Bringing into play the extent of awareness, level of training, spirit of courage and subjective dynamic quality, etc. of a person directly decides the bringing into play of weapons and equipment effectiveness and the implementation and execution of higher level intent. Therefore, during operations, completely stress to fully bring a commander's superb command art into play, fully muster the enthusiasm and active qualities of the mass of combatants, and fundamentally improve force-unit combat power.

5. Attach importance to stratagems and pay attention to fighting methods

China's thousands of years' fine tradition in the art of war put a high value on stratagems. The PLA's campaign science has inherited and carried forward this fine tradition. In the organization and directing of campaigns, the PLA stresses the importance of bringing into full play the commander's wisdom and talents; it emphasizes winning by stratagem and by ingenuity – with minimal cost for maximum results. Guided by this thought, a series of fighting methods with distinguishing features was created. Major areas include: concentrate a superiority of force-strength and wipe out the enemy one by one; attack the weaker enemy first and the stronger enemy later; strive to wipe out the enemy when he is on the move; fight in close quarters and fight at night; combine military strikes with political collapse, etc. In the area of mobile warfare {yundongzhan} campaign fighting methods: there is the retreat in order to advance, and the "lure the enemy in deep" fighting method of awaiting opportunity to break the enemy; there is the "mushroom [dilly-dally] tactic" of leading the enemy around by the nose and devouring when the plate softens; there is the we advance when the enemy advances fighting method of seeking opportunity to annihilate the enemy; there is the fighting method of advancing and retreating in large steps, dispersing and extending a concentrated enemy, and then wiping out the enemy one by one; there is the fighting method of carefully biding one's time, and carving out a slice from the enemy's dense formation and wiping it out; there is the fighting method of surrounding fortifications and fighting reinforcements, attacking fortifications and fighting reinforcements, and attacking fortifications and blocking reinforcements; there is the fighting method of ambushing, pursuing and encountering; and there is the fighting method of deep outflanking, large envelopment and severe annihilation, etc. Positional warfare and guerilla warfare also have their own distinct fighting methods.

III. The Discipline System of Campaign Science...13

The discipline system {tixi} of campaign science is a whole composed of mutually related and restricted disciplines in campaign science. It is not only the discipline structure of campaign science but also the hierarchical knowledge system of campaign science. Since every country has different features and traditions of military culture, levels of theory development maturity, military organizational systems, and military theory systems, the discipline system of campaign science also differs. The discipline of campaign science is a dynamic structure developing with campaign theory and practice.

(1) Basis and requirements of the discipline system of campaign science

The PLA campaign discipline, like any other discipline, is a dynamic system evolving from simple to complex and developing with enriched PLA campaign practice and theory. The foundations and requirements of the discipline system of our military campaign science are as follows:

1. Based on PLA realities, and adapt to the requirements of PLA development

The current state and development {fazhan} of campaign strengths play an important role in establishing the discipline system of campaign science. The PLA is a combined armed force {hecheng jundui} developed from a single service – the Army. Because the Navy, Air Force, Second Artillery were established rather later, over a long period of time, the campaign science of the PLA had always had at its core the combined campaign science {hetong zhanyixue} with the Army in the lead. Moreover, the discipline layers were also not clearly distinguished. After over 70 years of armed forces modernization construction, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery of the PLA have developed a great deal, the weapons and equipment of each service continue to improve and renew, the organizational structure *tizhi*-system have progressively improved, and a combined armed force composed of several or several tens of specialized arms has been formed with the capability of independently carrying out campaign missions. Along with the transformation of PLA strategic key points {zhanlue zhongdian} and the reinforcement of service and arms such as the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery construction, the inter-relationships between services with the Army in the lead is currently changing. In a future campaign, especially in a campaign of a high tech local war, the status and function of the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery will be greatly elevated, and a campaign with the Navy in the lead or the Air Force or Second Artillery in the lead will appear and become more and more important.

The development of service strengths and service campaigns has caused the basic form-state of a campaign to transform from the combined campaign {hetong zhanyi} of the past into the joint campaign. With its prominent characteristic of being able to fully bring into play the might of integrated operations, the joint campaign has become the main form-state armed force campaigns of the world's military powers. Speaking on just the PLA, in a future local war under informationized conditions, the potential campaigns we

may face will appear in the form-state of a joint campaign such as a landing campaign, a border counterattack campaign, an anti-air raid campaign, etc. Reinforcing the study of the joint campaigns is a key point of current PLA campaign science studies. The establishment of the discipline *tixi*-system of campaign science also must adapt to important changes to PLA future campaign form-states so as to establish a solid theoretical basis for the PLA to strive for victory in future campaign operations.

2. Based on the study conditions of PLA campaign practice and theory, and conform to the requirements of campaign practice and theory development

Campaign science is a discipline that contains two research objects, campaign practice and campaign theory. The development of campaign practice inevitably brings about the development of campaign theory. Without mature campaign practice and theory, it is impossible to form a complete discipline system of campaign science. Therefore, the establishment of the discipline system of campaign science must conform to the current situation of campaign science study and meet the requirements of campaign theory development. In wartime, our military accumulated rich experience in Army campaigns and formed the science of combined army campaigns including rich Army campaign theory. Through campaign training and partial operational practice in peacetime and the experience drawn from foreign operations, our military has developed service and arm campaign theory by leaps and bounds, formed more improved service campaign theory, established the science of service campaigns, and formed our first complete discipline system of campaign science since our country has been founded. This discipline system is based on combined Army campaigns. With the development of weapons and equipment and further enhancement of the status of services, joint campaigns have become the research focal point of worldwide campaign practice and theory. To study joint campaign theory has become a development trend of the science of campaigns. At present, our military is gradually forming joint campaign theory. To build the discipline system of campaign science, our military should focus on the development of campaign theory and form the discipline system of campaign science with joint campaign theory as the core.

Campaign science is a very practical discipline. To study campaign science, we must focus on the practice and development of particular campaigns and reinforce the study of joint campaign science and service campaign science. In the meantime, campaigns, as a developing historical phenomenon, have emerged from wars and battles. As a result, campaigns have the particular development laws distinguishing from their intension and extension and essential features of other things. To study, summarize, and abstract the essence, features, and general laws of campaigns is one of the basic missions of campaign science and the basis of the existence and development of campaign science. Studying the essential features and general laws of campaigns and exploring general campaign guidance laws can not only grasp campaigns and the development of general laws but also have an important meaning for guiding our military campaign practice and theory. Therefore, the science of campaigns needs to study practice and theory of particular joint campaigns and service campaigns, and general characteristics and development trend of campaigns.

3. Based on the relevant stipulations of the State Council Academic Degree Committee

Forming complete campaign theory and the science of campaigns does not indicate that the legal status of the discipline system is established. The establishment of a science and the division of the discipline system can only be effective by the approval of related national departments. The establishment of the discipline system of campaign science must be based on the relevant stipulations of the PRC State Council Academic Degree Committee and approved by the State Council Academic Degree Committee. In 1984, the State Council Academy Degree Committee included military science as one of the disciplines in our country for the first time. In 1985, it approved nine disciplines and specialties with Ph.D. and bachelor degrees awarded in military science and for the first time determined that the Campaign Science discipline *tixi*-system is constituted by the first order discipline – the Science of Campaigns and the five second-order disciplines and specialties of the Science of Combined Campaigns, the Science of Naval Campaigns, the Science of Air Force Campaigns, the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns and the Science of Logistic Campaigns. In 1997, when the State Council Academic Degree Committee and the National Education Committee revised the Graduate Student Discipline and Specialty Catalogue, they adjusted the Campaign Science Discipline *tixi*-System and determined a new Campaign Science *tixi*-System with the Science of Campaigns as a first order discipline and the Science of Joint Campaigns and the Science of Service Campaigns as second order disciplines.

(2) The structure of the Science of Campaigns *tixi*-System and its content

The science of campaigns is a first order discipline. It mainly studies the universal qualities, essence, and laws of campaigns as well as the essence and laws of the special campaigns such as the joint campaigns, Army campaigns, Navy campaigns, Air Force campaigns, Second Artillery campaigns, etc.

The Campaign General Introduction is the discipline that studies campaigns and their guidance laws. It mainly explores the basic laws of campaigns and the universal quality tenets of the campaign discipline. The main content includes: campaign definition, features, and classifications; campaign formation and development; PLA campaign generation and development; campaign objective factors such as campaign strengths, campaign battlefield, and campaign time; the characteristics, guidance thoughts, and basic principles of campaigns; campaign preparation and implementation; campaign command and coordination; important operational activities; campaign operational support; campaign logistics and equipment support; and campaign political work. The campaign general introduction is the highest level of campaign theory and it plays a leading and guidance role in the Science of Joint Campaigns and the Science of Service Campaigns from the overall situation.

The Science of Joint Campaigns is the discipline that studies joint campaigns and their guidance laws. The main study content has: the essence, characteristics, and laws of joint

campaigns, the connection and influence between the Science of Joint Campaigns and related disciplines, and the methods for organizing and implementing joint campaigns, etc. Under modern conditions, it pays attention to studying and discussing the characteristics, guidance thought and principles of joint campaigns under modern technology, especially high technology conditions, the establishment of the joint campaign strength structure and the command and operational *tixi*-systems, as well as campaign patterns, campaign fighting methods, etc.

The Science of *Respective Service Campaigns* studies the campaign laws of the respective service or with the respective service in the lead. It is also a discipline that is used to guide the practice of that campaign. At the same time, it also studies theoretical problems of the activities of the respective service while jointly implementing a campaign with other services, and this includes the Science of Army Campaigns, the Science of Naval Campaigns, the Science of Air Force campaigns, and the Science of Second Artillery campaigns.

The Science of *Respective Service Campaigns* emphasizes the study of: the characteristics and laws of respective service campaigns; the task organization and missions of the respective service campaign large formations; and the principles and methods for preparing and implementing the various campaigns of the respective services, and these include: preparing and implementing a campaign of the respective service or with that service in the lead, and the activities of that service in a campaign jointly implemented with other services.

This page intentionally left blank.

Part I: Campaigns...17

Chapter 1 Overview...17

Section 1: Definition, Characteristics, and Classification of Campaigns...17

Clarification of the definition of a campaign and a thorough grasp of its essential characteristics and taxonomic techniques are a basis and prerequisite for studies on the science of campaigns, and are also the primary mission of such studies.

I. Definition of a Campaign...17

A campaign is the operational activities composed of a series of battles conducted under a unified command by a large formation to achieve partial [localized] goals {jubu mudi} or overall situation quality goals {quanjuxing mudi} of a war.

The armed forces of different nations and different historical periods have had differing formulations of a campaign's definition, but as for the essential elements {yaosu} comprising a campaign, the above understanding is basically consistent. These essential elements are mainly embodied in four aspects: strengths {liliang}, goals {mudi}, command, and composition. In terms of strengths, this mainly refers to a campaign large formation, but under specific conditions it also refers to an operational strength equivalent to a campaign large formation which is able to carry out campaign missions. In terms of goals, a campaign generally generates a specified effect on the overall war situation {zhanzheng quanju} and is able to achieve partial goals in a war while certain large-scale strategic-quality campaigns, especially certain campaigns in a localized war {jubu zhanzheng}, can achieve overall situation quality goals of a war. In terms of command, this not only includes higher level unified command but also the command of

War, campaign, and battle [combat] are the three different layers of armed struggle, and among them exists an interdependent, interactive dialectical relationship. War is the highest form of armed struggle, and occupies the highest layer; it is normally comprised of a number of campaigns, and directly decides the nature, goals, missions, scale, and activities of a campaign; it is the overall situation of a campaign. Battle [combat] is the main body constituting a campaign and it is also the basic means for achieving campaign goals. Campaign is not only one part of war, it is simultaneously also the main means for achieving war goals; it directly conforms to and is under the control of the overall the campaign large formation on its own operations. In terms of composition, battles are the main body constituting a campaign, but at the same time, it also includes operational activities such as relevant maneuvers {jidong} and assaults {tuji}. situation of war, and also to a different extent, it reacts to the overall war situation; a campaign is the overall situation of all battles, not only does it stipulate the missions of combat, it puts forth the requirements for completing missions, to a certain extent determining the nature, goals,

missions, and activities of combat, it also directly exercises an influence on whether a battle is won or lost. Campaign is situated between war and battle and is an important link that plays a connecting role between the two. Victory or defeat in a single campaign – especially victory or defeat in a campaign with decisive significance – can generate a major effect on the overall war situation, and even affecting the course and outcome of the war. Hence, in the overall war situation, a campaign, as compared with combat, has a more important position and role. Under the conditions of a high tech local war, a certain trend towards uniformity appears between war, campaign, and combat, but there remain important distinctions in their essence and attributes.

II. Features of a Campaign...18

Campaign features refer to the special attributes of the campaign itself. Compared to combat, there are mainly the following features:

(1) The participating strengths {canzhan lilian} are numerous

Participating strengths refer to the force-strengths {bingli}, weaponry, materiel, and equipment participating in campaign operations. In terms of the participating force-strengths only, in general situations, a single campaign often can involve tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands, and even up to a million or more people. In terms of participating strength composition, a campaign is also much more complex than combat. In particular, a campaign under modern conditions normally is joint operations of all services and arms, and the weapons and equipment used in a campaign are not only large in quantity, but many in types and mixed in models. Under modern local war conditions, due to limitations of war goals, some campaigns have appeared below large formation scale, so campaign strengths have decreased in terms of quantity, but compared to combat, it has not yet changed the feature of numerous participating strengths.

(2) The battlefield space is expansive

The campaign battlefield is an idea of three-dimensional space. The expansive quality of this battlefield space is determined by many campaign participating strengths, large activity scales, as well as enhanced armed force maneuver capability, amplified weapons and equipment operational ranges and lethality, and growth of operational means and modes. For example, the three great campaigns – Liaoxi-Shenyang, Huaihai, and Beiping-Tianjin – conducted by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) during the War of Liberation involved almost all regions of the Northeast, Eastern China, and Central Plains, as well as North China. During the Gulf War, the U.S.-led Coalition Forces, in their large-scale air strikes against Iraq and in the follow-on ground offensive, fully embodied the distinct three-dimensionality of the campaign battlefield. With the rapid development of modern military technology and unprecedented increases in the operational capabilities of the services, the modern campaign warfare space is much more expansive, far exceeding the traditional battlefield bounds; it has assumed a multi-dimensional, integrated {yitihua} development trend.

(3) The duration is relatively long

The duration of campaign operations is generally longer than that of a battle, and can range anywhere from a few days to as much as a dozen days, several dozen days, and even 100 days. The reason for this is mainly that during a single campaign, it is normally necessary to simultaneously or successively launch several battles, and a campaign's duration is the sum of the individual battle durations and inter-battle periods; it is thus clearly and easily seen that a campaign's duration is longer than a battle's duration. For example, the Liaoxi-Shenyang, Huaihai, and Beiping-Tianjin campaigns of the Chinese PLA during the War of Liberation lasted 52, 65, and 64 days, respectively. During World War II, the Soviet Army's Leningrad Campaign had a history that reached 3 years and 1 month. Modern campaigns, though evincing a trend toward gradually shorter courses and significantly faster tempos – such as the 43-day duration of the Gulf War, with the ground offensive occupying only 100 hours – nevertheless in overall terms retain unchanged the feature of having a relatively long duration, compared to individual battles.

(4) Maneuver activities are extensive

Maneuver {jidong} serves as the main means for an armed force to seize initiative, create favorable posture against the enemy, capture combat opportunity and achieve activity suddenness, and it has always occupied a decisive role position amongst military activities. The PLA has abundant experience and a glorious tradition of excellence in maneuvers, such as the Long March's Crossing the Chishui River Four Times {Si du Chishui} Campaign, the War of Liberation period's Northern Shaanxi "Three Battles, Three Victories" {Sanzhan, Sanjie}, and the East China battlefield's Laiwu Campaign – all of these are models of maneuver operations. Compared to a battle, a campaign has more maneuver instruments {jidong gongju} and a broader field of activities, more frequent maneuvers, more flexible and diversified modes and means of maneuvers, and more stringent requirements on maneuvers. In a modern campaign, the status of maneuver has become more prominent, and it is only through extensive maneuvers can one seize and create favorable postures, produce and catch the favorable combat opportunities, alter and cast off unfavorable positions, and seize and maintain battlefield initiative.

(5) The operational patterns {zuozhan yangshi} are diverse

Due to the several services participating in a campaign, the scale of an operation's goals, and the breadth of the space and fields involved, a campaign's feature of diversity in operational patterns is more pronounced than in combat. For example, in the Liao-Shen Campaign during the War of Liberation, the PLA successively or simultaneously conducted the Jinzhou fortification-storming warfare {gongjian zhan} (urban attack), the Tashan and Heishan blocking attack warfare {zuji zhan} (positional defense), the Liaoxi decisive battle warfare {huizhan} (mobile warfare {yundongzhan}), and the operations to liberate Shenyang and Changchun. Another example is in the British-Argentinean

Falkland Islands War, there were air raids and counter-air raids; blockades and counter-blockades; landing and anti-landing operations, there were air force air warfare with anti-sea and anti-ground attack operations, there were naval at-sea air defense, surface operations and antisubmarine operations, and there were army ground attack and defense operations. It is clear that one campaign, in terms of categories of operations, generally has both offensive and defensive, with purely offensive and purely defensive operations rarely seen; in terms of operational forms {xingshi} and patterns {yangshi}, one often integrates operations such as maneuver warfare, positional warfare, guerrilla warfare, as well as airborne and anti-airborne operations, and air raid and counter air raid, etc. into one; and in terms of operational space and domains, there can be ground, sea, and air operations, and frontal, flanking, enemy rear and depth operations. In addition, there are also electronic warfare and firepower warfare as well as psychological warfare and intelligence warfare, etc. In particular, in the all-services and arms joint campaigns under high-tech conditions, the feature of diversity in operational patterns is even more pronounced.

(6) The degree of independence is significant

The space of campaign activities is normally in one region {quyu} or one direction of a war, and this region or direction generally is a relatively independent operational area {zuozhanqu}. This kind of theater {zhanqu} is not only purely an idea of military region, but also an physical entity of integrating military, political, and economic into one, and it has the responsibility for independently accomplishing given local-quality missions of war. For example, during the War of Liberation, the Chinese PLA operated in five major, relatively independent theaters: the Northwest, Central Plains, East China, the Northeast, and North China. This independence is reflected even more clearly in campaigns waged under modern conditions – and especially in localized-war campaigns. So, for example, the several border wars of self-defense counterattacks {ziwei fanji zuozhan} waged by the Chinese PLA since the founding of the PRC have all exhibited significant independence.

(7) The connection with a war's overall situation is close

This characteristic is determined by the nature and interrelationship of a war, campaigns, and battles. What is required in a campaign is achieving a war's partial or localized goals and even goals bearing an overall quality {quanjuxing}, but a single battle generally cannot realize the overall goals of a war. A campaign is assigned missions based on a war's overall situation, and is waged for a strategic or even higher-level intent, while a battle is normally fought for a campaign intent. Hence, a campaign has a more direct and closer relationship to a war's overall situation than a battle. This relationship is particularly close in certain major or important campaigns, as well as in the campaigns of localized wars. In localized wars waged under informationized conditions, this characteristic of a close relationship between a campaign and a war's overall situation becomes even more pronounced.

III. Classification of Campaigns ...21

Campaigns are classified based on differentiation in type {leixing} and pattern {yangshi} made for campaigns under different conditions. The campaign type is the basic classification of campaigns; the campaign pattern is a further differentiation of the campaign type. The goals of classification are to reveal the campaign's inherent nature and its regular patterns from different angles and at different layers, to facilitate formulation of subjective guidance and objective theoretical guidance and countermeasures conforming to reality, and to dynamically wrest victory in all types of campaigns.

(1) Based on the nature of combat, campaigns are divided into offensive and defensive

An offensive campaign {jin'gong zhanyi} is a campaign with the main goals of annihilating the enemy and seizing-occupying a specified space; a defensive campaign is a campaign with the main goals of expending the enemy and guarding a specified space. These are the two major basic types of campaigns. In the general {zongti} sense of war, an offensive campaign is the main type and main means for achieving war goals, and plays a decisive role in seizing war victory. A defensive campaign acts as an important means for aiding and preparing for attack and it also has a decisive position in war. These two basic types of campaigns, the offensive and the defensive, can be further divided into offensive campaigns such as the landing campaign, maneuver warfare {jidong zhan} campaign, positional offensive campaign, urban offensive campaign, airborne campaign, anti-airborne campaign, and pursuit-attack campaign, and the defensive campaigns such as the anti-landing campaign, positional defensive campaign, urban defensive campaign, counter-siege {fanweigong} campaign, and retreat campaign. In campaign operations, pure offense or defense does not exist; there are only differences in the proportions of offense to defense and their main-secondary positions.

(2) Based on the participating services and their interrelationship, campaigns are divided into joint campaigns and service (combined) campaigns {junzhong (hetong) zhanyi}

A joint campaign is a campaign implemented by large formation of two or more services (under special situations, this can also be a campaign large formation task-organized of a number of tactical formations {bingtuan} from at two or more services) under a shared unified command of a joint command institution. A joint campaign is the basic pattern of future campaigns, and normally is composed of a series of service (combined) campaigns. The service (combined) campaign is a campaign independently conducted with the large formation of a certain service or with the large formation of a given service in the lead, and implemented with cooperation [complemented] by relevant services and arms, also called a service campaign (including Army campaigns, Navy campaigns, Air Force campaigns, and 2nd Artillery Corps campaigns).

(3) Based on operational space {zuozhan kongjian}, campaigns are divided into land campaigns, sea campaigns, and air campaigns

A land campaign is a campaign implemented on a land battlefield by an Army campaign large formation independently or complemented by other services and arms. A sea campaign is a campaign implemented on the sea battlefield or coastal {binhai} areas by a naval campaign large formation independently or complemented by other services and arms. An air campaign is a campaign implemented in an air battlefield or within a specified space or region by an Air Force campaign large formation independently or with the Air Force campaign large formation in the lead and complemented by other services and arms.

(4) Based on operational form {zuozhan xingshi}, campaigns are divided into the maneuver warfare {jidongzhan} campaign, positional warfare campaign, and guerilla warfare campaign

A maneuver warfare campaign is a campaign conducted by a campaign large formation with the main means of force-strength {bingli}, firepower, electromagnetic maneuver {dianci jidong} and assault and at a non-fixed battleline. A positional warfare campaign is a campaign of by a campaign large formation attacking an entrenched {jushou} enemy or supporting a positional defense, and it is divided into positional offensive campaign or positional defensive campaign. A guerilla warfare campaign is a campaign conducted in order to complement the frontal battlefield or the regular operations of a main force large formation by a guerilla large formation on a battlefield such as the enemy rear or flank. The maneuver warfare campaign, positional warfare campaign, and guerilla warfare campaign are respectively different in position and role in different wars or different phases of a war. A maneuver warfare campaign can fully bring the powerful might of the People's War into play and it can even more fully bring the leadership art of war directors and the liveliness of a person into play, thus it occupies a prominent position in a future campaign. The maneuver warfare campaign is inherited from and developed from the PLA traditional mobile warfare campaign {yundongzhan zhanyi} under modern conditions.

(5) Based on operational scale, campaigns are divided into the theater strategic-quality campaign, theater independent-direction {duli fangxiang} campaign, and group army {jituanjun} campaign

A theater strategic-quality campaign is a large-scale campaign having a decisive significance on the overall war situation that is conducted under unified command and by the entire or large portion of strengths in a theater or by the strengths of a number of theaters in a provisionally designated operational area. A theater independent-direction campaign is a campaign implemented in a certain direction of a theater by employing some or most of the theater strengths and under a theater command or theater-direction command institution {zhahui jigou}. A group army campaign is a campaign implemented by the operational strengths of a group army or group army equivalent.

In addition, based on sequential order of operations, campaigns can be divided into first campaigns and follow-up campaigns; based on the operational geographical environment, it can be divided into flatland area, hilly area, and mountain area campaigns, and into river network area, desert steppe area, desert-gravel desert area, tropical- mountainous-jungle areas, and plateau-cold-area campaigns.

Section 2: Objective Essential Elements {keguan yaosu} of Campaigns...23

Victory or defeat in a campaign is subject to the constraints and effects of many essential elements and these factors are divided into subjective essential elements and objective essential elements. The subjective essential elements mainly indicate human subjective activity {nengdong zuoyong} and the superb art of leadership in a campaign. The objective essential elements are mainly three in number: campaign strengths {liliang}, campaign battlefield, and campaign time. A campaign is a contest between strengths, and strengths are the objective basis on which victory in the campaign depends. The battlefield is the objective arena in which the campaign strengths conduct their activities {huodong}; and time is the objective form {xingshi} where the campaign activity {huodong} exists. The campaign leaders can direct the “living drama” only by relying on their strengths, by supporting the battlefield, and by utilizing time. With the development of campaigns, the influence of all the subjective essential elements on a campaign is growing more and more extensive. An in-depth study on these influences is an important prerequisite for seizing victory in a future campaign.

I. Campaign Strength {liliang}...23

Campaign strength is a general term for the armed forces used for campaign operations and in preparations used for campaign operations. It is the most dynamic essential element among the three objective essential elements of a campaign, because campaign confrontation ultimately is a confrontation between strengths. Hence, campaign strengths are an important content of modern campaign study. Today, with the continually deepening development of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), campaign strengths are undergoing an enormous transformation. Armed forces in all respects – from weapons and equipment to the organizational *tizhi*-system {bianzhi tizhi}, strategy, tactics, operational thought, training, and logistics – are experiencing profound changes. The changes in and development of campaign strengths are important constituent parts of this RMA. Moreover, the strategic quality of modern campaign strengths has greatly intensified. In modern wars, no battle is fought unless complete victory is assured; all military powers around the world fully emphasize concentration of crack troops, setting the tune with one beat of the gong. Hence, modern campaign strengths have become a critical component in a nation’s armed strength, or a supporting part thereof; their strategic status has become quite remarkable.

(1) All essential elements of campaign strengths

All essential elements of campaign strengths refer to the main components for constituting the campaign strength, and one can differentiate the various essential elements based on carrying out the various specific mission needs-requirements. The basic essential elements of campaign strengths are: information power {xinxi li}, firepower, maneuver power {jidong li}, assault power {tuji li}, and protection power {fanghu li}, as well as the campaign derivative {paisheng} essential elements: reconnaissance capability, assault power, electronic warfare (EW) capability, command and control (C²) capability, operational support capability, logistic and equipment support capability, protection power, and comprehensive operational capability.

1. Basic essential elements of campaign strengths

Information power refers to the capability of the armed forces in information gathering, transmission, processing, and control, as well as preventing the enemy from effectively employing information. The capability for campaign strengths to control the military information domain {junshi xinxi lingyu} is also precisely the capability for the armed forces to conduct information warfare [IW]. The military information domain refers to the sum of all information domains associated with campaign operational activities. IW refers to a struggle by the armed forces to seize dominance in the military information domain. Although in military history the essential elements of information power have always played an important role within campaign strengths, they have not attracted a high degree of attention until recently.

The military information domain is the functional domain for the essential elements of campaign strength information power. Today, with the vigorous development of military technology revolution with information technology [IT] as its core, the status and role {zuoyong} of the military information domain have increasingly grown more important, becoming a new operational domain. The military struggle from today forward will be conducted in an informationized battlefield environment where information can be transformed into a real operational capability and has become a source of strength for victory. All of the resources of war – capabilities and materiel – must rely on information power before they can be fully brought into play. Thus, the armed forces must pursue information superiority {youshi} and continuously strengthen its own information strengths before being able to put itself in an invincible position in future wars.

In future IW operations, one must allow the structure of information strengths to have an integrated quality and allow the integrated {zhengti} functionality of each strength's essential elements to be brought into play, so one must grasp the integrated whole {zhengti bawo} and arrange the unified overall planning {tongchou anpai}. One must take aim at the characteristics of the information operations strength structure, combine the realities of specific information operations in conducting the general design {zongti sheji} of the strength structure, and completely consider and adjust the constituting of the information operation strengths of the various services and arms. One must completely

weigh the real operational capabilities of every strength-essential-factor and scientifically determine the ratio of information operation strength task-organization so as to allow mutual adjusting-coordination and complementary functionality in terms of constituting various strengths. At the same time, one must establish smooth and highly effective C4I systems {xitong} and ensure that various strengths form organically integrated entities and consistently adjusting-coordinated activities.

Firepower is the main means used by a campaign large formation to kill the enemy military's effective strength {yousheng liliang} and smash its weapons and equipment and various facilities, thus causing it to lose its operational capability. It is an important indicator of a campaign large formation's operational capability. It can be differentiated according to firepower systems {xitong}, nature of the firearm, and categories and varieties. In terms of technology, firepower general requirements are: tremendous power, long range, high precision, rapid fire, and multiple purposes. The trend in modern firepower development is towards long-range, precision guided firepower. It has the characteristics of remotely deployed weapon platforms, rapid reaction, high hit accuracy, ease of concentration, and able to remedy insufficient force-strength maneuver {jidong}. It can directly strike various targets in the enemy's campaign depth, and has an important effect on a campaign's course and conclusion.

Maneuver power {jidongli} is the sum of a military's speed and range for transferring troops and firepower and its capabilities for overcoming the effects of terrain and weather. Maneuver {jidong} is an activity in which an armed force tends toward the favorable and avoids harm, and this has historically received a high degree of attention by the armed forces of all nations both in ancient and in modern times. There are mainly three functions of maneuver in a campaign: the first is to form favorable posture to subdue the enemy and seize battlefield initiative; the second is to allow one's own strengths to break away from a dangerous location and reverse a passive situation; and the third is to more fully bring into play the effectiveness of force-strengths and firepower. The developmental history of war has proven that the density of battlefield personnel and weapons and equipment has always assumed a declining trend, and the battlefield of the future could turn into an even wider expanse. Under these situations, if one wants to effectively concentrate and shift force-strengths and weaponry, one can only rely on rapid and flexible maneuver {jidong}. In another respect, the large improvements in the progress of modern military technology and automation of armed forces command and control systems {xitong} have provided conditions for armed forces rapid maneuver.

Assault power {tujili} is the capability to rapidly and fiercely strike the enemy; it is the combination of firepower and maneuver power. Modern campaign goals are firm, and its offensive characteristics are prominent; even in defensive operations, it still requires for the accomplishment of defensive missions with offensive activities {xingdong}. Hence, assault power has become an important essential element in balancing the modern campaign strengths. The assault power of a modern campaign large formation, to a very large extent, depends on the quantity and quality of maneuver firepower {jidong huoli} high tech operational platforms. Aviation forces, missile force-units, armored force-units,

and artillery force-units, as well as helicopter force-units, are the important strengths of campaign assault. Within the campaign strengths, one should stress establishing a powerful assault strength so as to facilitate being able to form an assault fist at a critical moment {guanjian shike} and open up as well as control {dakai bing zuoyou} the entire campaign situation.

Protection power refers to the capability of campaign strength on the battlefield to adopt various measures and activities to preserve themselves. Along with the unprecedented improvement in a modern campaign large formation's kill capability, improvement in protection power has already become a fundamental measure for preserving one's own operational strengths. If the armed forces lack protection capability, then all of the other capabilities will be thoroughly weakened. The widespread application of high-tech weapons and equipment has elevated the improvement of protection power to an even more important status.

Within campaign strength, all of the aforementioned essential elements are an organic integrated [whole] {zhengti}, and together they prop up the campaign strength mansion. The integrated might {zhengti weili} brought into play from their complementing of each other is far greater than the sum of the five. Taking for example the relationship between firepower and maneuver {jidong}, although maneuver and firepower represent two entirely different thoughts, in actual warfare maneuver and firepower are in fact integrated {yiti}. Maneuver is not merely maneuver without firepower kill, it is only that the maneuver component is greater than the firepower component, and its characteristic is "large maneuver, small firepower" {da jidong, xiao huoli}; whereas firepower is not kill without maneuver, it is only that the firepower component is greater than that of maneuver, and its characteristic is "large firepower, small maneuver" {da huoli, xiao jidong}. It is precisely due to the effective cover of firepower that rapid maneuver under the threat of enemy firepower is possible, and that renders even more might to maneuver. Also, it is precisely due to maneuver's race to seize a favorable occasion and site that firepower can be fully brought into play and that the armed forces can concentrate firepower to assault the enemy's weak points. Between the five essential elements of campaign strength is precisely such mutual facilitation and mutual remediation to jointly achieve optimum operational effectiveness of campaign strengths.

2. Derivative essential elements of campaign strengths

Reconnaissance capability is a campaign large formation's capability for acquiring intelligence on the enemy's situation, terrain, and related operations. Without completely accurate, real-time information acquired from a reliable reconnaissance capability, a campaign commander cannot implement battlefield command, which will surely affect bringing operational capabilities into play. The modern campaign battlefield is vast, the information volume has sharply increased, and time effectiveness is very strong. Thus, basic requirements on reconnaissance are: a wide detection range, long reconnaissance range, diverse reconnaissance means, prompt and accurate discovery of targets, rapid

transmission of intelligence, and the ability to implement continuous reconnaissance in full time-space.

EW capability refers to a comprehensive capability for protecting one's own unimpeded employment of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and disrupting the enemy's employment of the EMS, an important component of information power {xinxili}. It includes the capabilities for electronic reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, jamming and counter-jamming, and destruction and counter-destruction. In a modern campaign, the position and roles of EW capability increase daily; electronic confrontation {dianzi duikang} activities will be jointly conducted by multi-service electronic confrontation force-units and penetrate operations from beginning to end. Not only is the confrontation's broad in range, large in both scale and space, the means and modes of confrontation have trended toward diversification. The strengths or weaknesses of EW capability have become an important indicator for balancing operational effectiveness of campaign strengths.

C² capability refers to the capability of a commander and the command organ to apply command tools so as to achieve specified goals, comprehensively employ various strengths and means, command and bring into play subordinate force-units and control the enemy force activities. Its objective materiel bases are the military information systems {xitong}. C² capability occupies a very important position within campaign strengths, and improving C² capability is an important way to enhance campaign strength.

Operational support capability is the capability for supporting a campaign large formation's smooth fulfillment of its mission; it is a general term for various support capabilities – communications, transportation, engineering, meteorology, camouflage, surveying and mapping, protection against nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC) weapons, and battlefield management. In a modern campaign, the degree of reliance by the armed forces on operational support strengths has continuously increased and the content of operational support continuously has grown so that operational support strengths are an indispensable component of campaign strengths.

Logistical and equipment support capability is the sum of the various man-, materiel-, financial-powers, technology and its organizations that assist and support operations. Logistical and equipment support capability has a major effect on force-unit operational capability, campaign decision-making and campaign course and conclusion. Logistical and equipment support can greatly enhance the flexibility and sustained operational capability of armed forces operations. Modern campaigns require that logistical and equipment support must achieve initiative, straightforwardness, flexibility, economy, reliability, and endurance, and moreover require high self-survivability.

(2) Form-state {xingtai} of campaign strength structure

The foundation of campaign strength structure is the force-units of the services and arms. Structure decides functionality and the good and bad of campaign strength operational

effectiveness not only depends on the qualitative level and quantitative amount of men and weapons and equipment, but it also depends on whether or not the campaign strength structure is rational. A rational campaign strength structure can organically combine {jiejie} the different functional services and arms force-units within the campaign strength based on an optimum ratio and form the maximum combat effectiveness {zhandou xiaoneng}.

The modern campaign strength structure is divided into a peacetime structure and a wartime structure. In peacetime, the campaign strength exists with the mode of services and arms force-units, and in wartime, the force-units are transferred from the various services and arms to organize and build the campaign large formation. This structural mode is decided by the diverse quality of the modern military activities. The patterns {yangshi} of modern military activities not only include the non-war {feizhazheng} activities such as providing security and humanitarian aid, emergency and disaster relief, seizure of drugs, maintaining peace, the activity of striking terrorists, suppressing riots, assisting the local governments of other countries, and evacuation of non-combatants, it also includes large-scale regional conflicts, localized wars, and full-scale wars, and the intensity of employing armed strengths between them has great differences. Furthermore, the operational adversary not only can be a powerful enemy possessing high-tech weapons, but it can also be an ordinary mechanized armed force or it can even be some irregular armed force {feizhenggui wuzhuang}. The threats and missions to be faced are different, thus, organizing and building the needed services and arms force-units and the adopted structure of the joint campaign large formation will certainly be different as well.

1. Peacetime structure of campaign strengths

The differentiation modes of the peacetime structure of campaign strengths are mainly the following three:

Differentiation according to service. For example, the Chinese PLA is basically divided into an Army, Navy, Air Force, and 2nd Artillery Corps; the U.S. military is divided into an Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines; and Russia's military is divided into an Army, Air Force, Air Defense Force, and Navy. This mode of differentiation facilitates each service's ability to independently conduct equipping, training and management of their respective force-units. The modern campaign battlefield is undergoing an extension toward outer space, and together with its corresponding space force-units {hangtian budui} it has become a critical part of the modern campaign strength structure. Today, some developed nations have established Space Commands {hangtian silingbu}, and some nations have space force-units under the unified command of the Air Force with launch force-units, monitoring force-units, and scientific research institutions, etc. subordinate to it. With the development of space technology and its widespread application in coming wars, the "Space Force" {"tian jun"} will occupy a prominent position in the composition of future campaign strength.

Differentiation according to the capability and characteristics of force-units accomplishing missions. For example, the U.S. military campaign strengths are divided into ground, naval, aviation, mobile {jidong}, special operations, and space force-units. Amongst these, the ground force-units are composed of the Army and Marines. The [U.S.] ground force-units, naval force-units, and aviation force-units possess the capabilities for fulfilling operational missions in three different physical realms: land, sea, and air, respectively. The [U.S.] space force-units have the capability for controlling outer space. Moreover, their so-called mobile force-units are neither a service nor a service arm, but in reality are composed of air- and sea-transport force-units consisting of military personnel and materiel dispatched to various places around the world; their mission is to boost the U.S. military's capability for large-scale delivery of force-strengths.

Differentiation according to the differences in the strategic mission assumed by the each force-unit. For example, the present Western military powers popularly divide campaign strengths into the following three: forward {qianyan cunzai} force-units, emergency mobile force-units, and reinforcements. Another example: some Western nations differentiate between force-units stationed overseas and domestic force-units. The Chinese PLA's trinity campaign strength *tizhi*-system of field-operation large formations {yezhan juntian}, local formations (force-units) {difang bingtuan (budui)}, and militia is another method of differentiation. The field-operation large formations are composed of Army campaign large formations, Air Force campaign large formations, Navy campaign large formations, and 2nd Artillery Corps campaign large formations, which are responsible for the operational missions within the entire theater. Local formations (force-units) execute local operational missions within the range of their specified areas (province, city, and county). The militia is an irregular armed strength {feizhenggui wuzhuang} mainly complementing the field-operation large formation and local formation to carry out their corresponding operational missions.

At present, the differentiation modes are mainly the above three, but this does not exclude the possibility of having other differentiation modes in the future.

2. Wartime structure of campaign strengths

The wartime structure of campaign strengths refers to the strength group {liliang jituan} subordinate to the unified command of campaign command institution established from the needed components to be transferred from within various armed strengths in order to achieve specially designated campaign goals, based on specific operational objects and battlefield environments in wartime, all to facilitate carrying out the series of interrelated battles and operational activities and win a victory in the campaign.

(3) Developmental trends in the campaign strength task organization {biancheng}

After the end of the Cold War, the international strategic order and security circumstances {xingshi} underwent enormous changes, and regional armed conflicts

became the main threat to national security; reductions in quantity, improvement in quality, increases in the high-tech content of weapons and equipment and optimization of armed force structures have become a common trend in the development of the militaries of all nations. All nations commonly hold that the composition of future campaign strengths should be able to ensure that the armed forces effectively handle many kinds of threats, with regional conflicts as the main threat, and possess a high degree of mobility {jidongxing} and the capability for implementing “full-dimensional operations” {“quanwei zuozhan”}. To this end, all the major nations of the world, at the same time as building the prominent key point force-units {tuchu zhongdian budui jianshe}, have mostly adjusted the task organization of their conventional strengths based on the mission, readiness levels {zhanbei chengdu}, and reaction speed.

First of all, the characteristic of “integration of three” {sanwei yiti} appears in the task organization of campaign strengths. The U.S. divides its conventional strengths into three parts, forward deployed force-units, contingency force-units, and reinforcing force-units, while Russia divides its conventional strengths into standing contingency force-units, rapid mobile force-units, and strategic reserves. The “integration of three” campaign strength task organization is full of elasticity, and can effectively produce a rapid reaction for a regional quality crisis for an undetermined direction, region, opponent, scale, and [or] intensity. A small number of standing strengths *bushu*-dispositioned in a critical region can be used for dealing with small-scale crises; when the crisis-level is raised, the rapid mobile strengths are quickly delivered to the crisis region; and if the crisis further expands, then the reinforcing strengths are delivered, and war mobilization is conducted. The key point of the “integration of three” conventional strength task organization is the rapid reaction force-units. Within the task organization of the rapid reaction force-units are not only ground force-units such as marine, light infantry units, and air defense force-units, but also naval, air force, as well as airborne {kongjiang}, air-mobile {kongzhong jidong}, and special force-units, with a high readiness level, excellent equipment, and awesome combat power {zhandouli}. The “integration of three” conventional strength structure not only has reduced the armament scale {junbei} and curtailed military spending, but also has guaranteed the quality of armed forces construction {jundui jianshe} and increased armed force rapid reaction capability.

Next, the development of various nations’ campaign strength task organization has also trended towards smaller scale and integration. The development of military technology and the massive equipping of force-units with high precision and high lethality weapons have provided a material basis for reducing force-unit task organization and not lowering combat power. The integration level of future force-units will be even higher, the coordinated operational capability will be even stronger, the integrated might will be even greater, and in terms of organizational structure, one will be able to adapt to various different conditions and different intensities of wars and carry out various missions.

Third, the following characteristics also emerge in the development of campaign strength task organization of all nations: in terms of the service proportion, there will be key point development of naval and air forces, and at the same time the army will be reduced and

national defense resource allocation will steadily tilt towards naval and air forces. In terms of the proportion of combat and support force-units, the proportion of combat force-units will decrease, and support force-units will increase. Among the support force-units, technical support force-strengths will increase, and service {qinwu} support force-strengths will decrease. In terms of personnel constitution, the officer staffing {yuan e} will rise while enlisted personnel staffing will drop; the proportion of technical officers will rise, while the proportion of command and general staff officers will drop.

(4) The organizational grouping {bianzu} form of the joint campaign large formation

The organizational grouping of the joint campaign large formation is the scientifically organized allocation {bianpei} and composition for the various services-arms force-units and for the organized systems at all levels of those participating in the joint campaign and their personnel, weapons, and technical equipment. Normally, it is flexibly determined in the campaign preparation phase by the commander on the basis of the campaign intention, battlefield posture, and enemy task organization, as well as the situations of the activity characteristics and PLA force-unit realities, etc. Consequently, determining the organizational grouping form of the joint campaign large formation must be directed at the scale and pattern of a given specific campaign.

In general terms, during such a joint campaign, the organizational grouping form of the joint campaign large formation are mainly the following two kinds.

1. Organizational grouping based on operational space

This mode of organizational grouping normally divides the campaign strengths into the three parts of ground, air and naval operational strengths on the basis of the operational areas of the various services and arms. Its advantage is that it is easy to form an effective and unified command of the various services and arms force-units.

2. Organizational grouping based on operational mission

This organizational grouping form is to organize and group several interrelated and inter-functional operational groups according to specific campaign missions and natures so as to bring into play the optimum superiority of various strengths and to improve the integrated operational capabilities. This kind of organizational grouping benefits the implementation of direct command and control in accordance with the special operational missions assumed by the various groups.

II. Campaign Battlefield...30

The campaign battlefield is the arena on which the two opposing sides of a campaign conduct a contest of strengths, and has an extremely large effect on campaign activities. Studying the battlefield environment's relationship to campaign operations and its effect on campaign activities {xingdong} and mastering its inherent laws not only have an

important significance for the campaign directors' correct decision-making and driving of the campaign, but they also have an important role for the entirety of force-units to fully utilize the geographic environment to *pursue benefits-avoid harm* and *use strong points-avoid shortcomings*.

(1) Analysis of the battlefield environment

The modern campaign battlefield is constituted by a land, sea, air, space and electromagnetic multi-dimensioned battlefield.

1. Land campaign environment

The land campaign environment mainly includes the natural geographic environment, the human environment, economic conditions, transportation/transport {jiaotong yunshu}, and communications.

(i) Natural geographic environment. The natural geographic environment, based on its influence on the campaign operations, is further divided into topographic features (geomorphology), hydrology, and meteorology.

① Topographic features. Topographic features on land mainly include mountainous regions, hills, plains, and special topographical deserts.

A mountainous region is a region with a relatively steep slope involving a regional relative altitude of greater than 200 meters, with a significant run {zouxiang}, and a height above sea level of more than 500 meters.

Mountainous regions have complex terrain, few roads, thin populations, and meager materials; they place limits on force-unit {budui} activities, which is particularly inconvenient for maneuvers, but also inconvenient for command and coordination. Mountainous regions are easy to hold but hard to attack; are advantageous to defense; facilitate the occupation and holding of a strategic point {pingxian eshou}, the blocking of openings and control of valleys, and the construction of positions; and enable a relatively small force strength to resist the attack of an enemy with superiority. Mountainous regions are natural obstacles to attackers, can break up attacking formations, and force them to execute their attack along restricted routes. However, the blocking effect of mountainous regions is conducive to the attackers' secret concentration and closing with the enemy, facilitates penetration/cutting up {chuancha fenge} and flanking attacks {yuhui gongji}, and also facilitates ambushes.

Hills are gently sloped unbroken low hills with a height differential of 100-200 meters, and often interconnected with a low mountain(s); it is a region where land battlefield hostilities have been quite numerous. China's northern hilly regions mostly open up into dry farmland, and have few trees, thus having little effect on force-unit {budui} activities.

In southern China, the hilly regions mostly are woods and thickets, with many small brooks in the valleys; these place certain restrictions on armed force activities {xingdong}. Hilly-region rolling and swelling terrain can become an effective support for defense, and can form a relatively solid defensive position. However, since the height fluctuations are not large, the degree of dependence on terrain is limited, and defensive flanks often lack favorable terrain for cover. Hence, the offensive defense of maneuverability {jidongxing de gongshi fangyu} appears even more important in a hilly region. Attacking in a hilly region facilitates the execution of multipath, multidirectional assaults, and facilitates selection of defensively weak positions against which to execute a concentrated strike, and to rapidly effect an encirclement of the enemy defenders; however, this also makes it easy for the enemy at an early point to discover your intention, and difficult for you to conceal your operational activities.

A plain is a regional {quyuxing} flat and open region with an altitude above sea level of less than 200 meters, a good lookout, developed transportation, many residential places, a dense population, and convenient supplies, and convenient for maneuver, but inconvenient for concealment. When defending plains, it is difficult to find favorable terrain that can be reliably held fast, and it is not easy to select and build various positions. Cities, towns, river banks, residential places, and prominent hills play an important role in an overall defensive system. Normally it is necessary to add a defense in depth; to conduct large-scale preparation of positions; to form a multi-point or multi-channel {duodaodai} defensive system that can be not only independently held fast, but also tightly interconnected; and to stress the antitank and anti-firepower raid-attack problems. Attacking on a plain facilitates rapid maneuver and concentration of force-strengths, and execution of multipath, multidirectional, multi-echelon continuous assaults; it also facilitates widespread execution of flanking maneuvers and encirclements {yuhui baowei}, so that an operation can simultaneously unfold in full depth – in front, on the flanks, and in the rear – which benefits command and coordination, and in turn facilitates pursuit.

A desert {huangmo} is a general designation for any desert or gravel desert area; it refers to a region with dry weather, low rainfall, sparse vegetation, and relatively flat and open terrain. Desert regions have many sandstorms, a sparse population, and meager produce, and they are deficient in sources of water. Those spots that do have a source of water are the oases. China's deserts are mostly located in areas inhabited by various minorities, and in scattered residential areas. Desert terrain is convenient for observing firing, but inconvenient for judging azimuth and concealing one's intention; construction of defense works is difficult. Due to the unusual weather, the great depletion of the physical strength of personnel, and the many mechanical breakdowns, the great difficulty for rear support. In a desert, it is difficult for mechanized force-units to maneuver away from the road. Desert area operations center more on vying for unfolding of water sources {shuiyuan zhankai} or blocking the opponent's maneuver passage. In general terms, it favors attacking, but does not favor defending or holding.

② Hydrology. Land battlefield hydrology mainly refers to river hydrology, including for theater rivers their flow direction, flow length, surface width, water depth, flow rate, water quality, shoal properties, fording places, bridges, riverbed substrates, and various changing parameters. River hydrology has a very large effect on campaign activities. Rivers with deep water and fast currents are a natural protective screen for the defenders, and are obstacles for the attackers; not only can they block up an attack, and compel the opponent to make a forced crossing of the river, they also easily create enormous casualties on the attackers' side. Rivers with shallow water, slow currents, and hard substrates can be forded by troops on foot, but can greatly reduce the speed of a maneuver and attack. Some rivers in ordinary times do not pose obstacles, but chance heavy rains cause the water level to rapidly rise, which then requires bridging and preparation of crossing tools. In winter, rivers in severely cold regions are blocked with ice, and heavy equipment can then cross them unimpeded. Rivers aligned perpendicularly to the direction of an operation often are a protective screen which the opponent finds it difficult to overcome; rivers flowing in a direction which is the same as that of an operation are advantageous to mobile force-units and to transport materiel, but can easily break apart an operational formation, complicating adjusting-coordination between friendly forces. Large-scale application of aviation forces and amphibious rapid landing instruments reduce the effects of rivers on operations, but in on-land operations, the various effects of rivers still cannot be underestimated.

③ Meteorology. Meteorology represents the physical quantities and physical phenomena of weather conditions. The main elements having a major influence on campaigns are air temperature, clouds and mist, rainfall, and wind.

Air temperature. Excessively high air temperatures with unbearable extreme heat can result in decrease of personnel physical strength, irritable morale, sleep deprivation, and easy contraction and transmission of diseases, and this can create non-combat personnel attrition. Excessively low air temperature, with casualties from the severe cold and easy icing, aggravates the load on personnel, inconveniences activities, and reduces the combat power of force-units. An abnormal air temperature can have effects on both weapons and vehicles, viz., reductions in efficiency and frequent breakdowns; in particular, the effect of severe cold is even stronger. The higher the air temperature, the faster chemical warfare (CW) agents will vaporize, and the greater are the casualties. By contrast, with lower air temperatures, CW agents do not easily vaporize, even to the point where they lose their lethality. The casualties created on the opposing sides by an abnormal air temperature are the same, but bright campaign directors – via various cold-proofing and heat-proofing preparations – invariably reduce the unfavorable effects of air temperature on one's own side, and convert adverse air-temperature conditions into relatively favorable conditions, with which to seize victory.

Clouds and mist. Clouds and mist can cause reduced visibility, inconveniencing observation and firing; they can reduce the hit accuracy of laser-guided and other precision guided munitions, place limits on various reconnaissance equipment, and create difficulties for communications, which inconvenience coordination between command

and various force-units. However, clouds and mist are conducive to the concealment of the force-unit activities and intentions, facilitate the execution of sudden raids against the enemy, and can be used for close range {di jin} reconnaissance of the enemy; at the same time, maneuver and transfer can be conducted under the cover of clouds and mist. The greatest effect of clouds and mist is on the aviation force takeoffs, landings, and implementation of various ground operations is subject to very great restrictions, and under dense fog conditions, aviation force assistance to ground operations will receive the greatest restrictions.

Rainfall. Rainfall muddies open fields and restricts force-unit maneuver; heavy rains and torrential rains can cause rivers to rise suddenly and sharply, and valleys and ravines to flood, which create transportation interruptions and hinder activities. Rainfall can cause reduced visibility, affecting weapons firing and resulting in frequent machinery breakdowns; in particular, this creates difficulties for logistical support and various other types of operational support. Rainfall affects the in-air flight and the safe takeoff and landing of aircraft. Although rainfall has an unfavorable effect on armed force activities, if one is good at exploiting advantages, rainfall can also enable one to make full use of one's strong points and gain victory through the unorthodox {chuqi zhisheng}. Under modern conditions, the development of artificial rainfall techniques has caused rainfall to become an important meteorological weapon in the struggle against an enemy. How to overcome the various effects of rainfall engendered on operations, and under special meteorological conditions how to seize the initiative have become important topics in campaign research.

Wind. Wind has an effect on both personnel activities and weapons firing. In particular, windstorms, which blow dust and sand around, not only can reduce visibility, but also can damage the eyes and skin of personnel. Wind-blown sand can seriously damage weapons and equipment, reduce force-unit maneuver speed, and make it difficult for the force-units to distinguish directions and discover attack targets. High winds affect aircraft takeoffs, which creates difficulties for command and coordination. Windstorms are disastrous weather, which can seriously constrain all operational activities. However, windstorms in fact are conducive to sudden raid-attacks, to concealment of transfers and retreats. At the same time, wind determines the propagation direction of nuclear mushroom clouds and CW agents. A fire attack executed with a favorable wind can yield twice the result with half the effort.

(ii) The human environment. The human environment refers to the socio-cultural environment with man as the mainstay. It includes the population composition, political organization, nationalities and religion, and science, education and hygiene {ke jiao weisheng}. The population resources of the campaign battlefield are important factors affecting a campaign's success or failure; they include both manpower resources and labor resources, so that a high population density can serve as large utilizable strengths {liliang}. However, with a low population density, the usable strengths will be limited. Manpower resources depend on both numbers and quality. Quality includes political quality, military quality, cultural quality, and physical development. A relatively high

political consciousness and patriotic spirit and a tenacious will – added to rigorous training in military technology and tactics, relatively high cultural standards, and various specialized skills, as well as physical conditioning – can produce a major positive effect on campaign operations. In the social structure, the bringing into play of the capabilities of human life is closely related to that structure; necessary here is the attaching of importance to bringing into play all of the effects of social organization, and to the maximum degree the mobilizing of the masses in the theater, to wage a People’s War campaign.

(iii) Economic conditions. Battlefield economic conditions mainly signify the natural resources, agro-industrial production capacity, and various kinds of materiel reserves that can provide operational utility. Modern campaigns are on a grand scale, with enormous depletion of materiel. Campaign support, besides supplying various kinds of off-the-shelf equipment and materiel, often also requires local production and supply, so that various types of ordinary and civilian goods and materials are converted into operational materiel. The quality or shabbiness of battlefield economic conditions is closely related to gaining the upper hand in a campaign.

These resources, and the lumber and fuel directly associated with military supplies, as well as water resources and minerals – all these are indispensable raw materials supporting war production. Industrial production can provide the force-units {budui} with various kinds of weapons and ammunition, vehicles, communications equipment, medical equipment, food, uniforms, and other equipment. Agricultural production not only provides the war industry with raw materials, it also can directly provide force-units {budui} with grain and non-staple foods. The state of theater materiel reserves directly determines the sustainability of a campaign.

(iv) Transportation/ transport {jiaotong yunshu} and communications. Transportation/transport includes transport and transportation vehicles, lines, various facilities (stations, harbors, air fields, bridges), and the transportation and transport networks constructed from these. The number of all essential elements comprising transportation/transport, and the degree of their quality, are important marks in weighing the status of battlefield transportation/transport. Campaign operations are highly dependent on transport lines, and wartime requires large-scale expropriation of civilian transport vehicles and facilities; hence, it is necessary during preparations to be assured of a variety of transport capabilities within the battlefield range. Rail transport, enabling rapid, high-volume transport, is the main means for pre-war force-unit and materiel transport. During campaigns, railroads often become major targets for enemy aviation forces and missile strikes, and under conditions lacking reliable screening, their positional functions {diwei zuoyong} can be degraded. The positional functions of public transport in modern campaigns are increasingly improving; artillery and many other transport vehicles cannot do without highways. Tanks and [other] tracked vehicles, by maneuvering along highways, can increase their speed. The quality of rear transport also mainly depends on highways. Water transport includes inland water transport and sea transport. Inland water shipping can transport both materiel and troops; river ferrying is

an important means for ensuring that troops can overcome obstacles and obtain freedom of overwater activities. Sea transportation/transport can forcefully assist land campaigns in coastal regions, and is an important prerequisite for seizing victory in a sea campaign. Air transport is fast and flexible, is not subject to the effects of terrain obstacles, facilitates execution of long-range rapid maneuvers and sudden attacks against the enemy, and can also implement long-range transport; it has special functions in modern campaigns. Under conditions where overland transportation has been damaged, air transport often becomes a major means for transporting materiel and troops. Pipage has the advantages of high effectiveness, economy, concealment, and difficulty of being damaged; effective employment of various kinds of preconstructed {ji she} pipelines on a battlefield is a major development trend in campaign rear transportation.

Battlefield communications mainly include the following: various communications hubs, communications stations, major communications equipment layouts, and quantitative and qualitative states; wired and radio communications network safeguards ensuring performance and wartime survivability and recoverability; and plants for manufacturing communications equipment, as well as their production capacity. Campaign communications only relying on a large formation's own equipment are insufficient; instead, campaigns should make full use of a variety of communications facilities – including civilian communications facilities – preconstructed on the battlefield. This can augment the communications channels and means, ensuring that campaign communications requirements are met.

2. Sea battlefield environment

The sea battlefield environment, based on its features, in general includes the natural environment and its related non-natural environment. With the increasing prominence of the status of the seas, research on the sea battlefield has become an important subject in studies on the science of campaigns.

(i) Natural environment. In military geography, there are many ways to divide the marine natural environment; based on the characteristics of campaign operations, this division mainly includes the following three parts: the marine composition, marine hydrology, and marine meteorology.

① Marine composition. The marine composition is divided into essential element {yaosu} composition and area {quyu} composition. The essential elements refer to seacoasts, islands and reefs, straits, marine bodies of water, and seabed landforms (geomorphy) {haidi dimao}. Considered from the standpoint of campaign operations, area composition is normally divided into open sea areas, island and reef areas, littoral {binlu} sea areas, and straits. The effects produced on campaigns by the waters of different areas also vary. Open sea areas refer to vast waters, mainly the high seas {gong hai}, including some territorial waters of littoral nations; they are the main arena for sea campaign struggles. They are characterized as follows: vastness, deep water, few islands and reefs, and a relatively long distance from the coast; convenient for observation and

firing of various ship guns and missiles; convenient for communications; convenient for broad maneuvers implemented by a variety of ships, especially large ships; convenient for large-scale concentration of all types of ships to be thrown into engagements; convenient for command and coordination; and convenient for aviation forces assistance. However, they are inconvenient for concealing activity {xingdong} intention; ships in open sea areas are easily attacked, do not easily obtain the assistance and cover of shore-based weaponry, and have stringent requirements on precision navigation and communications. Ship formations must possess multiple comprehensive operational capabilities, such as air defense and antisubmarine capabilities, and must be able to implement independent operations, with stringent requirements on logistical support.

Island and reef areas signify sea areas comprised of archipelagos, island chains, cluster reefs, and table reefs, as well as their adjacent waters. Often, due to contention for jurisdiction over islands and reefs, these areas become one of the critical arenas for campaign combat. The characteristics of islands and reefs are that they are scattered here and there on the sea surface, they echo each other from afar, and they are interrelated. Islands can be large or small. Large islands often have mountainous regions and hills, terrain that is strategically located and difficult to access {xian yao}, few strips for amphibious landings, and favorable terrain convenient for support; on such terrain it is easy to construct heavily fortified defensive positions, enabling control of certain waters and airspace, and forcing the enemy to unfold {zhankai} prematurely. Island coastlines are tortuous and have many havens {gangwan}. Island and reef surface areas are narrow and small. Southern islands mostly lack fresh water, or have a critical shortage of it; they are encircled completely by table reefs, have precipitous shore cliffs and open terrain, generally lack docks, and are fairly difficult to climb. Island and reef areas have complex seabed landforms, a non-uniform depth, and many zones dangerous for navigation. During island/reef-area operations, ship navigation is restricted, requirements on positioning and handling are stringent, and mutual adjusting-coordination is difficult; this inconveniences command, is unfavorable to maneuver, complicates concentration of force-strengths to implement relatively large-scale engagements, and is also inconvenient for both sides to bring into full play their firearm might. Operations in island and reef areas have an amphibious nature and stringent requirements on sea-land coordination; and given this, reliance on at-sea strengths is greater. Without powerful sea strengths, operational goals cannot be achieved. Operations in island and reef areas far from the mainland have relative independence, and are not easily supported by shore-based and aviation forces. Under such conditions, aircraft carriers assume great significance for a campaign victory. Island/reef-area operations are very highly dependent on logistical support. Speaking only from the standpoint of amphibious landing operations, islands and reefs are favorable to defense, but inconvenient for the landing forces as they assault the beach and climb onto land. However, since islands and reefs are narrow and small, the depth [zongshen] is shallow, maneuvering space {huixuan yudi} is not large, and defense lacks toughness and elasticity. Moreover, islands and reefs often have outbreaks of many kinds of disease, which easily cause decreases in noncombat personnel.

Littoral areas signify land-bordering sea areas, including various waters – fringing sea, gulfs, harbors, and offshore islands – and seacoasts. Littoral areas normally are focal

areas for the three armed services to successfully conduct a joint campaign and for the enemy to put up a fierce resistance, and can also be important areas for the Navy or Army to successfully conduct a combined campaign. Fringing sea is situated on the mainland's fringe, and is also called epeiric sea; its outer side is separated from the ocean by a peninsula and island chain, it has waters of a certain surface area that are interconnected with the ocean, and its depth gradually becomes shallower the nearer to the seacoast. Fringing sea has a flat, shallow seabed formed by a mainland extension toward the ocean; some regions have small fluctuations and underwater valleys, which are not only special sites for the opposing sides to deploy weaponry for combat, but also areas where they can establish stocks and a variety of bases. Bays are the parts of sea regions where the sea water extends up to dry land; their waters mostly are encircled by land, and they have fairly shallow water levels and fairly large tidal drops, thus forming large-scale intertidal-zone beaches. The sea water in a bay is relatively calm, enabling avoidance of stormy waves, and terrain is concealed; bays thus normally make good harbors and military bases. The seacoast refers to the dry land adjacent to the sea fringe, and is divided into muddy coast, rocky coast, and sandy coast. Muddy coast is mostly connected to river alluvial plains; it has coastal beaches mostly of sludge, little load-bearing ability, a straight coastline, a gentle slope, extensive beaches, and a wide variation in the ebb-and-flow tidal boundary line, all of which are inconvenient not only to amphibious landing forces but also to construction of defensive positions, and make maneuvers difficult. Rocky coast mostly is [where] a mountainous region extends to the sea; it has high and steep precipices, a tortuous coastline, many offshore islands and reefs, large fluctuations in coastal terrain, and many estuaries. Rocky coast has few and small landing-capable stretches, is inconvenient to an amphibious landing force's development toward the coast, and is difficult for development in depth; but it is convenient to construction of a heavily fortified position, and is favorable as a reliable site for establishing a defensive position in fairly great depth. Sandy coast is mostly formed from a hilly region extending to the sea; has a regular coastline, spreading beaches, and short and slight slopes; enables ships to easily draw near the shore; has many stretches convenient to an amphibious landing; and is convenient to development in depth. Sandy coast stretches are not convenient to defense; the coastal projections, coastal heights, and offshore islands are focal points for fighting between the opposing sides. Some sandy coastal waters have many shoals, which are not convenient for ship activity {huodong}.

A strait refers to a relatively narrow channel, between two pieces of dry land, which connects two seas and/or oceans. A strait is often a vital passage along a sea line; it is mostly the only way to pass through, and thus its strategic position is significant. This significance is very high both militarily and economically, and thus straits have become major battlefields on which the opposing sides engage in fierce struggles. Straits normally have narrow waters, precipitous shores, rapid flows, and sharp changes in water level, but some straits abut shore terrain that is relatively flat. Straits mostly have regular shorelines, but there are also some with tortuous shorelines, offering many havens. A strait's shore conditions are closely correlated with the shore terrain. Strait waters are cramped, and the channels are restricted and easy to block; it is especially easy to set up blocks in relatively narrow channels. In a strait, not only is there no way to deploy large numbers of force-strengths, there are also the great restraints to which ships are

subjected. Straits easily come under shore-based firepower and are easily controlled by shore-based force-strengths; and from a strait's entrance to its exit one almost always can encounter a shore-directed block {zuji} and/or blockade. Hence, control over the shore is more important than control over the [strait] waters, and this point is especially significant for continental {dalu} straits. The influence of a strait on operations is closely related to the position occupied by the strait, the terrain of the two shores, the surface width, the water depth, the flow rate, and the substrate; and it is necessary to acquire detailed knowledge of all the various kinds of natural geographic conditions related to these, in order to be able to correctly apply fighting methods and adopt various measures. The special geographic conditions of a strait have caused blockades and counter-blockades to become important forms of a campaign in such an area. In blockade struggle, the focal points are concentrated, the number of force-strengths employed is small, and the duration is long, enabling one to achieve major operational goals at a relatively low cost.

② Marine hydrology. Marine hydrology refers to the physical phenomena representing and reflecting the sea water's depth, temperature, salinity, water color, and transparency, and also the conditions of sea currents, swells, tides, and sea ice. The physical phenomena relatively highly related to campaign operations follow: the first is water depth. Depth determines the activity {huodong} area for various kinds of ships, and simultaneously also determines the useful range of several kinds of weaponry. For example, a torpedo attack against an enemy ship should be executed in a relatively deep sea area, and the position of mines and several kinds of obstacles should be chosen in a relatively shallow sea area. The second is tides. Their size and ebb-and-flow time change daily, which greatly affects ship navigation and underwater weapons; and amphibious landing campaigns must master the tidal patterns, and – based on their features – select the landing time, strip, and vehicles. In late 1949, the Chinese PLA attacked Jinmen (Quemoy) Island, and since the activity was not conducted based on tide laws, after the first wave landed, the flotilla, due to its grounding from an ebb tide, could not return to deliver a second wave, leading to a setback for the entire campaign. The third is sea currents and swells. Sea currents signify the horizontal flow phenomena produced under the effects of meteorological and seasonal factors; their flow speed and flow direction are relatively stable. The direction and speed of sea currents affect not only ship maneuver and operational activities, but also the accuracy of calculation of a ship's position while underway. Vertiginous currents affect a ship's handling, and internal waves can sometimes cause harm to submarines. Swells can affect both a ship's navigation and the firing of ship guns and other firearms. When swells are large, seaplane and shipborne aircraft takeoffs and landings are difficult, and moored mines under the pounding of waves can shift in position, even to the point where the mooring cable breaks off. A ground mine laid in shallow waters can move around, causing accidental actuation of its fuse. The degree of danger of offshore currents and surf directly determines whether amphibious landing forces can smoothly go ashore. The fourth is the transparency of sea water. It has the greatest effect on a submarine's diving depth and execution of a stealthy attack, and also has an effect on underwater mine laying and the emplacement of other obstacles, but it is favorable to discovery of enemy underwater targets. In addition, as the

sea water depth changes, the various sea-water transition layers – in which the temperature, salinity, and density undergo sharp changes in the vertical direction – have very large effects on submarine maneuvering {huodong}, hydroacoustic detection, and underwater communications; however, clever use of transition layers is advantageous to a submarine's execution of a stealthy attack. In overall terms, each of the essential elements in marine hydrology has an effect on operations, only each has its own degree of influence. These environmental essential elements should be understood in depth, to facilitate pursuing the advantage and avoiding harm.

③ Marine meteorology. This is closely season-correlated. The marine meteorology factors affecting campaign combat mainly include sea fog, wind, and rainfall. Sea fog, since its position varies by sea area, also shows variance in its nature, distribution, and duration. The Chinese sea areas are a part of the Western Pacific's many foggy sea areas, with advective fog as the primary type of sea fog. Its characteristics are: an extensive range, fairly great thickness, long duration, a zonal distribution assumed near the shore, and very high seasonality. Spring and summer are the main occurrence seasons for sea fog in Chinese sea areas; the fogs start at the beginning of the year in the South China Sea area, and conclude in a zone of the Yellow Sea in August, with a prominent south-to-north development pattern. Sea fog mostly lifts at 1-3 hours after sunrise, but in sea areas where foggy days crowd together, there are sometimes periods of a dozen-odd consecutive days when dense fog fails to lift. Sea fog reduces visibility; creates difficulties for ship navigation, positioning, and visual communications; and often precludes ship gun firing and minelaying at sea. In particular, it inconveniences coordinated operations among ships and among all of the service arms, and also presents command with various kinds of detriment. Fog has certain absorptive and scattering effects on sound, light, and electromagnetic waves, and can cause impaired performance in various kinds of technical observation equipment. Sea fog also inconveniences aviation forces in visual flight, observation, and attacks against ground targets. However, sea fog can also be used as cover, to conceal operations and intentions, and to launch a surprise attack on the enemy.

The effect of wind on campaign combat is also very large. The most prominent feature of Chinese sea areas is seasonally windy weather; tepid southerly winds prevail in summer, while in the last half of the year, frigid northwest winds commonly blow. Wind can cause ships and aircraft to deviate from course, and produce error in weapons firing. Wind can induce waves, causing ships to rock; excessively windy waves can generate difficulties for ship navigation and weapons use, cause sea-sickness and fatigue in personnel, and create difficulties for command and coordination. China's sea areas are areas of frequent tropical windstorms; these storms belong in the category of severely destructive weather, which can force aircraft to be grounded and prevent surface ships from maneuvering, and can create dangers for ships during navigation. After windstorms, recovery of combat power and adjustment of *bushu* disposition requires a certain time, which easily gives the enemy an opportunity that can be exploited to his advantage. Under tropical rainstorm conditions, there is almost no way to conduct large-scale omni-service-arm joint

operations, but these conditions are advantageous to submarines in executing surprise attacks against anchored assembled ships.

Sea-area rainfall, although it cannot produce major effects on sea operations, is nonetheless also a critical factor that cannot be ignored. The characteristics of rainfall in Chinese sea areas are: concentration of amount, spells with the same season as high-temperature spells, and amounts gradually increasing from north to south and from west to east. The South China Sea area is subject to tropical weather-effect multiple torrential rains. Torrential rains and heavy rains similarly can reduce visibility, which affects ship navigation safety. Rainy days have much thunder and lightning, which interferes with radar and communications. When the rainfall level is concentrated, the humidity is high, various kinds of weapons and equipment easily rust, ammunition easily becomes damp, and materiel easily gets moldy. Rainfall has relatively large effects on electrical equipment and on guided weapons.

(ii) Non-natural environments. Like the composition of a land battlefield environment, a sea battlefield's non-natural environments mainly are the human environment, economic conditions, transportation/transport, and communications.

① Marine human environment. This means the sociocultural environment of the seas along shores and on islands, and also includes: the population make-up; political organizations; nationalities, religion, and science education; culture; and health. Its features include a vast expanse of waters, a relatively sparse population, wartime return of commercial vessels to port, and, except for special conditions, extremely few non-military personnel and boundless waters. It is a free battlefield for the opposing sides to move about freely and quickly, and does not require taking into account the problems of protecting civilians and preventing destruction of the populace's facilities; but at the same time it loses the support of the populace. In sea operations, no matter how far from dry land, the land in the end is still the final place. Hence, emphasis on studies of the marine human environment, doing well in work with the populace, and to the maximum limit exploiting operational potential are the critical links in sea battlefield operations. Its specific content is roughly like that of a land battlefield; what is required for attention is the distinguishing feature of needing to be based on marine operations, and to perform well all work in a focused manner.

② Economic conditions. Economic conditions, besides being the same as those on coasts, islands, and land battlefields, also include the exploitable marine resources. Marine resources are extremely abundant, and include both aquatic products and various mineral products; but among these numerous resources, only the aquatic products can be directly used outside. Extraction of the remaining resources involves a high degree of difficulty, added to which is the fact that natural resources are also difficult to rapidly convert into military supplies materiel. Hence, the sea battlefield's economic conditions mainly signify the land conditions on the coasts and islands. Under these conditions, the

local advantages of the various kinds of support for the battlefield during operations are relatively decreased.

③ Transportation/transport and communications. Transportation/transport and communications, especially the vehicles and facilities like the rest of all the essential elements, mainly depend on the various conditions offshore and on the islands. One is the size of the numbers, second is the level of the quality, and third is the degree of exploitability. During wartime, many civilian vehicles and facilities must be refitted, reconstructed, and enhanced; and it requires knowing the score in order to be able to fully take advantage of and realize the potential capabilities of the battlefield.

④ Rules of the seas and of naval warfare. Studies on the sea battlefield environment must stress the rules of the sea and naval warfare, to facilitate during military combat the capability for reasonable, advantageous, economical, and facile utilization of the marine environment. The law of the sea is a general term for rules and regulations related to the rights and interests of the seas; it is a principle in all nations having marine activities, and is also a standard of conduct for dispute resolution at sea. It has not only clarified the legal status and regulations of the seabed and sea regions – territorial waters, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, continental shelf, straits, the open sea, and international seaboard – but also specified the principles and the various rules and regulations to be followed for at-sea navigational safety, marine resources extraction and protection, and marine scientific research. The sea combat-related laws of war also include several special laws and regulations, such as a specification that a sea battlefield is not restricted to the territorial waters of the belligerent states, and may be fought on the open sea, but may not hinder normal international shipping, and may not infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of neutral states. The rules of the seas and of war, fundamentally speaking, involve battlefield range issues, which are very closely related to use of the battlefield environment; every campaign director must understand and be intimately familiar with these rules and regulations.

3. Air battlefield environment

The air battlefield environment normally is a general reference to the spatial environment of the earth's atmosphere. Based on the effects of the various natural essential elements in the air on various kinds of flight vehicles, we here mainly study the battlefield environment of the spatial range from the earth's surface to an aerial altitude of a few tens of kilometers, including the troposphere and stratosphere in the earth's atmosphere, with a focus on the troposphere. The troposphere refers to the air layer, at the earth atmosphere's bottom, which has significant convective motion. Its bottom interface is the ground, and is subjected to the greatest effects of the surface. Its temperature gradually drops as the altitude increases. Most of the moisture in the atmosphere is concentrated in this layer; hence, the troposphere often exhibits weather phenomena such as clouds, rain, and thunderstorms. The troposphere's thickness decreases as the latitude gradually increases, and is normally about 16-18 km in a low latitude, about 10-12 km in a middle

latitude, and about 7-10 km at a high latitude. Its thickness is also related to the season, and in general its thickness in summer is less than the thickness in winter. The atmospheric layer above the troposphere and up to about 50 km is the stratosphere. The characteristics of this layer are a temperature that slowly rises as altitude increases, sparse moisture and dust, basically no cloudy or rainy weather, faint vertical movement of air, and stable airflow, which is good for high-altitude aircraft flights. However, its air is rarefied, and the reaction of an aircraft to its controls is slow.

The air battlefield and the land battlefield are interwoven. First, they are interwoven in the relationship between their natural environments. Second, they are interwoven in the interdependence of their campaign activities; dry land is the final stopover point of various types of flight vehicles. In regard to land battlefield problems, we have already presented in overall terms a brief analysis of the related natural environment; below, we mainly offer an analysis focusing on all of the meteorological essential elements of atmospheric space that can have an effect on the flight of various flight vehicles.

(i) Clouds and rainfall. The essential elements with a fairly large effect on flight are low clouds and clouds with vertical development. These normally run from a few hundred meters up to about 2000 meters, with stratus clouds that can be as low as a few tens of meters; they can reduce visibility, and can create very great difficulties for the takeoff, landing, and formation flying of combat aircraft. At the same time, since stratus clouds have a low altitude and strong convection, after paratroops during a drop enter such clouds, at a point very close to the ground, there will not be enough time to distinguish the ground situation and to adopt measures; this affects landing safety and control of the landing point. Vertical-development clouds include cumulus and cumulonimbus, which have abundant water content, and also large supercooled water-drop clouds; aircraft flying in them easily encounter medium or intense icing, affecting the normal flight of these aircraft. At the same time, thunderstorms in cumulus directly impact the safety of personnel and aircraft. In dense cumulus and cumulonimbus clouds there are sharp ascending-descending airflows and turbulent flows, which create aircraft bumps, cause fatigue in pilots and prevent aircraft from maintaining the preset flight altitude and a level-flight state; this not only affects optical sighting, but also causes radar sighting to be subjected to certain effects.

Several species of clouds can cause aircraft to ice over. For example, in nimbostratus, altocumulus, stratocumulus, and stratus clouds, icing-over has a large effect on aircraft. Hence, besides installing de-icing equipment on aircraft, it is also necessary to provide meteorological support with accurate forecasts, and as much as possible to avoid icing clouds. Once icing does occur, one must rapidly alter the heading and flight speed, and break away from ice-over areas.

Poor visibility created by clouds and rainfall can affect aerial reconnaissance and photography; it also affects visual discovery and sighting of targets and radar target discrimination. Rain water falling onto a runway can reduce friction between the airplane wheels and runway, which increases the aircraft takeoff/landing taxi distance, and at

times can also cause a friction imbalance, affecting safe landing. Current advanced airfield and airborne equipment can ensure safe takeoff and landing for aircraft in zero visibility, but excessive slickness on runways after ice and/or snow buildup can affect aircraft takeoff and landing, and then one must adopt [snow/ice] elimination measures that can ensure safety.

(ii) Wind. Wind has all-around effects on the takeoffs and landings, flight, reconnaissance, bomb release, and firing of flight vehicles. Its effects on flight vehicles, based on its direction, can be divided into tailwinds, headwinds, crosswinds, and vertical gusts; and based on its speed, it can reach specific flow ranges per second.

Tailwinds can increase the taxi distance for aircraft takeoffs and landings, while headwinds reduce the taxi distance; hence, one normally chooses headwinds to effect landings. Tailwinds reduce an aircraft's flight time, while headwinds extend flight time. Aerial interception of enemy aircraft requires consideration for the effects of wind direction, or else there is no advance {chaoqian}, which causes falling behind. Tailwinds and headwinds each have different effects on surface bombing and strafing; one must calculate the winds at bombing and strafing altitudes and the mean winds from these altitudes down to the ground, and then make the sighting corrections, or else one will be unable to hit the target.

Crosswinds can cause aircraft to experience twists and dips, even to the point where they cause the aircraft to collide with the runway, or to dip and gyrate. In general, crosswinds of 6-8 m/s do not greatly impede modern aircraft takeoffs and landings, but if they exceed 11 m/s, twin-engine aircraft will have difficulty taking off and landing. Crosswinds can cause aircraft to deviate from the predetermined route, and if corrections for crosswinds are not made, it will be difficult to fly toward the predetermined target. Similarly, releasing bombs and firing, under crosswind conditions, require correction for crosswinds, or else the target cannot be hit.

The factors contributing to vertical gusts are mainly the various vortices and convergence zones in the atmosphere, and mountain range windward- or leeward-slope upflows or downdrafts. Clear sky sometimes also exhibits turbulence; since this is difficult to predict, the harm is relatively great, and has become a focus for research. Vertical gusts cause aircraft bumps, which affect flight and operational activities, even to the point of causing aircraft to crash.

Wind has a very large effect on paratroop airborne landings; it can cause paratroops to drift from the predetermined landing point. When encountering upflows, paratroop landings easily experience fairly large divergences, making it difficult for the paratroops to assemble per the predetermined plan, and affecting the overall airborne landing operation.

The effects of wind on the various flight vehicles depend not only on the wind direction, but also on the magnitude of the wind force. Normally, wind exceeding 10 m/s can create

a variety of relatively large effects. Gusts possess suddenness, easily cause aircraft bumps, and can produce severe effects on aircraft takeoffs and landings. Typhoons belong in the category of destructive weather, which not only affects aircraft flight in the air, but also often can damage aircraft on land or on a ship. Today, even with technical advances, so that the wind-resistance capability of various kinds of flight vehicles has been enhanced, in overall terms the effects of wind on flight vehicles still cannot be ignored.

(iii) Visibility. Visibility refers to the maximum range over which a human with normal vision can distinguish target objects from the background. Nighttime visibility is low. In addition, the degree of visibility normally is more or less determined by minute droplets and dust suspended in the air. Besides clouds and rain, dense fog, sand, smoke, and smoke screens all can reduce visibility. Aerial visibility includes three directions – horizontal, vertical, and oblique – which are one of the meteorological conditions determining air force flight activities. Although advanced airfields and airborne equipment can ensure aircraft safe takeoff and landing under zero-visibility conditions, and also ensure that aircraft under poor-visibility conditions can carry out an attack against a target, visibility nonetheless remains an important factor determining the opening or closing of an airfield, and the distribution of dangerous weather reports and warnings. Low visibility can cause pilots to lose clear sight of the horizon {tiandixian} and ground marks – and at night to lose sight of, or lose clear sight of, or incorrectly see luminous points.

Visibility has a relatively large effect on aircraft takeoff, landing, and aerial formation flying. Poor visibility easily causes an aircraft to deviate off course, or lose course; in air warfare, it also affects target searches and moreover affects aiming and firing; and it can also affect reconnaissance aircraft photography. Operations under poor-visibility conditions can only conduct activities with single planes or small formations; it is difficult in a short time to send out large numbers of planes to execute a concentrated strike, and for executing strikes against targets one must have special-purpose specified equipment support. Poor visibility not only produces unfavorable effects on coordination among an air force's various formations, but also has an even greater effect on adjusting-coordination among all of the services and arms.

The effects of visibility on an airborne [landing] force are also fairly large; not only does it affect safe landing, it also makes it difficult to determine bearing after landing, and difficult to rapidly concentrate to form combat power. However, poor visibility in fact is favorable to the concealment of airborne activities and intentions.

In addition, air temperature also has a certain effect on aviation forces' activities. Its level can change an engine's thrust, which affects the airspeed indicator and the takeoff/landing taxi distance.

4. Outer-space battlefield environment

Outer space refers to the cosmic space outside the earth's dense atmosphere, and is also called deep space, or just space. At the 32nd Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, convened in 1981, outer space was called the "4th environment," on a par with dry land, the seas, and the atmosphere. Thus, people are now also calling outer space the 4th-dimension battlefield, based on the 3-dimensional (land/sea/air) battlefield. Outer space, serving as a battlefield environment for military conflict, has a lower-limit range of 100-120 km, which is determined according to the flight altitude of spacecraft. Since the density of the earth's atmosphere below 100-120 km is relatively high, friction between the spacecraft in flight and the atmosphere can generate high temperature, causing the spacecraft to incinerate; and even if it does not burn up, the effect of atmospheric drag on the spacecraft can cause it to lose speed and drop to the ground. People have their various different partitions of outer space, although the upper limit is never clearly specified, and serves as an arena for human campaign combat – from the present viewpoint, this arena is mainly within the flight zones of the various spaceflight vehicles in motion around the earth. The flight altitude of the various types of spacecraft is not uniform; geostationary satellites have an orbital altitude of ~36,000 km, and based on the above conditions, some developed nations have determined that the future space battlefield altitude range will be within 130,000 km, or about the length of 10 earth diameters.

The effects of the outer-space battlefield environment on a campaign are prominently reflected in aspects of its effects on various flight vehicles. These mainly include the following few factors:

(i) The earth's gravity. Although gravity gradually decreases as altitude increases, the amplitude of this decrease is very small; at an altitude of 160 km, it only drops 1%, and even at an altitude of 2700 km, it decreases only by one-half (50%). When a flight vehicle needs to enter outer space, it first of all must have powerful sustained thrust. At the same time, after a flight vehicle enters outer space, so that it will not fall back into the atmosphere, it must overcome the pull of gravity, and overcoming gravity can only be accomplished by having the flight vehicle reach a certain speed. This in fact means: flight around the earth must attain the 1st cosmic velocity, 7.9 km/s; flight around the sun must reach the 2nd cosmic velocity, 11.2 km/s; and flight beyond the solar system requires reaching the 3rd cosmic velocity, 16.7 km/s.

(ii) Temperature. The ground temperature can have effects on all types of weaponry. Ground temperature differences between the equator and the two poles, and between summer and winter, can reach maxima of more than a few tens of degrees. And in outer space, due to the sparse air, there is no other medium to transmit temperature; a flight vehicle will have a temperature as high as 200°C for a sun-facing surface, but as low as -100°C for the opposite surface (in shadow) – a difference of up to 300°C. In space, far from a fixed star, the environmental temperature approaches absolute zero, while in the vicinity of a fixed star, temperature can be as high as several hundred to

several thousand degrees Celsius. This places very stringent requirements on the materials used in spacecraft components; not only must they withstand high temperatures, they must also resist low temperatures, and simultaneously they must also meet various high targets (indicators), such as light weight, and ease of realizing various effects. A space shuttle, before returning to earth, in order to resolve the temperature-difference problem, is forced to roll over its sun-facing side, so that its outer temperature reaches a uniform level.

(iii) Vacuum. Spaceflight requires overcoming the disadvantages introduced by vacuum. When the surface air pressure is 760 mm Hg, each cubic-centimeter volume contains ~240 quadrillion molecules. At a high altitude of 1500 km, atmospheric pressure is ~10-12mm Hg, and each cubic-centimeter volume contains ~32,000 molecules. Moreover, in interplanetary space, the average number of molecules or atoms contained in each cubic centimeter does not reach 100, and in interstellar space this average is only 10. In outer space, if there is no shielding for a flight vehicle's outer skin, and no oxygen-supply equipment, the oxygen atoms in a human body can immediately be cleared out completely, and this alone will prevent humans from surviving in outer space. Engine operation requires air, and an aircraft equipped with one typical engine has a climb altitude limit [i.e., ceiling] of 27 km.

(iv) Harmful radiation. Outer space's terrestrial space (the space from ~35,800 km and below) is a high-radiation environment. Solar electromagnetic radiation – X-rays and infrared rays – has certain effects both on the human body and on materials. Particle radiation coming from the earth's radiation belt, solar cosmic rays, and the Milky Way cosmic rays can seriously affect the environment. A series of corresponding protective measures must be adopted, in order to ensure the smooth performance of space activities.

(v) Weightlessness. Although the decrease in the earth's gravity as altitude increases is fairly small in amplitude, when a high altitude of several 10,000 km is reached, a spacecraft can experience serious weightlessness. Under these conditions, any extraneous tiny interference can cause roll or attitude change, which makes normal operation difficult. A spacecraft's manufacture must resolve the weightlessness problem, so the vehicle's flight attitude is controlled. At the same time, a variety of weightless-state-induced unfavorable effects on crew activities must be eliminated.

In addition, one must also resolve various kinds of harm to spacecraft and crew brought about by meteorites, space debris, silence, and loneliness. The outer-space battlefield environment is a special environment that is both known and at the same time still not deeply understood; with continuous deepening of such research, the outer space battlefield will assume further use and development, and the struggle for the outer space battlefield will further intensify.

5. Electromagnetic (EM) battlefield environment

With the widespread application of high and new science and technology (S&T) in the military field – and especially with the unprecedented development of information technology – the power of various kinds of military EM radiator (radar, communications, navigation) radiation sources is becoming ever greater, and quantitatively has increased many times over; also, the spectrum is growing ever wider; on top of which, the emergence of directed energy weapons (e.g. high-power microwave weapons), EM pulse bombs, and ultra-wideband and high-EM-radiation jammers has made the battlefield EM environment extremely complex. According to related reports, the frequency band of military EM radiation equipment approved for use by NATO has almost covered the entire common EM-wave spectrum.

Under informationized conditions, operational command cannot do without the EM environment, which has become an indispensable important factor under operational command and control. Communications and command systems – at any time, in any space, and at any point on the battlefield – are always in a certain EM environment, and the changing posture of the EM environment perforce induces changes in communications and command system states. For any one side, seizure of EM dominance has critical effects on mastery of battlefield operational information, on formation of operational command decisions, and on transmission and feedback of operational orders. From the viewpoint of practice in several recent localized wars under informationized conditions, operations always develop in a complex, changeable EM environment; the contest between the warring sides in the EM environment is more intense and more spectacular than in a mechanized war. Clearly, under informationized conditions, the effects of the battlefield's EM environment directly influence the realization of the combat effectiveness of weaponry, and determine survivability on the battlefield. Hence, the effective use of the EM environment, control of EM environmental effects, the seizure and holding of EM dominance, and then the effective boosting of command effectiveness and combat effectiveness, are major prerequisites and the utmost important factors in winning an informationized war campaign. The U.S. military has clearly stated: "Ensuring use of the EM spectrum is extremely important for the U.S. military's strategic and tactical systems' fulfillment of combat missions."

It is worth mentioning that since the EM environment is an objective reality that is "invisible and formless to the naked eye," regardless of whether in wartime or peacetime, a campaign commander must make good use of advanced information technology, fully bring into play the art of stratagem, enhance the protection and ruggedization of weaponry against EM damage, and be on alert for "electronic surprise attacks;" they must at the right moment seize a favorable EM environment, actively take the initiative to transform an EM environment, and do everything possible to disrupt and defilade the enemy's EM environment.

(2) Battlefield characteristics and battlefield preparations

1. Battlefield characteristics

Compared to past campaign battlefields, the modern campaign battlefield exhibits several new characteristics. These mainly include the following:

(i) An expansive space. The modern campaign battlefield has an extensive character; its space extends not only transversely, but also vertically. Campaigns in the past mostly were waged on land or mainly on land, and mostly had spaces ranging from a few tens of square kilometers to several hundred square kilometers. In the 1950s, the Shanggan Ridge campaign [i.e., the “Triangle Hill” and “White Horse Hill” battles of Oct. 1952] waged by the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army had a space of only 0.43 sq. km. Also, in the localized war campaigns since the 1970s, the battlespace has often involved a length and breadth of several hundred kilometers and even as much as 1000 km or more, and involved the warring sides’ far-reaching depth and even entire [national] territory. The range of the modern campaign battlefield – besides the scale required for politics and foreign relations, or for strict control of the war – is almost unlimited; the span of long-range raids and of the mobile interception range is extremely large.

The modern battlefield space’s vertical extension is especially prominent. First is its extension into the sky. Past air wars mostly were fought at a medium altitude of 1000-7000 meters; but with the emergence of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), forcing aviation forces to develop toward high altitude, many new types of aircraft today have a ceiling already exceeding 20,000 meters, and approaching 30,000 meters, which has significantly increased the space for the activities of campaign combat. In particular, the development of spaceflight technology has caused outer space to become a key constituent of the campaign battlefield, and has extended the campaign battlespace suddenly upward to almost 100,000 km. Second is its extension underwater (underground); the seas have become a more important campaign site. In the later stage of World War II, submarine dive depth was only ~100 meters, while for a modern submarine it is generally 300-500 meters, and up to 700 meters for some. One U.S.-built deep submersible experimental vessel has a dive depth now up to 1000 meters. With the widespread use of weapons with large-scale lethal destructiveness, the underground has become a closely watched, important arena; this has resulted not only in construction of a large number of air raid shelters, but also in the concealment underground of both key facilities and arms. Forces, by fully utilizing underground passages and facilities, frequently execute maneuvers and operations. Under these conditions, many types of weapons capable of deep earth penetration and destruction have emerged as the times require, and the underground thus has become an organic constituent part of the battlefield.

The expansive nature of the modern campaign battlefield is determined by the development of weaponry. With the continuous advances in S&T, the future battlefield will further expand toward every field.

(ii) The “5-dimension” integral whole. Past campaigns mostly were independent operations of each service, each activity occurring in a corresponding spatial range; land, sea, and air battlefields each had relatively high independence. However, in modern campaigns, all battlefields – land, sea, air, space, and EM – are interdependent, and form a closely connected whole. This mainly arises from the following two causes: the first is that the joint campaign is the basic form of a modern campaign; only by bringing into play the overall might of each battlefield’s operations can a campaign victory be seized. A joint campaign is an integrated operation jointly executed by all service arms, on land, at sea, and in the air; the connection among the various forces in a campaign is close, and centers on one campaign goal, bringing into play the overall effects. However, each service arm’s troops have their own maneuver space; integrated operations have determined the integrated spatial battlefield. The integral nature stressed in a modern campaign naturally also includes the integral nature of the campaign battlefield. The second cause is that in modern campaign operations, all of the battlefields – land, sea, air, space, and EM – are interrelated, intercoordinated, interdependent, and indispensable. The land battlefield is a base for the sea, air, and space battlefields; likewise, the sea battlefield also can serve as a base for the air and space battlefields. Air battlefield operations and the other battlefields’ operations support each other by coordinated action, but air operations in particular can directly and rapidly support each battlefield’s operations, and have become major prerequisites for overall campaign operations. The outer space battlefield’s intelligence and surveillance directly guide activities on the land, sea, and air battlefields; and anti-satellite and antimissile warfare can directly cover and protect each battlefield’s critical targets from discovery and damage. A strike on a key target in the enemy’s depth is itself a closely coordinated joint operation. The close coordination among all battlefield operations inevitably fuses all of the battlefields into a whole.

(iii) Nonlinear forms. In traditional battle, the opposing sides have a relatively clear battle line; differentiation of the front and the rear is fairly evident, the focus of the opposing sides’ combat is at the forward edge and at the frontal surface of one line, and the two sides, based on the campaign’s course, constantly throw in fresh forces and gradually advance toward the enemy’s depth. However, in modern campaign battle, friend and foe are very close to or interlinked with each other, even to the point where they sometimes mutually enter into the opponent’s far-reaching depth and attack; not only is there no clear battle line, there is also no clear distinction between the front and the rear, and there is also no marked difference between the front lines and the flanks. Thus, the battlefield’s external form assumes a complex state in which friendly forces are within the enemy and enemy forces are within friendly troops.

Modern campaigns not only develop in full-depth expansive space, but also penetrate into the ground, underground, sea surface, underwater, the air, and even outer space. On the ground, various types of mechanized equipment undergo altitude maneuvers; on the sea surface and underwater, various ships contend in different directions and at different depths; in the air, a variety of missiles and flight vehicles enter into intense combat; in outer space, various weapons assist and support all battlefield operations –

simultaneously with all of this, the opposing sides also launch attacks, so that campaign combat pervades the entire battlefield space.

The constant improvements in all sorts of weapons not only have boosted their capabilities for overcoming and surmounting complex terrain and water regimens, but also have enabled them to adapt to operations under a variety of meteorological conditions; adding to this is the widespread use of meteorological weapons on the battlefield, enabling campaigns to be continued in various special environments. At times, in order to enhance surprise, the attacking side also has the possibility for specialized use of special harmful environments to execute an active strike.

(iv) The status of the air battlefield is prominent. From the viewpoint of campaign practice in several recent localized wars, the status of the air battlefield is growing ever more prominent. In 1983, when the U.S. military invaded Grenada, the main forces thrown in were Army commandos and Marines; but in the entire operation – from amphibious landing to maneuvers, envelopment, outflanking, and attack – the vast majority of activities were conducted in the air. The military was held to have fought an aerialized {kongzhonghua} ground war. In the Gulf War, 1991, the full-course assault of the Coalition Forces was 42 days, while completion of the air strikes used up 38 of those days. In the 1980s, Israel's air strikes on Iraq's nuclear reactor and on the PLO headquarters, and the U.S. military's air strike on Libya – all of these were pure air operations. Some have gone so far as to hold that if a modern campaign lacks strong support in the air, then victory cannot be attained.

The prominent status of the air battlefield is because it has greater advantages and broader development prospects than the ground battlefield. In the air, one can advantageously look down from a commanding height, with enormous controlling power and influential power over the ground and the sea; no matter whether for observation or for fire, one point can control a large sector, the field of vision is wide, and the deterrent effect is large. The speed of air maneuvers is high; it is 10 or even dozens of times higher than that on the ground or at sea, is not subject to terrain constraints, and makes it easy to defeat one's opponent by a surprise move. The air is more advantageous to bringing into play a variety of advanced technologies, and electronic transmission in the skies has much better effects than on the ground. Airborne weapons, compared to ground weapons, have greater use value and a higher benefit-to-cost ratio, and in manufacturing respects yield higher benefit for the same expense. The beneficial status of the air battlefield has promoted a gradual shift in the focus of weapons production toward development of airborne weapons, which in fact has further boosted the prominent status of the air battlefield.

(v) The land battlefield is a support for all battlefields. Studies of modern campaign battlefields must fully and correctly understand the status effect and interrelationship among the various battlefields. The land, sea, air, and space battlefields of the 4-dimensional battlefield are mutually influential, interdependent for their existence, and form an interwoven, unified whole; but in the final analysis the land

battlefield is the end place for the other battlefields. First, the land battlefield is the place for human survival, and is also the end place for the entire war's fighting. This fighting, regardless of the battlefield, fundamentally speaking is always subject to the service of the land battlefield. Wars start from a land battlefield, and finally return to the land; the land battlefield is the decisive battlefield. Second, the land battlefield is an appendage to and support for the other battlefields. The higher and farther various flight vehicles fly, and the longer is their flight duration, the more they eventually need to land. With ships, the farther they sail, the more they need to pull in to shore for supply. The land battlefield is thus a base for the sea, air, and space battlefields. Although bases similarly can be established in outer space and at sea, such bases all require starting from land bases. In particular, under present conditions, each of the other battlefields has an extremely high dependence on land bases. Third, land targets are critical targets or first-choice targets against which [the forces on] each battlefield execute strikes. Even with more intense combat at sea or in the air, in the end the land targets must be finished off; direct strikes on land targets are advantageous to accelerating a campaign's course and directly achieving the campaign goals. Fourth, the land battlefield is the key point for battlefield construction and use. Not only are the weapon bases for all of the other battlefields on land, the quality of the land battlefield's own construction and use is very closely related to achieving victory in the entire campaign. This indirectly explains the status effect of the land battlefield.

2. Battlefield preparations

Battlefield preparations are all of the operational preparations conducted in a certain space for waging a campaign. They include familiarization with the battlefield environment, selection of an advantageous battlefield, and performing battlefield construction.

(i) Familiarization with the battlefield environment. A campaign commander, during the prewar period, based on the possible assumed mission and operational direction and the land (sea) area, studies and becomes familiar with the battlefield environment – first, in order to make preparations for the campaign plan {*jihua*} and for decisions, and second, to facilitate in wartime the full use of the environmental conditions to implement flexible command.

The campaign battlefield involves a wide spatial range, with no intervisibility. Hence, the familiarization on maps must be performed first. However, what are mainly reflected on maps are the terrain conditions and reliance on these for making operational decisions and for command is still far from enough; one should also simultaneously study relevant data: the operational area's military geography and military topology. By repeated comparative studies of the various kinds of data, based on fully striving to obtain a macroscopic thorough grasp of the operational area's terrain environment, the features of the theater's geographic environment are mastered. On this basis, operational reconnoitering {*zhanchang kancha*} is then performed; when the situation permits, the air and ground or sea (or water) reconnoitering should then be conducted, so as to enhance

perceptual knowledge. Land battlefield reconnoitering mainly ascertains situations such as the critical-quality high areas where one can control the entire battlefield and where can play a supporting role on the entire battlefield; it also ascertains the situation of terrain, passageways, and transportation hubs favorable to use. Sea battlefield reconnoitering mainly ascertains the situation of coastal terrain, regions advantageous to amphibious landing, docks and harbors, islands and reefs, marine hydrology, and strait channels.

To facilitate a comprehensive, in-depth understanding of the battlefield environment, one should also perform – in a focused, concentrated way – investigational surveys, invite personnel familiar with the local situation to introduce it, charge the proper specialized personnel with further testing and revision of relevant figures and data, and really learn how things stand at the center.

(ii) Selection of an advantageous battlefield. The modern campaign battlefield possesses very great uncertainties. First is that modern arms are not much subject to terrain constraints; any space always has the possibility of becoming a battlefield. Second is that a battlefield is not only determined by one's own side, it is at the same time also subject to the enemy's constraints. However, fundamentally speaking, the geographic environmental conditions are still the basis for the opposing sides' operations, and one cannot break away from and completely transcend these conditions. Added to this, campaign operations themselves stress stratagems and the spirit of initiative, in which what is very important is to force the enemy and lure the enemy into an operation under unfavorable conditions. Hence, selection of an advantageous battlefield is still a critical factor in gaining the upper hand in a campaign under modern conditions.

There are four main criteria for selection of a battlefield. The first is strategic intent; one must set out from the strategic overall situation, and in a specified operational direction and area range, select for waging the campaign the space that is most advantageous to achieving the strategic goal. The second is the geographic environmental conditions; mainly, based on the size of the battlefield capacity and the features of the geographic environment, one chooses a position and range for waging the campaign. The third is the enemy's situation; based on the specifics of the enemy's operation and on the enemy's possible main operational direction, one determines the main battlefield and the secondary battlefield. The fourth is our situation; based on one's own operational capability and equipment status, one facilitates one's ability to develop the strong points and avoid the weak points.

Different campaign patterns have different requirements on geographic environment; in terms of universal significance, when selecting a battlefield, one should have a firm grasp of the following four points: the first is that position is important. Defense requires selecting a key area that possesses major significance, can cover an important objective and area, is situated in an enemy offensive communications hub, and can check or exhaust the enemy's massed forces {zhongbing} groups; offense requires selecting an objective or area that has a major impact on the overall situation, and can at one point

settle and propel the overall situation. The second is that the geographic environment [should] be advantageous. On defense, one can be entrenched in a strategic place with difficult access; a forward edge and flank having advantageous terrain can be covered, which favors friendly maneuvers but disfavors the enemy's attack. On offense, geography [should] favor concealed closing with the enemy and unfolding an attack, facilitating coordinated operations by all of the services and arms and full use of firepower. The third is that supply is convenient; it can provide the campaign with material resources and various types of supply. The fourth is that the civilian situation is favorable; the populace politically [should] actively support – and militarily, energetically assist and participate in – the fighting.

(iii) Conducting battlefield construction. Battlefield construction includes military engineering construction, materiel reserve, battlefield data preparations, work with the masses, and campaign battlefield preparations.

Military engineering construction includes construction of a positional system; establishment of a stationing and quartermaster system for personnel, weapons, and equipment; and construction of transportation networks and their corresponding stations, docks and harbors, wharves, air fields, various command facilities, and rear supply facilities. Military engineering construction should follow the principles of fast and urgent at first and slower later, heavy at first and lighter later, and manufacture of products for both peacetime and wartime use; it should proceed according to plan and with stress on key points. At the same time, one should also pay attention to the terrain features, integrate the future possible forms for waging a campaign, and enhance the directed quality {zhenduixing} of the construction.

Battlefield materiel reserve is normally directed at a potentially occurring war; in conducting prewar reserves, there are mainly ammunition, equipment, fuels, pharmaceuticals, and foods. For reserves, one must successfully seize the time opportunity, being too early not only is inconvenient for preserving, it also facilitates mold damage. While reserving materiel, one should also – based on the situation of a campaign's possible duration – make good use of local materials, and carry out the preparations for production of military supplies and materiel. In a modern campaign, the requirements on preparations – water and motive power (especially electric power) – are very stringent; one should integrate peacetime production and livelihood to establish various kinds of facilities, to facilitate a wartime capability for self-support.

The various kinds of battlefield materiel preparation are one of the important tasks in battlefield preparations. One must conduct a detailed collection of preparations for the overall operational area and the various types of operation-related data, such as terrain, hydrological, meteorological, transportation, and communications data; and one must continually complement and improve upon the original basis. Ample materiel preparations not only are required by commanders to implement battlefield command, but are also required for force-unit {budui} activities and for bringing into play the optimal effectiveness of various kinds of weapons.

The efficacy of battlefield work with the masses is very closely related to a campaign's success or failure. Based on a full understanding of the situations of the battlefield military and civilian numbers and structure, and of the political attitude, one must enhance the ties to the masses, and assist the masses in performing production and construction. One must conduct propaganda among the masses, and arouse the broad masses' patriotic fervor and sense of justice. Assisting the local governments in building good relations between the troops and the people, and conducting military training in a focused manner, will facilitate to the greatest extent the exploitation of the potential of People's War.

Campaign battlefield preparations must be performed under a unified plan {jihua} and leadership, and stress should be laid on maintaining secrecy and concealing the intention. With the continual use of a variety of weapons on the battlefield, operations will continually open up new fields, and hence will also cause a constant increase in the objective factors affecting the battlefield; campaign directors must establish new battlefield concepts, and enhance in-depth studies on all essential elements of the battlefield, so as to adapt to the requirements of future operations.

III. Campaign Time...53

Campaign time refers to the entire course of preparations, commencement, and conclusion of one campaign. Time is one form in which all moving matter exists, and naturally also should be an objective form in which campaign activities {huodong} exist. Among campaign activities, campaign time is an exceedingly important objective essential element. Every phase of campaign development and every activity {xingdong} in the campaign course has the time variable as its basic condition, and they all also have time as the objective form in which they exist. Away from time, a campaign cannot exist; to talk about a campaign away from the time would also completely lack significance. A campaign acts as a relatively advanced form of military confrontation; the time has special requirements on it, and has a constraining and influencing effect on a campaign's success or failure. Under high-tech conditions, the effects of the time factor become increasingly important. Hence, research on campaign preparations and execution surely must do the following: stress their time environment, time field of view, and time scale; examine and analyze the changes in and updates to the sense of time; and do the utmost in campaign practice to conscientiously master and put to use the time factor.

(1) Inherent traits of campaign time and its basic functions

1. Inherent trait

In the campaign category, there are very many time-related concepts. From different viewpoints, campaign time can have different divisions. Based on the order of the campaign activity {huodong}, this time can be divided into campaign preparations time, campaign implementation time, and campaign conclusion time, as well as campaign rest and reorganization time. Based on the time sequence of campaign implementation, it is

divided into primary campaign time and follow-up campaign time. From the viewpoint of the course of campaign activities, the inherent basic traits of campaign time are manifested as duration quality, phased quality {jieduanxing}, and sequential quality.

Duration quality {chixuxing} reflects the length of the full course of the campaign activity {huodong}. Time is one-dimensional, unidirectional, and irreversible. Hence, it is the sum reflection of the specific and localized campaign activity {huodong} times within a single campaign. Any campaign or campaign activity {huodong} is a continuously performed and change-developing process; moreover, they all have a mutually interconnected continually developing process of past, present and future. During this process, each specific or localized activity {huodong} of a campaign is interlinked, and connects the preceding with the next, thus forming the duration time {chixu shijian} [sustained time] of an intact campaign. A campaign's duration time is normally reflected with time segments, such as several days, ten-odd days, and several months.

Phased quality {jidianxing} refers to a gradual-progress quality of the campaign process. It is a form of expression distinguishing the different development phases in the campaign's course. In order to effectively implement a campaign or to achieve results when a campaign's external environmental conditions determine that the campaign's overall objectives cannot be achieved in a single operational activity, a campaign normally gradually achieves sub-objectives over a series of operational activities, and finally achieves the campaign's overall objectives. Therefore, campaign activities in one sense are expressed as one continuous, unbroken development process, and in another sense it has a law of "cycles", it is conducted with tempo and step-by-step, and thus campaign time inevitably takes on a phased quality. This phased quality is the most effective inherent trait in campaign time. Since the emergence of the campaign, people have discovered and recognized the phased quality law of a campaign, and have consciously employed this law in campaign operations research {yunchou}, organization, and implementation. For example, when a commander organizes the plan {jihua} and implements a campaign, he will divide the campaign into a number of campaign phases, allowing them to be interlinked. He will create conditions for a campaign's latter phase development with the previous phase's results by adjusting-coordination of campaign strengths. And in order for the latter phase to more effectively inherit and develop the previous phase's results, he will thus render campaign development to have adjusting-coordination qualities, a balanced quality, and a tempo quality. The length of a campaign phase is normally expressed by use of time segments. It is obvious that it cannot be greater than the campaign duration time.

The third inherent trait in campaign time is the sequential quality {shunxuxing}. From the macroscopic viewpoint, a campaign phase gradually progresses from start to finish, and has a trait of not leaping over, so its division should be based on a campaign's specific situation, with a preceding [part] and a latter [part], and it expresses the sequence of time. From the microscopic viewpoint, all of the specific, individual, and localized activities {xingdong} within the developing campaign activity {huodong} all

have a definite sequence. Hence, the phase differentiation of a single campaign has a definite time sequence, the overall planning {chouhua} procedure {chengxu} of one concept {fangzhen} has a definite time sequence, and the arrangement of the various strengths and their activities within a plan {jihua} also has a definite time sequence. Fundamentally speaking, these are decided upon because campaign goals cannot be achieved with a single operational activity. Hence, the sequential quality of campaign time is the basic assurance for smoothly achieving the campaign's anticipated goals {yuqi mudi}. Only by fully grasping sequential quality can a commander genuinely overall plan {chouhua} and guide a campaign according to the basic movement laws of a campaign {zhanyi de jiben yundong guilyu}, otherwise, the campaign will fall into chaos.

The duration quality, phased quality, and sequential quality of campaign time are interrelated. First of all, all three are recognized as inherent traits of campaign time. Second, the sequential quality of campaign time is reflected in – or in other words is contained in – the duration quality and phased quality of campaign time. Third, duration quality normally includes a certain phased quality, and this is manifested in the sequential quality of campaign time.

2. Basic functions

The various functions of campaign time are reflected in the relationship between time and the many facets of campaign practice. They basically can be divided into the control function, the synergistic function, and the transforming function.

The control function refers to the impact of a commander's use of time on standardization of generation of campaign activities. That is, during campaign preparations and operational practice, by seeing that campaign activities are established on the basis of a time-sequenced structure, and thus overcoming the chaos of campaign activities, one achieves and maintains a stable operational sequence. Drawing upon the control function of campaign time, commanders can – based on a specific concept and plan {jihua} – achieve a campaign's anticipated goals. In reality, regardless of what campaign control mode one is in – control of the objective or control of the plan – and regardless of the duration or time of implementation of control measures, the time factor is always an important criterion and standard.

The synergistic function means the high benefits obtained by the campaign's opposing sides by use of time, generating a positive effect on the campaign's course. Since the content of a modern campaign's operational activities is complex, the operational tempo fast, and the strengths invested diverse, these require that no matter whether in terms of activities or in terms of strengths, there should always be close complementation and coordination in terms of time between the various links of a campaign. Only thus can there be ordered adjusting-coordination and overcoming of chaos so as to tightly combine the various systems {xitong} of a campaign. The synergistic function requires relying upon a full understanding of the time sequence changes in all aspects and layers of a campaign in order to forecast the campaign's final orientation, as well as the cyclic

changes of campaign phases. Only thus can one maintain a clear campaign development direction and objective, and maintain a favorable campaign tempo so as to lay the foundation for victory in the campaign. The synergistic function is also manifested in terms of utilizing combat opportunity, namely, this is adopting an activity at the most appropriate time, and in this way, one can gain twice the result with half the effort.

The transforming function refers to campaign time changes being able to generate transforming quality effects on the content of the campaign activity {huodong}. Campaign time and the content of campaign activity are interrelated, mutually restrictive, and under certain conditions mutually transforming. For example, campaign rest and reorganization expends time, but it restores and enhances combat power {zhandouli}; extension of defense time is beneficial for reducing losses in defensive space.

(2) Basic characteristics of modern campaign time

Campaign time in different eras has different characteristics. With the continuous application of high technology in the military, the operational capability of weaponry and troops has constantly risen, impelling the continual development of the campaign, which now possesses several new characteristics. Campaign time acts as the form in which the campaign activity exists, and also surely will assume a new development trend, embodying new characteristics.

1. Shortening the duration quality

This is determined by diverse causes. The first is the prominent strategic quality of modern campaigns, stressing the overall might brought into play by the joint operations of all the services. Second is the constant improvement in the performance of high-tech weaponry; this has increased strike lethality, has provided a material basis for curtailing of campaign duration, and has greatly reduced the response time of modern weapons and equipment, which has provided the conditions for accelerating the campaign course. Third is the implementation of campaigns under unreciprocating {buduideng} conditions. Fourth is the widespread application of various operational support systems, which greatly shortens the time for each decision-making item of the campaign activity. Fifth is the enormous consumption in a modern campaign; both sides strive for quick battle-quick decision {suzhan sujue}. These causes have significantly increased the utilization rate of campaign time, and have continuously increased the activity density per unit time. Therefore, the duration of a modern campaign is significantly shorter than that of prior campaigns; it may be the time used for a single major battle in the past. To give some examples, the operational duration of the U.S. military's invasion of Grenada was only 8 days; the duration of operational activities in the U.S. military's air strike on Libya was 15 hours, with the air-strike operation per se only taking 12 minutes; and the Gulf War and Iraq War only took 42 days and 43 days, respectively.

2. Improved precision quality

Various kinds of electronic equipment, precision guided munitions, stealth weapons, and night-vision devices have gradually taken over a dominant position on the battlefield; they have not only greatly increased the accuracy of time, but also required that the computation of time must be more precise. Simultaneously, they have also required that operational activities and plans {jihua} must be coordinated in time with a high degree of accuracy. For example, if air operations time is several seconds different from the plan time, this will harm the coordinated operational capability of operational aircraft. Another example: concentrating force strength and firepower certainly must have a high degree of accuracy and consistency in time; otherwise, the effectiveness of the concentration will be degraded. In addition, the widespread application of high technology in the military not only has increased the accuracy of firepower maneuver and of force strength injection, it has also provides a campaign commander with more aided decision-making means. This greatly boosts the capabilities of a commander to gather information, process information, conduct decision making, and ad hoc command, and – while organizing, planning, and commanding a campaign – one can accomplish more precise operations research {yunchou}. To this end, in the arrangement of time-unit divisions for each campaign activity {huodong}, one must be even more careful and certain activities {huodong} must be precise to the minute or second as the permissible range for time difference grows ever smaller. Hence, a modern campaign requires that campaign large formations in their activities {xingdong} cannot have even minute carelessness, no matter whether in combined operational activities or in joint operational activities, one must always maintain high precision adjusting-coordination consistency.

3. Fuzziness of the phase quality

One expression of the contention between the opposing sides in a campaign is the opposing commanders' meticulous arrangement of the transitions between the various campaign phases. In modern campaigns, the constant improvement in weaponry performance, as well as the development of campaign theory, has increasingly shortened the intervals between the campaign phases. The time segments for some campaign phases constantly overlap and intersect, causing the clear outlines between conventional campaign phases to tend toward fuzziness. This is expressed as follows: on one hand, the transitions between campaign phases become even shorter; on the other hand, some campaigns do not undergo clear phase transitions. The fuzziness of the phased quality is a major trend in modern campaign development.

(3) Use of campaign time

If one wants to achieve victory in a modern campaign, one must conscientiously study campaign time, integrate the processes of the various campaign activities, and use campaign time in the most reasonable, most effective manner.

1. One must strive to optimize the relationship between time and space

Any campaign process always occurs within a certain time and space. In order to obtain the greatest operational benefit, commanders should take the overall plan {*jihua*} time as their guide, and strive to optimize the tempero-spatial system. First, they must focus on the time quality of a plan. They must establish a time sequence and time-space sequence for all plans related to a campaign's overall situation. Second, they must focus on the plan quality of time. Based on a campaign's overall intention, the duration of campaign operations is taken as a whole for the plan, the operational activities for each campaign phase and continuation are outlined, and a reasonable time-space relationship is formed; in a reasonable space, one can reasonably plan and spend the time, and thus more rapidly achieve the campaign intention. For an optimized time-space relationship, one should grasp two points: first, one must grasp the laws of campaign development, and scientifically compute the time. When computing time, one should focus on the need to precisely calculate and precisely operate the time sequence of every operational activity and the use of all force-strengths and weaponry. Computation of campaign time should accurately consider the interrelationship and constraints among time and each spatial dimension, as well as their impact and constraints on the entire campaign process. Second, one must reasonably fix a campaign time limit. The time limits of an optimized campaign time-space relationship generally can be divided into three categories: same-start time limits, same-finish time limits, and synchronous time limits. Same-start time limits place limits on the unified commencement time for each campaign activity; same-finish time limits place limits on the unified conclusion time for every campaign activity; and synchronous time limits will restrict each operational activity's process – from start to finish – to a certain time segment.

2. One must at the right moment utilize and actively create favorable time-opportunities

A time-opportunity is a moment or time segment of operational activity {*huodong*} by both sides. A similar campaign activity {*huodong*} at different times will achieve very different results. The time-opportunity problem exists within all campaigns, but in a campaign under informationized conditions, this problem seems especially prominent. Hence, a campaign commander must fully grasp the characteristics of different time-opportunities, and work towards placing the various campaign activities {*huodong*} at the most appropriate time-opportunity.

The modern campaign battlefield situation changes rapidly; the confrontational situation varies minute by minute, and the conditions present a more blurred picture. Control over operational methods, forces, firepower application, campaign processes, tempos, and the like, will all become abnormally complex and difficult; hence, the time remaining for a time-opportunity is extremely short, and selection and use of an opportunity will be more difficult. To this end, one must be adept at recognizing a favorable time-opportunity. Firstly, one must conduct a comprehensive analytical assessment of one's own, the enemy's, weather, and geographic conditions within the same time, and then select an

time-opportunity favorable to one's own side and unfavorable to the enemy. Among these, one must especially focus on the campaign "apex" {dingdian} problem; for example, in an offensive campaign, when an "apex" instant will soon arise, or at the time of approach of an enemy counterattack (decisive counterattack), timely partial or complete suspension of strike operational activities, or temporarily going on the defensive, prevents falling into a passive state, due to lack of a "counter-counter [attack]" capability, when an offensive "apex" appears. A campaign commander must also grasp natural knowledge, be good at using the weather, and understand time- and season-based arrangement of opportunities for campaign activities. Secondly, one must be adept at utilizing favorable time-opportunities. A time-opportunity has a very strong time-effectiveness quality. It requires a commander to have sharp discernment and a rapid reaction capability, and to promptly go and use it, avoiding its use too early or too late. For example, in concentrating strengths – no matter whether the concentration is of force-strengths or firepower – if done too early, one can easily reveal one's own operational intention, and thus cannot achieve suddenness; if done too late, one can then let the time-opportunity slip past, and cannot reach the goal of the concentration. In view of this, a commander must be adept at standing at the height of the overall situation, examining the time to measure the circumstances {审时度势 shenshi duoshi}, knowing what's coming from a small clue {jianwei zhizhu}, and accurately grasping the time-opportunity to concentrate strengths. Third, one must fully bring into play subjective dynamic quality, flexibly apply stratagem means, and create favorable time-opportunities. Time-opportunities have three different situations: the first is the inevitable quality of time-opportunity during the campaign process; the second is the accidentally appearing time-opportunity during the campaign process, and the third is the artificially created time-opportunity during the campaign process. These three kinds of time-opportunities should be successfully mastered [grasped], but the third kind of time-opportunity requires fully bringing into play a commander's subjective, flexible, and planning qualities {jihuaxing}, and requires bringing into play superb stratagem skill. To create a time-opportunity, one must thoroughly know stratagems and be far-sighted. Fourthly, one must comprehensively analyze and grasp the time-opportunity from the perspective of the overall situation. The strategic quality of modern campaigns is prominent; it is subject to constraints by factors such as political, economic, and diplomatic struggles {douzheng}. Hence, one must not only consider time-opportunities on the battlefield, but also give consideration to and take advantage of favorable time-opportunities for struggle in the political, economic, and diplomatic realms. One must not only employ military means to grasp and create time-opportunities, but also fully employ a variety of means – political, economic, and diplomatic – to create and select time-opportunities. One must not only consider the posture of the battlefield, but also consider the postures of the political, economic, and diplomatic struggles and their development trends; perform a comprehensive, integrated analysis; and weigh the advantages and the disadvantages. Thus, one selects a time-opportunity most advantageous to one's own side.

3. One must have sufficient campaign preparations time

The special quality and complexity of modern campaign preparations lead to an increase in the time for preparations. The opposing sides in a campaign – and especially the side with an active attack – must have ample time for campaign preparations. Modern campaigns are not only confrontations in the military arena, but are also confrontations in the political, economic, and diplomatic fields; campaign confrontations are directly subject to the control and influence of national strategy. A campaign's goals and means, time and space, course and outcome are directly subordinate to, and serve a country's strategic objectives. Hence, a commander during campaign preparations must stand at the height of the strategic overall situation and conduct stratagem-planning of a campaign from the perspective of the integrated-whole interests of the nation's politics, economics and diplomacy. Thus, the military struggle needs a sufficient amount of time to create a desirable and big environment for campaign initiation from the perspective of the political, economic and diplomatic struggles. A modern campaign is generally a confrontation between immense campaign operational systems {tixi} that is constituted from the campaign strengths, various weapon systems and operational support systems of all services which must consume large amounts of material resources. Campaign preparations can involve every layer of a theater; moreover, sometimes they can involve authorities associated with the entire military and even the entire nation, which facilitates concentrating the entire military's crack troops and efficient weapons, to fight a high-tech campaign. Therefore, one must conduct necessary preparations during peacetime. Before campaign initiation, one also needs a specific imminent battle preparation time so as to firmly grasp the further implementation of campaign preparation work. This includes further improving the positional [emplacement] systems {zhendi tixi}, overhauling and additional repairs of various facilities and equipment, replenishing materiel and equipment, and inspecting the work of the masses, as well as organizing imminent battle training. Only on the basis of sufficient preparations can one ensure the effective conduct of a campaign.

4. One must have a good grasp of campaign tempo

Adaptation to, and mastery of campaign tempo are of major significance to a thorough understanding of the speed of a campaign's course, the length of the campaign activity {huodong} cycle, the degree of urgency of operational levels, and the joining of operations to the rest-and-reorganization phase and other phases. Under informationized conditions, the operational preparations time of campaign strengths has shortened, maneuver capability has improved, assault speed has increased, the spacing between operations is gradually disappearing, and the duration of operational activities has gradually shortened, thus causing an acceleration of campaign tempo. For example, in a typical positional offensive campaign in World War I, attack speed was only a few tens of meters per day, the tactical penetration operational phase often required maintaining for several weeks or even for a longer time, and depth extension operations also required several tens of days; campaign tempo seemed extremely slow. In World War II, due to the huge increase achieved in the destructive capability of firepower, and to the rapid

maneuver capability bestowed on operational groups by mechanization, campaign large formations acquired a capability for high-speed penetration, the duration of several operational phases – tactical penetration, campaign expansion, campaign encirclement – was greatly shortened, and the links between the campaign’s various phases grew tighter, greatly accelerating campaign tempo. The duration of Germany’s first strategic offensive campaign against France was 25 days, of which the time for the active attack was 18 days; during this period, the average attack speed along the primary direction was 18-20 kilometers per day. Since the 1980s, campaign tempo has significantly increased. During the Soviet Army’s Afghanistan invasion war, the Soviet Army’s east/west 2-route assault group – under the coordination of paratroops, air-landed troops, and armored helicopters – executed a 3-D penetration, and in 1 week had completed the capture of Afghanistan, with a mean speed of as much as 120 km/day. In the Gulf War, the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Assault Division (of the XVIII Airborne Corps) executed two airborne assaults against the Iraqi Army in depth, with attack speeds reaching 150 km/day and 280 km/day, respectively. Moreover, the entire ground offensive campaign during the Gulf War only lasted 4 days. The reasons for the acceleration of campaign tempo follow: the first is that the military possesses powerful campaign firepower. The second is that the maneuver capability of troops, arms, and firepower has been enhanced. The third is that advanced operational command systems have enhanced command and control of the battlefield, troops, and weapon systems, which has enhanced operational activities’ foreseeability, planned quality {jihuxing}, and ordered quality, which in turn has enhanced the flexibility and rapidity of responses. The fourth is the widespread application of large amounts of night-vision equipment, giving campaign activities a 24-hour/day continuous execution capability.

This high-speed quality of modern campaign tempo has increased the difficulty of mastery of campaign tempo. If one wants to correctly understand a modern campaign’s tempo, one must first understand the factors of campaign tempo. These factors include the campaign strengths of both-sides, the battlefield, time, and stratagems. All of these can impact time changes of campaign activities, and accelerate or retard campaign tempo, thus lengthening or shortening the campaign course. Next, one must understand the generational features of campaign tempo. Due to a modern campaign’s force-strength and firepower maneuvers, the decision-making, stratagem-planning {mouhua}, and controlling of campaign command all show a trend toward rapid tempo. Hence, in the overall campaign tempo rapidly becoming a law of campaign development, a commander must rapidly react, in order to be able to adapt to the requirements of that campaign law. Third, one must understand the principles and methods of adjusting and arranging tempo. From the viewpoint of principles, although campaign tempo is accelerating, in the process of directing a campaign one still must adjust and arrange well the speed and degree of urgency of campaign tempo. For example, in an offensive campaign, the tempo corresponding to the organization and planning phase is relatively slow; one must carefully organize, fully prepare, have everything in good order, conduct concealment, and – after having assurance of these achievements – then act. However, in the campaign execution phase, one must emphasize the attack’s high speed, and the sudden fierce, rapid, and continuous assault on the enemy. In a defensive campaign, the organization and planning phase tempo is perforce faster; it requires fast reaction, accurate decisions,

Careful organization, prompt defense, and maximum reduction of the losses in the enemy's early strike. From the viewpoint of methods, one generally must adopt methods to try to achieve coordinated, balanced development of the campaign course, including the throwing in of troops and firepower, and the use of offensive and defensive means and methods – all of these require one's best effort at coordinated, balanced development. For example, when formulating campaign plans {jihua}, one must allow for unforeseen circumstances, have in hand adequate long-range firepower, and establish strong reserve forces, thus avoiding weakness in the rear (while having strength at the front) and a lack of reserve strength, or being unable to deal with external events, leading to speed at the front but slowness in the rear. In addition, one can also employ reinforced troops, firepower density, and maneuver speed to upset the enemy's tempo, while simultaneously adjusting one's own campaign tempo, so as to effectively shorten the campaign course. However, at times, in order to adjust-coordinate force-unit activities, build up forces, and immobilize and disintegrate the enemy, adoption of various methods for adjusting campaign tempo, and retarding it – envelopment, delayed attacks {huan gong}, encirclement without attack, and careful biding of one's time – will be beneficial to the smooth development of a campaign.

5. One must correctly understand and process the relationship between a “quick decision” {sujue} and “protracted” {chijiu} [warfare]

The duration of modern campaign operations has relatively shortened; but in a specific campaign, the attacking side seizes the initiative by launching a campaign, and strives to employ various types of strengths, using active operational means and activities, to seek out and discover the enemy's weak point(s), fully bring into play its own superiority, reduce depletion during the campaign, and strive for a “quick decision” within the shortest possible time, to achieve the campaign intention. However, the side finding itself on the defensive mostly is in a passive position in the campaign's early phase; and in order to change this passive posture, only by a tenacious defense and aggressive counterattack, via repeated contention with the enemy, can it shake off this passive situation in the campaign's early phase, and strive – on the basis of a “protracted” resistance, by using the means of active attack – to amplify the attacking side's depletion, and [thus] gradually change from passive to active. Since the side conducting the active offensive normally seeks a quick decision to defeat the enemy, in terms of thought and psychology [mentality], they do not have preparations for sustained [protracted] operations; thus, once the defending side has smashed the attacking side's goal of a quick decision to defeat the enemy, it can psychologically create pressure against the attacking side, and this assists the defending side in psychologically achieving the conversion from passive to active. Moreover, the defending side, once it drags the campaign operations into a protracted stage, can reduce the attacking side's expectations, and deny the latter's intention, so as to enhance confidence in a defensive victory. From the standpoint of campaign activities, the defending side, in the midst of a passive early-phase overall situation, seeks a partial (or localized) initiative, and then from that partial initiative, it gradually expands to an active state for the overall situation. If the defending side drags out the campaign into a protracted state, making the attacking side's campaign goal difficult to rapidly achieve, then it can cause the attacking side to abandon the offensive

and conclude the campaign. For example, the U.S. military, during the Vietnam War, lasting as long as 14 years, and the Korean War, lasting less than 4 years, had the early-phase initiative in both, and strove for a rapid victory in both; but in the end, following the prolongation of the [war]time, they fell into a protracted state. Hence, no matter whether in an offensive position or in a defensive position, all commanders must understand the dialectical relationship in time between a “quick decision” and a “protracted” state, and attain very good knowledge of offensive and defensive operations; in this way they can guide the campaign’s development in a direction advantageous to their own side.

Chapter 2 The Creation and Development of Campaigns...63

Section 1: The Emergence and Development of Campaigns...63

I. The Emergence of Campaigns...63

The campaign is an operational form-state {xingtai} that appeared after war and combat. It is an inevitable product of social productivity and human warfare practice developing to a certain phase and its emergence has undergone a long and slow process of development.

Toward the end of the slavery era, the development of production power and population growth in states provided ample supply of manpower for the military. The subsequent growth in the size of the military provided an impetus for change in the inner organization of the military, which in turn led to developments in the modes and methods of war. These developments served as a catalyst for the emergence of the campaign. With expanded war scales, development in war practices and prolongation of durations of war and its continuity, operational forms {xingshi} and patterns {yangshi} of war began to change. Campaigns subsequently emerged as a class of activity on the battlefield. In addition, the needs-requirements of the goals of war and subjective guidance have also pushed forward the appearance of campaigns from a rational aspect.

In China, as early as the pre-Spring and Autumn Period (770-475 B.C.), some battles with certain campaign characteristics made their debut, for example, the Mingtiao Battle during the war in which the Shang Dynasty vanquished the Xia Dynasty, and the Muye Battle during the war in which King Wu of the Zhou Dynasty vanquished the Shang Dynasty. During the Spring and Autumn Period, frequent battles for supremacy and of conquest took on distinct characteristics of campaigns. For instance, the Battle of Changshao of 684 B.C. fought between the Kingdoms of Qi and Lu during the war for supremacy over central China waged by Lord Heng of the Kingdom of Qi was called “a little campaign” by Mao Zedong in his “On the Strategies of Revolutionary Wars in China.” If one believes that ancient Chinese campaigns began to germinate after the Battle of Changshao, then the Battle of Chengpu of 632 B.C. fought between the Kingdoms of Jin and Chu during their war for supremacy over central China far exceeded the scope of an ordinary battle. It took on an embryonic form of a campaign. More than one hundred years later, the first campaign in ancient China made its debut – the Battle of Baiju fought between the Kingdoms of Wu and Chu.

The Battle of Baiju of 506 B. C. fought between the Kingdoms of Wu and Chu, in view of the participating strengths, the operational goals, the organizing of plans {jihua} and command, and the composition of operational activities, bore the basic attributes of a campaign. First of all, the Battle of Baiju consisted of a series of battles and operational activities. Under a unified intention, planning and command and with a unified goal, the

two sides engaged in battle used their respective main force and conducted, on a vast battlefield, a series of combat and operational activities, including the Han River Standoff, the Decisive Battle of Xiangju, the Battle of Pursuit at Shenyuan and the Capture of the Capital of Chu Kingdom. Secondly, the two sides each deployed several dozen thousand troops, mobilizing all their main forces in all-out operations. Thirdly, the battle lasted dozens of days. Historical records clearly indicated that from the time the Wu and Chu began to deploy their respective forces at Baiju on the 19th of November in 506 B.C. to the time of the fall of Ying, the capital of the Kingdom of Chu, into the hands of Wu forces on the 29th of November, the battle lasted 11 days. Adding the time for the thousand li surprise attack by the Wu army, the storming of three passes, and the Han River standoff, the actual duration of the battle was estimated to have run dozens of days. Fourthly, the operations affected a large area. Direct engagement by both sides were fought in an area of more than ten thousand square kilometers, running from Xinyang in the north to the Han River in the south, and from Baiju in the east to the city of Ying in the west. Fifthly, the operational activities were conducted under a unified command. In addition to the kings of the two states being present to supervise the battle, the Wu army was under the unified command of Fu Kai, brother of He Lu - the King of Wu, and commanding General Xun Wu, whereas on the Chu side, operations were uniformly directed by the supreme commander, Yin Zichang and others. Sixthly, in the Battle of Baiju, the Wu army achieved the goal in the war that affected the overall situation. After dealing a decisive blow to the Chu army, the Wu army captured the capital of Chu at one stroke, thus determining decidedly the course and the outcome of the whole war.

In other parts of the world, campaigns can trace their origin to the Marathon Battle during the Greek-Persian War of 492 B.C. The battle bore many characteristics of a campaign.

During the fifth century B.C., an embryonic form of sea campaign began to emerge. The naval battle between the state of Wu and the state of Yue in the Yellow Sea in China, and the Battle of Salamis between the navies of Greece and Persia were representative of such naval engagements.

II. Development of Campaigns...64

Ever since their emergence, campaigns have undergone a process in which they evolved and developed from simple to complex and from rudimentary to more advanced. Judging by development and change in the weaponry, the development of campaigns has undergone historical phases of “cold weaponry” era to “hot weaponry” era to thermo-nuclear weaponry era. And now we are moving toward the information era.

“Cold weaponry” era: In China, this era of “cold weaponry” roughly ended in the 12th century A.D. during the North Song dynasty. In the rest of the world, the era came to a close around the 14th century A.D. – with the introduction of gunpowder manufacturing skills from China to Europe. Campaign patterns during this era were mainly field warfare, attack and defense of fortresses and sea warfare. Field warfare was often fought over plains and open fields with the opposing sides first lining up in formations and then

following with attacks on each other at close quarters. The basic formation was the phalanx. With the growth in types of arms, foot soldiers were joined by chariots and the cavalry in mixed formations, and the flexibility and mobility of battle formations were gradually expanded. More and more attention was devoted to the use of reserves. Better advantage was also taken of different terrains. Battles were no longer restricted to plains and open fields. Most battles were still fought in frontal engagement, but a lot of emphasis was placed on winning through surprise attacks. In terms of operational methods, the most widely used methods were simultaneous attack from both the front and the rear, attack from the flanks, ambush and sneak attacks. Attacks on and defense of fortresses during the cold weaponry era were typical positional warfare. The defense of a fortress was considered a more advantageous operational pattern. It mainly relied on the enclosure wall and the surrounding trenches or the moat. Sometimes, other fortifications and barriers were also constructed for better defense. The focus of such battles though was consistently centered along the wall and its periphery. In the assault on a fortress, the main strategies included laying siege and forcing the enemy to surrender because of starvation and exhaustion, surprise attack, and encouraging defection and other stratagems. To storm a fortress by stacking up, digging a tunnel or by using other instruments, generally speaking, would exact a heavy toll on the attacker. Therefore, the leading thought in this regard regarded such strategy not as the best choice, but as last resort. The main modes of sea battle engagement were boarding battles, and other times the ramming of the enemy's vessel. In sea battles, such tactics as attacking simultaneously from the front and the rear, attacking from the flanks and other directions were also used. In China, typical campaigns in this era included the Battle of Chengpu, the Battle of Baiju, the Battle of Lize, the Battle of Changping, the Battle of Chenggao, the Battle of Guandu, the Battle of Chibi, and the Battle of Yihulao at Luoyang. Typical foreign campaigns included the Battle of Marathon, the Battle of Cannae, etc.

Era of "cold and hot weaponry:" This era in China lasted for 900 years beginning in the North Song Dynasty and ending in the mid-Qing Dynasty. In the rest of the world, the era began in the 14th century and ended in the 17th century. With the emergence of "hot weaponry," the cavalry began to decline. Foot soldiers armed with "hot weaponry" re-emerged as the dominant force in the battlefield. With growth in the range and destructive power of "hot weaponry," the role of close-quarter fighting with "cold weaponry" increasingly became subordinate. Campaign *bushi* disposition and operational formations underwent constant changes. In the 16th century, in order to avoid casualties by enemy artillery fire, loose columns replaced ancient phalanx formations in battles. By the end of the 16th century, the ratio of musketeers in the military units increased. Linear columns emerged in order to take advantage of their firepower. In the 17th century, linear columns were widely used. The use of gun power and artillery also greatly spurred the development of urban offensive and defensive campaigns. To capture a city by forceful assault became the dominant means. On the other hand, the defenders gradually placed more emphasis on the defense along a city's periphery. In sea campaigns, the appearance of guns on boats also change the way sea battles were fought. Instead of ramming the enemy ships or close-quarter fighting, fighting was conducted with greater distance between the opposing sides. With the development in sea campaigns, tactics such as ambush on the high sea, interception, encirclement and pursuit began to be adopted.

During this period, typical campaigns fought in China included the Battle of Saerhu and the Battle to Recover Taiwan by Zheng Chenggong. Overseas, there was the Battle of Constantinople.

Until the 17th century, there was no permanently organized campaign large formation. Campaigns were often fought by employing all or most of the forces of the state. They were fought under a unified intention and plan *{jihua}* and under the direct and unified command of the king or military commander. And they often bore the characteristics of a decisive battle or a massive campaign. Campaigns in this era were generally called ancient campaigns.

“Hot weaponry” era: This is an era during which campaigns witnessed a great leap forward. The era can be divided into three phases:

Campaigns in the 18th – early 20th century period: During this period, the Industrial Revolution led to great development of the production power in capitalist countries in Europe and North America. A large amount of rifles, guns, automobiles and new types of steam ships and boats were produced for the military, which also began to be equipped with wire or wireless communication gears. A new military recruitment system was adopted, leading to more recruits for the military forces. Also organized were infantry group armies and naval fleets, which formed campaign large formations. During the Napoleonic Wars of 1796-1815, not only were extended and column formations used to cope with enemy fire, but a linear operational method was adopted in attacks against the enemy. Furthermore, there also emerged maneuver warfare campaigns with characteristically fast maneuver, active attacks, resolute of goals and short and fast battles. Campaign operations often involved campaign large formations with more than one hundred thousand up to several hundred thousand troops that were quickly massed at selected battlefield. Flexible maneuver warfare was adopted and tactics of encirclement, outflanking, surprise attack, hot pursuit as well as converging attack were widely used to wipe out enemy forces one by one. During the American Civil War of 1861-1865, the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, long-range, high-density threaded bore guns and artillery were widely used. At the same time, the building of field fortifications, the appearance of armored trains and armored gunboats forced the wide adoption of skirmisher tactics. They also led to positional defensive and offensive campaigns conducted on a wide front by campaign large formations. During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the group army campaign became the basic campaign operational pattern. Also appearing were campaigns with front army (a cluster of group armies) characteristics. Sea campaigns during this period often were conducted by fleets made up of several dozen to hundreds of armored sail or steam battle ships. Sea blockade and anti-blockade campaigns also made their debut. The battleground also extended from shallow waters to deep seas. Maneuver warfare was widely adopted.

Campaigns during the period of the First World War: During the First World War, the armies of the major participating states had reached unprecedented scales in terms of their sizes. Fast firing weaponry and new types of artillery pieces were common

equipment. The much-improved railway and highway transport networks and the wide use of both wire and wireless communication greatly enhanced the mobility of the military forces and facilitated their command. Campaign scales further expanded. Group armies and front army (group army cluster) campaigns, and fleet and theater fleet campaigns became the norms of land and sea campaigns. The First World War also witnessed a big development in positional offensive and defensive campaigns. In offensive campaigns, the attacking army would first try to open up a point in the enemy defense line by concentrating its firepower and repeated charges. Then it would exploit the success by pouring in follow-up units or reserves to encircle and wipe out the enemy in depth. In defense on the other hand, a line of defensive positions were linked by trenches. The defender would mainly rely on heavy fire to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. Campaign reserves were concentrated behind the main defensive direction to back up the defense and to execute counter attacks to defeat enemy's offensive operations. Toward the end of the war, such new equipment as tanks and airplanes were introduced in battlefields. And the multi-service and arms combined campaign made its debut. For instance, the Second Battle of the Marne River of July 1918 witnessed the participation of thousands of pieces of artillery, hundreds of tanks and more than a thousand aircraft. Thus a combined and multi-dimensional ground campaign began to take shape. In sea campaigns, there emerged ship formation attacks. Gun battles among large surface combatants such as battle ships, cruisers and destroyers, torpedo warfare, submarine attacks, mine warfare etc. became principal means to achieve victories in sea campaigns. The introduction of seaplanes added a new dimension to the development in sea campaigns. After the First World War, a large number of new equipment entered into service, including artillery guns, tanks, aircraft, ships as well as communication and engineering equipment. New services and arms were added and existing services and arms were expanded. These included air force, air-defense corps, naval fleets, armored corps, motorized infantry units, anti-aircraft artillery forces, airborne forces, anti-chemical warfare forces, etc. These developments led to the evolution of group armies, front armies (group army clusters) and front army groups (theater force) into multi-service and multi-arms combined large formations of various categories, which provided a new material basis for the further development in campaigns. The multi-service, multi-arms combined campaign under a unified command began to take shape.

Campaigns in the Second World War: During this period, campaigns further expanded their scales with the emergence of the front army group campaign, enlarged theater campaign conducted by several clusters of army groups, and the blue water theater campaign conducted by several naval fleets. Campaign patterns also became more varied. The air force campaign, air-defense campaign, airborne campaign and anti-airborne campaign etc. appeared. There were not only campaigns conducted independently by the army, navy and air force, but also combined and joint campaigns by the army and air force, navy and air force, as well as by the army, navy and air force. The integration and multi-dimensional characteristics were further enhanced. Not only was there maneuver warfare and positional offensive and defensive campaigns of various scales, but also guerrilla warfare campaigns of various scales. Campaign operations also witnessed some new developments. The basis methods of attack were: to concentrate superiority of force-strengths to first implement a breakthrough and follow it up with a quick grouping or

campaign second echelon to enter the engagement in order to throw the enemy's defensive *bushu* disposition into chaos, or to resist an enemy's counter-attack. Some force-strengths would be sent to the enemy's rear in an outflanking move or alternatively an airborne operation would be executed in the enemy's depth in order to encircle and annihilate the enemy. The basic methods of defense were: concentrate the main strengths in the main defense direction and construct a ringed shape with multiple defense lines, multiple zones, and a combination of force-strengths, firepower and obstacles. Infantry and tanks with air and artillery support would try to prevent an enemy breakthrough in the defense line. And campaign reserves would be used at appropriate time to mount counter attacks so as to defeat enemy attacks. In sea campaigns, aircraft carrier-based aircraft and land-based aircraft, and submarines and surface ships, were used to mount assaults on enemy targets on the sea and naval bases and ports. Active anti-submarine and air-defense operations were also conducted to protect or disrupt sea-lanes. The purpose was to wipe out enemy targets on the sea (or in the air) or on the shore and to seize command of the sea. In air campaigns, a large number of bombers were often used to mount attacks on major enemy targets such as lines of transport, industrial facilities, and airports, and on enemy's strategic and campaign reserves. At the same time, fighter aircraft would engage the enemy in air battles to wipe out or cripple the enemy's air power and to seize control of the air. During this period, the landing campaign and anti-landing campaign had developed into a large-scale joint or combined campaign undertaken by the infantry, the navy and the air force.

Campaigns in local wars in the thermo-nuclear era: After the 1950s, with the introduction of various nuclear-tipped guided missiles, helicopters, precision-guided weaponry, electronic equipment into the military, strategic missile force, army aviation corps and electronic countermeasure units came into being, providing the material basis for the emergence of new campaign patterns. Typical post-Second World War local wars included the Korean War, the Middle East War, the Vietnam War, the British-Argentine Falkland War, the Gulf War and the Kosovo War. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the world witnessed a number of campaign operations conducted in a modern sense. Especially in the Gulf War of the early 1990s, the multi-national force led by the United States, under nuclear and chemical weapon threats, conducted campaign operations that bore the characteristics of a high-tech war. The scale of air strikes was expanded and their role enhanced. Operational coordination between the ground and the air, and between the air and the sea became closer. The pace was accelerated. All these exemplify the characteristics of a modern campaign - high degree of integration, mobility, multi-dimensionality and fast pace.

Currently, an information revolution is sweeping across the globe. Information technology weapons and equipment are being developed and put into use in campaigns. The Kosovo War of the late 1990s signaled that it would not be long before the arrival of campaign operations in the information age.

Section 2: The Generation and Development of the PLA Campaign...69

Since its first campaign – the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927, the PLA has a history of 70 years conducting campaigns. During this period, the PLA has experienced the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the War of Resistance against Japan, the War of Liberation, the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, and border counter-attack operations in defense of socialist construction. In all, the PLA has successfully conducted some 400 campaign operations of various scales. All of them have been undertaken on the basis of the people’s war, and have been characterized by the PLA defeating a better-equipped enemy with inferior arms. These campaigns have also undergone a process in which campaign scales have grown from small to large, from a single-service army campaign to the multi-services and arms combined campaign.

The Agrarian Revolutionary War period: After the Chinese Communist Party-led armed uprisings created the Worker-Peasant Red Army, this army had limited military strength during the early period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War. The base areas were small in size and geographically scattered. Every single force of the Red Army was, from the very beginning, surrounded by powerful enemies and was the target of constant “encirclement and suppression” drives by the enemy. The Red Army was mainly engaged in guerrilla warfare and its dominant campaign pattern was the guerrilla warfare campaign. Every time the Red Army fought to break out of encirclement or started attack operations in a new area, in terms of the overall activity of military struggle, it was a strategic problem, but in terms of operational activities, it was a campaign problem. This kind of one-time operation often required the Red Army to undertake a number of or even dozens of related battles of various scales. For any single base area or any single Red Army force-unit, the strategic guidance and campaign or even combat command were often provided by a single commander and the command organ. Thus they served not only as one who guides strategy, but also as the one who organizes the command of a campaign or major battle. Under such conditions, it was difficult to distinguish strategic considerations from campaign or tactical considerations merely by the size of the army unit and control and command relationship. However, distinctions could be made by the scope of the military operation and its impact on the overall situation. Thus, the PLA campaign originated when the Red Army was incepted. From the first counter “encirclement” conducted at the central revolutionary base area in the winter of 1930 on, the mobile warfare {yundongzhan} campaign with guerilla warfare characteristics became the main campaign pattern for the Red Army. The basic operational method adopted was: when faced with a multi-pronged “encirclement and suppression” offensive by the enemy, the Red Army would take full advantage of the friendly people of the base areas and terrain, and try, first of all, to lure the enemy in deep and compel it to disperse its forces and tire down the enemy. By concentrating its force-strengths to form a localized superiority, the Red Army would then seize the opportunity to wipe out the attacking enemy forces one by one, until finally defeating the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” drive. From 1934 to 1935, the Red Army on the 25,000 li Long March also conducted campaigns to break out of enemy encirclement as well as offensive campaigns.

The War of Resistance against Japan period: During the anti-Japanese war, the operational object of the armed strengths led by the Chinese Communist Party was the Japanese army and its puppet army. At the same time, [another operational object] was also the armed forces of the active anti-Communist diehard clique of the Kuomintang (KMT). Due to limitations in terms of equipment and in human and material resources of the base areas, the PLA forces were mainly engaged in guerrilla warfare campaigns aimed at smashing up enemy's "mopping up drives" (counter encirclement and counter attacks) and at disrupting enemy transport lines. It also undertook some mobile warfare {yundongzhan} campaigns of various scales aimed at defending or enlarging its base areas. In addition, some positional offensive campaigns were also mounted for the purposes of capturing enemy strongholds as well as small cities and townships. Most campaigns were conducted under the unified command of a military district or sub-district. Main campaign participants were mostly division or brigade-strength units or a number of independent regiments. They received wide support from local forces, militia and self-defense forces. The characteristics of the people's war were more clearly demonstrated in campaigns during this period than those of the Agrarian Revolutionary War period. With few exceptions, most campaigns were of limited scale and the majority of them were independently organized and executed. Through repeated counter mopping-up drive operations, the PLA made further advances in counter-encirclement tactics developed during the Agrarian Revolutionary War period. On the other hand, through offensive operations against a large number of strongholds and small cities and townships controlled by the enemy, the PLA also enriched itself in positional offensive campaign experience. However, it still lacked experience in conducting concentrated operations by big formations.

The War of Liberation period: In the War of Liberation, the PLA's operational object was the KMT armed forces. The campaign patterns were mainly mobile warfare {yundongzhan} campaign and a partial position warfare campaign. With ever increasing quantities in the PLA and continuous improvements in weapons and equipment, new arms emerged in the PLA, which developed into a powerful army with infantry in the lead, and a definite combined quality including artillery, armored, engineering, and communication forces, etc. As its capabilities to conduct campaigns became stronger, the scale of those campaigns it mounted became also bigger and the patterns more varied. It accumulated very rich and important experience in organizing and implementing mobile warfare {yundongzhan} campaigns, positional warfare campaigns, urban offensive campaigns, strategic offensive campaigns as well as cross-sea landing campaigns. In terms of scale, these campaigns included formation {bingtuan} campaigns, field army campaigns, as well as strategic-quality campaigns conducted jointly by several field armies. Campaign patterns were highly varied and flexible and operational methods were flexible and diverse. The main category was attack and the main objective was to wipe out the enemy's effective strength. The basic operational method was to concentrate a superiority of force-strength to wipe out the enemy.

The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea period: After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese People's Volunteer Force fought the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. In the mountainous Korean Peninsula, the

Chinese People's Volunteer Force, together with the Korean People's Army, fought a modern war with the "United Nations Force" led by the then most modern army of the world – the U.S. imperialist forces. In the war that lasted almost three years, the Chinese People's Volunteer Force, after waging consecutively five major mobile warfare {yundongzhan} campaigns, mounted positional defensive campaigns and positional offensive campaigns. These campaigns had many characteristics different from those campaigns conducted by the PLA in the past. The gap between the arms and equipment of the enemy force and the Chinese force was even wider. And the Chinese force had to operate in a geographical environment that was especially difficult. Nevertheless, it created new operational methods and gained new campaign experience, especially in how to achieve a massive breakthrough against a fortified enemy defense in a positional warfare campaign, and in how to conduct a positional defensive campaign over a broad front and in substantial depth.

In the period of defending national frontiers and building socialism: After the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the PLA has taken big strides in developing weaponry and equipment. The navy and the air force grew steadily in strength. Campaigns developed into modern multi-service, multi-arms combined campaigns. In the struggle to safeguard the national frontiers of the socialist motherland, the PLA successively conducted frontier (sea) campaign operations against expansionists in the Sino-Indian Self-Defense Counter-Attack, the Sino-Soviet Self-Defense Counter-Attack, and the Nansha Sea Battle and Sino-Vietnam Self-Defense Counter-Attack etc. operations. Through these operations, the PLA gained new experience in fighting different enemies under special natural geographical conditions and in special social environments.

In peace time, the PLA also organized many campaign maneuvers: Among the most notable were the Liaodong Peninsula anti-landing campaign maneuver of November 1955, the East China military exercise of September 1981 and the Southeast China joint army, navy and air force exercises of March 1996.

A survey of the history of campaign practice of the PLA indicates that most of the campaigns have the following characteristics: the campaigns were conducted on the basis of the people's war and close cooperation among the three armed forces; most campaign victories were won under the conditions of enemy superiority and our inferiority in technical equipment and stronger enemy and weaker us in strength ratio; the basic concept was *annihilation warfare*, the main operational method was *concentrate superiority of force-strength and annihilate the enemy one by one*; the main operational form {xingshi} was mobile warfare {yundongzhan} supplemented by positional warfare and guerrilla warfare as necessary; in terms of campaign guidance, we stressed setting out from realities, flexible maneuver and not sticking to one way; have strong and forceful political work and fully bring the decisive roles of a subjective dynamic quality and humans into play.

Section 3: The Developmental Trend of Campaigns...72

Technology determines tactics. Developments in military technology have always been the material basis for and fundamental dynamics behind changes in operational tactics. With rapid development in science and technology and wide application in the military field of high technologies such as space, laser, infrared, information, biological, micro-electronic technologies as well as new materials, a new class of high-tech weapons and equipment has appeared and been used in battlefields. They include tanks, artillery, aircraft, naval ships, electronic warfare equipment, nuclear and biological weapons, precision-guided weaponry, space weaponry etc. The developments have triggered new changes in the internal structures of the military and in the way military operations are conducted. Some new trends are developing in future campaigns.

I. Continuous Expansion of Battle Space, Continuous Enhancement of Depth and Multi-dimensional Qualities...72

The development in long-range precision-strike weapons and space weapons has enhanced the long-range mobility of armed forces and expanded the scope of campaign activities. Thus a trend is developing toward further expansion in the battle space in future campaigns. This expansion is full-directional, not only in plane geometrical terms, developing on the ground and water surface level, but also in stereoscopic terms - from ground or water surface to the air and even to outer space. A campaign large formation equipped with modern weapon systems possesses the capability to carry out multi-service, multi-arms joint operations. With the support of strategic weapons, it is capable of mounting large-scale operations encompassing the entire campaign depth or even in strategic depth. Strategic and campaign tactical guided missiles, various types of operational aircraft, ground armored vehicles, and various types of surface and underwater combatants and weapon systems can be used to mount multi-directional, multi-wave, great depth and multi-dimensional force-strength and firepower assaults. Developments in deep-sea weapon systems, under water force-units and space weapons, in particular, have extended the campaign engagement scope from ground and water surface, and from the air to underground, under water sub-terrains, and to outer space. The struggle in the electromagnetic field has in turn introduced into campaign operations a battleground that is invisible. A future campaign would first start in this “invisible” and smokeless battleground.

The expansion in campaign and battlefield space has brought about some profound changes in campaign operational depth and dimensions. The armed forces of different countries have in general been paying more attention to the study of “in-depth operations” and “multi-dimensional assault,” and have been putting these concepts to wide trial and into practice either in their military exercises or in post-Second World War local wars. During the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, for instance, the Soviet military mounted very deep and multi-dimensional strikes. During the Gulf War, the multi-national force led by the US also widely practiced multi-dimensional strikes and drives. In future campaign operations, regarding operational depth and

dimension, the emphasis will be placed not only on mounting in-depth strikes against the enemy by maximum use of force-strengths, firepower and electromagnetic power, but also on actively adopting effective measures to protect the entire depth of one's own *bushu* disposition, not only on supporting ground and sea operations with stereoscopic reconnaissance, maneuvering, and strikes as well as vertical encirclement, but also on mounting sea and air blockade and battlefield interdiction with long-range fire power and electromagnetic power in order to cut off the enemy's reinforcement and supply lines as well as retreat route. The past linear operational method of starting from a single point and broadening it out, starting at the front and then moving to the rear, going through one layer at a time, and pushing forward step by step is being gradually replaced by multi-depth, multi-directional and multi-dimensional non-linear engagement. Full depth operations and multi-dimensional strikes will become an important trend in future campaigns.

In view of the actual conditions, the PLA in a short time or in a considerably long period of time will not possess the deep and multi-dimensional strike capabilities of the world's top military powers. However, in the face of this serious challenge in the development of future campaign trends, it must strive to enhance its deep and multi-dimensional campaign operations to a new height. That is, it must possess certain capabilities to mount deep and multi-dimensional strikes, and at the same time, it must also have fairly good protective capabilities to effectively counter deep and multi-dimensional strikes mounted by the enemy. This would require that on the one hand, it must improve its weapon systems and equipment while exploring new operational methods, and on the other hand, it must, based on present conditions, search for ways and means with characteristics of its own, to mount or counter in-depth and multi-dimensional strikes. Only by using its areas of strength to strike at the enemy's weakness can the PLA achieve campaign victory in future wars against aggression.

II. Higher Requirement for Integrated Quality in Campaigns...74

Since the emergence of campaigns, the composition of a campaign has undergone a process of development from small to big and from simple to complex. In terms of weaponry, swords and spears – chief weapons of the “cold weaponry” era developed into guns, artillery, tanks, aircraft and naval ships – main weapons of the “hot weaponry” era, or even into “hot weapons” backed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In terms of military force, foot soldiers and water units have developed into multi-service, multi-armed combined military made up of infantry, navy, air force, strategic missile force and a number of professional technical arms. The battlefield has developed from the ground battlefield into a vast multi-dimensional space including the ground, the sea and the air etc. The operational mode has changed from square phalanx and close-quarter fighting into varied types and patterns of combat and engagement. It is foreseeable that with further progress in the modernization of weaponry and equipment, and with the increase in the types of elements forming a campaign large formation, operational modes and methods, and campaign types and patterns will become more varied. In addition, the battle operational space will grow. Thus future composition of a campaign will become

more complex. More importantly, the interdependency and mutual complementarity among different weapon systems, different operational activities, and different operational force-strengths will generally increase, though the quantity of operational strengths in a modern campaign could decrease. Without air cover, the safety of ground (surface) forces would be gravely threatened. Without the guide and support of electronic warfare, modern precision-guided weapon systems could not play their roles fully, and would themselves become very vulnerable. Without logistical support activities, any campaign operational activities could not be sustained. Therefore, a future campaign is not a contest of any single strength. Rather, it will be a contest of integrated strengths. It is a joint operation conducted in even broader space domains, using more and more advanced weapons and equipment and using more types of operational modes and patterns. Any single weapon system, operational strength or operational form will not be able to dominate the battlefield. The complexity of future campaign composition has put forth even higher requirements for the integrated-whole quality {zhengtixing} of a campaign. Only by seeking an optimized make-up in integrated-whole terms {zhengti shang}, scientifically grouping of various operational strengths, closely combining various operational forms, carefully coordinating the various battlefields and domains and interlinking the various operational phases and steps to form an organic whole can one fully bring into play the overall might of the campaign and seize operational victory. The main reason for the Argentine army's defeat in the Falkland War lay in its inability to bring into good play the integrated might of its participating strengths.

In its past campaign operations, among the reasons why the PLA was able to overcome better armed enemies with inferior weapons and equipment, one important factor was attributable to its ability to bring into full play the integrated might of its various campaign strengths. In a future campaign, the PLA will face an enemy that is equipped with highly modernized weapon systems; its own weapon systems and equipment will remain inferior; and the composition of the campaign will become increasingly complex. Under such conditions, one must attach importance to bring an integrated strength into play. The PLA will be able to defeat the enemy only by proceeding from its actual conditions, taking advantage of the concept of the people's war, of the fact that it is fighting on home territories, and of its superior political work, and by carefully integrating various factors of a campaign into an organic whole and mounting an integrated operation.

III. Higher Level Intensity of High-Tech Weaponry Confrontation...74

High-technology weapons are the products of high technologies that bring about a qualitative change in traditional weapon systems and equipment. The high technologies here refer to those technologies that have been developed and been widely applied since the 1970s. They include micro-electronic, computer, optical-electronic, new material, new energy, space and biological technologies which have formed a new high-tech class. High-tech weapon systems and equipment refer to weapon systems and equipment that are either developed or improved with the above-mentioned technologies. Representative of such weapon systems and equipment are precision-guided weapons, stealth weapons,

electronic warfare equipment, optical electronic night vision instrument, C⁴I systems, and those new-concept weapon systems that are currently under development. To say that the engagement of technologies of weapons systems and equipment will become more intense chiefly means that there is a trend pointing to ever increasing intensity in operations of the above-mentioned high-tech weapon systems and equipment.

Science and technology can be translated into a productive force. Even more so, they can also be translated into combat power. After the Second World War, particularly since the 1980s, countries of the world have attached great importance to comprehensively reforming the weapon systems and equipment of the military with the latest products of science and technology. A great number of new modern high-tech weapon systems and equipment have, in batches, in complete sets and in families, entered into the ranks of the organized structure of the armed forces and committed into operational use. They have influenced the progress and the outcome of campaigns. This has been fully demonstrated in post-World War II local wars. During the Israeli-Lebanese conflict of 1982, for instance, the Israeli army, by first using advanced air radar surveillance and detection systems, and electronic jamming devices together with air strike weapon systems, was able to mount attacks on the Syrian guided missile positions in the Bekaa Valley, and was able to destroy at one stroke 19 Syrian SAM-6 surface-to-air missile positions, thus winning the battlefield control of the air. The Gulf War and the Kosovo War were turned into testing grounds for high-tech weapon systems and equipment. The U.S. forces won a complete military victory due to many reasons. Distinct superiority in technologies was the most important factor.

With rapid development in modern science and technology, it is foreseeable that by the middle of the 21st century, there will be a complete new outlook in the military's weapon systems and equipment. In addition to the existing weapon systems and equipment constantly being upgraded, new-concept weapon systems and equipment such as directed energy weapons, dynamic energy weapons, non-lethal weapons, micro and miniaturized weapons, subsonic weapons, climatic weapons, genetic weapons, military robots etc. will gradually enter the battlefield. These developments will lead to weapon systems with higher energy, and systems that are more diversified, more highly automated and more intelligent. At the same time, more powerful, longer range and more accurate, these weapon systems will have an increasing impact on campaign operations. At present, many countries are actively preparing for high-tech wars of the 21st century. Digitized force-units and information battlefields could make their debut in 21st century wars. With the introduction of these advanced technology weapon systems, future campaign activities will be heavily colored by high technology. The elements of direct hand-to-hand engagement of soldiers will gradually decrease while the weight of high-tech weapon engagement and trial of strength will greatly increase, and high-tech weapons will become an important pillar for the survival of the armed forces and for winning wars. It is foreseeable that future wars will be an arena dominated by high-tech weapon systems; soldier-intensive campaigns will be replaced by technology-intensive campaigns. The outcome of high-tech trials of strength will have a profound influence over the theories and practices of campaigns.

Although the weapon systems and equipment of the PLA have seen great improvement from the past, there is and will continue to be in the future a considerably large gap when one compares them with those of forces of developed countries. Therefore, we must accelerate the development of advanced weapon systems and equipment so as to narrow this gap while at the same time, we must get prepared to overcome the enemy based on existing weapon systems and equipment. In future campaign operations, we must stress countering the enemy with our limited high-tech weapon systems and equipment while at the same time, attaching greater importance to bringing into full play our strength in waging a people's war and in individual subjective initiative. In this way, we will be able to find ways to defeat, under high-tech conditions, a superiorly armed enemy with inferior weapons of our own.

IV. More Diversified Operational Patterns and Methods...76

Developments in weapon systems and equipment inevitably give rise to changes in campaign operational patterns and methods. After the Second World War during which modern large-scale air warfare, sea warfare, amphibious landing operations, airborne operations and tank warfare made their debut, new operational patterns and methods have been widely used in campaign operations in post-War local wars. These include electronic warfare, missile warfare, precision warfare, psychological warfare, deep multi-dimensional warfare, infrastructure destruction warfare, integrated offensive-defensive warfare, raid-attack and long-range raid operations, etc. Taking the Gulf war as one example, from the very beginning, the U.S. forces kicked off their operations with electronic warfare, bringing into play their power of reconnaissance, surveillance, suppression, guidance and control. Five hours before launching the air war, the multi-national force mounted its electronic warfare activities codenamed "White Snow" – to comprehensively jam and suppress the Iraqi command and control, air defense early warning and communication systems. The operation served as a cover for air and missile strikes mounted by the multi-national force, which disabled more than 4,000 anti-aircraft artillery pieces, more than 700 surface-to-air missile launchers, more than 140 Hawk surface-to-air missiles and almost 700 operational aircraft of the Iraqi forces. After seizing control of the electromagnetic field, the multi-national force subsequently launched an air war led by missile strikes. First to take to the sky were some 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles from the battleships USS Missouri and USS Wisconsin positioned in the Persian Gulf. They were followed by wave after wave of various types of guided missiles and precision-guided munitions launched from land, sea and the air, which totally paralyzed the entire Iraqi campaign operational system. The trial of strength between the Patriot anti-missile systems and the Scud missiles "opened a new era of missiles shooting down missiles in modern war history." During the 43-day Gulf War, firepower played a very pronounced role. Just in the first day of air operation alone, the U.S. forces dropped 18,000 tons of bombs. During the entire war, some 30 types of aircraft from 10 countries of the multi-national force led by the U.S. flew a total of 110,000 sorties, and dropped a total of 500,000 tons of bombs – averaging 12,000 tons a day, making it the largest scale, longest lasting firepower strike that involved the largest number of airmen and weapon systems.

With the introduction of more and more new types of weapons systems and equipment, in future wars, more new operational methods and patterns will appear; the trend toward diversity in the campaign operational methods and patterns will become more pronounced. This will inevitably lead to profound changes in future campaign guidance thoughts. Old operational thoughts will step down from the stage of campaign operations and give way to new campaign operational guidance thoughts that conform to the campaign development laws.

V. Rapid Future Development in Intelligent and Automated Command...77

In the “cold weaponry” era, the commander comprehended the conditions and commanded operations mainly through direct visual and audio signals, and he communicated by simple means such as through foot or horse riding messengers. In modern times, a commander directs operations mainly by way of telephone and telegraph; now computer-based command automation systems are being used to execute campaign command. With the arrival of the information age, the trend moving toward automated and intelligent command is accelerating. In a future campaign, the vastness of the battleground requires attention to many points, long lines and broad fronts. It is very easy to have gaps and blind angles, thus losing control. The battlefield situations rapidly change, the campaign course and tempo are accelerated, and the time effectiveness quality of decision making is even higher. Greater amount of available information, and more numerous variables and undeterminable factors, all have higher requirements on campaign command. Past ways and means of command by way of human heads and hands will be far inadequate to meet the needs-requirements of future campaign operations. Successful campaign command depends on the art of command and on the astuteness and resourcefulness of the commander. It also depends on advanced command instruments and the ability to make highly efficient and high quality decisions, and to direct and control. Hence, in the whole process of organizing and executing a campaign, a wide range of reconnaissance and surveillance means will be deployed to collect and to obtain a large amount of intelligence, which in turn will be processed with advanced technical facilities and by scientific methods; automated and intelligent command systems will also be used to assist the commander to do operations research and strategem plan, as well as optimize courses of action; advanced command and control systems, on the other hand, will help execute reliable battlefield command and macro control.

As a symbol of modern command automation systems, the C⁴I system developed after the 1950s was widely used in post-Second World War local wars, especially during the Gulf War. With progress in science and technology, a computer-based integrated C⁴I system will make its debut in the future battlefield of campaign operations. The level of automated and intelligent campaign decision-making, command and control will be further enhanced.

The PLA has started its own command automation system relatively late. However, the developing campaign theories and practices, and the stark realities of modern warfare and

campaign operations that it faces, require that the campaign command system of the PLA must develop in the direction of automation and intelligence in order to meet the needs-requirements of future campaign operations.

VI. Status of the Campaign Support is Clearly More Important...78

Campaign operations are the overall contest of two strengths. Without a well-consolidated rear, without strong logistical and equipment support, there can be no victory in campaign operations. With progress in science and technology, with the upgrading of weaponry and equipment, and with the development in campaign practice and theories, the opposing sides will in a future campaign become more and more dependent on the rear. And the status of the campaign rear will become more important. This can be seen in the following two ways:

First, the campaign rear itself will become a battlefield in that its security will be vital to the outcome of the campaign. With continuous upgrading of weapon systems and equipment, and the daily increase in operational methods and means, both sides engaging in war will either simultaneously or successively unfold an intense contest in the whole depth of the battlefield. The campaign rear will change from a secured zone in the past to an important battlefield, and it will become an important target for in-depth operations. To provide strong logistical support and at the same time to keep the rear secure have become two important and indispensable tasks for modern campaign logistics, as well as an important guarantee for victory in campaign operations. During the fourth Middle East war, the 20,000 Egyptian armed forces that had broken through the Bar-Lev line to cross to the east bank of the Suez Canal came perilously close to complete annihilation while the Syrian armed forces that had successfully penetrated the Israeli defense line south of the Golan Height ended in a major defeat. The main reason was that both the Egyptian and Syrian campaign rears were raided by the Israeli forces. Therefore, a well-organized rear defense and enhancing the area's self-defense capabilities have become an important issue in the directing of a campaign. It is predictable that in a future campaign, struggle over the campaign rear will become even more intense.

Secondly, to secure logistical support will be an arduous task. The quality of logistical support will have a direct impact on the progression of a campaign. As witnessed in a number of post-War local wars, every campaign would consume large quantities of materiel, causing a large number of casualties and damage a large amount of equipment, due to ever increasing intensity in campaign operations and to the multiplication of elements that could consume war materiel, cause personnel casualties and inflict damage to equipment. This high consumption and high demand on the logistics, that are characteristic of a modern campaign, place a heavier burden on logistical support. The quality of this support would have a direct impact on the progress of campaign operations. During the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the Chinese People's Volunteer Force, in the mobile warfare {yundongzhan} phase, had to repeatedly slow down the pace of attack, or completely halt its attack in most campaigns, due to the inability of logistical supplies to keep pace. The launching of the Jincheng Counterattack

Campaign {jincheng fanji zhanyi} had to be postponed for 10 days because logistical support was not ready in time. In the Gulf War of 1991, the voracity of war consumption was even more stunning. The 600,000-strong multi-national force cost an average of one billion US dollars a day during the 38-day air campaign, and an average of two billion dollars a day during the 100-hour ground operation phase. The daily consumption of an average U.S. soldier was as follows: 200 kilos for ground force-units, and 1,100 to 1,400 kilos for naval units. The U.S. spent 1.2 billion U.S. dollars on warplanes alone. This astounding level of consumption has far exceeded any war in history. The air strike code-named “Desert Fox” mounted by the U.S. and British forces in 1998 lasted only a bit over 70 hours but cost 1.2 billion U.S. dollars. In a future campaign, the confrontation between the two sides engaging in war will become much higher; materiel consumption will be much greater and there will be more personnel casualties and damage to weapons and equipment. Thus logistical supplies of materiel, field medical aid and services as well as technical support will present much tougher challenges.

Furthermore, the expanding battlefield operational space, the multiplicity of participating services and arms, and the fluidity of battlefield conditions will require that logistical support and its organization and command be raised to a higher level. The quality of logistical support will have an increasing impact on campaign operations. And at the same time, the importance of the campaign rear will become even more pronounced.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 3

Campaign Guidance Thought and Basic Principles...80

The campaign guidance thought and basic principles are the fundamental theoretical bases for the overall-planning and organization of a campaign. They are the basic criteria for guiding and implementing campaign activities. The campaign guidance thought is the collective embodiment of the campaign basic principles and the campaign basic principles are the specific reflection of the campaign guidance thought from a different perspective. The campaign guidance thought and basic principles not only emerge from campaign practice and guide campaign practice, they develop along with the development of practices. Studying campaign guidance thought and basic principles under informationized conditions has major theoretical and practical significance. From a theoretical perspective, this study occupies a core position in the theoretical system of campaign science discipline, it is a specific reflection of PLA strategic thought in the new era, and it directly affects the developmental direction of campaign theory research; from the perspective of practice, it possesses a major guidance role in unifying the campaign thought for all-services and arms, overall-planning, organizing and commanding campaign operations, adjusting the system of the organized structure, developing weapons and equipment, and guiding campaign training, and especially for joint campaign practice under informationized conditions. Therefore, on the basis of carrying on PLA traditional campaign guidance thought, the study of and inquiry into the campaign guidance thought and basic principles that are suitable for localized war under informationized conditions and conform to the objective realities of the PLA are very important and urgent missions.

Section 1: Campaign Guidance Thought...80

In different historical periods, the prompt establishment of a scientific operational guidance thought on the basis of different objects [targets] of operations as well as changes to the objective environment of a war to point out the correct direction of campaign operations is not only the historical experience of the PLA in achieving operational victory, it is also an important way of the militaries of some of the world's great nations. In the late 1980s, based on objective realities, the PLA put forward the campaign guidance thought of "*integrated operations, key point strike*." Putting forward and establishing this campaign guidance thought played a very good guidance and unified-grasping role for force-unit readiness, training and weapons and equipment development. However, we should also see that the current warfare form-state {zhanzheng xingtai} is transforming from mechanized warfare to informationized warfare, and a profound transformation is occurring in the factors of various campaign operations. If we want to adapt to the need-requirements of the new strategic circumstances {xingshi} and missions and if we want to win a localized war under informationized conditions, we must conduct adjustments to the guidance thought of the PLA campaign.

Based on the spirit of the Central Military Commission's strategic concept in the new era, and integrating the ideas consistent with various areas and tendencies, we can make "*integrated operations-precision strike to dominate the enemy*"¹ {zhengti zuozhan, jingda zhidi} as the guidance thought of the PLA campaign. The basic connotation of this thought is: bring into play the total superiority of the People's War, and persist in *you fight yours and I fight mine* {nida nide woda wode},² the integrated joint campaign {yitihua lianhe zhanyi} is the basic form-state and necessary requirement of the informationized war; seizing information dominance, air dominance and sea dominance is an effective way to overcome the enemy and gain victory.

Integrated operations is namely using integrated methods and information technology, blending an operational system {tixi} from all services and arms and other types of armed strengths with operational organizational-units to form an integrated whole, and achieving integration for a variety of operational strengths, multiple dimensions of battlefield space, a variety of operational patterns and activities, and various support systems; with seizing control of the "*three Superiorities*" as the pivot, master battlefield control, and starting with the destruction of the integrated structure of the enemy's operational system {tixi}, strike the enemy with consistent adjusting-coordination over the entire depth of operations and in every domain.

Precision strike to dominate the enemy is namely implementing precision operations and precision strikes of vital areas {yaohai}. This includes precise application of various operational strengths, especially medium and long range strike strengths, precise selection of operational targets, precise use of fighting methods and means, precise control of the operational intensity and course, a tight grip on the vital-area parts within the enemy's political, economic and military system and critical links for precision strikes, and striving to seize joint campaign victory in the shortest time, with the lowest risk and with minimum cost.

These two, *integrated operations* and *precision strike to dominate the enemy*, are a closely connected unified body. *Integrated operations* stresses the comprehensive integration of various operational factors via information and information systems in order to establish an optimum operating mechanism for the operational architecture {zuozhan tixi jiegou}, and form an integrated joint campaign capability; *precision strike to dominate the enemy* stresses the use of this type of capability and with precise and accurate operational activities, resolve critical problems for promoting war situation development, defeat the enemy, and achieve operational goals. The former is the basis and a condition for achieving victory while the latter is an essential element and pathway

¹ Translator's note: The *dominate the enemy* {制敌 zhidi} portion of this phrase also can be translated as *control the enemy* or *subdue the enemy* and is the same term used in *air-sea-electromagnetic dominance*, etc. {制空海电磁权 zhi kong-hai-dianci quan}.

² Translator's note: This phrase was a style of fighting included as part of Mao Zedong's military thought - to fight the fight one is prepared to fight and to fight at the time and location one chooses.

to victory. Both reflect the essence and essential points of campaign guidance thought under informationized conditions from different perspectives.

I. Firmly Establishing the Main Basis for the Campaign Guidance Thought of “*Integrated Operations-Precision Strike to Dominate the Enemy*”...63

Not only is the campaign guidance thought of “*integrated operations-precision strike to dominate the enemy*” firmly established on the basis of the PLA’s *Military Strategic Concept and Strategic Mission of the New Era* {xinshiqi junshi zhanlue fangzhen he zhanlue renwu} but it is also put forward while directed at the PLA’s objective realities; not only does it conform to the general guidance laws of the modern campaign, but it also conforms to the special guidance laws of PLA implementation of a joint campaign under informationized conditions; not only does it carry on the experiences of PLA tradition, but it also possesses distinctive epochal features and very strong thought-, scientific- and directed-qualities.

(1) It is based on the military strategic concept and the strategic mission of the new era

The *Military Strategic Concept and Strategic Mission of the New Era* is determined on the basis of the national political strategy, the general objective of development, foreign policy and the international circumstances. The *Military Strategic Concept and Strategic Mission of the New Era* is the basic reliance for military struggle preparations, armed forces construction and conducting war. Moreover, the joint campaign, especially the joint campaign at the campaign level, is not only a part of the war but also the main way for reaching the war goals. Thus, the campaign guidance thought must be based on the *Military Strategic Concept and Strategic Mission of the New Era*, and it must conform to the requirements of the *Military Strategic Concept and Strategic Mission of the New Era*.

In a future war, the PLA will implement and execute the *Military Strategic Concept of the New Era*, undertaking the historical mission of safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, realizing the general objective of national development and providing a secure and reliable environment. This requires for joint campaign guidance to conform to and be in the service of strategic needs-requirements, and allows for the joint campaign goal[s] and activities to be adjusting-coordinated with a nation’s political, economic and diplomatic struggles and to be consistent with the national military strategy. Strategically we persist in *Active Defense* {jiji fangyu}, whereas in a joint campaign we stress an *Active Initiative Offense* {jiji zhudong de jin’gong}. This is because only an offensive defense can be truly *Active Defense*. No matter whether it is an island offensive operation, a border counterattack operation or an anti-air raid operation, we must establish the awareness for flexible response, for preemptively dominating the enemy, and offensively achieving victory. With active attack activities as the axis, overall-plan and implement the joint campaign and realize the strategic goals. The guidance thought of “*integrated operations- precision strike to dominate the enemy*” emphasizes first, to fully bring into play the just quality of the war and superiority of operations on one’s own territory, to mobilize all of the strengths that can be mobilized, to utilize all operational

methods and means, and to form the overall might of the People's War in order to win over the enemy; at the same time, this guidance thought also stresses to fully bring into play a subjective dynamic quality, to be adept at having a grip on the enemy's weaknesses and vital areas, to concentrate our crack strengths to perform precision strikes, to destroy the enemy's operational system and to seize victory in a joint campaign. Therefore, the campaign guidance thought of "*integrated operations-precision strike to dominate the enemy*" is the basic requirement for implementing the PLA's *Military Strategic Concept of the New Era* and accomplishing the strategic mission.

(2) It suits the new characteristics and developmental trend of informationized warfare

In future informationized warfare, profound changes will occur in very many areas such as the battlefield form-states, operational methods, the command system and the view on operations, and many new characteristics and new trends will emerge. For example, as mentioned above, battle engagement will unfold in full dimensional spaces such as land, sea, air, space, electronic and network; space dominance, information dominance and air dominance will play a leading role in a war; operational patterns will give priority to non-contact, asymmetrical and medium-, long-range precision strikes and be accompanied by necessary non-linear contact operations; large scale special warfare as well as psychological warfare will be extensively implemented at the strategic and campaign levels. The operational thought and operational patterns of the mechanized war era will be replaced by new operational ideas and operational patterns and various new operational activities and patterns will unfold in the various battlefields. Additionally, they will be interwoven and have frequent transitions. These new characteristics and new trends of informationized warfare can be summarized into their most prominent features:

First, there are higher requirements imposed on integrated operations. The practices of several recent localized wars have demonstrated that the joint campaign has become the basic form-state for a campaign. In a certain sense, the joint campaign is precisely integrated operations and it is a confrontation between the operational systems of the two sides engaged in combat. Any individual service or operational pattern cannot achieve the war goals independently. Only by constituting an interconnected and interactively integrated operational system of all operational essential elements {zuozhan yaosu} such as diversified campaign strengths, multi-dimensional battlefield spaces, various operational patterns, operational methods and means can we bring into play an integrated operational might to overcome the enemy and gain victory. This is also a concrete reflection of the modern system science theories in the military domain. Especially in a campaign under informationized conditions, the operational system will be even more massive and complex. This will require for those guiding operations to strengthen their view of large system integrated operations, to be adept at applying the tenets and methods of system science, and to establish an optimized and integrated operational architecture in order to bring into play an optimum operational effectiveness and gain the victory. A joint campaign under informationized conditions also has some new characteristics and it imposes higher requirements on integrated operations from different perspectives. For example, the struggle in vying for the "*three Superiorities*" is extremely fierce and

permeates the entire course of the campaign, which demands even more to bring an integrated might into play; operational command and support are complex and arduous and the degree of difficulty in battlefield control is high, and one must maintain an integrated adjusting-coordination for operational activities. Therefore, to say that “*integrated operations*” possesses connotations of the new period and is still a component factor serving as campaign guidance thought completely conforms to the characteristics of a joint campaign under informationized conditions as well as its developing trend. This is scientific and necessary.

Secondly, the modes and ways for gaining victory in operations have changed significantly. The operational guidance center of gravity is no longer a single military target and the effective strengths of the armed forces, but it also includes important political and economic targets. Information attack, psychological attacks, special attacks, and medium-, long-range precision strikes have become the main operational patterns and activities. The victories in past campaigns were achieved mainly by fighting annihilation warfare and wiping out the opponent’s effective strength. Yet in a campaign under informationized conditions, even though annihilating the enemy’s effective strength is a very important method, but similarly, one can achieve the strategic goal[s] through full depth integrated precision strikes, destroying and paralyzing the opponent’s economic and operational systems, strengthening the psychological strike effects against the enemy as much as possible, and collapsing and depriving the enemy’s will to resist. One can say that “*precision strike to dominate the enemy*” is an important content of the campaign guidance thought and reflects the objective laws of the localized war under informationized conditions.

(3) It fully brings into play the total superiority and specialty of People’s War

One of the basic starting points for establishing the PLA campaign guidance thought is to attach importance in fully bringing the total superiority of our People’s War into play, to persist in the strategic tactics of “*you fight yours and I fight mine*” to bring into play our advantages as much as possible, and avoid our weaknesses. Despite the occurrence of profound changes in the form-state of future warfare, many new situations and new characteristics have emerged, not only driving the transformation in areas such as the content and fighting methods of the People’s War, but the just qualities, the collective mass quality, and the overall whole quality of war have not changed. It is just as Chairman Jiang pointed out: “no matter how the form-state of warfare evolves, the basic laws of the People’s War will not change and winning a future war will still rely on the magic weapon of the People’s War.” Fully bringing into play the basic superiorities and specialty of PLA People’s War is still a [chess board] move the enemy fears the most, and it is also a basic thought that the PLA must fully embody in joint campaign guidance.

In order to creatively develop and utilize the thought of the People’s War, we must study, deploy and implement a joint campaign from the operational system of the modern People’s War. Simply put, the joint campaign system of the People’s War is forming an optimally combined and integrated operational capability on the basis of a fairly strong

comprehensive national power and a solid war potential, of combining the military and civilian, of combining the various armed strengths, and of combining various operational forms and activity patterns. Having a grip on and centering on the crux of the overall operational situation, we strike the enemy with adjusting-coordination and precision in the overall depth and various domains. This kind of full depth integrated operations and precision operations that are the basis of the People's War strength system is an effective way and fundamental method for overcoming the enemy and gaining victory. It is also a concentrated reflection of the essential feature of the PLA joint campaign, that carries on and develops the experiences of PLA tradition and possesses distinctive PLA characteristics and period features. One can say that the guidance thought of "*integrated operation-precision strike to dominate the enemy*" specifically manifests and creatively implements the thought of People's War.

(4) It focuses on the PLA's objective realities and the needs-requirements of the new military transformation

The joint campaign under informationized conditions is a manifestation of information age advanced productivity and production modes in the military realm. Without a doubt, it needs a series of good military equipment symbolized by high technology, especially information technology equipment, as its basic support. For example, in order to implement unified, highly effective and agile command, one needs advanced command and control (C⁴KISR) systems; in order to seize information dominance, one needs good information offense and defense weapon systems, including soft kill informationized weapons and hard destruction informationized weapons; in order for the operational strengths to quickly respond and maneuver into position, one needs to have various modernized transportation tools; in order to implement non-contact long range precision operations, one must have precision guidance weapons and various informationized operational platforms, etc. Although there has been much development in PLA weapons and equipment, we have a fixed quantity of "trump card" weapons equipment, and we have greatly improved in the operational capabilities of various services and arms as well as joint campaign capability. With the development of the economic construction and national defense modernization in our nation, the PLA's informationization level for weapons and equipment as well as its joint campaign capability of each service and arm will continue to advance. However, compared with powerful enemies, our weapons and equipment is and will remain inferior for a fairly long period of time, especially in terms of the degree of informationization. Thus, the establishment of campaign guidance thought must start from the objective reality of the PLA. [We must] seek and create fighting methods and ways to *exalt our strengths-attack our weakness* and to defeat superiority with inferiority based on the new situation and new characteristics. This is an important focal point for establishing campaign guidance thought.

Currently we are in a period of new military transformation. Chairman Jiang has pointed out that this current military transformation is the most extensive, most influential, and most powerful and revolutionary transformation in the history of world military development. Its core is informationization and its essence is a fundamental change of the

armed forces model and a fundamental change to the form-state of war. Faced with the challenge of new military transformation, we should be clearly aware that contact operations with the objective of annihilating the enemy's effective strength and an operational theory of large formations with ground army in the lead have occupied a leading position in the PLA for a long time. Add to this our lack of practice in a joint campaign under high-tech conditions, the PLA, until now, has had difficulty in completely shaking off the constraints and influences from traditional operational theories. Although we have achieved some breakthroughs and progress in the study of PLA joint campaign theory, generally speaking, we still lag behind in the form-state of war which is currently undergoing profound changes. On the basis of carrying on and developing traditional experiences, we must, with a broad view and forward thinking insight, fundamentally break through the outdated operational theories and operational methods and create new operational thoughts. Only then can we adapt to the needs-requirements of new military transformation and winning a localized war under the informationized conditions. This is the important significance for putting forth the campaign guidance thought of "*integrated operations-precision strike to dominate the enemy.*"

II. The Basic Way for Implementing the Campaign Guidance Thought of "*Integrated Operations-Precision Strike to Dominate the Enemy*" ...86

The campaign guidance thought of "*integrated operations-precision strike to dominate the enemy*" is the generic principle and the general requirement put forth from a macroscopic perspective for a joint campaign under informationized conditions. It has a complete guidance and restrictive role for a joint campaign at the campaign level. Implementing the guidance thought of "*integrated operations-precision strike to dominate the enemy*" involves every aspect of a joint campaign.

(1) The essential points for implementing the thought of "*integrated operations*"

In order to creatively implement the thought of *integrated operations*, we must attach importance to applying the thought and methods of comprehensive integration and fully utilizing the connecting and blending quality of information technology, and [we must] realistically accomplish the comprehensive integration of the intelligence-information system, the command and control system, the firepower strike system and the various support systems. [We must] integrate together each subsystem of the participating strengths into a large system with macroscopic order and optimum integration, and form an integrated operational effectiveness that is much further along than simply adding together subsystems. One must especially stress accomplishing the "*Four Integrations,*" namely: the integration of multiple elements of operational strengths, the integration of multiple dimensions of battlefield space, the integration of a variety of operational activities and patterns and the integration of various assisting-supports {zhiyuan} and safeguarding-supports {baozhang}.

1. Scientifically compose to integrate a multi-element operational strength

The operational strength is the material basis for overcoming the enemy and gaining victory and the basic essential element for implementing the joint campaign. In a joint campaign under informationized conditions, only by conducting comprehensive integration and flexibly applying the various different strengths on the basis of their nature, characteristics and operational capabilities and building an optimal strength structure can we form a maximum integrated combined strength. First, we must carry out integration of the military and government, integration of the military and civilian, tight integration of the military struggle with the struggles along the combat line of politics, economics and diplomatic, and [we must carry out] the tight integration of the main strength force-units, the local force-units, the armed police force-units, the militia, and the broad mass of collective strengths to form of a blended military-local and all-services and arms integrated modern military and government and the integration of the military and people in the campaign strength architecture. Secondly, we must tightly center on the general operational intent, focus on how to bring into play the operational specialties of each service and arm, organically integrate the strengths of all services and arms such as the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Second Artillery, rationally task-organize the various service operational groupings, and build an all-services and arms joint campaign integrated strength architecture. Next, scheme [stratagem] functionality through the structure {yi jiegou mou gongneng}, base each type of weapon system on its operational characteristic-capability and application characteristics, scientifically task-organize integrations, integrate “*hard strike*” with “*soft strike*,” integrate firepower strike with special strike and with psychological strike, integrate long-, intermediate- and short range strike with high-, medium- and low-altitude strike, and form an integrated precision strike system with key points. To sum up, in implementing a future joint campaign, we must aim at different objects of operations, battlefield environment and missions, scientifically compose various operational strengths and build an integrated operational strength system. We must match up force-strength, firepower and information operation capabilities and adapt the assisting-support and safeguarding-support capabilities with operational capabilities. [We must] concentrate the many capabilities such as battlefield awareness, information transmission, rapid mobility and precision strike into one and achieve a complement of the superiorities of various operational capabilities. [We must] form maximum operational effectiveness in the totality of the joint campaign and defeat the enemy.

2. Make a unified layout, and integrate the multi-dimensional battlefield space

A joint campaign under informationized conditions is a comprehensive confrontation in multiple dimensions of battlefield space such as the land battlefield, the sea battlefield, the air battlefield, the electromagnetic battlefield, outer space battlefield and the “psychological” battlefield, each battlefield space being important and indispensable. It is difficult for operations in any single battlefield to win victory for the campaign. The crux is in the integrated adjusting-coordination and close cooperation between operations in the various battlefield spaces, and this has been proven true by recent localized wars.

Therefore, in terms of guiding operations, we must be adept at fully utilizing the favorable conditions of each battlefield and form a highly three-dimensional, full-depth and integrated battlefield system for the operational strengths of each battlefield space of land, sea, air, space and electromagnetic, the front, flank and enemy rear battlefields and the activities, [all] centering on the unified goals, the unified and overall-planned layout and the rational arrangement. Only this way can we enable each battlefield to mutually complement each other, mutually increase effectiveness and combine strengths in multiple dimensions to gain victory. In a joint campaign under informationized conditions, the outer space domain has become a more and more important operational space. According to statistical data, during the Gulf War, the coalition forces led by the US used more than 70 satellites and in the Kosovo War, Afghanistan War and Iraq War the satellites, more than 50. These [satellites] established a system of many types of satellites such as reconnaissance early warning, navigation and positioning, communications and command, which provided omni-directional information assisting-support and safeguarding support for air, sea and ground assault systems. Outer space has already become a new strategic commanding height. In a future implemented joint campaign, we must pay highly close attention in terms of battlefield spaces, build an air-space "*reconnaissance-strike*" operational system which can effectively carry out missions and safeguard-support the implementation of consistently adjusting-coordination in the battlefield spaces of land, sea and air, and consequently enable the multi-dimensioned battlefield to form an organic whole. Moreover, operations are not only a contest of materials but also a contest of "*mental vitality*" {jingshen or spirit}. In the Iraq War, the joint US-British forces comprehensively applied various means in implementing psychological warfare against the Iraqi military, achieving tremendous results. Thus, we should incorporate the "*psychological warfare*" battlefield into the integrated category of elaborate stratagems in the joint campaign. [We should] broadly open-up-development on psychological warfare against the enemy, disintegrate and deprive the enemy's will to resist, and speed up development on the operational course.

3. Comprehensively apply and adjust-control, integrate a variety of operational activity patterns

On the one hand, because of weapons and equipment going high-tech, profound changes have occurred in operational activity patterns and fighting methods, and many new types of operational activity patterns and fighting methods were predestined to emerge. On the other hand, modern campaign practices have proven that not a single operational pattern, fighting method and means can dominate the battlefield. The basic way to gain victory is the comprehensive application of various operational patterns and fighting methods. Not only is this an objective requirement of a modern campaign, but it is also a basic content in the thought of *Integrated Operations*. Thus, the directors of operations must definitely comprehensively apply the many types of operational patterns and fighting methods such as information warfare, firepower warfare, maneuver warfare {jidongzhan}, position warfare, psychological warfare, special warfare, and network warfare, etc. [They must] integrate regular operations with irregular operations, offensive operations with defensive operations, non-contact operations with contact operations, "*soft strike*" and "*hard destruction*," and military strikes with shock and psychological attack, etc. [They must]

blend adjusting-coordination of various operational patterns, fighting methods and means, into one and form a comprehensive might in integrated strike. They must achieve integration of a variety of operational patterns, not only thoroughly conduct overall-plan prior to battle, but during battle, they must implement realistically effective adjusting-coordination and control of the various operational activities. To this end, they must build and perfect the command and control system, establish command relationships that are authoritative, laterally wide and vertically short, and smooth and highly effective. [They must] ensure the implementation of strong adjusting-coordination and control of various operational activities in hopes of obtaining maximum operational benefits.

4. All-around overall-plan, integrate various safeguarding-support systems

The implementation of various careful, prompt and effective safeguarding-supports has a very important function for seizing victory of a joint campaign under informationized conditions. Because the objects of safeguarding-support are diversified, the safeguarding-support space is multi-dimensional, the structure of safeguarding-support strengths is complex, and the specialization quality and the comprehensive quality of safeguarding-support are increasing, the various safeguarding-support missions have become more and more arduous and strenuous. In regards to safeguarding-support strengths, in terms of structural division, there are safeguarding-support strengths at each level of Army, Navy, Air, and Second Artillery; in terms of functional division, there are area safeguarding-support strengths, organizationally structured strengths and local support-the-front strengths; in terms of classification division, there are operational safeguarding-support strengths, logistic safeguarding-support strengths and equipment safeguarding-support strengths; etc. With such a numerous and complicated strength structure, if we do not conduct all-around overall-planning, then we will not have a centralized command support system to smooth out command and adjusting-coordination relationships in a campaign. If we place the organizing of safeguarding-support at anyone's discretion, there will naturally be separate departments and areas, orders coming from multiple places, low efficiency, even causing mutual conflicts, so one will be unable to implement prompt, effective, and comprehensive safeguarding-support with key points. This requires for those directing operations to further strengthen their views on large system integrated safeguarding support. On the basis of the People's War operational system, and relying on comprehensive national power and territorial superiority, [we must] carry out the joint safeguarding-support of the "three integrations" of integrating military-civilian, integrating all-services and arms, and integrating logistics with equipment. We should unify-overall-plan and formulate the safeguarding-support plan {*jihua*} from the perspective of land, sea, air, space and electromagnetic integration. [We should] unify and organize the safeguarding-support strengths, unify and differentiate the safeguarding-support missions, optimize the composition of various safeguarding-support systems, and then form an integrated safeguarding-support capability. At the same time, we must pay attention to the confrontational functions of the various safeguarding-support systems, adopt various measures to strengthen protection of support strengths, support resources, support hubs and mobile lines, and ensure the implementation of a full-course, full-depth and omni-directional reliable support to the joint campaign.

5. Attach importance to destroying the integrated structure of the enemy's operational system

In a future joint campaign, in terms of the essence of operational activities, it is a confrontation between the operational systems of both sides. At the same time as we strengthen and optimize the structure of our operational system and increase campaign capabilities to the greatest extent, we will do everything possible to think of ways to destroy the structure of the enemy's operational system and weaken its overall operational capability. This has already become a basic way for gaining victory in a modern campaign and has critical-quality significance. An important aspect of implementing and applying the thought of *integrated operations* is to look at the objects of operations as an integrated system and focus on destroying its integrated structure. The enemy's operational system relies on each integrated system of high-tech equipment, and is closely interconnected, strongly interdependent, and with a certain weakness. If any critical part or critical link is destroyed, then it can affect the entire system, or even paralyze the entire system. Therefore, we must be adept in seizing hold of the critical parts in the enemy's operational system to conduct destruction: for example, assaulting and destroying the enemy's command and control system, information system, weapons systems and important support systems, etc. In order to create conditions for seizing joint campaign victory, we will cut apart the enemy's operational system, destroy the enemy's integrated structure and weaken the enemy's capability for integrated operations through strikes on parts and link points of the enemy's vital areas.

(2) The essential points for implementing and carrying out the thought of "*precision strike-dominate the enemy*"

"*Precision strike-dominate the enemy*," in a narrow sense, does not only refer to precision firepower strikes, but rather, it refers to precision operations. Precision operations means to precisely select operational targets, to precisely use various operational strengths, to precisely apply fighting methods and means, to precisely control the operational intensity and course, and to defeat the enemy with precise and highly effective operational activities. The guidance thought of "*precision strike-dominate the enemy*" not only contains the requirements for weapons and equipment and operational capabilities, it also contains the requirements for the skill of joint campaign guidance. In order to implement the thought of "*precisions strike-dominate the enemy*," we should seize upon the following essential points:

1. Precisely select strike targets

The core of the "*precision strike*" thought is to accurately strike the enemy's vital area targets. The enemy's vital-area targets are targets that directly create important effects on the campaign and even the strategic overall situation and can form a benefit on the overall situation. This not only includes important political and economic targets, but also includes critical systems, parts and links that play a holding together role for the enemy's operational system, and it also includes important force-strength groupings and important

military facilities. Precision selection and precision strikes of these vital area-targets can effectively destroy or paralyze the enemy's operational architecture and weaken its operational capability and war potential. It can *strike ruthlessly-strike to hurt* the enemy, shake its morale and deprive its will to fight, so that we can achieve a shaking of the overall situation by striking one point and achieve the effect of moving the whole body by pulling one hair. We should pay attention to mastering four points in precision selection and strike of vital-area targets: first of all, we must stand at the height of the strategic and campaign overall situation and center on precision selection and strike of targets to achieve strategic and campaign goals. Secondly, we must set out from destroying the enemy's operational architecture in precision selection and strike of targets, mainly the enemy's reconnaissance surveillance systems, command and control systems, high-tech weapon systems and rear area safeguarding-support systems as well as the critical nodes within these systems. Third, we must rely on our own operational capabilities in precision selection and strike of targets. We must fully consider our strike capabilities. Especially for targets of first-battle strikes, we need even more demonstration-proofs from many angles {duofang lunzheng}. There must be precise and full accuracy in target data preparation. [We must] thoroughly accomplish quantifications for every vital-area target and ensure that we can succeed, get results if we strike, and win if we strike. Fourth, vary the targets of key point strike at the right time. The decision-making and planning of precision selection strike targeting must have flexibility and contingency quality and there must be a variety of courses of action and many preparations. During the course of operations, carry out tracking of decision-making and precisely evaluate strike results based on the changes in the battlefield situation. From within the changes to battlefield posture, be adept at promptly seeking and seizing upon the exposed vital-area targets in the enemy's operational system that have holding-together and supporting roles and striking them to push forward and alter the battle situation.

2. Use forces with precision and key points, form superiority of strikes against vital-area targets

Using forces with precision means we must transform from the past quantitative scale model towards a precision qualitative model. [We must] attach importance to thorough calculations of quality and quantity and bring into play the specialty and superiority of various operational strengths. This is an inevitable requirement of a joint campaign under informationized conditions on strength application. Using forces with key points is a military rule having universal significance. Only by using forces with precision and key points against vital-area targets to form strike superiority can we ensure smashing and annihilating the vital-area targets. To this end, we should pay attention to master the following points: first, form the "*three concentrations*" against the vital-area targets. Namely, concentrate and use crack strengths in the main direction, key point areas and critical time segments. We must precisely calculate various operational strengths and form overwhelming superiority against vital-area targets. Secondly, we must have a good mastery of the relationship between qualitative and quantitative. Precisely use operational strengths with a definite quantity as the base, but attach even more importance to the qualitative factors of the weapons and equipment. Establish a notion of qualitative

superiority but one must especially stress precise calculations and concentrated use of crack forces and sharp weapons. Third, we must have a good grasp of the relationship between concentrate and disperse. The enhanced destruction capability of modern weapons and the increased battlefield transparency have created an extreme threat, in terms of time and space, for excessive and lengthy concentration of force-strengths and weaponry. Therefore, in using forces with precision and key points, we must rationally disperse and deploy in terms of time and space. In terms of time, we must be adept at selecting the time-opportunity, accomplishing rapid concentration and use during battle and rapid dispersal and concealment after battle. Fourth, we must have a good grasp of the relationship between the force-strength and firepower. The goal of using forces with precision and key points is to improve operational effectiveness and firepower is the most direct factor in modern operational effectiveness. Fundamentally speaking, to concentrate force-strengths is to concentrate firepower, and precise calculations mainly refer to firepower calculation. Thus, in terms of the relationship between the force-strengths and firepower, we must emphasize giving priority to concentrating firepower and with firepower concentration as the prerequisite, improve the effectiveness of using forces with precision and key points. Fifth, we must have a good grasp of the relationship between striking targets and selecting force-strengths. Strikes on different targets need different strike strengths, thus using forces with precision and key points must emphasize directed-quality. For example, a strike giving priority to destroying the enemy's information systems and command systems as the main targets should have force-strengths and weaponry having "soft-kill" capability in the lead. In strikes against the enemy's important military facility and effective strength targets, we should lead with force-strengths and weaponry having "hard kill" capability. Only in this manner can we achieve the optimum strike results.

3. Precisely utilize various operational methods and means

In a future joint campaign under informationized conditions, we will face a completely different battlefield environment, different operational opponents and different operational activity patterns than in past wars. Therefore, on the basis of carrying on and developing traditional fighting methods of the PLA, precise, flexible and creative application of fighting methods is of utmost importance for seizing victory in a joint campaign. Fighting methods have a layered quality. There are joint campaign fighting methods of an overall general quality, and there are specific fighting methods for each operational phase and operational activity. Speaking in terms of the overall general quality fighting methods, they are mainly to fight well the contention warfare {zhengduozhan} of information dominance, air dominance and sea dominance; fight well the high-intensity full-depth assault warfare; fight well the high-efficiency structural destruction warfare; fight well the highly independent asymmetrical operations; etc. Of course, the content of fighting methods is very ample. For example, in terms of specific fighting methods, one cannot exhaust them. However, in applying fighting methods, one must be precise and flexible, and especially in carrying out specific activities of the force-units of the services and arms, one must thoroughly plan and precisely calculate. For example, for landing operations, apply the fighting method of full depth seize-occupy the landing site. Not only must one assault the first-line defense positions of the enemy's

inshore beachheads, but one must also strike the maneuver strengths {jidong liliang} moving forward from the enemy's depth; not only must one strike the incoming raid of enemy aircraft, but one must also seek and annihilate the operational ships at sea and below the sea; not only must one assault onto land from the sea, but one must also implement vertical landing from the air; not only must one use hard strike means such as force-strengths and firepower to smash the enemy's important targets and kill the enemy's effective strengths, but one must also use soft strike means such as electromagnetic attack and computer network attack to destroy and jam the enemy's reconnaissance and command and control systems; not only must one implement frontal assault onto land, but one must also implement special sabotage operations in the enemy's rear. With such a multitude of strengths and operational activities unfolding at the same time or in sequence in the full depth of the campaign, we must, based on the objective situations of the battlefield, conduct precise calculations and thorough arrangements for the necessary force-strengths, firepower as well as the operational time and location of every operational activity. [We must] bring into play the subjective dynamic quality of campaign guidance and with precision, flexibly apply fighting methods. Only then can we fully bring into play the might of the integrated joint campaign and achieve the operational goals.

4. Precisely control the operational course

The joint campaign at the campaign level is generally implemented in phases, and each phase has different operational missions, operational patterns and fighting methods. However, they are required to be inter-linked, to have mutual functions, and to be mutually complementary. This requires that those directing a campaign should, on the basis of the general operational intent and battlefield posture, set out from achieving the campaign goal[s], have a foothold in the campaign overall situation, and rationally divide the operational phases, allowing them to be inter-linked; [the campaign directors should] precisely determine the implementation sequence and methods of various operational patterns and fighting methods for each service and arm in different phases, and achieve a consistent adjusting-coordination in terms of time and space; they must conduct realistic and forceful precision adjustment and control of the critical factors affecting the operational course and conclusion such as the operational time-opportunities, the operational intensity and the operational phase transitions, etc. In terms of the joint campaign guidance, one must attach importance to precisely have a good grasp of the major key-link quality operations that affect the overall situation. First, one must strive to fight the first battle well. Though the first battle is the opening match of the battle, it is the organic prelude to a joint campaign, and its outcome extremely influences the overall situation. Thus, one must precisely plan and make meticulous preparations in order to have a good grasp of the time-opportunity to start fighting and to strive to win if there is a first battle. Secondly, one must precisely have a good grasp of the transitions of the operational phases and fight well in the operations connecting the middle phases. This phase is a period of time when severe changes occur in the battlefield posture and when the situation is complex and contradiction points are many. Many situations will exceed outside of what was predicted, so one must have a good grasp of the operational centers of gravity of the new phases and promptly modify and improve the operational plan.

[One must] quickly adjust the *bushi* disposition and transition the operational activity patterns. [One must] ensure that one has a good grasp of the operations of the middle phases and push forward the smooth development of the battle situation. Third, one must precisely control the operational conclusion and grasp the operational “apex.” This is to fight well the concluding battle, as its success or failure relates to whether one can achieve the entire operational goal. Those directing operations must master the degree of achieving campaign goals and the changes in the battlefield situation. They must make scientific calculations and assessments for campaign developing trends and conclusion, control the operational limits, grasp the operational “apex,” adopt suitably realistic operational activity patterns, fight well in operations of the last phase and consequently obtain the complete realization of the entire campaign goals.

Section 2: Basic Principles of a Campaign...93

The basic principles of a campaign are the concrete manifestation of the campaign basic guidance thought of “*integrated operations-precision strike to dominate the enemy*” from a different perspective. They are the basic rules one should adhere to in preparing and implementing a campaign.

I. Know the Opponent and Know Yourself, Full Preparation...93

To know the opponent and know yourself is a basic prerequisite for correctly guiding a campaign. The modern campaign battlefield is broad in scope, has multi-elements of participating strengths, changes in the situation are abrupt, the struggle in reconnaissance and anti-reconnaissance is fierce, “*knowing the enemy and knowing yourself*” touches upon many issues, and the amount of information is large. The scope of the confrontation between the enemy and us is no longer limited in the material domain such as force-strength and weaponry. It has expanded to the information domain and the cognition domain, so the importance of information has increased daily. Centering on these two domains, information warfare and psychological warfare are unfolded. They will become the important content of a campaign under informationized conditions, requiring one to accomplish knowing the opponent and knowing yourself in all areas of land, sea, air, space, electromagnetic and psychological, and further increasing requirements. To this end, we should especially pay attention to the following issues: first, we must master intelligence information even more comprehensively and profoundly. The campaign commander and the command organ must, on the basis of correctly understanding the strategic intent, mastering the needs of the strategic interests, profoundly understanding the operational missions and fully comprehending the requirements of the nation’s political, economic and diplomatic struggles on the campaign, be as familiar as possible with the operational capabilities and specialties of both sides. In terms of our side, they should understand with key points how to enable the operational capability of each service to mutually match each other and complement each other’s superiorities and accomplish the campaign missions together; at the same time, they should comprehend the situations such as the political and diplomatic that are closely related to the campaign and ensure that the campaign from start to finish conforms to and serves the needs-

requirements of political and diplomatic struggles. In terms of the enemy's side, not only must they master the enemy situation that can be gathered from general battlefield awareness, but they also should more profoundly comprehend the relevant content of the enemy's operational will, mental psychology, values and education. Secondly, they must strive to achieve information sharing among the participating strengths. They should unify the *bushu* disposition and application of the reconnaissance strengths of all services and bring into play the function of information networks. They should join the reconnaissance and early warning equipment in the different operational spaces and various operational organizational-units into one, form a functionally and highly integrated reconnaissance and early warning system, and improve the overall level of battlefield awareness; at the same time as closely organizing root-level reconnaissance and early warning, they should also utilize higher level intelligence, common media, etc. to expand intelligence and information sources and even bring into play further the superiority of information sharing. Third, is to actively open-up-development of information confrontation. They must comprehensively: use the various strengths of information operations, fully bring into play the auxiliary role of local information sources during information operations and improve the capability of information operations from an overall standpoint; use a variety of methods together, combine “*soft strike*” and “*hard destruction*,” combine technical means and tactical measures, and influence the normal bringing into play of the enemy's information system effectiveness; and adopt realistic and effective information security secrecy measures, strengthen protection of PLA information systems, and ensure the normal running of systems.

Superiority without preparation is not real superiority, and inferiority with preparation can often defeat a superior enemy. On the basis of *knowing the opponent and knowing yourself* and dependent on the campaign mission, one must focus on the full course of the joint campaign and center on the operational needs-requirements to fully prepare. This is an indispensable prerequisite for ensuring joint campaign victory.

Campaign preparations must be conducted as early as possible to fully utilize the favorable conditions of peace time. One must: be rooted in the most complex and most difficult situations, thoroughly and precisely formulate the campaign plans {*jihua*}, conceive a variety of courses of action, have in advance multiple preparations, and conduct operational simulations; strengthen battlefield construction and material reserves; muster the force-strengths at the right time, and organize imminent battle training; broadly and profoundly accomplish political work; and adopt strict defensive and safeguarding-support measures, ensure completion of joint preparations with concealment, safely, and on time.

II. Strive for Initiative, and Seize and Control “Two Dominances”...94

Initiative is a freedom of armed forces activities, a dominance of the battlefield and the enemy, and it is also a main content that both participating sides strive for on the battlefield. Striving for initiative and striving to avoid passivity are universal military rules throughout military history.

In operations under informationized conditions, striving for initiative faces many new difficulties and this reveals some special laws. Applying high-tech weapons and equipment, paralyzing the enemy's operational architecture, first seizing of critical domains that sustain the battlefield, and gradual expanding of the aforementioned into the other domains of the battlefield have already become important ways to seize battlefield initiative. In a future joint campaign under high-tech conditions, especially under informationized conditions, the crux of controlling the battlefield and seizing initiative is to strive and master battlefield information dominance and air dominance. Only after seizing and controlling these "*two dominances*" can we smoothly conduct land and sea operations.

To seize and maintain battlefield information dominance, one must: unify the planning {*jihua*} and use of the strengths of various information operations of each service and fully bring into play the role of the people and masses in information operations; adopt various effective means, closely organize information reconnaissance, and provide enemy information and battle conditions at the right time and accurately; strengthen the protection of information systems and information security in joint operations, adopt various measures to conduct electronic demonstrations and deception, and make it difficult for the enemy to gather our real information; fully bring into play the role of the command automation system and improve the effectiveness of collecting, processing, transmitting and using information; and implement active and effective electronic jamming and hard destruction, jam, suppress, destroy, and smash the enemy's important information systems such as their command and control systems, and seize information dominance.

To seize air dominance, we should, with Air Force operational strengths in the lead, fully bring into full play the overall might of the campaign and tactical missile force-units, the Army aviation force-units, the air defense force-units and special operational force-units. [We should] comprehensively use different activities such as missile assaults, air attacks, air combat, anti-air operations and enemy rear sabotage-raids, etc., and smash and weaken the enemy's air combat capability and air defense capability in order seize air dominance.

To strive for initiative and seize-control of the "*two dominances*," we must unify the overall-planning and organizing and strengthen the adjusting-coordination of various operational strengths and operational activities; we must give prominence to key points, adhere to the needs-requirements of the campaign's realities in different phases, rationally determine the scope of time and space in seizing and maintaining battlefield control, enlarge the degree of control over the main area, and ensure the freedom of the campaign's main activities.

III. Concentrate Crack Troops, Strike the Enemy's Vital Areas...95

In a campaign under high-tech conditions, especially under informationized conditions, and in the situation where the enemy is superior in weapons and equipment and we are

inferior, in order to strive for campaign victory, we must adhere to the specific patterns and needs of the campaign and unify the mustering of the crack force-units and high-tech weapons and equipment of all services. [We must] form a crack strength with crack troops and sharp weapons in the lead and in combination with a variety of operational strengths. [We must] seek a comprehensive superiority of qualitative and quantitative operational strengths, and enhance our capabilities to contend with the enemy to the greatest extent possible.

In order to concentrate crack troops, first of all, adhering to operational needs, muster sufficient crack troops and sharp weapons from the services and the goal is to form an effective key point strike capability in the main operational direction and in the main operational activities. Secondly, one must attach importance to the mutual aggregation of operational effectiveness and the factors for gaining victory. [We must] unify the task organization and the use of strengths, attach importance to the comprehensive integration of weapon systems and operational factors, allow the various strengths to complement each other, and form an overall combined power; at the same time as concentrating strengths, we should pay even closer attention to a comprehensive concentration of long range operational effectiveness such as electronic warfare, firepower warfare, information warfare, etc., select the most favorable time-opportunity to release the strike capability towards the most valuable target, and achieve optimum operational results.

To strike the enemy's vital area is to apply crack strengths, to comprehensively apply different methods and means, to set out from the needs-requirements of the overall operational situation, and to select the vital area targets that play a holding together and supporting role in the enemy's operational system. It is also what facilitates our achieving of the operational intention. It is being able to quickly dismember the command and control systems, the main force-strength groupings, the main weapon systems and important battlefield facilities in the enemy's operational system as well as the critical parts of the assisting-support and safeguarding-support system, and to implement key point strikes and to quickly destroy and paralyze the enemy.

IV. Rapid and Sudden, Catch the Enemy Unaware...96

In campaign operations, we must adopt effective measures, strive to achieve a sudden quality in activities, and boldly implement mobility. With rapid activities and catch the enemy unaware fighting methods and means, [we must] seize and maintain battlefield initiative and obtain operational victory.

Sudden quality [suddenness] is a multiplier of combat power. Along with the notable enhancement in the capabilities of armed forces intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance and information processing under informationized conditions, warfare has become more and more transparent and it has become more and more difficult to achieve operational suddenness by relying on traditional concealment measures. War practices have demonstrated that although camouflage and deception measures can preserve actual strength, they are after all passive and protective measures and can easily restrict the

normal conduct of the activity of operations. With the dual roles of mechanization and informationization, an armed forces' capability for rapid activities has been significantly raised. Through rapid and sudden activities, it has become possible to achieve operational objectives before an enemy can make a response. Compared with achieving suddenness via concealment, not only can rapid activities directly weaken the enemy's operational capability with activities such as firepower damage and force-strength assault, it can similarly catch the enemy unaware, psychologically fear and awe the enemy, and achieve the result of manipulating and smashing the enemy's will to resist. This point was proven by the Iraq War. If the PLA fights with a high-tech and powerful enemy, we must achieve operational suddenness. Outside of retaining methods such as traditional concealment, camouflage and deception, we must further attach importance to bringing the specialties of PLA traditional maneuver warfare {jidongzhan} and fighting method flexibility into play, strive to make breakthroughs in the conventional in the range and speed of operations and operational methods, and strike the enemy and catch them unprepared through rapid activities and asymmetrical methods and means.

Actively adopt concealment, camouflage and deception measures. Directed at the enemy's operational characteristics and the battlefield posture, be adept at applying stratagems, and strengthen information confrontation. Disrupt the enemy's reconnaissance and surveillance with various means of jamming. Conceal the real and show the false throughout the complete domain of the battlefield. Cleverly deceive and confuse the enemy. Cause the enemy to be unable to ascertain our activities, bringing about their false impression and being unaware.

Be adept at taking advantage of the enemy's mistakes. Those directing a campaign must be adept at discovering and utilizing the mistakes and carelessness of the enemy. They must skillfully use stratagems, think of ways to trap the enemy into unfavorable situations, and compel the enemy to make mistakes. Once combat opportunities appear, they are able to rapidly respond and strike the enemy to catch them unaware.

Maintain a fast tempo in activities. Boldly implement maneuver operations {jidong zuozhan} and fully bring the role of command automation systems into play. Strive to be quicker than the enemy in the command flow and occupy a preemptive position in the activity flow. Maintaining a rapid operational tempo means that even if the enemy knows our operational intention, they still are unable to effectively respond, and this restricts and deprives the enemy's freedom of action.

Flexibly use strengths and change fighting methods. Based on the specific battlefield situation, persist in the idea of *you fight yours and I fight mine*. Bring the PLA's operational advantages into play. Attack the enemy at undefended points. Avoid the strengths and attack the weaknesses. Strike the enemy with means and methods the enemy is unable to anticipate, and force the enemy to fall into a condition of being passive and taking a beating.

V. Combine Offense and Defense, Attach Importance to Attack...97

In an offensive operation, we must strive from the start to paralyze the enemy's information systems and air dominance systems with sudden and intense firepower. In addition, we must win against the enemy's decision-making superiority and activity superiority with fast tempo operational activities, and trap the enemy in a passive position where he is hard put to respond. At the same time, we must adopt necessary measures and accomplish full-dimensional protection and prevent the enemy from utilizing the occasions when we cannot form operational capabilities such as our committing, assembling and unfolding of force strengths to implement strikes for *taking the initiative to subdue the enemy* {xianfa zhiren}. The main measures are: accomplish network and electromagnetic protection and ensure the normal operating of our integrated command and control system; accomplish well anti-air defense, minimize the operational effectiveness of the enemy's air raid weapons, and ensure the anti-air security of important targets; and thoroughly organize anti-airborne landing and anti-special operations, prevent the enemy's infiltration and disruption, and ensure the security of our operational rear. Closely match up defensive operations and the offensive, and ensure achievement of the offensive operational goals.

During defensive operations, with realizing the goals of defensive operations as the core and setting out from the operational disposition {bushu} needs-requirements in building key point defense and key point garrison duty, [we must] consider defending operations and offensive operations unified-overall-planning, and form a great depth and three-dimensional disposition {bushi} having both offense and defense. Seizing upon the occasions when the enemy is committing long range force-strengths, when force-strengths have not unfolded, and when they have not completed attack disposition {bushu}, open-up-develop active offensive activities, sudden attacks [assaults] their port and airfield facilities, and destroy and delay the committing and unfolding of enemy force-strengths; taking advantage of the occasion when the enemy has yet to construct their air defense system, strike the enemy's command system, air defense system and air combat system; and taking advantage of before the enemy has yet formed a three dimensional attack disposition {bushu}, sudden-attack the enemy's key point disposition {bushu} and delay the initiation of the enemy attack. When the enemy is not done with the creation of the three dimensional offensive disposition {bushu}, we need to assault the enemy's key point *bushu* disposition, and delay it from initiating the offense. In summary, [we must] strive for implementation of matching up active offensive operations with defensive operations over the full course of operations and operations of offense assisting defense and integrated offense-defense.

In a campaign under informationized conditions, both sides have rapid mobility capability of force-strengths and firepower and possess the capability to implement long range strikes against an enemy. They both stress implementing preemptive sudden-attacks, smashing the enemy's vital-area targets such as their command and control systems and precision strike systems in order to seize air dominance and information dominance and firmly grasping the war initiative. Also, only by accomplishing this point

can we gain victory in the war. Consequently, whether it is offense or defense, in order to achieve one's own goals, one must actively conduct offensive activities.

VI. In-depth Strikes, Attach Importance to Long Range Operations...98

Full-depth strikes are an important way to achieve campaign operational goals. Whether one can win a modern campaign to a large extent depends on one's operational capability to suppress or smash the opponent's depth. In full depth strike, we stress that, at the same time as striking the enemy's forward force-units, strike the high value targets such as the strategic centers of gravity in the enemy's full-depth and the rear area and command systems. This also includes protecting one's own full-depth important targets from the enemy's assault. In terms of space, this not only includes striking the enemy's depth, it also includes protecting one's own depth; not only does this include ground surface but it also includes air, sea surface (underwater) and even outer space three-dimensional strikes. In terms of time, in-depth strikes and forward position strikes are conducted simultaneously or near simultaneously; sometimes in-depth strikes are even conducted before the forward position strikes. In an offensive campaign, one must alter the methods of going from forward position to in-depth, instead one should strike against the enemy's forward position and in-depth simultaneously; in a defensive campaign, place emphasis on at the same time actively resisting the enemy's attacks on the forward position, and strike the enemy's attack disposition {bushu} with active initiative counterattack activities.

In terms of strike targets, give priority to the enemy's vital-area and weak targets. One should focus on striking the enemy's command and control systems, rear area assisting-support systems, airfields, ports, traffic and communication hubs, as well as important battlefield facilities, etc.; in terms of using strengths, with high-tech "trump cards" in the lead, fully bring into play the superiority of the People's War and extensively open-up-develop special operations in the enemy's depth; in terms of operational patterns, with long range firepower sudden-attack in the lead, combine the application of operational patterns such as guerrilla warfare, special warfare and airborne [landing] operations, etc., and strike the enemy with flexible maneuver and catching them unaware; and in terms of strike time, select the most favorable time-opportunity and strive to form continuous strikes during the entire campaign course.

Long range strike capability is the foundation for implementing in-depth strike. One should apply, inclusively, long range artillery, campaign tactical missiles, weapon systems such as operational aircraft and ships equipped with various precision strike weapons, as well as force-strengths undertaking in-depth operational missions. These will implement long range operations against the enemy and simultaneously strike the full depth.

VII. Unified Command, Consistent Adjusting-Coordination...99

In campaign operations under informationized conditions, there are multiple elements of participating strengths with a variety of functions. The operational activities of the various battlefield spaces are intermingled, so if one departs from unified command, then it would be difficult to form the powerful might of integrated operations. Therefore, flexible and highly effective command systems, command means and command methods, and smooth coordination relationships are the basic conditions for achieving unified command and consistent adjusting-coordination. To this end, we must accomplish the following points:

Establish a highly effective and authoritative command system. In a campaign under informationized conditions, the operational space is broad, the operational disposition {bushu} is dispersed and the situational changes are extreme. Especially in an integrated joint campaign, the command system should have a thin and flat profile, and it should be laterally interconnected and vertically integrated. It should have robust functionality to implement command of all types of operational strengths. It should have clear responsibilities, be highly authoritative, and have a capable, agile and effective architecture for nimble operating.

Apply command automation means. Under high-tech conditions, especially under the informationized conditions, there are multiple elements of participating strengths and battlefield posture changes are extreme. The information volume a campaign commander needs to receive and process is soaring and time effectiveness requirements are high. One must vigorously open-up and apply tools such as information fusion, intelligence analysis, decision-making optimization and plan-formulation, etc. In order to provide the campaign commander nimble and effective aided decision-making means to conduct fully automated and real time monitor-control and analysis of the battlefield, [one must] make command and control automated and intelligent, shorten the command cycle of the campaign and enhance both the scientific quality of decision-making and the real time quality of command.

Selecting to use an appropriate level of centralized and dispersed command mode. In a modern campaign, not only is there a high degree of centralized command required, but one can also organize operations on one's own {zizuzhi zuozhan}. [One must] fully utilize the integrated information network system to achieve a common battlefield posture awareness, and allow all services and arms, various operational organizational-units and operational factors participating in operations to grasp corresponding information of the enemy forces, our forces and the operational environment; and apply modern organizing and decision-making ideas, establish a new mechanism for joint and synchronous decision-making, and transform the traditional decision-making and planning process that was vertical, level-by-level, and unidirectional to a parallel, synchronous and interactive one. Shorten the time for cognition and decision-making and elevate the quality and results of decision-making. Not only must we centralize command and unify the operational thoughts, unify the formulation of plans {jihua}, unify the

clarification of operational objectives, unify the differentiation of operational phases, unify the determination of the operational disposition {bushu}, and unify the control of critical quality operations, etc., but we must attach importance to combining centralized with dispersed command. This will fully bring into play the initiative and creativity of all services and arms and the commanders at various levels and overcome the problems of exercising too rigid control, and lacking in flexibility. It will also allow the subordinate levels, centered on the general operational intent, to actively and flexibly complete their operational missions

Establish smooth coordination relationships. Common operational thoughts, operational principles and full understanding of higher level intent, individual missions and mutual relationships are the foundation for consistent adjusting-coordination of operational strengths and operational activities. The campaign resolution and the campaign plans {jihua} are the basis for coordination. In order to ensure the consistent adjusting-coordination of the various operational strengths, one should: clarify the coordination relationships and stipulate the coordination discipline; seize upon the links, give prominence to coordination key points; combine plan {jihua} coordination with ad hoc coordination; establish the coordination organization and reinforce the coordination support, etc.; and especially stress that we must set out from the overall campaign situation to actively coordinate and tacitly cooperate.

VIII. Full-Scale Safeguarding Support and Give Prominence to Key Points...100

Full scale safeguarding support includes operational, logistical and technical support as well as an integrated comprehensive support to the various services, arms and component parts. Giving prominence to key points is, on the basis of full-scale safeguarding support, give prominence to support in the key point operational direction, the key point operational area, the key point operational activities, the key point time occasions and the important weapon systems.

Achieve integrated support. One must: fully utilize the favorable conditions of the People's War, rationally employ the various safeguarding support strengths and build a robust safeguarding support system that is military-civilian integrated and services and arms integrated; based on the needs-requirements of the campaign, unify the organization of the safeguarding-support strengths, differentiate the safeguarding-support missions, and implement the safeguarding-support activities; and based on the battlefield situation, adopt flexible and diverse safeguarding-support modes.

Implement key point safeguarding-support. We must do both unify-overall-planning and give prominence to safeguarding-support key points based on the safeguarding-support needs of the campaign mission and various services and arms; first, we must scientifically differentiate and employ the safeguarding-support strengths, concentrate the main safeguarding-support force-strengths, materials, equipment to use them in operations in the main direction, the main battlefield and critical campaign phases, and ensure the accomplishment of main operational missions. Secondly, within all of the campaign

safeguarding-support content, we must give prominence to safeguarding-support of the key point content. The safeguarding-support problems in areas such as intelligence, communications, air defense, logistics and maneuver are especially prominent, so those directing a campaign should attach importance and resolve key points in areas such as technical equipment and personnel, etc. Third, we must secure sufficient materiel reserves, strength reserves and equipment reserves in order to ensure the completion of key point safeguarding-support missions and maintain a capability for sustained safeguarding-support.

Implement safeguarding-support during confrontation. In a modern campaign, the struggle between safeguarding-support and anti-safeguarding-support is intense and the confrontation quality of safeguarding-support is enhanced. One should strengthen the view and measures for implementing safeguarding-support during confrontation. We must especially combine the safeguarding-support capability of weakening and disrupting the enemy with improving and strengthening one's own safeguarding-support capability. Thus, implement full-scale safeguarding-support during confrontation and ensure the smooth implementation of the campaign.

IX. . Bring into Play the Superiority of Political Work...101

A campaign is not only a contest between the military and economic powers of the opposing sides but it is also a competition between their political and mental strengths. Strengthening political work and bringing political superiority transforms the PLA officers' and men's mental vitality strength into a tremendous combat power and brings into play a person's largest dynamic quality to defeat the enemy. [This is accomplished] on the basis of the excellent political affairs and through the series of political work that stimulates the high level of operational zeal and the brave spirit of not being afraid of difficulties and not being afraid of sacrifice by various types of combatants.

Campaign political work must be jointly implemented under the centralized and unified leadership of the party committees of the campaign large formation to bring into play the strengths in various areas. It also implements and permeates the full course of the campaign. Through implementing the orders and instructions of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, it upholds the absolute leadership of the party over the military, and guarantees a high level of centralization and integration of the force-units; it teaches the force-units to recognize the dialectical relationship between humans and weapons, to avoid "the worship of weaponry," to solidify the confidence in *winning if one dares to strike*; it promotes military democracy, collective thinking with broad benefits, and creates fighting methods suitable to the new conditions; through the broad connections with local governments, it allows the mighty force of People's War to be fully brought into play; it focuses on bringing an overall combined power into play, it teaches force-units to do away with the thought of a single service being able to gain victory, and it establishes the view of active cooperation and close coordination; it strengthens education in battlefield discipline and accomplishes well the people's work;

and it improves work styles and work methods and adapts the requirements of modern campaign political work.

In addition, we must especially attach importance to opening-up-development in the struggles of "*psychological warfare*" and countering the enemy's "*psychological warfare*." In a campaign, at the same time as implementing military strikes against the enemy, we must pay attention to understanding and mastering the psychological dynamic state of the enemy's officers and soldiers. [We must] have a grasp of their weaknesses and contradictions and actively open-up-develop "*psychological warfare*." [We must] collapse the enemy's will to fight and break up the enemy's military strengths. At the same time, we must strive to accomplish the work on countering the enemy's "*psychological warfare*," and expose the enemy's "*psychological warfare*" negative media and reactionary propaganda. [We must] build a defense line of solid thought and render the entire body of battle commanders to be able to politically, mentally and psychologically crush the "*psychological warfare*" intention of the enemy and ensure participating force-units unite with solidarity and raise combat power.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 4

Campaign Preparation and Implementation...102

Campaign preparation is the prerequisite for ensuring smooth implementation of a campaign and seizing operational victory. Campaign implementation affects the realization of the campaign resolution and directly affects campaign success or failure.

Section 1: Campaign Preparations...102

Campaign preparation is the process of conducting campaign overall planning and organizing by the campaign commander, and it is the basis for the campaign activity. Campaign preparation time is normally determined by a higher level commander based on the nature, the conditions, and the scale of operations. A campaign commander and the command organ should tensely but orderly accomplish operational preparations within the time limit stipulated by higher level authorities. All preparation work should be correctly and carefully planned, and quickly and covertly conducted.

I. Determining the Campaign Concept and Setting the Campaign Resolution...102

Determining the campaign concept and setting the campaign resolution are the core contents of campaign overall planning.

(1) Determining the campaign concept

The campaign concept is the general objective that the campaign must reach as well as the basic methods to be used. It is the general outline for campaign activities and it is the fundamental basis for organizing and implementing the campaign. Determining the campaign concept is a special feature of PLA operational guidance; not only is it a treasured experience accumulated by the PLA in a long period of war practice, but it is also an effective way for the PLA to conduct future campaign preparations. The campaign concept is normally determined by higher level authority, but sometimes it can be put forth by the campaign commander and reported to the higher level authority for approval. It can also be jointly determined by higher level authority and the root-level campaign commander.

1. Contents of the campaign concept

The contents of a campaign concept do not have a fixed model-form and they should be determined according to the actual situations for each operation. The contents normally include content such as the campaign goal[s], the operational direction, the operation objective[s], the operational strengths to be used, the fighting method[s], and the campaign phases, etc. In each operation, the campaign concept is normally formulated by capturing one or several of the most prominent and most critical issues from amongst these contents.

In campaign practice, sometimes when a situation is unclear, it is necessary for one to first determine a macroscopic and outline concept, and then after that, as the situation gradually gets clearer, set the campaign resolution; sometimes a commander is able to quickly and completely grasp the battlefield situation and under these conditions, he is able to directly set the campaign resolution. Consequently, in campaign practice, one must not necessarily first determine the campaign concept in each operation and then set the campaign resolution, but one should flexibly grasp [the situation] based on the actual situations for each campaign.

2. The main issues that should be grasped in determining the campaign concept

(i) Mastering the bases. The main bases for determining the campaign concept include higher level intent, the enemy's situation, our situation, the battlefield environment, etc. Amongst these, the higher level intent is the main basis for a campaign commander in determining the campaign concept. Therefore, a campaign commander must correctly and profoundly understand the higher level intent and grasp its spiritual essence. A campaign under informationized conditions affects the national political and diplomatic struggles and affects the overall situation of national economic construction, so a campaign commander must determine the campaign concept based on the intent of the supreme command and needs-requirements of the national political and diplomatic struggles. The enemy's campaign intention, force-strength task organization, operational characteristics, weapons and equipment and posture, the PLA's campaign task organization, the military-political quality of the force-units as well as the situations such as military geographical environment, weather, social conditions within the theater are all important bases for determining the campaign concept. Therefore, when determining the campaign concept, one must also thoroughly and completely analyze these issues.

(ii) Focus on the overall situation. The campaign concept is the general outline for operational guidance, so one must focus on the overall situation and macroscopically stratagem-plan. One must fully understand the status and role of the campaign in the overall situation. [One must] accurately grasp internal relationships within the campaign overall situation and focus on the strategic and campaign overall situations and full process. [One must] conduct macroscopic stratagem-planning and correctly determine the important issues in the campaign, such as the campaign goal, the operational direction, the main *bushu*-disposition and main fighting methods, etc.

(iii) Scientific forecasting. A campaign commander should forecast the possible changes in the enemy situation and activities in each campaign phase on the basis of correctly analyzing the objective situations, and [he should] conceive the PLA approach, measures to be adopted and possible final results of operations.

(iv) Capturing the critical [issues]. Because the situations of each operation are different, the critical issues are also different. In a campaign, the campaign goal, operational direction, operational objectives, fighting methods, the use of operational strengths, and time opportunities for campaign phase transitions, etc, can all be critical

issues in operations. One must capture the critical issues of operations in determining the campaign concept and make clear stipulations.

(2) Setting the campaign resolution

The campaign resolution is the final decisive resolve made for the main issues of operations in accordance with further mastering the situation and on the basis of the campaign concept. It is the basis for formulating campaign plans, organizing campaign coordination and implementing the campaign.

1. The main contents of the campaign resolution

The main contents include: the campaign goal; the main operational direction; the campaign *bushi*-disposition, the basic fighting methods; the campaign phase divisions, and campaign initiation time, etc.

The campaign goal – is the ultimate outcome of campaign one must reach. The goal of a campaign under informationized conditions is subjected to fairly large restrictions of political and diplomatic struggles. When determining the campaign goal, one must conform to higher level intent. When contradictions occur between higher level intent and the root-level operational capabilities and battlefield actual situations, the commander should have the courage to reflect the real situation to the higher level authority and put forth one's own recommendations by seeking the truth from fact. One must set out from objective realities; not only can one not determine an excessive campaign goal that surpasses PLA operational capabilities and is difficult to attain, but one cannot be too conservative and go as far as to influence the bringing into play of latent capabilities and delay war progress.

The main operational direction – in selecting the main operational direction, one should determine this based on situations such as the enemy situation, the higher level intent, the campaign goal, the campaign task organization, the battlefield environment, etc. For one campaign, one should only select one main operational direction. The main operational direction selected by a commander should benefit the realization of higher level intent, benefit the reaching of the campaign goal, benefit the requirement to win the initial battle, benefit later development {*fazhan*}, and benefit a favorable battlefield environment, these are the general requirements. In actual operations, the situation of having all these factors being favorable is in the minority; often only some of them are favorable and some are not. A commander must focus on the most important factors, weigh the pros and cons and make scientific decision making.

Campaign *bushi* disposition – is the *mission differentiation* {*renwu qufen*}, the *organized grouping* {*bianzu*} and the *positioning* {*peizhi*} accomplished for the strengths within the campaign task organization. Correct campaign *bushi* disposition has important significance for the course and conclusion of the campaign. Campaign *bushi* disposition should be determined according to the enemy situation, the terrain, campaign type and

patterns, etc. Normally, one establishes a group (a concentrated grouping) *bushi* disposition whose *mission differentiation* should allow the various participating strengths to be clear in its responsibilities and achieve the common campaign goal through consistent adjusting-coordination; the *campaign organized grouping* should be flexibly organized based on different operational needs, and one can adopt the forms of organized grouping of mission and organized grouping of organized system. The rank levels for the organized grouping of various services and arms force-strengths in general are the joint concentrated group {lianhe jiqun} – the campaign large formation – the force-strength group {bingtuan jituan} – the tactical formation-unit {zhanshu biandui} – the tactical grouping {zhanshuqun}; force-strength *bushu* disposition {bingli bushu} is the positioning of participating force-strengths for a fixed time and space on the basis of *mission differentiation* and the *organized grouping of campaign* and in accordance with operational conditions and the enemy's possible activities. In certain campaign patterns, one can also establish echelon *bushi* disposition {tidui bushi} or a combination of group and echelon *bushi* disposition {jituan yu tidui xiangjiehe de bushi}. Echelon *bushi* disposition {tidui bushi} is normally *organized grouping* of first echelon, second echelon (sometimes one can form a third echelon), campaign reserve forces, reserve forces of all arms, campaign logistics, and equipment support force-units, etc. according to the precedence for commitment into engagement. The *bushi* disposition of a combined group and echelon {jituan yu tidui xiangjiehe de bushi}, namely one based on the situation of different operational directions or phases of a campaign, respectively adopt group-model and echelon-model *bushi* dispositions. If the campaign type and patterns are different, then the form and content of campaign *bushi* disposition will also be different. The general requirements are: the campaign *bushi* disposition should conform to the campaign intention, use the main strengths in the main operational direction and at important time segments, and focus on forming an integrated pooled strength and creating favorable posture; establish campaign *bushi* disposition with depth, full dimensions, flexibility and key points; strive for a type of *bushi* disposition which is able to adapt to multiple courses of action; participating strengths not only must be positioned with dispersal and concealment, but it must also be beneficial for concentrating operational effectiveness and facilitate command and coordination; it has the capability for independent operations and sustained operations; it can fully bring into play the integrated might of all services, arms and every force-unit, etc.

Basic fighting method – is namely, the process of activities for applying participating force-strengths, following operational sequences and adopting active and effective operational means in order to reach the campaign goal[s]. Clarifying the basic fighting method should be beneficial for macroscopically guiding the campaign towards smooth achievement of the established goal, it should be beneficial for bringing the comprehensive superiority and specialty the various services and arms into play, it should be beneficial for containing the enemy's superiority, and it should be beneficial for implementing joint strikes against the enemy.

Campaign phase – a campaign is divided into phases in order to adjust-coordinate the operational strengths and allow the strengths of the participating services and arms to complete their operational missions with planning and in separate steps. The campaign

phase should be determined according to the operational missions as well as the possible progress and development. In a large scale campaign, one must frequently undergo a certain number of operational activities before being able to reach the campaign goal; thus, based on the missions, the annihilation targets or the main operational activities of the operational strengths, divide up the entire campaign progress into a number of close together and linked phases according to implementation sequence. A previous phase should create favorable conditions for a subsequent phase, and a subsequent phase should consolidate and develop the results of the previous phase, allowing the campaign to smoothly develop with tempo.

Campaign initiation time – in joint offensive operations, one should clarify the campaign initiation time; in defensive operations, one should clarify the time limit for completing operational preparations. Determining campaign initiation time or the time limit for completing operational preparations, one must adhere to the needs-requirements of the overall situation, strive to fully utilize favorable conditions of aspects such as political, diplomatic, battlefield posture and geography, catch the enemy unaware, attack where the enemy is unprepared, and achieve a sudden quality.

2. Procedure and methods for setting the campaign resolution

The setting of the campaign resolution is the process by which a commander conducts analysis, assessment and repeated reflections for the objective essential elements of operations, the anticipated operational activities and relevant situations, and it is the process by which he conducts assessments and deductions for objective situations. Its basic procedure is: understanding the mission, assessing the situation, listening to reports and recommendations, organizing operational calculations, and being decisive {zuochu jueguan}.

(i) Understanding the mission. One must correctly understand the strategic intent of the higher level authority and the general mission of the higher level authority; understand the national political and diplomatic struggle concepts {fangzhen}, policies {zhengce} and goals {mudi}; understand the mission that the higher level entrusts the root level as well as the status and role within the overall situation of the war; understand the missions of friendly forces and the coordination relationships with friendly forces, etc.

(ii) Assessing the situation. This is mainly conducting comprehensive analysis and assessment of the enemy situation, our situation, and battlefield environment, etc. and obtaining a correct conclusion in order to provide an objective basis for setting the correct campaign resolution.

Enemy situation. This is mainly to ascertain the enemy's intention, unit designators and force-strength task organization; their operational *bushu* disposition; their main operational direction; the quantities of high-tech weaponry, their position locations, the potential time opportunities for employment and the threats they may generate against us;

the situation of the possibility to obtain assistance during the operational course; activities they could possibly adopt, etc.

Our situation. This is mainly to completely and correctly evaluate the specialties and comprehensive operational capabilities of all operational groups within the campaign task organization so as to correctly determine the campaign intention and properly entrust the missions of each force-unit.

Battlefield environment. This is mainly ascertaining the effects of the natural environment such as terrain characteristics, road conditions and weather-meteorology of the operational area on operational activities; as well as the social and economic conditions within the theater and manpower, materials, science and technology, and financial assistance, etc. available to us.

(iii) Listening to reports and recommendations. For the purpose of completely and accurately understanding the situation, the campaign commander sets the correct campaign resolution, [but] before setting the resolution, he should listen to the situation reports from headquarters and various services and arms. The modes for this are: one can centralize the listening and one can individually listen; one can listen completely, and one can only listen to certain situations one needs; one can get reports separately from each organizational-unit or department, and one can also allow the chief of staff to make a comprehensive report.

(iv) Conducting campaign calculations. On the basis of listening to reports and recommendations, the campaign commander and his command organ should organize campaign scientific calculations. In accordance with operational needs-requirements: they should rationally determine the quantities of operational strengths that the various services and arms should commit; they should scientifically select weapon types based on the target destruction indices of each campaign phase, and the technical tactical characteristics of the weaponry for the various services-arms; and on this foundation, based on the indices of various services-arms weaponry such as the hit probabilities, the penetration probabilities, and success probabilities, they should calculate the needed weaponry quantities to strike targets; and they should utilize computer aided decision making systems {xitong} to conduct simulation evaluations of the calculation results in order to provide a reliable basis for setting the campaign resolution.

(v) Being resolute {zuochu jueguan}. After understanding the mission, assessing the situations, listening to reports and recommendations, and organizing operational calculations, the campaign commander should r {zuochu jueguan} about the campaign goal and activities. Because the situations of each operation are different, the time opportunities for being finally resolute {zuochu zuihou jueguan} are different. Sometimes the situation is not sufficiently clear enough, especially in land mobility operations, and the two sides engaged in battle are both maneuvering with the situation not clear, so one can first set a preliminary resolution {dingxia yuxian juexin} and then set the final resolution {dingxia zuihou juexin}. Sometimes, even if the situation is

relatively clear, the campaign commander should put forth the various resolution courses of action from different perspectives, comparing them with each other, weighing any two benefits and selecting the more favorable and weighing any two harms and selecting the least harmful, and then select the optimum course of action and set the final resolution. When possessing the right conditions, one can, through computer simulation or by organizing live force exercises on similar terrain, further revise and improve the operational course of action in order to set the correct campaign resolution.

The setting of the campaign resolution is one of the most important jobs [work] of the campaign commander in conducting operational preparations. Whether or not the campaign resolution is correct directly influences the success or failure of the operations. Therefore, this requires that, when the campaign commander is setting the resolution, he must thoroughly comprehend the higher level intent, master the five basic essential elements of the mission, the enemy situation, our situation, location and time, and with the mission as the core, the enemy situation as the key point, with the location and time as the basis, set the resolution. At the same time, one should fully bring the collective wisdom of the command team into play, broadly listening to various ideas and pooling the wisdom to allow the set resolution to better conform to the objective reality and to be more perfect and correct.

II. Formulating the Campaign Plan {jihua} and Organizing Campaign Coordination...107

After determining the campaign concept and setting the campaign resolution, the campaign commander and the command organ should quickly formulate the campaign plan {jihua} on the basis of the established concept and resolution, and thoroughly organize campaign coordination.

(1) Formulating the campaign plan {jihua}

The campaign plan³ is the basic document for achieving the campaign goal and formulating the campaign *bushi* disposition, basic fighting methods, campaign phases, and various supports. It includes the campaign activities plan and the support plan and it is the basis for organizing the command of force-units and implementing the campaign. The operational activities plan can be divided into the general plan {zongti jihua} and the sub-plans {fenzhi jihua}. The content of the general plan mainly includes: situational assessment conclusion, higher level intent and operational missions, friendly force missions and combat boundaries, the task organization {biancheng}, the positioning {peizhi}, and missions of each force-unit, the division of campaign phases, the situational scenarios for each phase and the courses of action for dealing with them, the organizing of command, the time limit for completing operational preparations, and the pre-determined times for initiating and concluding the campaign. The sub-plans normally include: the anti-reconnaissance plan, the seizing air and sea dominance campaign plan,

³ Plans are *jihua* unless otherwise noted.

the main direction operational activities plans, the anti-air raid (air defense) plan, the firepower plan, the special operations plan, the psychological warfare plan, and the rear area defense plan.

The campaign commander should instruct the chief of staff to take charge of formulating the campaign plan, [apply] key points to the situational assessment conclusion, the campaign concept, the operational *bushu* disposition, the main fighting methods and the divisions of the campaign phases, and further clarify the important problems such as the predictions for each phase situation and counter-moves to be adopted. [The campaign commander should] specifically guide the command organ in formulating the campaign plan.

The basic requirements for formulating the campaign plan are: be thorough and strict, be clear and specific, and allow for unforeseen situations. One must correctly analyze the situations of both sides, scientifically forecast the developing changes over the whole course of the campaign, and conduct unified-overall-planning and arrange the operational activities and various supports for participating services and arms; [one must] set out from the most complex and most difficult situations that could appear on the battlefield of each phase of the campaign and conceive various activity courses of action; centering on the campaign centers of gravity, [one must] properly handle the relationships between each battlefield, each operations direction, and each operational activity.

After the campaign commander guides his command headquarters in successfully formulating the campaign plan, he should also instruct relevant departments and various operational groupings to formulate the operational support plans, logistics support plans, equipment support plans, and political work plans of the campaign in accordance with the operational activity plans. When formulating the campaign plan, the various organs should shorten the amount of time as much as possible and strictly maintain secrecy.

(2) Organizing campaign coordination

Campaign coordination is the adjusting-coordination and complementing {xietiao peihe} according to a unified plan conducted by all services and arms participating in a campaign. Organizing campaign coordination allows for participating services-arms, People Armed Police, reserve force-units and militia to implement campaign activities with consistent adjusting coordination in accordance with unified planning.

Organizing campaign coordination should be directed at the potential activities of the enemy, and in separate phases, stipulate the missions, activity methods, sequences and coordination requirements of subordinate force-units based on direction, goals (and objectives), time and locations. Because the situations are different for each operation, the various types of operational requirements are different and consequently, the key point issues of each operation are also different. One should grasp the key points and strive to successfully organize the coordination for the main battlefields, main directions, main campaign phases, main operational patterns, and critical operational activities that

affect the overall strategic and campaign situations. The organizing of campaign coordination can be conducted on charts and on sand tables, or one can utilize command automation networks to organize coordination and fully apply computer simulation technology to conduct simulation exercises in campaign coordination. When the situation needs deem possible, one can also organize on-site coordination in a certain phase or a certain direction of operations. When time is urgent, stipulate relevant coordination matters at the same time as issuing operational orders.

An agile and reliable command information network system {xitong} is the basis for organizing coordination. Fully utilizing data link technology to achieve lateral organic linking of operational organizational-units is the crux for organizing coordination. The basic requirements for organizing coordination are be quick, be precise, and be continuous.

III. Organizing Campaign Support...109

Campaign support includes operational support, logistic support, equipment support and political work. Organizing complete and effective operational support plays a very important role in increasing the operational capabilities of participating strengths and in smoothly accomplishing operations missions.

When organizing operational support, a campaign commander should adhere to the principles of be prepared in advance, unified overall planning considering all factors, full scale support, and give prominence to key points, and in consideration of the most difficult and complex situations, thoroughly organize the various supports. [The campaign commander] should provide clear instructions to the joint headquarters, political departments, logistics departments, and equipment departments, and give specific guidance to critical supports such as the main operational direction, main operational area, and main operational activities. Instruct the various functional departments to formulate various, detailed support plans, and conduct supervision and inspections so that the various support plans are practical.

IV. Assembling the {diaoji} Campaign Strength...109

The campaign strength is normally assembled in the theater. When conducting a large-scale campaign, one must also, on the basis of the instructions of the supreme command {tongshuaibu}, assemble the crack strengths from across the PLA. Moreover, with help from relevant theater and service leadership organs and local civilian governments, [one must] organize the participating strengths to maneuver towards the operational area and unfold.

The assembling of the campaign strength should be thoroughly planned, painstakingly organized, and arrive in position on time. Its basic requirements:

(1) Meet the needs of precision operations

Assembling the campaign strengths should be determined on the basis of the needs of the operational missions and operational scale. One must scientifically determine the operational strengths of each service and arm that should be committed on the basis of the needs of accomplishing the general operational mission, and in accordance with the operational effectiveness of the weapons the services and arms, [one must] calculate the force-strengths and weaponry necessary for carrying out the various operational missions; one must conduct precise calculations for the operational space and times of the different operational groupings based on the operational characteristics of the different service strengths, People's Armed Police and militia, and ensure the achievement of precision operations. When necessary, one can also assemble newly organized force-units and advanced science and technology support-the-front strengths during imminent battle in order to benefit the achievement of the campaign goal.

(2) Adapt to the battlefield environment

Assembling the campaign strengths must conscientiously analyze the battlefield environment and fully consider the protection conditions for maneuver and concealment, and support conditions such as manpower and material supplies. One must assemble strengths that are adaptable to the battlefield environment and able to fully bring their operational effectiveness into play within the battlefield in order to enhance integrated operational might.

(3) Achieve superiority against the enemy

In assembling the campaign strength, while directed at situations such as strengths-weaknesses and quantity of the object of operations, one should assemble sufficient crack forces and cutting weapons, achieve superiority against the enemy, favorably form a material basis for victory, and accomplish the campaign mission with full mastery.

(4) Respond to developing changes in a campaign

In assembling the campaign strength, one should fully consider the rapid force augmentation that may appear during the course of implementing operations, or the various complex and difficult situations that might appear such as a powerful enemy's intervention or a regional military alliance conducting interference. [One must] ensure there are sufficient operational reserve strengths to deal with the occurrence of various unexpected situations.

In assembling the campaign strength, one must rely on the campaign resolution, thoroughly organize the pre-determined participating strengths to quickly maneuver and unfold in the operational area, and reach the designated location on time. When the assembled campaign strength is maneuvering and unfolding, one should strictly organize

anti-air cover and information operations and as much as possible reduce operational casualties and losses during maneuver.

V. Conducting Political Mobilization and Imminent Battle Training...110

After a campaign commander accepts the operational mission, he should fully utilize the various modes and all dissemination media, promptly and thoroughly conduct political mobilization, organize subordinate force-units, earnestly transmit and study the higher level campaign concept, orders, and instructions, and deeply understand the higher level intent. [He should] clarify the campaign goal, mission and significance, the favorable elements and unfavorable conditions of the operational mission as well as the methods for overcoming the enemy and gaining victory. [He should] use the campaign concept of the Central Party and the Central Military Commission to unify the thought and activities of the force-units. While directed at the realities of officer and soldier thought and the pre-determined operational mission, thoroughly conduct education on patriotism, collectivism, revolutionary heroism and revolutionary integrity and ethnic nationality integrity. Stimulate the combat-participating enthusiasm of the officers and soldiers and the spirit of heroic operations and no fear of sacrifice. Establish overall situation perspective, active cooperation, close coordination, and a concerted effort for seizing campaign victory.

Imminent battle training is a directed-quality training conducted as war is close to breaking out or after the operational mission is accepted. Directed at the objects of operations, operational missions that are compactly mixed and the characteristics of theater terrain, one normally selects the urgently needed items and conducts training with a sudden-attack mode. The training content can include: review training and supplemental training on tactical and technical subjects urgently needed for operations; living and physical training conducted for adapting to the environment such as terrain and weather of the operational area; live-force and live-fire campaign training conducted on similar terrain in accordance with pre-determined operational preliminary courses of action; and gaming exercise training in a room on a sand table or with charts and exercise training utilizing computer simulation of real battle situations conducted by the senior officer's organ according to the operational preliminary courses of action. Imminent battle training possesses the characteristics of short training time, many contents, large degree of difficulty, strict requirements and high standards. When a campaign commander conducts imminent battle training, he should carefully plan and tightly organize it on the basis of these characteristics. In order to ensure that the participating force-strength groupings know the theater well, and know the operational activities and coordination methods well, he should improve the capability of the various levels of commanders and command organs to organize command, and further examine and perfect the operational preliminary courses of action and achieve the best results. Imminent battle training is normally conducted covertly; if necessary, one can also combine the organizing and implementing of deterrence and feints, but one must conceal the campaign intention.

VI. Supervising and Inspecting Force-unit Rapid Completion of Campaign Preparations...111

During the process of conducting operational preparations and after basic completion of operational preparations, the campaign commander and command organ should, at the appropriate time, inspect the situation of completing operational preparations by subordinate participating strengths.

(1) The main content of inspections

[This is:] the networked linking of subsystems such as intelligence information, command and control, firepower strike, maneuver sudden-attack, full dimensioned protection, and comprehensive support within the campaign system {tixi} and their operating situation, that is, inspecting the situations of split-second response, integrated joint operating, self-adaptive reconstituting, and independent loops; the times for each force-strength grouping to receive-accept the advance orders, operational orders and various instructions as well as the level of comprehension; inspecting the understanding and level of familiarity of the coordination plans for each force-strength grouping; and the preparation situation of important military facilities, weapons and equipment, and physical materials.

(2) The main methods of inspections

[These are:] send personnel to go deep into the force-units to conduct inspections; conduct inspections via operational simulation tests; conduct inspections via imminent battle training exercises; and listening to situation reports of relevant personnel.

Inspectors should conscientiously and responsibly carry out their duties and reflect the situation of seeking truth from facts. When problems having a relatively large effect on the operational activities are discovered during inspections or when the resolution and campaign plan are discovered to not conform to realities, the inspectors should promptly report and resolve it, supervising and helping the force-unit to quickly complete the various items of operational preparation.

VII. Organizing Joint Defense Operations...112

At the same time as the campaign commander is leading the completion of operational preparations work, he should guide the command organ in organizing joint defense operations {lianhe fangwei zuozhan}, putting emphasis on clarifying the missions, force-strengths, assisting-support strengths, and relevant requirements of joint defense operations.

In organizing joint defense operations, one must put into effect the principles of military-civilian integration, integrated defense, give priority to defense, and combining defense and strike. [One must] fully bring the roles of all services and arms, the armed police

force-units, the local people's government and masses into play, and with important targets, important areas and communication and transport lines as key points, thoroughly organize operational activities such as anti-air raids, anti-airborne assault, anti-infiltration, anti-psychological warfare, and anti-sabotage and ensure the smooth conduct of campaign preparations.

Section 2: Campaign Implementation...112

The campaign implementation phase is the phase for applying the campaign strengths, carrying out and adjusting the established resolution, striking the pre-determined targets, and realizing the campaign goal. The commanders at each level scan the overall situation, examine the time and measure the circumstances {审时度势 shenshi duoshi}, command decisively, calmly handle situations, and maintain the initiative of the campaign from beginning to end. The command organs at each level should completely assess the developing dynamic state of the enemy situation, actively and with initiative provide various data for the correct decision-making of the campaign commander, and put forth valuable recommendation reports at the appropriate times. When certain discrepancies exist between the campaign resolution and courses of action with the changes in the enemy situations, necessary revisions may be made on the basis of the original campaign resolution and courses of action in order to adapt to the situation of developing changes in campaign implementation; when very large discrepancies exist between the campaign resolution and courses of action with the campaign activities, the campaign commander and the command organ should quickly assess the situation, decisively set a new campaign resolution and quickly organize the force-units to implement the new campaign activities.

I. Initiate the Campaign at the Appropriate Time...112

Initiating the campaign is a critical activity of the campaign. The time opportunity {shiji} for initiating the campaign should be decided in accordance with higher level intent, the campaign resolution and plan, the actual situations of both sides, and the situations such as weather and meteorology. Operational activities normally start from the information domain with seizing information dominance as the precursor to safeguard the smooth conduct of follow-up operational activities.

(1) The time opportunity for initiating the campaign

Under normal situations, the campaign initiation time is specifically grasped by the campaign commander on the basis of higher level intent in view of the situation. However, in a large scale operation, because of its strong strategic quality, its initiation time is generally determined by the supreme command headquarters {tongshuaibu}. The time opportunity for initiating the offensive campaign should be selected during the time opportunities when the enemy is caught unaware, when the enemy has a weakness that can be exploited, or whenever we have already fully prepared and can commit to operations at any time. As much as possible, allow for situations that favor us and not

favor the enemy, ensure we have a grasp and avoid by all means hastily initiating the campaign. Initiating defensive operations generally depends on the time opportunity the enemy starts attacking. Under modern conditions, this campaign is initiated under the situation of encountering the enemy's sudden raid-attack. Thereby, a campaign commander and the command organ must apply various means to ascertain the enemy's time for commencing combat, its force-strength *bushu* disposition, the main activities direction, and the adopted fighting methods. [The campaign commander and command organ must] also command force-units to frustrate the enemy's first attack with active activities in order to lay a foundation for seizing operational victory. When the situation is possible, in order to seize the benefit of first opportunity, when the enemy is directed at our conduct of operational preparations, we can disrupt the enemy's attack preparations {jin'gong zhunbei} with offensive activities {gongshi xingdong} and force the enemy to be able to initiate the campaign according to their pre-determined plan {jihua}. In summary, no matter whether it is joint attack operations or joint defensive operations, both should be based on a thorough comprehension of higher level intent and an accurate grasp of the situations of both sides and the natural geographical environment of the theater. [We should] ensure that the operations are initiated at the right time in accordance to the plan {jihua}, avoid by all means indecision and avoid losing the time opportunity for favorable commencement of combat.

(2) Some situations for initiating a campaign

1. Initiating with information warfare

A campaign is normally initiated from information warfare, permeating from beginning to end [of the campaign], and sometimes, information warfare can become an independent phase. When initiating a campaign with information warfare, generally, this is for creating conditions for follow-on operations such as seizing air dominance and sea dominance, and, on the basis of accomplishing information system {xitong} protection and strengthening the secrecy of information security, it is normally initiated with the mode of information attack. We can concentrate the use of electronic attack strengths, implement full-scale and key point electronic jamming against the vital area electronic targets {yaohai dianzi mubiao} of the enemy's information systems {xitong}, weaken the enemy's "ability to hear" and "ability to see," and render the enemy with no way to command and be blind in their activities; conduct electronic deception, install false electronic targets, transmit false information and lure the enemy to make mistakes. Conduct network warfare and paralyze the enemy's C⁴KISR [sic] systems.

2. Initiating with seizing information dominance, air dominance, and sea dominance

Sometimes, in order to increase the suddenness of campaign initiation, one can also initiate a campaign at the same time as seizing information dominance, air dominance and sea dominance. In this instance, seizing information dominance is mainly as a service to seizing air dominance, one achieves superiority in the electromagnetic battlefield; seizing air dominance is mainly to create conditions for sea and land operational

activities; in seizing sea dominance, one must seize air dominance at-sea, otherwise, at-sea superiority cannot be brought into play due to the air threat, so the so-called sea dominance should include air superiority at-sea.

To seize air dominance, first is assaulting [sudden-attack] the enemy's air combat strength support systems {xitong}. Concentrate the use of strengths such as aviation force, Second Artillery force, army campaign tactical missile and naval submarine-launched missile to assault enemy airfields and aircraft carriers and to smash the enemy's reliance on air operations. Second is aerial engagement. Concentrate the use of fighter aviation forces to unfold air combat with the enemy's raiding aircraft, or penetrate the enemy area to seek and annihilate the enemy's aircraft with initiative in order to seize and maintain air superiority. Third is implementing ground-to-air resistance. Rationally *bushu* dispose ground air defense strengths to implement strikes against raiding enemy aircraft and other air targets so as to ensure the security of the main air [tactical] zones {zhuyao kongyu}. Fourth is suppressing and smashing the enemy's ground air defense systems. Concentrate firepower to suppress and smash the enemy's ground-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery positions, and air defense command systems {xitong} in order to assure freedom of activity for one's own aviation forces.

To seize sea dominance, first is using force-strengths of aviation forces, conventional missile force-units, and naval submarines and surface ships, adopting the method of combining firepower and obstacle blockade, implementing sea and air blockades against the enemy navy's ports, bases (anchorage) or sea areas they need to cross, and restricting the freedom of activity for the enemy navy's force-strengths. Next, comprehensively apply aviation force, surface ship and submarine force strengths, through extensive maneuvers, create and capture the combat opportunities, and annihilate the enemy's at-sea effective strengths. Next, comprehensively implement firepower assault with aviation force, campaign tactical missile, and naval submarine force-strengths against the enemy's ports, bases and anchorages, and disrupt the enemy's reliance on naval operations.

3. Initiating with comprehensive firepower assault

When the locations such as the enemy's heavy force groupings {zhongbing jituan}, high-tech weapon systems, command and control systems and logistics support systems have been accurately ascertained prior to battle, we can concentrate the aviation firepower, missile firepower and artillery firepower of all the participating services and arms to implement precision, comprehensive firepower strikes {daji} against the enemy, to smash and paralyze the enemy's operational system {tixi} and weaken their operational capability in order to create conditions for follow-on operations.

Initiating the campaign with comprehensive firepower assault {tuji} is generally implemented under the support of information warfare. The main body of comprehensive firepower assault should be aviation force firepower and missile firepower and [with that] we conduct an integrated planning {guihua} based on the operational characteristics of the various firepower strike systems of all of the services and arms in accordance with

their operational characteristics and achieve an optimized composition. We must formulate thorough firepower destruct {huishang} plans {jihua}, unify and regulate the application of the various destruct weapons {bingqi}, and adopt a combination of centralized and dispersed, flexible command mode, allowing the various destruct strengths to be able to form an integrated pooled effort {zhengti heli} with initiative and flexibility in accordance with the general requirements of campaign initiation and achieve sudden and fierce results.

4. Initiating at first opportunity from within the joint defensive operations

In joint defensive operations, in order to strive for first opportunity, during the initial period of operations when the enemy implements long range force-strength delivery {yuanjuli bingli tousong}, conducts operational preparations, and has not yet formed its combat power, we can conduct counter-preparations against the enemy with comprehensive firepower assault {tuji} or other means and strike {daji} the enemy's high-tech weapon systems, transport systems, C4ISR command systems, heavy force grouping areas and logistic supply bases, etc. [We can] weaken the enemy's high-tech superiority, disrupt the enemy's attack preparations, change the passivity of defensive operations into initiative, and by forming superiority in the beginning of the match, we create conditions for later operations.

II. Pushing Forward Campaign Development...115

After campaign initiation, at the same time that they are maintaining a desirable beginning of the match, the campaign commander and the command organ must completely and accurately grasp the battlefield situation, scientifically predict {yujian} the developing trends of the war situation, firmly master the campaign centers of gravity, closely adjust-coordinate joint activities, take advantage of momentum {chengshi} to push forward campaign activities in accordance with the pre-determined resolution and plans {jihua}, and develop towards a direction favorable for us.

(1) Grasping the battlefield situation

Tracking and grasping the battlefield situation is a prerequisite and basic reliance for pushing forward the campaign development. The modern campaign battlefield is multidimensional and the situation is complex and variable. The campaign commander and organ must be adept at applying various methods and means to promptly grasp the battlefield situation.

1. Employing various methods to grasp the battlefield situation

The main method for grasping the battlefield situation is to comprehensively master the intelligence obtained by higher levels, root level, lower levels, and friendly forces {youlin} via the battlefield information network. For important intelligence, one must conduct verification and demonstration-proof {lunzheng} through multiple channels and

applying a variety of means. On the basis of fully mastering the situation, conduct *proceed from one point to the other, proceed from outside to inside, discard the bad and select the good, and eliminate the false and keep the real*, so as to establish a foundation for correct decision-making.

2. Accurately forecast {yuce} changes in the battlefield situation

First, one must forecast the possible changes in the enemy's situation, including changes in the force-strengths the enemy might commit, the operational directions, and the activity patterns. Second, one must forecast the changes in the battlefield environment, including weather and hydrological, etc. Third, one must forecast the results of the enemy's and our operational activities, including the possible outcome of seizing "three dominances" operations, changes in the postures for the enemy and ourselves, and possible transitions between attack and defend. In particular, one must forecast the potential military intervention of a powerful enemy and prepare for it in advance in order to facilitate pushing the campaign forward to develop in a direction favorable for the nation's highest strategic interests.

(2) Mastering a campaign's center of gravity

The center of gravity refers to a critical link connected to various aspects of the campaign and has a decisive significance for operational success or failure. It is the combined force point {helidian} of the participating strengths of all services and arms. It is the focal point {jiaodian} of all operational activities and it is also a central issue that the campaign commander pays high attention to and should be resolved. A campaign can have one or multiple centers of gravity, but there is only one within one time period and phase. Thereby, the campaign commander must center on the realization of the general goal of operations and, in accordance with the developing changes in the battlefield situation, successfully master the center of gravity from start to finish and push forward the development of a campaign with all one's strength.

1. Accurately find the campaign center of gravity within the dynamic state

A campaign is a complex system and each activity has the possibility of producing an effect success or failure on the entire activity. Particularly after campaign initiation, in order to seize and obtain the early period initiative, it is very possible that we must adopt various reactive measures directed at the opponent's activities, and changes may continuously occur to the campaign center of gravity during the confrontation of both sides. Therefore, it is relatively difficult for a campaign commander to accurately find and push forward the center of gravity in campaign development within a dynamically complex system. [The campaign commander] must have the overall situation in his heart and, through analysis of the many contradictions in operations as well as their interplaying relationships, find the crux for pushing forward the development of the whole campaign.

First, in accordance with the higher level intent, one must find the primary contradictions that play a decisive role in pushing forward campaign development or the problem that must first be resolved from within the strategic goal and the operational objectives the higher level requires to be reached and the explicit missions given to the root level. Next, one must accurately find the center of gravity from within the inter-connected operational systems {xitong}. After campaign initiation, operational activities will unfold in the multi-dimensional battlefield from strengths of all services and with a variety of modes. The struggle between the enemy and us will also generate many focal points in many domains and this requires the campaign commander, depending on developments on the battlefield, to analyze the role played by each focal point within the operational system {xitong} and to find the given focal point that is able to effectively push forward the development of the overall operational situation. Normally, this focal point of struggle {douzheng jiaodian} is the center of gravity for that phase.

During a campaign, for the operational groupings of different services, different campaign types and different operational missions, the manifested form of their campaign centers of gravity will also be different. Some will be manifested as attacking cities and seizing of territory, namely the capturing and occupying of important cities and strategic vital sites; some will be manifested as annihilating the opponent's heavy force groupings; and still some will be manifested disrupting the opponent's command or the paralysis of the opponent's operational system {tixi}. This requires the campaign commander to combine realities and accurately find the center of gravity for pushing forward campaign development from within intricate and complex battlefield situations.

2. Forming the campaign center of gravity

After the campaign commander accurately finds the campaign center of gravity, he should concentrate strengths, form the center of gravity and ensure operational victory. First, he must put his main energy onto resolving the central issues related to operational success or failure, and the campaign commander must personally command and adjust-coordinate the critical quality operational activities. Next, he must center on the center of gravity to coalesce the strengths of the operational groupings of the various services, and concentrate the main strengths to successfully resolve the main contradiction. Then, he should also pay attention to center on the center of gravity to successfully resolve other issues related to the center of gravity in order to push forward and promote the development of the entire operational situational momentum {jushi}.

(3) Actively creating combat opportunities

Creating combat opportunity is utilizing various means to force the enemy to expose their center of gravity, lose coordination effectiveness, interrupt support, and lose command effectiveness, to create a fighting momentum beneficial to us, and push forward the combat situation to develop towards a favorable direction.

There are two categories of methods for creating combat opportunity. First, create opportunity according to plan {jihua}. When the development of the operational course is basically smooth and there are no fundamental changes occurring to the battlefield situation, one should persist in the original campaign plan {jihua} and objectives, supervise and urge the various operational groupings to resolutely implement in accordance with the established resolution and plan {jihua}, and create favorable time opportunities for pushing forward campaign development. Second, create opportunity based on the situation. When the battlefield developments deviate from the campaign plan {jihua} and the original campaign plan {jihua} is already not suited to the new situation, one should promptly accomplish a new emergency approach, adjust the bushu disposition and activities of force-units in order to adapt to the new situation; when major changes occur in the battlefield situation requiring changes to the pre-determined operational objectives, one should, on the basis of higher level requirements, revise the resolution and plan {jihua} at the right time, adjust the missions of each operational grouping, and actively create favorable combat opportunities.

(4) Committing maneuver strengths at the right time

After campaign initiation, the developing changes on the battlefield change along with the decline and growth in the strengths of both sides. In a campaign under informationized conditions, because of improvements in the operational capabilities of both sides, the acceleration of the operational tempo and the rapid changes to the ratio of both sides' strengths on the battlefield, once the time opportunity to push forward campaign development appears, a specific strength is needed to be committed at any time to achieve this. Thereby, grasping and at appropriate times committing powerful, maneuver strengths is the material foundation for pushing forward campaign development.

III. Conducting Campaign Transitions...117

During the course of implementing a campaign, there exists transitions of campaign phases, transitions of attack and defend operations, and transitions of operational directions. On the basis of the campaign goal and specific circumstances {xingshi} of the battlefield, a campaign commander should seize the favorable time opportunities, adopt forceful means, and push forward the campaign to transition towards a favorable direction.

(1) Campaign phase transitions

1. Predicting transition trends

A campaign commander must stand at the height of the strategic overall situation to analyze the direction of campaign development and thereby predict the trend of campaign phase transitions. Generally, he must master the following few aspects.

First is the level of the progress in the current campaign phase's objective. Each campaign phase has an objective. Generally speaking, basically reaching the operational objective indicates that the current campaign phase will conclude.

Second is the level of change in the enemy's strengths. During operations, changes in the enemy's strengths will lead to changes in the overall battle situation. If an enemy's strengths gradually weaken and its campaign *bushi* disposition tends to be collapsing, it will undoubtedly force the enemy to transition into a state of defeat; if an enemy's strengths is quickly enhanced and it adopts new operational activities, this indicates that a new campaign phase will soon arrive.

Third is the level of change in the battlefield posture. When the PLA grasps battlefield initiative and the enemy has already completely slipped into passivity, we should seize the favorable combat opportunity, transition into a new phase and strive for a complete victory; when the PLA has slipped into an unfavorable position and lost its initiative, this also indicates that another campaign phase will soon begin.

2. Grasp the transition time opportunity

A campaign commander must correctly grasp the transition time opportunity, fully utilize the current phase's operational results and advantageous conditions, and at the right time, conduct the transition to allow the operations of the next phase to be smoothly implemented. If the transition is too early, it is not only unfavorable for successful completion of the current phase's missions, but it is also not beneficial for the operations in the next phase. If the transition is too late, then it is possible to miss a favorable time opportunity, to the point of unfavorable conditions appearing and this is not beneficial for the unfolding of the combat situation in the new phase. Under normal situations, the favorable time opportunities for transitioning campaign phases include: our current operational objectives have been basically realized and transition preparations have been completed; the enemy's intention for the next phase has been ascertained and the enemy has not adopted the measures, etc. Conducting the phase transition at such times can allow the PLA to seize the first opportunity and enter a new campaign phase, placing us in a position of initiative.

3. Meticulously organize transitions

Before implementing campaign phase transitions, on the basis of the changing situation, one should revise the operational objectives and the campaign plan *{jihua}*, unify the operational thought, and for all of the operational groupings to be able to accomplish transition preparations in the various areas such as in thought, in organization, and in operational strengths. One must be directed at the enemy's intentions in the next phase and determine the new operational patterns and methods; one must promptly adjust the missions and *bushu* dispositions of the various services and groupings, successfully organize coordination according to the new operational objectives and plans *{jihua}*, one

must continue to organize and complete the wrap-up work of the current missions and cover our adjustment of the *bushu* dispositions and begin the new campaign phase.

During the transition, the campaign commander must have the overall situation on his mind, and based on the different battlefield environments each operational grouping is located in, complete the transition to the new phase. Under general situations, the main operational strengths and critical operational groupings are the first to transition and create conditions for the transition of other operational groupings; after the other operational groupings cover the transition of the main operational grouping, they will progressively achieve transition, allowing the entire transition to go methodically.

(2) Attack and defense campaign transitions

In a campaign under informationized conditions, attack and defense operations interweave and transition frequently. When we need to achieve attack and defense campaign transitions from an overall situation, a campaign commander must conduct an integrated overall planning {zhengti chouhua}, and successfully adjust-coordination in the operational activities of the various service operational large formations and between the battlefields to allow the activities of the entire transition to go methodically, forming a chessboard. When we need to achieve attack and defense transitions from a localized situation, a campaign commander must successfully adjust-coordination in the strengths and operational activities from the height of the overall situation in order to successfully accomplish a localized attack and defense transition and [thus] drive the development of the entirety of operational activities.

When transitioning from attack to defense, the land battlefield must have the backstop of favorable terrain, the ground operational strengths must promptly occupy their positions, and the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery operational strengths must correspondingly adjust their *bushu* dispositions and successfully organize campaign cover to ensure the smooth implementation of the transition.

When transitioning from defense to attack: one must have favorable circumstances {xingshi} in political and diplomatic struggles; the battlefield posture is unfavorable for the enemy and favorable for us; the enemy's follow-on strengths are interrupted; the enemy loses battlefield dominance and the logistics support is difficult; and our force-strength assembly is complete, the strengths ratio is favorable for us and unfavorable to the enemy, and we possess the capability to attack the enemy. During the transition, one must implement fire support, one must concentrate the main strengths to be used in the main attack direction, and the force-units shouldering the defense missions cover the attacking force-unit's unfolding with active operational activities, allowing a consistent adjusting-coordination in the transitions of the entirety of operational activities.

(3) Operational direction transitions

In a campaign under informationized conditions, operational strengths are flexible in maneuver and fast in speed and the operational direction changes frequently. Moreover, changes in operational direction both restrict and affect issues such as the operational methods and the employment of participating strengths. Therefore, successfully accomplishing operational direction transitions at the right time plays an important role in realizing the strategic and campaign intentions. In order to successfully accomplish the main operational direction transition, one generally should grasp the following points. One must conform to the strategic intent. Changing the operational direction directly affects the development of the entire battlefield situational momentum {jushi}, and it even affects the outcome of operations. Consequently, one should, based on the strategic intention, determine a new operational direction.

It must be beneficial for developing victory. The changing of the operational direction often presages the arrival of the operational turning point. The campaign commander must treat the operational direction transition as the prelude to the turning point and push forward operations to develop in the direction of victory.

It must focus on striking and disrupting the enemy's integrated structure {zhengti jiegou}. The operational direction transition must focus on paralyzing the entire operational system {tixi} of the enemy, on striking the advanced weapon systems {xitong} maintaining that integration, such as the C⁴KISR systems {xitong}, rear area supply systems, etc., and thus weakening their operational capability and breaking the integrated structure of the enemy.

After the transition of the main operational direction, immediately make relevant adjustments to the main battlefield, participating strengths, and campaign fighting methods in order to allow all of the activities to be able to unfold by centering on the main operational direction.

IV. Decisively Concluding a Campaign...120

Selecting the appropriate time opportunity to conclude a campaign is an important problem that a campaign commander must follow with interest.

When operations progress smoothly and the campaign goals have already been reached or have basically been reached and the battlefield circumstances {zhanchang xingshi} are extremely favorable for us, we can, after taking advantage of the victory to develop and expand the results of battle, conclude the campaign.

When the campaign goals have not yet been realized but, because of political or diplomatic needs-requirements, even if it is very favorable militarily, one should also decisively conclude the campaign.

When a campaign does not develop smoothly and the campaign goals have not yet been realized and the battlefield circumstances {zhanchang xingshi} have become a stalemate, and continuing operations not only cannot achieve the pre-determined missions, but it may possibly cause the overall situation to fall into passivity, in order to seize the initiative, one should also decisively conclude the campaign.

When operations fall into passivity and a crisis situation appears, the armed forces have lost initiative, they are in a passive status on the battlefield, in an extremely unfavorable posture, and they are in danger of being wiped out or defeated; when the campaign has no way to develop in accordance with the plan {jihua}, when operational command and control has lost effectiveness, and when all services and arms cannot adjust-coordination of operations, the campaign commander must face squarely the serious effects that may be created and he should decisively shake off the enemy and conclude the campaign.

In order to smoothly conclude a campaign, first, the campaign commander should, at all times, master the operational progress and changes in the battlefield situation and accomplish precise assessments of the campaign developing trends. Simultaneously, [the campaign commander] should instruct his command department {silingbu} to formulate the battlefield withdrawal plan {jihua}, and put forth the recommendation for concluding the campaign to higher levels at the right time on the basis of the mission completion situation. Next, when organizing the conclusion of the campaign, one should clarify the missions, the withdrawal sequence, and the return-to-area or to a new area of deployment {peizhi diyu} of each operational grouping; correspondingly adjust *bushu* disposition, stabilize posture, and as much as possible maintain the already obtained battle results; organize reliable air and at-sea cover, support the safe withdrawal of the main operational strengths, and strictly defend against the enemy's sudden raid-attacks. When withdrawing from the battlefield under situations of contact with the enemy or confrontation, one should adopt the mode of alternating cover in order to block the enemy's pursuit from the rear with sufficient force-strengths or monitor the enemy's direction of movement, and defend against enemy retaliation. When concluding a campaign with the mode of transitioning operational missions based on the strategic need-requirements, the campaign commander and the command organ, on the basis of higher level instructions, organize the withdrawal from the battlefield of each operational grouping under the situation of concealing the intention and successfully accomplish the preparations for carrying out the next operations. In sum, no matter under what situation a campaign is concluded, it must be carefully organized to ensure smooth implementation.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 5

Campaign Command and Coordination...122

Section 1: Campaign Command...122

Campaign command is a campaign activities-oriented organizational/leadership activity of the campaign commander and his command organ. It permeates the entire process of a campaign. The correctness or incorrectness of campaign command directly impacts the success or failure of a campaign.

The basic missions of campaign command are as follows: based on a high-level intent, to organize and to overall-plan {chouhua} a campaign, and command the campaign's implementation; to flexibly use forces and to vary the strategies and tactics of war; and to guide the campaign toward victory. The goals of campaign command are: to unify will and unify activities; to the greatest extent bring into play the overall power of the campaign large formation, as well as that of the regional forces and militia; to most effectively eliminate the enemy while protecting friendly forces; and to strive for the campaign victory. With the high-speed development of science and technology, and the constant emergence of many kinds of high-tech weaponry, the modern campaign has assumed many new features, and campaign command appears more complex than in the past.

I. Basic Requirements of Campaign Command...122

Campaign command requires good knowledge of all aspects of the opposing sides' situation, finding the patterns of its activities, and utilizing these patterns to guide one's own activities, while avoiding blind and subjective free rein, so that subjective guidance conforms to objective reality. These are the basic requirements and basic methods for realizing campaign command.

(1) Scientific prediction

Campaign command is both a contest of efficiency and time, and a competition between commanders in their ability to predict a campaign's development. Scientific prediction of campaign development is a prerequisite for implementing correct command; only by correctly predicting a campaign's development changes, and by promptly ascertaining the enemy's activity {xingdong} intention and the campaign development trend, can one control the enemy {zhi di} at the first opportunity, seize the initiative, and guide the campaign toward a direction advantageous to one's own side.

Correct prediction of campaign development changes requires knowing oneself as well as the enemy. An overall understanding and objective analysis of all aspects of the situation of both opposing sides are prerequisites for correct prediction of campaign development changes. Knowing both sides first of all requires knowing the enemy. A campaign

commander and command organ must: fully utilize intelligence collection systems; acquire a variety of intelligence collection means; conduct omnibearing, omnilayer, continuous reconnaissance; and in overall terms grasp the enemy's operational intention, features, and patterns. In a modern campaign, the campaign commander must also know himself; only by knowing well the participating forces' combat power {zhandou li} and the strategies and tactics of war in which they are skilled, by knowing well the quality of lower-level commanders and the performance and campaign uses of the major weaponry participating in the combat, and by having an accurate estimate of the forces' overall combat power, can a campaign commander rationally employ the various kinds of operational forces, bring into play the strong points of the participating forces, and form an overall operational capability.

In knowing both sides, one cannot only know the past and the present, one must also know its possible development. The situation understood by a campaign commander through a variety of means is quite often partial (or localized) and superficial; instead, they need to completely master the essence and inherent laws of campaigns, and to employ sensitive materials so as to conduct an analytical assessment which discards the coarse and grasps the precise, discards the false and retains the true, moves from one point to another, and moves from the exterior to the interior. Finally, they draw correct conclusions, and thus adopt the corresponding measures; in such a way they can then control the enemy and dominate the battlefield. Since campaign operations have very large probability {gairanxing} and uncertainty, accurate prediction of campaign development changes is not simple. Hence, a campaign commander must set out from the most difficult, most complex situations, and must make many manual preparations; i.e., before fighting the first battle, they should predict the tactics to be used in several later battles. When the campaign circumstances {zhanyi xingshi} are favorable to our side, we must prevent the possible appearance of unforeseen situations, adopt effective measures, and develop the favorable circumstances {youli xingshi}. When the campaign circumstances {zhanyi xingshi} are unfavorable to our side, we must adopt all means and alter the unfavorable posture {buli taishi}, so that the campaign direction changes toward a direction favorable to us.

(2) Keeping an eye on the overall situation

Any war or campaign always presents the problem of the relationship between the overall situation and the localized situation, between the whole and the parts. Keeping a good eye on a campaign's overall situation is the key to driving the development of a war situation and to control of the battlefield posture. Mao Zedong pointed out: "The main and first problem in victory or defeat in a war is the good or bad eye one keeps on the overall situation and on every phase." The words of the ancients, "From ancient times, something not planned for generations is not worth planning at one point in time; an overall situation not planned is not worth planning in one of its areas," also showed this principle. Hence, a campaign commander should focus his attention on commanding problems involving the overall situation, and should put priority on the overall benefits for the overall situation. First, they must deeply comprehend the strategic overall situation, and all along

put priority on the benefit for that overall situation. The strategic overall situation is the general trend in war, and is also the general direction and overall requirement for the campaign. Hence, formulating a campaign concept and setting campaign resolution both require taking the strategic intention as the basic criterion; even if it is not advantageous to the localized (or partial) situation but is advantageous to the overall situation, the strategic intention still must be subordinated to the requirements of the overall situation. Next, they must keep a good eye on the campaign's overall situation. A modern campaign is joint operations, and is 3-dimensional warfare and integrated warfare; only with overall planning for the overall situation, and fully bringing into play overall power, can one achieve a campaign victory. Any issues bearing consideration for all aspects of a campaign and for the nature of all campaign phases are [part of] the campaign's overall situation; a campaign commander must set out from the strategic heights and the campaign's overall situation, and keep a good eye on all aspects and all phases of the campaign.

In keeping an eye on the overall situation, one should be skilled at getting good control over the campaign links. The campaign links mean the parts and activities having a decisive effect on the campaign overall situation; good control over the campaign links can rapidly propel the overall situation to develop in a direction favorable to one's own side, and even become a key to deciding victory or defeat in the campaign. Mao Zedong pointed out: "Commanders at any level should focus the core of their own attention on those issues or actions having the most important and most decisive significance for the overall situation they command, and should not focus it on other issues or actions." Generally speaking, campaign links mainly include the following: selection of operational objectives, determination of the main offensive direction and defensive direction, use of reserves, the major operational activities in the campaign, and the campaign's initiation. However, due to differences in each campaign's patterns and missions, as well as in the situations of the campaign's various phases, a campaign's main links are each different; the campaign commander must – based on the specific situation on the battlefield – take all things into consideration, and grasp and resolve well the links.

(3) Centralized and unified

Operations have always stressed "military power is the most valuable thing." A modern campaign is a comprehensive confrontation of a variety of operational patterns and means that are conducted with an enemy on many battlefields, in many domains, with a variety of participating strengths. Only by implementing unified command can one cause the various participating strengths to form an interdependent, mutually complementary, mutually supporting, indivisible organic whole while centering on the unified operational intent. To implement unified command, one should grasp the following few points: the first is unified operational thought. The operational thought is a rational understanding for the campaign's objective laws. It is mainly manifested in the campaign guidance thought {zhanyi de zhidao sixiang} and basic principles {jiben yuanze}, and it is also manifested in the understanding of the operational objective laws for a given specific

campaign. The unified operational thought not only is the soul of campaign operations, it is also the leading and basic reliance for a commander to overall plan {chouhua} and organize-implement a campaign. A modern campaign is mainly a joint campaign, and if one doesn't have a unified operational thought, it is difficult to implement a joint campaign of real significance. A unified operational thought, in a general sense is precisely establishing an integrated-whole operational thought, persisting in integration of military-civilian and integration of all services and arms, and forming the might of an integrated-whole; it is establishing a thought of precision strike to control the enemy, persisting in concentrated crack strengths {jingrui liliang}, meticulously selecting and attacking the enemy's centers of gravity and critical nodes, disrupting the enemy's integrated-whole structure, and paralyzing the enemy's operational system {tixi}. The second is to establish an integrated all-services joint command institution. This command institution should possess a high degree of authority and combined quality {hechengxing}, not only with the authority to give orders {haoling} to the "tri-services" and the capability to command the "tri-services;" but at the same time, it also must be sharp and capable, highly effective and combined peacetime and wartime [institution]. The third is the command mode gives priority to centralized command and is supplemented by other command modes. This is decided by the modern campaign's integrated-whole adjusting-coordination quality and the characteristics of a unified-quality of goals.

Centralized command is reflected during campaign organization/planning {jihua}. A commander must conduct stratagem planning of the unified overall planning {tongchou mouhua} for the major problems related to the campaign overall situation such as the campaign concept, force-strength task-organization, mission differentiation, main direction, basic *bushu* disposition, coordination actions, time limit to complete preparations, and time to start activities. During the campaign implementation process, [a commander] implements centralized command and control for adjustments of the main-secondary directions, campaign phase transitions, and adjusting-coordination of important operational activities, etc. In particular, they should even more master concentration and unified use of those force strengths and weaponry which can directly impact the campaign course, such as high-tech weapon systems, long-range ordnance, and campaign maneuver forces. At the same time, they should also see that characteristics such as the expansiveness of the modern campaign battlefield space, the multi-varied qualities of strengths, and fast-changing situations depend on centralized command and cannot encompass all command; rather, under the premise of centralized command, they should adopt a mode of decentralized command over non-overall segments and over activities along a secondary campaign direction. Moreover, so as not to lose combat opportunity and rapid reaction, they should also conduct bypass command [skip echelon] {yueji zhihui}. Establishment of an integrated command automation system (CAS) is the basic means for ensuring unified command. Without an integrated CAS, it is difficult to implement unified command. This system {xitong} must be adaptive with the modern campaign command system {tixi}, and every effort toward forming an organic whole of the intelligence sharing, information exchange, and communications compatibility among all service arms; at the same time, it also requires a very high time effectiveness {shixiaoxing} and battlefield survivability.

(4) Steadfastness and flexibility {jianding linghuo}

Steadfastness is a quality that requires firm conviction, a tenacious will, and a resolve toward certain victory; it requires incisive judgment, and [the ability] to not be confused and wavering by the complex changing situations on the battlefield. When force-units suffer severe setbacks and major casualties, steadfastness is the ability to withstand enormous psychological pressure, to persevere in tenacious efforts, and to dare to overcome difficulties. When the situations have not undergone fundamental changes, one must firmly and unshakably carry out the established resolution, and at times a campaign's victory often propels one into the midst of a "persevere further" {"zai jianchi yixia"} effort. When the battlefield situations have truly undergone fundamental changes, one should adroitly break off a stand {ji li duan}, resolutely adjust the plan {jihua}, and push forward changes in the battle situation.

Flexibility requires using cleverness to control the enemy. The battlefield situation is constantly changing, and the opposing sides' operational activities are dynamic and indeterminate; even the most brilliant commanders cannot completely predict all situations and development changes occurring in a campaign. Hence, the campaign commander must flexibly maneuver, and adjust to changing situations. In a campaign plan {jihua}, he must have a variety of courses of action, and sometimes one course of action must be adaptable to a variety of situations; in command implementation, he must flexibly employ various operational strengths and fighting methods, and flexibly handle various situations. Flexibility is prominently reflected in the ability to rapidly react to changing situations, and in the shortest time to set the resolution and handle it. Pursuit of gain and avoidance of harm are the direct goals of flexible command. A campaign commander must accurately grasp the battlefield circumstances {zhanchang xingshi}, be flexible in initiative, avoid and shake off from passivity, and ensure the war situation continuously develops in a direction that favors one's own side.

Steadfastness and flexibility are the concentrated embodiment of campaign command skill. Firmness and flexibility are a unification of a contradiction. Steadfastness is not equal to mechanical rigidity or to inflexibility stemming from disregard for the main objective conditions, and flexibility is not equal to rash and unconsidered action, or to doing as one pleases. Only with the two complementing each other and organically combined can one realize correctly campaign command.

(5) Adept use of stratagems

Campaign operations use of stratagems is precisely fully bringing into play a campaign commander's highly subjective dynamic quality and the schemes and tactics used to achieve campaign goals. A modern campaign not only is a test of strength between the real strengths of both sides, it is also a contest in the application of stratagems. Campaign operational practice has proven that there hasn't been a war where stratagems weren't used, a war that victory was gained without stratagems, and a defeat that wasn't lost to stratagems. Future PLA campaign operations still have a foothold in defeating an enemy

with equipment superiority with equipment inferiority, and through emphasis on *implementation of schemes and use of stratagems*, we can remedy PLA inferiority and weaken the enemy's superiority. The adept use of stratagems first of all requires using a variety of means to *conceal the real and show the false*, deceiving the enemy, and creating misconceptions by the enemy, which results in mistakes in assessments and command. PLA traditional campaign deception – such as attack where the enemy must rescue, and move the enemy to assist; surround three sides and leave one side open, relax the enemy and suddenly surround; conceal strength and display weakness, make the enemy arrogant and willful; and luring the enemy deep, and force the enemy to stick out – still have practical guiding significance in modern campaigns. Modern campaign deception should also pay attention to apply information operations; conduct electronic demonstrations {yangdong}, jamming, confusion {mihuo} and deception against the enemy; and use computer viruses to invade and harass the enemy's command and control (C2) system, thus putting the enemy in an unfavorable position. Second is the use of conventional operational activities combined with special operational activities, and strike the enemy to catch them unaware. As Sunzi (Sun Tzu) said, "In all battles, join the battle with the orthodox, but win with the unorthodox. Thus, one who is adept in the unorthodox is unlimited as the sky and earth and inexhaustible as the river." The "unorthodox-orthodox" stratagems of a campaign are mainly the fighting methods for gaining victory with the unorthodox such as *we attack when the enemy attacks* {dijin wojin}, leap forward operations {chao Yue zuozhan}, decapitation assault {zhanshou tuji}, scoop out the heart and attack {taoxin gongji}, etc. One should flexibly apply these during campaign command on the basis of the battlefield situation.

II. Campaign Command Systems...127

(1) Campaign command institution types and the command post system {tixi}

1. Command institution types. Campaign command institution, based on campaign scale, can be divided into three types: theater command institution, army group {jituanjun qun} campaign command institution (theater-direction command institution), and group army {jituanjun} (corps) command institution.

A theater campaign command institution normally applies to a large scale campaign; it is composed of the theater Army, Navy, and Air Force commanders, the campaign tactical missile force-units commander and associated staff officers and institutions, and it is normally established on the basis of the existing theater organ. Under modern conditions, the theater campaign command institution has many joint campaign command institutions subordinate to it. Its military command senior officer can be assumed by the theater commander, or it can also be appointed by the supreme command. The theater campaign command institution mainly commands the campaign operations of its own theater. It is subject to the command of the supreme command and it can downward-command the army group campaign command institution (theater-direction command institution) or all subordinate group army (corps) command institutions and special operations group command institutions. The missions of the theater campaign command institution are as

follows: based on the supreme command's intent, set the campaign resolution, formulate the campaign operational plan {jihua}, formulate the service coordination plan {jihua}, organize imminent battle training, and assume responsibility for organizing and guiding campaign implementation.

An army-group campaign command institution (theater-direction command institution) normally applies to a medium-scale campaign. This campaign is independently implemented by an army group {jituanjun qun} composed of a number of group armies (corps) in one strategic direction or several campaign directions. The command institution can be independently established from the theater, and it can be established by relying on a given army group or a given service in the theater with the theater sending representatives and assimilating the participation of other service commanders participating in that direction. It is composed of the theater commander, associated service commanders and their corresponding command organ personnel. Under normal conditions, an army group campaign command institution (theater-direction command institution) can command the several campaign large formation strengths. Such a command institution is subject to command of the theater command institution, and sometimes it can also be directly commanded by the supreme command.

A group army (corps) campaign command institution applies to a small-scale campaign or to a sub-campaign in a medium-to-large campaign. The command organ of the various service large formations participating in combat, namely, the campaign command institutions, the provisionally organized campaign large formations and their command institutions can be organized-established thus: dispatched from higher-level, provisionally organized-established, or with a given established organized [structure] large formation command institution as the basis. It can be divided into the Army group armies, Air Force group army, Navy formation, and conventional missile force base campaign command institutions. These are the most basic campaign command organs and directly command the tactical strength of their respective services. They are normally subject to the command of the theater campaign or the theater direction command institution.

2. The command post system {tixi}. In order to safeguard prompt, stable and uninterrupted command, one must establish an interconnected command post system {tixi}. Normally, one should establish a main command post, alternate command post, a rear command post, and based on needs-requirements, one can also establish a forward (direction) command post in the main campaign direction.

The main command post is a campaign's basic command institution. It supplies the main site employed by the campaign commander and the basic members of the command organ and is the center for implementing campaign command. It is normally composed of the superior officer or higher-level directly assigned campaign commander, a chief of staff and main members of headquarters {silingbu}, political, logistical, and equipment organs, participating associated personnel of various services and arms as well as the communication system[s] {xitong} and command automation system[s] {xitong}. It also

is allocated with fairly strong services support strengths {qinwu baozhang liliang} such as security {jingwei}, engineering, and chemical defense. In order to safeguard the command institution's concealment quality and maintain a high level maneuver quality, the personnel of the main command post should strive to sharp and capable, and should be in a dispersed deployment {shusan peizhi}.

The alternate command post is the alternate command institution established in preparation of taking over command from the main command post. Normally, it is composed of a deputy-position senior officer and necessary staff, political, logistic, and equipment technical personnel, as well as the necessary CAS and communications system(s). It is also allocated with necessary service support elements {qinwu baozhang fendui}. The alternate command post should maintain a close relationship with the main command post, receive situation reports, and at all times understand and grasp the developmental situations of the campaign. Once the main command post is disrupted or cannot implement command of campaign activities, then [the alternate command post] immediately takes over command so as to ensure continuous campaign command.

The rear command post is an alternate command institution established for a unified organizing and implementing of rear command. Normally it is composed of one campaign deputy commander/commander, logistic and equipment departments of participating services as well as associated personnel of local support-to-the-front institutions. It is also allocated with necessary CAS, communications system(s) and support strengths such as security. It is mainly responsible for the *bushu* disposition of force-units, implementation of logistical and equipment technical support, and coordination of all logistical and equipment technical organizational-units. [It is mainly responsible for] organizing and commanding signal communications and rear defense, and as necessary at anytime be prepared to assume command of rear area air defense and NBC weapons, and prevent raids by enemy ground force-units, as well as [being responsible for] campaign rear area work such as rear area anti-airborne operations.

The forward (direction) command post is an auxiliary command institution established to enhance command in the campaign's main direction. It is normally composed of a deputy-position senior officer, a small number of staff personnel and a communications element, and it is allocated with needed service support strengths {qinwu baozhang liliang}. The forward (direction) command post mainly assists the main command post in implementing command and its established position is more forward than the main command post. Sometimes, one can utilize a lower-level main command post, and hence it is also called an auxiliary command post or forward area command post.

The composition of the various campaign command posts should be rationally determined according to the campaign command missions and possible conditions. A main command post's command center is normally composed mainly of a planning adjusting-coordination center {jihua xietiao zhongxin}, intelligence center, communications center, electronic countermeasure (ECM) center, and firepower center. The command center is the heart of campaign command.

One does not necessarily need to entirely organize-establish the various command posts for one campaign. Just in terms of one campaign, exactly what sort of command post system {tixi} should be flexibly grasped on the basis of actual requirements and battlefield possibilities.

The command post can be divided into two types: fixed and mobile. Fixed command posts are set up within various defense works having fairly high concealment and stability, as well as certain defensive equipment. Mobile command posts can be set up in mobile vehicles, airplanes (helicopters), ships, and trains.

The location of each command post should be chosen in places: favorable to the command's main-direction operations; favorable to launching of work; favorable to maneuvers; favorable to decentralization, concealment and camouflage; favorable to defense against the enemy's high-tech weapons, especially precision guided munitions (PGMs) and against enemy raids with NBC weapons; favorable to organizing a CAS and communications system(s); and making full use of favorable terrain and existing engineering facilities. The time and location main command post set up is normally determined by a higher-level senior officer {shouzhang}, but when they are determined at the root-level, it should be immediately reported to the higher level. The times and locations for setup of other command posts are determined by the root-level senior officer {shouzhang}. In order to ensure the command posts' security and the stability of command, the commander should guide his headquarters {silingbu} to closely organize the defense of the command-post.

(2) Personnel composition of the campaign command institution

The campaign command institution is composed of a campaign commander and a specific number of staff personnel {canmou renyuan} and support personnel.

The campaign commander is the military superior officer responsible for campaign command. Within the command institution, he occupies the core position, and plays a leading and controlling role. This kind of commander responsibility and authority determines that the campaign commander has a major effect on operational success or failure, and even on the survival or downfall of a nation. The role played by a campaign commander in the campaign command activity depends on the degree of his mastery of campaign operational laws, on the strength of his subjective guidance capability, and on the level of his psychological quality. Different campaigns show variance in their command features, and also levy varying requirements on a campaign commander. A joint-campaign commander normally is a commander appointed by a theater commander or by the supreme command, and can also be a campaign commander in the Army, Navy, or Air Force; combined campaigns normally are led by a combined-armed-forces {hecheng jundui} commander. Among commanders, the principal commander is mainly responsible for the command of the campaign overall situation and important campaign activities, while the deputy commander assists command of the principal commander, or – in division of labor fashion – has individual responsibility for one services' operations

and for command of the campaign's secondary direction and support matters, and assumes campaign command when the principal commander is not present. The chief of staff is also one of the commanders, and – besides participating with the [campaign] commander in command activities – is mainly tasked with internal adjusting-coordination of the headquarters organ and with execution of campaign decision making, planning {jihua}, and controlling, as well as with guiding the work of the logistical and equipment organs.

Campaign staff personnel mainly {zhanyi canmou renyuan} refer to the staff personnel of the command organ at campaign large formation and above and is should be shouldered by personnel having undergone specialized campaign training. Their main duties are as follows: to provide data and recommendations for the senior officer {shouzhang} to set the resolution; formulate the operational documents such as the campaign plans {jihua} and orders based on the senior officer's {shouzhang} resolution; and to participate in the specific work of organizing the coordination actions and implementing battlefield control. Because a modern campaign is increasingly becoming high-tech, the requirements on the staff personnel quality are also continuously increasing. Besides needing to be proficient in grasping general staff duties, and having specified campaign organizing and planning {jihua} capabilities and higher skills in stratagems, they must also have higher science and technology qualities. In a joint campaign, the staff personnel of the various services are normally a joint organized grouping and compose a joint command institution.

In order to safeguard-support the continuous conduct of the command activity {huodong}, the internal command institution must also be organized-assigned with a specified number of command safeguarding-support personnel, such as communications personnel, confidential-security personnel {jiyao renyuan}, graphic reproduction personnel, microcomputer operators, survey-mapping personnel, electrical power personnel, equipment maintenance personnel, vehicle drivers, and guarding-security personnel {jingjie renyuan}. These similarly must have undergone specialized training and must possess very high qualities.

(3) Campaign command information systems

A campaign command information system (CIS) refers to, among campaign command systems, a “man-machine system” that comprehensively uses a variety of technical equipment with electronic computers as the core; realizes automation of operational information acquisition, transmission, and processing; and ensures that commanders achieve command and control over the objects of command. In a modern campaign, weapons and equipment and its assisting-support and safeguarding-support systems are becoming ever more complex, the specialized division of labor among the services and arms are becoming increasingly detailed, the command-associated essential elements {yaosu} are increasingly growing in number, and the complexity of command and control is increasingly rising, all of which levy more stringent requirements on the means of command. Without a stable, highly effective, integrated CAS, one cannot achieve

interconnectivity between the various operational organizational-units {danwei} and the command systems {xitong} at each level, between the command systems {xitong} at the same level, between weapon systems and between the various subsystems within the weapon systems and one cannot be tightly complementary so as to form an organic whole.

1. Functions of a campaign CIS. In campaign CISs, humans and automated equipment are fused into one and jointly participate in command. Staff personnel utilize intelligent systems or expert systems to aid the campaign commander in completing campaign decision making, and they utilize the command network system {xitong} to issue orders, thus combining into one the work completed in the past by three departments – operations, confidential-security {jiyao} and communications. The commander in a command center can utilize various display terminals to continuously observe the situations of campaign operations, to at any time grasp the battlefield posture and relevant intelligence, and to implement real time command. CASs mainly have four major functions: information collection, information processing, aided decision-making, and command and control (C2).

Information collection {xinxi shouji}. This normally includes the following: the situations such as the enemy's activities intention, force strength task-organization {bingli biancheng}, weapons and equipment, and operational activities; and our engineering facilities, transportation, communications, air cover, assisting-support and materiel preparations, as well as logistical supply, force-unit {budui} operational preparations, and operational area social and natural conditions. There are mainly two types of common-use {changyong} information collection equipment. One type is remote sensing (RS) equipment, mainly used for detection of long-range targets. Common-use RS equipment includes visible RS equipment, ultra-low-light night vision equipment, infrared RS equipment, multispectral RS equipment, microwave RS equipment, acoustic RS equipment, and a variety of radio communications equipment. These kinds of equipment are respectively carried on satellite, aircraft, vehicle, or ship platforms, to perform information detection and acquisition. The other type is various kinds of sensors; their operating mode uses several sensing elements near a target, and when these sensing elements acquire certain physical traits of the target, they will transmit a signal, providing target data. Different reconnaissance systems have different means of information collection. Common-use information collection means are radio reconnaissance, radar reconnaissance, and satellite reconnaissance. Information processing mainly includes text processing, graphics processing, and intelligence synthesis processing. Information processing mainly adheres to the information needs of campaign command, and over various information channels, distributes the data of all information sources into a central processor to form the initial data {chushi xinxi}, and then via information screening filters form integrated intelligence information that has a certain degree of confidence and specification requirements. On this basis, it performs an analysis of the campaign posture and formulates as well as evaluates pre-selected courses of action {yuxuan fang'an}, enabling it to become information providable for use in decision making; finally, the decision making is performed by the commander and it forms the decision making information [data] {juece xinxi}; the staff personnel, based on the decision making

information [data] {juece xinxi}, operate a CAS to formulate orders, instructions, and plans {jihua}, generate control information {kongzhi xinxi}, and transmit the control information such as orders, instructions, and plans {jihua} via a transmission network to the objects of command.

Assisted decision-making. In a campaign CIS, there are mainly three decision making modes: the first is the expert system. This uses a computer to emulate an expert's thinking; it is a program system to resolve complex problems. At the time of use, relevant intelligence on the battlefield is used as initial data {chushi xinxi} input into the system; the expert system performs inference and analysis of the various kinds of intelligence, and puts forth the decision making courses of action [COA] {juece fang'an}. The commander, based on his own experience and the expert system's put forth COAs, makes the final decision. The second is operational simulation. Operational simulation is precisely the construction of the battlefield model and with this, derivation {tuiyan} of the campaign course and the campaign outcome under given conditions. At the time of use, the initial data is input into the previously constructed model, and then the feasible decision making COAs are separately input into a computer and simulation derivations {moni tuiyan} are performed, and an optimum COA is selected from amongst these. The third is preliminary COA [P-COA] retrieval. In peacetime, based on a preset battlefield and operational activity forecasts and directed at every kind of potentially occurring operational posture, a variety of corresponding COAs are formulated as well as evaluated and optimally selected. Finally, the optimally selected COAs under different postures along with the full-complement [complete set] computer control programs and the fabricated software products are loaded into the software database to form the P-COA software system {tixi}. In wartime, the corresponding P-COA is retrieved on the basis of actual situations, and is provided for a commander's direct use or used after modifications.

Command and control (C2). C2 is the core function of a command center. The command center is responsible for automated gathering and synthesized processing of a variety of intelligence information and providing this to a commander. With this as the basis, the commander implements C2. C2 systems {xitong} are composed of two major parts: hardware and software. Hardware is computers, the core equipment of C2, display systems, the equipment that displays posture intelligence and actual battlefield conditions, and C2 stations, the various control equipment where the commander conducts campaign calculations {zhanyi yunsuan}, issues orders, and checks on order execution situations.

Software includes two types: systems software {xitong ruanjian} and application software for command automation.

The essence of the campaign C2 process is the process of uninterrupted feedback of information flow. The chief links in campaign command are collecting and processing of intelligence. All types of reconnaissance equipment and all kinds of data terminals used by the various forces, from all around continuously transmit intelligence information to

the command center; the center's equipment promptly performs analysis and editing of this intelligence and then stores it for future reference or transmits it to the proper commanders. A command center's intelligence database also includes a large amount of previous information; when a commander needs to search for data, he uses the intelligence retrieval system to retrieve the necessary information from the intelligence database. The commander, based on his grasp of the needed intelligence, utilizes an assisted decision making system to perform COA selection, and via creative thinking ultimately determines the optimum COA (campaign resolution). After the campaign COA (resolution) is determined, the operational orders are formed, and the command personnel will transmit the operational orders via the information transmission system {xitong} to the network terminals of the individual force-units {budui} and is provided to the objects of command to execute.

2. The establishment of the requirements of campaign CIS. A campaign command institution must, based on operational needs-requirements and conditions, organize-construct a CAS with a rational structure, nimble to use, strong survivability, and a high degree of integration, and ensure the implementation of effective command for the various participating strengths. The establishment of a campaign CIS should be suited to the campaign command system {tixi} and to the task-organization of the command institution. Based on the requirements of *being centralized and unified, proceeding from top to bottom, separate levels and separate categories, giving prominence to key points, and dealing with more than one thing in unified overall planning*, unfold the organizing work for systems {xitong}. [The command institution must] fully utilize existing equipment within the operational areas and with the CAS of the various participating force-units {budui} as the backbone, fully bring into play the role of existing equipment and implement system synthesis and integration. Simultaneously, [the command institution must] carefully organize the system's concealment and protection and ensure the high effectiveness, stability and reliable operation of the system.

All functions of the CAS should form a synthetic integration. This is both a requirement of a modern campaign and an intrinsic requirement of a CAS. One must organically blend together all of the functions of C2, intelligence and reconnaissance, communications, and ECM {cianzi duikang}.

The campaign CIS should be integrated with the automated systems of all the services. The campaign command institution s must acquire all-source information from the "multidimensional" battlefield and from all the services; and a CAS must be an organic integrated-whole, with intelligence sharing and information interflow, in order to be able to ensure the execution of smooth command over all of the participating services. To this end, a campaign CIS must realize "technical integration;" the campaign command institution [must] achieve equipment compatibility, command interface interflow, all-subsystem interconnectivity, and highly effective operation with all of the services and with the command means between all of those services.

The campaign CASs should be integrated with the CASs of the strategic command at all levels. By way of measures such as development of an Area Synthetic Communication System {quyu zonghe tongxin xitong}, [one must] achieve interconnectivity and interflow of the CAS at the strategic and campaign levels, and enhance the time effectiveness, flexibility, and stability of the CAS.

III. Campaign Command Modes...133

The command mode is the method and form of implementing command by a commander and his command organ. Whether or not the selection and application of command mode are appropriate directly affects the level of campaign command effectiveness and quality.

(1) Centralized command and decentralized command

In operational command, due to differences in the centralization level used in command functions and authority, the two main command modes to be formed are centralized command and decentralized [dispersed] command.

1. Centralized command. Centralized command, also called unified command, is the implementation of centralized control and unified adjusting-coordination command of subordinate force-units, and it is the basic mode of campaign command. This command mode essentially is the command authority to maintain a high degree of centralization and unification of the force-units. Generally, a campaign's highest commander directly grasps and controls the command authority, and also has a clear command relationship with attached and assisting-support force-units. The main characteristics of centralized command are: not only does the higher level provide clear missions for the lower level, but it also stipulates the specific method(s) and steps to fulfill the mission. Under ordinary conditions, only the higher level commander has the authority to change the operational *bushu* disposition, missions, and the time opportunities and direction of activities, and the lower-level commander may not arbitrarily vary an action without approval. During the operational process, the higher level commander has the authority to intervene and correct the lower level commander's resolution and plans {*jihua*}. At the same time, the lower level commander, in organizing and implementing command, must standardize his own activities on the basis of higher level intent and missions. During the entire operational process, the higher level commander maintains a relatively centralized command authority.

The centralized command mode has the following advantages: first, it facilitates the unified organization of campaign operational activities, [facilitates] the formation of an integrated-whole composite power and the consistent adjusting-coordination achievement of the operational goal. A commander can, based on higher level intent and their own level's campaign intention, make unified arrangements for the campaign *bushi* disposition, operational direction, and main coordination matters and allow all activities to be conducted by tightly centering on achieving the general objective[s]. He can fully bring into play the strong points of each of the operational strengths and the various

weaponries so as to form a powerful operational effectiveness from an integrated-whole perspective. Second, this mode facilitates a commander in keeping an eye on the overall situation and in grasping the operational links. A commander applying centralized command mode can take in the campaign's overall situation, grasp the operational centers of gravity, and strictly require all operational strengths to resolutely execute their orders and conduct activities per the unified plan *{jihua}*, and better accomplish their missions. Third, it facilitates the lower level to better accomplish their operational missions. Because the higher level conducts unified planning *{jihua}* and *bushu* disposition for the entirety of operational activities, this reduces the work load on the lower level commander in organizing and planning operational activities, and particularly at the critical occasions of the campaign, he can obtain the powerful support of the higher level.

The centralized command mode also has certain drawbacks: one is that command authority is highly centralized, which is often unfavorable to bringing into play the initiative and creativity of the lower level commander, even to the point where it can reduce the lower level commander's sense of responsibility. The second is that the lower level commander, in handling some important situations, must get higher level approval and this reporting to a higher level or sending down of the approval wastes time, which is unfavorable to seizing a fleeting combat opportunity. The third is that centralized command requires the higher level commander to relatively explicitly differentiate missions and comprehend the situation, and this is bound to increase the work load, thereby affecting a commander's creative thinking. Fourth is that centralized command is highly dependent on command tools, and once communications are blocked and connectivity is interrupted, that could cause the entirety of campaign activities to be exposed to unfavorable effects.

Centralized command, no matter whether in the past or in the present, has always been the most basic mode of campaign command. The secret of Napoleon's campaign command lay in centralized command. Mao Zedong was a commander in chief even more adept at applying centralized command. During the War of Liberation, he concentrated force-strengths over various theaters for use on the main battlefields, and commanded the famous "Three Great Campaigns." In modern campaign operations, the application of the centralized command mode is even more common.

The centralized command mode generally should be adopted based on campaign command requirements and on whether they will be determined in the future. When the enemy situation is fairly clear, when the root-level operational activities have a decisive effect on the campaign's overall situation, when the campaign preparations time is relatively ample and the terrain favorable, when the operational patterns and area are relatively stable, when an operation is in a critical direction and time, when organizing a joint campaign involving all the services, and when communications support is possible – in all of these cases the centralized command mode can be employed.

2. Decentralized command. Decentralized command, also called directive {xunlingshi} command and delegated {weituoshi} command, is a command mode which appropriately transfers command authority to a lower level commander. It is an important mode of campaign command; its essence is that the lower level commander shares relatively large command functions and authority. Liu Bocheng, in his 1947 summary of the lessons from the Ju-Jin-Yu Campaign, devoted a high degree of effort to summarization of its features: he wrote that directive command in fact “shows that because of the mission – and not because of the means – lower level commanders are enabled to act promptly at their own discretion.”⁴ When conducting decentralized command, a higher level commander only assigns to the lower level commander a clear mission and a time limit for fulfilling the mission, issues principle-quality instructions, and provides the force strengths and weaponry needed to fulfill the mission; but he does not stipulate the specific method(s) and steps for fulfilling the mission. The lower level commander can, based on the higher level commander’s general intent and the actual situation on the battlefield, independently perform C2. For example, a large scale joint campaign is normally unfolded in many directions, and the joint campaign command institution normally implements centralized command over the operational groups in the main campaign direction, while in the other directions they can observe the situations and at the necessary time dispatch a forward command {qianzhi}, or delegate the campaign direction joint command institution to implement command.

Decentralized command has the following advantages: the first is that one can fully bring into play the initiative and creativity of the lower level commander. This mode enables a lower level commander to be nondependent on the higher level, and instead to rely on his own cleverness to find an effective method for defeating the enemy, enhance his sense of responsibility for fulfilling the mission, and raise his capability for independent command of operations. The second is that it facilitates seizing combat opportunity. Decentralized command enables a commander to independently and autonomously handle some major situations, and decrease the series of procedures such as requests for instructions, reports, and replies to subordinates. This decreases the command hierarchy, enabling lower level commanders to act promptly at their own discretion and have autonomy in terms of command. The third is that it not only can lighten the higher level command load, but also enables better command of the root-level operational activities. Decentralized command in one respect can shorten the command span, reduce the number of troops commanded, and lighten the command load; in another respect, lower level commanders are more familiar with the *bushu* disposition and more informed of their own battlefield environment, which facilitates their completion of a mission. Fourth is that decentralized command, due to a reduced flux in the flow of information between the higher and lower levels, has eased the requirements on communications support, and can effectively reduce leaks of classified command information, and enhance the survivability of the command institution.

⁴ Liu Bocheng *junshi wenji* [Collected Military Works of Liu Bocheng], Zhanshi [Soldiers’] Publishing House, 1982, p. 481.)

Decentralized command also has certain drawbacks: first, commanders acting alone often cannot obtain high-level timely coordination and support, making for fairly high difficulty in adapting to operational activities of the campaign's overall situation. Second, it levies fairly stringent requirements on the quality of the lower-level commanders; these commanders must have the capability for independent operations and for dealing with dangerous environments. Third, it requires obtaining more force strength and weaponry reinforcement, which to a certain degree creates a certain dilution of the high-level operational strengths. The concept of decentralized command was first proposed and put into practice by the 19th- century commander in chief, old Marshal Blücher. The old marshal in command practice proposed a new concept called "directives;" in issuing directives to group armies, he normally only specified the overall operational direction for those armies, and permitted the army commanders, based on the overall mission, to act independently. The old marshal used such directives to command military operations, and won many victories in wars against Denmark and Austria and in the Allies' wars with France. This command method later came to be called the "detailed command method." After World War II, the importance of the detailed command method was increasingly recognized. Liu Bocheng was an active practitioner and proponent of detailed command; during the Anti-Japanese War and the War of Liberation, he used the directive command mode to conduct command, and won many brilliant victories. Detailed command was also the command mode adopted by the UK during the British-Argentinean Falklands War.

Decentralized command is normally appropriate for the following: campaign command under special conditions; command of force-units solely conducting an operational mission in an independent direction; command of force-units shouldering maneuver operations, insertions and infiltrations, airborne landing, anti-airborne, independent holding operations, depth, and special operations; and command when the battlefield situation has shown unanticipated changes and the means of communications have been damaged or destroyed.

3. Combination centralized command and decentralized command. A campaign's integrated-whole adjusting-coordination nature and the unified-nature of campaign goals require the implementation of a highly centralized and unified command. At the same time, features such as the expansiveness of the campaign battlefield space and the multiplicity of strengths, as well as the rapidity of situational changes, also require that one must attach importance to decentralized command. Each of the two modes – centralized command and decentralized command – has its advantages and disadvantages, and during operations one should, based on the specific conditions, deal with each case on its merits, flexibly apply them, avoid indiscriminate copying, and truly achieve a "unified-dispersed combination, and a good fit between concentration and separation" {tong fang jiehe, ji fen shidu}. Any of the major problems involved with the campaign's overall situation – such as the campaign concept, operational objectives, and selection of time; application of campaign strengths; and the adjusting-coordination between the various battlefields, service large formations and the various campaign patterns – all of these require a high degree of centralized and unified command realized by the campaign commander. As regards the specific *bushu* disposition and use of

operational methods for any tactical formation, all of the services' commanders should be given the authority to act promptly at their discretion and to make emergency decisions, and excessive intervention by the campaign commander is inappropriate. For campaign operational activities having high mobility, one should primarily employ decentralized command, while for campaigns with little mobility, centralized command should be primary. For campaigns having ample time for preparations, centralized command is mostly adopted; otherwise, decentralized command is mostly adopted. For campaign large formations assuming the main campaign mission, centralized command is primary, while for the campaign large formations assuming a secondary mission(s), decentralized command is primary. When the *bushu* disposition has a relatively strong independent command capability, decentralized command can be adopted; otherwise, centralized command is primary. When the command means of communications are advanced, centralized command can be primary; otherwise, decentralized command can be primary. When adopting centralized command, a campaign commander may not exercise rigid control, or take care of everything by themselves; they must give the lower-level commanders the power to act on their own judgment under special situations. Finally, when adopting decentralized command, a campaign commander should specify the range over which the lower-level commanders may exercise authority; and when the latter exceed their authority, the former must request instructions from their superiors, and guard against letting the latter do as they like, and thus losing control.

(2) Command according to level {anji zhihui} and command bypassing the immediate chain {yueji zhihui}

Campaign command, based on the hierarchy of command span, can be divided into command according to level and command bypassing the immediate chain.

1. Command according to level. Command according to level is command relying on a system of administration with level-by-level implementation, and is also stepped command according to the order of establishment of operations and implemented from top to bottom, so as to maintain the normal command relationship. Under the usual conditions, campaign operations do not damage this command relationship.

The basic mark of this command mode is as follows: level-by-level control, with each level assuming its own responsibility for effecting command. Its advantages are expressed as follows: on the one hand, the orderliness of command facilitates giving play to the effects of command functions and powers at all levels. The command system is an organizational system composed of many levels. Each organizational level has its own command functions and powers; this authority relationship in peacetime is clearly specified, while in wartime additional specific decisions are handed down, and commanders become intimately familiar with their own level's authority, which facilitates giving play to effects level by level, and formation of a command composite strength {heli}. On the other hand, the reliability of command is advantageous to fulfilling a mission. Since this type of command is implemented within the normal order of establishment, commanders are quite knowledgeable about the command relationship

at their own level, at the high and low levels, and at the adjacent levels. Even if temporarily there are several changes, commanders do not make fundamental changes to the overall command system, but only make certain shifts in the system of administration, which generally do not create chaos for command. Its drawbacks are as follows: one is that it is easy to form rigidly orthodox command customs, which restrict command initiative and flexibility; second, the command links are too numerous, so that orders transmitted from above must go through layer after layer, which easily affects the time efficiency of command. Under special situations, one command link raising a problem could cause a chain reaction, easily creating an interruption in C2. Command according to level is one of the basic categories of command modes, and is also a commonly seen command method.

2. Command bypassing the immediate chain. This is command where the commanders bypass the subordinate level. It is a special command mode, whose essence is – due to the need to break the normal command relationship because of special situations – to achieve the goal of dealing with those special situations.

The advantages of command bypassing the immediate chain are expressed as follows: it can form a rapid command relationship with the subordinate forces, and implement effective command, so that one may save time, reduce the command layers, seize an opportunity for battle, and realize the goal of dealing with emergency situations. This mode's drawbacks are as follows: command bypassing the immediate chain disrupts the normal command order, which requires reestablishing a command relationship. At the same time, to a certain degree it increases the load on the high-level commanders, and thus under ordinary conditions is not suitable for too much use. Command bypassing the immediate chain is normally adopted when: a situation is critical, and it is mainly suited to influencing the main direction of a war's or campaign's overall situation, and the actions of a campaign or battle; critical situations, and fleeting opportunities for battle, when there is not enough time for level-by-level command; and when there are command and communications interrupts, so that normal command according to level cannot be effected. When implementing command bypassing the immediate chain, the commanders at this higher level should promptly inform the bypassed lower level(s) of their orders or instructions, and – based on the commanders of the forces being commanded, depending on the possible situations – they must also promptly report to their immediate higher level the situation involving receipt of the mission.

3. Combination command according to level and command bypassing the immediate chain. Command according to level and command bypassing the immediate chain are related in a “unity of opposites.” The so-called “opposites” here means that the two in the command hierarchy have different requirements. However, no matter whether in level-by-level command or in command bypassing the immediate chain, the focus of attention is always what is advantageous to fulfillment of the operational mission. The so-called “unity” part here means that without command according to level, there is no command bypassing the immediate chain, and vice versa. In command, command according to level and command bypassing the immediate chain sometimes are also used interchangeably,

and are mutually inclusive. Any command mode cannot be the only existing mode. This then requires that a campaign commander not only must not confound the features and range of applications possessed by the two, but also must oppose any kind of action purely using only one command mode. They must focus on battlefield realities, and integrate use of the two, with command according to level as the primary mode, and command bypassing the immediate chain as the supporting mode.

Section 2: Campaign Coordination...139

Campaign coordination refers to the coordination and cooperation among all the service arms and the various other forces participating in the campaign operations, per the unified plan *{jihua}* of the campaign commander and command organ, and implemented in all areas of campaign operations. Its goals are to form an organic whole of a series of operational activities conducted in the multidimensional battlefield space by the various campaign forces, to closely coordinate per the unified plan, to mutually cooperate, to bring into play the overall power, and to coordinate in unison to achieve the campaign's final goal.

In a modern campaign, owing to the complex composition of the campaign operational essential elements, the status and role of campaign coordination seem to be increasingly prominent. From the viewpoint of the force composition, a modern campaign is an integrated trial of strength of all the service arms' operational systems; it requires that all forces form a composite strength *{he li}*, which requires relying on coordination of this link, and joining together the campaign's many forces. From the viewpoint of the battlefield space and campaign activities, the various operational activities of a modern campaign are simultaneously or successively unfolded in the land/sea/air/space/electronic multidimensional space, and the various operational modes and means are synthetically applied; one must fuse into a whole the campaign activities of many battlefields and a variety of patterns, and unquestionably one must inter-coordinate all of the battlefields and activities in order to achieve this. In a certain sense, under modern conditions, the quality and operational capabilities of the troops are mainly expressed in the close coordination among the participating forces and arms, in the close coordination among the various battlefields, and in the close coordination among the various campaign patterns and activities. The degree of campaign coordination not only affects the realization of all the service arms' overall combat effectiveness, but also has a major impact on the campaign course and even on the outcome of the campaign and war. In the British-Argentinean Falklands War (1982), the two sides' entirely different methods of coordination of operational activities led to two different results. The Argentinean military – despite having numerical superiority in terms of “favorable climate, geography” and force strength and weaponry, and despite its Air Force's flexible, courageous and resolute operations, which achieved major combat successes – nevertheless lacked coordination and cooperation among the three services, due to their Navy's and Army's passive avoidance of battle, which led to defeat in that war. The British military – although having troops tired from the long expedition, locked in a desperate fight against fortified positions, and not at all possessing superiority in

personnel and arms – nevertheless had extremely close triservice coordination and cooperation, and finally scored a victory in that war. Hence, in campaign operations under modern conditions, militaries must rely on the joint efforts of all the service arms, thoroughly organize the coordination, form a composite strength, and coordinate uniformly the strikes against the enemy – then they can win a victory in a campaign or even a war.

I. Characteristics of Campaign Coordination...140

The multiplicity of modern campaign forces, the multidimensionality of the campaign battlefield, and the diversity of campaign activities have caused a campaign's coordinated operations to assume several new characteristics.

(1) Wide scope of coordination, with abundant content

First, from the battlefield space viewpoint, the campaign battlefield under high-tech localized war conditions is a 3-D battlefield comprised of a multidimensional space. The battlefield scope involves several domains – land, sea, air, space, and electromagnetic – and campaign coordination requires organization within a vast, multidimensional spatial scope, and objectively requires that the campaign commander and his command organ must control coordination of all domains involved with covering operational activities. Next, from the campaign forces viewpoint, due to the many participating service arms, campaign coordination in a modern campaign includes not only coordination among the many services, but also coordination between the regular forces and the regional People's Armed Police and militia. Third, from the viewpoint of campaign patterns and activities, in a modern campaign – and especially in the joint campaign – one campaign often includes coordination among several different sub-campaigns. For example, in an amphibious landing campaign, normally required is coordination among campaign patterns – organization of an air defense campaign, an air offensive campaign, and a naval blockade or offensive. This inevitably requires that the campaign commander must both organize the coordination among many campaign patterns and activities, and coordinate activities among all of the services. In addition, also required is organization of coordination between operational forces and support forces; coordination between regular forces and the regional forces, as well as irregular forces; and coordination among specialized arms and special operations and the various campaign activities; etc. In sum, modern campaign coordination has increasingly assumed the notable characteristics of extensiveness, diversity, and complexity.

(2) Frequent transitions in the coordination relationships, and high time effectiveness

In a localized-war campaign under information technology (IT) conditions {xinxi jishu tiaojianxia}, due to the rapid transitions between the various operational phases, the various campaign patterns exhibit frequent transitions, and the coordination relationships inevitably also change with the constant adjustments. In the campaign development process, the status and roles of the various services in the different campaign phases and

different campaign patterns show differences, added to which are differences in the operational goals and centers of gravity of the campaign's various phases; the services assuming the main mission are also constantly shifting, causing the overall status of each service during a campaign to constantly undergo changes, and the coordination relationships to be constantly adjusted. The primary-secondary relationship of the various services in coordinated operations constantly shifts, following the transitions between campaign phases and shifts in campaign patterns, so that sometimes the Army has the primary status, while at other times the Navy, Air Force, or Missile Forces will be primary. For example, in the early operational phase of an amphibious landing campaign, the campaign's primary mission is to seize battlefield information superiority, air superiority, and command of the seas, and to paralyze the enemy operational system. During this phase, one should respectively organize the coordination with the Missile Forces and Air Force, as well as the Navy, as primary. During the crossing phase, the campaign's primary mission is to safely and smoothly cross the Strait, so that the Navy should be primary in organization of coordination. Then, during the amphibious landing operational phase, the campaign's primary mission is to seize a landing site, so that the Army should be primary in organization of coordination. The course and tempo of a campaign under IT conditions are constantly accelerating, and the various coordination relationships form rapidly and dissolve just as rapidly, causing the shifts in the various coordination relationships of modern campaign operations to trend even more toward greater frequency.

High time effectiveness is another important characteristic of campaign coordination under IT conditions. With the widespread use of high-tech arms – especially information weaponry and IT – in operations, the military operational preparation and long-range maneuver time has greatly decreased, campaign C2 and rapid response capability have greatly improved, and the time for the entire campaign's operations has greatly shortened. One campaign, and even one war, lasts from several days to several tens of days; campaign battles are instantaneous, and can even determine the winning or losing of the entire war. Added to this are the fast changing battlefield situation and fleeting opportunities for battle. Hence, in a modern campaign, the time usable for organizing and implementing campaign coordination has decreased even more. If all activities of coordinated operations cannot be completed in good time, or even are slightly delayed, it could bring about enormous harm to the entire operation's activities. Therefore, one must within a finite time simplify the coordination procedures and links, clarify the documents, and as much as possible adopt automated means of coordination and control, achieve effective use of every second, and rapidly and precisely organize and coordinate well each campaign activity; otherwise, the situation could lead to loss of the entire campaign.

(3) Stringent requirements on coordination, and a high degree of difficulty

In a modern campaign, especially the joint campaign, coordination is not only coordination between one service and another service, but also often involves issues of cooperation and coordination in many fields, such as national politics, foreign relations, and economics. Hence, campaign coordination is not only a matter for headquarters

officers, but also an important matter that must be personally organized and followed with interest by a campaign commander at each level. Moreover, modern campaign coordination not only has much content, but also a complex relationship composition. The operational activities in a certain service or a certain area are compositionally interrelated to the operational activities of the many other services and many other fields, and have a cross-coordination relationship to them. In particular, the application of large numbers of high-tech weapons in campaign operations, and the omnibearing, highly 3-D, all-day modernized reconnaissance systems and precision guided munitions (PGMs) have accelerated campaign operational tempos, have greatly improved precision strike capabilities, have caused myriad changes in the battlefield situation, and have created fleeting opportunities for battle. Campaign coordination must achieve precision, timeliness, flexibility, and continuousness, in order to ensure the smooth execution of campaign operations. In the early 1980s, the U.S. military compiled statistics on the reasons for accidental injuries caused during its major conflicts; 45% of these injuries were caused by coordination problems, and 26% were caused by target identification mistakes. Target ID in fact also belongs among coordination problems, so that we can take the total of these two factors, 71%. During the Gulf War, accidental casualties from coordination represented 29% and accidental casualties from target ID represented 39%, thus reaching 68% for the total of the two factors.

(4) Intense countermeasures to coordination, and its easy sabotage {pohuai}

In a modern campaign, the opposing sides not only fully emphasize the overall power that can be brought into play on their sides by operational coordination, but at the same time also extraordinarily stress use of a variety of means and adoption of a variety of methods to sabotage the enemy's operational coordination, and thereby disrupt the tempo of the enemy's activities, and cripple or reduce the enemy's operational capability. In future campaign operations, the opposing sides will launch intense countermeasures centering on coordination and counter-coordination operations, and the two sides' operational coordination at all times has the possibility of meeting with sabotage. In particular, when there is a wide gap between the opposing sides in high-tech weaponry, the enemy's counter-coordination facing the side in the weaker position will be more prominent, and the difficulties will be greater. If one does not adopt practical and effective measures to overcome the enemy's counter-coordination, one's own coordinated operations will be difficult to execute; and this point was driven home in extremely prominent fashion during the Gulf War.

Due to the use in war of large numbers of high-tech weapons – especially the omnibearing, highly 3-D, all-weather modernized reconnaissance systems – one can over all battlefield spaces seek out and find C2 systems. Adding to this is the increased strike range of modern PGMs, with a precision that has now risen to the meter level. All this enables one to conduct precision strikes against point targets in the full depth of the battlefield. Once command organs and coordination and communications facilities are discovered, they in fact are faced with the danger of being destroyed. The opposing sides can also employ devastating campaign firepower, to effect battlefield interdiction, cut

apart the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition, block the enemy's rear support for his forward forces, and sabotage their mutually coordinated operations. In addition, modern campaign coordination mainly is accomplished via signal communications, especially radio communications, while a major deficiency of technically complex, variegated communications equipment is that it easily meets with jamming and damage. The use of large quantities of electronic warfare (EW) weapons has exposed campaign coordination to greatly increased jamming and threat levels from soft-kill means. High-intensity, long-duration, large-area electronic suppression and jamming will cause command and communications equipment to lose effect, and even if it is not destroyed, it will have practically no effect. Hence, in the intense EW environment, C2 and coordinated communications will appear totally vulnerable.

II. Principles of Campaign Coordination...143

A modern campaign operations system is a huge and complex system. One must comply with the principles of system theory, and must scientifically, thoroughly, and meticulously organize campaign coordination, so that all of the "components" in this system mutually cooperate, mutually coordinate, functionally complement one another, and produce a synergistic effect where "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts." To achieve this synergistic effect, when organizing campaign coordination, one must adhere to the following principles.

(1) Integrated-whole adjusting coordination {zhengti xietiao}

Integrated-whole adjusting coordination refers to the campaign commander and his command organ, by setting out from the campaign overall situation and centering on the general campaign missions, the macroscopic adjusting coordination and control conducted over the entire course of a campaign for the activities of the campaign strengths of all services and arms, the various campaign patterns, each campaign battlefield, and each campaign direction. Integrated-whole adjusting coordination is the first principle of modern campaign coordination. Hence, in campaign guidance, one must seek overall effects, and combine forces to subdue the enemy. If overall one cannot achieve thorough, effective coordination, then even if one achieves good coordination over individual activities, one will be unable to produce a decisive effect on the overall situation—partial or localized coordination cannot replace coordination over the overall situation. What is stressed in the word "integrated" {yiti} in the U.S. military's new operational theory "air/ground/sea/space integrated operations" is the overall problem; "integration" {yiti} is achieved via close coordination. Also, the Russian military's combined operations principles point out: "Coordinated actions which coordinate uniformly the use of all services and specialized forces, and which ensure that their mutual coordination is maintained, are one of the basic conditions for seizing victory in modern operations." The PLA has always stressed integrated-whole coordinated operations {zhenti xietong zuozhan}, and under modern conditions, the PLA campaign's basic guidance thought with respect to emphasis on "integrated-whole" {zhengti} has become more prominent.

To implement integrated-whole adjusting-coordination, first, based on the general campaign mission, one must make unified overall planning arrangements for all campaign activities over the campaign's entire course. One must scientifically and rationally assign missions to many types of strengths – the participating Army, Navy, Air Force, and Missile Forces, as well as the local People's Armed Police and the masses – according to the characteristics and strengths of each, and based on the overall campaign objective. Secondly, one must conduct unified overall planning of the *guihua* planning {tongchou guihua} for the campaign phases and determine the coordination relationships among the various campaign strengths. One must proceed from the actual requirements of the campaign's overall situation and course, carefully divide the campaign phases, and clearly determine the main-secondary status for all campaign forces in each operational phase, and their coordination relationships. Normally, one should organize and implement adjusting coordination mainly of the campaign strengths or groupings assuming and executing the main missions. Third, one must organize full-course regulating and controlling. This means that during the entire course of the campaign, the campaign command organ must, based on the coordination plan, supervise and push forward all of the participating forces in their execution and fulfillment of the coordination plan {jihua}, so as to maintain overall adjusting coordination of all battlefields and of various operational activities. When a major disaster appears in campaign development, the campaign commander and his command organ must adhere to the changing situation, center on the general campaign intention, and conduct adjusting coordination at the right time for the various operational activities by all strengths in each of the battlefield spaces in order to form a new integrated-overall coordination.

(2) Give prominence to key points

Giving prominence to key points is coordination organized and implemented on the basis of an integrated overall coordination, and tightly centering on the campaign operational centers of gravity. Modern campaign coordination has a wide content and many layers; only by distinguishing the primary and secondary, concentrating on links and prominent key points, and placing the coordination centers of gravity in activities which have the most decisive significance for the campaign's overall situation, can one see that the overall campaign will maintain orderly, high-efficiency operations, and thus ensure the campaign's smooth development.

To implement key-point coordination, first, one must organize coordination with a campaign operation's main mission as the key point. The general mission {zong renwu} in a single campaign operation contains various different specific missions. Some of these different specific missions {juti renwu} play a critical role in achieving the general mission. These specific missions that have a major effect on a campaign's overall situation should become the focal points {jiaodian} to be followed with interest and the key points {zhongdian} for organizing coordination by a campaign commander and command organ. Only by centering on the main missions and successfully organizing the coordination between the campaign strengths, battlefield spaces and campaign activities, allowing the participating services and arms or the groupings to standardize their own

activities by centering on the campaign's main missions, and undergoing the completion of predetermined missions by the respective services in order to ensure the campaign activities of the other services, can one ultimately achieve the campaign general goal {zong mudi}. Second, one must organize coordination by centering on the service or group playing the leading role in campaign operations as the key point. Modern campaign operations normally are joint operations conducted by all services and arms. Although all the services in a campaign are on an equal footing and none are subordinate to the other, the status and role of each service – in the various patterns, phases and times of campaign operations – are distinguished as primary or secondary. Only by organizing and implementing key-point coordination with the service playing a leading role in a campaign operation as the key point, can one bring into play the optimal effectiveness of this coordination during an operation, and better realize the optimal overall effects of the various forces. Third, one must organize coordination with the main battlefield and the main campaign activity as the key points. Modern campaign battlefields normally include a land battlefield, sea battlefield, air battlefield, electromagnetic battlefield, and space battlefield; and during an entire campaign operation, although they are an indivisible organic whole, the status and role of each battlefield and each campaign activity in the different campaign patterns show differences. For example, when waging a naval blockade campaign, the sea battlefield and sea-campaign operational activities will become key points for coordination; when conducting urban offensive and border counterattack campaigns, the land battlefield and land-campaign operational activities become key points for coordination. Hence, doing well in coordination must be based on the campaign's actual requirements, and must all along be centered on the main battlefield and the main campaign activity. Fourth, one must organize coordination with the campaign's main phase and key times as the key points. Different campaign phases and operational times play different roles in a campaign's overall situation, so only by organizing coordination centering on the main operational phase and time key points can one forcefully promote the campaign's smooth development. Fifth, one must organize coordination centering on special lethal, destructive {shashang pohuaixing} weapons. In a modern campaign, large numbers of special lethal, destructive weapons will have widespread applications on the battlefield, which will have a major impact on a campaign's course and outcome. With special lethal, destructive weapons as primary, one should do a good job of coordination and cooperation with and among the other campaign activities, in the areas of the order of activities and exploitation of operational results.

(3) Precise plans {jihua}

Precise plans are the precise calculations and arrangements made for the participating force strengths and weaponry by the campaign commander and command organ, based on the modern campaign characteristics of fast operational tempo, surprise activities, and precision firepower strikes. In campaign operations under IT conditions, the application of the various operational forces is becoming finer and finer, and only when the mutual coordination among the various activities in an operation is right on the mark can coordination be truly achieved. In particular, the use of precision-strike munitions places more stringent requirements on the degree of precision of coordinated operations. If all of

the activities in a coordinated operation cannot attain a high degree of precision, the realization of the superior performance of high-tech weaponry could be severely impacted.

Implementation of precise-plan coordination first requires that a campaign commander and his command organ, based on the operational characteristics of the various service arms and on the different functions and requirements of the weaponry, must precisely plan and organize the coordination among the various campaign forces, and see that the coordinated activities of all weapon systems and all operational forces in the different operational spaces are right on the mark. Second, it requires full use of IT means and CASs to effect coordination, so as to improve the precision of coordination. Third, it requires that via coordinated drills among the various campaign forces, so that the operational characteristics and requirements are mutually understood among all of the services' participating forces, the commanders can master mutually coordinated operational procedures and methods, see that all coordinated activities achieve a high degree of precision and consistency, and ensure the high effectiveness of coordinated operations.

Organizing modern campaign coordination, besides upholding the above principles, also requires that – via strict campaign coordination discipline to ensure the thorough execution of the orders, instructions, and coordinated plans of the campaign commander and their coordination elements – the smooth realization of a coordinated operation among all the service arms is assured.

(4) Continuous {bujianduan} flexibility

Continuous flexibility means that under informationized conditions, several characteristics – a changeable campaign battlefield situation, a frequently varying coordination relationship, and poor coordination stability – not only require efforts to overcome all difficulties and obstacles, and to achieve firm and unshakable coordination per the plan, but also require that when the situation undergoes a major change, ad hoc {suiji} coordination is flexibly and constantly effected, so as to maintain stable and uninterrupted coordination. Whether a campaign commander, based on developing changes in the battlefield situation, can effect flexible and continuous coordination is of the utmost importance to a campaign's smooth execution and even to the accomplishment of the predetermined campaign objective(s).

Implementation of flexible, continuous coordination in one sense requires embodying flexibility toward adjustment of campaign coordination. Thus, when drafting a coordination plan in advance, one should as much as possible conduct a comprehensive analysis and estimate of major situations that may arise during the campaign course, as well as of coordination changes that may occur, and should formulate a variety of coordination proposals, so that the coordination plan {jihua} has a certain capacity to meet an emergency. However, since there is always a certain disparity between the subjective and the objective, added to which is the complex and changeable battlefield

situation under informationized conditions, coordination plans drafted in advance, even if they are numerous, cannot exhaust all situations that arise in the full course of a campaign. Hence, coordination for the various situations in the plan cannot be specified to death; one must leave some room for adjustment and alteration, and prevent an excessive disparity between the changes in the actual situation and the advance plan, since such a disparity introduces difficulty in adjustment of the coordination plan. In another sense, this implementation requires embodying timeliness toward the regulation of ad hoc coordination. This means implementing timely and effective coordination and control over the operational activities of all participating forces, based on the situation suddenly arising on the battlefield. Under IT conditions, even with a coordination plan carefully prepared before battle, it is difficult to anticipate every fast-changing situation on the battlefield. Hence, the campaign commander and his command organ certainly must enhance battlefield monitoring, promptly acquire battlefield information, resolutely make decisions based on the developing changes in the battlefield situation, rapidly make new decisions, promptly adjust or organize new coordination, assure the uninterrupted coordination of activities among all the campaign forces, and ensure the smooth conduct of the campaign.

(5) Complementary initiative

Complementary initiative means bringing the subjective dynamic nature of participating force-units into play by setting out from the overall situation and centering on unified campaign objectives to actively complement each other and in close coordination. A modern campaign normally is a joint operation that is implemented together by provisionally organized all-services and arms. Since all of the services have equal status, and since operations have a relatively independent nature, there isn't a leading or being lead relationship amongst them. Adding to this is the intense confrontation between coordination and counter-coordination in campaign engagements, the coordinated operations are easily disrupted, thereby if all of the participating strengths cannot coordinate with initiative and closely complement one other, it will be very difficult to form and maintain a consistent adjusting-coordination of campaign activities.

In implementing coordination with initiative, first one must strengthen the sense of the overall situation. In a localized war campaign under informationized conditions, enhancing the sense of the overall situation is extremely important to coordinated operations. This is because the modern campaign normally are joint operational activities of all the services, and in such joint operational activities there is no single service or arm which can fulfill the mission by itself; one must rely on the close cooperation of all the service arms in order to be able to win victory. Hence, the commander of the participating services and arms and his force-units cannot observe and handle the problem of coordinated operations solely from the viewpoint of their own service or their own arm, but instead must set out from the campaign's overall situation, so that the overall situation's benefit is their own service's benefit, so that triumph in the overall situation is the triumph of their own service. Second, one must strengthen the awareness coordination with initiative. Participating services and arms still with only an insufficient

sense of the overall situation must also promptly and accurately fulfill their own mission per the requirements of the coordination plan, and simultaneously must with active initiative closely cooperate with the force-units of the other services and arms; in particular, during major activities affecting victory or defeat in the campaign, they must call forth all their energy, must have no fear of sacrificing their own local benefit, and must have the courage and resolve to ensure that the entire campaign's activities are smoothly conducted. Third, one must restore coordination with initiative. In campaign operations, cutting off of command communications and disruption to coordination are commonly occurring events, so restoring coordination with initiative is an important assurance for maintaining uninterrupted coordination. When command communications are cut-off and coordination is disrupted, all force-units should take the initiative to conduct inter-connectivity according to the coordination plan, actively adopt various measures and flexibly apply various modes and methods to restore coordinated activities with initiative.

III. Content, Procedures, and Modes of Campaign Coordination...147

(1) Content of campaign coordination

The content of modern campaign coordination is quite large, but mainly has the following six aspects:

1. Coordination among all of the campaign groups (large formations). Examples include coordination between a campaign's main attack group and holding group {zhu gong jituan}, between a ground offensive group and an airborne assault group, between a fighter group and a group holding off enemy reinforcements, between an Army campaign large formation and an Air Force campaign large formation and Navy campaign large formation, as well as with a 2nd Artillery Corps campaign large formation (land-based forces). The campaign commander should clarify the missions of all campaign groups (large formations) and the coordination relationships among all campaign groups (large formations).

2. Coordination among the various campaign patterns. In particular, this is coordination in a large-scale joint campaign, and includes a series of sub-campaigns, such as the theater-direction joint campaign and service (combined) campaign of all the services, as well as the campaign conducted in an independent direction. The campaign commander and campaign command organ should successfully organize and implement the coordination of the direction, time, and forces used among this series of campaigns, so that all of the campaign patterns are tightly linked, and form an integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli}.

3. Coordination among all battlefields and among the different campaign directions. Modern campaign battlefield spaces are expansive; the battlefield scope includes the land battlefield, air battlefield, sea battlefield, and even the space battlefield. The land battlefield also includes the frontline battlefield, depth battlefield, flank battlefield, and

enemy rear battlefield. A single theater-level joint campaign also includes several campaign directions. Hence, the campaign commander, setting out from a focus on the campaign's overall situation, should successfully organize and coordinate the campaign activities on all battlefields and in the various campaign directions, see that they can mutually cooperate, assist one another, and center on conducting the coordinated, uniform activities of the campaign's overall goal.

4. Coordination among the various campaign phases. In a modern campaign, due to its huge scale, the many participating service arms, the many campaign patterns, the expansive battlefield, and its relatively long duration, the campaign is normally divided into several campaign phases for execution. The campaign commander should organize and coordinate well the various campaign phases, especially the activities of all the service arms' various forces during the transitions between campaign phases, so that a previous phase will create favorable conditions for activities in a later phase, and should tightly interlink the later phase with the earlier phase, so that the entire campaign's operations can smoothly move forward according to the plan, divided into steps, and in rhythmic fashion.

5. Coordination among special weapons, special operations, and the various campaign patterns. A campaigns under informationized conditions will widely employ several special weapons and special forces to execute special operations, striking at the enemy's key links (command systems, firepower systems, logistics systems, EW systems, etc.), so as to weaken and paralyze the enemy. Hence, the campaign commander should emphasize coordination among special weapons and special operations and the various other campaign activities, and see that the use of special weapons and special operational activities not only can bring into play the maximum combat effectiveness, but also can maintain close coordination with the various operational activities.

6. Coordination between operations and various types of support. In a modern campaign, due to the intensity of high-tech countermeasures and the enormous depletion of various kinds of materiel and equipment, the fulfillment of an operational mission increasingly relies upon timely, stable support. The campaign commander must show concern for coordination between operations and the various types of support, carefully organize well the coordination between campaign operations and campaign support, and see that the various types of support can fit with and satisfy the requirements for campaign operations, so as to ensure the smooth execution of the campaign.

(2) Procedures and modes of campaign coordination.

1. Coordination procedures

Coordination procedures mean the steps taken for all the campaign-participating services, under a unified plan, in order to achieve coordinated cooperation in their mutual operational activities.

Coordination in a modern campaign, especially the joint campaign, is hierarchically arranged, and generally includes two administrative levels: overall situation quality {quanjuxing} coordination and localized quality {jubuxing} coordination. Hence, when organizing modern campaign coordination, one must distinguish these administrative levels, and carry out [the coordination] from top to bottom, and level by level.

Overall situation quality coordination refers to the overall-situation quality and full course-quality integrated-whole {zhengti} coordination implemented over the campaign by the campaign's highest commander and his command organ. The content of this coordination includes coordination among all campaign phases, among all battlefields, among all campaign forces, among all campaign patterns or activities, and between operations and support. To use the joint campaign as an example, methods for overall situation quality coordination normally take the campaign phases (course) as the axis and the campaign mission as the core, and combine certain spaces and times to organize the overall-planning {chouhua} and what is specifically implemented. Overall situation quality coordination plans are the joint consultations and deliberations {yanjiu nizhi} between the campaign large formation's Chief of Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of all the participating services with associated personnel, conducted after the campaign commander sets the campaign resolution, and clearly stated to all the participating service commanders called together by the campaign's highest commander. A campaign commander and command organ must concentrate energy on grasping overall situation coordination. They must focus on clearly differentiating each of the campaign phases, and on the main missions of each service's campaign forces in each phase; they must clearly specify the status and coordination relationship of all campaign forces in each operational phase; and they must clarify the principles, requirements, and methods of mutual coordination.

Localized coordination refers to coordination organized and implemented for a specific phase, a specific battlefield or direction, and/or a specific activity of the campaign. Normally, after the campaign commander makes the campaign resolution, appoints the campaign coordination staff, and clearly states the overall situation-coordination plan, a delegate(s) sent from the campaign large formation – or the service commanders appointed responsible for one phase, one battlefield or one direction, or one activity's major operational mission – will assemble the commanders of the services involved with supporting and coordinating the operation, plus related personnel, for joint consultations and deliberations to formulate a specific local coordination plan. The local coordination must specifically make clear the activities' sequence, area(s), and method(s), for each participating force in each operational time, as well as the targets for the activities' results; at the same time, it must also clarify each type of support measure, as well as the command relationship, the methods for signal communications, mutual identification, and mutual support and coordination, and the measures for adjustment and recovery when coordination is lost or disrupted, and also fix the associated coordination signals (signs).

A campaign commander and command organ, at the same time as they are overall planning and organizing the implementation of campaign overall situation coordination, the following steps are performed:

First is partitioning of the coordination phases. Campaign coordination phases are the phase partitions made for the course of a coordinated operation. In partitioning coordination phases, the goals are – based on the laws of a campaign operation’s own development – to have focused coordination of campaign forces, to control campaign tempo, to have orderly step-by-step organization of campaign coordination, and to gradually realize the campaign’s overall objective. A campaign coordination phase generally is mutually consistent with a campaign operational phase, and the mission of its coordination is mutually consistent with the operational goal of that phase. Partitioning of campaign coordination phases is not fixed unchangeably; when a campaign commander is overall planning the campaign and setting its resolution, he must – based on estimates conducted over the campaign’s full course of development, and according to the campaign intention, the enemy situation, the battlefield posture, and the conditions of the troops – determine the differentiation of the campaign coordination phases. Different conditions can have different partitions [of coordination phases]; the amount does not matter, nor does the level of detail. To make the coordination clearer and more specific, normally one can also further partition each phase of campaign coordination into several operational times, but such partitioning generally is only suited to a campaign’s local coordination. In a modern campaign, and especially a joint campaign, the participating forces are numerous, the scale is relatively large, and the battlefield situation is changeable; so, in order that a campaign can have a relatively strong basing in principle {yuanzexing} and flexibility, during overall planning {chouhua} of campaign overall situation coordination, generally one does not further partition the coordination phases or times into smaller segments. Hence, based on the requirements of different coordination levels, good partitioning of the campaign coordination phases is the basis and a prerequisite for maintaining close coordination among all the service arms and ensuring that a campaign operation is smoothly executed.

Second is specification of a coordinated mission. An operational mission or objective is the basic foundation for a campaign commander and command organ to formulate a campaign plan {jihua} and organize campaign coordination. An operational mission is the core of campaign coordinated operations; it not only has a major constraining effect on the various operational activities of all the participating forces in each space, but also determines the status of all the forces in the campaign operation, as well as the mutual coordination relationships among them. Hence, no matter whether in a campaign’s overall situation coordination or in its localized coordination, only by implementing it via tight centering on the operational mission can it be advantageous to a clear statement of the coordination relationship, advantageous to formation of an integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli}, and advantageous to realization of the campaign goal.

Campaign missions include the overall mission and specific missions. The overall mission is the overall goal that must be reached in the overall campaign, and is the core in

organizing campaign overall situation coordination. The specific missions signify the results or targets that must be reached in the operational activities of each campaign phase. Specification of coordinated missions means that – based on partitioning of the campaign coordination phases – the campaign large formation commander and command organ will, according to the campaign’s overall mission, unify and clarify the specific missions of each service in each campaign phase. First, they must clearly state the specific missions of the services executing the main campaign missions in each campaign phase, and, based on a campaign objective that must be reached in a certain campaign phase, centering on the requirements of the operational activities of the services supporting and cooperating in the execution of the main mission, clearly state the specific missions of the other services, so that the missions of all services will – in terms of targets, spaces, and times – form a mutually complementary supportive and cooperative relationship.

Third is clarification of the coordination relationship. This means determination of the mutual support/cooperative relationships among all the services in each campaign phase. In the relatively large-scale campaign operations executed under modern conditions, each campaign coordination phase’s operational activities cannot be conducted completely by a single service. Some can be conducted primarily by one service, with the other services cooperating in conducting a combined operation; but what normally occurs will be a joint campaign mutually conducted by all the service arms. Thus, not only is there the problem of how to coordinate the other services’ operations when one service is primary, there is also the coordination problem during activities in which a variety of forces center on a unified objective. When organizing overall situation coordination, one must – with a focus on clarifying the coordination relationship – make a unified clear statement and specification of each service’s activities. Campaign directors should, based on the coordinated objective of each phase of the campaign, determine which services and how many forces will participate, and which service will assume the main operational mission. On this basis, with the service executing the main mission as primary, they then make clear the primary-secondary relationship for coordination of all participating services. Taking island and coastal-area operations as examples, under the usual conditions, in the blockade and counter-blockade operational phases, with the Navy as primary, the other services cooperate or assist in the operation; in the air-raid and counter-air-raid operational phases, with the Air Force as primary, the other services similarly will assist [or] cooperate in the operation; in the amphibious-landing and on-island maneuver operational phases, with the Army as primary, the other services will assist [or] cooperate in the operation. After the coordination relationship is clarified, the campaign commander should authorize the service that will assume the main campaign operational mission, present a specific operational activity COA for the phase, and be responsible for specific planning, preparation, and organization of the operational coordination for that phase. At times, even though the primary and secondary services do not at all comprise a commanding-to-commanded relationship, once the coordination relationship and plan {*jihua*} are formed, the secondary service must – per the overall coordination objective and requirements – actively and initiatively center on the primary service’s launching of the activity. Thus, having established the top-to-bottom coordination relationship, and having clarified the mission of this coordination relationship, the opportunity and

methods for coordination are relatively principle-based; a fairly large selection margin and flexibility remain for localized coordination, which is advantageous to strengthening the coordinated activities of all the participating services, and advantageous to arousing the subjective initiative and enthusiasm of commanders at all levels.

Fourth is partitioning of the operational areas and sequence of activities. This means the specification made by campaign commander and command organ – based on partitioning of the coordination phases, clarification of the coordination mission, and specification of the coordination relationship – for the spatial range and time of each phase’s activities for each service or group. Partitioning of the spatial range for the operations of a service or group should involve – based on the requirements for 3-D operations and the characteristics of each service – rational partitioning of each service’s or group’s operational area, as much as possible avoiding the creation of accidental injuries and interplay, fully bringing into play the strengths of each service in the different battlefield spaces, and forming from the activities of each space’s battlefield a good relationship marked by mutual assistance, mutual cooperation, and mutual complementarities. Since a modern campaign fuses the various operations into a whole, the times for the activities often have an intersecting quality; this requires – via scientific calculation and specification of a prioritized sequence for each service’s or group’s execution of an operational mission, and of a time limit for completing the mission – achieving mutual coordination and close linkup among the various operational activities, and preventing the occurrence of deviation. Specification of the times for each service’s or group’s activities should – based on the characteristics of each service and the requirements for target strikes – be implemented in an ordered, tightly interlinked way. At the same time, it requires having remedial measures when a loss of coordination occurs, and requires enhancement of ad hoc coordination and command during activities, so as to prevent accidents or the unexpected.

Fifth is organization of coordination transitioning. Coordination transitioning refers to the process of changes and linkup in the coordination relationship. During the campaign execution process, transitioning of campaign coordination in a planned, smooth fashion is of the utmost importance to the initiative-oriented, planned use and transport of forces, and to the development of a campaign victory. Hence, good campaign coordination transitioning has become a critical link in campaign execution and coordinated operations. A commander and command organ at each level, when organizing campaign coordination transitioning, must fully grasp the following three points:

First, they must anticipate trends in coordination transitioning. The sufficient and also necessary anticipation of transitioning of operational coordination means that, with this anticipation, they can in a prepared and organized fashion realize this change, promptly convert to new campaign coordination, and strive for the battlefield initiative. First of all, they must accurately analyze and decide whether the campaign’s current mission has been basically completed, and whether the objective basically reached. In general terms, a campaign objective that is basically reached refers to that the current operational coordination is about to end. Next, they must accurately analyze and decide whether the

enemy forces have undergone a fairly large change. In a campaign, if the enemy forces suffer major losses, or the campaign *bushi* disposition has been disrupted, it is very difficult to continue countermeasures, and the situation inevitably turns into a rout. Conversely, if the enemy is tending toward an advantageous situation, he will surely adopt a new major activity. No matter what kind of situation appears, it always presages the arrival of a new operational phase or coordination. Then, they must accurately analyze and decide whether the war situation has undergone a qualitative change. This means whether the posture assumed by the opposing sides in the campaign's overall situation and the contradictory leading aspects have undergone fundamental changes, and whether the opposing sides have fallen into a passive, unfavorable position – these will presage that a new operational phase and a new coordinated activity will soon begin.

The second point is that they must fully seize the opportunities for coordination transitioning. An opportunity for campaign coordination transitioning should not be too early or too tardy. If too early, the requirements are not satisfied, and preparations will be insufficient; this is unfavorable both to fulfillment of the previous coordination phase mission and to the unfolding of the next coordination phase mission. If too tardy, then the effective value of the favorable conditions will have already fallen, even to the point where new unfavorable factors can appear, and this is precisely the lost opportunity for battle we often talk about. In general terms, a favorable opportunity for transitioning coordinated operations is the following: our side has basically completed the current mission and has basically done a good job of preparing the transition, and simultaneously has basically ascertained the intention of the enemy's next phase. At such time, if our side can promptly transition the campaign coordination relationship, then we can strive for the advantage of the first opportunity, and find ourselves in a favorable position.

The third point: they must meticulously organize the transitioning of coordination. First, the campaign commander – based on the latest trend in the current war situation's development – must study, adjust, and revise the operation and the coordination plan {*jihua*}; be able at the necessary time to convene an operations conference; formulate a new operational coordination plan; and see that all the participating services and arms or campaign groups can properly carry out well all the preparatory work for transitioning a coordinated operation – in terms of thought, organization, and operational strengths. Next, they must promptly adjust the mission and *bushi* disposition of each service arm and campaign group, further specify and clarify the new operational objective and coordination relationship, and use a small part of the forces to continue execution of the current mission, pin down the enemy, cover the main groups' rapid *bushu* disposition and begin to enter a new coordinated operation phase. Then, they must scientifically determine and carefully organize the precedence for every service arm's or group's coordination transition, do well in the linkup of campaign coordination, gradually complete the transition into the new coordination relationship, and see that the coordinated transitioning activities for the entire campaign's overall situation are conducted all in good order without confusion.

2. Coordination modes

In campaign operations under IT conditions, mastery and good use of the modes of coordination, and a thorough understanding of the procedures and methods of coordination, have effects of the utmost importance on improving operational command effectiveness, and giving full play to the overall power of all the participating service arms. Coordination modes signify the organizational forms {zuzhi xingshi} adopted by all the campaign participating services, under a unified plan {jihua}, for the purpose of achieving coordinated cooperation in their mutual operational activities. The coordination modes of a modern campaign mainly include three types: conference coordination, plan coordination, and ad hoc (emergency) coordination.

(i) Conference coordination is coordination organized in conference form by the campaign commander using maps or sand tables. Conference coordination normally is personally organized by the campaign's highest commander, who assembles each participating service's or group's principals, and, based on the campaign resolution, clarifies on the spot the coordination relationship in the major operations. On this basis, the commanders of each service and group further propose views and recommendations for coordination. Then, after joint coordination, the final verdict is given by the campaign commander. Conference coordination has the quality of key-point coordination, and mainly resolves key-point and difficult-point problems in coordination.

(ii) Plan coordination is when the campaign Chief of Staff, based on the campaign commander's resolution or the coordination key points, assembles the Chiefs of Staff from all participating services and associated personnel for joint consultation on, and study and formulation of, a specifically detailed campaign coordination plan, which, after approval by the campaign commander, is transmitted to the troops for execution. A coordination plan normally – with the campaign phase (course) as the axis and the campaign mission as the core – is drafted by combining the corresponding spaces and times. The content of a coordination plan normally includes the following: partitioning of the campaign coordination phases (times) and the expectations of situations; the missions, order of activities, and activity spaces for each participating service and the region's various campaign forces in each operational phase (time), as well as targets for the activity results; the mutual coordination relationship and support measures among all the services; linking and transitioning of the coordination phases; and specification of coordination communications, identification, and signals (signs), as well as measures and methods for readjustment and recovery when coordination meet with disruption. Plan coordination modes are of two types: one is the tabular style (i.e. a coordination plan table), while the other type is the map notation style, which means plotting of the coordination plan on maps, and adding the corresponding written notes. A coordination plan should anticipate various COAs with respect to the enemy situation, but should have one basic COA among these.

(iii) Ad hoc (emergency) {lin ji} coordination is, during the campaign execution process, coordination organized at the time by the campaign commander and his

command organ on the basis of the battlefield situation. Ad hoc (emergency) coordination is a further perfection of and complement to the plan coordination. When the battlefield situation undergoes a major change, and when the originally set coordination plan no longer suits the new battlefield situation, one must resolutely alter the original coordination plan, and reorganize a new coordination. Organization of ad hoc (emergency) coordination requires having relatively strong foresight; when the battlefield shows a fairly large discrepancy from the anticipated situation or a change, the campaign commander and his command adjusting-coordination institution must then as much as possible and as early as possible implement ad hoc (emergency) coordination, and prevent the emergence of a passive [state]. The mode of organizing ad hoc (emergency) coordination is the instruction – via the battlefield ad hoc (emergency) command – to instruct each service and each group to adjust the original plan, and make clear the new coordinated activities and methods.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 6

Important Campaign Activities...155

In a modern campaign, the content of campaign activities is very broad. Of which the more important ones are: campaign information warfare, campaign firepower assault, campaign maneuver, campaign special operations and campaign psychological warfare. They exist in various campaign types and campaign patterns and permeate campaign operations from beginning to end. They have a significant effect on the progress and outcome of the campaign and they occupy an important position within the campaign.

Section 1: Campaign Information Warfare...155

Campaign information warfare refers to the comprehensive quality operational activities on the battlefield directed at the enemy's information detection sources, information channels and information processing and decision-making systems {xitong} and adopted with the aim of seizing and maintaining information superiority, disrupting the enemy's information control capabilities and at the same time maintaining one's own information control capabilities.

Information warfare is a new kind of comprehensive quality operational activity which is gradually forming along with the development of information technology under modern conditions. Since the 1970s, along with the massive military application of information technology, many new systems have emerged, including informationized operational platforms, precision guidance munitions, advanced electronic warfare weapons, night vision instruments, all-aspect, all-times of the day and all-weather reconnaissance, surveillance, detection, navigational guidance, and positioning systems, and especially in the use of C⁴I systems, which has integrated the intelligence, reconnaissance, communications, command, control and strikes on the battlefield, causing a qualitative leap forward in the status of information in warfare and becoming one of the decisive factors governing operational activities. Just as with materials, energy and information constituting the three main pillars of modern society and culture, under modern conditions, information together with campaign strengths, campaign time and campaign battlefield already constitute the four basic objective factors of a modern campaign. Among these four basic objective factors, battlefield information is the critical link that connects the campaign strengths and the other two factors. Only through having a grasp of battlefield information can the campaign director be able to govern the campaign strengths and utilize the time and space of battlefield. As demonstrated by the practice of localized wars that have erupted since the 1970s, whichever side is able to more timely, more accurately and more effectively gather, transmit, and utilize information will have more possibility in winning the war. Moreover, the side holding information dominance can also obtain an even higher operational cost-effectiveness ratio than in previous wars. Thus, seizing information superiority and depriving the enemy of its ability of controlling information has become the foremost mission of modern campaign operations.

Information warfare itself is not a goal but a means. Its objective is in the overall situation of campaign operations or at critical occasions and area, depriving the enemy of its right of gathering, controlling and using information to influence, weaken or even totally disrupt their capability for observing, decision-making, and commanding and controlling force-units, and maintaining one's own ability to command and control, seizing information superiority and thus forming strategic and campaign superiority in order to create conditions for winning a decisive engagement.

I. Main Characteristics of Campaign Information Warfare...156

(1) Information operations permeates through all domains and the entire course of a campaign

Activities of information operations affect and govern all domains of a modern campaign. In a modern campaign, because armed forces' weapons and equipment have basically already achieved becoming electronic, computerized, networked and systemized, the decision-making of the armed forces and all kinds of operational activities are highly dependent on prompt, accurate and uninterrupted information; if the campaign activities in any battlefield space are separated from the assisting-support and safeguarding-support of information, then one will not be able to gain success. Thus, the effect and control of information operations on a modern campaign is a cross spectrum quality, without information dominance, there is no space-, air-, sea- and land-dominance, and there is no campaign initiative.

Activities of information operations permeate the campaign from start to finish, and information warfare is the precursor in modern campaign activities. In past wars, the initiation of a campaign normally began with firepower strike, but under modern conditions, information attack has already become the indicator of the initiation of all campaign activities. A modern campaign frequently pulls open the curtain with electromagnetic — firepower assault with electronic warfare in the lead; the first strike targets of a campaign are no longer the enemy's heavy force groupings and artillery positions, but rather the enemy's information systems such as its detection, command and communications, to strive to deprive or weaken their capability of information control in one blow and create conditions for subsequent force-strength and firepower engagements. Information warfare during the campaign implementation process cannot be interrupted. Seizing and maintaining information dominance is a continuous process. On the one hand, all campaign activities must be conducted under the assisting support and safeguarding support of information operations; on the other, in order to resist the information attack of the enemy, one must implement uninterrupted information defense so as to ensure one's own side to have the capability to effectively gather, transmit, and use information until one gains victory in the entire campaign. Information warfare is also an important safeguarding-support for a smoothly and safely concluding a campaign. It is evident that information warfare exists in all times and domains of modern campaign operations.

(2) Information systems have become the foremost strike targets

Information systems mainly refer to the information detection sources, the information channels and information processing and decision-making centers of the armed forces. These constitute the three most basic links for gathering, distributing and using information, and they are also the foremost strike targets of information operations.

Information systems having become the foremost strike target of information operations mainly depends on the following three reasons: First, information systems are the “ears, eyes, brain and nerve center” of the modern armed forces and they are also the most vulnerable part of the entire operational system. Striking the enemy’s information systems genuinely carries out the war principle of *avoid the strong and attack the weak*. Secondly, the development {fazhan} of weapons and equipment provides ample conditions and means for striking the information systems of an armed forces. In the latter period of World War I, the British military theorist Fuller explicitly put forth the fighting method of “paralysis attack” (also called “decapitation attack”) with the enemy’s command system as the foremost attack target. However, due to the limitations of weapons and equipment technical levels, wanting to first attack the enemy’s information systems in past wars, particularly the command and communication system *bushu* disposed in the enemy’s campaign and strategic depth, was often a kind of wishful thinking. Under modern conditions, due to the rapid development of weapons and equipment and military information technology, on the one hand, the high-degree of becoming electronic by armed forces’ reconnaissance, communication and command systems has allowed military command and communication systems to be completely exposed to an opponent’s electromagnetic spectrum detection and attack and causing the past layer-by-layer protection formed by heavy force groupings to be defunct. On the other hand, the armed forces not only have all kinds of long-range reconnaissance systems and high-precision, long-range and high-lethality strike systems, but they are also equipped with a large quantity of new types of attack weapons—electronic warfare weapons. This allows for the armed forces to be able to directly attack the information systems in the enemy’s campaign and strategic depth during campaign operations completely without contacting the enemy’s operational force-units. A modern campaign starting with strikes on an opponent’s information systems has truly become a reality. Thirdly, first attacking the enemy’s information systems has become an operational method with most effectiveness, least losses and shortest consumption time. This method has changed the strike sequence against an enemy’s operational systems in the past from fighting from outside to inside to from inside to outside, and by directly striking the enemy systems’ “ears, eyes, brain and nerve center,” the enemy’s powerful force-strength groupings are paralyzed or deprived of its capability to organize resistance, thereby greatly reducing operational loss and campaign duration.

(3) High level of synthesis of operational modes and operational means

Information warfare is a highly synthesized operational activity. It contains a variety of operational modes such as intelligence warfare, electronic warfare, C⁴I countermeasure

warfare, special operations, psychological warfare, firepower warfare, etc., and a variety of operational means such as campaign deception, campaign feint, etc. It can be said that information warfare is a campaign operational activity with the strongest synthetic quality and widest coverage as well as one using the most operational modes and operational means.

Synthetic quality is one of most distinctive characteristics of information warfare because synthesis is a necessary condition that information warfare relies on to form and to exist. Information warfare is a new operational pattern put forth after the 1990s, but most of the operational factors it contains have existed since the localized wars of the 1970s, and some of the operational factors (such as intelligence warfare and operational deception, etc.) even appeared in ancient wars. However, these operational factors did not form information warfare for a long time, and the main reason for this is not because there weren't operational means and technical conditions for it, but rather because these operational factors did not center on the core of seizing battlefield information dominance to form synthesized, unified, and adjusting-coordinated operational activities. In past wars, they were often relatively and independently brought into play in a scattered state. The viewpoint of system theory acknowledges that the different composition of similar factors may form new systems and functionalities. Information warfare precisely synthesized the functionalities of operational factors in the past which already existed, those being to strike the enemy's information systems and to protect one's own information systems, all to form a kind of new synthetic quality operational pattern with seizing battlefield information dominance as its direct goal.

(4) Tightly combining information attack and information defense, and attack occupies the leading position

Information warfare is divided into the two categories of information attack and information defense. They are mutually supporting, mutually dependent, and one cannot have one without the other. Without information attack, one cannot deprive and weaken the enemy's ability for information control, and information defense will ultimately lose its function; similarly, without information defense, information attack cannot be smoothly implemented and one's own ability for information control will be lost. Therefore, in information warfare, one must tightly combine information attack and information defense and one cannot do one and neglect the other. This is different from traditional operational modes because information attack and information defense are not operational activities that are mutually replaceable and continuously transitioning. They accompany each other from start to finish and cannot be separated even for an instant.

Information attack occupies the leading position in the struggle for seizing information dominance. Information attack is an attack with initiative implemented against the enemy's information systems with means such as electromagnetic suppression, network attack, and firepower and force-strength assault. Information defense, on the other hand, is mainly the application of means such as secrecy and technical protection to protect one's own information systems from the enemy's interference and disruption. If it is

separated from information attack, information defense will play nearly no role against the enemy's information systems. Thus, only with information attack can one have the functionality of depriving and weakening the enemy's collection, transmission and use of information on the battlefield. This, therefore, decides that information attack has a decisive role in the struggle for seizing and maintaining information dominance.

II. Basic Categories and Patterns of Campaign Information Warfare...159

Information warfare is divided into two basic operational types: information attack and information defense.

(1) Information attack

Information attack is an operational activity to weaken and deprive the enemy of the ability for information control by attacking with initiative the enemy's information systems with various means. It is the main operational type for winning battlefield information warfare and seizing battlefield information dominance.

There are mainly four basic patterns of information attack, namely, electromagnetic attack, network attack, psychological attack and physical destruct (psychological attack is individually listed; please see campaign psychological warfare.)

Electromagnetic attack refers to applying electromagnetic spectrum weapons to suppress, jam and deceive the enemy's electronic equipment in order to cause their information systems and weapon systems to lose effectiveness {shiling} or to mislead them to make mistakes in judgments. Electromagnetic attack is not just limited to radio or radar frequencies as it also includes bringing into play the role of domains of optical, infrared and audio frequency weapons. Electromagnetic attack mainly has three operational activities: first is electronic reconnaissance. This is applying various electronic reconnaissance equipment and means in combination with other reconnaissance means to collect and ascertain the electromagnetic radiation signals from enemy's electronic equipment in order to gather intelligence such as technical parameters, locations and types, usage and working laws {guilyu} and to provide necessary information for electromagnetic attack. Second is electromagnetic suppression and jamming. Namely, this is, in a decisive direction and time, concentrating the use of electronic warfare force-strengths and instruments, releasing high-powered electromagnetic energy or jamming signals and conducting forceful suppression and jamming against the enemy's electronic equipment so as to render their electronic equipment functionality to be softened, lose effectiveness, or be paralyzed. Third is electromagnetic deception. This mainly is a comprehensive application of various electronic techniques and tactical means to provide false electromagnetic signals to the enemy and to mislead them so as to cause erroneous recognition and assessment of battlefield posture. Under modern conditions, in reality, electromagnetic attack has a disguised assault pattern, and to a certain extent, it has resulted in similar results as firepower assault. Electromagnetic attack is a main

operational pattern for seizing electromagnetic dominance and after that, for seizing information dominance.

Network attack refers to the invasive and disruptive activity of applying computer software technology and other network means against the core of the enemy's information systems — the computer and computer network systems. The command and control system of modern armed forces is actually a large computer network system that blends together all kinds of information detection, information transmission and information processing systems into one entity and is connected to civil networks, thus this objectively creates conditions for implementing network attack. There are two basic modes for implementing network attack: first is computer virus attack. Mainly, this is applying various modes to inject computer viruses into the enemy's computers and computer networks to attack the enemy's information system, contaminate useful information, barrage information channels and destroy system functionality at critical time opportunities and in critical parts. The second is "hacker" invasion. "Hacking" refers to computer experts who specialize in advanced code techniques. Through certain nodes of computer exchange networks, they can hopefully, with effort, enter encrypted level military or civilian information system and relevant databases. The biggest threat of the "hackers" to the enemy's command and control systems is in their ability to directly modify and use the enemy's information, resulting in putting the enemy in an extremely passive and unfavorable place: for example, stealing their information, and controlling the arteries of their activities; modifying their instruction information and making it follow one's own orders; revising critical data in the enemy's databases; destroying the enemy's command center and high-tech weapon systems, etc. Compared with other patterns of information attack, the objectives of network attack are more direct, more effective, less losses, and higher degree of concealment. The appearance of network attack puts information technology-developed countries in two difficult dilemmas. On the one hand, they must vigorously develop information technology to maintain their military superiority; but on the other hand, the more developed their information technology, the more tightly connected with the information of the whole world, which makes the protection of their information system weaker. Network attack will be one of the most effective means for armed forces in general terms of weapons and equipment inferiority to counter a strong military.

Physical destruction refers to employing "hard kill" means such as force-strengths, firepower and high energy weapons to destroy the enemy's command headquarters and command posts as well as the various kinds of hard facilities constituting military information systems. Compared with "soft kill" means such as electromagnetic attack and network attack, the strike results of physical destruction of the enemy's information systems are permanent unless the enemy re-organizes its command institutions or rebuilds its information systems. However, the organization and support of physical destruction operational activities are more complex and the manpower and material resources and costs are also very big. Based on the nature of the employment means, physical destruction is divided by mainly three modes: first is force-strength sudden-raid {tuxi}. This is organizing appropriate force-strengths to penetrate the enemy's campaign depth to demolish the enemy military's command institutions and C⁴I systems through

the mode of unorthodox raids or damage the enemy's information facilities. The most suited to shoulder the sudden-raid mission are special operations force-units and armed elements acting in the enemy's rear. Second is firepower assault. This is using artillery firepower, aviation force firepower and missiles to destroy the enemy's information systems. Campaign firepower under modern conditions possesses characteristics such as long range, high precision, high lethality, rapid response and small combat losses, and for this reason, it is the main mode for implementing physical destruction against the enemy's information systems. Third is physical destruction by high energy weapons, especially by precision guidance munitions (including anti-radiation missiles). This is mainly using electromagnetic pulse weapons, laser weapons, microwave radiation weapons, and particle beam weapons, etc. Through release of high energy, they puncture or burn-destroy the enemy's information systems or the electronic equipment components within the weapon system and thus causing the loss of work effectiveness.

(2) Information defense

Information defense is an operational activity of using all kinds of means to prevent one's own information systems from being gathered and used by the enemy, to protect one's information systems from being sabotaged by the enemy, and to maintain one's own ability for information control. Information defense is an important operational type for winning battlefield information warfare and seizing battlefield information dominance.

There are four basic patterns of information defense: electromagnetic protection, network protection, physical protection, and information intelligence protection.

Electromagnetic protection is the measure and activity adopted to withstand the enemy's implementation of electromagnetic attack and to safeguard bringing into play the effectiveness of one's own electronic equipment. Its main modes of activity are: the first is counter-electronic reconnaissance. It prevents the electromagnetic signals of one's own information systems from being acquired by the enemy or renders the enemy to be unable to obtain useful information. The second is counter-electronic jamming. This is adopting various kinds of tactical and technical means to maximally eliminate or weaken the harmful effects of the enemy's electromagnetic attack against one's own electronic equipment and safeguard the smooth operation of one's own information systems. At the same time, this avoids mistaken entry into the "information trap" set by the enemy's electromagnetic signals.

Network protection is the series of measures and activities adopted to defend against the enemy's network attack. Its main activities: the first is to defend against virus contamination; and the second is to defend against "hacker" invasion. This is mainly in terms of organization, in terms of a system, and in terms of technology, adopting a series of measures to prevent and weaken the disruption and harm caused by the enemy's network attack on one's own information systems. Because the application of computers and interactive networks in armed forces information systems and weapons systems has expanded on a daily basis, while at the same time, because network attack possesses the

characteristics of being highly dispersed and concealed, therefore, prevention against network attack is correspondingly difficult. It may be said that network protection is one of the most important and arduous missions in information defense.

Physical protection is the series of measures and activities to ensure that the physical entity of one's own command institutions and information systems are free from destruction by enemy's force-strengths and firepower. If divided in terms of the nature of activities, physical destruction can be divided into two basic types: the first type is operational quality protection which mainly refers to physical protection conducted with force-strengths and firepower. For example, this refers to dispatching force-units to reinforce the defense of command institutions and information systems and frustrate the enemy's raid-attacks implemented by force-strengths, or [this refers to] destroying with a portion of firepower the enemy targets posing a threat to one's own information systems. The second type is non-operational quality protection. This mainly refers to adopting various engineering and technical means and other measures to improve information system anti-destruct ability and survivability. For example, this is building underground and mobile command posts, storing backup systems and equipment, establishing networked information systems with multiple systems, multiple nodes, multiple pathways and multiple frequencies, and dispersing the deployment {peizhi} of centers, nodes, and signal radiation sources of information systems. Precision guidance munitions, anti-radiation missiles, and high energy weapons pose a big physical threat to information systems, and they should be the key points of physical protection.

Intelligence information protection is the important intelligence information activities and measures that do not allow the enemy to obtain one's own operational intent and operational capabilities. Its main modes are: anti-reconnaissance, anti-espionage, prevention of divulging secrets, etc. The meaning of intelligence information protection is to lower the effectiveness of the enemy's information systems by not allowing the enemy to gain useful intelligence. Not only is this one of the important patterns of information defense, it is also an indispensable "partner" to information attack. This is because any excellent stratagem and skillful deception, if separated from the assistance of intelligence information, would completely lack any hope for success.

Information warfare is a form of highly synthesized pattern of operational activity. Information attack and information defense as well as the various activities included in them are mutually dependent, mutually supporting and mutually supplemental and they constitute a robust operational system {tixi}. Information warfare has an extremely strong integrated quality, and the absence of any of the various operational types and activity patterns within it will affect the results of information confrontation and even lead to defeat in information warfare.

III. Basic Requirements of Campaign Information Warfare...162

(1) Active attack

Active attack is the most important basic requirement in implementing battlefield information warfare. It reflects the vitality of attack with initiative {zhudong jin'gong} in the principle of modern campaign operations. In a definite sense, the technical and tactical characteristics of battlefield information warfare decide that it emphasizes more on attack than traditional land, sea, and air warfare.

Seizing battlefield information dominance mainly relies on information attack. The most effective way to seize information dominance is to destroy and jam (deceive) the opponent's information systems and to completely suppress and disrupt their ability to obtain, transmit, process and use information. Obviously, this objective must undergo active information attack with initiative in order to be realized.

Information defense can only bring into play its active role by combining with information attack. Although traditional defensive operations have a certain negative sense, in the process of defense, however, it can still massively expend the enemy's effective strength and directly enable the enemy military to encounter strikes. Information defense in information warfare does not have this function, and simple information defense not only is helpless for seizing information superiority but can only lead to the passive situation of being suppressed, jammed and deceived, and this ultimately loses the significance of information defense. Thus, in information warfare, it is only through information defense relying on information attack that one can play an active role in the struggle for seizing information dominance.

Seizing information dominance more depends on having the benefit of first opportunity. This is decided in the characteristics of information warfare. First, information attack is mainly implemented with the modes of long-range warfare and in concealment so as to more facilitate achieving the sudden quality of attack. Second, the manpower and material resources expended in information attack are considerably less than traditional force-strength engagements, so it has a fairly strong sustainability, and once attack starts, it can be continuously implemented for a long period. Third, the operating of information systems cannot be separated from the spatial passage through the electromagnetic spectrum. Therefore, on the battlefield, any operating information system is exposed. Theoretically speaking, an operating information system cannot conduct complete protection against the enemy's information attack. Besides, the physical destruction in information attack will normally render the defender difficulties in restoring for a longer period. These characteristics of information warfare demonstrate that the side having the benefit of first opportunity can more easily or possibly seize battlefield information dominance in one blow and obtain a fairly larger operational benefit. When speaking in this sense, the requirement for active attack not only refers to that we must give priority to attack, but it even more refers to that "the one striking first is stronger."

The requirement for carrying out active attack should grasp the following points: first is to have ample intelligence information safeguarding-support. This is the basis for implementing effective information attack. Second is concentrating the information attack strengths and placing resources at the critical occasions and directions. Third is striving to implement information attack before the enemy and strive for the benefit of first opportunity. Fourth is implementing uninterrupted information attack and maintaining and expanding the information superiority already achieved.

(2) Nodal attack

A node refers to a critical part of the armed forces information systems. It is the core of operational systems {xitong}. Its function and composition decide that it is the most concentrated portion of the intellect, technology and information in the entirety of operational systems, but it is also the weakest portion of operational capability and self-protection capability.

The implementation of nodal attack refers to, as soon as the campaign starts, concentrating the information attack strengths and directly striking the vital area parts and critical links of the enemy's information systems, first to destroy the enemy's information systems, and then leading to paralysis of the entirety of the enemy's operational systems, and thus striving to obtain a maximum victory with minimum cost.

Directly attacking the enemy's critical links and vital area parts is a kind of operational method with highest effectiveness, minimum losses and shortest consumption of time. In the Gulf War, the multi-national force-units started with striking the critical links and vital area parts of the Iraqi military's operational systems, first by paralyzing the Iraqi military's information systems, creating very favorable decisive battle conditions, and then within a very short time, achieving victory in the attack campaign with very small cost and subsidiary destruction as well as very high operational effectiveness. This showed a distinctive contrast to past wars.

The main reasons for directly attacking the critical links and vital area parts of the enemy's systems in order to be able to obtain the highest operational benefits are: first, this method truly carries out the "avoiding the strong and attacking the weak" principle of war, and the foremost selected attack target is the weakest and the most vital area parts in the enemy's systems. Secondly, it reflects the pursuit of the operational guidance thought of "low cost but high effectiveness," discards the operational methods of successive attack and layer-by-layer peeling universally used in past wars, and through direct attacks on the enemy's "brains, heart and nerve centers" of the enemy's systems, it causes the enemy's powerful force-strength groupings to fall into paralysis and collapse on itself, thus greatly reducing personnel casualties and campaign duration. Thirdly, nodal attack demonstrates the optimum combining of weapons and tactics under modern conditions. As theory and practice have fully proven, directly attacking the enemy's critical links and vital area parts have an extremely high value in a modern campaign, and one can say that

regardless of how one values it, its value is not enough. And this is also a fundamental reason why information warfare has become a new mode of operational activities.

Attacking the critical links and vital area parts of the enemy's systems should mainly take the three basic chain links of the enemy's information systems as the main targets. Namely, information detection sources, information communications, and information processing centers. The information detection source is the "eyes and ears" of operational systems, the information communication channels are the "central nerves" of the operational systems, and the information processing center is the "brains and heart" of the operational systems. It is not difficult to see that these three chain links are the critical links for ensuring the normal operations of the information systems and even the entirety of the operational systems. Attacking the three basic chain links in the enemy's information systems should be a unified and adjusting-coordinated entity. Through the activities of "blinding," "paralyzing" and "killing" the enemy's systems, we create favorable conditions for decisive quality engagements and we can directly reach the goal of causing the enemy to surrender.

(3) Synthesis and adjusting-coordination

Synthesis {zonghe} refers to implementing a full-scale {quanmian} information confrontation with the enemy by as much as possible simultaneously or successively applying a variety of means for information attack and information defense; adjusting-coordination refers to forming the kind of desirable relationships that are mutually assistive, mutually enhancing, mutually supplemental, with no conflicts nor dissension, that are centered on a unified objective between the various activities of campaign information warfare and between campaign information warfare and other campaign operational activities. Synthesis and adjusting-coordination are another essential requirement for campaign information warfare.

Synthesis is a necessary requirement for overall seizing battlefield information dominance. Only by synthetically applying various means can the enemy's information systems encounter full-scale strikes, only then can one's own information attack and information defense obtain operational results that are mutual assistive and enhancing, and only then can one ultimately obtain a full-scale information superiority. For example, combining a large-area electromagnetic attack and precision physical destruction can fundamentally disrupt the enemy's information systems; deception-quality network attack complemented by deception-quality electromagnetic attack can more easily dupe and mislead the enemy commanding officers; only an active attack aided by tight defense can achieve the goal of both disrupting the enemy's ability for information control and maintaining one's own ability for information control. Campaign information warfare is a full-scale, synthesized information confrontation activity. Individual and dispersed information weapons, information systems or activities of information confrontation may have information superiority in a given localized domain, but they cannot have full scale information superiority on the battlefield. In the Vietnam War, the U.S. military had an extremely large superiority in electronic weaponry, ground sensors, night vision

instruments, communication equipment and tactical command and control information systems, but for the most part, they were employed dispersed or individually used. This resulted in the U.S. military not being able to seize full-scale information superiority in the Vietnamese battlefield from start to finish. As attested by practice of war, only by synthetically applying various information confrontation means centered on a unified goal and intent, conducting full-scale information attack and suppression against the enemy and conducting full scale information defense for oneself can we obtain information superiority of the overall situation quality.

Adjusting-coordination is a “twin brother” to synthesis. The function of synthesis without adjusting-coordination could be cancelled or even generate negative effects. If synthesis is said to improve strike intensity and scope by increasing operational means, then adjusting-coordination improves strike results by rationally ascertaining the relationships between the various means and eliminating the conflicts and dissension that may be created between them. Therefore, synthesis and adjusting-coordination have equal significance. In campaign information warfare, adjusting-coordination is mainly reflected in two aspects: first is the adjusting-coordination of the internal activities of campaign information warfare, such as the adjusting-coordination between electromagnetic attack and psychological attack, the adjusting-coordination between “soft” kill and “hard” strike, and the adjusting-coordination between information attack and information defense. Second is the adjusting-coordination between information warfare and other basic operational activities in a campaign. These adjusting-coordination relationships mainly are: the adjusting-coordination between campaign information warfare and campaign firepower assault; the adjusting-coordination between campaign information warfare and land, sea, air, and space engagements; the adjusting-coordination between information warfare and special operations; and the adjusting-coordination between information warfare and the assembly, delivery and *bushu* disposition of the campaign large formation. As attested by recent local wars under informationized conditions, from the perspective of the basic content of operations, a modern campaign is actually a synthesized application of information warfare, firepower warfare, and land, sea, air and space engagements. These most basic operational activities have already become an inseparable organic integrated entity, and whether or not there is a desirable adjusting-coordination relationship between them bears much importance to the victory of the entire campaign.

(4) Tight protection

Information attack and information defense are the dispensable operational modes of information warfare.

Since active attack is the most important basic requirement for implementing campaign information warfare, this inevitably is a principle both sides mutually adhere. This, therefore, decides that at the same time when one’s own side is implementing information attack, one will encounter the enemy’s information attack. Hence, at the same time when

one is actively implementing information attack, one must also attach importance to accomplish tight information defense.

In information warfare, when comparing information defense to information attack, the degree of difficulty in its [information defense] organization and implementation is greater and its missions are more strenuous. This is because: first, the extensive reliance by armed forces information systems on electronic technologies and computer and network technologies is the most exposed and vulnerable part in the entirety of operational systems. Secondly, the strike targets selected in information attack are frequently only a certain number of points, while information defense has to defend the entire system, and it is an all-aspect protection of the entire information system. It could fall into a very delicate situation when facing information attack which is becoming manifold and synthesized everyday. Thirdly, comparing the activities of information attack with traditional operational activities, [information attack activities] possess even more sudden quality and better concealment quality, and furthermore, the latent threats on this kind of attack are more difficult to assess, early warning is difficult to achieve, and the results of defense are difficult to predict, thereby increasing the difficulty of defense. As shown by the characteristics of information defense, successfully accomplishing tight information defense, protecting the normal operating of one's own information systems, maintaining the one's own capability for information control, and ensuring that one's own important intelligence and information isn't obtained by the enemy all similarly have very important significance for seizing information dominance.

The scope touched upon by information defense is very broad; therefore one must be tight and have key points and not leave the enemy an opportunity to take advantage.

Section 2: Campaign Firepower Assault...167

Campaign firepower assault is the synthesized firepower strike jointly implemented by the aviation forces, artillery forces and missile forces of all participating services under the assisting-support of information warfare. The firepower used in campaign firepower assault is mainly the aviation firepower, artillery force firepower (includes naval ship artillery firepower) and missile firepower that the campaign commander directly controls and is able to push forward and affect the campaign progress. Thus, firepower warfare belongs at the campaign level. The main goal of firepower warfare is to control battlefield space, to destroy the enemy's war potential and important infrastructure, to demolish and paralyze the opponent's operational system {tixi}, and to weaken the opponent's operational capability in order to create conditions for decisive quality engagements or independently achieve specified campaign and strategic goals.

The effectiveness of modern campaign firepower has greatly improved, causing the status of firepower warfare in campaign operations sharply ascend. This is mainly manifested in firepower warfare having become a relatively independent phase of a modern campaign; not only does it create favorable conditions for campaign engagements and combat, but it can also directly push forward and affect or even decide the progress and conclusion of a

campaign. For example, in the 42-day Gulf War, the U.S. military conducted 38 days of campaign firepower assault, accounting for 90 percent of the progress of the campaign, and creating very favorable conditions for ground engagements; the “DESERT FOX” operation and the War of Kosovo were completely constituted by air assault and long range firepower strike activities. This illustrates that campaign firepower warfare has already shaken the shackles of its subordinate position of being attached to ground engagements in a traditional war and has become a basic operational activity directly pushing forward and affecting campaign progress and conclusion and even being able to independently accomplish specified campaign and strategic missions.

I. Main Characteristics of Campaign Firepower Assault...168

(1) Large in-depth quality

Modern campaign firepower systems already possess the capability to simultaneously strike the enemy’s full depth on the battlefield, which is a change from the past of sequential firepower strikes from front to back and close to far. Now, at the start of a campaign, the attacking side can strike any part of the enemy’s full depth, assault the enemy’s command and communication systems, traffic hubs, energy facilities, and important military works production bases, etc., and paralyze the entirety of the enemy’s military systems and operational systems {xitong}. The greater in-depth quality of modern campaign firepower has caused the centuries-old clearly defined divisions of boundaries on the battlefield between the operational front, the engagement zones, and rear areas to start to become fuzzy. Under modern conditions, operational tanks on the front engagement lines and the important strategic targets in the battlefield depths can both be assaulted simultaneously by campaign firepower.

(2) Full course quality

The full course quality is mainly reflected in the firepower of a modern campaign being able to penetrate the full course of campaign operations based on needs-requirements. In the Gulf War, from the first laser guided bomb dropped overhead Baghdad on the Iraqi telecommunication building, the comprehensive firepower assault on the Iraqi military by the multi-national forces nearly never stopped. In the air campaign, large-scale, high-intensity comprehensive firepower assault continued round-the-clock for 38 days to greatly weaken the Iraqi army’s overall operational capability. During the ground attack, armed helicopters and artillery directly supported the attack activity of the ground forces. At anytime, there were fixed-wing planes standing-by in the air to wait for call to support ground operations; therefore, they strongly supported the ground troops to accomplish their objectives with high efficiency and low consumption. Firepower assault in the full course was made the main means with maximum advantage of the effect of suddenness to continuously keep strike pressure on the enemy.

(3) High effectiveness quality

The high effectiveness quality of modern firepower warfare is mainly reflected in: first is being able to quickly achieve the specified operational goal in a short time. For example, in the US military's air raid on Libya, "ELDORADO CANYON" operation, they only used 11 minutes to drop 150 tons of bombs and accurately destroying five designated targets and accomplished all other objectives, except killing al-Gaddafi. The actual operational time spent by Israel on the strike of the Iraqi atomic reactor, air raid of the PLO headquarters, and destruction of 19 Syrian air defense position in the Becca Valley was only 2, 3 and 6 minutes, respectively. Ground force-strength engagements cannot be compared with this high effectiveness quality of campaign firepower. Second is the very high destructive lethality on targets. The great improvement of weapon and equipment's kill lethality and hit precision has enormously enhanced the destructive lethality of campaign firepower on targets. According to relevant data reports, the yield of a one-time bomb drop by three B-1Bs is equivalent to 1.2 times the total volley fire of a whole Soviet motorized infantry division in the 1980s, and one heavy bomb precision guidance bomb can produce the effectiveness that could be reached by the bombs dropped by hundreds of planes in WWII. Thirdly, one can greatly reduce personnel casualties. Especially during implementation of beyond visual range strikes, the personnel casualty rate can be even lower. Not only that, the damage results of campaign firepower can create conditions to tremendously lower the casualty rates in ground attack.

(4) Diverse quality

The diverse quality feature of campaign firepower includes three connotations: first is the diverse quality of strike means. The diversification in modern weapons and equipment development {fazhan} has allowed for modern campaign firepower to form an integrated multi-dimensional battlefield of land, sea, air, space and electromagnetism, [allowed for] the comprehensive application of aviation firepower, missile firepower and artillery firepower combined with high-, medium- and low-altitudes and long-, intermediate- and close-ranges, and the diversified strike means of dual "soft-hard." The most outstanding feature of a modern firepower strike is the close coordination of electronic suppression and firepower strike, which plays a critical role in attaining campaign victory. Next is the diverse quality of strike targets. The diverse quality of strike targets is the natural result of the diverse quality of firepower strike means. As the degree of restriction of battlefield environment on the modern campaign has already been greatly lowered, one can strike various different qualities of targets under various conditions according to campaign operational needs-requirements. Third is diverse quality of styles {shiyang}. Under modern conditions, the styles for implementing fire strikes have obviously increased, such as: the jointly implemented joint air raid by firepower strike strengths of all services and arms; high-performance operational aircraft for implementing long-range raids; land-, sea-, and air-based campaign tactical missiles for implementing beyond visual range strikes; precision guidance weapons for implementing nodal strikes for the goal of "paralyzing" the enemy's operational systems; and ground artillery strengths in the lead for implementing large-scale artillery warfare, etc. The diverse quality of modern

campaign firepower gives the application of firepower warfare to have very large flexibility and adaptability, as not only can one complete even more campaign operational missions but with the use of firepower warfare, one achieve some operational goals that cannot be achieved with other operational patterns.

II. Basic Patterns of Campaign Firepower Assault...170

In a modern campaign, there are three basic patterns of campaign firepower assault, namely, air raid, missile assault and artillery assault

(1) Air raid

Air raid is firepower assault from the air implemented against ground (sea surface) targets with aviation forces as the main body. It played a brand new role in the First World War, and was expansively employed in the Second World War to become an indispensable part of war. Since the 1970s, the development of aviation technology, especially the wide military application of high and new science and technology led by the information revolution, has enabled air force weapons to complete the transformation from “mechanized operational platforms” to “informationized operational platforms” and is gradually moving toward “intelligent operational platforms.” Not only have the types of aviation munitions remarkably increased, but we have also experienced going from “not guidable after firing” [unguided] to “fire and guide” [guided] through “fire and no need to guide,” [fire and forget] and is gradually developing toward complete informationization of munitions. The leap forward jump in quality of aviation weapons and munitions has significantly enhanced the killing and destructive results of air raids, thereby tremendously elevating the position of air raid in war. As fully attested by the practice of recent wars under informationized conditions, the air raid is a basic operational pattern in campaign firepower assault and it has a very important role in attaining victory in an attack campaign to the point of directly determining the victory or defeat in a war.

Due to the high level of development in air operational strengths, the modern air raid already possesses the capability for implementing strikes against multiple targets with a variety of operational means and in full depth, at all altitudes, in all aspects, and in all weather. The methods for implementing air raids have also certainly had revolutionary changes as it this was taking place. In a modern campaign, the main modes of air raids are:

The joint air raid refers to an air firepower assault jointly implemented with multiple services, multiple aircraft types and multiple aircraft group formations. The operational task organization {zuozhan biancheng} of a joint air raid is normally composed of air early warning command aircraft (formation), escort cover formation, target assault formation, suppression of air defense weapons formation, electronic warfare formation, air refueling formation, and air rescue formation, etc. They form with the early warning aircraft as the command center, with the target assault formation as the main assault

strength, and with other formations functioning as assisting-support, cover and safeguarding-support strengths to form a complete, organizationally matched and rational operational integrated whole. Because the joint air raid gathers the reconnaissance, command, jamming and destruction into one entity, the collective functions of air operations is complemented and enhanced. Thus, the joint air raid's penetration capability is strong, its assault results are good, its combat losses are few, and it is the main mode of modern air raid operations. It is worth pointing out that in the Gulf War, the joint air raid has developed from the small joint [ness] of the various aircraft types of the single service of the Air Force to a large joint [ness] through joint participation of the Air Force, Navy, Army and missile force-units using various types of weapons and equipment (including various space systems) and operational strengths. It foretells that the large joint air raid of air, ground, sea, space in the modern offensive operation will become the basic mode of air raids.

Long-range raids refer to aviation weapons taking off from bases distant to the theater, undergoing a long distance air maneuver, and after arriving at the effective range of their air-launched munitions, conducting air assault against the enemy's targets. Due to the unprecedented improvement of the flight range of modern aviation weapons, especially under the assisting- and safeguarding-support of refueling aircraft and space positioning systems, some already have "global reach and global operations" capabilities, and this makes long-range raid a reality. During the U.S. "ELDORADO CANYON" operation, F-111 fighter-bombers took off from the British Isles to long range raid Libya, along the way refueling six times for a round trip of 10,380 km. During the Gulf War, B-52 bombers based over 10,000 km from the Iraqi-Kuwaiti battlefield on American soil implemented international maneuver for a round trip flight of 35 hours to conduct air strikes against Iraqi depth targets joining with aviation weapons positioned in theater and fully demonstrating the capability of its air force for long-range raid. The appearance of the operational mode of beyond visual range long range air raid was a breakthrough in the traditional battlefield view. This manifested to the greatest extent the principle of *dispersed bushu disposition and concentrated use of air strengths*, greatly extending the depth of air strikes, amplifying the suddenness of air raid operations and improving the survivability of air strengths.

Stealth sudden-raids {yinxing tuxi} refers to implementing stealth penetration with stealth combat bomber aircraft utilizing their characteristics of being difficult to be detected by opponent air defense early warning systems to penetrate the enemy's campaign and strategic depths and suddenly conducting air strikes against enemy vital area targets. The superior quality of stealth sudden-raids are: first, the stealth sudden-raid does not need to open up a penetration corridor on the enemy's tight aerial defense line, which is that it can directly penetrate enemy's defense depth to implement air assault. Therefore, it breaks the traditional mode of the aerial linear battlefield, causing the enemy's multi-layered air defense strike rings composed of air defense fighters, ground to air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery to lose function, thereby greatly enhancing the sudden quality of air raids. Second, stealth sudden-raids possess the capability of directly attacking the most critical parts in the enemy's air defense system that are the most tightly protected, so that one can one can disintegrate or even paralyze the enemy's entire

air defense system with one blow. Third, stealth sudden-raids can greatly simplify the operational task organization of the air raid strengths and maximally reduce the amount of combat losses. In the Gulf War, the U.S. military's first air raid used 30 F-117As stealth combat bombers, and under the conditions of Iraqis not being aware of anything, directly attacked critical targets in Baghdad, effectively achieving the sudden quality of the air raid which resulted in the Iraqi air defense systems suffering serious destruction at the very start and losing the capability to organize any resistance. In the entire air raid operations, there were over 2,000 sorties of stealth aircraft. In the absence of any support from electronic warfare aircraft and other escort aircraft, many times they penetrated Baghdad's airspace with the densest air defense firepower without a single loss. It can be anticipated that along with the increase in the number of stealth aircraft, stealth sudden-raids will become one of the main modes of modern air raid warfare.

(2) Missile assault

Missile assault is a new kind of firepower warfare pattern using guided munitions newly developed since the 1970s.

Along with the development of precision guidance technology and weapons, the missile has become the main combat weapon in modern firepower warfare. The missile has superior qualities that cannot be compared with other weapon. It has strong long-range capabilities, high penetration effectiveness, fast activity tempo, good strike results and low combat consumption; thus it is the campaign commander's main firepower club for pushing forward and affecting the campaign course. The missile assault has also become one of the main patterns of firepower warfare. The combination of the missile with remote sensing technology and electronic warfare suppression technology has formed a new firepower assault pattern. The missile has fundamentally changed the nature of traditional firepower warfare and it has also generated a series of transformations to the methods of campaign operations.

Missile assault is normally a style of firepower assault jointly implemented by various services. Division based on the spatial relationship of each service carrying out the missile assault, the main modes of missile assault are:

Ground-to-ground assault mainly refers to firing of campaign missiles from land surface to attack important enemy land surface targets. This pattern is the Army's main mode for implementing missile assault. Ground-to-ground missiles have the characteristics of long strike distances, strong penetration capability, nimble ballistic maneuver, concealed and dispersed firing positions, simple and fast operational process, little meteorological effect, and easy to achieve suddenness. One long-range precision guidance missile can replace depth attack results of several modern operational aircraft and it has a very high cost-effectiveness ratio. Thus, the ground-to-ground assault is one of the main modes for implementing depth strikes against targets deep in the enemy's rear.

Ground (ship)-to-air assault mainly refers to firing missiles from land surface or sea surface ships to attack the enemy's air targets. This mode is the main mode for implementing air defense operations by the Army and Navy, for complementing the Air Force's seizing of air dominance or for implementing a sea and air blockade. Combining of modern ground (ship)-to-air missile with AAA can constitute a high-, medium-, low-altitude, and long-, intermediate-, and close range, all-aspect multi-layered three dimensional air defense firepower net which is capable of achieving optimum anti-air strike results.

Air-to-ground (ship) assault refers to firing missiles from an aviation flying craft to attack the enemy's land surface or sea targets. This mode is the main mode for aviation forces participating in the campaign firepower assault. The air-to-ground (ship) assault possesses characteristics such as broad operational space, good missile launch platform maneuver quality, high precision in adjacent airspace assault, and strong adaptability to the assault target. It also has stronger strike capability against strategic and tactical targets as well as both fixed and moving targets. In particular, it has a good strike results against moving targets deep in the enemy's depth, and in this respect, the ground-to-ground assault pattern cannot match this. The emergence of the air-to-ground (ship) missile assault mode has caused an important change to take place in ground (sea surface) operations by air strengths. In the past, the method of aviation weapons penetrating the enemy's anti-air defenses, then entering overhead the target and using aviation bombs to conduct adjacent airspace bombing has gradually been replaced with the mode of long distance launching of missiles mainly outside the enemy's "defense rings." The massive employment of the long distance launching of missile method has greatly improved the attack capability of Air Force strengths against ground targets as well as the transport aircraft's survivability.

Air-to-air assault refers to the firing of missiles from aviation flying craft and attacking the enemy's air targets. This mode is the main operational method for the aviation force to wipe out the enemy's air strengths and seize air dominance under modern conditions. The assault characteristics of air-to-air assault are long distance engagements, fast attack speeds, and high precision. At the same time, there are fairly high requirements on the maneuver capabilities of operational aircraft, onboard radar detection systems, fire control systems and missile performance. Along with extension of air-to-air missile ranges and improvement of guidance performance, the air-to-air assault mode has changed the traditional mode of giving priority to conducting tail attacks and close range combat with reliance on aerial guns and close-range missiles between aircraft engaged in air combat, and replaced it with the mode of giving priority to beyond visual range air combat.

Ground-to-ship assault refers to firing missiles to attack the enemy's sea surface targets from land surfaces, and it is one of the main modes for the Army to implement firepower assault against sea surface targets. It is mainly used to complement the Navy's implementation of seizing sea dominance operations, control important strategic straits

and waterways, protect one's own sea lanes of communications and disrupt the enemy's sea lanes of communications.

Ship (submarine)-to-ground assault mainly refers to firing missiles from sea surface (underwater) to attack the enemy's land surface targets, and it is one of the main modes for the Navy to implement firepower assault towards the land. Ship to ground assault mainly employs cruise missiles and submarine launched missiles, and its attack distances are far, precision high, lethality strong; especially the concealed nature and sudden quality of submarine-launched attacks is for the most part higher than that of other missile assault modes. Therefore, a ship-to-ground assault has a very strong penetration capability and depth attack capability, and it is an important mode of modern missile assault. Under modern conditions, the Navy emphasizes more its support to land attack operations in order to fully bring the integrated might of the all-services joint operation into play. This foretells that in future campaign operations giving priority to the joint campaign, the ship-to-ground assault mode will have a more and more important position.

(3) Artillery assault

Artillery assault mainly refers to army artillery firepower assault, and at the same time, it also includes naval surface ship gun firepower assault. Here, we expound with key points on army artillery firepower assault. Artillery is the main firepower assault strength of army operations. In WWII, it had the complimentary name of "god of war." Under modern conditions, despite the fact that the firepower of air force and missiles has had huge development and is expansively applied on the battlefield, artillery firepower, however, still holds an important position in campaign operations and is an indispensable component of firepower warfare.

First, artillery firepower is the assault strength with strongest sustained operational capability in campaign firepower. Although the modern air force has the capability of operating in night and complex meteorological conditions, to a certain extent, however, it is still subject to the restriction of climate, capability of flight endurance, and pilot physical limitations, plus the limited number and high cost of strategic, tactical missiles; therefore, it cannot keep a long-time and continuous firepower assault. Artillery guns have a large quantity, abundant ammunition, and low manufacturing cost. At the same time, artillery operations have a low requirements for battlefield conditions, can be easily operated and have little physical consumption from the operators; thus, they have a stronger capability for sustained operations when compared with other types of firepower. Second, artillery firepower has the fastest speed of response. Modern guns have materialized integration of "reconnaissance-firepower" to enable the artillery gun system to directly receive and process the information on a target provided by all types of reconnaissance and tracking, telemetry and control systems to automatically complete command and launch missions at real-time or near real-time. In the Gulf War, when the Iraqi artillery fired one shot, it was immediately responded to by the U.S. forces with 5-6 shots. Claimed by an Iraqi battalion commander, his artillery guns had the right of firing

only one shot as the opposite side would pour their gunfire like a downfall after that shot. This speed of response is incomparable by other firepower. Third, artillery has excellent accompanying support capability. Modern guns have basically achieved automation and motorization. Tracked self-propelling guns have the same cross-country capability as ground units to attack simultaneously with them, and at the same time, they, as a component of the operational formation, have the convenience to coordinate with them; thus, they can provide timely and reliable support firepower to ground units. In addition, along with the improvement of their performance and increase of their quantity, artillery already possesses the capability to independently conduct fire warfare. Due to the extension of its firing range and improvement of its precision, as well as increase of its ammunition and enhancement of its power, artillery has elevated its attacking capability from general suppression in the past to the degree of directly destroying enemy targets and also being able to carry out various firepower assault missions. The strike targets of artillery warfare have been expanded from general battlefield military targets to enemy strategic targets of war potential. Thus, in order to accomplish a specified strategic and tactical goal, artillery can not only complement aviation forces and missile forces to implement firepower assault, but it can also independently carry out firepower warfare.

The main modes of modern firepower warfare are:

Intensive assault refers to concentrating a superiority of artillery firepower to implement an intensive assault that is high-density, powerful, sudden, and fierce against important targets (normally targets with a fairly large area shape) in the enemy's defensive depth, striving to heavily damage the enemy. The intensive assault is one of the main modes of firepower warfare, and it normally generates fairly good firepower assault results.

Firepower interdiction refers to establishing several thick firepower screens in the enemy's campaign depth or implementing rapid long distance mine-laying with medium and long range artillery firepower in order to split the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition, seal off the localized battlefield, interdict the moving forward of their tank groups or follow-up force-units and reserve forces, and cut off its logistics supply.

Firepower point-uprooting {拔点 *badian*} refers to implementing a resolute extermination quality strike against vital area targets within the enemy's campaign depth that play a core and pillar role with concentrated, accurate and fierce artillery firepower in hope of attaining the effect of shaking their campaign *bushi* disposition by uprooting one or several points. Firepower point-uprooting can thoroughly cause damage to the struck target or even completely lose its operational capability.

Firepower counterattack refers to fully utilizing the characteristic of rapid artillery firepower response and immediately conducting prompt and forceful counterattack operations when the enemy has already implemented firepower assault or firepower raids in order to destroy and suppress the enemy's firepower strengths and safeguard one's own operational activities.

Firepower blockade mainly refers to implementing uninterrupted firepower blockade against targets in the enemy's depth such as transportation thoroughfares, bridges, ports, piers, and airfields with medium and long range artillery firepower in order to cut off and control the enemy rear transport, stop the enemy force-strength maneuver, destroy the enemy's military infrastructure, and disrupt and weaken the enemy's integrated operational capability.

Firepower feint mainly refers to skillfully using artillery firepower to create false appearances, to cause misconception by the enemy or to lure the enemy to give in order to create favorable battlefield posture.

III. Basic Requirements of Campaign Firepower Assault...176

(1) Unified control

Unified control refers to the campaign command organ's implementation of command and adjusting-coordination for the firepower strike strengths of all participating services and arms that can be brought into play at the campaign-level to ensure maximally bringing into play the synthesized strike effectiveness of the campaign firepower systems.

The necessity for implementing unified control mainly lies with: first, the implementation of unified control is able to maximally concentrate the employment of campaign firepower resources and maximally bring strike effectiveness with limited firepower resources into play. Second, campaign firepower assault is a synthesized operational activity mode implemented together with multiple services and arms and multiple weapon systems, so through integrated *guihua* planning, one can conduct unified control of campaign firepower systems, seek the optimum firepower composition mode so that various firepower assault systems form an integrated effect that is mutually remediable and mutually strengthening, and at the same time, [one can] form a multi-layered, multi-echeloned firepower strike *bushu* disposition with multiple dimensions and multiple layers against the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition. Third, one can fully bring into play the integrated role of strategic- and campaign-level reconnaissance systems. Because a campaign firepower assault's strike precision is high, its delivery range is far, the number of assault targets are many, and its operational duration is long, the requirement for obtaining strike target intelligence and information in real-time and near real-time is very high, so it is difficult for the reconnaissance strengths of any single service and subordinate campaign large formation to satisfy the intelligence support of its own participating campaign firepower assault. Implementing unified control benefits the synthesized use of the strategic and campaign reconnaissance systems and brings into play the integrated strengths of high level reconnaissance systems, thus maximally ensuring the needs of campaign firepower assault for intelligence information.

In order to achieve unified control of campaign firepower assault, one should mainly grasp the following three points: first, one should establish a unified and synthesized firepower adjusting-coordination institution and from the perspective of organizing the

mechanism, ensure the implementation of unified control for the application of various campaign firepower strengths. Second, by adopting the flexible command and control mode of a combined centralized and dispersed command, not only ensure that the entirety of the campaign firepower systems is able to form a pooled strength by centering on the general campaign intent, but also allow all firepower systems to be able to maintain a full initiative nature and an agile response capability. Third is to formulate a thorough firepower coordination plan, establish an effective firepower coordination mechanism, and through stipulating and controlling the coordination actions of various firepower systems, achieve unified control of the entirety of campaign firepower systems.

(2) Ensure key points

Ensuring key points refers to concentrating the main campaign firepower assault strengths and ensuring the implementation of key point strikes against the enemy.

Concentrating the main strengths and implementing key point strikes against the enemy is a traditional operational principle. However, due to limitations encountered in the level of weapons development, in past wars, carrying out the principle of key point strike frequently had fairly large restrictions because many important targets were placed in the opponent's campaign and strategic depths and were too far to reach or will tire troops and waste time; they were hard to quickly destroy. Under modern conditions, campaign firepower has had unprecedented development in strike precision, delivery range and lethality and has given armed forces the capability to conduct strikes against any important target in the enemy's depth. Therefore, one can even more effectively carry out the principle of key point strike while the advantageous qualities of key point strike are even more amply manifested.

To ensure key point strike in campaign firepower assault, one should mainly grasp the following points: first is concentrating firepower in the main direction. In operations under modern conditions, the enemy campaign *bushi* disposition is dispersed, the targets forming threats against us have greatly increased, the reliance and needs of the offensive campaign on firepower have obviously grown, and therefore, we should even more resolutely concentrate our main strengths in the main direction and bravely economize firepower in the secondary directions. In a modern campaign, the concentration of integrated firepower is no longer formed from a dense *bushu* disposition, but mainly through forming the implementation of "maneuver of ballistics." Second is concentrating firepower at critical time occasions {*guanjian shijie*}. The operations of critical time occasions are able to produce major effects on the campaign progress and therefore one must concentrate the use of firepower. Worth pointing out is that under modern conditions, the first assault of the campaign firepower assault has important significance. The first strike normally has a fairly large sudden quality, is able to obtain fairly large assault results, and is able to immediately produce an important effect on subsequent operational activities. Therefore, the first assault should maximally concentrate superior firepower, strive to paralyze the enemy's operational systems in one blow, and attain battlefield initiative as soon as possible so as to create conditions for subsequent

operations. Third is concentrating firepower on important targets. Important targets refer to targets that pose the biggest threat against us and affect the enemy's entirety of operational systems and operational capabilities the most. These targets are mainly: the enemy's information systems and command systems {xitong}, high-tech weapon systems, air defense systems, important harbors, airfields and traffic hubs, and the enemy's force strength groupings. In the situation of limited campaign firepower resources, one should determine the priority order of strike targets, concentrate firepower sequencing and assault the most important target; if we strive for one batch, then ensure we thoroughly destroy one batch, and thus immediately generate a positive effect on campaign progress.

(3) Full course suppression

Full course suppression refers to implementing continuous firepower strikes against the enemy over the full course of campaign implementation, maintaining strong firepower suppression and continuously destroying newly emerged or revived targets all the way until the enemy's operational system {tixi} is thoroughly paralyzed. Full course suppression does not refer to uninterrupted continuity in the astronomical sense of time, but it refers to, through continuous firepower strikes, not permitting the enemy to recover and form organized resistance.

In past offensive operations, due to the restrictions of the level of weapons and equipment development, one had no way of implementing full course suppression as firepower normally appeared in the state of attacking in daytime and resting at night, firepower assault might also be greatly reduced in inclement weather, and the enemy took advantage of night darkness or poor climate to organize its defense, thereby weakening the effect of campaign firepower assault and extending the course of the campaign. Under modern conditions, campaign firepower has the capability to make all-weather, all-time and round-the-clock strike a reality. Besides, because armed forces have enhanced their mobility without precedence, the force-units who have not been killed in the enemy's campaign and strategic depths can in an extremely short time enter a designated operational area and restore the original campaign *bushi* disposition; an armed forces' capabilities to protect, camouflage and revive targets have also been greatly strengthened, so some important targets have very strong survivability. For example, in the Gulf War, despite the multi-national force units having absolute firepower superiority and concentrating their full effort to seek and destroy Iraq's "SCUD" missile launchers, they were still unable to achieve all expected goals. It is evident to see that only by implementing uninterrupted full course firepower suppression against the enemy can one ensure achieving firepower assault results and creating favorable conditions for subsequent decisive quality engagements.

To achieve the requirements for full course suppression, first, we should conduct ultra conventional reinforcement of the theater and large formations carrying out the offensive campaign so as to ensure that there are sufficient firepower resources for implementing continuous strikes against the enemy. Second, we must unify-plan the application of

firepower resources, thoroughly organize the planning of firepower assault activities, rationally select targets, [rationally] allocate missions, [rationally] differentiate batches {pici}, [rationally] control tempo, [rationally] grasp intensity {qiangdu}, do not unilaterally pursue the extendibility {yanxuxing} of, and strive not let the enemy have a way to recover from receiving uninterrupted strikes. Third, we must, within the allowable scope of the physical conditions of operational personnel and the technical conditions of weapon systems, improve the employment intensity {qiangdu} of campaign firepower systems. On the basis of needs-requirements and what is possible, continuously re-allocate and reorganize groupings for limited campaign firepower and implement re-strikes so as to seek to amply bring into play the effectiveness of campaign firepower resources. Fourth, strengthen reconnaissance against strike targets and [strengthen] estimates of assault results, ensure that we have definite targets, reduce duplicating strikes, and avoid creating waste of firepower resources. Fifth, successfully accomplish the various operational and logistical equipment supports and ensure that campaign firepower systems are able to receive effective operational support and have sufficient operational materials. [Ensure] damaged weapons and equipment are able to receive prompt repairs and operational personnel are able to obtain prompt replenishment so as to enhance a sustained operational capability.

(4) Rapid maneuver

Rapid maneuver refers to utilizing superior qualities of rapid, flexible and beneficial firepower maneuver to rapidly and flexibly shift and concentrate firepower in the campaign firepower assault to strike the enemy without losing time opportunity.

Under modern conditions, the rapid maneuver of firepower is having a more and more important position in operations. Modern operational theory emphasizes the concentration of firepower and only when absolutely necessary to concentrate force-strengths, so the rapid maneuver of firepower maneuver is a necessary means for achieving firepower concentration. Transparency has increased on the modern battlefield and it is very difficult to conceal the intention of force strength maneuver; consequently, sudden quality of a modern campaign is mainly formed through the rapid maneuver quality of firepower strike. Rapid firepower maneuver can make a flexible response to the full depth posture of the battlefield, and it can promptly seize combat opportunity so as to quickly control the development of the battlefield posture or alter the strength ratio in a given direction. For example, according to Russian military calculations, an advancing motorized infantry division will undergo a seven minute assault of 50-70 tactical fighter aircraft and suffer 40-50% losses, which is almost on the verge of a total loss of its operational capability. Rapid firepower maneuver can even better adapt to the requirements for the high speed quality of modern warfare and thus it is more beneficial than force strength maneuver for seizing battlefield initiative.

The factors for ensuring campaign firepower rapid maneuver are mainly: real-time or near-real-time intelligence information support; establishing a reliable and flexible synthesized system of implementing command, control and communications for

campaign firepower; ensuring close and accurate coordination between the campaign firepower systems and between the campaign firepower systems and the maneuver operational and information warfare systems; and having a grasp of the specified campaign firepower reserve strengths.

(5) Tight protection

A modern war will first be a contest of fierce firepower between two sides engaged in battle with the campaign firepower systems as the important targets in the assault of both sides. Therefore, it is necessary to tightly protect the campaign firepower systems, especially the high-tech weapon systems, to improve their battlefield survivability. Only then can one guarantee the smooth conduct of the campaign firepower assault and only then can one gain victory in campaign operations. Maintaining campaign firepower system survivability and combat power under the conditions of massive employment of high-tech weapons and equipment by the enemy has become the basic content of a modern campaign. The basic measures for implementing tight protection of campaign firepower systems are summed up mainly in three areas: first, actively seek and destroy the enemy's firepower assault systems. This is wiping out the enemy first with active initiative attack activities or suppressing the enemy's firepower systems, especially the biggest threat high tech weapon systems. In a contest of firepower systems, the side that first shoots down the other side's assaulting weapons will gain the initiative, and will thus be more able to effectively preserve themselves. Other than the necessary firepower assault, one should also widely use methods such as force strength raid-attacks, special strikes, and guerrilla sabotage, etc. to strike the enemy's firepower systems. Second is to establish a robust air defense system. The biggest threat on campaign firepower systems is the modern air raid; therefore, it is necessary to establish a comprehensive air defense system {tixi} in the entire theater, to concentrate the air and ground air defense weapons of all services and arms in the entire theater, and to maximally crush the air raid activities or weaken the enemy's air raid results. Third is to adopt effective early preventive measures, for example: implement skillful camouflage; fully utilize terrain and fortifications and disperse the positioning of firepower systems; and strengthen the warning and defense of the firepower systems.

Section 3: Campaign Maneuver...180

Maneuver is the activities of shifting force strengths and weapons and moving firepower in an organized manner in order to seize the initiative or form a favorable posture. Campaign maneuver is maneuver conducted by the armed forces to achieve a specific campaign goal. Not only is it the main content of campaign activities, it is also an important way to seize initiative position, to create favorable posture, to achieve sudden quality of the campaign, or even to gain campaign victory.

Maneuver is one of the basic activities of a campaign. Basically speaking, a campaign is conducted and accomplished in uninterrupted maneuver. Napoleon once said, "A marching army is precisely warfare," "the talent and ability of warfare is precisely the

talent and ability of movement,” and “an armed forces adept in movement will gain victory.” Campaign maneuver is not only the movement of force strengths and weapons before the battle, but it is even more prominently manifested within campaign operations. The penetration, thrust, cutting off, outflanking, envelopment, pursuit and retreat in a campaign are all specific manifestations of maneuver. It may be said that there is no campaign if there is no maneuver, and maneuver is the most important operational activity for constructing a campaign.

Maneuver is the main way in war to seize initiative and shake off the shackles of passivity. On the battlefield, the crux for seizing initiative is to form superiority of strengths, and superiority can only be formed through maneuver; a campaign is particular about seeking to locally create momentum, but creating momentum cannot be separated from maneuver; a campaign normally has many operational missions, many operational directions and many operational phases, and maneuver is the basic means for accomplishing the various transitions; battlefield situations are rapidly changing, the armed forces frequently fall into passivity, and maneuver is again the main method to shake off the shackles of an unfavorable position and to deal with unexpected situations.

Maneuver is an important means for achieving suddenness. Maneuver can result in an armed force to appear at a time and place the enemy did not expect and strike the enemy to catch them unaware; maneuver can move, disperse and tire the enemy so as to create favorable conditions for us to implement sudden attack; and maneuver is also an effective method of implementing campaign deception so as to attain the goal of hiding the real and showing the false, and sounding in the east but attacking the west.

Under modern conditions, due to the tremendous enhancement in reconnaissance capability, firepower, mobility, and assault capability of the armed forces, the operational space has drastically expanded and the non-linear battlefield has become a basic battlefield form-state {xingtai}. Therefore, the position and role of campaign maneuver has elevated without precedent while autonomous, flexible, and rapid maneuver have become the factors for gaining victory in the modern campaign.

I. Characteristics of Campaign Maneuver...181

(1) There are many maneuver modes and means, and three-dimensional maneuver becomes the basic mode of maneuver

Along with the development of military technology and weapons and equipment, the maneuver capability of the armed forces has been enhanced without precedent, and the modes and means of maneuver have obviously increased. The space of maneuver has developed from the past when ground maneuver had the lead to a three dimensional maneuver in multi-dimensional space on land, on sea (underwater) and in the air; the means of maneuver have developed from the past of maneuver on foot and riding ordinary transport vehicles to mechanized and motorized maneuver with tanks, infantry combat vehicles and standardized transport vehicles in an organized system in the lead, to

aerial maneuver with large type transport aircraft, transport helicopters and various operational aircraft and combat helicopters in the lead, and to sea maneuver with oceanic transport ships, specialized landing ships (boats), hover crafts and all kinds of operational vessels in the lead; and the content of maneuver has developed from the past where force strength maneuver was in the lead to a combination of force strength maneuver and firepower maneuver, with the proportion of firepower maneuver continuously growing.

The enhancement in armed forces maneuver, especially in the massive use of military helicopters, has led to the taking place of a qualitative leap in campaign maneuver modes. Currently, about 120 countries have a total of over 20,000 helicopters, of which the United States has more than 10,000. Meanwhile, the armies of every nation have universally established army aviation force units, giving ground force units the potential to implement maneuver and operations in the air. Aerial maneuver not only is fast in speed but it also has superior quality for directly leaping over the enemy's defensive positions. Thus, since the 1970s, the trend of army maneuver and taking operations into the air {zuozhan kongzhonghua} has developed extremely fast. The aerial maneuver capabilities of campaign operational strengths have continuously improved, and there have appeared within the campaign task organization new types of aerial maneuver and assault force units who can maneuver in the air as well as be able to alternatively maneuver in the air and ground. And the result of this is that the maneuver and operations in a modern campaign have a more and more three dimensional integrated ground and air quality, with three-dimensional maneuver already becoming a basic mode of modern campaign maneuver.

(2) Maneuver is large in scale, fast in speed, and long in range

1. The scale of the modern campaign maneuver has become larger. The degree of motorization of the modern army is already approaching 70%, enabling a campaign large formation in an organized structure {cheng jianzhi} to be able to conduct large-scale rapid maneuver on the battlefield. The largest aircraft-landed vertical envelopment occurred in the Gulf War when air assault force units of entire divisions and brigades rode military helicopters to implement aerial maneuver on the battlefield. At the same time several ten thousands and several hundred thousands of armed forces implemented transoceanic and transcontinental maneuvers.

2. The speed of modern campaign maneuver has accelerated. The highest speed of modern advanced tanks has reached 70-some km, and the attacking side can maneuver to an area over several hundred kilometers away within ten hours. A modern ship has increased its speed to 30-50 knots from the 10 knots in the early periods. During the War of the Malvinas Islands, the advanced detachment of the British special task fleet crossed the Atlantic Ocean at an average daily speed of 684 km to arrive in the theater of war in only 19 days and nights. Aerial maneuver has an even faster speed as the speed of operational aircraft has reached 3 mach (1000 m/sec). Advanced main combat aircraft can fly over 10 hours to participate in fighting on a battlefield over 10,000 km away. In the "ELDORADO" operation, 48 U.S. combat aircraft separately flew from three air

bases in the U.K. homeland at a speed of Mach 2 going around the west of France and Spain and via the Strait of Gibraltar to make a long-range intercontinental raid. In less than 6.5 hours, they flew 5,180 km to amply display the high speed nature of modern campaign maneuver.

3. The distance of modern campaign maneuver has expanded. Along with the continuous enhancement of armed forces maneuver and transport capabilities, the long range delivery capability of the armed forces has increased without precedence. In the War of Malvinas Islands, the maneuver distance of the British fleet was 13,000 km. The maneuver distance in the Gulf War was even longer as the airlift was 11,000 km, the eastern line of sea transportation was 15,000 km, and the western line was 22,000 km. During the ground offensive operations in the Gulf War, the U.S. 24th Mechanized Division spent only one and one half days to push 320 km forward. The 101st Airborne Assault Division implemented two airborne assaults towards the Iraqi military's campaign depths and leapt forward 150 km and 280 km, respectively. In the Iraq War, the maneuver speed of US forces was even faster. In modern campaign maneuver, the obvious changes in aspects such as scale, speed and distance have greatly improved the maneuver effectiveness of the armed forces.

(3) Confrontation between maneuver and counter-maneuver is fierce

In a modern campaign, the confrontation between maneuver and counter-maneuver will be extraordinarily intense. On the one hand, because maneuver is growing in significance for seizing campaign victory, counter-maneuver operations on the battlefield will receive a high level of attention. Counter-maneuver operations can delay the speed of an opponent's advance, disrupt their operational plans, kill their effective strengths, and weaken the sharp momentum of their attack. Highly effective counter-maneuver operations can even directly alter the force strength ratio between ours and their sides, and gain battlefield initiative. Thus, counter-maneuver operations are critical for winning a victory in a modern campaign. On the other hand, campaign maneuver under modern conditions will be implemented on a battlefield of unprecedented "transparency," and concealing the intention and activities of maneuver will be very difficult. At the same time, the means of modern operations and strikes will increase and firepower system assault will have high precision, long range, and large lethality. This will result in maneuver to encounter at any time an opponent's strikes and damage from the battlefield spaces such as air, ground, water surface (underwater) and various operational means. Hence, in a modern campaign, as both sides engaging in battle strive for and maintain battlefield initiative, not only must they implement initiative and flexible campaign maneuver, they must also adopt active and effective measures to oppose the counter-maneuver activities of the enemy. Maneuver and counter-maneuver have already become an important content of modern campaign confrontation and the struggle between maneuver and counter-maneuver will very intense.

(4) Firepower maneuver occupies an important position

Firepower maneuver refers to the activity of changing strike targets via altering fire direction or firing distance under the condition of not changing firing position or location.

In past wars, due to the close range and low strike effectiveness of firearms, the maneuver of firepower, to a large extent, was achieved via firearm maneuver, while the speed and scope of firearm maneuver were very limited. Thus, in terms of campaign level, it was very difficult to achieve effective firepower maneuver, and firepower maneuver was mainly applied in a tactical scope. Under modern conditions, the maneuver characteristics of firearms themselves have improved while the speeds and distances of maneuver have developed without precedence, particularly in the increase of firepower range and improvement in precision. This has enabled firearms to be able to control the entire depth of the campaign battlefield without changing their deployed locations as well as be able to accurately strike nearly all detected targets. Therefore, firepower maneuver has easily become an important component of modern campaign maneuver. Firepower maneuver not only is able to quickly and effectively wipe out and suppress the force strength and weapons of an opponent, restrict the freedom of their activities, and weaken and destroy their operational capability, but it can also gain even more freedom of activities for oneself, strive for more time and space, and under certain conditions, it can even directly attain specific campaign and strategic goals. Under modern conditions, along with the significant improvement of firepower strike and mobility, firepower maneuver will occupy a more and more important position in campaign operations.

II. Basic Patterns of Campaign Maneuver...184

In a modern campaign, correctly selecting and applying maneuver patterns has important significance for striving for campaign victory. In a modern campaign, campaign maneuvers with the shifting of force strengths and weapons as the main content mainly are the following patterns:

(1) Moving-in

Moving-in is the maneuver activity by a campaign large formation, based on a unified plan {*jihua*}, of organizing subordinate force-units to advance from an assembly area towards an area for preparing to carry out campaign missions. The goal of moving-in is to approach the enemy in order to create conditions for conducting campaign concentration and unfolding at the right time. When force-units are far from their attack targets or the defense areas, the moving-in is an indispensable maneuver pattern in implementing a campaign.

The modes for moving-in, if divided based on maneuver instruments, are moving-in on foot, motorized moving-in, mechanized moving-in, rail transport, air transport and sea transport, etc.; if divided based on maneuver spaces, there are moving-in by ground, moving-in by air, and moving-in by sea, etc. Under modern conditions, massive

application of modern means to conduct rapid transport is the main mode of campaign moving-in.

The characteristics of modern campaign moving-in are: a diversity of moving-in modes and means; the distances of moving-in are far, its speed is fast and time effectiveness is strong; during moving-in, it is normally difficult to avoid the enemy's reconnaissance and surveillance, the threat of encountering enemy raids, blockades, and sabotage is great; moving and fighting are frequently blended into one; and organizing command and organizing support missions are arduous and complex.

Campaign moving-in relates to the important operational activities of whether or not force-units are able to be used and successfully fight, whether or not they can preserve their military strength and fight to win, whether or not they can conceal the campaign intention and achieve campaign suddenness, and whether or not they are able to grab the battle opportunity and form the favorable postures at the right times. Thus, based on the threat level of the enemy situation and mission needs, we should implement campaign moving-in at the right time, quickly, covertly and safely.

(2) Depth envelopment

Depth envelopment {zongshen baowei} refers to the implementation of long-range, enveloping-form maneuver attack from the enemy's weak flank and against the enemy's remote depths and rear area by the main attack strength and complemented by frontal attack force-units. Its main goal is to first form an enveloping momentum against an enemy one is preparing to annihilate, and then, complemented by the frontal attack force-units, annihilate them. Great depth envelopment {dazongshen baowei} is one of the main patterns of campaign maneuver assault.

Great depth envelopment methods can be divided into two types according to maneuver assault modes:

The first type is flank envelopment. This includes two kinds of methods. The first is two-flank envelopment. Namely, this is to implement a pincer envelopment assault along a centripetal direction from two flanks towards the enemy's campaign depth. The characteristics of this type of method are that, by implementing maneuver assault from two directions, one can form a favorable posture of a two-flank complementary and pincer assault while at the same time one can force the enemy to disperse their resistance strengths so that it would be difficult to gain an advantage from both sides and this is beneficial for the attacking side to attain the envelopment goal. The second is single-flank envelopment. Namely, this is the implementation of an outflanking assault from one flank of the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition, pressing the enemy towards a natural or man-made obstacle difficult to scale, and one's own friendly groupings or a prearranged "pocket" so as to annihilate the surrounded enemy. The characteristics of this type of method are: by implementing maneuver assault from one direction, the attack strength is fairly concentrated and command coordination is relatively simple; by drawing the aid of

natural and man-made obstacles, one can economize on force-strengths; and maneuver distances are normally far, the resistance encountered is stronger, and one needs to have corresponding objective conditions.

The second type is separating envelopment. It also includes two types of methods: the first is to implement a separating envelopment from one direction. Namely, this is implementing assault from a weak direction at the front of the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition towards the depth, then wrapping into a fist to attack from two flanks, and separating and enveloping the enemy one is preparing to annihilate. The characteristics of this mode are that the initial assault strengths are concentrated, and one can separate the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition after entering the enemy's depth, but when wrapping into a fist to attack from two flanks, the strengths are weakened; furthermore, maneuver distances are far and the requirements are high for sustained operational capability. Implementing this envelopment method has a high requirement on the complementary activities of aerial assault force units (airborne landing force units) and other insertion, long range raid force-units (elements). The second is implementing separating envelopment from multiple directions. Namely, this is implementing a number of mutually adjusting-coordinated assaults either from multiple directions simultaneously along the front of the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition or successively towards the enemy's depth, and then separately implementing deep separating envelopment from along centripetal or centrifugal directions so as to one by one annihilate the surrounded enemy. The characteristics of this mode are that: implementing maneuver assault in multiple directions is more beneficial for achieving suddenness of attack and does not allow the enemy to promptly maneuver campaign reserve forces towards the direction that is greatly threatened; and after entering the enemy's depth, one can first dismember the enemy's entire campaign *bushi* disposition, cut off the mutual connectivity between the operational groupings, and facilitate subsequent separating and annihilating. However, this normally requires that the attacking side have absolute strength superiority and for the whole theater to have terrain and road conditions convenient for passage; command and coordination are also very complex.

Regardless of whether it was in past wars or under modern conditions, envelopment is the most effective maneuver pattern for annihilating the enemy's effective strength. The role of envelopment is even more reflected in its ability to generate huge psychological strike effect on enemy forces. Not only does envelopment cut off the connectivity between the enemy's surrounded groupings and the outside, which forms a favorable posture for annihilating the enemy, but even more important, this results in the enemy receiving an intense shock to their spirit, creating fear and confusion and even directly resulting in paralysis of the entirety of operational systems, and thereby obtaining higher operational benefits.

(3) Outflanking {yuhui}

Outflanking refers to force units avoiding or bypassing the front of the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition and conducting maneuver attack from the flank towards the enemy's

rear area. Its goals are mainly to attack the important targets in the enemy's depth, to seize important areas (or sites) along the lines of communications, to sever the connectivity between the enemy's current grouping with the campaign and strategic depth, to force the enemy to abandon its pre-established defensive positions or change its operational direction, and to form a favorable posture to annihilate the enemy. Like envelopment, outflanking is also one of the important patterns of campaign maneuver.

When weak parts appear in the enemy campaign *bushi* disposition flanks, and important targets or important areas (sites) related to the vital area of the enemy's campaign overall situation {di zhanyi quanju yaohai} are discovered in the enemy's depth, in order to accelerate the campaign progress and quickly form favorable posture to annihilate the enemy, one can adopt the mode of outflanking. The main characteristics of outflanking are: employment of crack rapid maneuver force-units; activity initiation possesses fairly large suddenness, and requires rapid, prompt, and accurate arrival at the outflanking terminal points, and actively and quickly accomplishing designated missions; and the outflanking distances are normally far, the operational intensity at the outflanking terminal point areas are high, and contention is fierce. Therefore, outflanking force-units must have stronger independent operational and support capabilities, and additionally, they still need to obtain powerful assisting support from aerial assault force units (airborne force units) and firepower.

Outflanking can be regarded as a modified form of envelopment. Outflanking and envelopment have one important difference, namely, that envelopment pays attention to mainly the enemy's force strength groupings, and as long as one is able to achieve the envelopment of the enemy one is preparing to annihilate, then in terms of operational space, one is permitted to make a large degree of movement, while outflanking lays even more attention on geographical position and the attack on a designated target. The role of outflanking is that it can "utilize the freedom of maneuver to create a decision point at a place the enemy has not made preparations." And this "decision point" is normally the enemy "fatal point" represented by a geographical location and important target. By attacking the enemy's "fatal point," outflanking can attain operational results similar to that of envelopment. During the ground offensive campaign of the Gulf War, The US military's 18th Airborne, complemented by aerial assault forces, implemented deep outflanking from a weak area on the Iraqi military's defensive right flank, and cut off the highway from Kuwait to Basra. It was the main reason causing a total collapse of the Iraqi defense system. This highway was also called the "Road of Death."

(4) Insertion

Insertion refers to crack force-units utilizing the gaps and weak parts in the enemy campaign *bushi* disposition to insert into the enemy's campaign depth and implement maneuver attack against their important parts. Its goals are mainly to raid the important targets in the enemy's depth, seize and occupy the vital points in the depth, disrupt the enemy's integrated whole *bushi* disposition, and block and separate the enemy's depth operational activities. The modes of insertion, based on the methods of entering the

enemy's depth, can be divided into secret insertion and forced insertion; based on the time of entering the enemy's depth, it can be divided into advance insertion and in-combat long-range raid insertion; and based on the direction of entering the enemy's depth, it can be divided into vertical insertion, outflanking insertion, single-direction insertion and multi-direction insertion.

The main characteristics of insertion are: employing crack force-units, fully utilizing the gaps and weak parts in the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition, and sudden, swift and violent, flexible and tenacious operational activities; its operational missions have a very strong directional quality and time effective quality, and it emphasizes avoiding entanglements with the enemy; its assault targets normally have fairly high campaign values and one can attain fairly high operational benefits with a fairly small amount of force-strengths; with mission-oriented command in the lead, it stresses active initiative and prompt execution; and it is separated or remote from the main force operations, it cannot easily receive prompt and effective assistance-support, and the degree of difficulty for survival and safeguarding-support is high.

Regardless of in a past or a modern campaign, insertion assault has an important position. Practice has proven that in the course of an attack, it is often impossible for all of the main force to attack and advance at the same high-speed at the same time. Moreover, its task organization is not large, its maneuver quality is strong, and insertion force-units also have independent operational capabilities, so they can leave the main force activities, and quickly wedge into the enemy's campaign depth. Utilizing the gaps and openings in the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition, they can broadly implement maneuver, bypass the enemy's strong points and not become entangled with the enemy. Thereby, they can even more quickly enter into a designated location, attack the important targets, support the smooth advance of the main attacking force-units, or achieve a favorable posture for annihilating the enemy. In addition, the implementation of high speed insertion assault is also an effective means for fully utilizing and expanding battlefield information warfare and integrated firepower warfare assault results. Under modern conditions, because there are no forever-stretching defensive zones and positions, the armed forces positioning on the battlefield is very dispersed and there are a large number of gaps and openings in the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition, it is even more beneficial to implement insertion assault operations.

(5) Vertical envelopment

Vertical envelopment refers to a kind of maneuver attack pattern of employing aerial assault force-units and airborne landing force-units to leap over the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition from the air and establish an internally-facing and externally-facing front in the enemy's campaign depth and rear area. Its goals are mainly to utilize the superiority of aerial maneuver, to seize the important areas and vital points in the enemy's remote depths and rear areas, to sever the enemy's retreat routes, to block the enemy's reinforcements, to complement force-units attacking the front or outflanking the side flank, and to quickly achieve a momentum of besieging an enemy one is preparing to

annihilate. Vertical envelopment is one of the campaign maneuver patterns that most possesses modern features and it is an important marker of three-dimensional maneuver.

The modes of vertical envelopment, based on airborne landing methods, can be divided into aircraft airborne landing, parachute airborne landing, and a mixed aircraft-parachute airborne landing, with the implementation of vertical envelopment with aircraft airborne landing receiving more and more attention. Based on the method of leaping into the enemy's depth from the air, one can divide it into direct mode, meaning to arrive at the position in a one-time maneuver, normally used in situations of relatively short distance aerial maneuvers or when the misgivings on the enemy situation in the enemy's depth is not bad; alternating mode, which is two or more aerial maneuver echelons successively alternating and maneuvering towards the designated area, and this is mainly used in situations of longer distance maneuvers or when there are greater misgivings for the enemy situation in the enemy's depth. For example, when the U.S. 101st Airborne Assault Division implemented vertical envelopment in the Gulf War, they used this mode; and frog-leap mode, meaning the same aerial assault force-unit uses the mode of gradual forward leaps to implement aerial maneuver, and this usage situation is basically the same as the alternating mode. Based on the vertical envelopment direction, it can be divided into single direction and multi-direction vertical envelopment. Based on the nature of the enemy one is preparing to annihilate, it can be divided into vertical envelopment of a face-to-face defensive enemy, of a retreating and fleeing enemy and a maneuvering enemy.

The main characteristics of vertical envelopment are: it needs to employ aerial assault force-units and airborne (parachute) landing forces at a fairly large scale; aerial maneuver speed is fast and distance is long, so that one can jump over the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition and natural obstacles and quickly achieve envelopment momentum against the enemy one is preparing to annihilate; it must be implemented under the condition of mastering air dominance (or localized air dominance); it must have strong and powerful air-to-ground firepower assisting-support and security safeguarding-support during the course of loading, unloading and aerial maneuver; it is far from the main force operations, its assisting support and safeguarding support are difficult, and it has limited sustained operational capability; and it emphasizes adjusting-coordination and complementing from frontal attack force-units and long-range campaign firepower.

The important significance of implementing vertical envelopment lies in the fact that force-units implementing envelopment can fully utilize the superiority of aerial maneuver, and by not undergoing the intense engagements of ground, layer-by-layer penetration and overcoming the long distance maneuver of heavy obstacles, they can quickly arrive at the designated area. They can form a favorable besiegement posture and thereby immediately be able to shake the entirety of the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition and tremendously accelerate the course of the campaign. This kind of campaign value possessed by vertical envelopment cannot be compared to other maneuver patterns. Exactly because of this reason, the Russian military considers vertical envelopment to have become a very important pattern of maneuver [mobile] operations

and a modern offensive campaign cannot be implemented without the coordination of this type of maneuver operations pattern. In the Gulf War, the U.S. military implemented the largest scale and longest distance airborne-landing vertical envelopment in the history of warfare. The 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Assault Division, only in about 3 hours on the second day of the ground offensive, conducted a one-instance long range raid of 175-miles to the north, and established a blocking position on the south bank of the Euphrates River, cutting off the connectivity between the Iraqi frontal defense force-units and the strategic depth, quickly forming an enveloping posture against the Iraqi military, and fully displaying the important position of vertical envelopment in a modern campaign. In the Iraq War, the US military's vertical envelopment activities also played an active role in its operations for quick decision.

(6) Retreat

Retreat, which is also known as withdrawal, refers to the maneuver by a campaign large formation giving up occupied areas and targets in an organized backwards transfer. The goals of retreat is to seize initiative, create combat opportunity and wait for defeat of the enemy, or to shake off the shackles of passivity, separate from the enemy and preserve military strength.

The types of retreat, based on its nature, can be divided into active retreat and passive retreat. Active retreat means to implement retreat when there is no or little enemy pressure and one's own side still enjoys battlefield initiative; passive retreat means to implement a forced retreat when enemy pressure is greater and one's own side is in an unfavorable position or perilous environment. If divided based on the relationship with the enemy, it can be divided into retreat while maintaining contact with the enemy and retreat while separating from the enemy. Retreat while maintaining contact with the enemy is retreat with partial force strengths entangled with the enemy, step by step resisting, and fighting and retreating at the same time. It is normally used in: blocking the enemy's rear pursuit, and covering the main force retreat; blocking the enemy's reinforcement, and supporting the main force's annihilation of the enemy on its route (partial); and luring the enemy in deep so as to create combat opportunity for the main force to annihilate the enemy. Retreat to separate from the enemy is maneuver implemented to achieve the goal of separating from contact with the enemy, and this is normally used when withdrawing from the battlefield or shaking off an unfavorable position. Under the situation when the enemy pressure is fairly large, in order to quickly shake off the enemy, sometimes it is necessary to step by step resist, block-intercept and pursue the enemy forces with partial force strengths. However, once the main forces enter the safe area, the covering force-units should also quickly separate contact with the enemy and discontinue entangling with the enemy.

The characteristics of retreat are: the force-units are often in an unfavorable position, time is urgent, circumstances {xingshi} are severe and missions are arduous; the enemy situation threat is serious, easy to encounter enemy intercept-attack, pursuit-attack, and firepower assault; under modern conditions, the intention of retreat is difficult to conceal,

and the requirements on campaign deception and operational secrecy are high; moving and fighting are tightly combined, and the operational missions of the covering force-units are heavy; correctly selecting the retreat route and controlling critical parts have important significance; it faces dangerous situations, retreat is easily thrown into confusion, control and adjusting-coordination of force-unit activities are difficult, and the requirement on a commander's psychological quality and command capability is high.

As an important campaign maneuver pattern, when compared to other maneuver patterns, one can say that retreat is harder to master and apply. Especially when forced to retreat under the situation of operational defeat or strong enemy pressure, it even further relies on a commander's courageous spirit, superb command skill and excellent quality of force-units. Just as what famous military theorist Jomini once said, "One should give an award for a skillful retreat the same as given to a most glorious victory."

III. Basic Requirements of Campaign Maneuver...190

(1) Avoiding the solid and attacking the void

Avoiding the solid and attacking the void is where the essence of campaign maneuver lies. Under modern conditions, because of the unprecedented improvement in military reconnaissance, firepower and maneuver, and in order to provide even more favorable conditions for identifying, creating and quickly utilizing the enemy's weak parts during operations and implement campaign maneuver, the thought of avoiding the solid and attacking the void can attain even more ample embodiment in campaign maneuver attack.

First, one must accurately identify and actively create the weak parts the enemy exposes. On the battlefield, the enemy military's weak area normally does not directly expose itself. Therefore, one must undergo thorough reconnaissance and comprehensive analysis of the battlefield situation and accurately identify the enemy's most weak points {ruodian}. When its campaign *bushi* disposition does not have an obvious exploitable utility weak part, one must manufacture an exploitable utility weak part in the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition with campaign information warfare, campaign firepower warfare and other necessary operational activities, aided by measures such as deception and feint, and through striking, relocating and holding up the enemy.

Second, we must quickly employ the main attack strength on the enemy's exposed weak points. Normally, we should make the enemy's weak flanks and rear area as the main direction of campaign maneuver. On the modern battlefield, the weak parts cannot remain static and unchanged for a long time because the enemy has the capability for high speed maneuver and in a very short time, their weak point can become a strong point. This requires a campaign commander to have sharp insight ability and rapid decisiveness to promptly ascertain and seize the weak parts appearing in the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition, and not lose the time opportunity for implementing campaign maneuver. At the same time, one should think of ways to maintain and expand the enemy's weak parts.

Third, one should connect together the attacking of the enemy's weak points to striking the enemy's centers of gravity {zhongxin}. Attacking the enemy's centers of gravity can quickly and fundamentally disrupt the stability and synchronization of the enemy's operational systems and collapse the enemy's operational capability. Therefore, one should select the weak parts that can lead to or directly threaten the enemy's centers of gravity to implement the main maneuver attack. The weak parts of the enemy's center of gravity that cannot be quickly attacked normally do not have important utility value. This requires one to thoroughly comprehend the internal situation of the enemy's operational system {tixi}, accurately identify the centers of gravity of their strengths, and fully utilize the enemy's exposed weak points. [This also requires one to] strive to implement quick attack and key point strike against given core parts or critical factors having a holding-together and bracing function on the entirety of the operational systems so they lose balance, thus accelerating the victory in the overall situation.

Fourth, one must make envelopment and outflanking as the basic campaign patterns. The main goal for implementing campaign maneuver is to annihilate the enemy's effective strengths, and envelopment and outflanking are the basic means for annihilating the enemy. Envelopment and outflanking are also the most suitable patterns for attacking the enemy's weak flanks or rear areas. Under modern conditions, the campaign patterns of envelopment and outflanking have had new development in their contents. Not only do they employ ground force-units to implement high speed maneuver against the enemy rear flanks, they also as much as possible broadly use patterns such as vertical envelopment and three-dimensional outflanking to quickly achieve envelopment and front-rear pincer momentum against the object [target]⁵ one is preparing to annihilate. At the same time as conducting envelopment and outflanking with one's main strengths, one should also implement frontal suppression, flanking feint attacks (movements) and small scale insertion assaults with partial force-strengths, and ensure that one smoothly achieves the main attack goals.

(2) Rapid advance-attack

Rapid advance-attack is the essential requirement of campaign maneuver. Suvarov once said, "Rapid and fierce attack is the real soul of war." Rapid advance-attack helps achieve suddenness of maneuver; it can maintain and enhance the sharp momentum of attack and render the enemy unable to recover from the first initial strike and organize an effective resistance; it can confuse the enemy's activity tempo and cause them to lose their freedom of activity; and it can allow the enemy to suffer heavy psychological strikes and lose the will to resist. Campaign maneuver seeks, through rapid advance-attack, to render one's own operational activities from beginning to end to be faster than the enemy's

⁵ Translator's note: the Chinese term, *duixiang* - 对象, is rendered as "object" with the [target] appended because "target" alone does not fully capture the Chinese meaning. *Duixiang* is *dui*, mutual or opposite and *xiang* is appearance or resembling, as if one is studying something in a mirror. It is a partner, target, opponent, object or subject of interest, depending on usage. The use of this term reflects a distinctively Chinese dialectic view of a relationship between the "object" and observer or subject.

response, to not allow the enemy's effective response to be able to avoid falling behind one's own continuously implemented decisive quality activities, and thus to realize the operational effects brought about by a rapid quality, ensuring that one seizes and maintains battlefield initiative.

To realize rapid advance-attack, we should grasp the following aspects:

First is to fully bring into play the function of suddenness. Suddenness and rapid quality complement each other. Suddenness can allow the enemy to be taken by surprise, be panic-stricken, and lose their capability for organized resistance, even being able to decisively alter the combat power ratio, thus reducing the obstruction to attack and improving attack speed. To this end, during maneuver, one must unify the overall *guihua* planning and implement effective campaign deception activities. [One must] also give support with information warfare, increase the weight on the enemy's "fog of war," and diligently achieve campaign and tactical suddenness so as to ensure high speed of maneuver. At the same time, high speed maneuver will also continuously disrupt the enemy's command cycle, continuously manufacture new suddenness, and further accelerate the tempo of maneuver attack. The campaign commander should fully utilize the direct relationship of the mutually facilitating and each shining brightly together relationship of suddenness and rapid quality, resulting in suddenness becoming the accelerator for rapid advance-attack.

Second is to implement three-dimensional, multi-route and multi-direction maneuver. Three-dimensional maneuver is the most effective means for improving maneuver speed. Realistically, modern campaign firepower can implement assault against the full-depth of the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition, but the capability of the ground maneuver force-units to immediately utilize these assault results are still very limited as before. Thus, aerial maneuver is the only maneuver mode able to be maximally matched with modern firepower. Consequently, one should concentrate and use army aviation forces and airborne landing forces in the most important direction and time opportunity to implement rapid maneuver so as to accelerate the campaign course. Moreover, implementing multi-route and multi-direction maneuver can disperse and contain the enemy's strengths, enlarge the space and intensity of strikes against the enemy, and similarly be beneficial to the speed of maneuver attacks.

Third is to maintain a sharp momentum and continuity of maneuver. Once maneuver attack starts, one must make full effort to carry it through round-the-clock, not let the enemy recover from the shock of the first assault and not let the enemy have time to ascertain the main direction of our attack. More importantly is to not provide the enemy the opportunity to concentrate its force strengths and firepower to deal with one's own main maneuver force-units and to reorganize their resistance. We must from start to finish maintain the pressure of the maneuver attack, as well as form and maintain an irresistibly sharp momentum.

Fourth is to only conduct operations with an enemy having an effect on achieving maneuver goals. All combat, even though it can annihilate enemy forces, consumes time, which slows down maneuver speed. Therefore, one must resolutely avoid unnecessary tactical activities. In maneuver, one must maintain the attack direction and strive to conduct operations only with a previously selected enemy at the necessary time and place. When one encounters an unyielding enemy strong point, one should decisively bypass it and avoid entangling with the enemy force units so as to facilitate leading the attack activities to the enemy's far depth as quickly as possible and fundamentally disrupt the balance of the enemy's operational system {tixi}.

(3) Lay equal stress on fighting and "moving"

Under modern conditions, the maneuver of armed forces faces severe challenges. On the one hand, since maneuver has become more important to attaining victory in operations, counter-maneuver operations are getting more attention everyday; on the other, the development of modern weapons and equipment has formed a huge threat for maneuver causing modern campaign maneuver to be conducted in the high intensity counter-maneuver operations of the enemy from the very start. Force-units will promote "moving" with fighting and protecting "moving" with fighting, and not only must one resist the enemy's counter maneuver, but one must implement counter maneuver against the enemy. The practice in past wars of *move first and then fight* or *fight first and then move*, and the conditions of alternately separating fighting and moving no longer exists. Fighting has already become an indispensably intrinsic essential element of "moving," if one does not successfully fight, then he cannot "move," and only being able to fight and win can one smoothly "move." Additionally, "moving" also achieves a more effective "fight." Not only can "moving" achieve a favorable posture for annihilating the enemy, but it can also gain a more favorable launch position. It can also approach the enemy and create considerations for implementing long range strikes against the enemy. The new publication of the US Army's "Operational Outline" [Operations] also acknowledges: "If the enemy holds a clear superiority from a long distance, the confrontation method may be to approach the enemy so that it does not dare to use its firepower might to possibly endanger its own forces." Hence, laying equal stress on fighting and "moving" is a necessary requirement for implementing campaign maneuver under modern conditions.

To abide by the requirements of laying equal stress on fighting and "moving" in a modern campaign one must mainly grasp the following aspects:

First is seizing and maintaining localized air dominance. Under modern conditions, there is no freedom of maneuver if there is no air dominance. In this regard, when implementing campaign maneuver, one must maximally concentrate the main aviation forces and air defense strengths, form a tight air defense firepower system {tixi} in the main maneuver direction, build a safe maneuver corridor, and seize and maintain a localized air dominance for a specific time and space. At the same time, relying on their own air defense firepower weapons, the maneuver grouping's strikes on the enemy's

incoming aerial raid is also one of the main methods for safeguarding anti-air security during maneuver.

Second is attaching importance to protecting the security of the flanks. Along with the expansion of the depth for entering the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition, the maneuver force-units will form totally exposed flanks. These are the "weak windows" of maneuver force-units most easy to encounter strikes; thus safeguarding the flank security of the attack force-units is an important content of fighting during "moving." In order to reliably safeguard the flanks, one must: dispatch guarding elements {jingjie fendui} to the flanks; position strong flank safeguarding force-units in the direction receiving threats; especially position anti-tank and anti-helicopter reserve forces so as to prevent enemy tank and armored raids; allow second echelon (reserve forces) to follow the rear of the most threatened flanks; and when necessary, one can pluck partial force strengths to occupy areas having important significance for flank protection.

Third is implement counter-maneuver against the enemy. Maneuver and counter-maneuver complement each other because often it is difficult to be successful with maneuver alone. It is only through uninterrupted disruption and restriction of enemy maneuver that one can effectively safeguard one's own maneuver because the enemy's maneuver is frequently on account of one's own maneuver. For this reason, one should implement powerful counter-maneuver operations against the enemy with modes such as firepower strikes, long range rapid set-up of obstacles, aerial leap-over assaults, etc., throwing the enemy's plans {jihua} into confusion by delaying the enemy's activities, weakening the enemy's combat power, and even completely smashing the enemy's maneuver so as to create favorable conditions for one's own side to smoothly implement maneuver.

Fourth is multi-route, multi-direction and multi-mode maneuver. One should fully utilize various road and transportation conditions inside the area of maneuver and strive to adopt multiple modes while simultaneously implementing multi-route, multi-direction wide maneuver. The superior qualities of this kind of method are: First is to be able to in general terms improve maneuver speed and reduce maneuver time. Second is to be able to increase the degree of difficulty for the enemy to accurately assess one's own maneuver intention and main maneuver columns, and even cause the enemy to generate mistakes and delay the time for the enemy to correctly respond. Third is to be able to disperse the force strengths and firepower the enemy uses for counter-maneuver, making it difficult for the enemy to simultaneously obstruct the various directions of our maneuvering columns, as well as clearly lowering the effects of firepower intercepting attacks. Even if a certain number of force-units encounter the enemy's blocking attacks or gets heavy losses, other force-units will still be able to accomplish their maneuver missions according to the predetermined plans {jihua}.

Fifth is to adopt multiple measures of deception, concealment, camouflage and safeguarding-support. One is actively implementing feints, deceiving and bewildering the enemy, and concealing our main maneuver *bushu* disposition and main attack directions.

Second is enhancing concealment and camouflage, blinding the enemy's long-range remote sensing reconnaissance, and weakening the assault results of their aerial and long-range firepower. Third is successfully completing various safeguarding support measures such as: organizing and allocating sufficient road safeguarding support strengths for the maneuver force-units; dispatching advance elements to the bridge, crossings and narrow passages, etc. in the maneuver direction to control them in advance; raid attack and disrupt the enemy's information systems and long range firepower strike systems with special operational force-units and local force-units; ensuring technical and logistical safeguarding support during maneuver; and implementing uninterrupted command and coordination.

(4) Attach importance to creating momentum

The basic goal of campaign maneuver is to create a type of favorable battlefield posture that allows for an attacking armed forces to obtain or maintain superiority at their location and in the aspect of strengths, allows for decisive quality engagements to be implemented under the most favorable conditions, or even directly achieves a decisive quality outcome through maneuver and thus greatly reducing the combat coefficient and sustained time. During the Liao-Shen Campaign, the PLA's southern move to Jinzhou by the Northeastern Field Army formed the momentum of *shutting the gate and beating the dog*. Also, McArthur's Inchon landing [created momentum]. These are representative examples of gaining superiority in terms of location to generate a significant effect on the entire campaign and even the overall war situation. In the words of Lidell Hart, "one doesn't have to undergo a significant engagement to achieve decisive quality results." In this sense, the real goal of campaign maneuver rather than explained as seeking out engagement is better explained as seeking to create a favorable battlefield posture. Even though this type of superiority itself cannot lead to a decisive quality battle results, one can achieve the entirety of campaign goals through subsequent engagements and battles.

In order to achieve the goal of creating momentum through maneuver, one should grasp the following points:

First is to prudently await opportunity [stand by], remain still, and move later. Under modern conditions, battlefield transparency has greatly improved, so although one would create desirable combat opportunities by continuing to use the mode of large scale and long distance maneuver with main force units from previous warfare periods to shift, disperse and exhaust the enemy and form favorable posture, one could not achieve the anticipated goals and even cause the maneuver force-units to become the targets for enemy aerial and long range precision strike firepower. To this end, the main force force-units should be at a campaign depth location convenient for maneuvering forward, selecting favorable terrain, be concealed and awaiting opportunity. Wait for when the enemy's weak part is completely exposed, when the conditions for implementing maneuver attack are already mature and the operational goals are a hundred percent clear; then the main force force-units will implement sudden and quick maneuver.

Second is boldly maneuver, and try hard to avoid tactical quality operations. As soon as the maneuver starts, we must fully utilize the enemy's weak parts, without regard for anything, directly inserting into the campaign center of gravity of the enemy's furthest depth. [We must] not excessively have misgivings about the security of the flanks, not pursue localized tactical victories, strive for the fastest speed to enter the enemy's rear, and achieve favorable operational posture. Although this bold maneuver seems to be risky, the decisive quality effects it brings will quickly be revealed as we approach the enemy's campaign center of gravity, as well as immediately being reinforced. In 1940, the German army conducted a blitzkrieg against France. Its main characteristic was deliberately avoiding fierce engagements and penetrating the French rear, not pursuing significant tactical victories and instead directly outflanking to the rear of the Maginot defense line along the weak parts where the French army did not set up defenses, and immediately and totally collapsing the French defense

Third is applying various patterns and means to quickly achieve favorable battlefield posture. Great depth envelopment and outflanking are the most basic patterns for achieving favorable battlefield posture. At the same time, one must apply as much as possible patterns such as vertical envelopment and aerial leap-over attack, improve maneuver attack speed, and shorten the time for forming favorable posture.

Fourth is forming favorable posture by centering on strikes to the enemy's center of gravity. What is called favorable posture refers to the posture formed when the main force force-units can enter a location where they can most directly or indirectly strike the enemy's center of gravity. Consequently, the terminus of campaign maneuver should be selected at the vital area that holds together the entire campaign *bushi* disposition and that plays a supporting function for maintaining the operational capability of the enemy. Approaching and striking these parts not only results in being unable to immediately obtain overall campaign situation victory, but it also creates favorable conditions for subsequently and ultimately smashing the enemy's center of gravity.

Section 4: Campaign Special Operations...196

Campaign special operations refers to the irregular operational activities implemented by specially formed, trained and equipped crack force units (element) using special warfare in order to achieve specific campaign and strategic goals. Its goals are mainly to raid the enemy's vital area targets, paralyze the enemy's operational systems {tixi}, reduce the enemy's operational capability, and interfere, delay and disrupt the enemy's operational activities in order to create favorable conditions for the main force force-units. Campaign special operations are important operational activities in a modern campaign for affecting battlefield posture and pushing forward campaign progress.

Modern special operations emerged in WWI and received full development after the war. The main reason for this is because in a long period of non-warfare state, a party implementing special operations normally can effectively achieve certain limited military, political and diplomatic goals under the conditions of not undertaking great

political risk and not creating large human and material expenditures. Consequently, this mode of specialize operational activities easily has become the commonly used means for some countries to externally prosecute their military force, express their political will and resolve major disputes during a non-warfare state. Because of this, it has received high attention.

Along with the continuous development in the scale, weapons and equipment and training levels of special force-units, the application of special operations has broadened on a daily basis. Recent localized wars have shown that special operations serve as an effective operational means and during a modern campaign, bring a more and more important function into play. For example, in the Malvinas Islands War between the Britain and Argentina, the British military organized 15-member special task teams to sneak into Argentine territory and blow up all “Super Etendard” aircraft at Rio [Grande] and [Rio] Gallegos Air Base to remove the greatest threat to British Special Task Force. In the Iraq War, the multi-national force headed by the United States implemented the largest scale special operation in the history of warfare. The multi-national force sent various types of special force-units (elements) composed of up to ten thousand personnel to infiltrate into the rear of the Iraqi army for special operations such as reconnaissance, jamming, sabotage, deception and feints to provide a powerful complement to the aerial and ground main offensive activities. The practice of war has proven that special operations have become an important, indispensable operational activity of a modern campaign.

I. Main Characteristics of Campaign Special Operations...197

(1) Special quality

Special quality refers to campaign special operations having many special parts when compared with other regular operational activities. They are mainly manifested in: the strengths of special operations normally undergo special equipment, special training and special organizational groupings, and they possess very strong special operational capability, survivability and self-sufficiency; special operational activities are flexible, covert, sudden, and quick, and they are difficult to be on the lookout for because it is a “hidden arrow” against an “open gun;” it can execute a variety of operational missions with special qualities, and it can satisfy the needs-requirements of a variety of operational goals; and with the vital part targets in the enemy’s campaign systems {xitong} as the main objects of attack, one can obtain the results of “extracting a 1,000-pound effect from 4-ounces;” implement “precision strike” against the enemy with force-strengths, and be able to accomplish many complex missions unable to be achieved with firepower precision strikes. In addition, owing to the continued emergence and the application on the future battlefield of high and new technology equipment such as space warfare weapons, meteorological weapons, biological weapons and non-lethal weapons, the missions of special operations will increase and their scope will grow. Space warfare, meteorological warfare, environmental warfare, and non-lethal warfare, etc. will possibly

become the content of special operations and this will result in the position and role of special operations to become even more prominent.

(2) Flexible quality

Flexible quality is one of the biggest characteristics of special operations. First, the operational organizational groupings are flexible. Normally, this is being forthright and capable [crack], having the goal of accomplishing the mission, and not having a fixed model. Second, the operational missions are flexible. The entrusted operational missions have a fairly large degree of freedom and selectable quality and can be nimbly determined according to needs-requirements; outside of missions that must be accomplished, during the operational course, one can nimbly make changes by centering on the general operational goal to be achieved. Third, the operational activities and methods are flexible. Special operations will have great flexible quality in all aspects such as the entry-exit routes, maneuver modes, strike time-opportunities, and operational means, etc. This is the core embodiment of the flexible quality feature of special operations. Last, the command mode is flexible. Normally, mission-oriented command is used, whereby the commander of a special operations element or team makes his own decisions and command based on actual situations of the battlefield in order to achieve the goals of exchanging for optimum operational results and maximum victory with the most beneficial modes and minimum costs.

(3) Concealment [covert] quality

Campaign special operations are the operational activities implemented with crack strengths for penetrating the enemy's campaign depths. Thus, concealment quality is a necessary condition relied upon by special operations strengths for survival and accomplishing designated missions. One must strive to implement all the activities of special operations in a concealed state. The time opportunity for special operations is mainly utilizing night, inclement weather and when the enemy is careless in guarding; the activities of special operations mainly adopt indirect confrontation modes such as deception, surprise raids, sabotage, enemy captures, and assassinations, as well as special tactics and psychological warfare; the basic means of special operations are unorthodox raids, the use of fighting methods and means to catch the enemy unaware at a time and place the enemy does not expect, and swift and violent strikes to catch the enemy unprepared.. It is worth pointing out that newly emerging computer "hacker" warfare possesses even greater concealed quality. This kind of broadly distributed, simple to use equipment and completely invisible logical attack will cause an armed forces which is developed in information technology and broadly using information equipment to suffer attacks that are difficult to guard against. Consequently, computer "hacker" warfare will also become an important means of special operations. Concealment quality can bring the important role of special operations into play during a modern campaign, and it is a main factor for creating tremendous psychological deterrence for the enemy.

(4) High effectiveness quality

High effectiveness quality refers to special operations having a very high cost-effectiveness ratio. Special operations normally only requires very few campaign strengths and operational resources, and special operation activities often are small-scale tactical-grade activities, but due to its adoption of all kinds of special fighting methods and means and its main objects [targets] of attack being the vital parts and critical targets in the enemy's operational systems {xitong}, it can gain very high operational benefits. For example, before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the USSR dispatched a special assault team to secretly infiltrate into that country and assassinated President Amin to cause chaos in that country, and then occupied the country almost without any resistance. In the Gulf War, before the air strike of the multi-national force, a special operational detachment was sent in to guide armed helicopters to destroy the border radar stations of Iraq's air defense system to turn the huge air defense system defunct before the first ground attack by the multi-national force. Along with the enhancement of their operational capability and further development of their operational theory, special operations force-units will possibly employ small-scale activities to directly achieve some specified campaign and strategic goals and their activities develop higher operational effectiveness.

II. Basic Patterns of Campaign Special Operations...199

Campaign special operations have broad adaptability and flexibility; thus this emphasizes flexibly selecting operational modes based on operational missions and specific situations of the battlefield. This has resulted in the appearance of obviously diverse features for the operational patterns of special operations. When seeing them as a whole, its main operational patterns can be divided into the following types:

1. Special reconnaissance. This is penetration of the enemy's campaign depth and rear area, the implementation of strategic and campaign reconnaissance, indicating targets for one's own precision strike weapons, and verifying strike results, etc. Using special operation force-units to implement reconnaissance operations is an important method for remedying the shortage of high-tech reconnaissance means under modern conditions. Campaign special operations are normally implemented by adopting unorthodox raids and clandestine sabotage methods and as much as possible avoids face-to-face confrontation with the enemy; but under very necessary situations, one can concentrate a certain number of special operations force-units to seize-occupy important targets and vital points in the enemy's depth and directly complement the attack of main force force-units.

2. Special raid-attacks. This is mainly eliminating enemy command personnel or capturing the important military-political heads with the method of unorthodox raids and attacking enemy strategic and campaign command institutions. The goal is to cause the enemy's government and armed forces to lose control and cause chaos without fighting. This also includes capturing and eliminating the enemy's important secrecy, intelligence

and technical support personnel, and raiding-wiping out small force-strength groups in the enemy depths that are careless on guard.

3. Special sabotage-attacks. This is mainly adopting “hard” destruction means such as demolitions and destroying the enemy’s high-tech weapon systems {xitong}, C³I systems {xitong}, radar detection systems {xitong}, airfields, piers, bridges, traffic hubs, large rear area bases and warehouses, and weakening the enemy’s capability for information control, operations, maneuver and logistics support.

4. Special raid-harassments. This is, in the enemy’s expansive campaign depth and rear, the adoption of methods such as breaking the whole into pieces, going east now and then going west, promptly striking-promptly leaving, spreading flower petals in all directions, or [this is] the raid-attacks and capturing and killing, or blowing up, or harassing, [this is] the putting of the enemy constantly in an air of fear, worry, uneasiness and tiresomeness and in a difficult situation to deal with matters; and [this is] forcing the enemy to have difficulty in concentrating its energy and force strengths to counter the attack of one’s own main force force-units.

5. Special technical warfare. This is fully utilizing various technical means provided by modern science and technology and achieving specific operational goals. For example, pouring computer viruses into the enemy’s computer network systems {xitong}; applying information technology to alter the content of command and control instructions transmitted within the enemy’s information systems; inserting one’s own manufactured broadcasts and images in the enemy’s radio and television stations; applying technical means to cause deviations to occur in the enemy’s positioning and navigational systems or cause their high-tech weapons to lose effectiveness, etc. Along with the progress of military-use high technology, the content and methods of special technical warfare will be further substantiated and expanded.

III. Basic Requirements of Campaign Special Operations...200

(1) Flexible organizational grouping, multi-functional capable [crack] troops

The basic requirements of campaign special operations are: small grouping, capable, and multi-functional. “Small grouping” is the requirement in terms of scale for a special operations organized grouping. In order to adapt to the characteristics of being flexible, concealed and sudden, one special operational team (group) is normally organized with several to several tens of people, and the specific number of people should be flexibly determined on the basis of the needs-requirements for accomplishing the mission.

“Capable” is the qualitative requirement for the special operations organized grouping. Since a special operations team (group) is normally in the enemy’s campaign depth, is far from the main force, operates independently, and accomplishes missions with campaign or even strategic significance, they must possess rapid infiltration capability, independent operations capability, ad hoc variable capability, and battlefield survival capability. This requires the composition of special operation teams [groups] from sharp soldiers and

special technical personnel undergoing special training. They are also equipped with superior weapons and equipment and special technical instruments in order to ensure the needs-requirements of special operations. “Multi-functional” is the functional requirement for a special operations organized grouping. The missions of special operations have very strong flexibility and diversity and the special operation teams [groups] must have the capability to accomplish multiple missions, so they must have a variety of functions in terms of task-organization. The organized grouping of special operations under modern conditions must possess a very high combined quality. Within an operational team, not only should it be organized with experts of general-use weapons, experts of communication and electronics, experts in engineering and explosives, and experts in health, etc., but it should also be matched with specialized special experts based on mission needs-requirements. At the same time, the members participating as special operations teams should also have specialties and skills in many areas so that the organized grouping of the special operations teams [groups] is based on the principles of small grouping and capable troops, and possesses the function of accomplishing variously different missions.

(2) Select vital areas to attack, give priority to unorthodox raids

Selecting vital areas to attack is the basic principle for selecting operational targets in special operations. Special operations serves as the implementation of “precision” strike by force strengths, and one should persist in selecting the vital area parts holding together and propping up the enemy’s operational system {tixi} and overall operational capability as the main objects [targets] of strikes. These vital area targets are mainly concentrated in the enemy’s information systems {xitong}, high-tech weapon systems {xitong}, logistic support bases and communication and transportation systems {xitong}. One should select from amongst these systems {xitong} the vital area targets having the most strike value, concentrate special operation strengths to give key point strikes, so as to get the effect of “pulling one hair to move the entire body” and “attack one node and all nodes become useless,” maximally paralyze and dismember the enemy’s operational systems {xitong}, and weaken their operational capability.

Unorthodox raid is the main operational method of campaign special operations. Unorthodox raid can change the strength ratio of the two sides in the twinkling of an attack, and greatly improve the relative operational strength of the special operations team (element); it can effectively achieve suddenness and reinforce the assault results; it can avoid the face-to-face confrontation with the enemy’s superiority force-strengths, and improve the special operations team’s (element’s) survivability and sustained operational capability. Consequently, one should fully bring into play the characteristics of small, capable and flexible for the special operations team (group), [one should] utilize the opportunities of nighttime, bad weather and careless enemy guarding, [one should] adopt measures such as camouflaging (disguising), deception and feints, and [one should] implement surprise raids and various sabotage activity against the enemy’s vital area targets via concealed, sudden and fierce operational activities. Strive to *attack what is not prepared, subdue the enemy with speed, seek victory in the midst of confusion, fight fast-*

leave fast, and avoid falling into an unfavorable position of face-to-face confrontation. Only in the situations of when absolutely necessary or as a last resort should one use the fighting method of forced attack.

The relationship between selecting vital areas to attack and giving priority to unorthodox raid is the relationship between goal and means. The enemy's vital area targets are often tightly guarded, so one can only have the possibility of achieving one's goals by adopting unorthodox fighting methods. The unorthodox raid is a necessary means for implementing selecting vital areas to attack.

(3) Independent operations, dispersed in form but combined in strengths

Independent operations are the basic activity mode of the special operations team (group). The teams (or groups) executing special operation missions separately enter the depths of the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition, each following their respective missions, independently operating, and normally infrequently receiving any direct assistance from other teams (groups) and main force force-units. This requires the special operations team (group) to have a very strong capability for independent operations, and be able to completely rely on their own strengths to accomplish the pre-determined missions.

Separated in form and combined in strength refers to a highly independent operational activity in terms of activity modes for special operations, and it is not *fighting on one's own* and *each doing their own thing* separate strikes implemented against the enemy but rather an important component forming an organic whole with the entirety of campaign activities that is tightly centered on the unified campaign operational intent. Although it is difficult to form in terms of tactically, a direct complementing of each other between the various special operational teams (groups) and between the other campaign operational activities, they must form complementing of each other in terms of the campaign and even the strategic level. This high level complementation is mainly manifested through the function created from achieving the unified campaign goal. For this reason, one should stand at the campaign and strategic height in selecting the targets of special operations. "Good to strike" is not the main criterion for selecting targets for special operations. The main criterion is the campaign or strategic value possessed by the target. In order to achieve a specific campaign or strategic goal, special operations frequently adopt activities in the enemy's strong point parts. In this regard, this is a very large difference between special operations and guerilla warfare. Campaign special operations even further emphasizes bringing into play the role of achieving the general campaign intent, and further emphasizes a campaign quality complementing of the offensive activities of regular operational force-units. This results in each operational activity of each special operations team (group) being able to directly or indirectly play an active role in directly or indirectly pushing forward and affecting the entire campaign progress. Thereby, this allows the special operations activities separately implemented in the enemy's great depth to form a tremendously combined strength at the campaign and even at the strategic level.

(4) Centralized control and dispersed command

Due to the unique qualities of special operations, the teams (groups) responsible for special operations should be under the centralized control of the group army, service and theater command institutions. This not only allows the campaign commander to directly control specialized strike means and strike targets, but it also unifies the overall planning and employment of the limited special operations strengths in the campaign's most important direction and on the most valuable strike targets so as to ensure the organic adjusting-coordination of special operations activities with the activities of the entire campaign. One should mainly adopt the mission-oriented command mode for the specific activities of the special operation team (group), and carry out dispersed command. The commanders of the special operation team (group) will, based on the actual battlefield situations, handle affairs according to one's own judgment, flexibly dispose of affairs, and conform to all the characteristics of independent, rapid and flexible qualities of special operations. When the battlefield situation undergoes major changes or contact with higher levels is lost, the special operations team (group) commander should consciously adhere to the general campaign intent and fully bring into play initiative and creativity to try every means to accomplish the predetermined missions or diligently create conditions and seize combat opportunities to independently organize ad hoc operational activities and actively center on the general campaign goal in implementing effective special operations.

Section 5: Campaign Psychological Warfare...203

Psychological warfare refers to a specially synthesized operational activity in which two sides engaged in battle, with information and media as weapons and psychological factors such as human thought, awareness, spirit and emotions as operational objectives, bring to bear stimulating effects through various means and create a psychological state favorable to us but unfavorable to the enemy, thereby solidifying one's own psychological defense line and maintaining high morale, splitting up and collapsing the enemy forces, and exchanging for as small a price as big a victory as possible.

Along with the rapid development of scientific technology and continuous innovation of weapons and equipment, the psychological warfare built on the foundation of strong military and real economic strength will have more deterrence power and cohesive strength than at any time of the past. Speaking from a certain sense, it can even surpass material strengths and restrict the progress and conclusion of a war. On the one hand, psychological warfare has powerful "soft kill" ability in war as it can achieve effects other operational activities cannot. During operations, [we should] seriously study and analyze the psychological characteristics and changing laws of enemy personnel, implement psychological attack with definite aim points, adopt various means such as propaganda, threats, deception, temptation, and bribes to induce psychological activity and collapse their will to resist. This kind of special operational form that is completely different from military strike will often achieve unimaginably amazing results. During the period of the Liberation War, with the aim of shaking the enemy army's faith, the PLA

utilized various forms {xingshi}, leading with propaganda, to influence the reasoning and awareness of the enemy personnel, conquered their hearts in terms of thought and politics, caused the enemy to put down their weapons and surrender, and achieved brilliant battle results. On the other hand, psychological warfare has powerful cohesive function which can extremely elevate combat power during operations. War is famous for its fierceness, tension, hardship, bloodiness and cruelty, and all personnel participating in operational activities suffer tremendous psychological pressure. Under these situations, we should adopt various effective methods for conducting psychological protection, raising our own personnel's psychological endurance capability, and weakening the enemy's psychological effects. All of these enable one's own personnel from start to finish for maintaining the conviction of *must win*, maintaining the optimism for defying hardships and dangers, and thus maintaining a vigorous combat power.

In short, psychological warfare has become an indispensable operational form in a modern campaign. The fighting methods and application scope of psychological warfare also continuously develop along with the development of warfare. In a modern war, psychological warfare is called "one of the various operational modes on the integrated battlefield" and "the fourth operational mode as distinguished from land warfare, air warfare and sea warfare." The development of informationized war has decided the inevitable enlarged role of psychological warfare and that objectively requires placing psychological warfare in a more important position.

I. Main Characteristics of Campaign Psychological Warfare...204

(1) Psychological warfare possesses a distinctive strategic quality feature

Psychological warfare under modern conditions is the highest phase as well as the highest form-state of psychological warfare development up to today. In the era of informationized wars, psychological warfare has been included in the category of national strategy and has become an important operational form for achieving national strategic objectives. Psychological warfare is no longer an auxiliary means in military struggle but rather an important campaign activity possessing strategic significance. The macroscopic instigating hierarchy of psychological warfare has already been elevated to the highest national and military strategic decision-making levels and the foremost attack targets of psychological warfare also directly aim at the opponent's highest strategic decision-making level. The localized war under modern conditions, due to the restrictions of various factors and the strength, scope and time of military strikes, can be restricted as much as possible within the scope of what is permitted politically. For each military activity, one must not only consider its military value but also its political and psychological value. For every phase of the campaign, one must evaluate the psychological effects achieved on the enemy and then decide the strength of the next phase's military strike in order for military objectives and political-psychological objectives to highly coincide. In modern wars, the criteria for measuring success are no longer solely the material factors such as personnel casualties, property losses and loss of territory. Conquering the spirit has become a fundamental goal and symbol for conquest

and victory. The ultimate objective of military activities is also the conquest of national will and social psychology. The high tech quality of campaign activities under modern informationized conditions has given psychological warfare solid materialistic technical foundation and means, thereby enabling its development to become an even more active and important role. The implementation of high intensity psychological warfare against the enemy has already become an importantly indispensable component in military strategy. It is already difficult to distinguish the strategic, campaign or tactical levels of psychological warfare activities in integrated joint operations, and the psychological warfare campaign scale and even the tactical scale frequently can bring about an important strategic role.

(2) The characteristics of diverse psychological warfare methods and concurrent implementation of soft and hard are prominent

The unfolding of psychological warfare itself is directed against human psychology, and it has all along been traditionally regarded as a mode of soft strike, but in modern wars, because “psychological warfare” and “military warfare” have been tightly combined, and many methods are synthetically applied in psychological warfare, mutually complementing each other and concurrent implementation of soft-hard, the effectiveness of psychological warfare has been greatly enhanced. The so-called *hard* generally refers to physically conducting real kills against humans via weapons; the so-called *soft* refers to creating an effect against human reasoning, emotions and will via psychological methods, achieving the goal of depriving or changing the mental spirit, morale and will of enemy personnel, not harming the physical body of the opponent and “attacking the enemy without form.”

The soft quality strike of modern psychological warfare will achieve hard kill by creating psychological damage. The high-tech weapons used to conduct armed strikes is precisely the effective means of psychological warfare, and their display and employment are able to achieve the actual results of psychological warfare. The soft quality strike of psychological warfare itself has no form and must have the help of carriers and delivery instruments to achieve the effectiveness and function of a weapon, which is also to say that soft-quality weapons must be attached to hard-quality weapons before it can become a weapon. For example, the microwave weapon, the hypersonic weapon and the infrasonic weapon currently being vied for by the countries of the world, there are major differences between their ways and means of killing and that of conventional weapons, but what must be paid attention to is not the human flesh and body to be destroyed but the human will. Thus it may be said that the means used by psychological warfare themselves are both soft and hard.

Additionally, the traits of a highly blended “military warfare” and “psychological warfare” in modern integrated joint operations have decided that the fighting method of psychological warfare is definitely a concurrently implemented soft and hard. Deterrence concurrently exists with reason and comfort, and the implementation of both a hard contest of strength and a soft-quality lure for gain extremely enriches the content of

psychological warfare activities. In terms of operational results, the physiological hard wounds caused by firepower kill will also bring about a psychological soft kill, while the slight decrease in enemy personnel combat power created by psychological soft kill is also exactly the operational results pursued by hard kill.

(3) The time domain of psychological warfare activities has an extended quality

Under modern conditions, psychological warfare often has already been implemented before the campaign is initiated. It also permeates the entire campaign course and its effectiveness can still be brought into play after its operational activities have concluded. Its implementation is manifested in a phase quality, it is unfolded over the full time, and it has an extended quality in terms of time domain. Although the content, object [target] and pattern of activities in its different phases are not all the same, its general objective is consistent. In the Gulf War, the U.S. military psychological warfare units were took the lead in their *bushu* disposition and arrived in place five months before the war erupted to unfold prior to battle psychological warfare activities. On the one hand, they played up that U.S. forces and a large quantity of new-type weapons and equipment had arrived in the Gulf with the intention of creating a huge psychological deterrence for the Iraqi people and creating momentum for a big war; on the other hand, they were helped the media to continuously issue “authoritative” news-information with which to confuse the Iraqi forces and manufacture the false image that the multi-national forces would not start the war until February. During the course of operations, the U.S. psychological warfare units actively unfolded their activities to fool, mislead, and deceive the Iraqi public and military, collapsing their will, slackening their sentiments and effectively complementing the military offensive activities. After the end of the war, the psychological warfare personnel continued to execute missions in the northern Iraq. Another example is after the end of the Kosovo war, NATO continued to publicize through various means the “just quality” of their activities, made accusations on the “crimes” of Yugoslavian leaders, and augmented the achievements of their military strikes through psychological warfare with the intent of ultimately conquering public sentiments. In this sense, psychological warfare activities played a vanguard role in war, catalyzed the war results and also did its utmost to consolidate and preserve the war results. Because psychological activities are often somewhat covert [concealed] at the beginning of initiation, campaign initiation and conclusion still start and end with military strikes, but in fact, due to the participation of psychological activities, the start and end of campaign activities under modern conditions has also changed to a concealed quality and has a relatively extended quality in terms of time-domain.

(4) The functional scope of psychological warfare is vast without precedent

When comparing the operational domains, objects [targets] and spaces of psychological warfare with other operational activities, there is an even more prominent extended quality. From the perspective of operational domain, a modern war is not simply confined to the violent confrontation on the battlefield any more, and it has expanded to an even broader sense of the contest of strength to comprehensive national power and national

potential, etc. Psychological warfare is not only a contest of strength and competition in the military domain but one can also fully bring into play the functions of all domains such as the political, economic, diplomatic, cultural and religious.

From the perspective of the object [target] of operations, psychological warfare activities are not restricted by personnel and departments, but it can psychically influence any organization and individual, including political heads, military leaders, ordinary soldiers and even the people and masses in the rear. The objects [targets] of psychological warfare can even refer to the countries and regions participating or not participating in fighting, as well as the friendly countries, international organizations and even the entire international society. The implementation of effective psychological warfare activities against these different objects [targets], one can also achieve maintaining an exalted will to fight of one's own personnel and stabilize one's own front; it can cause the enemy's personnel to be weary of war, be fearful of war, be anti-war, and collapse their front; and cause neutral parties to sympathize with and lean to one's own goals.

From the perspective of operational space, the battlefield of a modern war has broken through the boundaries between front and rear and between theater and non-theater. The battlefield itself has the dynamic-state non-linear quality of you are amongst us and we are amongst you. The unfolding of psychological activities directed at psychological defensive lines without form has long discarded the traditional battlefield boundaries, and the unfolding is in all directions of the domain of vast space.

II. Basic Patterns of Campaign Psychological Warfare...207

The basic patterns of campaign psychological warfare can be divided into psychological attack and psychological defense:

1. Psychological attack. It is a non-kill-quality attack activity implemented against the enemy's psychologies of understanding and conviction. Its goal is to weaken the enemy's combat power through controlling the enemy's awareness and spirit so as to create favorable conditions for campaign operations. Inclusion of psychological attack in the scope of information warfare further elevates the direct effectiveness of information operations. On the battlefield, implementing attack against the enemy's psychologies of understanding and conviction is a critical link for winning battlefield information warfare. According to its nature, psychological attack is divided into mainly two modes: One is attacking the enemy's psychology of understanding. This is, on the basis of the needs-requirements of campaign operations, adopting various operational deception activities with goals and planning and not allowing the enemy's command officers any way to attain a correct understanding of the current situations and future developments on the battlefield or to be led into the attacking side's pre-established "information trap" and thus make mistakes in decision making and adopt erroneous activities. The essence of deceptive psychological attack is cause the loss of ability for correct analysis and assessment of the battlefield posture, through attacking the understanding systems {xitong} of the enemy command personnel. Its main object [target] of attack is the

various levels of the enemy's command decision-making personnel, and from the perspective of campaign operations, this mainly refers to the enemy's campaign/strategic command officers and command organs. These are the concentrated manifestation of battle of wits and stratagems by commanders of both sides on the battlefield. During campaign operations, the main methods for attacking the enemy's psychology of understanding are campaign feint, campaign camouflage and intelligence deception. Second is attacking the enemy's psychology of conviction. This mainly is striking the enemy's psychology of conviction with various open psychological attack modes in order to achieve the goals of collapsing the enemy military's will to fight and morale and weakening the enemy military's combat power. This main object [target] of this kind of psychological attack is the broad mass of soldiers and the grass roots officers of the enemy's military. Its main methods are to let the enemy military comprehend their own real plight through open propaganda of various forms, or cause the negative sentiments such as being weary of war, anti-war, fear, and homesickness until they finally give up resistance and make it very difficult for commanders to implement command and control of their *bushu* disposition according to their own desires.

2. Psychological protection is the series of activities {huodong} directed at the enemy's psychological attacks and adopted with the aim of seeing through the enemy's military deception, dispelling the undesirable effects of harmful propaganda, stabilizing the force-units and raising morale. Psychological protection can roughly be divided into three categories: first is psychology of understanding protection. Namely, these are the various campaign activities {huodong} that can be implemented against the enemy, the establishment of a high level of being psychologically on guard, the simultaneous implementation of thorough and prompt battlefield reconnaissance, the correct analysis and assessment of battlefield situations, and seeing through the enemy's tricks. Second is psychology of conviction protection. This mainly refers to the activities {xingdong} adopted for maintaining the force-units' will to fight, morale and cohesive power. Conviction psychology protection has a strong synthesized quality. Not only does it include adopting psychological confrontations such as anti-propaganda, anti-instigation, and anti-temptation directed against the enemy's psychological attack, but it also includes conducting of thought education such as unified thought, enhancing unity and inspiring morale for one's own force-units. It also includes various assisting-support work having forms, such as maximally safeguarding the living needs-requirements of force-units on the battlefield so as to promptly replenish troops and weapon munitions for the operational force-units. Third is the psychology of spirit protection. This mainly refers to preventing operational personnel from suffering tremendous pressure on body and mind and creating an epidemic in the psychology of spirit (the phenomenon of pathological psychology of spirit). The scope touched upon by psychological protection is very broad and permeates from start to finish of campaign operations, thus the basic principles for implementing psychological protection are having a directed quality, prompt quality and flexibility.

III. Basic Requirements of Campaign Psychological Warfare...208

(1) Active initiative and combined attack and defense

Active initiative is, during the organization and implementation of psychological warfare activities and with an attitude of active initiative, adopting active initiative activities, firmly grasping operational initiative, mastering battlefield posture, dominating the campaign progress and development direction, achieving psychological superiority over the enemy, and ensuring campaign victory. Its core is seizing initiative.

One must grasp initiative in psychological warfare and one must strengthen one's scientific foresight. [One must] capture combat opportunity and grasp key points in unfolding fierce attack against the enemy. One must actively find the breakthrough point of psychological attack, give enemy fatal strikes and collapse their entire psychological defensive line. At the same time, we should concentrate our strengths, rationally apply warfare methods, strike the enemy's vital parts, and achieve the goals of attacking the solid and wresting their will {攻坚夺志 gongjian duozhi}. Only in this manner can we genuinely achieve the requirement of active initiative.

Like all other operational activities, psychological warfare always has both attack and defense, so even under the conditions of maintaining an attack posture, one will be attacked. Therefore, psychological warfare must persist in active defense during attack with initiative and accomplish a combined attack and defense. In psychological warfare under informationized conditions, stopping the enemy's implementation of psychological attack with the negative modes of *being divorced from reality* and *shutting the doors and windows* is fundamentally useless. Therefore, on the one hand, one must strengthen protection and guidance, and open up information, allow one's personnel to gather data one can distinguish the real from the false. One must also guide people with real information, inspire people with firm conviction, and taking initiative in the defense of the enemy's psychological attack. At the same time, one must conduct counterattack with initiative. In order for this kind of counterattack to produce results, then one must have the foresight to conduct psychological protection, and in order to have direct counterattacks with a directed-nature, one must utilize the enemy's existing weak points and concentrate counterattack with key points. Counterattack activities must firmly implement effective counterattacks by paying attention on seizing the issues having a relatively large effect on our military and people and the issues most easily poisoning their sentiments. One must not take all matters the same and immediately counterattack when attacked. By doing this, we will only create the situation of being too tired to deal with matters and have no way to achieve the core goal of mastering psychological warfare initiative.

(2) Specialization of strengths and unified adjusting-coordination

In a modern campaign, in order to more effectively implement psychological attack and defense, one must attach importance to establishing specialty psychological warfare

strengths to open-up-development in psychological activities under informationized conditions. First is one must establish a scientific and effective organized leadership institution. Within the joint operational command headquarters {lianhe zuozhan zhihui bu}, one should set up a special psychological warfare department or designate a given department to specially be responsible. [This department] would be responsible for conducting planning and guidance of the psychological warfare activities in the theater or a given direction. Second is to establish specialized psychological force-units and cultivate specialty talent for psychological warfare. Currently, many countries have established specialized psychological warfare force-units. For example, the psychological warfare force strengths of the U.S. military account for 5% of the total force strengths, they are assigned to force-units of all services, and are able to execute broad psychological warfare missions.

The integrated feature of joint operations under informationized conditions has decided that the strengths used for implementing psychological warfare activities are also a multi-element and integrated. Not only are there specialty psychological warfare force-units, but non-specialty ordinary serviceman and masses are also included as well as various armed forces organizational-units, government department, and social organizations and groups, etc. are included. Specialty psychological warfare strengths themselves also have many departments such as operations, intelligence, communications, propaganda, electronic warfare, people-masses work and liaison work, etc. In operations, one must adjust-coordinate these strengths together and from a combined joining of strengths, with unified *bushu* disposition, unified command, and unified employment so as to bring the integrated operational might of various strengths into play. One must unify together the activities of these personnel and departments, and avoid contradicting each other and interfering with each other.

Another important aspect of unified adjusting-coordination is to successfully adjust-coordinate the interrelationships of various different levels and links of psychological warfare activities, strategically, in a campaign, tactically as well as peacetime and wartime so as to form a structurally robust system {xitong} and bring a maximum effect into play. In short, in order to strive for initiative in a future war and win a complete victory in psychological warfare, one must strengthen the unified adjusting-coordination in each area and at each level.

(3) Be objective and rational, and have definite goals

The requirement for being objective and rational refers to psychological warfare activities must set out from realities, respect objective facts as well as be based on facts, it allows the object [target] of psychological warfare to sense a factual nature for information, it is easy to generate a psychological identity, and it avoids creating a sense of exclusion; moreover, psychological warfare must also possess a rational quality in terms of time-, area-, conditional- and specific- activities, namely, conform with conventional thinking, conventional standards, and conventional situations. Under modern conditions, information sources have expanded without precedence and there are more favorable

assessment conditions for people's assessments on the authenticity of information, therefore, the information weapons utilized in psychological warfare must be first established on the basis of objective facts. Completely not conducting fabrications accordingly causes someone to easily know what's real and false in one glance, and obviously one is unable to achieve the goals of psychological warfare. Along with the broad employment of modern high-tech means in the psychological warfare domain, has also resulted in information weapons being able to perform "creation" through these high-tech means. However, one must note that this kind of creation must have a factual basis, and it must also have a real basis. In recent localized wars, each side of a war utilized terrain, etc. to successfully implement psychological warfare of military deception only because its "creation" had considerably high realness.

In the psychological warfare under informationized conditions, if information transmission is rational, then people will believe it and thereby the goal of psychological warfare is achieved. This information must conform to the general understanding of things by people, conform to the basic laws of warfare development, conform with the understanding of the laws happening to things, and they appear as basic laws and common knowledge. In order to have rational transmission of information, first, one must select the appropriate time opportunity and give information a rational time opportunity, meaning the things expressed in the information of psychological warfare should happen at the appropriate time. Second, one should select an appropriate object [target] to implement suitable psychological warfare against. One must have a definite goal, for example, in implementing religious psychological warfare means against Islam, one absolutely cannot use what is used for Catholicism. Third, one must select the appropriate location and lend a rational quality to the location of something happening. Fourth, one must properly process information by not excessively overstating and causing someone to generate doubt, so one must allow information to only be natural but factual. Fifth is one must allow the information to technically or in principle conform to basic principles and rules. Implementing psychological warfare in a modern campaign, *concealing the real and showing the false*, and *confusing the real with the false* are both very good methods, but they must be rational, if an irrational spot appears in their use would run counter to what is desired.

(4) Be concealed and sudden, and be strict in secrecy

The requirement for being concealed and sudden means that in course of implementing psychological warfare, one must conceal the true intention of the one implementing and cause the object [target] to unknowingly receive the psychological effect. In psychological warfare activities, if one wishes to conceal one's own intention without the object's [target's] perception, we must first stand in the position of the opponent⁶ to observe the problem and understand things. We must use the psychology of the opponent

⁶ Translator's comment: please note that here the "object" {duixiang} changes to "opponent" {duifang} in mid-paragraph. The difference between the terms is the *xiang* and the *fang*. The difference in meaning is subtle and the change is from the meaning of "opposite *image*" to "opposite *side*".

to feel things and comprehend the problem, and in this manner the ascertained content and means of psychological warfare will also be accepted by the opponent. In a modern campaign, one must establish and maintain a relationship of a certain association with the opponent at a specific level and establish and maintain a specific communication [with the opponent]. Only by doing this are the effects of psychological warfare covertly [concealed manner] exerted on the opponent and thus the operational goal is achieved.

Ensuring psychological warfare planning {*jihua*} and implementation through measures of strictly maintaining secrecy is a requirement that must be satisfied for any form of psychological activities without which psychological warfare will lose its significance. As the true-false and nominal-real of psychological warfare becomes more complex and difficult to identify, one needs to maintain secrecy even more, and furthermore, strictly maintaining secrecy itself is a kind of psychological warfare measure. The main goal of maintaining secrecy is to cause the enemy to be unable to know what is nominal or real, to have no way of correctly making assessments, to have difficulty in seizing the combat opportunity, and even to lure the enemy into making mistakes in their decision making. In organizing and implementing psychological warfare activities, one must strictly control the scope of the knowledge of classified [information], strengthen the management of maintaining secrecy, and promptly detect and stop leaks. Psychological warfare itself has a hierarchical quality and is a system {*xitong*} implemented in multiple domains, from multiple angles and in multiple modes. Its command, organization and specific implementation has a scope of strictly secret [cleared] personnel, so maintaining secrecy must be workable within the corresponding scope [where] everyone knows their own missions without exceeding their hierarchy or leaping over their boundaries. To this end, one must then formulate a corresponding secrecy [classification] *zhidu* system and conduct standardization {*guifan*} and management with laws-regulations {*fagui*}, as well as strictly execute them. Under modern conditions, the complex nature of psychological warfare makes this point particularly important. In addition, psychological warfare needs a corresponding inspection and control system {*tixi*} that not only inspects-controls the plan {*jihua*} implementation situation, promptly performs adjustments and ensures the results of psychological warfare information, but it also ensures security through inspection-controls, so when one discovers a security leak situation, one promptly adopts remedial measures and enables the continued conduct of psychological warfare.]

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 7 Campaign Operational Support...212

Campaign operational support⁷ is a general designation referring to various support measures unified-planned and organized by the campaign command organ in order to ensure that the campaign large formation safely and smoothly carries out campaign missions. Campaign operational support is an important basis for fully demonstrating the capabilities of weapon systems and for the smooth execution of a campaign. Thus it is an important factor in the formation of campaign operational capabilities. Organizing campaign operational support in a comprehensive and meticulous manner is of vital importance to enhancing the operational capabilities of various services and arms and to safely and smoothly accomplishing campaign missions.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...212

I. Characteristics...212

(1) Heavy support tasks, multitude of contents and high requirements for integrated-whole

A modern campaign is an all services and arms joint operation implemented in the five integrated dimensions of land, sea, air, outer space and electromagnetic fields. It covers a multitude of battlefields and areas and it is a large and complex system. Campaign operational support is an arduous task. Campaign operational support not only involves various participating services and arms, various campaign battlefields and various operational activities, but also runs through the entire course of a campaign from organization to execution. Any specific support strength or means has its characteristics as well as limitations. By relying on any single support strength and means, one obviously can not expect to comprehensively carry out campaign operational support missions. Only by making support strengths and means complement and support each other can one take advantage of the collective power and achieve excellent results. Therefore, in the organization of campaign operational support, to maintain integrated support is even more prominent. It is necessary to set up a comprehensive in categories and types, well coordinated and integrated operational support system with detailed division of labor and in accordance with the needs of multi-service, multi-arm joint operations as well as with specific characteristics of various services and arms.

⁷ Translator's note: in all cases unless otherwise noted, the *support* referred to in this chapter refers to *safeguarding-support* {保障 baozhang}, which is contrasted with another type of support – assisting-support {支援 zhiyuan}, which is also translated as support.

(2) High degree of fusion between campaign operational support and operational activities

With wide introduction of high-tech weapon systems and equipment in modern warfare, new requirements are raised on operational support. To bring into play the capabilities of high-tech weapon systems and equipment, one must rely on support in various aspects. Without timely and reliable support, it is very difficult to maximize the effects of such weapon systems and equipment. As a result, operational support and operational activities have increasingly demonstrated a high degree of fusion. On the one hand, support operations such as reconnaissance and intelligence gathering and communication have already been well integrated into operational activities. These operations have a dual role in operational support and operational activities. On the other hand, operational support is, at any given time, indispensable to operational activities. Successful support is a pre-condition and basis for the smooth execution of operational activities. Without support, there can be no operations. The two are inseparable from each other.

(3) Highly technical and time sensitive

Campaign operational support has developed alongside campaign development. The rapid development in science and technology and their application in the military field have had a direct impact on campaign operational support, making it more and more technical. This is not only due to the fact that campaign operational support itself has adopted a large amount of high-tech equipment and means, but also because, more importantly, the objects, scope and extent of campaign operational support have undergone profound changes. For the moment, micro-electronic technology is widely used in battlefields and space; infra red, laser, high-energy rays, artificial intelligence, super-conductor and stealth technologies have been developed and put to use. Operational activities now possess a characteristic high-tech nature. As a result, campaign operational support must similarly have a high-tech nature. At the same time, in a modern campaign, the Navy, the Air Force and the Second Artillery force themselves are highly technical services. As a result, the operational support for their campaign missions is also very technical.

In a modern campaign, the characteristic of time sensitivity has become more and more pronounced. The introduction of various advanced weapon systems and equipment and technologies make it imperative for various campaign systems to operate at a fast clip and high speed. Battlefield conditions can change instantaneously. They are dynamic and fluid, changing drastically and constantly. Whether it is campaign command and coordination, or it is a large formation maneuver, assault and engagement, or other activities, they are all conducted with an emphasis on speed, timeliness and surprise. Therefore, campaign operational support must be highly time sensitive.

(4) Conducted in an environment of intense confrontation, large degree of difficulty for support

The wide use of advanced C⁴I systems and long-range, high-precision and powerful weapons in modern wars has made campaign operations more tense and ferocious, and conflict far more intense than in the past. Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, strikes and counter-strikes, maneuvers and counter-maneuvers, blockade and anti-blockade, sabotage and anti-sabotage, jamming and anti-jamming operations intertwine with one another. The two sides would seek to quickly degrade and debilitate the other side through various actual or invisible attacks. Campaign large formation safety is under constant threat. At the same time, the conflict between the two sides over campaign operational support systems is also highly intense. The two sides would wage an intense contest aimed at enhancing one's own support capabilities while degrading the capabilities of the other side. Hence, in high-intensity conflicts, campaign operational support faces some grave challenges, and provision of such support would be a highly difficult task.

II. The Requirements of Campaign Operational Support...214

(1) Support capabilities compatible with operational activities

Campaign operational support capabilities are an important component of campaign operational capabilities. Campaign operational activities depend on the backing and complement of operational support. In a certain sense, the capabilities of operational support would have a direct impact on the modes, scales, fighting methods and duration of campaign operations, or even on the outcome of the campaign. Therefore, one should correctly manage the relationship between operational support capabilities and operational activities. On the one hand, one should, based on the needs of operational activities, fully utilize operational support capabilities, making them serve the operations as much as they can. On the other hand, one must also take into consideration the limit of such capabilities so as to avoid the situation under which the operational activities exceed operational support capabilities. Only by making the two suited to and coordinated with each other can one ensure a smooth progression of the campaign. To achieve this goal, in the course of campaign overall-planning and command, the campaign commander should try his best to pay enough attention and give his backing to support strengths in various aspects. That is to say that the campaign commander should be willing to spare and devote the necessary manpower to enhancing operational support capabilities. At the same time, he should pay attention to mobilizing all possible support strengths, meticulously organize reliable operational support and bring into play its capabilities so as to meet the needs of operational activities.

(2) Timely and reliable

To enhance the timeliness and reliability of campaign operational support is not only a basic requirement of campaign operational support, but also critical to the smooth completion of support missions.

Timely support refers to the requirement that the acquisition, transmission and processing of intelligence must be conducted in a speedy manner; command and coordination must be smooth; and various support measures must be adopted by seizing the time and seizing the opportunity so as to bring them into play at the most needed junctures of the campaign. In a modern campaign, the element of surprise has greatly increased. The pace has been greatly accelerated with fast transitions and drastic changes in the campaign situation. The timeliness in campaign support has become an important factor in shortening command cycles, enhancing command efficiency, and in strengthening rapid response and self-protection capabilities of force-units.

Reliable support means that the intelligence acquired must be true, the transmission of all information must be accurate, the various support measures and means must be truly effective, and they must ensure bringing into play the functions. Under modern conditions, particularly under informationized conditions, the struggle between reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, between deception and anti-deception is intense. There are a lot of uncertainties regarding the truthfulness of intelligence, as one can lose control of a lot of factors and accurate transmission of information can be difficult. The struggle between jamming and counter-jamming and between sabotage and anti-sabotage is also very intense. Support is characterized by its repetitiveness, continuity and militancy. There are high qualitative requirements. The heavy toll on personnel and materiel is difficult to replenish. All these factors have highlighted the importance of support reliability.

In order to ensure timely and reliable support, one must strive to enhance the quality of support strength personnel and their equipment. On this basis, one should meticulously draw up plans and make full preparations in accordance with concrete campaign conditions. To this end, prior to the launching of a campaign, one should widely collect relevant information, anticipate possible support missions, draw up multiple advance support plans and conduct well targeted training and preparations so as to enhance support's adaptability and emergency response capabilities. In the course of a campaign, based on campaign developments and campaign needs, one should rationally divide up and employ support strengths, make quick response and flexible execution, and seize time to provide effective support. At the same time, one should pay attention to checking the results through collecting feedback and promptly adjust support methods and key points. In addition, in order to cope with emergencies in a fluid battlefield environment, one should also maintain an appropriate and sizable support reserve strength so as to strengthen the capabilities for quick support and sustained support and to enhance support stability.

(3) Comprehensive and with key points

Modern campaign operations are trials of overall strength between two opposing sides. Only by maximizing various factors can one win campaign victory. Therefore, campaign operational support should not only take into consideration the needs of any one particular aspect of the campaign (such as the needs of one particular service or arm, one weapon system, one operational pattern, one battlefield direction or one point of time). Instead, one must take the entire campaign, the overall situation and the needs of various aspects as the point of departure, look after all aspects of the entire campaign system and provide comprehensive support. One must avoid attending to certain aspects while losing sight of other aspects. To this end, in terms of space, one should look well after the frontal battlefield as well as the flanks and depth and provide all aspect support on the ground, the sea and in the air. In terms of time, one should look well after various phases, points of time and the entire course of the campaign and provide sustained and uninterrupted support. In terms of support objects, one should look well after various participating services and arms in a way that is suited to their respective characteristics and special needs.

Comprehensive support does not mean not differentiating main and secondary, nor does it mean evenly using support strengths without key points. This is because in an actual operation, campaign support requirements vary with different campaign directions and areas, at different phases and different points of time, and with different large formations (formations) and different force-units. Only at the same time as taking care of the comprehensive, having a grip on the key links and main contradictions and implementing comprehensive support with key points can one better satisfy the needs for campaign operational support. To this end, the campaign commander should, based on campaign missions, the enemy conditions, battlefield conditions and support strength conditions, and in anticipation of possible campaign developments, make unified-overall-plan arrangements and comprehensive planning, differentiate what is important and urgent and what is not, give prominence to the key points and correctly implement various campaign operational support. One should rationally organize and deploy various support strengths. Give priority to supporting the services and arms and force-units of the main battlefield, the main direction and areas, the critical time occasions, and the ones executing the main missions, so as to ensure the accomplishment of the key missions. Particularly in cases when one faces a heavy support task and an inadequacy in support strengths, it is even more important to stress the key points in providing support. At the same time, care should also be taken to provide support to the needs of other directions and areas, at other points of time and to the needs of other force-units so as to maximize support's effect on the entire campaign.

(4) Enhancing the overall function

To enhance campaign operational support functions is a basic requirement on campaign operational support under informationized conditions. It is also an effective way to carry out campaign operational support. To this end, one must adopt the concept of collective

support, turning one's attention from single service support to multi-service, multi-arm support, from single campaign support to support for a series of campaigns, and from emphasizing single dimensional and linear support to multi-dimensional support and key point, multi-directional and full depth support, so as to develop an organic whole that combines support strengths and means, support space and time. One must strengthen the support functions of the commanding organ, taking into consideration support operations together with operational activities and making comprehensive arrangements. Based on the general needs of campaign activities, one should unify the task organization of the use of support strengths, unify the formulation of the support plan, unify-overall-plan the differentiation of support missions, and unify the control and adjusting-coordination of various support activities so as to form an organic whole. One should comprehensively employ various support strengths and means. That is, in the employment of strengths, one should rely on the specialized support strengths of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force as the backbone while at the same time actively seeking to mobilize the support strengths of the masses of people in playing supplementary support roles. Various specialized support units possess special technical equipment and have undergone special technical training. Thus they have relatively strong support capabilities and should be regarded as the backbone for carrying out operational support. The people are also a support strength that should not be overlooked, and they can be assigned to carry out some support missions within their abilities. In terms of means, one should try to make various supports, such as reconnaissance, communication, engineering, disguising and protection etc., complement and co-ordinate with each other so as to bring into play a collective effect of the entire support system. To this end, one should, based on battlefield conditions and campaign operational needs, combine planned support with ad hoc support, unified collective support of various services and arms with independent supports of various service and arms, specialized strength support with support of the masses, military support with local civilian support, and high-tech means with medium-level and low tech means.

(5) Strengthening self support

In modern campaign operations, various participating services and arms, and various large formations (formations) and units should also establish a consciousness for self-support. They should, through utilizing their own personnel and equipment, organize operational support so as to enhance self-support capabilities and meet part of their own support needs-requirements. The implementation of self-support is an effective method for resolving insufficiencies in specialized support strengths and it is an objective requirement of a modern campaign. As far as a campaign large formation is concerned, due to limits in supports provided by specialized force- (element-) units, total reliance on specialized force- (element-) units to provide campaign operational support would inevitably come into conflict with the objective reality of a modern campaign characterized by varied support contents and heavy support duties. It thus would affect the timeliness and reliability of support. In cases where battlefield conditions are changing drastically, in particular, it is very difficult to completely rely on specialized support force- (element-) units to undertake some temporary or urgent support missions. In view of this, it is even more necessary to adopt the concept of establishing self-

support. To this end, various large formations (formations) and units should strengthen operational support training in peacetime and carry certain quantities of support equipment and instruments in order to enhance self-support capabilities. And they should try their best to be self-reliant in support capabilities without relying on specialized support force- (element-) units.

Section 2: Contents and Methods...217

The main contents of campaign support include reconnaissance and intelligence support, communication support, engineering support, camouflage, transport support, protection from nuclear, chemical, biological and other specially lethal and destructive weapons, meteorological and hydrological support, surveying and mapping support and battlefield control etc.

I. Reconnaissance and Intelligence Support...217

Campaign reconnaissance and intelligence support refers to various activities carried out by campaign large formations to acquire and provide campaign intelligence by employing various reconnaissance and intelligence strengths and through various means. The basic mission of campaign reconnaissance and intelligence support is to promptly, accurately, and continuously acquire information needed in campaign operations. In order to provide the necessary intelligence data to the command institutions of the participating services and arms and the force-units, such information should be centered on the enemy situation but should also include political, economic, military, geographical, meteorological, hydrological etc. conditions of the region of operation. The basic requirements of campaign reconnaissance and intelligence support are: integrated application, give prominence to key points, prompt and accurate, and sharing of results. The main measures of campaign reconnaissance and intelligence support include the following points:

(1) Setting up a multi-dimensional reconnaissance system

In order to ensure multi-domain, around the clock air and ground intelligence collection, the campaign command organ should follow the instructions given by the commander and higher authorities and deploy reconnaissance strengths comprehensively and with key points. There should conduct unified and rational *bushu* disposition and employment of various high-tech reconnaissance and surveillance equipment and instruments such as reconnaissance satellites, reconnaissance (early warning) aircraft, reconnaissance ships, ground advanced reconnaissance equipment etc. They should organically combine the reconnaissance of outer space, air, ground, sea (underwater) front, flank depth and rear area and the reconnaissance of the armed forces and locals to form a three dimensional intelligence and reconnaissance distribution system. [They should] form a three-dimensional intelligence and reconnaissance distribution system that is multi-directional, multi-domain, multi-tiered, all weather, and that combines long-, medium and short-range reconnaissance, and a mutually complementary high-, medium- and low altitude. [They

should] ascertain the enemy's land, sea and air operational intentions, force-strength *bushu* disposition and activity characteristics, and promptly acquire the damage situation of the enemy's command and control, reconnaissance and communication, supply and support systems, heavy forces concentrations, airfields, ports, and high-tech weapons after suffering our strike.

(2) Expanding ways to acquire intelligence

One should comprehensively utilize various reconnaissance methods and means to widen intelligence sources. For instance, one should comprehensively utilize technical reconnaissance, armed reconnaissance, secret reconnaissance, space reconnaissance, aero reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, sea surface (underwater) reconnaissance, wireless technical reconnaissance, infrared reconnaissance, remote sensing reconnaissance, special reconnaissance, espionage reconnaissance, enemy rear reconnaissance, and reconnaissance by masses of people and various other ways and means. One should pay attention to gathering and studying the enemy's documents and material, rationally use the intelligence provided by the strategic intelligence system, fully exploit intelligence provided by friendly forces, strengthen analyses and study on strategic locations and on the topography of the operations area, and timely and comprehensively analyze, process and treat tactical intelligence that has strategic value so as to make it serve campaign operations.

(3) Setting up unhindered and speedy intelligence transmission networks

The campaign command organ should establish an unhindered intelligence communication network between higher authorities, the force-units of subordinate services and arms, the intelligence institutions of friendly and locals and directly subordinate reconnaissance force- (element-) units, comprehensively using many kinds of transmission modes and promptly and rapidly transmitting intelligence; when conditions permit, it [campaign command organ] should strive to allow intelligence communications to form independent intelligence networks and establish automated intelligence transmission systems; the communication networks of subordinate force-units should give priority to the transmission of support intelligence, while for important intelligence, it should adopt two of the above supports as communication means; for the main reconnaissance direction and reconnaissance organizational-units, it should do one's best to establish dedicated lines, routes or networks and give key point support; it should also plan and conceive in advance a method for intelligence transmission once communications are broken, and make transmission preparations for special situations.

(4) Handling intelligence accurately, highly efficiently and comprehensively

Processing intelligence is an important link in exploiting intelligence information. Since both sides would try to keep secret and adopt deceptive measures, under normal situations a substantial part of intelligence gathered is self-contradictory, disparate and uncertain. Only by making necessary processing of such intelligence can one exploit it.

Thus, the campaign command organ should set up intelligence processing centers and by taking full advantage of modern technical means and equipment, categorize, analyze, study, and sort intelligence gathered from various sources and file them in proper categories. Coming to grip with key issues, one should conduct comprehensive analysis on the intelligence by discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating the false and retaining the true, going from one point to another, from superficial to depth. When one reaches a conclusion, he should report in a timely fashion to the superior authorities and notify other units and friendly forces. In the case of major but suspicious intelligence, one should organize timely verifications through various sources. In the case of developmental intelligence, one should try to keep track of it and keep it under control. Intelligence centers of various services and arms should maintain constant communication with each other and share intelligence with each other so as to enhance the timeliness and utilization ratio of intelligence gathered.

(5) Actively engaging in counter intelligence operations

At the same time one strives to enhance his own capabilities in timely and accurately gathering of intelligence, he should take steps to actively engage in counter intelligence collection, carefully organize campaign counter reconnaissance operations and prevent the enemy side from acquiring intelligence. One should also meticulously organize protective measures so as to enhance the battlefield survivability of one's intelligence and reconnaissance systems. One should employ various deceptive and disguising means to create false intelligence and disinformation, deftly exercise feint intelligence maneuvering, and widely practice campaign disguises. One should also strengthen security and counter-espionage work and should take advantage of mounting operations on, or based on, one's own country's territories by organizing masses of people to stage counter reconnaissance activities. Finally, one should widely adopt destructive and crippling means to strike, through firepower assault or force-strength raid-attacks, at the enemy's important reconnaissance and surveillance platforms so as to degrade its reconnaissance capabilities.

II. Communication Support...219

Campaign communication support refers to all communication operations mounted by a campaign large formation in organizing and employing various communication facilities, instruments and means to ensure transmission of various types of campaign information. The basic missions of campaign communication support are: organizing and executing communication to ensure transmission of information concerning campaign command, coordination, intelligence, warning, notification and rear command etc.; and carrying out effective counter-interference measures to ensure the functioning of the communication system. The central mission is to ensure operational command. The basic requirements for campaign communication support are: fast, accurate, confidential and uninterrupted. The main measures of campaign communication support are as follows:

(1) Setting up stable and reliable campaign communication networks

The campaign command organ should, based on campaign operation needs-requirements and in view of the realities of communication strengths and existing communication facilities, uniformly plan, organize and adjust-coordinate the communication units of various participating services and arms. At the same time, it should fully utilize the local communication infrastructure and constitute an overall whole of the military communication system and the civilian communication system. It should complement the field communication equipment with the fixed communication infrastructure and form a comprehensive communication *bushu* disposition with key points. [It should] establish a crisscrossed, linked, multi-path, and circuitous full-dimensional campaign network with the campaign command communication system as the main body and complemented with coordination, intelligence, alert notifications as well as rear area communications. This guarantees unimpeded information between land, sea, air and space.

(2) Comprehensive employment of various communication means

The electronic struggle of a modern campaign is extremely intense and complicated. The interference on communication is particularly grave. In view of the strength and limitation of various communication means, the campaign command organ should, based on the concrete requirements of various campaigns and campaign phases, employ wire, wireless, satellite, micro-wave, fiber-optic, mobile and simple signal communication methods at appropriate times and in a flexible manner. Modern communication methods should be combined with traditional communication methods. And by flexibly using wire and wireless communication methods, field communication equipment and fixed communication facilities, one can ensure timely, accurate, stable, confidential and uninterrupted communications.

(3) Attaching importance to mobile {jidong} and coordination communications

Mobility is a salient characteristic of a modern campaign. In communication support, one should take care to use various means to ensure communication in the midst of frequent and fast pace mobility. One should take full advantage of communication equipment with strong counter-interference capabilities and effectively resolve the issue of “communication on the move.” Coordinated communication is a necessary element in fully realizing the collective power of various participating services and arms in a modern campaign. One should strive to make use of those universal communication instruments of various services and arms, unify the formulation of a meticulous coordination communication plan, set up not only a communication network that can unify the activities of the various services and arms, but also conform with the communication network of the communication needs-requirements of all services and arms, and formulate the coordination communication contingency measures under special situations.

(4) Strengthening communication counter-measures and protection

Communication is a key target of the enemy's reconnaissance, interference and damage efforts. It is thus imperative to strengthen communication counter-measures and protection. The campaign command organ should pay attention to concentrating strength in order to seize and maintain command of the electro-magnetic field, and strengthen communication management by controlling the use of electro-magnetic frequencies and channels. Important communication facilities should be set up in dispersed locations, well disguised and placed underground as much as possible. At the appropriate time, electronic feint operations should be organized and false electro-magnetic radiation targets set up to deceive and confuse the enemy. Communication local support and electronic counter-measures should also be meticulously coordinated so as to avoid mutual interference. One should strengthen communication network security and protection, and in the case of enemy sabotage, one should immediately repair and restore the network. At the same time, one should actively jam, suppress and sabotage the enemy's communication and enhance one's own communication counter-measure capabilities.

(5) Meticulously organizing communication equipment reserve, supply and technical support

Communication equipment is the main material basis of the communication network. The campaign large formation should have unified planning and tightly organize reserve, supply and technical support. To this end, one should rationally determine the types, quantities of, and places to hold, communication equipment reserves, and well organize timely supply and replenishment of such equipment so as to meet various needs. There should be a regular check-up and repair of communication equipment so as to keep such equipment in good condition. There should also be well-organized field repair service in an effort to carry out battlefield emergency repairs as much as possible and to minimize the amount of equipment sent for repair in the rear. Related personnel should be trained on how to properly use, maintain and service communication equipment.

III. Engineering Support...221

Campaign engineering support is a generic term referring to all engineering works undertaken to ensure operational activities of the campaign large formation. The basic missions of campaign engineering support are as follows: set up and perfect a protective engineering system to ensure the stability of campaign command and the safety of the main *bushu* disposition; build and maintain facilities such as roads, bridges, airfields, and piers to support force-unit mobility; build engineering obstacle systems to limit and degrade the enemy's mobility; and create engineering disguise and provide water supply support. The basic requirements of campaign engineering support are as follows: comprehensive *guihua* planning, combine peacetime use with war time use, integrated adjusting-coordination, give prominence to key points, integrate military with civilian,

and combine the ingenuity of the masses of people with experts' knowledge. Campaign engineering support measures mainly include the following points:

(1) Organizing battlefield engineering reconnaissance

One should comprehensively employ various methods to carry out engineering reconnaissance, and meticulously collect and timely control intelligence and data concerning the operational theater, particularly those needed for engineering support in the main operational directions and regions. [One should] find out with key points the operational area states such as terrain, road (water) ways, bridges, airfields, ports (ferry) , navigation channels, and hydrology and one's own engineering facilities and the enemy's engineering preparation situation. Engineering reconnaissance can be carried out independently or can be conducted jointly with other reconnaissance operations. Engineering intelligence acquired should be analyzed and judged in a comprehensive manner. Suggestions concerning engineering support should be put forward at the appropriate time so as to provide the basis for commanding officers to make decisions and to organize engineering support.

(2) Building a protection engineering system possessing a comprehensive resistance capability

Building various fortifications is one of the main contents of campaign engineering support. It is of vital importance to enhancing the survivability of the campaign large formation and the efficiency of campaign command and to making effective use of weapon systems and equipment. To this end, an engineering system should be constructed with protective engineering works as the main body, and construct with key points the protection engineering projects for the campaign command institution, important ports, airfields and positions. The layout of various engineering works should be rational and in complete sets. They should have all necessary functions. They should be aimed at both providing effective protection and optimizing firepower. Best effort should be made to closely integrate fortifications for combat with those for covering, maneuvering and obstruction, and to improve such works and make them into complete sets, so as to meet the needs of both combat and living. It is also necessary to pay attention to the use of new material and new technologies. Special units should be organized for the construction and maintenance of key engineering works and for providing them with excellent disguise.

(3) Building a campaign mobility engineering system

In campaign operations under modern conditions, force-strength mobility is frequent, and the transport volume of various support operations may reach unprecedented levels. Thus higher requirements are made on the engineering support work for campaign mobility. Thus strengths should be organized to construct, repair, maintain roads, bridges, ferry station (ports), piers, and field airports (heliports) in the theater, and to dredge navigational channels, clear various obstacles so as to ensure smooth mobility and

unimpeded keep transport lanes. Constructing new roads must be based on existing roads and constructing the necessary connecting roads and circuitous roads so as to form a crisscross road network. The emergency repair and maintenance of roads and other transport engineering works should be carried out with the engineering corps as the backbone while making full use of force-unit and civilian strengths. Support should be conducted in a way that combines fixed points and fixed lines support with accompanying support.

(4) Adopting counter-mobility engineering measures

Based on operational missions and the enemy conditions, one constructs and sets up ground (water, air) obstacles with key points in the direction of an enemy may attack or maneuver, or in area for a potential airborne landing or in the direction of low-altitude helicopter entry. And based on the terrain and obstacles, one should carry out necessary demolition work. In placing obstacles, one should strive to combine natural obstacles with man-made obstacles, explosive obstacles with non-explosive obstacles, ground obstacles with water surface, underwater and aerial obstacles, pre-positioned obstacles with pro-tem obstacles, and combine obstacles with firepower, so as to truly achieve the goal of restricting enemy mobility, breaking up its battle formations and depleting its strengths.

(5) Setting up a battlefield water supply system

In a modern campaign, because of the high mechanization level of the armed forces and the complex battlefield environment, supporting force-unit use of water is a major issue that must not be overlooked. To this end, the command organ of a campaign large formation should organize strengths to carry out reconnaissance over water sources, construct battlefield water supply works, and set up water supply stations and water supply networks; it should also strengthen water source protection to prevent the enemy from sabotaging and polluting water sources, and should carry out timely emergency repair and maintenance of water facilities so as to ensure normal water supply.

IV. Camouflage...223

Campaign camouflage is a generic term referring to various measures adopted by a campaign large formation to deceive and confuse the enemy. The basic missions of campaign camouflage are: comprehensively employ various measures to conceal campaign intentions and important targets so as to preserve campaign strength; and deceive, confuse and mislead the enemy so as to create conditions for realizing surprise in operational activities and for seizing campaign initiative. The basic requirements of campaign camouflage are: set out from the needs-requirements of the overall campaign situation, and unify planning and organize the implementation; comprehensively apply many measures, be systematic, have adjusting-coordination, be visual; be distinct; strengthen supervision, inspect and manage. Campaign camouflage measures mainly include the following:

(1) Understand the characteristics and capabilities of the enemy's reconnaissance and surveillance systems

The command organ of a campaign large formation should organize strengths to find out, through various means and as much as possible, the *bushu* disposition of the enemy's reconnaissance strengths and their reconnaissance means, methods, characteristics and the patterns of their activities in order to make well-informed selection and employment of various camouflage measures.

(2) Actively conceal the real

The campaign command organ should guide force-units to widely apply new material, new technologies and use various methods and means to meticulously conceal the real equipment and facilities. One should apply necessary engineering technical camouflage, construct various types of concealed fortifications and place important weapons and equipment underground or semi-underground. One should use standard and simple camouflage equipment to cover up, camouflage, and change the shape of important targets and fixed facilities, or to create smoke screens. One should take full advantage of night time darkness, bad weather conditions, natural vegetation and other natural conditions to provide cover for force-unit activities, and conceal the deployment {peizhi} of force-units or weapons and equipment.

(3) Widely organize deceptions

This includes creating fake targets, disinformation, and organizing various feint maneuvers etc. One should spread false information and leak fake intelligence through the media, or in political, economic and diplomatic activities, as well as by way of espionage, and should issue false orders through the command communication system. In campaign operations, one should at appropriate times carry out feints with firepower, force-strength and electronic strengths, and should alter *bushu* disposition at appropriate times and organize deceptive maneuvers in the battlefield. One should also plan the construction and the setting up of fake assembly sites, fake airports, fake ferry docks, fake positions and fake command headquarters and strive to give them the characteristics of real targets.

(4) Tighten camouflage activities

Campaign camouflage plans should be drawn up in a uniform manner. Such plans should strictly lay down the camouflage missions, areas and scopes, methods, completion deadlines and other requirements for the force-units of various services and arms, so as to achieve unified camouflage effects. Moreover, one should conduct inspection on the conditions and effects of camouflage by various means and from various angles – the air, the sea and the ground – so as to make timely discovery of problems and make improvements in camouflage methods.

V. Transport Support...224

Campaign transport support is a generic term referring to various measures undertaken by the campaign large formation in transport preparation, and in maintaining, restoring, and enhancing transport capabilities. The basic missions of transport support are: differentiate in the use, management, emergency repair and maintenance of transport networks; and organize transportation and transport material reserves so as to ensure transportation lines stay open and transport missions be accomplished. The basic requirements of campaign transport support are: unified *guihua* planning, comprehensive organization, scientific management, giving prominence to key points, combining construction with maintenance, emergency repairs with protection, peacetime use with war time use, and military force with civilian force. Main campaign transport support measures are as follows:

(1) Build a joint command institution and implement a centralized and unified command

To provide campaign transport support, one should form a joint campaign command institution composed of the campaign command organ and local transportation agencies to exercise centralized and unified command over campaign transport support. An operational theater transport network should be built under a unified *guihua* plan; unified transport support courses of action and plans should be drawn up; means of communication and transport should be requisitioned in a unified way; theater transport strengths should be deployed and employed in a unified manner; the use and management of transport lines should be uniformly differentiated; and emergency repair and protection of transport lines should be uniformly organized.

(2) Set up all-aspect, multi-dimensional transport networks

One should take full advantage of existing transportation lines and comprehensively utilize railways, roads, water ways, air routes and pipelines in an effort to develop multi-route, multi-directional, multi-channel, and multi-dimensional communication and transport networks with a complex web linkage of transport lines. Based on operational needs, one should: make emergency repairs or construction of necessary connecting routes, dedicated routes and roundabout routes; renovate, expand low capacity road segments and upgrade poorly equipped train stations, docks (ports) and airports; dredge and improve water navigation channels; and construct airfields, docks and heliports etc so as to raise transport and shipping capabilities.

(3) Rationally employ transport support strengths and ensure key point transports are unimpeded

Based on campaign conditions and developments and on the needs of force-units of various services and arms, their missions, *bushu* disposition, directions of maneuver and their time requirements, on their war material needs, and on the distribution of rear bases and conditions of transport networks, one should, by differentiating what is urgent and

what is not so urgent, rationally employ transport support strengths, make separate use of transport routes and ensure the accomplishment of key transport missions. While taking engineering corps and civilian transport technical strengths as the backbone, one should also rely on the energetic support of local governments and masses of people. Priority should be given to supporting the main direction and the operations of force-units carrying out main operational missions. The main support strengths should be directed to ensuring the opening of key links. Capable transport controllers should be sent to man important bridges, ferry docks (ports), and key transport hubs to maintain traffic order.

(4) Meticulously organize emergency repairs and protection of transport lines

The organization and execution of emergency repair and maintenance of transport lines should be carried out by dividing up the lines into areas and segments for which units are separately given responsibilities. Emergency repair and maintenance schemes should be drawn up in advance and reserves of various equipment and material should also be made. Specialized units should be sent to key transport trunk lines, transport hubs, airports, seaports, bridges etc to carry out fixed-spot maintenance. Emergency repairs should be carried out in accordance with the principles of tackling the main parts first and accessories later, urgent tasks first and non-urgent tasks later, easier jobs first and difficult jobs later, and opening the line first and perfecting it later.

One should attach great importance to the protection of transport lines and draw up unified protection plans. The anti-air protection of the main transport lines and important targets should be included in the anti-air raid plan *{jihua}*. Position the air defense strengths, and when necessary, set up an air defense corridor along the important road segments (navigational routes). In the protection of sea lanes, submarines and surface ships should be organized to carry out fixed-spot protection and mobile escort (area escort). Attention should also be given to tapping into the initiative of the masses of people along transport lines and water ways and to setting up integrated military-civilian networks for the maintenance of transport lines.

VI. Protection from Weapons of Mass Destruction...225

Protection from weapons of mass destruction is a generic term referring to various protective measures adopted to avoid or reduce casualties and damage inflicted by the enemy's weapons of mass destruction. The basic missions in the protection from weapons of mass destruction are to: verify and report in a timely manner the enemy's preparations for the use of weapons of mass destruction, and the results of such attacks; meticulously organize protections from such attacks and cleanups of such attacks, so as to maximally avoid or reduce the effects, in terms of personnel casualties and physical damage, of such special weapon attacks from the enemy; and ensure that force-units maintain sustained fighting capabilities and smoothly accomplish their campaign missions. The basic requirements for protection from weapons of mass destruction are: combine strict protection from such weapons with actively destruction of such weapons; combine protective efforts by the masses of people with support by specialized arms;

integrate the employment of technical equipment with wide use of simple protective measures; and stress extensiveness, collectivity and timeliness in such protections. Main measures in the protection from weapons of mass destruction include the following:

(1) Timely detect and destroy the enemy's special weapons

The campaign command organ should organize various strengths to timely detect and verify the enemy's *bushu* disposition of weapons of mass destruction, and earnestly analyze and assess likelihood of their use, as well as the intention, the time opportunities, the sites, the scale, the modes and their preparation situation. And the campaign command organ should choose appropriate times to organize various types of firepower to actively seek to destroy such weapons. At the same time, special force-units can also be organized to carry out reconnaissance in the enemy's rear and to carry out sabotage against such targets so as to foil the enemy's intention to use such weapons.

(2) Set up tight monitoring and surveillance systems and issue alarm signals at appropriate times

In the operational area, the campaign command organ should set up the monitoring, surveillance, warning networks and notification services that combine the higher-level with the subordinate, the military with civilian, and all services and arms. It is especially important to set up and perfect nuclear and chemical weapon monitoring (observation), surveillance, alarm and report networks so as to detect in advance signs of the enemy's intention to launch an attack and to issue early reports and warning signals.

(3) Solidify protective preparations

Mainly accomplish the following work: thoroughly conduct thought mobilization; carefully formulate protection plans *{jihua}*; establish various protection organizations; organize imminent battle protection training; successfully accomplish the reserve and supply of protective equipment and materiel; strengthen hygiene, disease, and pharmaceutical protection. In particular, one should make proper preparations for the protection of such important targets as weapons and equipment, instruments, foods, water sources, airports, seaports, and command institutions.

(4) Swiftly verify the results of the enemy's attack and clean up the aftermath of the attack in a timely manner

After suffering from an enemy attack, one should organize specialized strengths to swiftly verify damages and contamination situation, report in a timely manner the conditions to the superior and notify military and civilian personnel in the theatre, and adopt effective measures of protection. One should at appropriate time adjust operational *bushu* disposition, continue to carry out operational missions; organize emergency rescue and repairs, fire extinguishing and cleaning up to neutralize the effects of enemy attack;

and carry out timely sanitary quarantine and processing of suspected or actually polluted food and water source.

(5) Correctly command force-units to carry out activities in contaminated land, air and sea zones

When the land, air or sea zones in which force-units operate are seriously contaminated, one should, based on actual conditions, consider organizing the speedy rotation or withdrawal from contaminated zones. When encountering contaminated land, air or sea zones in maneuvering, try one's best to avoid such zones or secure passage by adopting other effective means. After withdrawing from and passing through contaminated land, air or sea zones, one should organize timely rescue, treatment and clean up operations.

VII. Meteorological and Hydrological Support...227

Campaign meteorological and hydrological support refers to various service actions taken by meteorological and hydrological agencies and military units to provide support to ensure campaign operations. The basic missions of campaign meteorological and hydrological support are: provide meteorological and hydrological forecasts, information and data as required by the campaign; and put forward suggestions on how to take advantage of meteorological and hydrological conditions and avoid disadvantageous conditions, so as to ensure that the campaign large formations successfully carry out the campaign missions. The basic requirements of campaign meteorological and hydrological support are: timely and accurate, meticulous and reliable. The main measures of campaign meteorological and hydrological support include the following points:

(1) Set up meteorological and hydrological networks

Based on the requirements of the campaign, the campaign command organ should draw up campaign meteorological and hydrological support plans, and uniformly organize and rationally deploy meteorological and hydrological stations of various services and arms, and those belonging to civilian authorities, so as to develop unified meteorological and hydrological support networks that not only are suited to the needs of joint operations, but also would satisfy the special needs of various services and arms. The campaign command organ should also carry out uniform observation, monitoring, forecasting, information processing, analysis and transmission regarding meteorological and hydrological conditions in the operational theaters, and should ensure that campaign meteorological and hydrological information are precise and reliable.

(2) Continuously collect and analyze data and timely provide meteorological and hydrological forecasts and related suggestions

Meteorological and hydrological agencies and military units should tap into wide meteorological and hydrological sources of information, and employ all possible methods and means to carry out round-the-clock and comprehensive collection of various

meteorological and hydrological data. They should carry out comprehensive analysis study of the data collected and make good judgments and forecasts. Based on earnest studies of changes in meteorological and hydrological conditions and their impact on operational missions undertaken by various services and arms, particularly the Navy and Air Force, they should make timely suggestions on how to take advantage of favorable meteorological and hydrological conditions as well as on measures to guard against dangerous and major disastrous meteorological and hydrological conditions.

(3) Implement support with key points

At the same time as organizing comprehensive overall support, one should concentrate main meteorological and hydrological strengths and collect meteorological and hydrological situation and data in the main operational direction as well as for the campaign critical time occasions in ground, air and sea areas of main operations. Based on operational needs, one should flexibly determine the support key points and provide key point support to force-units of services and arms undertaking main operational missions. At the same time, one must accomplish support with a directed-quality for special requirements of meteorological and hydrological conditions based on the different services and arms, the force-units executing different missions and different operational activities.

(4) Actively engaging the enemy in struggles over meteorology and hydrology

One should actively organize interception and deciphering of the enemy's meteorological and hydrological intelligence, and pay due attention to the possibility that the enemy would artificially alter local meteorological and hydrological conditions. To this end, reconnaissance should be strengthened and necessary safeguards should be taken. One should keep one's own meteorological and hydrological intelligence strictly confidential. Depending on the situation, one may also stage feint meteorological and hydrological maneuvering in order to deceive or confuse the enemy. If and when conditions permit, one may also artificially influence local meteorological conditions to create a local meteorological and hydrological environment that is advantageous to one's side and disadvantageous to the enemy side.

VIII. Surveying and Mapping Support...228

Campaign surveying and mapping support is a generic term referring to various support measures taken to meet the need of military surveying and mapping in large formation campaign operations. The basic missions of campaign surveying and mapping support are to: provide accurate and reliable surveying and mapping products to ensure that the campaign commander and the command organ are familiar with the geographical conditions of the operational theaters and have a good grasp of battlefield terrain; and ensure that in an operation, the campaign large formation is able to correctly make use of the terrain, and technical weapons systems can make accurate fixing so as to fully realize the effects of their fire power. The basic requirements of campaign surveying and

mapping support are: timely, accurate, meticulous and highly efficient. The main campaign surveying and mapping support measures are as follows:

(1) Uniformly organize surveying and mapping strengths and form highly efficient and strict campaign surveying and mapping support systems

Although campaign surveying and mapping support demands a relatively high degree of specialization, its contents and scope are relatively wide. In order to smoothly carry out campaign surveying and mapping missions, a campaign large formation should, based on actual operational needs, set up highly efficient and strict surveying and mapping support systems with specialized surveying and mapping strengths of various services and arms constituting the core, supplemented by specialized technical strengths of civilian surveying and mapping agencies. In such systems, under the unified organization by the campaign command organ, there should be a clear division of labor and active coordination in efforts to accomplish surveying and mapping support missions. Under normal situations, campaign level surveying and mapping support and common surveying and mapping support shared by various participating services and arms should be the responsibility of the campaign surveying and mapping body; specific surveying and mapping support as required by individual services and arms, such as maritime water way surveying, mapping and charting etc for the Navy, aviation charting and collection of surveying data for the Air Force, and geodesy of position areas for the Second Artillery, should be carried out by the respective services and arms. If and when necessary, within the scope of the campaign, surveying and mapping strengths can be re-adjusted so as to strengthen surveying and mapping support for the main services and arms.

(2) Diligently collect, reserve, supply and manage various maps, surveying and mapping data and equipment

One should organize surveying, drawing and collecting various maps (maritime charts), as well as gathering data and information on main areas of the country and military control points, and study and collate data on the military geography, strategic locations, features and terrain. One should pay attention to collecting and capturing the enemy's military maps, charts and other surveying and mapping data. Based on operational missions and the senior officer's resolution, one should clearly lay out the quantity, types and scopes of reserves of various surveying and mapping material and equipment and should continuously replenish and perfect such reserves. Based on operational needs-requirements, one should make secret the military large-area control points and the re-surveyed maps, and promptly provide the necessary survey-mapping results to the campaign commander, the command organ and force-units. In addition, one should at the appropriate time start using and distributing the readiness maps to force-units and at the same time, adjust and replenish various maps, survey-mapping material and equipment so as to meet the needs for continuous operations.

(3) Earnestly analyze and study terrain and put forward suggestions on the use and transforming of terrain

One must fully apply advanced technical means such as computer-aided terrain analysis via measures such as gathering various terrain data, organizing terrain reconnaissance and interpreting aviation photographs to earnestly investigate and analyze the terrain of the operational area. [One must] ascertain the effects of various terrains on campaign activities and on the use of technical weaponry and promptly put forth recommendations to the campaign commander for utilizing and transforming the terrain.

(4) Draw up various key maps and make terrain models

Based on needs-requirements of command and operations, one should at the appropriate time organize surveying and mapping support personnel to draw up various essential charts regarding the senior officer's resolution, the enemy situation, the coordination plans, force-strength *bushu* disposition, fortifications, firepower distribution, obstacle placement and the campaign process. At the same time, one should also organize the making of the operational area terrain model to assist the campaign commander and the command organ in their study of the terrain.

(5) Strengthen technical guidance to force-units on surveying and mapping

Surveying and mapping support units should, based on the requirements of campaign operations, organize personnel to provide the force-units with necessary guidance concerning surveying and mapping support. It is particularly important to well organize and guide imminent battle training in military topography for the force-unit.

IX. . Battlefield Management...230

Campaign battlefield management is the general designation referring to various battlefield service activities and management on the ground, the sea, in the air and electro-magnetic battlefields organized by the campaign large formation for the purpose of providing combat support. The basic missions of campaign battlefield management are to exercise compulsive management over ground, sea and air battlefields and over the electro-magnetic field in order to maintain battlefield order and to ensure smooth execution of the campaign. The basic requirements of campaign battlefield management are: unified rules, joint execution, strict actions, supervision and inspection. The main measures of campaign battlefield management include the following points:

(1) Strengthen position management

Various facilities, weapons and equipment at various positions should be effectively and well managed and maintained. Clear and concrete requirements should be stipulated regarding battlefield order, duty and service schedules, vehicle and vessel control, communication control, health and prevention, light and sound control, confidentiality,

camouflage etc., and supervision and inspection should be strengthened. Relevant services and arms and specialized force- (element-) units should also put forward special management requirements regarding operational sea and air space and the electro-magnetic field. The management of operational sea space should also be conducted by dividing up the space into maritime operational zones, by setting up navigational waterways, sea blockade zones, and selective obstacle areas, and by organizing flood prevention and typhoon damage control, as well as navigational guidance and piloting. The management of operational air space should be conducted by dividing up the space into air operational areas, by setting up air corridors, flight control zones and no fly zones, and by organizing navigational guidance and flight monitoring and control. In the management of the electromagnetic domain, clarify the allocation, working methods, working frequencies, work times of the electronic equipment and the camouflage secrecy measures.

(2) Meticulously organize battlefield traffic control

Land, sea and air traffic control should be well and uniformly coordinated. Traffic controllers should be sent to important transportation hubs, bridges, airports, seaports, ferry docks etc. to strengthen supervision, inspection and coordination of battlefield traffic and ensure that transport lines such as theater highways, railways, navigational channels and air routes remain open. At the same time, civilian traffic in the battle zones should also be well coordinated and controlled, and clear rules and regulations should be established in this regard.

(3) Strictly enforce battlefield discipline

It is necessary to educate all the participating personnel to conscientiously follow various rules, regulations and orders, and to educate masses of people in the battle zone to jointly follow battlefield disciplines and maintain battlefield facilities. There should also be respect for the ethnic habits and customs in the battle zone, and strengthening of unity between the military and the government, and the military and the people. Wounded should receive timely rescue and treatment while the bodies of killed martyrs should be properly handled. The policy of well treating captives should be implemented and they should be well managed and educated.

(4) Comprehensively strengthen battlefield security and protection

There should be unified planning and unified *bushu* disposition in battlefield security and protection. Responsibilities should be clarified and there should be correct division of responsibilities among various services and arms and force-unit units in security missions and for land, air and sea areas. Special attention should be devoted to strengthening security and protection in the air, sea and electro-magnetic field, for which meticulous advance protective plans should be drawn up. Together with local party and government authorities, one should strive to mobilize masses of people to guard against traitors and

spies, and to conduct information blackout and to control enemy activities in the battle zones so as to ensure the security of the battlefield.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 8

Campaign Logistical Support...232

Campaign logistical support is the activity of applying logistical support strengths by a campaign commander in implementing manpower, material and financial support for force-units of campaign operations in order to achieve the capability of backing force-units to maintain sustained operations. It is an important support for consolidating and improving force-unit combat power and realizing campaign goals. In a modern campaign, there are many types of high and new tech equipment of those participating and the confrontation is fierce. Consumption is tremendous and the reliance by the front on the rear is great and requirements high. Logistic support thus has a very significant influence on seizing campaign victory.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...232

I. Characteristics of Campaign Logistical Support...232

Under informationized conditions, the development in weapons systems and equipment and the change in modern campaign operations characteristics have led to the development of many new characteristics in modern campaign logistical support.

(1) Heavy Support Tasks, High Degree of Difficulty and High Intensity

In a modern campaign, the opposing sides would concentrate their respective elite strengths of various services and arms and devote large quantities of high-tech weapons systems and equipment to wage high intensity confrontation in a broad, multi-dimensional battlefield. The factors capable of consuming, inflicting casualties and destruction have increased. The huge consumption of war materiel, the destruction of large quantities of equipment, and the cause of a large number of personnel casualties within a short period of time, all place a high and heavy demand on logistical support missions.

The first is the huge consumption of war materiel. Although a modern campaign is limited in scale and has a shortened duration, the introduction of a large amount of various high and new technology weapons systems and equipment in the battlefield has greatly increased the total consumption and unit time consumption levels. At the same time, the consumption structure has also undergone some changes. The ratio of consumption in fuel, maintenance equipment and electronic equipment in the overall war materiel consumption is on the steady increase. Also on the increase is consumption of special materiel and dedicated materiel. The increased complexity of the material structure has made it more difficult to gather, store, manage and supply war materiel.

The second are the changes in casualty distribution and forming of injuries, and the increased difficulty in rescuing and treating the wounded. A modern campaign is waged

simultaneously or consecutively in a multitude of battlefields on the ground, the sea, in the air, the front and the rear. The distribution of casualties would thus cover the entire campaign space, and in terms of time, the entire campaign process through its different campaign phases. Furthermore, the combination of the elements of “hard kill” with “soft kill” in information weapons systems has been increasing the ways and means to cause casualties as well as the complexity and diversity of casualty conditions. The introduction of information weapons systems would also increase the level of brutality in battlefield environment and would be more likely to cause mental and physical illness and non-combat depletion of personnel. With the introduction and development of non-lethal new concept high-tech weapons systems, the number of dead is expected to fall in combat personnel depletion while the number of wounded is expected to increase.

The third are heavier and more urgent transport missions and an increased complexity in organizing transport support. The outbreak of a future war is likely to come all of a sudden. The advance war reserves in materiel would be hard pressed to meet the expected demand. On the eve of a war, it is imperative to provide necessary support for the speedy mobility and concentration of force-strengths, weaponry and materiel. This would greatly increase the burden on pre-war transport missions. During the campaign, the volume of transport regarding materiel and the wounded will be huge, and the mobility of force-units will be great, while transport capabilities will be limited. All these would place a heavy burden on transport missions. The transport organization has also become very complex since during operational activities, it is necessary to organize not only ground, air and sea (water) transportation, but also transport line defense, control, and provision of services, medical care and various other supports.

(2) Three-dimensional and diverse support modes

In a modern campaign, operational space is broad and various operational patterns and activities are conducted in a comprehensive way. The trend in the modes of logistical support is toward multi-dimensionality and diversity.

First, ground-based one dimensional mode of support will be replaced by multi-dimensional mode of support. Since campaign activities will be launched simultaneously in a multi-dimensional space that includes the ground, the sea and the air, traditional ground-based one-dimensional form of support can no longer meet the campaign needs. Thus, a comprehensive and multi-dimensional mode of support that encompasses the ground, the air, water surface and under water will be more widely applied.

Secondly, a multi-linked, level-by-level support mode will be integrated with a bypass support mode. Implementing level-by-level support on the basis of support links is a basic campaign support mode. But if there are many intermediate links, then support time effectiveness is low, and this does not meet the needs of a modern campaign requiring better support time effectiveness. Hence, bypassing support links and implementing bypass support will become a widely utilized and important support mode.

Thirdly, back to front one-way support mode will be combined with all aspect and multi-directional support mode. To provide vertical, one-way, back-to-front force-unit support that relies on logistic bases located in the campaign depth is a traditional way of support. In a modern campaign, however, the front and rear are vulnerable to be separated by the enemy and thus the one-way, back-to-front flow of support mode is susceptible to disruption. Hence, in addition to adopting the mode of one-way, back-to-front support, one should also adopt a variety of support modes such as horizontal support, regional-based point-radiating support, and when necessary, a reverse direction support. Only in this manner can one meet the needs of modern campaign operations.

Fourthly, the mode of fixed base point support should be combined with the mode of flexible mobile {jidong} support. Maneuver operations has become a main operational pattern in a modern campaign. Force-units not only have wide scope, high speed and high frequency maneuver, but also conduct maneuver in wide land, sea and air areas. Relying solely on fixed base point support is no longer sufficient to meet the needs of a modern campaign. Hence, to provide multi-directional, multi-fields and high speed mobile {jidong} support has already become a very important support mode.

(3) Organizing command is complex and difficult

First, the strength composition of a modern campaign is diversified and the support relationships are highly complex. The PLA's modern campaign strength composition includes not only organized units within the operational theater but also various extra-theater ad hoc attached and assisting-support strengths; it includes not only the infantry but also the Air Force, the Navy and the Second Artillery; it includes not only field operational large formations but also local force-units. Campaign logistics have to organize not only general support for various operational strengths but also specialized support for various services and arms. The support service objects are multiple in types, wide in their spans, and the support relationships are highly complex.

Secondly, the support strength composition is also diversified and command relationships are complex. Campaign logistics would have to command not only general support strengths but also specialized support strengths of various services and arms; it would have to command not only support strengths within campaign logistic organizations, but also ad hoc reinforcement support strengths; it would have to command not only military logistic strengths, but also local support the front support strengths; and it would have to command not only relatively fixed regional support strengths, but also cross-regional mobile {jidong} support strengths. The pluralistic support strength composition has made campaign logistic command relationships even more complex.

Thirdly, there is great uncertainty in support mission estimates, thus making organizing and planning support even more difficult. Since every campaign is different in such factors as strength participation, operational area, operational scale and duration, logistical support mission workloads for different campaigns can vary greatly. Furthermore, the fluidity of the battle situation has also made it very difficult to

accurately predict the level of materiel consumption, personnel casualty, and equipment damage etc in each campaign. These factors have made it very difficult to make support mission estimates, and to organize and plan logistical support.

Fourthly, support is conducted simultaneously with protective defense, making logistic command even more intense. Modern campaign logistics are under the full time threats of the enemy's informationized weapons. Logistic commanders and organs would not only have to organize uninterrupted support for the force-units, but also have to command logistic strengths to fight against enemy strikes and sabotage. To organize support and command defensive operations simultaneously has made campaign logistic organization and command even more intense.

Fifthly, the enemy's electronic interference will make it difficult for logistic command to effect smooth and highly efficient implementation. In a modern campaign, the struggle in the electro-magnetic field is extremely intense; a multitude of "soft" and "hard" kill measures are employed; and command communication systems are vulnerable to interference and sabotage. Thus it is difficult to ensure the opening of communications between logistic command organs and campaign command organs, between different logistic command organs, and between logistic command organs and various logistic units. There also exists the possibility of even paralysis in logistic command.

(4) Survivability under grave threat

In campaign operational activities under modern conditions, to strike at and degrade the enemy's logistics has become one of the important means to accomplish campaign goals. The wide use of informationized weapons systems and equipment has made means of strike and degradation more and more varied and with increasing precision, as well as more widespread and destructive. Logistics faces at all times and in all space a grave threat from the enemy.

First, the concealment and camouflage of logistics *bushu* disposition have become even more difficult. Various modern high-tech reconnaissance means can provide wide, multi-layered, speedy, and accurate surveillance over the battlefield in real time. This has greatly enhanced battlefield transparency. As a result, the concealment and camouflage of logistics *bushu* dispositions have become more and more difficult.

Secondly, logistics would come under attack and destruction from the enemy's comprehensive firepower. Logistics in a modern campaign is one of the main objects of the enemy's firepower strikes. The enemy can launch from the ground, the air and the sea sustained, large-scale, all aspects and full depth comprehensive firepower strikes at logistics.

Thirdly, logistics would come under attack from the enemy's in-depth mobile {jidong} force-units. The increasing quantitative and qualitative enhancement of informationized equipment has enabled larger formations to exercise maneuver {jidong} operations in the

enemy's rear. Informationized ground, surface (submarine) and air mobile equipment can leapfrog frontal obstacles and execute high-speed mobility toward the campaign rear. Logistics would not only be the targets of attack and harassment by small groups of enemy special units or infiltration force-units, but also become the object of attack by the enemy's integrated air and ground (sea) in-depth maneuver force-units.

Fourthly, transport lines in the rear would suffer seriously from the enemy's blockade and disruption. In modern campaign operations, the enemy would employ various informationized weapons systems to stage full-length, multi-layered blockade and disruptive actions against our transport lines in the rear. The enemy may also use various mobile force-units to take control of our in-depth transport hubs, which could cause serious obstruction in logistical support.

II. Requirements...236

The new characteristics that have emerged in modern campaign logistics have made higher requirements on campaign logistical support.

(1) Combine peacetime with wartime work and be prepared in advance

Characterized by suddenness and fast pace, a modern campaign requires campaign logistics to respond and conduct support in a short period of time. Under such situations, only relying on imminent battle preparations is not sufficient to complete a great deal of preparations. Hence, one must rely on peacetime preparations in advance. Only by organically combining peacetime preparations with imminent battle preparations and with during battle preparations can one meet campaign needs.

Peacetime preparations are the basis for implementing support in wartime. One should formulate and improve various readiness courses of action and preliminary support plans based on the potential campaign scale and operational courses of action, and with a directed-quality, conduct the work that would be difficult to complete in the imminent battle preparation phase. These preparations include, for example, the construction of backbone logistics engineering projects and facilities, the building up of reserves of certain necessary materiel, the organization of necessary logistics exercises, familiarization of battlefield conditions, support missions and support courses of action and comprehensive enhancement of contingency support capabilities.

Imminent battle preparations are the crux to realizing speedy transition of logistics work from a peacetime footing to wartime footing. One should speedily organize logistics mobilization and expansion, perfect command and support institutions, revise and draw up support courses of action, adjust and replenish materiel reserves, perfect rear engineering facilities and timely deploy logistic strengths.

Preparations during battle are a supplement to peacetime preparation and imminent battle preparation. They are an important measure in seizing and maintaining support initiative.

After a campaign begins, logistics should, on the one hand, continue to strive to complete preparation work that is could not be completed in imminent battle preparations, and on the other, make correct estimates based on the most difficult and most complex scenarios, actively seek to get updated on campaign development and changes and potential progression, get prepared in advance to provide support for changes in campaign patterns and phase transitions, and draw up various contingency plans so as to ensure the sustainability, timeliness and reliability of combat support.

(2) Integrated overall-planning, give prominence to key points

Integrated overall-planning requires the organization of various logistics strengths into an organic whole based on the overall campaign and even strategic situations. It requires the comprehensive employment of various support means and modes to provide comprehensive, adjusting-coordinated, prompt and forceful logistical support to various operational strengths and various operational activities in the full course of the campaign and in its entire battlefield space. First of all, one should, based on the overall strategic situation, organize strategic logistics departments, relevant theater logistics departments and various relevant civilian departments to conduct high-level general operations research so as to ensure powerful logistical assisting-support. Secondly, based on the overall situation of the campaign, one should organize various campaign logistics strengths gathered at the operational theater into a campaign logistical support system that integrates the military units with civilian units, the infantry logistics units with air and naval units, and support units with defense units. Thirdly, one should comprehensively and rationally differentiate support missions. In terms of support objects, one should conduct unified support to all participating services and arms and the three types of armed strengths. In terms of support scope, one should not only provide support to ground battles, but also provide support to naval and air battles and should well co-ordinate support for various campaign patterns. In terms of support space, one should not only provide support to the operations in the front, but also look after and meet the needs for operations in in-depth battlefields and in the enemy rear. In terms of support time, one should provide support not only to the preparation and beginning of a campaign, but also to the full course of the campaign. In terms of content, one should achieve comprehensive support that includes materiel, transport, engineering and medical care etc. Fourthly, one should comprehensively utilize various support modes. One should comprehensively utilize general support with specialized support, regional support and organizational support, level by level support with bypass support, vertical support with horizontal support, and one dimensional support with three-dimensional support, so as to bring into full play overall support capabilities.

Comprehensive support must give prominence to key points. Modern logistical support has a multitude of objects, wide scope, heavy missions, and high requirements. The contradictions between support capability and operational needs are very prominent. Hence, at the same time as integrated overall-planning and full-scale dealing with both, one must employ logistics strengths with concentration and flexibility and promptly and fully support the key points. The key points of support mainly are: in terms of space, this

is normally the main battlefield, the main operational direction and important operational areas; in terms of time, this is normally the main operational phase and critical time occasions of the campaign; in terms of objects of support, this is normally the services and force-units undertaking the main operational units in each phase and each direction; and in terms of support content, this is normally the materials of the main operations. However, due to the rapid change in battlefield conditions under informationized conditions, the operational center of gravity frequently shifts. The logistics commander must be adept to promptly and correctly master the changes to the key points, to adjust the logistic strengths and support plans at the right time and to quickly form new support key points.

(3) High speed and high efficiency, taking the initiative

One should strive to the best of his ability to forcefully provide support for the force-units in fast pace, by one's own initiative and at appropriate time. A modern campaign is often launched in surprise and conducted at a fast pace. It consumes large quantities of war materiel and causes huge casualties. It places a high requirement on time effectiveness in support and requires campaign logistics to respond in a very speedy and accurate manner. It requires campaign logistics to be able to gather in a short period of time a sizable logistics strength to synchronize with force-unit activities, so as to ensure operational needs. Hence, one must strengthen the logistical support forecast and make advance estimates of support missions and make necessary preparations. One should also, based on the most difficult and complex scenarios, draw up various contingency plans. It is necessary to be pro-active in logistical support by getting to know in a timely manner, and keeping informed of, the force-unit logistical support needs, and by taking the initiative to send materiel and take delivery of the wounded. It is necessary to enhance the timeliness in organizing support, to simplify command procedures, to make resolute decisions, to take full advantage of various automated means and to speed up the transmission and feedback of various kinds of information. In providing support, one should also strive to reduce the number of links, to place support organs closer to the front, to comprehensively employ various support means and to organize speedy support operations.

(4) To be cost effective and to take advantage of one's strength while avoiding one's weakness

To be cost effective is to provide, at appropriate times, in appropriate places and quantities, effective support to force-units, and to achieve the best support effect by using as little as possible personnel and materiel and as little time as possible. To be cost effective requires that one pay attention not only to military effects but also economic effects. This is especially true in campaign operations under informationized conditions when there is a high consumption of war materiel, high rate of personnel casualties, and a large amount of equipment damage. Because of the many needs for high-tech equipment, the high cost of war materiel, and limited reserves, there is a sharp contradiction between supply capabilities and needs. Hence, in paying attention to support time effectiveness,

one should, while meeting the basic needs-requirements of force-units, also pay due attention to economic effects. For this purpose, one should make scientific estimates and correct decisions, and should try to avoid and reduce mistakes. Based on the needs-requirements of various units and support capabilities, one should make precise calculations and thorough planning, and should strengthen management, control consumption, and prevent abuse and waste, so as to ensure campaign victory at the shortest period of time and lowest cost.

To take advantage of one's strength while avoiding one's weakness is to fully exploit one's various strong points to make up for the deficiencies in backward logistics equipment and in financial strength as well as for the lack of professional support personnel, so as to improve support cost effectiveness. For this purpose, one should take full advantage of the benefits of fighting on home territory and of fighting a people's war. And one should perfect the logistics mobilization system, strengthen logistics reserve strength construction, and bring into full play the effect of the large-scale logistic of a people's war. One should carry out battlefield logistics construction in advance, improve the support environment, and make predictions on battlefield materiel needs, so as to reduce in-battle replenishment, take advantage of familiar terrain and use various flexible ways and means to organize logistical support. While taking full advantage of present conditions, one should also adopt various measures to overcome deficiencies and to focus on the development of certain advanced logistics equipment and on improving present logistics equipment. One should, furthermore masterfully integrate limited advanced support means with traditional means of support.

(5) Strengthen defense and enhance survivability

Campaign logistics is one of the key targets of the enemy's focused attack and sabotage efforts. Logistics survivability and support activities will face unprecedented and grave threats. The security of logistics has a direct bearing on the accomplishment of logistical support missions and may also have a direct effect on the progression and conclusion of a campaign. Hence it is imperative to strengthen logistics defense and enhance logistics survivability by closely integrating support with defense. For this purpose, it is necessary to include logistics defense in the overall campaign defense plan to be implemented under the unified organization of the campaign commander and headquarters. One must, with the logistic deployment area {peizhi diyu} and defense of the transportation line as key points, with the specialized duty defense strength as the backbone, and in combination with the special services strength and local militia, form a defense organization that is united in defense and a joint defense of military and civilian. Adhering to the principle of "*combining defense with strike and giving defense priority*," one should adopt a multitude of measures that integrate "concealment" with masterful "deception," point defense over individual logistics targets with area defense over support zones, reliance on self-defense by logistics strengths with cover by operational strengths, and "hard" defense that strikes at the enemy with firepower force-strengths with "soft" defense aimed at deceiving and interfering with the enemy reconnaissance and operational systems, so as to enhance logistics survivability. One should accomplish not

only being able to effectively preserve strengths, but also being able to continuously implement logistic support in a harsh environment.

Section 2: Contents and Methods...239

The essential function of campaign logistics is to provide direct or indirect materiel support for the personnel and weapon and equipment systems of the campaign large formation. The basic mission is to bring into full play the functions of various campaign logistics strengths, and to strengthen and enhance the force-units' operational capabilities through providing materiel, financial, medical, transport etc. support, so as to ensure the accomplishment of campaign missions. The main contents include materiel support, medical service support, transport service, financial support and logistics protection.

I. Material Support...239

Material support is a generic term referring to securing, reserving, replenishing and managing operational and living materiel for the force-units. It is an important component of logistical support. It mainly includes ammunition, fuel, provisions, bedding and clothing, medicine, and equipment support. Material consumption of a modern campaign is huge: it involves a wide variety of goods; the scope of supply is wide; and time is demanding. Thus support missions are highly difficult. The extent to which support missions are carried out would have a major impact on the progression and the outcome of a campaign. Campaign logistics must be scientifically planned, fully prepared, and comprehensively organized in accordance with campaign missions, participating force-strengths, campaign duration, materiel consumption and the degree of difficulty in replenishment. The focus should be placed on the four links of securing, reserving, supplying and managing support, so as to ensure the accomplishment of campaign missions.

(1) Securing Materiel

To secure campaign materiel is the primary link in campaign materiel support. In accordance with reserve standards stipulated by the superior authority and with campaign consumption plans, one should secure materiel needed in a campaign through various ways and means. Rear supply should be the primary channel for securing materiel. In addition to relying on rear supply, in a modern campaign, one should also try to secure materiel through various other ways and means such as drawing on local resources, mutual support between campaign large formations, using captured materiel, etc.

Rear supply of campaign materiel refers to supplies provided by strategic logistics to theater logistics and supplies conducted within a theater in accordance with the established support system. Campaign large formation logistical support is supplied from the top through dual support channels of organizational support and regional support. The supply of general materiel should be uniformly organized by united theater logistics and service organs and conducted in accordance with the established regional support

relationship. Specialized materiel support should be supplied in accordance with organizational relationships in the Navy, the Air Force, the Second Artillery and other arms. In order to maintain smooth supply relationships, the rear supply is normally conducted by higher level logistics according to plan, and the campaign large formation logistics should take the initiative to make requests on the basis of the multi-service and multi-arm joint operation material consumption plan and campaign reserves.

To draw on local resources is an important channel for securing campaign materiel. It is to secure within the operational theater or designated area materiel from local sources either under a unified plan from the superior or on one's own initiative. When one is unable to get supply from the superior organs due to a disruption in transport lines by the enemy or due to maneuvering of force-units to locations distant from the rear, one should try to draw on local resources, mainly dual use materiel and war materiel that can be produced locally such as provisions and fuel. Supply from local sources should be secured under unified control by theater logistics or campaign large formation logistics together with the local government. In regions where resources are unbalanced, supply should be allocated and managed jointly by theater command in coordination with local government.

Mutual help and assistance between operational theaters or campaign large formations is another important channel to secure materiel. In local war in particular, because of different locations of various operational theaters and different resource conditions with each theater, and because of differences in materiel possession and consumption, some theaters may have acute problems between supply and demand while others may enjoy relative ease in supplies. The same can happen to different campaign large formations within an operational theater. Hence, it is necessary for neighboring theaters and units to provide help and assistance to each other in materiel supply. This should generally be conducted under a unified plan drawn up by the superior logistics organ. In time of emergencies, each unit may also initiate contacts with neighboring units, directly requesting support and assistance.

Make use of captured materiel to replenish oneself is a supplementary channel in a modern campaign that should not be overlooked. Specialized logistics departments should, under the organization and assistance by the relevant department of the headquarters, make timely organization of a sweep of the battlefield and collect, sort and examine captured materiel and include those usable materiel in the supply plan so as to make unified allocation and rational use of such materiel.

(2) Material reserves

Campaign materiel reserves refer to the establishment of a certain quantity of materiel reserves for the purpose of meeting campaign materiel needs. They are the basis of campaign materiel supply and thus an important link in campaign materiel support.

Campaign materiel reserves generally should be held separately by logistics units of theater command, combined group army, provincial military districts and participating services in accordance with the division of labor in the support system. Theater logistics is responsible for general-use materiel reserves of the force-units of the services-arms formed within its organizations and the operational missions executed in the theater. Campaign large formation logistic units should be responsible for materiel reserves for the combined group army. Theater Air Force, Naval bases, Second Artillery bases, etc. should be separately responsible for their respective specialized materiel reserve and some general materiel reserve. Campaign materiel reserves generally should be implemented by the theater command and provincial military command in accordance with the expansion course of action. Light equipment reserves generally should be stored at the established force-units and in their vicinity while heavy equipment reserves generally should be warehoused in the vicinity of force-unit concentrations. When campaign materiel reserves are large in quantity and the reserve facilities of the military are limited, the military should consult the civilian authorities over divisions of labor in holding such reserves. The military should mainly be responsible for reserves in weapons, ammunition, fuel, field food supplies, technical equipment and other materiel that is urgently needed to operations and difficult to secure from local sources during wartime. The military can ask local governments to hold in custody dual-use materiel reserves in order to reduce its own reserves of such materiel.

Material reserve standards are generally drawn up by superior commanding officers. Sometimes the subordinate may also submit applications or suggestions to be approved by superior commanding officers. The main criteria in formulating materiel reserve standards are the intention of the campaign large formation commander, the superior's logistics instructions or rear orders, force-unit missions, amount, and materiel consumption patterns, campaign duration, logistical support capabilities and transport capacity, the degree of difficulty in replenishing during the battle, the reserve capacity of the force-units and the support potentials of local resources.

The basic requirements of materiel reserves are: rational in quantity, structure, and distribution, easy access and transport, and secure. In concrete terms, reserve quantity should be appropriate. While sufficient to meet the campaign needs, it should not lead to overstock which could hinder force-unit's mobility. In terms of types of goods, the reserves should be complete and in sets. One should make reserves of various types of goods in accordance with mission needs. The reserves should be complete in types, correct in specifications, comprehensive in sets and rational in distribution and classification. The allocation of reserves should have a hierarchical structure as well as a focus. On a macro level, it should be dispersed, while on a micro level, it should be concentrated. It should have a full depth, multi-layered layout so that from operational force-units to theater and all support links would have materiel reserves appropriate to the relevant support missions.

(3) Material replenishment

Material replenishment refers to the prior to battle distribution and during battle replenishing activity based on securing materiel and materiel reserves and in accordance with a unit's strength and supply standards, consumption limit or allocation quota. It constitutes an important link in materiel support. Only by timely and continuously providing replenishment can one safeguard campaign operational consumption, and maintain force-units' sustained fighting capabilities. The core issue of materiel replenishment is the direction of materiel flows. Whether the direction of materiel flows is rational depends mainly on if materiel distribution plans are scientific. The speed of materiel flows is mainly influenced by a combination of factors including the reception and supply systems and methods.

The material distribution plan is the main basis for materiel replenishment. The plan should be drawn up during the campaign preparation phase in accordance with the campaign commander's operational resolution, the force-unit operational missions, supply standards and consumption limits. Campaign materiel replenishment is generally based on a plan. However, when battle conditions have changed in the course of an operation and the original plan can no longer meet operational needs, one should make timely adjustments.

Perfecting and rationalizing materiel supply systems are the basis for conducting highly efficient replenishment exercises. Such a system is generally made up of theater logistics, combined group army logistics and service campaign logistics organs, and is linked to strategic and tactical materiel supply systems. Hierarchical replenishment methods should be combined with methods that bypass the normal chain of replenishment. The replenishment of general materiel is generally conducted by the theater to supply to the support organs of the campaign large formation of various services based on designated support regions. Sometimes, replenishment of general materiel may also be effected to directly supply divisions (brigades), naval attachments or district garrisons, independent divisions, regiments and aviation air stations. Under the campaign large formation level, replenishment should be organized in accordance with the established structure. Replenishment of specialized materiel for various services and arms should be carried out in accordance with their respective established structures.

There are a variety of modes of materiel replenishment. They should be employed in a flexible way based on the characteristics of different types of campaigns. The main ones are: in terms of links and structures, one may carry out hierarchical replenishment or bypass the chain of command in supplying replenishment; when normal replenishment can not be carried out, one may also organize mutual support and assistance between campaign large formations; in terms of replenishment procedures and division of labor, one may carry out planned replenishment or the subordinate unit may make replenishment requests; in terms of operating methods of materiel replenishing strengths, one may carry out fixed point replenishment, intercept replenishment, follow-up

replenishment etc.; in terms of replenishment space, one may carry out ground replenishment, sea replenishment and air replenishment.

The timing of materiel replenishment should be determined flexibly on the basis of the needs of the force-units, battlefield conditions, and the degree of enemy threats as well as the means and capabilities of logistics replenishment units. One should, in particular, take full advantage of the lull in campaign execution or gaps in the enemy's blockade, or should carry out replenishment after seizing control of the air or the sea, or by taking advantage of favorable hydrological or meteorological conditions, or other good opportunities such as when operational activities have achieved good results.

Material replenishment should follow the principle of main objects first, secondary objects later, urgent needs first, secondary needs later, and key support units first. It should generally follow the order of the main campaign direction first, secondary directions later; front line force-units first, second line force-units and campaign reserve forces later; remote distance force-units first, nearby force-units later; urgently needed materiel first, general materiel later.

(4) Material Management

Campaign materiel management is a generic term referring to storage and control measures adopted for the purpose of bringing into full play the utility value of campaign materiel. It is an important measure to minimize non-combat materiel loss. Wartime materiel support is carried out under a serious threat from the enemy. Furthermore, facilities of some ad hoc supply organs are relatively simple. As a result, the time limit on materiel storage and care-taking would be greatly affected by field operation's natural conditions. Hence, materiel management should mainly focus on supervising and inspecting the force-units in the use and management of carry-on materiel, materiel management in transportation, materiel management in warehousing.

II. Medical Services Support...243

Campaign medical service support refers to the organization of medical service strengths to rescue and treat the wounded and to send them to the rear, and the organization of medical prevention and protection services in the campaign large formation. The basic missions of wartime campaign medical service support include: organizing the medical service strengths in the campaign rear to rescue and treat the sick and wounded; providing them with medical care and sending them to the rear; and carrying out medical prevention and protection and maintaining the health conditions of participating personnel so as to strengthen and enhance the force-unit combat power. In a modern campaign, the increased lethality and destructiveness of weapons may create a large number of wounded in action, and at the same time, the significant change in the killing mechanism of many high-tech weapons will increase the forms and types of the wounded, making casualty conditions even more complex. Furthermore, the pace of a modern campaign is greatly accelerated, and the battlefield space widened; personnel

casualties will be more concentrated in time but more dispersed in space, making medical service support missions more burdensome; and the battlefield conditions would be seriously degraded in a high-tech campaign, making medical service support missions even more difficult. Hence, campaign logistics must make scientific planning and thorough organization so as to ensure the successful accomplishment of medical service support missions.

(1) Make an estimate of the medical depletion of personnel numbers

Making an estimate of the campaign medical depletion of personnel numbers provides an important basis for correctly drawing up campaign medical service support plans and for rationally organizing and employing medical service strengths. In the campaign preparation phase, the campaign commander should make an estimate of the overall medical depletion of personnel numbers in the campaign. The causes for campaign medical depletion of personnel numbers can vary. In making an estimate of medical depletion of personnel numbers, one should make a comprehensive analysis over the various factors that would cause depletion of personnel numbers, and based on references drawn from experiences and data in similar campaigns in the past try to make such an estimate as close as possible to the actual depletion of personnel numbers. Generally speaking, the total depletion of personnel numbers is higher in a defensive campaign than in an offensive campaign; in a naval campaign large formation, the depletion of personnel numbers in the main assault group is often higher than in auxiliary assault groups; in an air force campaign large formation, the depletion of personnel numbers is often higher in the phase of large scale enemy air strike than in other phases and it is also often higher when the aviation forces is operating in the enemy air space than in one's own air space; in the Second Artillery campaign large formation, the depletion of personnel numbers is often higher in preparatory positions than in established positions and it is often higher in guided missile mobile {jidong} operations than in positional warfare operations. The general law on campaign average daily depletion rate is: the offensive campaign depletion is higher than the defensive campaign depletion, the depletion in the main operational direction is higher than in secondary directions, the depletion in the front line unit is higher than in secondary line units, and the initial one to three days of a campaign is higher than in later operational days.

(2) Organization and employment of medical service support strengths

Campaign logistics should: uniformly deploy subordinate and reinforcement medical service strengths of various services and arms, as well as local support medical service strengths provided by the superior; rationally differentiate general medical service strengths and specialized service and arm medical service strengths; divide up the scope of rescue and treatment operations between medical service strengths for regional-based rescue and treatment and those for organizational-based rescue and treatment; ensure the connections between various links in the scope of rescue and treatment and between various contents of rescue and treatment; and establish a medical service support system that is based on established military medical service strengths as the backbone and one

that combines the military with civilian. The basic way of campaign rear medical rescue and treatment is to combine regionally based rescue and treatment with organizationally based rescue and treatment. Regionally based rescue and treatment is to receive, rescue and treat the sick and wounded of all services and arms according to designated regions. This is mainly carried out by theater rear hospitals (logistics field hospitals and base hospitals). Organizationally based rescue and treatment is to receive, rescue and treat the sick and wounded according to their designated organization and subordinate relationships. This is carried out by medical institutions of various military units. In order to ensure timely and good treatment for the sick and wounded, medical service strengths should be deployed appropriately close to the front, and special medical units should be sent to strengthen support to the main operational directions, to regional units, and to units carrying out independent operations, so as to enhance their rescue and treatment capabilities.

(3) Transport the sick and wounded to the rear

In order to reduce the death rate and disability rate among the sick and wounded, and to preserve effective strength, one should minimize the time it takes to transport the sick and wounded to the rear. In transporting the sick and wounded, one should adhere to the principle of combining forward reception by the superior organs with back transport by the subordinate units. The focus, though, should be placed on forward reception. Hierarchical forward reception and back transport should be combined with bypassing forward reception and back transport. The focus, though, should be placed on hierarchical forward reception and back transport. At the same time, one would take full advantage of various means of transport, combine military transport with civilian transport, and designated transport with return transport, so as to enhance the pace of transportation to the rear.

(4) Medical prevention

Medical prevention is to adopt various medical preventive and managing methods to realize the goal of preventing disease from occurring and epidemic from spreading. One should carry out the policy of prevention first, and a mass campaign against disease and of epidemic prevention. At the same time, one should adopt active and effective preventive measures so as to reduce instances of disease. For this purpose, one should do a good job of public education over health and disease prevention, strictly enforce medical regulatory systems and place emphasis on preventing the occurrence and spread of contagious diseases and regional epidemics.

(5) Medical protection

To guard against and reduce the harm of the enemy's weapons of mass destruction on force-units, one should construct protection works and provide necessary protective equipment, set up rescue organizations with the participation of chemical and medical service strengths, and designate hospitals to carry out special missions of rescue and

treatment of personnel. When there is a possibility that the enemy may use biological weapons, the medical departments should organize strengths to carry out the medical reconnaissance and quarantine work according to quarantine regulations. When the force-units come under weapons of mass destruction attacks, campaign logistics should organize timely rescue and treatment of the wounded in the affected areas and carry out decontamination treatment of the affected areas.

III. Financial Support...245

Financial support refers to the planning, allocation, replenishment and supply of expenditures of the military. The main missions are: preparing and examining the campaign operational budget and final accounting of expenditures; organizing various normal provision of funds; accurately controlling provision capabilities; timely handling the receipt and transfer of supply and demand relationships; organizing the provisions of funds for the surrendered and captives; collecting, keeping and processing captured money and other valuables; and organizing the custodian provision of military family living allowances etc. In order to financially support the accomplishment of campaign missions, one should follow the principles of taking the interest of the whole into account while giving due considerations to area interest, ensure the support for the key areas while giving due consideration to general areas, manage according to plans, be frugal, keep expenditure within the limits of available funds, and allow for unforeseen circumstances, so as to be fully cost effective in using funds.

(1) Provision of funds

The provision of funds is to supply force-unit needed funds through bank transfer, cash provision and local fund-raising. The regular funds needed in a campaign should be obtained by the finance department of campaign large formation logistics from superior organs on a monthly basis based on supply capacity and supply standards, and should be distributed to the subordinate units accordingly. Operational expenditures should be obtained and distributed in a timely manner and in accordance with the budget (expenditure plan) approved by the superior organs. The provision of funds should generally be timed to occur in the campaign preparation phase and during battle intervals. In case of contingency, or of a need for big expenditures that can not be met by pre-allocated funds, one may also provide support by adopting ad hoc funding measures.

(2) Acceptance and transfer of fund provision relationship

There is a high degree of mobility during wartime and command and subordinate relationships changes quickly. Campaign logistics should accept and transfer fund provision relationships and accurately organize provision of funds in a timely fashion. The acceptance and transfer of provision relationships regarding subordinate units should be determined by the duration of such relationship. If the command and subordinate relationship lasts only a short period of time, in principle no transfer of provision relationship is needed. However if the relationship lasts a relatively long time, transfer

may be done based on command relationship, or by a unit designated by large formation logistics to provide funds. For units located far away from their established units, units in the vicinity may be designated by large formation logistics to provide funds. When established units are moved, new provision organs should organize fund provision upon receipt of letters of introduction. As for personnel, horses, vehicles and boats provided by civilian authorities for the front, military units should start providing funds on the day of acceptance of letters of introduction from civilian authorities, name lists and other certifications.

(3) Fund management

Fund management should be focused on managing such links as application, allocation, designation, payment, release, reimbursement etc. In addition, there should also be careful management of settlement, auditing and supervision, and of captured money and other valuables. Settlement should be mainly based on provision relationship, provision capacity, provision standards, operational budget approved by the superior organs, expenditure plans of functional departments, commanding officers approval memos and various receipts. It should be conducted in a time sensitive manner during campaign intervals and, as much as possible, on a daily and monthly basis. One must strengthen auditing and supervision over various links concerning finance such as planning, expenditure, settlement etc so as to ensure the funds are spent in accordance with provision standards and relevant regulations. Financial departments at various levels should have designated officers to take charge of captured money and other valuables. They should make timely request for force-units to hand them in, and should have them registered, well kept, and handled in accordance with relevant regulations drawn up by superior authorities.

IV. . Transport Service...246

Campaign transport service is the basic means to carry out armed forces mobility support, transportation of materiel supplies and movement of the sick and wounded personnel and damaged equipment to the rear. It is a central link for campaign logistics to accomplish support missions. In a modern campaign, force-unit mobility is frequent; forward and backward transport tasks are heavy; the transport volume is huge; directions of transport flows are multiple and the space is wide; and transport lines are under grave threats from enemy attacks. Hence, campaign logistics should bring into full effect the power of integrated military-civilian support strengths and well organize multi-layered and multi-dimensional comprehensive transport that includes ground, water and air transport.

(1) Unified Organization and Command

Campaign transport is rich in content. It involves many areas. And command and coordination relationships are complex. Hence it is imperative to set up unified transport command organs to exercise unified organization and direction. For this purpose, on the basis of a peacetime communication and transport strategic leading small group, a

communication and transport leading small group should be set up that would be made up of theater and local party and government leaders and leaders of military and civilian communication and transport departments. Under the leading small group, lean executive organs should also be set up. Their main missions are: unified *guihua* planning of communication and transport and conducting guidance for various functional transport departments; making uniform arrangements for military and civilian transport; uniformly dispatching various transport strengths; organizing emergency construction and repairs and maintenance of communication and transport lines; directing struggles against the enemy along communication and transport lines; organizing communication adjustments; and maintaining traffic order so as to ensure that communication and transport lines stay open.

In order to accomplish well multi-dimensional and comprehensive transport, one should have a foothold in the campaign overall situation, conduct thorough planning and make arrangements for unified-overall-planning. In the division of transport missions, one should give priority to higher-level transport to the front, while subordinate levels should organize self-shipments; transport to the front should give priority to level-by-level transport to the front, and then organize skip-echelon transport to the front based on needs-requirements. In planning transport to the rear missions, in addition to using specialized back transport vehicles, one should also take full advantage of return trip transport vehicles. Furthermore, one should keep a certain amount of reserve transport capabilities in preparations for eventualities.

(2) Comprehensive employment of various transport capabilities

Railway and highway transport are the main transport means in campaign logistics transport. Such transport lines should be extended as far as possible to the front, so as to carry out more transport missions. Oil pipelines are the main means for campaign logistics fuel transport. The supply of fuels to naval (air) bases and stations should mainly be carried out through pipelines. Air transport, particularly helicopter transport, is more flexible and speedier. One should take full advantage of such forms of transport. In coastal areas and areas where an extensive network of waterway transport exists, one should devote much effort to organizing sea and river transport. In special regions, units under group army level should organize manual and animal auxiliary transport. In comprehensive employment of transport strengths, one should also organize connections between various forms of transport. For instance, when rail transport is disrupted, one should organize auto transport relay. When auto transport is under capacity, rail transport should extend as much as possible to the front. Air transport should also be organized so as to ensure all-time uninterrupted transport

(3) Building multi-dimensional transport system

Based on campaign *bushi* disposition and transport missions, in the campaign rear, a multi-route, multi-layered and multi-dimensional transport network should be constructed with railway and highways as the backbone and including waterways, oil pipelines, and

air routes. For this purpose, on the basis of peacetime transport construction, one should quickly improve and add transport trunk lines, feeder lines, dedicated lines and bypass lines, and open up new routes and air routes etc. In transport network repair and maintenance, engineering corps and local specialized technical strengths should form the backbone. The military should be joined by civilian strengths. Transport lines should be divided up into regions and sections for designated units to meticulously organize and carry out repair and maintenance.

(4) Meticulously organize protection of transport lines

In order to ensure smooth communication and transport, the campaign commander should include the protection of the transport network in the theater and campaign large formation rear protection plan, and organize aviation force-units, surface-to-air guided missile force-units and anti-aircraft artillery force-units to provide protective cover against air attacks, and rear ground defense force-units, frontier force-units and militias along transport lines to carry out ground safeguard and defense tasks. Campaign logistics should be centered on transport. It should meticulously organize the coordination between transport and repairs and protection. Transport and repairs should be carried out under protective cover. And taking full advantage of the protective cover, transport and emergency repairs should be carried out racing against time.

V. Logistics Defense...248

Campaign logistics defense refers to alert and protection measures and operational activities adopted to prevent and defeat the enemy's raid-attacks and destruction against logistic targets. Logistics has always been a key target of enemy's strike destruction. Various items of logistic work in a modern campaign are unfolded and conducted in an environment of encountering enemy threats and intense struggles with the enemy; thus the campaign and logistics commanders must adhere to the principles of *combining defense with strike giving defense priority, combining military with civilian giving military priority, combining points with areas giving priority to points*, and tightly organizing logistics defense. The basic missions of logistics defense are: accomplish well the concealment and camouflage of logistics organs, force-units and facilities against various kinds of enemy reconnaissance; actively open-up-development of anti-air raid, anti-air landing, anti-harassment, and anti-destruct operations, safeguarding the security of logistics personnel, materiel and equipment; coordinate the headquarters departments, accomplish the transport line struggle against the enemy, and safeguard the unimpeded security of communication and transport lines.

(1) Logistics defense command

Campaign logistics defense is an important component in campaign logistic defense. It must be carried out under the unified command of the campaign commander and the command organ. Defense of the logistic deployment area {peizhi diyu} should be carried out by various defense zones under the unified command of the logistics commander. The

defense of logistical support strengths deployed in defense zones, including engineering, telecommunication, anti-chemical warfare force- (element-) units and civilian assisting-support strengths, should be brought into the overall campaign logistics protection plan and executed under the unified command of various defense zones. The defense of logistics organs and force- (element-) units deployed at strategic and campaign vital sites should be brought into the vital-site defense plan *{jihua}* and is the unified responsibility of the vital-site commander. In the defense of rear communication and transport lines, the logistics should be jointly implemented in coordination and cooperation with the headquarters and the communication and transport command institution. There should be close coordination and mutually assisting-support between the defense zones and the force-units under the responsibility principles of unified command and division of effort, ensuring the safety of logistics.

(2) *Bushu* disposition of logistics defense strengths

Logistics defense forces include those units within the logistics organized structure, the higher-level reinforcement defense force- (element) units, and local armed and logistical support personnel. The *bushu* disposition of the defense strengths should be deployed in line with the key points and correspond to the principle of concentrated employment. It should be determined on the basis of essential elements such as the defense missions, the importance, terrain conditions, and enemy threat level of the defense targets, and the currently existing defense strengths. Specialized logistics defense force- (element-) units should mainly be responsible for the defense of the logistics command organ and the areas where important logistic institutions are deployed, and generally deploy them in the vicinity of the defended target. Task-organized with the support organizational-unit as its basis, the defense strength in the defense zone shoulders the dual missions of defense and support. Outside of special-duty defense strengths selecting points to set up defense and controlling vital points and thoroughfares, the surplus strengths will be separately dispersed and deployed according to the task-organization within the support unit's area, conducting both support and defense. One should also control a specific special-duty defense strength that is deployed at a location convenient for assisting-support in order to enhance the contingency capability of defending.

(3) Organizing united military-civilian defense

Organizing united military-civilian defense should be carried out on the basis of peacetime preparations. In peacetime, the military should, in line with the principles of *on-the-spot and close-at-hand*, and *combining military and civilian giving priority to the military*, take the initiative to contact, share studies and unify and organize command with departments such as provincial military area commands and military sub-commands. Such united defense should be organized locally in view of the deployed location of logistic organs and units. The military should play the leading role. The backbone role played by logistic defense strengths should be fully exploited. It is necessary to set up, in a timely manner, defense organizations, and to clarify command relationships and missions of joint defense, means of communication and various joint defense measures. It

is also necessary to organize united defense exercises so as to enhance coordinated defense capabilities.

In addition, campaign logistics work also includes the mobilization of logistics engineering support and local support-the-front strengths, along with employment and clean-up of the battlefield and handling prisoners of war, etc.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 9

Campaign Equipment Support...250

Campaign equipment support is the service activity for servicing, upkeep, inspecting, repairing and modifying in order to ensure the weapons and equipment of the campaign large formation stay in good technical condition. In a modern campaign, the technical equipment employed is both numerous in type and large in number, and the intensity of its usage is very high. Its role in the campaign is much more prominent than in the past. Modern weapons and equipment are also costly, and thus peacetime reserves of such weapons and equipment are relatively small. Their wartime production is also under constraints. Replenishment of such weapons and equipment during the war is more difficult. Weapons and equipment are also the key point for enemy strike and destruction. As a result, the rate of damage is high and replenishment is very difficult. This is likely to have a major impact on the combat power of force-units. Hence, to be able to organize effective equipment support is of very important significance for maintaining and rapidly restoring the good technical conditions of weapons and equipment, and for maintaining and strengthening the combat power of campaign large formations in order to achieve campaign victory.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...250

I. The Characteristics of Campaign Equipment Support...250

Because of the development and widespread use of informationized weapons and equipment on the battlefield, not only has this caused very major changes in operational ideologies, operational patterns, and fighting methods, but it has also caused the appearance of many new characteristics of equipment support.

(1) Complex weapons and equipment structure and the broad equipment support content

First, the types of weapons and equipment have greatly increased, and the objects of equipment support have been broadened. For a considerably long period of time in the future, a large number of traditional conventional weapons and equipment will still be in use, but at the same time, many high-tech weapons and related equipment will be added. As for weapons and equipment, the new and the old will co-exist, and high-, medium-, and low-tech weapons and equipment will be possessed together. The types of weapons and equipment will greatly increase and equipment support departments will have to provide technical support for all kinds of weapons and equipment, thus greatly broadening the objects of support. Second, weapons and equipment structures are complex and the contents of equipment support are numerous. Modern informationized weapons and equipment are extremely complex. For instance, at the time when the operational aircraft was first introduced, one had only some 1000 parts, but now one has more than one million parts. Equipment support has also been transformed from mainly mechanical maintenance in the past, to precision machine tools and electronic and optical

instruments, and other high-tech maintenance. The contents of such support are very broad. Third, the transport, storage and upkeep, and replenishment of expendable high-tech weapons and equipment maintenance materials, and the technical preparation of high-tech weapons and ammunitions, all require appropriate technical support, thus making support missions larger and larger and technical requirements higher and higher. From this it can be seen that the development of weapons and equipment, particularly the increase in high-tech weapons systems and equipment, has broadened the content of equipment support.

(2) More equipment damage mechanisms and increased degree of difficulty in equipment support

In a modern campaign, the mechanisms of weapons and equipment damage are varied. Not only is the threat of traditional “hard” destruction becoming greater and greater, as it can cause many types of physical damage to weapons and equipment, but also, various new forms {xingshi} of “soft” destruction will form many brand new mechanisms of destruction, like the disorder or malfunction of control procedures and the devouring or falsification of data by “viruses,” as well as the structural and qualitative changes that appear in weapons and equipment materials. At the same time, the inter-combination of the two types of destruction mechanisms, “soft” and “hard,” and their synthesized use, makes the types of weapons and equipment damage complex and varied. In addition, informationized weapons and equipment structures are more and more complex and precise. Often, they are the product of a combination of many new, advanced technologies. Any piece (or set) of new high-tech weapons or equipment has a high concentration of technology. For example, precision-guided missile weapons are the synthesized products of a combination of micro-electronic technology, sensor technology, computer technology, signal processing technology, propulsion technology, and other advanced technologies. The implementation of support for any one piece of such weapons or equipment requires the resolution of several tens or even several hundreds of issues with new, advanced technologies. This makes the degree of difficulty for testing and repairing damaged equipment more and more difficult, and the requirements of equipment support higher and higher.

(3) Tremendous consumption of weapons and equipment and strenuous equipment support missions

Along with an increase in the tactical, technical functionality of weapons and equipment, and their greater role in a campaign, the two sides participating in battle will consider striking at the other side’s weapons systems as an important means of weakening the opponent’s operations capabilities. In addition, the destructive power of informationized weapons and equipment has increased, making the rate of battle damage for weapons and equipment very high. For example, in the fourth Middle East war, of the 3,730 100-mm-plus artillery pieces of the Egyptian army participating in battle, 1,100 were damaged, for a damage rate of 29.5%. In the Gulf War, for the Iraqi force-units in southern Iraq and in Kuwait, the damage rate to their heavy equipment reached 30% and above, and among

that, 45% of their artillery was destroyed. According to statistics, the rate of damage to weapons and equipment in one campaign of a modern war will be 30% or greater. Such a high rate of battle damage greatly increases the load for support, making equipment support missions extremely strenuous.

(4) Accelerated campaign tempo and strong time effectiveness quality of equipment support

A modern campaign is often launched suddenly and the tempo of operations fast. This not only causes the time to service weapons and equipment and to make technical preparations before the launching of the campaign to be short, and the time for repairing equipment damaged during battle obviously short, but also, because an enemy on the offensive will carry out all-depth, all-position, anytime strikes over the whole battlefield during the course of operations, it will be difficult to send damaged weapons and equipment to the rear in a timely manner. One must primarily depend on campaign and tactical equipment support mechanisms to carry out battlefield repairs. This leads to the effective usable time for battlefield repairs and rear repairs to damaged equipment to be greatly shortened, thereby making repair missions strenuous and their level of difficulty great, and making the contradiction between urgent need and the short amount of usable time very prominent. This will increase the need for the effective use of time for technical support. Only by quickly completing maintenance and upkeep and technical preparations within rather short campaign preparations, and only by repairing and restoring a large amount of damaged equipment in a quick and timely manner during the execution of a campaign, can the combat power of the force-units be maintained and quickly restored.

II. The Requirements of Campaign Equipment Support...252

(1) Combine military-civilian and integrated support

For a modern campaign, both the amount of equipment damage will be large and the types of equipment damage will be numerous. Solely depending on the support strengths of the armed forces themselves, it will be difficult to complete support missions. Along with the informationization of weapons and equipment and the continual increase in the level of military-civil interoperability, the integration of military-civilian support for equipment has become possible. Because of this, the superiority of people's warfare must be brought to bear and a support system combining and integrating military and civilian must be established to be able to complete the important missions of equipment support.

To organize and implement combined and integrated military-civilian equipment support, not only must equipment resources and materiel storage during peace time employ a combination of the armed forces, the state, and the local, but also, the local front support strengths must be mobilized and used during wartime. The contents and scope of this primarily include: mobilizing local scientific research, industrial, enterprise, and other institutions to transform into campaign equipment support institutions; mobilizing local technical personnel and using their technical equipment and facilities to implement the

organization and expansion of campaign equipment support institutions; and requisitioning and modifying civilian-use ships, aircraft, vehicles, and other equipment and their materials, facilities, maintenance institutions, and tools to strengthen the support capabilities. To organize and implement combined and integrated military-civilian equipment support, one must do the following: in accordance with the campaign support missions and the actual situations of the support strengths, formulate detailed plans {jihua} for utilizing the local strengths and, in accordance with the advance plans for integrated support, establish a special coordination and liaison institution that is integrated with the local front institution; unify arrangements, rationally allocate, collectively utilize, and specially manage the local front strengths to incorporate the equipment and resources and materials mobilized into the unified use within the campaign equipment support plan {jihua}.

(2) Scientific organized grouping and rational deployment {peizhi}

Modern campaign weapons and equipment structures are complex, of numerous types, and are great in number. The contradiction between arduous support missions and insufficient support strengths is very prominent. Because of this, scientifically organizing, rationally deploying and employing equipment support strengths are necessary requirements for equipment support in a modern campaign.

Campaign equipment support strengths are primarily made up of the equipment support strengths within the organizational system, high-level reinforcement equipment support strengths, and the equipment strengths of local support. The equipment support strengths within the organizational system are the basic strengths for carrying out campaign equipment support missions. Except for a small amount of subordinate reinforcements, these strengths are rationally composed of force- (element-) units in accordance with their specialized skills. In principle, high-level reinforcement equipment support strengths are integrated into them in line with their special skills. When the reinforcement specialized strengths are rather large, they can also be arranged independently in accordance with their specialties to carry out missions under unified command. Local strengths are important strengths for carrying out campaign equipment support missions. It can be seen as to whether to separate them into related organizational-units, or to arrange them independently and to assign them suitable missions. Along with equipment support strengths sent to reinforce large formations (or force-units), reinforcement force-units are normally used as direct accompaniments for carrying out support and they can also be arranged and used in a unified manner.

The deployment {peizhi} of equipment support strengths can have an important effect on the execution of equipment support missions. As such, the equipment commander should carry out rational *bushu* disposition in line with the principles of facilitating support and benefitting security in accordance with the campaign missions, operational *bushu* disposition, support missions, and the level of threat from the enemy and the natural geographic conditions of the operations area and other factors affecting support strengths. Its *bushu* disposition should conform to the campaign *bushu* disposition; not only must it

consider each space, each direction, and the whole course of the campaign, but it also must consider the main direction, the critical time occasions, and the large formation (force-units) executing the main missions, and it must also reserve a specific maneuver strength in order to maintain the stability and contingency capability of the equipment services *bushu* disposition; it must use the main lines of communication as the axis to construct a dovetailed, top-down, front-to-rear, deep, hierarchical support system {tixi} with a clear division of labor. One must fully utilize the natural geographic conditions of the operational area, adopt measures that suit local conditions, and exploit advantages while avoiding disadvantages.

(3) Unified organization and implementation by classifications

Modern campaign equipment support strengths are a complex system of many services branches, many systems, many specialties, and many types. Equipment support must start from the overall situation of the campaign. And implement unified command over the various equipment support strengths and their support activities, so that the various support strengths constitute a single whole and so that support is implemented for the force-units in a coordinated manner. The equipment command mechanisms from each service and branch participating in battle should set up unified raising, organizing, and deploying of the equipment support strengths participating in battle on each front, they should set up unified decision-making, planning {jihua}, coordination, and control for equipment support activities, and they should unify command of the defense of equipment support mechanisms, in order to fully bring the overall superiority of campaign equipment strengths and the most effective support to bear.

In a modern campaign, the types of weapons and equipment participating in battle are numerous, the specialization of technology is strong, and great discrepancies exist in the use management, servicing and upkeep, repairs, and other specific methods for the equipment. In addition, the specialization of support personnel is strong and it is difficult for them to be replaced. Because of this, when concretely implementing equipment support, it should be organized and implemented by classifications. Normally, support for general-use equipment should carry out regionalized support under the unified organization and command of campaign equipment command mechanisms and in accordance with the support mechanisms issued for the direction and the area. Support for special-use equipment should be organized and carried out separately in light of differences in organizational systems and in accordance with the division of labor for each service and branch participating in battle.

(4) Numerous modes and comprehensive application

The modes and means for scientifically and rationally applying equipment support are important for completing equipment support missions. Because of this, campaign equipment departments and commanders should, in accordance with campaign missions, equipment support missions, equipment support strengths, and the actual situations of the battlefield, rationally select the modes of equipment support.

First, combine integrated support with key point support. In a modern campaign, in terms of force-strength and weaponry deployment {peizhi}, one generally forms a *bushu* disposition with great depth, in all directions, in echelon, and with key points. In order to conform to this, equipment support must carry out full-scale integrated support. At the same time, because the missions undertaken by the various weapons and equipment are different in the course of operations, and because the degrees of damage are different, the needs of equipment support are also different. Because of this, when organizing equipment support, one should also separate levels, seize on what is critical, and implement key point support in the main direction, the main phases, the important activities, and the important equipment, allowing equipment support to maintain consistency from start to finish with main operational missions.

Second, combine mobile {jidong} support with fixed point support. When there are no support strengths and usable facilities in an operations area, mobile support is the transfer of personnel from the theater and in each service branch's campaign large formation's equipment maintenance force- (element-) units and materiel storehouses, and the allocation of advanced command tools and mobile support equipment, to constitute a number of small, comprehensive, multi-functional, equipment support groups with independent support capabilities. They should be allocated to appropriate positions in the battle formations or rear of the main operations fronts to carry out developing support. Fixed point support is carried out from the starting point of an operations area base, force-unit {budui} station, or other fixed support. It is the opening of field repair posts along the force-units' operations lines and the formation of multiple equipment support entities for fixed point rush-repair of damaged weapons and equipment. A modern campaign will have mobile operations in the lead and with large operational scope will require that equipment support organizational-units must possess relatively strong mobile capabilities and be able to support mobile operations force-units as they act. Because of this, fixed point support and mobile support must be combined. Namely, this involves regarding mobile support equipment as the carrier, with a starting point mobile axes more or less linking up to support a laterally connected and vertically linked network of bases, depot stations, and maintenance stations.

Third, combine accompanying support with self support. Accompanying support is the allocation of equipment support strengths reinforced from higher-levels to operational force-units on the basis of operational mission requirements, and during the course of operations, one can carry out prompt equipment support. When organizing this reinforcement-type equipment support, one must clearly separate the main and the secondary and support key points. Under normal situations, support with key points the force-units shouldering the main operational mission. Self support depends on the personnel of operational force-units to self-repair and self-restore rather lightly damaged weapons and equipment. In this way, not only can one implement accompanying support and ensure key points, but one can also self-repair and self-rescue and improve the speed of rescue and rush repair for weapons and equipment as well as suit the needs-requirements of modern campaign operations.

Fourth, combine level-by-level support with level-skipping support {yueji baozhang}. For a modern campaign, the modes of equipment support must possess a high level of flexibility. On the one hand, a complete, level-by-level support system must be established. On the other hand, level-skipping support must be carried out as much as possible to increase the efficiency of support. As such, at the same time as one is adhering to the chain of command and carrying out level-by-level support according to the responsibilities of each level, the closest, most direct, level-skipping support must be carried out for the force-units shouldering the main missions in order to increase the efficiency of equipment support to the greatest extent possible.

(5) Strengthen defense and ensure security

Campaign equipment support strengths are one of the targets of the enemy's focal point attacks and destruction. Guaranteeing the security of equipment support strengths and support activities is a prerequisite condition for completing campaign equipment support missions. Because of this, campaign equipment support defense must be placed into the overall campaign defense plans {jihua} and must be carried out under the unified organization of the campaign commander and the command institution. A defensive organization must be set up that regards the areas for defense where equipment support strengths are deployed as its focal points and that regards special-duty defensive strengths as its backbone. It must combine professional service strengths and local militias. It must integrate defense with support, and link military and civilian defense. It must adhere to the principles of "regarding defense as the most important and combining defense with attack." It must combine concealment with deceit, it must combine the point defense of support objectives and the defense of support areas, and it must combine the self-defense of the support strengths with coverage of the operational force-units, all to increase the survivability of the equipment support strengths. With respect to command, it must both persist in unceasingly organizing support for each force-unit and it must command the defensive operations of the campaign equipment support mechanisms. In terms of activities, it must both conceal as much as possible and it must complete support missions in a timely manner. In terms of the selection of deployment areas {peizhi diyu}, it must both consider security and it must also facilitate the launching of support strengths. In addition, defensive training for support personnel should be strengthened to allow them to be able to carry out continual support in harsh operational environments.

Section 2: Contents and Methods...256

In accordance with the objects of support and the nature of the specialties, equipment support can generally be divided into general-use weapons and equipment support and special-use weapons and equipment support.

The modes of equipment support primarily include joined duty support, organizational system support, and partial joined duty support. Joined duty support is support of a regional nature, namely the unified organization of general-use military machinery, engineering mechanics, and materiel and other maintenance and supplies in the theater

based on delimited areas. Organizational system support is namely the self-support of each service, which is separately organized and implemented by each service's campaign large formation's technical support mechanisms and which is primarily responsible for the inspection and maintenance of special-use weapons and equipment. Partial joined duty support refers to joined duty support organizing parts of a service and parts of the contents in certain specially-determined areas. For example, in a coastal area, the maintenance and materiel supply of ships can implement a joint-service support between the navy and army with the navy being responsible for organizing it. In areas where army aviation forces are deployed near air force aviation forces, aircraft maintenance and aviation materiel supply can carry out an army-air force joint-service support, with the air force being responsible for organizing it. In an area where navy aviation forces and air force aviation forces *bushu* dispositions overlap, aircraft maintenance and aviation materiel supply can carry out navy-air-force joint-service support, and based on the support capability of the joint-services for both sides in that area, designate one side to take responsibility for organizing it.

The contents and methods of equipment support are very numerous. They primarily include organizing the servicing-upkeep and inspection of weapons and equipment, the conduct of weapons and equipment damage estimates, the organization of repairs for weapons and equipment, the supplying of ammunition, and the replenishment of equipment, etc. The key points amongst these are damage estimates and repair of weapons and equipment.

I. Damage Estimates for Weapons and Equipment...256

In order to correctly formulate equipment support plans *{jihua}*, scientifically arrange repair missions, store the maintenance materials, and rationally organize and utilize repair strengths, the campaign commander and the equipment support institution should make a forecast for the situation of weapons and equipment damage for each campaign (or for a day of battle). This primarily includes the amount of weapons and equipment damaged, the degree to which the weapons and equipment are damaged, and the proportion of weapons and equipment that can be restored.

(1) The factors affecting weapons and equipment damage

The factors affecting weapons and equipment damage are very numerous. The basic factors include: the types of campaign and the patterns of the campaign; operational missions, the comparative force-unit *{budui}* strength and weapons between the enemy and us and the time the campaign lasts and its degree of ferocity; the needs of the tactical and technical functions and uses of the weapons and equipment and the level of technical and operational experience of the personnel; the means and degree of the enemy's strikes and destruction, as well as one's own defensive capabilities and the natural environment of the operations area. Because of differences in the function and use of weapons and equipment and because of differences in the locations, times, and amount of strength of use, the degree of effect of the above-mentioned factors on the various weapons and

equipment damage also varies. Artillery damage is mainly determined by comparing the long-range firepower of the enemy and us, the degree of concealment and protection of launch positions, and the speed of launch. Vehicle damage is primarily determined by the degree of destruction to transportation lines and our defensive conditions, the situation for the terrain and roads, and the qualities of the drivers. Tank damage is primarily determined by the tank force-units' operational missions, the operations and defensive capabilities, how close together the tanks are used, and the terrain conditions and the amount and functions of the enemy's anti-tank weapons. Aircraft and ship damage is primarily determined by comparing the function and amount of equipment of the enemy and us, the operational missions to be carried out, the frequency of takeoffs, the operational capabilities, the situations of the weather on the sea and in the air, and the enemy's air defense and anti-ship capabilities. Nuclear weapon and conventional missile equipment damage is primarily determined by the concealment and degree of protection for launch positions and by comparing our and the enemy's raid and anti-raid capabilities. Electronic equipment damage is primarily determined by counter-reconnaissance and counter-destruction capabilities. Engineering defensive equipment damage is primarily determined by its protective function and by how much it is used. Because of this, estimating equipment damage should be based on the main factors affecting the damage for each type of equipment, combined with other relevant factors, to carry out comprehensive, complete, and specific analyses.

(2) The general laws of weapons and equipment damage

Normally and under normal conditions, the average rate of daily damage to equipment in an offensive campaign is greater than that in a defensive campaign; but the total rate of equipment damage in a defensive campaign is greater than that in an offensive campaign. For the same campaign types, the rate of equipment damage for different campaign patterns will differ. For example, the rates of equipment damage in an amphibious landing campaign and in an airborne [drop] campaign are greater than in other campaigns and the rates of equipment damage in a counter-amphibious landing campaign and urban defense campaign are higher than that for other defensive campaigns. For the same campaign patterns, the rate of equipment damage for the campaign large formation or force-unit of the main operational direction will be higher than the rate of equipment damage for the campaign large formation or force-unit in a secondary operational direction. As for types of equipment, the rate of damage for heavy equipment will often exceed the rate of damage for light equipment. For equipment with similar technical conditions, the rate of damage in the early phase of the campaign will often be higher than the rate of damage in the follow-on phase of the campaign. Along with the ever more prominent role for high-tech weapons and equipment in operations, high-tech weapons and equipment has become a focal point of attack and destruction for enemies, so its rate of damage could become higher and higher and the ration of high-tech weapons and equipment within the total amount damaged greater and greater.

(3) Methods for estimating weapons and equipment damage

The factors affecting the rate of weapons and equipment damage are many and varied and the degree of effect that the various factors have on weapons and equipment are different in different campaigns. Equipment damage is the result of many factors and effects, so the degree of difficulty in estimating the rate of equipment damage will become greater and greater. In normal situations, in addition to referring to data from previous, similar campaign battle example experiences, the actual situations of each campaign should also be concretely analyzed and an estimate should be carried out on the foundation of separately determining the main and secondary affecting factors for each damage to the equipment. The rate of equipment damage can then be estimated for the whole campaign in light of the different types of equipment, for example, light weapons, heavy weapons, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft weapons, campaign and tactical missile launch systems, aircraft, ships, etc. One can also add up estimates made for different campaign phases to come up with a total rate of damage. For vehicles, tanks, and other equipment, in addition to estimating operational damage, one should also estimate damage caused by natural wear and tear. Especially when mobile and operational distances are long, or when a campaign lasts for a relatively long time, one should make budgetary estimates of the damage caused by natural wear and tear in light of the distances driven or the motor hours, by combining the actual and reserved distances driven or motor hours for the vehicle.

II. Weapons and Equipment Maintenance...258

Equipment maintenance is the servicing and upkeep activity carried out to maintain equipment in and restore equipment to good technical functioning. For a modern campaign, the technical equipment participating in battle is numerous, intensity of use is large, and the rate of equipment damage is high. Add to this, the unstable conditions dealt with by the repair institutions, and the equipment maintenance missions are extremely arduous. Under normal conditions, the rate of possible restoration for damaged equipment is around 70%. The restorable equipment can be divided into lightly damaged, medium-degree damage, and heavy damage. Among these, the most important for campaign technical support restoration is heavy equipment with medium-degree damage and light equipment with heavy damage. Repair missions should be scientifically divided in this way and repair strengths should be organized and used in a unified manner, comprehensively applying the various modes of repair to “resurrect” the weapons and equipment to the greatest extent possible, to restore the operational capabilities of the force-units in a timely manner, and to support the smooth execution of the campaign.

(1) The differentiation of repair missions

A theater is normally divided into support areas according to the situations of the repair strengths. Unified repair is carried out for the general-use equipment in a support area and the repair of service and branch special-use equipment is carried out by each service and branch in accordance with the organizational system. Equipment repair under the

basic campaign large formation is carried out in accordance with the organizational system.

The theater is primarily responsible for accepting the damaged equipment sent back by the combined group army. It carries out major repairs of weapons, vehicles, tanks, etc., and it maintains the general-use equipment sent back by naval bases, theater air forces, and Second Artillery bases. To increase the time effectiveness of technical support, at appropriate times, the theater should dispatch mobile support strengths to implement forward support for force-units in the main operational direction and the force-units responsible for the main operational missions.

The combined group army primarily accepts the equipment sent back by subordinate force-units. It particularly conducts partial medium repairs of heavy equipment and major repairs and replacements of vehicles; the repair of radar, precision instruments and other special equipment, because of its greater degree of difficulty and higher technical requirements, can be appropriately reduced to the scope of minor repairs in order to guarantee the quality of repair. Besides opening up relatively fixed repair structures, a combined group army should dispatch mobile support strengths to implement forward support for force-units in the main operational direction and for force-units responsible for the main operational missions.

The repair strengths of theater air forces, navy bases and Second Artillery bases should primarily carry out medium-level repairs and partial major repairs of aircraft, ships, guided missile launch systems and other special equipment. At the same time, they should also separately bear medium-degree repairs and major repairs of helicopters and army ships. When concretely organizing maintenance support, they also should organize some mobile support strengths to be dispatched to key point force-units and implement forward assisting-support {zhiyuan}.

(2) Organization and use of repair strengths

Theater repair strengths are made up of the repair element-units of theater repair factories and logistic sub-departments, and local front-support repair strengths. The group army repair strengths are made up of repair element-units of the group army organizational system, higher-level reinforcement repair element-units, and local front-support technical support strengths. Navy, air force, and Second Artillery repair strengths are made up of the repair factories and repair subgroups subordinate to each service or branch and local front-support strengths.

In light of the repair missions and the state of the repair strengths, theaters and each service's campaign large formations should unify the organization of armed forces and local repair strengths, rationally group them and divide up the labor, and establish a repair system with multiple elements and multiple tiers. In accordance with the campaign *bushi* disposition, campaign strengths should be unfolded level-by-level and should be allocated to the front to the greatest extent possible, to constitute a repair network

combining top and bottom and military and civil. The use of local front-support strengths should strive to maintain their original organizational system, should allocate a certain amount of repair missions to them, and should also be able to use them in a combined manner with the force-unit repair institution.

(3) On-the-spot repairs

The modes of repair for damaged equipment are very numerous. Based on time, they can be divided into repairs before the campaign execution, repairs during the campaign execution, and repairs after the conclusion of the campaign. Based on the use of technical support strengths, they can be divided into accompanying repairs, making-the-rounds repairs, and fixed point repairs. Based on repair spaces they can be divided into rear area (or transported-to-the rear) repairs and on-the-spot repairs. On-the-spot repairs are an important mode of repair. Not only can it reduce the equipment sent to the rear, saving manpower and materials, but also it can restore the tactical and technical function of the equipment in a timely manner, allowing it to rapidly be re-invested into operations and thereby playing an increasingly important role in maintaining and restoring force-unit combat power.

One must employ different methods for carrying out on-the-spot repairs in light of the operational missions, the amount of equipment to be repaired, the repair strengths, and other situations. In the campaign preparation phase, technical support strengths should be organized to go into the force-units and survey and make emergency repairs to increase the rate of good equipment for the force-units. During force-unit mobility, for the force-units that are bearing the main operational mission, or coming under the greatest threat, or moving over relatively bad roads, the technical support strengths should be appropriately reinforced. The amount of repair materials carried should also be increased to heighten their on-the-spot, self-repair capabilities. Some of the equipment support strengths dispatched should organize accompanying support or open up temporary support points along routes of mobility to organize fixed point support. During the course of the campaign execution, some equipment support strengths should be sent to reinforce the force-units in the main operational direction or to organize a number of mobile repair force- (element-) units to carry out forward, emergency repairs. When the situation allows, one can organize fixed point emergency repair for damaged operations ships in certain areas of the sea. The Air Force should organize equipment support strengths to go into field stations and positions to assist force-units in carrying out on-the-spot, emergency repairs. The Second Artillery should organize equipment support strengths to carry out accompanying support for mobile missile force-units or ones implementing mobile operations. When the positions of the missile force-units are relatively fixed, it should organize mobile equipment support strengths to carry out mobile, making-the-rounds support for each missile force-unit.

In order to increase the speed of on-the-spot repairs, in terms of the methods of repair, part replacement repairs should be the most important and original part repair should be supplementary. When necessary, one can also disassemble and reassemble equipment.

When concretely organizing on-the-spot emergency repairs, one should adhere to the principles of doing the important repairs first and doing the less important repairs later, doing emergency repairs first and general repairs later, and doing the easy repairs first and the difficult repairs later. One should strive to meet the needs of the main operational activities and the main operational force-units within the shortest amount of time possible and one should strive to “resurrect” as much damaged equipment in the shortest amount of time as possible.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 10

Campaign Political Work...261

The theory of campaign political work is an important content of PLA campaign science and it is a special distinguishing feature of PLA campaign science.

Political work is the lifeline for our military and it is a critical factor in uniting ourselves to defeat the enemy in battle. The fundamental goals of wartime political work are to make an optimal combination of people that are highly politically conscious with modernized weaponry and equipment to more effectively bring to bear the total might of modernized people's warfare and to defeat the enemy and win victory.

Campaign political work directly serves the goal of realizing the goals of a campaign. It strongly has the natures of the overall situation, politics, and policy. The scope of the work is broad, its contents are numerous, it carries through the whole course of a campaign, and it touches on each level and realm of a campaign. Add to this the exceptional intensity and brutality of campaign resistance under informationized conditions and the sudden changeability of battlefield situations, and the missions of political work became more arduous and their organization and implementation become even more complex and difficult.

The campaign large formation Party committee and political organ must strive to strengthen leadership of campaign political work, persist in our military's basic theories and principles of political work, and inherit and further develop our military's excellent traditions of wartime political work. They must strive to bring the roles of each level of Party committees, political organs, and political work cadres to bear, strengthen overall concepts and the consciousness of service and support, and strengthen the predictability of the work, to master the rules and improve the methods. They must strive to seize opportunities, make focal points prominent, make changes flexibly, and rapidly respond. They must strive to aim at the characteristics of the PLA campaign under informationized conditions and the actual situations of wartime. They must strive to accord with the tactics of national politics and diplomatic struggles, closely revolve around campaign goals and missions, carefully carry it out throughout the entire course of the campaign, fully bring the broad, subjective initiative of the officers to bear, mobilize all of the strengths, and coordinate the struggle to win victory in the campaign.

Section 1: Missions and Contents...262

The basic missions of campaign political work are: to strengthen the Party's unified leadership of the campaign large formation in terms of thought and organization; to protect the high centralization and unification of the various strengths participating in the campaign; to ensure the carrying out and execution of higher level operational concepts, orders, and instructions, as well as the realization of the campaign large formation senior officer's resolution; to educate the force-units in further developing patriotism,

internationalism, and the spirit revolutionary heroism; to improve the political consciousness of commanders, and to enhance their will to fight and their confidence in certain victory; to guarantee force-units have from beginning to end command that has sound organization and strength, and to solidify and improve force-unit combat power; to strengthen internal and external military unity, to ensure consistency of military-civilian, consistency in military-government, consistency in officers-soldiers, and consistency across the PLA; to strengthen the discipline-quality of force-units, to guarantee that force-units resolutely follow orders, and strictly execute policies; to actively open-up-develop psychological warfare and to collapse the enemy's military.

I. Thought Work...262

Campaign thought work refers to the educational work carried out from the aspect of political thought to unify the political understanding of all the personnel participating in battle, to stimulate their enthusiasm and their combat spirit for participating in battle. It is an important content of campaign political work. Its basic work involves the following three items:

(1) Educate the force-units to be established in the correct view of warfare

The first question that campaign political work must resolve is for the personnel participating in war to correctly separate just warfare and unjust warfare, to objectively analyze the circumstances {xingshi} of a war, to believe in the bright future ahead and the present difficulties, to correct the attitudes about a war for the personnel participating in battle, and to educate the force-units to fight for justice with a highly patriotic spirit.

(2) Unify thought understanding and strengthen the view of the overall situation

The Party committees and political organs should widely and thoroughly disseminate the campaign concept and clarify the campaign guidance thought and the campaign goals for the personnel participating in battle, as well as their own missions, to ensure that all personnel participating in battle have a unified thought understanding of the critical questions for the campaign. Each force-unit should be educated to firmly establish the view of the overall situation, to bravely shoulder the most difficult and the most dangerous missions, to fully foster a spirit of unity and mutual assistance, to initiate cooperation and support with one another, and to prevent and overcome the tendency toward compartmentalism. The education of cadres must be strengthened, and especially the education of high-level and mid-level cadres in the campaign large formation, to unify their operational ideology and to deepen their spirit of comprehension of the campaign concept so that they comprehensively understand the general intention of the campaign and the missions of their own force-units, consciously conform to the requirements of the campaign concept and the instructions of the campaign large formation commander, and lead their own force-units to earnestly carry them out and put them to effect, following centralized and unified command and closely coordinating the campaign activities.

(3) Stimulate the force-units' will to fight and overcome psychological barriers

Future campaign activities under informationized conditions will be highly tense and fierce, and the need for a will to fight and a spirit of bravery for the personnel participating in battle will be put to the forefront. Party committees and political organs must educate the force-units to establish an ideology of strategically hating the enemy and tactically focusing on the enemy, in order to allow the force-units to both dare to contest an enemy military with superior weaponry and equipment and bring a heroic spirit to operations against all enemies and fully appraise the arduousness and complexity of campaign missions, starting from the most difficult situations and completing the spiritual preparations for fighting the hard fight and fighting the terrible fight. They must reveal the enemy's war crimes, and teach to hate, disdain, and despise the enemy to stimulate hatred of the enemy and to encourage the will to fight. They must aim at the possible negative spiritual factors that might arise in a campaign in carrying out education and obstacle removing work, eliminating psychological barriers for the personnel participating in battle and increasing their ability to psychologically endure under harsh operational environment conditions.

II. Organization Work...263

The Party committee and political organs should attach importance to strengthening the construction of the force-unit Party and [Youth] League organizations and other servicemen organizations, and fully bring into play the core role of Party organizations of all levels and the condensed role of organization of all categories so as to allow force-units to maintain vigorous combat power from start to finish. Grasp with key points the following two points:

(1) Strengthen construction of the organization

The Party committee and political organ must promptly comprehend the situation of the subordinate force-unit Party and the Youth League organizations. They must put forward the requirement for strengthening the construction Party and the Youth League organizations, master the implementation and execution situation of instruction items by lower-level Party committees, and guide and help each force-unit to fully bring the core leadership role of the Party committee, the combat bastion role of the Party branches, and the exemplary vanguard role of Party personnel to bear. During the course of a campaign, they must coordinate with relevant departments to guide the force-units in promptly accomplishing operations, construction, replenishment, and organizing work all at the same time, and allow each level of Party and Youth League organization to be sound and strong from start to finish.

(2) Safeguard the discipline of the organization

The Party committee and political organ should attach importance to conducting education in the area of organizational discipline for the force-units: [they should]

strengthen the dissemination of Party policy discipline and raise the view of policy discipline for all personnel participating in battle; they should perfect and safeguard the Party organizational system; they should, in accordance with the Party and Youth League constitution, the relevant rules and regulations, as well as other policy discipline stipulations, combine campaign missions and situations, and formulate supplemental stipulations; and they should seek truth from facts and conduct punishment work correctly and promptly.

III. Cadre Work...264

For cadre work in a campaign, the missions are arduous and the requirements are very high. Party committees and political organs should have planned *{jihua}* out the selection, cultivation, and retention of cadres in accordance with the needs of a campaign and the stipulations of relevant policies. They should assign and replace cadres in a timely manner. All of this is to maintain the soundness of every level of leadership team and cadre ranks in the force-units from start to finish.

(1) Adjust the leadership and command team

Each level and each type of leadership and command team in a campaign should be strong and structurally rational. Party committees and political organs should select good officers at each level of the military and government, allocate them among leadership and command bodies, and replace leadership and command cadres in a timely manner, and they should replace in a timely manner those who cannot carry out their duties to guarantee that each level of leadership and command bodies are, from start to finish, in a sound state and able to meet the needs of strong, uninterrupted organization and command.

(2) Investigate, select, and assign cadres

Party committees and political organs should focus on investing and identifying cadres during operations. The political organs should thoroughly understand and grasp a cadre's situations to provide good advice on the cadre to the Party committee. They must properly identify the best cadres who complete missions well during operations, who are brave and tenacious, and who have both ability and integrity, to boldly promote them to critical, important positions. The Party committees and the political organs must be good at assigning, replacing, and retaining each type of cadre in accordance with the needs for large numbers, many types, and high technical specialization for modern campaign cadres. For force-units shouldering the main missions in the campaign, with respect to cadre assignments, they must be reinforced with key points.

IV. . Safeguard-Defend Work...264

Party committees and political organs must attach importance to strengthening safeguard-defend work {baowei gongzuo}⁸ and effectively prevent and strike the enemy's covert activity. In terms of politics, thought, and organization, they must guarantee the purity and stability of force-units and solidify the combat power of the force-units.

(1) Master the situation comprehensively and promptly

Along with mastering the state of affairs for force-unit safeguard-defending work, the political organ must at all times strengthen its investigation and study into the social situation, the civil situation, and the enemy situation of the battle area; [it must] inspect and control the enemy's covert activity and promptly report relevant situations to the force-units.

(2) Broadly open-up-develop anti-psychological warfare, anti-infiltration, anti-instigating defection, and anti-information stealing work

The Party committee and political organ should, in accordance with the higher-level safeguard-defending work concept, policies, and instructions, conscientiously command the force-units to carry out defending against traitors and counter-espionage education, military laws and regulations education, revolutionary spirit education and anti-psychological warfare education. They should raise the total political vigilance of all personnel participating in battle and solidify the psychological lines of defense. They should guide force-units to strengthen the work of keeping secrets and strictly keep military secrets. They should seriously handle those who create rumors and leak secrets and punish those that flee the front and defect to the enemy in accordance with the law.

(3) Ensure the security {anquan} of the senior officer, the leadership organ, and the vital-area critical departments

Under the unified leadership of the Party committee and political organ, special personnel should be organized to conduct a widespread and strict examination of internal personnel to ensure that internal personnel are pure and reliable. At the same time, coordinate with relevant departments, strengthen the security {anquan} and guarding {jingwei} work of the senior officer, the leadership organ, and the vital-area departments on station and in the activity area, and ensure absolutely no slips.

⁸ Translator's note: this term, 保卫 *baowei*, is a problem term because it can be translated as "defense" and "security." The term, when combined with *work* generally forms a phrase that is widely recognized as "security work," but this term should be distinguished from security, 安全 *anquan*, which is used in national security.

(4) Establish a Joint Defense of the Military, Armed Police and Civilians

With the cooperation of the local government, the [people's] armed police, the public security [bureau], and the people, open-up-develop the defending against traitors and anti-espionage struggles, strike the sabotage activity of enemy spies and other criminal elements, and safeguard the public security of the battle sites.

V. Masses Work...265

Fostering the enormous might of people's warfare to ensure victory in a campaign is a characteristic of our military's campaign theory and practices and is one of the important contents of campaign political work. Party committees and political organs should guide the force-units working together in accomplishing the work of the militia and civilian workers participating-in-fighting and of the in-theater masses [people] with cooperation from local governments.

(1) Close relationships with local governments

Party committees and political organs should maintain a close relationship with local Party and government organs, exchange intelligence in a timely matter, consult with each other, closely coordinate, and resolve the problems that fall on both the military and the locality. In accordance with the instructions from higher-ups, constitute a joint Party committee and joint leading organs with the collective leadership of the armed forces and the locality to unify leadership and coordinate military-civilian operations.

(2) Accomplish the political work of the militia and civilian workers participating in fighting

Political organs should help localities set up sound Party and Youth League organizations for the militias and civilian workers participating in fighting. For the militias and civilian workers participating in fighting, there should be tight organization, centralized management, and proper resolution for various problems. At appropriate times, dispatch backbone cadre to conduct political mobilization and strengthen thought education and policy discipline education for them. [They should] introduce common military knowledge and combat experiences. [They should] care about their lives, bring their strengths to bear, and lead them to complete missions together.

(3) Accomplish well masses work in-theater

The victories of our military should be spread among the masses of people to broaden the influence of our military and reveal the enemy's war crimes and the nature of its invasion. The masses should be motivated and organized to actively participate in battle. Weapons for self-defense should be organized for the masses to defend against traitors, to counter espionage, and for other struggles. Social order should be maintained. Education force-units must strictly abide by the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points

for Attention, and self-consciously respect the leadership of the local government to preserve the interests of the masses.

VI. Enemy Military Work...266

Political organs should strengthen their investigation and study of the enemy military situation, and, in accordance with the special characteristics for enemy military work in local wars under high-tech conditions, draw up plans *{jihua}* for crumpling the enemy's military and promulgating requirements for achieving enemy military work. They must provide timely intelligence information to the force-units, along with various propaganda materials and tools. They should pay attention to cultivating, training, and retaining a backbone cadre in enemy military work, with special attention for translation personnel. They should guide the force-units to utilize various contradictions and weaknesses within the enemy and seize favorable time-opportunities. [They should] employ various modes and open up powerful psychological warfare offensives to crumple the fighting will of the enemy. They should guide the force-units to study and observe the relevant policies of the Party, as well as the relevant international laws.

They should carry out the policies and be good at prisoners of war work. They should educate the troops to strictly carry out prisoner of war policies. Prisoners of war cannot be beaten or cursed, they cannot be humiliated, and their personal property cannot be confiscated. The execution of prisoners of war is strictly forbidden. Wounded and sick prisoners of war are given medical treatment. The examination and management of prisoners of war should be conscientiously done well. Attention should be paid to splitting and crumpling prisoners of war. The occurrence of accidents should be prevented.

VII. Application and Control of the News Media ...266

Political organs should strengthen the application and control of the news media by designating special responsibilities to relevant departments and returning them to unified management. In accordance with the political, diplomatic, and operational requirements, propaganda guiding concepts and principles should be formulated to unify propaganda specifications and to fully apply the armed forces and local news media to correctly carry out propaganda reporting. The management and news examination of battle area reporters should be actively strengthened to strictly defend against leaks, and to strictly prevent negative propaganda reports. Various measures should be employed to struggle against the distortions and rumors of the enemy.

Section 2: Organization and Implementation...266

Under informationized conditions, the missions of campaign political work are difficult, have many contents, touch on all aspects, and run through each link throughout the whole course of a campaign. Campaign large formation Party committees and political organs should integrate overall-planning, comprehensively deploy, give prominence to key

points, and grasp the crux of campaign political work. [They should] guide and urge all levels of Party committees, their political organs and political work personnel to conscientiously organize and implement all political work, ensuring campaign political work fully brings its enormous role to bear and ensuring victory in the campaign.

To organize and implement campaign political work, one must rely on complete leadership systems and organizational systems, as well as the correct work procedures and scientific working methods.

I. Organize the Leadership System {zhidu}...267

The system for organizing leadership in campaign political work includes the Party committee system {zhidu}, the political commissar system {zhidu}, the political organs system {zhidu}, etc. In order to carry out this system {zhidu} for organizing leadership, not only fully manifests the absolute leadership of the Party over the armed forces, but it also they also reflects the fundamental requirement of campaign political work; not only is it related to organizing the leadership of campaign political work, but it is also related to organizing the leadership of the entire campaign. Campaign political work will be under the direct leadership of the campaign large formation Party committee and the political commissar, and it will be specifically organized and implemented by the campaign large formation political organ and political work personnel.

The composition of the campaign large formation Party committee. The campaign large formation Party committee must be composed based on the decision {jueding} of the higher-level Party committee and adhere to the requirements of *being a capable institution* and *facilitate work*. The membership of the Party committee generally are assumed by the campaign large formation military-political senior officer and responsible persons of his headquarters, political department, logistics department, and equipment department, the various campaign group army (large formation) military-political lead officers as well as relevant leadership in the local area of operations.

The leadership of the campaign large formation Party committee on the campaign. The campaign large formation Party committee is the core of unified leadership and unity for the campaign large formation and it is the core of unified leadership for the various campaign strengths participating in battle. It is the highest leadership institution of the campaign and it carries out unified leadership of the entire campaign. The major issues relevant to a campaign, situation permitting, normally must be studied and decided upon by the Party committee or the standing committee. These major issues normally include: implementing and executing the higher level intent, their decisions, orders, and instructions; determining campaign concept; organizing and leading the arrangement of campaign work; the cadre assignment and employment preliminary plans within their appointment; and dismissal jurisdiction and important awards and punishments for organizational-units and individuals.

The campaign large formation carries out a senior officer division of effort responsibility system unified under the collective leadership of the Party committee. After the Party committee undergoes discussion and decision of a major issue and makes a decision, the campaign large formation military and political senior officers divide the work and responsibility to organize and implement it. Within the Party, the campaign large formation senior officer presides as the principal/deputy secretary of the day to day work of the Party committee, and administratively, he is also in charge of military-political [affairs]. Affairs belonging to the area of military work, such as setting the campaign resolution and organizing and commanding the campaign are the responsibility of the military commander. Affairs that fall under the areas of political work are the responsibility of the political commissar. The political commissar coordinates with military commanders to command a campaign. The deputy helps with the work of the principal and is responsible to the principal. Under emergency situations, the campaign large formation senior officer can make decisions on important issues on the spot, and report to the Party committee and the higher-levels later.

The political commissar system. Improving and solidifying the political commissar system within the campaign large formation guarantees that the instructions of the higher-level Party committee are implemented and executed in the campaign large formation, it guarantees the smooth conduct of campaign political work, and it guarantees the full accomplishment of campaign missions. Campaign large formation political commissars are the leaders of campaign political work, are subordinate to the directly higher-level senior officer, and conduct work under the leadership of the Party committee at the same level. In terms of political work, they obey the higher-level political commissar and political organ; in terms of military work, they obey the higher-level military commander and military organ. At their root level of the large formation, together with the military commander, they are responsible for leading campaign preparation and implementation.

The political organ system. The campaign large formation political organ is the management organ of the Party committee at the campaign level and it is subordinate to the leadership organ of force-unit political work. It is responsible for specifically organizing and implementing each mission for campaign political work. The political organ should be composed of the relevant political work personnel of the various campaign strengths participating in the campaign. The political organ should, based on the missions and requirements entrusted by the higher-level Party committee, senior officer and political organ and under the leadership of the large formation Party committee and political commissar, participate in the collective decision-making of the large formation Party committee, formulate and implement measures, and organize the force-units in carrying them out; it should conduct specific guidance, supervision and inspection of subordinate force-unit political work; it should accomplish well the various duty work within the scope of its root level responsibilities; and it should promptly summarize experiences and resolve the actual problems political work will encounter in a campaign.

II. Work Procedures and Methods...268

Campaign political work must employ the correct work procedures and scientific work methods to be able to smoothly and effectively complete each mission. The basic procedures and methods are:

(1) Putting forward the guidance concept of campaign political work

The guidance concept of campaign political work is the macroscopic overall-plan {chouhua} and guidance for campaign political work and it is the basis for organizing and implementing campaign political work. It is normally put forward by the political organ and determined via collective discussion of the Party Committee. The contents of the guidance concept normally include the guidance thought of campaign political work, the basic missions of campaign political work and the main missions for each phase, as well as the principles, the requirements, methods, etc., that must be applied to accomplish the missions.

(2) Issuing the campaign political mobilization instruction

The campaign political mobilization instruction is the basic starting point for conducting political mobilization of the units. Generally, it is issued in the form of a political mobilization order, the essential points of the mobilization instruction, a mobilization outline, a written appeal, a political training order, etc. The campaign commander and political organ should, in accordance with the campaign missions and the instructions of higher ups, send down campaign political mobilization instructions at the appropriate time in order to facilitate the speedy organization and implementation of political mobilization of the subordinate force-units. In general, the contents of political mobilization instructions mainly include: the current circumstances {xingshi} of war, the campaign missions and significance, the favorable conditions and difficulties for completing campaign missions, the methods and measures for overcoming the difficulties and resolving the issues, and the different requirements put forward for force-units in different areas and carrying out different missions, etc. After the political mobilization instruction is sent down, one should guide each subordinate level Party committee and political organ to quickly organize force-unit officers and cadres to disseminate them and to guide the grassroots organization and implementation of combat political mobilization, on the foundation of campaign political mobilization.

(3) Formulating the campaign political work plan {jihua}

A campaign political work plan {jihua} is separately drawn up by the professional department of the campaign large formation political organization in accordance with the instructions of the campaign large formation Party committee and commanders and higher-level political organs, combining the actual situations of that large formation and in accordance with the contents of the work. After it goes through the review and approval of the director of the political department, it becomes the fundamental basis for

organizing, implementing, inspecting, and evaluating campaign political work. The content of the plan *{jihua}* mainly includes: the basic missions of campaign political work, the main missions and requirements of each phase of political work in the campaign, the key points of political work for the important time-occasions of the campaign, the task organization and *bushu* disposition of the main political work team, the support for physical materials, the basic measures and time limits for completing missions, and the relevant policies and stipulations.

(4) Arranging the main activity of campaign political work

The campaign large formation political organ should, based on the instructions of the campaign large formation Party committee and the senior officer and centered on the central missions of campaign operations, unify, *guihua* plan and arrange the political work of the Party committee and political organ as well as the relevant political work activity of subordinate force-units. The activities of Party committee and political organ political work include routine activities *{huodong}*, major activities *{huodong}*, important meetings, etc. Normally, one arranges the political work activity based on the campaign phase, and the specific activity content, the personnel participating, the goals to be achieved, the time limits and the items of attention are determined in accordance with a schedule. For the subordinate force-units, one must frequently examine the progress situation of each activity, summarize the experiences for training, and guide the smooth conduct of each political work activity.

(5) Organized grouping of the campaign political work strengths

The political organ should scientifically organize the political work strength and conduct a rational *bushu* disposition based on the set up situation of the campaign command institution and the needs-requirements of campaign missions and in accordance with the principles of *unified use, clear divisions of effort, flexible and light, and support key points*. Normally, they are grouped and assigned in the following teams: a basic command post political work team, alternate command post political work team, rear area command post political work team, subordinate force-unit work team, etc. Depending on the situation, group-assign a capable political work team to participate in the campaign command institutions such as a forward command post, direction command post, service command post, etc., to participate and help with the activity of organizing command.

(6) Organize the relevant support for campaign political work

Political organs should promptly and fully accomplish various relevant supports in accordance with the needs-requirements of campaign political work. They should formulate the support plan *{jihua}*, actively acquire the necessary funds, resources, materials, and equipment, and ensure the smooth implementation of all political work.

This page intentionally left blank.

Part II: Joint Campaigns...271

Chapter 11 Overview...271

The joint campaign is developed based on the service (combined) campaign. The development of the joint campaign brings about a series of major changes to campaign operations and pushes forward the development of campaign theory and practice. The joint campaign is the main campaign pattern of campaign operations in future wars.

Section 1: Definition, Categories, and Features of a Joint Campaign...271

I. Definition of a Joint Campaign...271

A joint campaign is a campaign undertaken by the large formations from two or more services (under special conditions, it can be a campaign large formation that consists of some tactical forces from two or more services) under the unified command of a joint campaign command. It normally consists of some service (combined) campaigns.

There are four factors in a joint campaign:

Participant strengths. The basic indicators of the joint campaign are: number one, “two or more services;” number two, “campaign large formation.” If there is only one service participant, it is not a joint campaign, even if its scale is very large. For example, “the Three Big Campaigns” in the Liberation War and the five campaigns in the War of Resisting the U.S. and Supporting Korea, though they were large-scale campaigns, were all combined campaigns. The “campaign large formation” is the task-organized organizational-unit of campaign strengths. It normally refers to an Army group army, a Navy campaign formation {biandui}, a theater Air Force, a Second Artillery base, etc. “A large formation of two or more services” refers to the campaign large formation of two or more different services, for example, an Army group army and a Navy campaign formation {biandui}, etc. A campaign large formation of two or more services task-organized together into a “joint campaign large formation” is the basic indicator in terms of composing the joint campaign strength. When a campaign is relatively small, the joint campaign large formation can be a task-organized tactical formation {zhanshu bingtuan} of two or more services.

There is a command institution. A joint campaign is under the unified command of a “joint campaign command institution” that is independent of all services. The joint campaign command consists of commanders of services and organs of the command institutions. It is responsible for making campaign plans, decisions, command and control. The commander of the joint campaign is normally appointed by the supreme command or theater, and possesses command authority.

There is a relationship among the services. All the participating services are parallel to each other and not subordinate to each other. Some call it “partnership.” Each service accomplishes its own campaign missions and brings into play their irreplaceable unique role in order to achieve the campaign objectives according to a unified plan {jihua}. Although assisting and cooperative relationships exist in a given phase and a given direction of a joint campaign, generally speaking, the inter-service coordination relationships and the inter-service assisting and cooperating relationships in a joint campaign are also under unified organization and implementation by the joint campaign command institution. This is unique to the joint campaign and it is decided by the characteristics of the modern campaign.

There is a composition of campaigns. A joint campaign normally consists of a series of sub-campaigns related to each other. They are mainly the air offensive campaign, the ground offense and defense campaigns, the sea blockade campaign, the landing and anti-landing campaigns, the air raid and anti-air raid campaigns, the airborne and anti-airborne campaigns, the conventional missile raid, information warfare, special warfare, etc. When a campaign is relatively small-scale, the joint campaign is composed of campaign-quality operations {zhanyixing zuozhan} conducted through a series of interconnected inter-service coordination.

A joint campaign is relative to a service (combined) campaign. Not only is it connected to a service (combined) campaign, it also has differences. The main differences are:

Difference in terms of service strengths. A service campaign is a campaign implemented independently by a given service or by a given service in the lead with the assistance and cooperation of some force-strengths {bingli} of other services, but this is mainly coordinated operation[s] {xietong zuozhan} between the various arms within the respective service. A joint campaign is then a campaign implemented together by the strengths of all-services participating in the campaign and it is inter-service coordinated operations.

Difference in terms of the command system {tizhi}. A service campaign is command conducted by a commander through the command institution of the respective service, and the attached and assisting force-units of other services receive the command of the service campaign commander. A joint campaign is then a unified command implemented by the joint campaign commander through the joint campaign command institution.

Difference in terms of service relationships. The service relationship in the service campaign is not a parallel [one], but a subordinate [one]. It is a principal to subordinate relationship between the service campaign large formation executing the main missions to the service force-units responsible for the assistive and cooperative missions. The joint campaign, in terms of the integrated-whole of the campaign, is a parallel relationship between all services, not a principal to subordinate relationship, thus there is a coordinated relationship of mutual assistance and cooperation.

Difference in terms of spatial scope. The battlefield of a service campaign is mainly in one space, with other spaces as auxiliary spaces. For example, in a ground maneuver campaign, the main battlefield is land and the Army mainly conducts it. The air battlefield can provide support, functioning as help. A joint campaign, however, is a campaign conducted by two or more services together. It is conducted in two or more battlefield spaces. For example, a sea blockade campaign conducted by the Navy and the Air Force is conducted in two battlefield spaces concurrently, namely on sea and in the sky, and there is no clear difference between the main battlefield and the subordinate battlefield.

In future local warfare under informationized conditions, a service campaign will mainly be a sub-campaign of a joint campaign, becoming the basis of the joint campaign. Meanwhile, we cannot exclude the existence of the service campaign.

II. Categories of Joint Campaign...273

A joint campaign is a campaign type {leixing} (some call it a form-state {xingtai}). According to different situations, we can further categorize the joint campaign.

(1) Based on operational nature, it can be divided into the joint offensive campaign and the joint defensive campaign.

A joint offensive campaign is a campaign conducted by a joint campaign large formation that is mainly offensive. Its purpose is to massively destroy effective enemy strength, to seize and occupy important regions and targets, and to accomplish strategic offensive tasks.

A joint defensive campaign is a campaign conducted by a joint campaign large formation that is mainly defensive. Its purpose is to massively consume enemy strength, to defend important regions and targets, to foil the enemy offensive and to accomplish strategic defensive tasks.

(2) Based on campaign strength composition, it can be divided into an Army and Air Force joint campaign, a Navy and Air Force joint campaign, and an Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery joint campaign.

An Army and Air Force joint campaign refers to a joint campaign conducted by the Army and Air Force campaign large formations.

A Navy and Air Force joint campaign refers to a joint campaign conducted by the Navy and Air Force campaign large formations.

An Army and Air Force joint campaign and the campaign force from the Second Artillery sometimes join the Navy and Air Force joint campaign.

An Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery joint campaign is a joint campaign conducted together by the campaign large formations from all these services.

(3) Based on campaign missions, it can be divided into the blockade campaign, the landing campaign, the anti-landing campaign, the border retaliation campaign, the urban offensive and defensive campaigns, the anti-air raid campaign, etc.

The blockade campaign is an at-sea {haishang} and air blockade offensive campaign implemented against an enemy entrenched {jushou} on an island or on shore. A large-scale blockade campaign is normally a unified command by a joint campaign commander and his command organ, with a Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery campaign large formation in the lead and implemented with cooperation from Army and Armed Police force-units and militia.

The landing campaign is a sea crossing offensive campaign implemented against an enemy entrenched {jushou} on an island or on shore. The landing campaign is normally a unified command by a joint campaign commander and his command organ, with an Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery campaign large formation in the lead and implemented with cooperation from Armed Police force-units and militia.

The border area counterattack campaign is an offensive campaign implemented against an enemy's localized invasion on our border area. A border area counterattack campaign is normally a unified command by a joint campaign commander and his command organ, with an Army, Air Force, and Second Artillery campaign large formation in the lead and implemented cooperation from Armed Police force-units and militia (during coastal area operations, naval force-strengths may also participate).

The anti-landing campaign is a defensive campaign to resist an enemy sea crossing landing relying on coastal areas, islands and other sea areas. The anti-landing campaign is normally a unified command by a joint campaign commander and his command organ with an Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery campaign large formation in the lead and implemented with cooperation from Armed Police force-units and militia.

The urban offensive campaign is an offensive campaign against an enemy entrenched in a city. The urban defensive campaign is a defensive campaign to resist an enemy's attack relying on a city and its surrounding areas. The urban offensive and defensive campaigns are normally a unified command by a joint campaign commander and his command organ with an Army, Air Force, and Second Artillery campaign large formation in the lead and implemented with the cooperation of Armed Police force-units and militia (during coastal area operations, naval force-units may also participate).

The anti-air raid campaign is an integrated defending and countering defensive campaign implemented against an air raiding enemy. The anti-air raid campaign is normally a unified command by a joint campaign commander and his command organ with an Air Force campaign large formation in the lead and implemented together with an anti-air

raid force-strength of a joint Army, Navy and Second Artillery led by the Air Force campaign large formation and implemented together with the anti-air raid forces of a joint Army, Navy, and Second Artillery campaign large formations and the civilian air defense strengths.

The joint campaign can also be categorized in other ways.

III. Features of a Joint Campaign...275

The joint campaign in a local war under informationized conditions has, apart from all the common features of a modern campaign, the following three outstanding features:

(1) Stronger strategic nature

A general campaign also has a strategic quality. Nevertheless, the strategic quality of a joint campaign is more obvious. The goal of a joint campaign in a future local war is to defend territorial and sovereignty integrity and ocean rights, to resist enemy local invasion, to protect strategic vital sites, etc. Sometimes, one campaign is a war, so the campaign goal and the war goal are the same to a certain extent. For its influence, the joint campaign involves military, political, economic, and diplomatic areas, the campaign process and result are tied in to the national interest and peace, and its result has a great impact on the realization of national strategy and military strategy.

(2) Higher command level

The higher command level shows in two ways: number one, in the higher decision-making level. In a joint campaign of future local wars, the important issues, such as the campaign goals, scale, time limit, strike targets, methods, and means will be decision making made by the supreme command, or direct intervention by the supreme command. This is decided by the strict constraints of modern campaign factors such as political, economic and diplomatic. Number two, the organization and implementation of a campaign is normally a joint campaign headquarters command is higher than the command level of a respective service campaign large formation. The joint campaign headquarters is responsible for the overall-planning {chouhua} and preparing of the campaign, and [responsible for] the adjusting-coordination of the operational activities of the various services, battlefields and phases according to the intent of the supreme command.

(3) Fierce high-tech confrontation

Fierce high-tech confrontation is another important feature of a future joint campaign. On the one hand, we will face the threat of high-tech enemy weapons and equipment, such as satellite reconnaissance, detection, electronic jamming, precision-guided weapon strikes, etc. On the other hand, because there will be a massive employment of participating services such as Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery, the technology volume of the

battlefield will be expanded and the technological confrontation of both operational sides will be more fierce. The air warfare, sea warfare, information warfare and even space warfare jointly implemented all services and its directly manifested form-state {xingtai}, from a given sense, is precisely the confrontation of high tech weaponry. One can see that in a joint campaign, the scope of high tech confrontation will be broader, its intensity higher, and features more distinctive.

IV. . Historical Development of the Joint Campaign...276

The joint campaign is a product of human military development. As science and technology progress, weapons and equipment develop and the structure of the campaign force changes; specifically, the service forces enlarge, their combat capability enhances, and the joint campaign goes through the historical process of birth, formation, and full development. Under modern conditions, the joint campaign has become the main form of carrying out a campaign in local warfare under informationized conditions.

(1) Birth of the joint campaign

The Army and Navy are the two oldest military services. The earliest joint campaign dates back from coordinated combat by the Army and Navy in regions bordering on the sea (water).

From the late 18th Century to the late 19th Century, the major western capitalist countries established armies and navies with modern characteristics after they went through the industrial revolution. The artillery force, engineering force, and communication force in the army made great progress. Their navies also finished the transition from sailboat fleet to armored steamboat fleet. The development of army and navy forces and the enhancement of their combat capabilities laid the material basis for not only their independent ground and sea campaigns, but also the joint campaign of the two services in a coastal region.

In this period of time, the combat relationship of ground combat and sea combat was enhanced in order to meet the needs of combat in a coastal region, and the coordination of the army and navy became very important. Thus, there appeared some prototypes of joint campaigns by the Army and Navy. The representative examples are: the Battle of Yorktown in the American Revolutionary War, the Battle of Vicksburg in the American Civil War, the Battle of San Diego in 1898 between America and Spain, the battle conducted by the Japanese forces to seize and occupy Qingdao under the occupation of the German forces, the anti-landing campaign by the Russian forces in the Sumining area, etc. Among them, the earliest, the Battle of Yorktown in the American Revolutionary War, can be seen as the landmark of the birth of the joint campaign.

The Battle of Yorktown was an Army and Navy joint combat conducted by the allied troops of the U.S. and France. In October 1780, the U.S. forces had begun to counterattack in the Independence War. The British Commander-in-chief Cornwallis was

forced to withdraw his left troops into the port city, Yorktown, Virginia. They built up positions around the city and resisted firmly, waiting for reinforcements from sea. In early September 1781, the French fleet with 36 ships under the command of French Admiral de Grasse fought the British Navy coming to reinforce from outside of the port of Yorktown. The French won, and they cut off the sea supply line of the British forces. George Washington, the Commander-in-chief of the American Continental Army, seized this favorable opportunity and attacked Yorktown together with the French Expeditionary Force under the command of General Rochambeau. After fierce fighting, the British commander Cornwallis finally surrendered with his 8,000 troops on October 19th. The American forces won the Independence War. The Battle of Yorktown is the first joint combat of the allied forces in the history of the U.S. armed forces, and it is also the first joint combat with the essential characteristics of a joint campaign in the military history of mankind.

In that time, with the limitations of weapons and equipment and the combat capabilities of the military services, joint combat by the Army and Navy was fairly loose, and the coordination operation was simple. The services still fought independently in their respective fields, and the support and help between them was very limited.

(2) Formation of the joint campaign

World War I is the first large-scale world war in human military history, and it is also the formation period of the joint campaign.

The second industrial revolution ushered in further development of weapons and equipment and the size and structure of the armed forces. The armies of the nations in war formed strategic campaign large formations, front armies and army groups. The strength of the artillery was greatly enhanced, and there came new service arms such as the tank and anti-chemical forces. The motorization and mechanization of the armed forces were also greatly enhanced. The Navy was equipped with not only large ships such as battleships and battle cruisers, but also with a large number of new ships such as destroyers, frigates, minesweepers, torpedo ships, and submarines, developing into a sea combat force with many types of ships and several joint sub-fleets. What attracted people's attention was the appearance of an aviation force and its use that gave war new dimensional characteristics. The size and quality of the army and navy developed rapidly and their combat capabilities enhanced greatly. It made deep changes in the scale of campaigns, combat models and combat methods. Also, it created the conditions for the formation of a real joint campaign.

During World War I, there were several large-scale Army and Navy joint campaigns. In these campaigns, the number of troops of the participating services, the scale of the campaigns, the sustained time, and the coordination among the services all reached a considerable level. The most representative and the largest of them is the Strait Landing Campaign, which was launched by the British and French forces in 1915. They wanted to control the Dardanelles Strait and the Bosphorus Strait, and to occupy Constantinople, the

capital city of Turkey. In this campaign, the British and French forces put in 570,000 Army and Navy troops and Turkey put in 700,000 troops to resist the landing. With the support of the allied fleet, the British and French forces sent in about 12 divisions, trying to seize and consolidate the beachhead. The Turkish forces sent in about 14 divisions to block the British and French effort to expand the beachhead. The combat was very fierce. The campaign lasted for 259 days and ended with the failure of the British and French forces. The British and French forces lost about 140,000 soldiers, while the Turkish forces lost about 180,000 soldiers.

Though the Battle of the Dardanelles Strait was not a successful landing campaign, it already had the basic characteristics of a modern joint campaign. The Army and Navy fought together to accomplish a common campaign intention. The size of the participating forces from the military services reached the scale of a campaign large formation. The support and help provided by the Navy to the Army was no longer limited to “non-combat loading and unloading;” instead, it used the powerful firepower of ship guns to support Army troops landing and seizing beachheads. Meanwhile, the Army troops attacked and occupied the region bordering the sea to protect the operation of the Naval fleet in the strait. Their coordination was already fairly close. The Battle of the Dardanelles Strait also showed that a landing campaign is a most complicated campaign model, and the average campaign commander of the time was far from mastering this campaign model. There were many problems in campaign command, campaign coordination, and combat methods in this campaign. It had a profound influence on the campaign operations, especially landing operations later on. The Battle of the Dardanelles Strait can be seen as the landmark of that time for the formation of the joint campaign.

(3) Development of the joint campaign

World War II is the most important historical period in human military development. This unprecedented large-scale world war and its bumper campaign experiences greatly pushed forward the development of various campaign forms and patterns. The joint campaign, as an important campaign form-state in World War II, made great progress during the war.

In World War II, the basic models for a joint campaign were the landing and anti-landing campaign and the airborne campaign. In the offensive and defensive combat operations on the battlefield on the European Continent, there were also some characteristics of Army and Air Force joint campaigns. In WWII, the most important impact of the full development of the joint campaign is that mankind experienced landing and anti-landing combats that were the largest in scale, the most numerous, the most dimensional, and the most advanced of all joint combats of services and branches in world military history. According to statistics, the belligerent states launched about 600 landing combats of various scales, of which several dozen were at the scale of a campaign. Compared with the previous world war, the great development of the joint campaign showed mainly in the following. Number one, the scale of the campaigns was large. In the war, there were 6

strategic landing campaigns, with the Landing Campaign of Normandy being the largest. The participating troops were 2,880,000 soldiers. Among them was an army group, commanding 3 group armies, totaling 36 divisions with 1,530,000 soldiers. There were over 9,000 ships and over 13,700 planes. The campaign lasted over one month. Number two, the position of the joint campaign was greatly enhanced. In the war, the joint campaign played an important role, whether it was on the strategic level or on the campaign level. The landing campaign of the British and American forces in Northern Africa forced the army corps of Erwin Rommel to withdraw from Africa. The Normandy Campaign opened a second battlefield in Europe, accelerating the collapse of Germany. In the latter period of the Pacific War, the American troops launched a large-scale amphibious combat operation, which not only extended the war onto Japanese territory, but also hit the Japanese Navy and Air Force with a destructive force, eventually forcing Japan to surrender unconditionally. Number three, it established a new model for a joint campaign with the coordinated combat of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In a large-scale joint campaign, there was normally an independent campaign by a single service, as well as a coordinated campaign by the various services together. The Army, Navy, and Air Force coordinated closely to fight, establishing a new type of joint campaign model for dimensional combat on ground, air, water and underwater. Number four, the joint landing campaign had a very high success rate. In World War II, the large-scale landing campaign had an almost 100% success rate. All six strategic landing campaigns were successful. This makes a sharp contrast with World War I. The bumper experiences of joint campaigns also pushed forward the great development of the theory of joint campaigns.

In over 60 years since the end of World War II, the rapid development of science and technology has led to great changes in the military field, with many new high-tech weapons, equipment, services and branches coming into campaign practices; compared with the joint campaigns of World War II, the model, force, space, combat method, and command all made new developments and changes. These developments and changes showed in recent four local wars, and it was especially obvious in the Gulf War of 1991. As far as the combat model was concerned, information warfare bore the brunt of the effort which lasted throughout the whole campaign. It became the key to grasping the initiative on the battlefield to seize control over information. And the air raid went on for 38 days, becoming an independent combat phase, creating favorable conditions for winning the whole campaign by multi-national forces. The ground maneuver warfare conducted mainly by mechanized forces, the largest-scale airplane attack in the world history of war conducted by air attacking troops, and the special warfare conducted in the deep area of Iraq all played important roles. As far as force was concerned, the air force, navy, missile force, special warfare force, and electronic warfare force gradually took important positions in the joint campaign. As far as space was concerned, as space technology developed and various military spacecrafts increased, outer space began to be seen as a battlefield as important as traditional battlefields on land, sea and air. Combat in space is changing from single supportive operations into an important part of a joint campaign. As far as command method was concerned, information technology, which centered on micro-electronic technology, developed rapidly and was used widely in the military field, greatly enhancing the capability of command, control, communications,

information collection and transmission on the campaign battlefield and providing reliable guarantee for the effective coordination and control of the services in a joint campaign.

(4) Development of the joint campaign of the People's Liberation Army of China

Limited by historical conditions and the level of military technology, the People's Liberation Army of China has little practical experience in joint campaigns, and its theoretical study also started late.

Looking back into history, the 400 plus campaigns conducted by the People's Liberation Army of China, including the large-scale strategic campaigns conducted together by several field armies, were mainly combined battles conducted by infantry and artillery forces. Therefore, they do not have the characteristics of the joint campaign. In January 1955, the landing campaign of the People's Liberation Army of China to liberate Yijiangshan Island was the first successful joint campaign conducted by the Army, Navy, and Air Force against the enemy-occupied offshore islands. Though the scale of the campaign was not large, it offered practical experience in the joint campaign.

As weapons and equipment developed and the Air Force and Navy strengthened, the People's Liberation Army of China strengthened the training for the joint campaign and the continuous study of the laws of joint campaigns. In November 1955, we had large-scale joint landing campaign exercises by the Army, Navy, and Air Force on the Liaodong Peninsula. They provided good experiences for the command, coordination principles, and an operation model for a large-scale joint campaign. In 1980, we conducted unprecedented large-scale Army and Air Force "801" and "802" exercises in Northern China. Since the 1990s, we conducted a series of joint campaign exercises of various scales, levels, and patterns including the 2005 Sino-China Joint Military Exercise, according to future potential war threats, fully displaying the capability of the People's Liberation Army of China under high-tech conditions for conducting a joint campaign of services.

In the theoretical study of joint campaigns, the People's Liberation Army of China also achieved bumper results. In the late '80s, we made the joint campaign one of the important campaign models of our armed forces for the first time, and made a definitive description of the joint campaign. In recent years, the study of the joint campaign is moving on to systematic study, providing some results of theoretical studies and establishing primary basic theory and a practical theory system of the joint campaign.

Section 2: Joint Campaign Command...281

Joint campaign command refers to the activities {*huodong*} of operations research-decision making, planning {*jihua*} and organizing, and adjusting-coordination control conducted by a joint campaign commander and his command organ for the operational activities of all subordinate force-units. It is the important link for transforming the

campaign strength potential {zhanyi liliang qianneng} into real operational capability. In carrying out a joint campaign under informationized conditions, [there are] many command objects, high requirements, a large degree of difficulty and intense confrontation.

I. Command Institution...281

Building a sound joint campaign command institution is an essential condition for organizing and implementing a joint campaign.

(1) Command system

Based on the joint campaign's force strength, formation, and mission, the structural system of the joint campaign command institution may be divided into the following three patterns:

First type: Three-level command system {tizhi}

The large scale joint campaign normally establishes a three level command system. Based on the specific situation, it can be divided into two models. Model 1: the first level is a multi-theater joint campaign headquarters, the second level is a theater direction headquarters, and the third level is the campaign large formation headquarters. Model 2: The first level is the joint campaign headquarters, the second level is the service campaign headquarters, and the third level is the campaign large formation headquarters. Each level of the institution follows:

Level 1 – The joint campaign headquarters is normally jointly composed of the commander of each theater and service and the command organ with relevant personnel included. When required, the supreme headquarters may also designate the participation of representatives. The joint headquarters is the highest command institution of the campaign; it receives supreme headquarters guidance and it is responsible for organizing and implementing the campaign.

Level 2 – Theater direction headquarters or service campaign headquarters is normally composed of the theater or relevant service commander and his command organ; it receives command from the joint campaign headquarters or the supreme headquarters and is responsible for organizing and implementing the operations in its direction or its service's operations.

Level 3 – The campaign large formation headquarters is normally composed of the commander of each campaign large formation of that service and his command organ, and is responsible for the specific organization and implementation of the campaign. One large scale joint campaign normally has a given number of campaign large formation headquarters for each service.

Second type: Two-level command system

The intermediate scale joint campaign normally establishes a two-level command system. This is namely a joint campaign headquarters – a service campaign large formation headquarters.

The joint campaign headquarters is normally composed of the theater and service commander, as well as the command organ. It can directly command the campaign operations of the campaign large formations of the Army, Air Force and Navy. The campaign large formation headquarters of the Army, Air Force and Navy receive commands from the joint campaign headquarters, and each is responsible for the specific organization and implementation of the campaign operations for its own service campaign large formation.

Third type: Single-level command system

The small scale joint campaign, namely the group army-level joint campaign, normally establishes a single-level joint campaign command system. The single-level joint campaign headquarters is normally jointly composed of the campaign large formation command institution of the participating service as lead, and with the absorbed participation of relevant commanders and command organ personnel of other participating combatant services. It is responsible for campaign organization and implementation, and the unified command of operational activities for the forces of all subordinate services.

(2) Command institution

The structure of the command institution of the joint campaign, according to the participating strengths and missions, normally has the following four parts:

There is an operations center. It is composed of the chief of headquarters and relevant personnel of the operations department. It is responsible for organizing and planning the joint campaign, assisting the commander's decision making and command and control. It is the core of the command institution.

The intelligence center is composed of the chief of the headquarters and relevant personnel of the intelligence department. It is responsible for battlefield reconnaissance, information and intelligence gathering, processing and analysis, and providing the campaign commander with the foundation for decision making and command and control.

The communication center is composed of relevant personnel from the communication system. Its mission is to establish the connections between the campaign command institution departments, and safeguard smooth command instructions and orders.

The support center is composed of various command support personnel and it carries out operational command of support missions.

When necessary, we can also establish a special coordination institution, such as an integrated firepower coordination center, an information operation center, etc.

(3) Command relationship

There can be three situations in the command relationship of a joint campaign:

There can be a relationship of subordination. It is the basic relationship in joint campaign command. A joint campaign normally conducts level-by-level command, according to the relationship of subordination. The joint command reports to the supreme command or a designated command institution and conducts unified command of the operational activities of its subordinate forces. The theater direction command or the campaign service command receives command from the joint command and is responsible for command of the activities of the operational strengths within its formations. The campaign large formation headquarters receives commands from the direction or service headquarters and is responsible for the operations of its own large formation. When there is a need for bypass level command, the supreme command and joint command can directly command the operational activities of the service campaign large formation.

There can be a relationship of guidance. The commanding institutions of all levels in a joint campaign can universally direct rear area service work, technical work, and battlefield control within their regions. They can also give guidance to a combat force that does not report to them, but is carrying out tasks in their regions, according to the order and instructions of the superior.

There can be a relationship of control. The commanding institutions of all levels in a joint campaign conduct combat control over the support and help troops according to plan or the authorization of the superior. Combat control is a limited command authority. It only commands the combat operation of the troops, but it does not have command authority over the formation and logistical and technical safeguarding of the troops.

II. The Command Activity...283

The command activity is a general term for all the activities a joint campaign commander makes when organizing and conducting a campaign. Its main contents are:

(1) The operations research and decision-making activity

The operations research {yunchou} and decision-making activity {huodong} in a joint campaign is the overall planning {chouhua} and decisiveness a commander of a joint campaign accomplishes for the campaign intention, objectives (direction), fighting

methods, campaign *bushi* disposition, support, etc. It is the core content of campaign command activity and the central mission and basic responsibility of the campaign commander. Its basic contents and processes are: analyzing the war situation circumstances {zhanju xingshi}, understanding the campaign missions, assessing the situations, putting forth the campaign concept, determining the campaign goals, formulating the campaign courses of action, and selecting the best and being decisive. The campaign courses of action mainly includes the campaign guidance thought, campaign intention, operational direction, operational objectives, main fighting method, employment of campaign strengths, division of campaign phases, campaign time limits, etc.

(2) Planning and organizing activity

The planning and organizing activity {huodong} of a joint campaign is the arrangements made towards the content and methods of campaign activities {xingdong} by a joint campaign commander and his command organ in order to guide force-unit {budui} operational preparations and operational implementation. It is also the further specification [making concrete] of the campaign courses of action and resolution. It is the basis for command and control. It is even more important to carefully formulate the joint campaign plan {jihua} and bring numerous participating strengths implementing a variety of operational activities in multi-dimensions of space into a unified and orderly plan {jihua}. The content of the campaign planning and organizing activity mainly includes: formulating the campaign operational plans, organizing campaign coordination, organizing various campaign support items, organizing the campaign command institution, organizing the force-units to complete campaign preparations, organizing campaign maneuver, and organizing campaign training, etc.

(3) The command and control activity

The command and control activity {huodong} in a joint campaign is the command activity {huodong} of submitting campaign decision making into practice by the joint campaign commander during the process of campaign implementation. It is the grasping and controlling of the campaign activities {xingdong} and it is the basic activity {huodong} for pushing forward and mastering the campaign course and conclusion. The command and control in campaign implementation, from campaign start to campaign finish, is the continuation of a number of command cycle loop processes {zhahui zhouqi xunhuan guocheng} – each cycle normally containing the four links {huanjie} of situational assessment, issuing orders, tracking feedback, and correcting deviations. The campaign commander must be focused on the modern joint campaign's characteristics and battlefield reality situations and from start to finish have a grasp of the campaign centers of gravity. [He must] tightly seize upon the campaign's most prominent and critical problems and implement steadfast, flexible and uninterrupted command. [He must] adopt methods such as target control, plans {jihua} control and ad hoc control, etc. and push forward the campaign to achieve the predetermined goals.

Section 3: Joint Campaign Coordination...285

Joint campaign coordination is the unified-overall-planning arrangement and adjustment-control activity {huodong} conducted for the operational activities {xingdong} of participating strengths by the joint campaign commander and his command organ in accordance with the campaign resolution and campaign plan[s] {jihua}. Its purpose is to allow a high level adjusting-coordination of the operational activities by the campaign large formations and formations {bingtuan} of all services in multiple dimensions of space, [allow] their close cooperation, [allow] bringing into play the might of the integrated-whole and [allow] achieving of campaign goals.

In a joint campaign under informationized conditions, the strength composition is complex and operational activities are varied. Various operational activities will unfold at the same time or successively in multiple dimensions of space, such as land, sea, air, space, and electromagnetic. There will be a combination of various operational patterns and means such as air raids and anti-air raids, maneuver and anti-maneuver, blockade and anti-blockade, as well as information warfare, firepower warfare, special warfare, and psychological warfare. Operational activities are complex, transitions are frequent, situational changes are rapid, and difficulty for unified activities are great, so it is even clearly more important to successfully accomplish campaign coordination.

I. Characteristics of Coordination...285

The coordination of a joint campaign has characteristics that are different from the service (combined) campaign. They are shown mainly in the following areas:

(1) Higher level of coordination

Higher level of coordination has three meanings: number one, it means the objects of coordination are at a higher level. A joint campaign is normally a campaign of a strategic nature conducted together with forces from all services. The levels of the forces of the participating service are normally more complete campaign large formations or formations. Number two, the type of coordination is at a higher level. As far as operational coordination is concerned, it can be the internal coordination within a service arm, between service arms, and between services. The coordination of a joint campaign is mainly the coordination between services. Therefore, it is the coordination of the highest level. Number three, it means a higher level of coordination activities. The coordination of a joint campaign is mainly the coordination of operational activities between different sub-campaigns, different battlefield spaces, and different campaign directions. These coordination activities are all activities on the campaign level. Some of them even reach the strategic level. Their coordination is the main body of joint campaign coordination. The characteristics of higher level coordination show that macro-coordination and overall coordination should be the focus of joint campaign coordination.

(2) Many essential elements of coordination

The essential elements of coordination {xietong yaosu} mainly refer to the force-units {budui}, operational activities, and battlefield spaces that need to establish the relationship of coordination. A joint campaign are the joint activities {xingdong} of multiple campaign patterns and multiple operational modes implemented by the campaign groupings and force-units of all services in multi-dimensional space and in different campaign directions, and its coordination essential elements are by far much more than in a general service campaign. They include: the coordination between various armed strengths, the coordination between campaign groupings and forces of all services, the coordination of different battlefield spaces, the coordination of different campaign directions, the coordination of different campaign patterns, and the coordination of different operational modes. There are many joint campaign coordination essential elements and their most direct influences are bringing about a more complex coordination and increasing the degree of coordination.

(3) Wider coordination space

In a joint campaign, the operational activities of the various services will be conducted simultaneously or consecutively in the multi-dimensional battlefield of land, sea, air, and sky, with the battlefield space greatly enlarged. In the Gulf War, the battlefield ranged from the Gulf in the east to the Mediterranean in the west and the Red Sea in the south to Turkey in the north, with a total area of 14,000,000 square kilometers. As for operational patterns, long-range raid, out-of-sight precision-guided attack, and maneuver attack in deep areas further expanded the battlefield space. The U.S. B-52 bombers took off over 10,000 kilometers away on U.S. territory and reached the Mediterranean about 800 kilometers from Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, where they launched cruise missiles against the key targets in Baghdad. Since the joint campaign is conducted in such a wide battlefield space, it makes the space of campaign coordination not only wide enough to cover the whole strategic campaign deep area, but also to go beyond the traditional strategic limit.

(4) Unstable coordination

The main causes of unstable coordination in the joint campaign are: number one, the coordination of a joint campaign is dynamic. Since the joint campaign has a strong strategic nature and many restricting factors, and different campaign patterns, operational modes, and campaign phases that frequently interchange, it has to require the services and branches to establish different coordinating relationships according to the changes of campaign patterns, operational modes, and campaign phases. This causes frequent changes of coordinating actions among the coordinating factors of a joint campaign and its coordinating relationships. So, the instability of joint campaign coordination is first of all decided by the high dynamics of campaign activities and campaign phases. Number two, under modern conditions, the accuracy and destructive power of weapons are more enhanced than ever, and the rapid maneuver capability of troops is greatly enhanced, too.

It makes the battlefield change dramatically. Meanwhile, because of the expansion of combat space, real-time or near real-time collection of battlefield information and the control and coordination of troops are harder, so it is harder to maintain the stability of campaign coordination. Number three, the confrontation of coordination and anti-coordination on both sides is fierce. In a joint campaign, to damage the enemy's coordination means to reduce the overall combat effect of the enemy. It can even collapse the whole combat system of the enemy. Therefore, to damage enemy coordination will be a combat goal for both sides in a joint campaign. And this will certainly make a fierce confrontation of coordination and anti-coordination by both sides, so the coordination of the joint campaign will be unstable.

(5) Complex coordination mechanism

It is shown mainly in two ways: number one, the organization system of joint campaign coordination is complex. On the campaign level of joint force-units, every command level has a joint command coordination institution consisting of the commander and command organ with a parallel suitable grade from the services. On the tactical level of joint force-units, every service will send out a coordination group or officer to other services. Meanwhile, we should establish crisscross command, control, and coordination relationships. Number two, the methods and process of organizing and conducting joint campaign coordination are complex. A joint campaign often consists of multiple campaign patterns and a variety of operational modes by the services at the same time or one after another. In different campaign patterns and operational modes, the services have different positions, functions, coordination actions, and coordination relationships with each other. This makes coordination methods complex. Besides, in a campaign, as campaign phases, campaign patterns, and operational modes change all the time, the coordination relationships between services and coordination methods are changing all the time, too. Plus anti-coordination combat by the enemy makes some damages and disturbs us. So the coordination of a joint campaign needs to seek stability in continuous change, continuous restoration and maintenance in continuous enemy damage, and continuous new coordination in a battlefield posture that changes rapidly. This complexity of coordination is more prominent than in any other campaign situation.

The above characteristics show that, in a joint campaign, organizing coordination is even more complex, maintaining and restoring coordination actions are even more difficult, and the ad hoc coordination missions are even more important. So there are more stringent requirements for the capability and methods for the joint campaign commander and command organ to organize force-unit coordination.

II. Coordinating Principles...287

When organizing and conducting a joint campaign, apart from the general principles of the modern campaign, there are several main principles to follow:

(1) Integrated-whole coordination

Integrated-whole coordination {zhengti xietong} is the coordination of all situations, all directions, and the whole process of the operational activities of service campaign groupings and forces in order to accomplish the general campaign intention. Integrated-whole coordination is the first principle for joint campaign coordination. This is decided by the following: the multi-variant quality of the joint campaign participating strengths, the multi-dimensional quality of the battlefield space, the variety of campaign patterns and operational modes, and the multi-phased quality of the campaign course. In a joint campaign, we can only fully bring into play the synthesized effectiveness of joint operations by first coalescing the various winning essential elements into an adjusting-coordinated and unified integrated-whole from the perspective of the overall situation,

When applying the principle of integrated-whole coordination, we should pay attention to the following: number one, we should have good integrated-whole coordination among service campaign groupings and force-units. This is the most important integrated-whole coordination in a joint campaign. We should center on the unified campaign goal, and based on the characteristics of all of the services, [conduct] unified-overall-planning {tongchou} of the organization and determine the coordination actions and coordination relationships of each service campaign grouping and force-unit. We should pay attention to fully realizing the advantages of all the services and branches. Also, we should make sure that all of the joint force-units form the optimum integrated-whole operational strength. Number two, we should have good integrated-whole coordination of battlefield spaces and campaign directions. We should make sure that the operational activities of services and branches fully unfold in multi-dimensional battlefield spaces and campaign directions. At the same time, we should make sure that there are good coordinating relationships among the battlefields and directions. This can destroy the enemy on multi-dimensional battlefields at the same time or one after another. Number three, we should have good integrated-whole coordination of campaign patterns and operational modes. The major advantage of the joint campaign is that it can fully realize the operational capabilities of all the services and branches to conduct an integrated attack against the enemy. Therefore, we should make sure that there are good relationships of mutual support, mutual help, and mutual enhancement among the different campaign patterns and operational modes in order to enhance the integrated attacking power against the enemy. Number four, we should have good integrated-whole coordination of the total campaign process. In a service (combined) campaign, integrated-whole coordination is crucial only in the important campaign phases and at critical occasions. But in a joint campaign, integrated-whole coordination is important throughout the campaign. Therefore, we should maintain the integrated-whole coordination of campaign phases incessantly. In particular, we should pay attention to maintaining the stability of the integrated-whole coordination of campaign phase transitions, and we should have good coordination of the coordinating actions of phases, making the coordination of an early phase the favorable condition for the coordination of later phases.

(2) Key point coordination

Key point coordination means that coordination must stress key points, grasp the key links, draw a distinction between the main and the secondary, and organize and implement from start to finish by centering on the campaign centers of gravity. The problems involved with joint campaign coordination are many, scope is broad, and relationships are complex. The joint campaign commander and command organ cannot take care of and grasp all the coordination issues, so they must carefully organize the coordination of key point problems.

We should pay attention to the following when carrying through the principle of key point coordination: number one, focus on the key point of organizing the coordination of the service campaign groupings that play a main role in campaign operations. In a joint campaign, generally speaking, all the service campaign groupings and force-units have an equal relationship when standing next to each other, but in specific campaign activities, they have main and secondary positions and roles. Only by organizing the service campaign groupings and force-units that play main roles as key point coordination and letting the force-units of other services be adjusting-coordinated and complementary can an optimum integrated-whole operational effectiveness be brought into play in campaign operations. Number two is to key-point organize coordination by centering on completing the main missions of campaign operations. Number three is to key-point organize coordination by centering on the main battlefield, main direction, and main areas of campaign operations. Number four is to key-point organize coordination by centering on the main patterns and main operational activities of campaign operations. Number five is to key-point organize coordination by centering on the main phase and critical occasions of campaign operations, etc.

Being adept at centering on the campaign centers of gravity and successfully adjusting-coordination of the activities and relationships in each aspect is the art of organizing joint campaign coordination. Especially in the process of implementing a campaign when campaign coordination is disrupted or in situations when significant changes occur, we should even more first center on the campaign centers of gravity to restore or re-establish coordination so as to ensure that the service campaign groupings and force-units are able to consistently adjust-coordinate activities in terms of the most important problems and at the most critical operational occasions.

(3) Coordination by separate levels

Coordination by separate levels means that each campaign command level is mainly responsible for organizing the operational coordination of the groupings or force-units of one subordinate level according to its direct command authority. For the important operational activities of the main direction and critical occasions, they can organize it for two subordinate levels.

We should pay attention to the following when carrying through the principle of coordination by separate levels: number one, the coordination authority is consistent with the direct command authority. That is, the campaign command institution of each level should be mainly responsible for organizing the coordination activities of the campaign groupings and force-units under its direct command. Number two, in principle, each level only coordinates the operational activities of one subordinate level of campaign groupings and forces. When necessary, one can organize the important operational activities of the main direction and critical occasions down to two subordinate levels. Number three, coordination of one level higher must stipulate the tasks and create the conditions for coordination of one level lower, while the one level lower coordination must provide powerful support and safeguarding for achieving the one level higher coordination. Number four, coordination by separate levels must accomplish clear distinctions of responsibilities of each level, closely linking them vertically and coordinating the relationships horizontally in order to form an organically connected integrated-whole coordination.

(4) Flexible coordination

Flexible coordination means that under the premise of firmly and unswervingly executing the coordination plan, we must flexibly and with initiative implement ad hoc coordination on the basis of new situations appearing on the battlefield in order to ensure stable and uninterrupted coordination.

The operational activities of a joint campaign are highly complex. That determines that coordination according to plan is the basic method of organizing campaign coordination. It is also the main task of the campaign commander and command organ to achieve coordination in the course of a campaign. Therefore, in implementing a campaign, the campaign commander and command organ must firmly overcome all the difficulties and obstructions, not be wavered by localized sacrifices and setbacks, try hard to restore destroyed coordination and firmly and unswervingly carry out the established coordination plan. But at the same time, we have to flexibly implement ad hoc coordination on the basis of developing changes to the battlefield situation. Ad hoc coordination is an indispensably important mode in joint campaign coordination, and it is an important supplement to coordination according to plan. In a joint campaign under modern conditions, the posture and operational activities of both sides are in constant change, and there are many unpredictable situations. It is impossible for service campaign groupings and forces to follow the coordination plan line by line. When the battlefield situation changes greatly, the original coordination plan can even lose its function completely. Therefore, it is very important for maintaining stable and uninterrupted campaign coordination that we flexibly implement ad hoc coordination on the basis of the changing battlefield situation. The flexibility of coordination manifests itself mainly in two areas: number one, when localized changes occur in the battlefield situation, we should promptly make the corresponding corrections, adjustments, and replenishments of the coordination actions of forces on the basis of advance coordination. Number two,

when there are major changes in the battlefield situation, we should quickly and decisively organize new coordination as the occasion requires.

III. Coordination Methods...290

(1) Coordination by task

Coordination by task means to coordinate the operational activities of each campaign strength by stipulating the time, space and relevant requirements for each campaign large formation to execute its tasks. First of all, the joint campaign commander and coordination institution should scientifically and reasonably decide the coordination activities of various campaign strengths, closely following the general intention of the campaign, coordinating various campaign strengths closely, mutually assisting one another, and completing the campaign tasks together. Secondly, we should organize coordination around the main tasks of the campaign. The tasks of various campaign strengths are different. The joint campaign commander and command organ should organize coordination according to the main tasks of the service campaign large formation and formations. When there is a problem, we should make a quick adjustment to ensure the smooth accomplishment of the main tasks of the campaign.

(2) Coordination by phase

Coordination by phase means to stipulate the tasks and centers of gravity of each campaign large formation and organize the coordination of various campaign strengths according to the phase of campaign operations. On the basis of coordination by campaign phase, we must grasp the following points: number one, we should rationally divide the campaign phases. The division of campaign phases should conform to campaign progress to facilitate organizing campaign coordination. If a joint campaign is a large-scale one that consists of a series of campaigns, we can divide the campaign phases according to campaign sequence. Number two, we should clarify the operational tasks and coordination issues among the services and branches in various campaign phases, and focus on the coordination activities of the main operational occasion of the main operational phase. Number three, we must accomplish the coordination for each campaign phase transition. The coordination at campaign phase transitions is extremely important. If the links are not good, being out of tune in the coordination activities of the previous phase can bring difficulty to the coordination of the later phase and affect the accomplishment of the general campaign task.

(3) Coordination by space

Coordination by space means to stipulate the spatial scope of each service campaign large formation to fully bring into play the superiority of various services in different spaces, and to allow the variety of campaign activities of each space and domain to form an integrated-whole that is mutually assisting, mutually enhancing and mutually adjusting-coordinated. In organizing of coordination based on space, one must first perform general

guihua planning for each battlefield and campaign direction and set strict stipulations for the time, scope, and missions of the operational activities in each battlefield space for each campaign strength, making the operational activities of various battlefield spaces orderly and preventing chaos and conflict in the same space. Secondly, the operational activities in each battlefield space must center on the main battlefield to form the integrated-whole. As far as achieving the general goals of the campaign is concerned, there is the difference of main and secondary in the various battlefield spaces and campaign directions, and they change with campaign phase transitions. Therefore, under the prerequisite of looking after the total campaign operational space, we must center on the main battlefield and main direction, meticulously organize coordination and consistently adjust-coordinate the conduct of campaign activities in the full depth, in all aspects, at all levels and in all domains of the campaign.

Chapter 12

The Joint Blockade Campaign ...292

The joint blockade campaign is an offensive campaign that is implemented by Navy-, Air Force-, Second Artillery- and Army campaign large formations with the assistive concerted efforts of the armed police force and militia, and is implemented under unified intention and command, in order to sever enemy economic and military connections with the outside world.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...292

I. Characteristics...292

In addition to having the general characteristic of being an offensive campaign, the joint blockade campaign also has the following primary characteristics:

(1) There are multiple constraints on campaign decision-making and campaign activities and they are strongly policy-oriented

The battlespace of a joint blockade campaign is vast, the scope of the blockade involves international public waters and airspace; the objects limiting the campaign do not merely consist of the hostile side, they also include any third party ships and aircraft that enter into or have the intention to enter into the blockade area, thereby inevitably involving the political, economic and military interests of several nations and areas. In addition, international societies touch upon blockade operations to formulate and create various international laws and international conventions to provide specified restrictions on blockade activities. As a consequence, there is an augmented quality to operational guidance and activity policy. This requires that the campaign commander should have a foothold in the overall situation when decision making on the significant campaign issues such as the goals, fighting methods, activities, course, time and space, and be circumspect and farsighted with regard to taking the initiative in the two major aspects that consist of politics and diplomacy in view of their benefits to the military.

(2) The operational intensity is relatively low and there is a protracted campaign sustainment period

Normally, the main goal of the joint blockade campaign is not to annihilate the effective strength of the enemy in great quantities but to cut off the sea and air connections that the enemy side has with the outside world. As a result, in comparison with the other campaign patterns, the campaign intensity is generally lower. Owing to the comparatively stronger economic and military sustainment power of the enemy, it is not possible to achieve the goals of the blockade in a single action, and generally a longer period of sealing off and isolating [the enemy] is required before it is possible to achieve the depletion of enemy goods and materials, to cause public sentiment to weaken, and to se

vacillation in political arenas, thereby successfully compelling the enemy to submit to the campaign goals.

(3) Non-combat military activities hold a prominent status and the complexity of the campaign is broadened

In the joint blockade campaign, in addition to achieving military activities of a combat nature, one should also achieve a great majority of military activities that have a non-combat {非战斗 fei-zhandou} nature; not only must one implement attacks against the various military targets from the side being blockaded that are entering the blockade area, but one must also implement boarding and seizure and confiscation of civilian shipping vessels associated with the side that is being blockaded. Such non-combat activities as interceptions, boarding, expulsions, seizure and confiscation, and the like, comprise a great proportion of the overall campaign activities. Moreover, these activities: are highly policy-oriented; they extend through a protracted period; and, without a doubt, they have added to the complexity and arduousness of the implementation of the campaign.

(4) Offensive and defensive postures are intertwined and the struggle to seize the campaign initiative is intense

In a joint blockade campaign: the battlefield scope is extensive and the blockade force-strength *bushu* disposition is relatively dispersed; the main battlefield is a broad and boundless expanse of ocean as well as the skies overhead, and thus the blockade activities of the force-strengths are easily exposed; and there is a “high threat area” {高威胁区 gao weixie qu} that stretches forward to the enemy coast within which the mission is accomplished, not only making it difficult for us to strategically transform our overall superiority into battlefield superiority, but also intertwining offensive and defensive postures on the battlefield, making the ensuing campaign rivalry extraordinarily intense.

(5) There are multiple factors to “imbalance” the campaign and great degree of difficulty in commanding and coordinating the campaign

The joint blockade campaign is a campaign composed of multiple campaign strengths that not only consist of Navy, Air Force, Second Artillery and Army strengths that comprise the main body strengths; there are also a great quantity of local force-units, armed police force-units, militia and the general populace that participate in the campaign. There is great complexity in the composition of campaign activities; military activities of a combat nature coexist with a great quantity of military activities of a non-combat nature; offensive activities coexist with defensive activities; near-shore- and air operational activities coexist with operational activities that extend to distances that are far from the mainland; sea blockade- and air blockade operations coexist with shore defense- and outer island operations; and general military activities coexist with special operations activities. In addition, the following factors of “imbalance” exist: there is widespread use of highly-technical weapons; there is a complex electromagnetic environment; offensive operations are intertwined with defensive operations; and there

are rapid changes in the battlefield situation. All this results in an expansion of the difficulty in commanding and coordinating the campaign, thus requiring that [those who provide] campaign guidance be adept at judging the timing and sizing up the situation, adapting themselves to changing situations, and making resolute decisions.

(6) The prominence of the contradiction of an unfavorable area of operations creates a greater dependence on comprehensive support for campaign activities

In the joint blockade campaign, not only is there a protracted period that should be sustained, but it is also necessary for us to extend forward into the “high threat area” to execute the operation, so it is necessary to have such things as timely and reliable intelligence support, uninterrupted communications support, reliable nautical and aviation support, durable and sturdy engineering support, as well as campaign protection support and support for the protection of life, and the like, before it is possible to ensure the smooth execution of the campaign activities. At the same time, the battlefield is broad; the force-units from the Navy and Air Force will take turns executing missions in sea- and air spaces that are remote from the shore; there are a multitude of participating force-units and many services that participate; there is a multitude of highly technical weapons and equipment; and the time period for the blockade operation is protracted. As a consequence, there is an increase in the normal consumption and combat loss rates for materials and highly technical equipment, which has not only caused greater difficulty in supplying logistics and equipment technical support, but has also caused an unprecedented increase in dependence on logistics support and equipment technical support for campaign activities. Campaign commanders, especially logistics and equipment commanders, should recognize these characteristics, have multiple means of preparation, have the flexibility to meet any emergency, and ensure the timeliness and reliability of campaign support.

II. Requirements...294

In organizing the execution of a joint blockade campaign, it is essential to abide by the following basic requirements.

(1) Have political initiative and benefits for policy

In a joint blockade campaign, the time period for sustaining the operation is protracted, there are great restrictions posed on it per international law, there are many factors of uncertainty, and they are highly politically- and policy oriented. As a result, it is necessary to lay prominence on the dominance of political struggles and closely coordinate military struggles with political, diplomatic and economic struggles in order to seize the strategic initiative for blockade operations. One should: be eager to transform policy into the guiding nature of campaign activities; comprehensively implement policies and approach {政策和策略 zhanlüe he celüe} in struggles associated with foreign affairs; make flexible use of the stipulations associated with international laws concerning blockade operations; pay particular attention to the art of the struggle; and

prevent ourselves from merely looking at things from the partial viewpoint of their benefit to the military while neglecting their inclination toward political affairs and policy.

(2) Thorough planning and abundant preparations

Making thorough plans and abundant preparations is the foundation and assurance for carrying out the joint blockade campaign. When carrying out the joint blockade campaign, we encounter complex strategic backdrops, ever-changing battlefield situations, a multitude of participating strengths, and multiple operational activities. As a consequence, one should: see things from the overall strategic situation; objectively analyze the state of the battlefield as well as those beneficial and detrimental conditions for ourselves and our enemies, as well as other factors; revolve closely around the goals of the campaign; and thoroughly plan the campaign activities. During the course of campaign preparation, it is essential to: scientifically predict changes that develop in the state of the battlefield and other situations that may emerge, in order to gain a foothold in formulating an operational course of action {作战方案 zuozhan fang'an} for the most complex and the most difficult battlefield environments; covertly and rapidly concentrate campaign strengths and carry out battlefield preparations; effectively carry out political mobilization and training for imminent war {临战训练 linzhan xunlian} and educate [associated personnel] in relevant policies and international laws; comprehensively organize material reserves; mobilize sufficient reserve strengths; scientifically calculate and make use of time; and rapidly implement each item of preparation. Moreover, one should also adopt various measures to carry out the concealed execution of these preparations and prevent the enemy from coming in to destroy them.

(3) Centering on the key points {围绕重点 weirao zhongdian} and concentrating the use of forces {集中用兵 jizhong yongbing}

In a joint blockade campaign, according to the campaign guidance, it is necessary to stress the concentrated use of force strengths, weaponry, and the seizure of important key points; attack enemy vital areas; and implement a key point blockade {重点封锁 zhongdian fengsuo}. It is for this reason that in employment of strengths, it is essential to be adept at having a grasp of the centers of gravity, the important blockade directions and campaign crucial time segments that directly effect whether we achieve our campaign goals, concentrate crack force-strengths and weaponry, and form partial absolute superiority {局部上的绝对优势 jubushang de jiedui youshi}; from the perspective of blockade objectives, one should give prominence to the fulcrum objectives {支点目标 zhidian mubiao} within the enemy anti-blockade system {tixi}, [and give prominence to] the important ports and sea-air passages that form the enemy's military and economic lifeline; from the perspective of blockade activities, it is essential to correctly manage the relationships between key points and non-key points, and pay attention to economizing the use of force in non-key point blockade directions and blockade objectives.

(4) Establishing ourselves in protracted periods and vying for quick decisions

The time period involved in sustaining a joint blockade campaign is protracted, and as a consequence, it is necessary to establish and implement the principle of “firmly establishing ourselves in protracted periods and vying for quick decisions” {立足持久, 力争速决 li zu chi jiu, li zheng su jue}. One should view campaign preparations from the standpoint of the [preparations] that are most difficult and the most complex, and stress the capture of successfully preparing campaign strengths and materials. During the execution of the campaign, it is necessary to: persist in protracted operations; integrate the act of attacking with the act of isolating; create beneficial combat opportunities to destroy the enemy; accumulate several small victories to bring about a great victory; and gradually attrite {消耗} the enemy’s latent capacity for war {敌战争潜力 di zhanzheng qianli}. In order to prevent the overall war situation from becoming one that is long drawn-out and not decisive {久拖不决 jiutuo bujue}, there are certain operational activities that should be quickly fought and quickly decided, so one should try to the best of our abilities to achieve the campaign goals within as short a time as possible through a series of rapid or effective operational activities, under the prerequisite of establishing ourselves in protracted operations in the situation as a whole.

(5) Preventing anti-integration [activities] and frustrating enemy counter superiority

Although the joint blockade campaign is a campaign that is offensive in nature, it is possible that [the enemy] may direct efforts to deny control at us during the overall process of the campaign by way of weakening and pinning down our blockade force-strengths, thus disrupting our blockade activities. As a consequence, when organizing the joint blockade operation, it is essential to attach a high degree of importance to: augmenting the defense of the near shore sea areas and campaign vital sites {战役要地 zhanyi yaodi}; widely adopt measures such as camouflage and engineering support: increase protective capabilities; and be on guard for enemy counter superiority operations {敌反制作战 di fanzhi zuozhan}. In this way, we can ensure the smooth execution of the campaign. When we differentiate missions, it is essential to marshal the operational strengths that will muster responsibility for the defensive operational mission. From the standpoint of the campaign *bushi* disposition, one should: have a one kind of *bushi* disposition with many functions and establish as well as maintain strong reserve strengths in order to handle unexpected situations when it becomes necessary; and make ports, bases and airfields into the main targets for protection and defend them against enemy air raids. At the same time, it is essential to: pay particular attention to the battlefield environment and integrate defensive operations with counterattack operations; rapidly react, and amend or change our original resolution at the right moment, based on developing changes in the situation on the battlefield; and suit measures to the enemy, the timing and the local conditions and make adept use of our strengths and operational methods and means. In this way, we can adeptly handle various situations. It is essential to: comprehensively make use of the various means of reconnaissance; promptly capture the indications of enemy counter superiority activities; make every effort to preemptively control the enemy {xianji zhidi}; apply the integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti

heli} of all of our services and arms; take the initiative to attack enemy strategic and campaign centers of gravity as well as counter superiority force-strengths; and crush the enemy's counter superiority operational intention. In this way, we are safeguarding the security of our campaign strengths and the smooth execution of our campaign activities.

(6) Unified command and close coordination

With regard to the joint blockade campaign there are multiple strengths that participate, the scope of the battlefield is broad, there are many activity patterns {行动样式 xingdong yangshi}, and the battlefield situation can change suddenly, so one should form the campaign integrated-whole composite strength {战役整体合力 zhanyi zhengti heli}, and it is necessary to deepen the implementation of centralized, unified command. To this end, we need to rationally establish a highly-trained and capable campaign command institution {战役指挥机构 zhanyi zhihui jigou} that is highly effective and wields the authority to execute unified command over all the participating strengths. It is on this basis of unified command that we can adopt flexible command modes to deal with specific situations for certain operational activities as they are directed against the different phases of the campaign while clarifying rational command relationships and the timing opportunities and methods for transitioning [between phases]. It is essential to: unify operational thought; unify operational intentions; meticulously formulate the campaign plan; and strictly command discipline. It is essential to: make full use of modernized command facilities and means all the while establishing rapid, smooth and stable systems for command communication and coordination communication; enhance the effectiveness of command and coordination while adopting various measures; and increase the existing command coordination capabilities and regeneration capabilities {再生能力 zaisheng nengli}. During the process of executing the campaign, one should tightly capture the key activities that have a major influence on the campaign and exercise effective and uninterrupted control over synchronization {调控 tiaokong};⁹ and when command is suspended or when there is damage to coordination, one should adopt effective measures to rapidly act to renew it without delay.

(7) Combining multiple methods with their application and comprehensive support

In a joint blockade campaign there are multiple branches of the service and service arms participating, the sustainment period is lengthy, there is a highly intensive role for the forces, and there is a great amount of campaign attrition, so operations have comprehensive and close logistics and equipment technical support, which serves a vital role in winning a victory in the campaign. Therefore, from a support strength standpoint, it is necessary to implement organic military support. Not only should we fully exploit the individual support capabilities of each of the branches of the service and service arms participating in the campaign, but one should also fully make use of local ports, airfields,

⁹ Translator's note: 调控 {tiaokong} is most likely an abbreviated form of 协调控制 {xietiao kongzhi}, "[to exercise] control over adjusting coordination."

and warehouse facilities, and mobilize local human resources, financial resources, material resources, and more particularly, technical support capabilities. From a support mode standpoint, it is necessary to establish area or specified local support that is integrated with mobile convoy support based on the features of a blockade campaign, and integrate it into the ground, navigational support systems, while meticulously formulating support plans and successfully making each preparation in advance. In the support *bushu* disposition, it is essential to correctly divide and arrange in echelon the deployment [positioning] {peizhi} and sufficiently capture the reserve support strengths {yubei baozhang liliang}, while, from a basis of full-scale {quanmian} support, implementing key point support {zhongdian baozhang} for main operational activities such as striving to gain campaign dominance, countering enemy penetrations, and resisting enemy counter superiority in the main blockade direction and for the main blockade grouping {主要封锁集团 zhuyao fengsuo jituan}.

In addition, in order to ensure the reliability and stability of rear area support, one should: adopt effective measures and channel security and defense for rear area defense and reinforcement of the fleet into the defensive system for the overall campaign. In addition to establishing effective rear area air defense defensive systems and stable and highly effective defensive command hierarchy, one should also augment our own defense capabilities with reinforcement and support strengths, and, when necessary, one should send naval and air force forces to provide [the fleet] with protection and augment [the fleet's] existing capabilities.

Section 2: Main Activities...297

The implementation of the joint blockade campaign is the process by which the campaign strengths under the joint campaign command directorate carry out campaign missions in accordance with the campaign resolution and the campaign plan {jihua} in order to achieve the blockade campaign goals. This [process] generally begins with force-strength unfolding and concludes with campaign conclusion. Its main activities are: campaign unfolding and establishing the blockade system {tixi}; seizing and maintaining campaign dominance {zhanyi kongzhiquan}; implementing sustained and full-dimensional blockade operations; and concluding the campaign.

I. Unfolding the Campaign...297

The unfolding of the campaign refers to the activities whereby each campaign large formation maneuvers from the campaign assembly area {战役集结地 zhanyi jijie diyu} (sea or air) towards the operational area (sea or air) and whereby the campaign *bushi* disposition is completed according to the campaign plan {jihua}. Based on the orders from the supreme command or in accordance with the pre-determined campaign plan {jihua}, the campaign commander must promptly issue his orders for unfolding the campaign, and command each of the force strength groups {兵力集团 bingli jituan} to: enter into their respective campaign areas (or sea area or air zone) according to plan; quickly establish the blockade system {tixi}; and form a favorable campaign *bushi*

distribution. Once they receive their orders to unfold the campaign, each of the force strength groups must rapidly organize unfolding for all force-units subordinate to them, and ensure that they assume their positions punctually. In general situations, the naval ship force-units {舰艇部队 jianting budui} should covertly maneuver towards the pre-determined operational sea areas or nearby stand-by sea areas from the assembly site[s] or sea areas in small formations {xiao biandui}; the aviation force-units should, with the regiment as the organizational-unit, transfer from depth airfields to departure standby airfields and a portion of force-strengths entering the air operations and patrol standby areas; the campaign tactical missile force-units should, using the mode of highway motorized march {公路摩托化行军 gonglu motuohua xingjun}, enter into the operational area and standby under cover; ground force strengths should, with the operational group {zuozhanqun} as the organizational-unit, adopt a mode such as motorized moving-in, on-foot moving-in {徒步开进 tubu kaijin}, rail transport {铁路输送 tielu shusong} or water transport {水路输送 shuilu shusong}, enter the predetermined operational area and successfully accomplish operational preparations. When the sea and air force strengths are unfolding towards the blockade area and interdiction-inspection area {拦检区 lanjian qu}, the unfolding sequence is normally: first unfold the reconnaissance force strengths and establish a reconnaissance patrol distribution system {peixi}; unfold the mine laying force strengths to implement mine laying and establish an obstacle blockade distribution system; then gradually unfold the naval- and air blockade force strengths and screening force strengths in sequence of first the air, then the sea, first under water and then the surface, and establish an air blockade distribution system, a sea blockade distribution system and a assisting-support screening distribution system.

Based on strategic needs-requirements, it is also possible to first establish a reconnaissance patrol distribution system, then establish a firepower strike distribution system {火力打击配系 huoli daji peixi}, to implement integrated firepower strikes against the enemy. When organizing integrated firepower strikes, it is necessary to painstakingly choose those valuable military targets that greatly influence the overall campaign situation and targets that pose a threat to our blockade forces, based on the needs-requirements of the blockade force activities and the actual situation on the battlefield. At the same time, one should make full use of the effects of integrated firepower strikes, and make full use of the aviation force strengths and submarines that can force their way into enemy ports and shipping lines to carry out mine laying on a grand scale. Other blockade forces on the water can determine the time in which they will enter the advance unfolding sea area {预先展开海域 yuxian zhankai haiyu} based on the comprehensive firepower strike period, for the purpose of unfolding on time, and progressively forming the blockade posture {封锁态势 fengsuo taishi}.

During the process of unfolding the campaign, the campaign commander and his command organ should thoroughly organize such support such as feints, screening and road guidance [directing traffic] and ensure all force-strengths unfold safely and on time; accurately grasp the campaign unfolding and the entire battlefield situation, and continuously issue reports to force-units on the enemy situation and the hydrological and meteorological conditions; promptly handle problems that occur in unfolding, and

command the force-units to adopt relevant countermeasures. Each force-unit should adopt all effective measures to conceal their activities so as to not expose their intention; [they should] rapidly maneuver so as to shorten the unfolding time; and augment reconnaissance, observation and the organization of a good defense and prevent the enemy from conducting counter-maneuver raids.

II. Seizing Campaign Dominance...298

Seizing campaign dominance is the general designation for seizing information dominance, air dominance and sea dominance in the overall campaign space or in important directions during the overall course of the campaign or during important phases. Normally, information dominance is the precursor, air dominance is the most important, and sea dominance is the objective. Seizing and maintaining campaign dominance typically consists of all the various seizing and controlling activities interwoven in their execution with sudden changes in the situation and frequent shifts from attack to defense and back, The determination of the form of the operation as well as the targets and scope of the attack is restricted by multiple factors, and [seizing and maintaining campaign dominance] permeates the entire course of the campaign and has the characteristic that the struggle [for dominance] might repeatedly crop up. Hence, the campaign commander should: stand at a height of the overall situation from start to finish; examine the time and weigh circumstances {shenshi duoshi}; grasp what is critical; rationally apply force, and implement steadfast and correct, but flexible command.

(1) Seizing and maintaining campaign information dominance

Seizing and maintaining campaign information dominance is commonly implemented by forces that consist of the information operations grouping that has been given the lead over the relevant forces from the other operational groupings. The launch time [for the activities associated with seizing and maintaining campaign information dominance] is typically chosen prior to the campaign unfolding time. Its basic mission consists of: furnishing our own side with all the various kinds of information both timely and accurately and safeguarding that we “know detailed information about our enemy,” while at the same time making use of the various means to eliminate enemy capabilities for “knowing detailed information about us.” During the course of the campaign, the joint blockade campaign headquarters must closely relate the struggle and maintenance of campaign information dominance to other major campaign activities and make every effort for each to complement the other to the furthest extent possible.

1. Implementing campaign information reconnaissance

Information reconnaissance for the joint blockade campaign consists of conducting supplementary reconnaissance and real time reconnaissance built on a basis of peacetime reconnaissance. Its goals are to have a directed quality, and with key points, detect, search, intercept and capture enemy electromagnetic emanation signals and electro-

optical spectrum information. [Its goals are] through recording, locating, analysis and identification, further ascertain the tactical features and tactical parameters of enemy information warfare systems {xitong}, as well as the *bushu* disposition situations and activity laws {huodong guilyu} of the enemy information targets, in order to provide the conditions for implementing information attack and defense operations.

In implementing campaign information reconnaissance we want: firstly, to form an organic link between peacetime and wartime information reconnaissance to enable continuity in information gathering; secondly, to unite multiple means of reconnaissance such as reconnaissance satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, reconnaissance vessels and radar, and observation posts, while at the same time paying attention to exploiting the effectiveness of the reconnaissance facilities subordinate to each of the participating air, water, and underwater forces, allowing information gathering to have a wide-ranging nature in order to expand the sources of information; thirdly, to give prominence to key points and conduct uninterrupted information tracking directed against both enemy command and control systems and significant information targets in the main blockade direction to increase the quality of information reconnaissance.

2. Implementing campaign information attack

Campaign information attack refers to the activities adopted in order to disrupt and weaken the enemy's capability to gather and control information, and it is the main means for seizing and maintaining campaign information dominance.

During the joint blockade campaign, the implementation of campaign information attack normally is not an isolated activity, but it is conducted with adjusting-coordination with other campaign activities and they absolutely cannot be separated from one another. The joint blockade campaign headquarters should: start out from the needs-requirements of the overall situation, center on the major campaign activities for each campaign phase; and rationally determine the time-opportunity and methods, etc. for implementing campaign information attack.

During the initial period of the operation, the associated force-strengths from the information operations groups must do the following. They must begin a concealed unfolding to their appointed sea areas and air zones prior to the unfolding of the other forces and immediately carry out the activities of the campaign information attack, first ensuring that the blockade force strengths are capable of unfolding to their positions rapidly and covertly, and initially establish a joint blockade system {tixi}. Then they, in conjunction with the information attack strengths subordinate to the other operational groups, must: center on the major activities such as important outer island operations against the enemy, seizing air dominance operations, seizing sea dominance operations, and smashing the enemy's counter superiority operations, and [center on] key point jamming and disrupting information targets such as enemy observation, early warning, electronic warfare and precision guidance weapons systems.

In the sustained blockade phase, joint blockade campaign headquarters must: unify command and coordinate information operation groupings with the associated operational strengths from the other operational groupings; comprehensively use the various operational methods; and conduct information offensive activities throughout the entire course [of the campaign]. Normally, the headquarters must adopt modes to integrate regional operations with operations that are associated with them, and to integrate the differentiation of targets with the differentiation of regions based on the information attack capabilities of the various operational groups; and key point jamming and disruption of such information targets as the enemy command net, coordination net, electronic warfare systems, precision guidance weapons systems, and the like. [The headquarters] must: make active use of the means to infiltrate computer networks; break enemy information security codes; steal intelligence; or implement encroachment by computer viruses; destroy enemy network operations processes; and paralyze enemy command- and information systems. It must expand the unfolding of special operations; adopt multiple means for ‘destruction,’ ‘jamming’ and ‘severing;’ actively destroy important enemy information facilities on the ground; disrupt enemy satellite orbits and electronic channels; and sever enemy electronic and fiber optic cables laying on the sea floor. In this way, the headquarters must continuously weaken enemy information operations capabilities. When conditions permit, the headquarters must: organize long-range firepower at the right time to execute abrupt, accurate and vigorous firepower strikes directed against crucial positions {关键部位 guanjian buwei} in enemy information operations systems; sabotage enemy information systems; and deny the enemy its information operations capabilities.

3. Implementing campaign information defense

The goals of the campaign information defense are to defend against the enemy’s implementation of reconnaissance, jamming, and destruction of our information systems, and ensure our normal conduct of information collection, transmission, processing and employment.

The implementation of campaign information defense should permeate the entire course of the blockade campaign. The campaign commander and his command organ should unify the organization of counter reconnaissance, anti jamming and counter destruction activities based on the capabilities the enemy has for adopting activities and means for information attacks in each of the phases of our campaign. The first [defensive] is the broad use of the various measures such as the use of standard- and non-standard materials, concealment and camouflage, concealing what is real while displaying what is false, maneuver evasion, dispersed deployment {shusan peizhi}, and the reduction of electromagnetic radiation; and weakening, to the furthest extent possible, the effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance, jamming and destruction that is directed against our information systems. The second is that one should strengthen ground defenses and take precautions against enemy espionage agents and saboteurs. The third is to augment security measures and measures to maintain secrecy; and avoid and reduce information leaks {信息泄漏 xinxi xielou}. The fourth is that one should: unify the processing of all

the sources of information; establish a thorough and reliable information transmission network; comprehensively make use of all the available means; and ensure that we have the capability to collect and control information from start to finish. The fifth is that one should adopt technical and tactical measures; take precautions to prevent the enemy from infiltrating our computer networks or inserting viruses into them; and safeguard the normal function of information systems. In addition, each of the operational forces that move forward into the blockade sea area or air zone to fulfill their mission should also actively adopt all the various measures of prevention and weaken enemy capabilities to carry out the information offensive, thus safeguarding the normal rotation of their subordinate information assets {信息设备 xinxì shebei}.

(2) Seizing and maintaining campaign air dominance

Operations for seizing and maintaining campaign air dominance is jointly implemented with Air Force force-strengths in the lead with participation from relevant force-strengths of other services (groups). Normally, it is specifically organized and implemented by the Air Force (air operations group) command headquarters under the unified command of the joint blockade campaign headquarters. The time-opportunity for its initiation [start] is generally selected to coincide with campaign unfolding or slightly afterwards. The main methods are: air fighter attacks {空中歼击 kongzhong jianji} and ground intercept strikes {地面拦打 dimian lanji}. When we are permitted to strike enemy military targets on the shore, one should actively adopt air assault {空中突击 kongzhong tuji} and strive to destroy the enemy on the ground.

1. Air fighter attacks and ground intercept strikes

Air fighter strikes refer to the operational activity {作战行动方法 zuozhan xingdong fangfa} method in which the fighter aviation forces {歼击航空兵 jianji hangkongbing} are used for aerial elimination of enemy aircraft. The basic requirements for this method are as follows: to control the scope of air intercept strikes to a moderate degree, taking as the prerequisite the capability to effectively achieve the operational goals not only requiring force-unit {budui} superiority to be formed against the enemy, but also requiring the prevention of excessive losses of our force-strengths, and the retention of leeway to continue to have force-strengths remaining for use; to flexibly make use of the various air warfare fighting methods {空战战法 kongzhan zhanfa} and the tenet that if we have to fight, then we must fight to win; and to organically integrate the two modes – aerial standby and airfield standby – to maintain continued operational capabilities in order to handle such complex situations on the battlefield such as capturing, losing and regaining [a target or object] repeatedly that can unexpectedly occur on the battlefield.

Ground intercept strikes refer primarily to the operational activity method of primarily making use of ground-to-air missile cells to intercept enemy aircraft. The basic requirements for this method consist of: allowing air-to-ground missiles to play the lead and combine the adoption of a mixed *bushu* disposition {搭配的混合部署 dapei de

hunhe bushu} of high-, medium- and low grade [missiles] with high-tech weapons that are fully forward deployed, in order to increase the effectiveness of ground intercept strikes; carefully organizing coordination between aviation forces, preventing the fratricide of our air operations craft; and shifting positions and organizing maneuver ambushes in order to increase the element of surprise for intercept strikes.

During the course of the operation, one should organically integrate air fighter strikes and ground intercept strikes. Typically, when the distance between the airspace and our shoreline is relatively close, we take ground intercept strikes as the primary, and when there is a greater distance to the airspace, we take air fighter strikes as the primary.

2. Air assault

Air assault consists of the use of bombers, fighter bombers and ground attack aviation forces who execute air strikes either independently or as a cooperative effort with campaign tactical missile force-units against such valuable enemy targets as airfields, ground aviation facilities and early warning command systems, and they are the most effective method for seizing campaign air dominance.

With air assault, one should: conform to the principles of concealment and surprise, careful target selection, integrated-whole application of force, and appropriate scale; execute key point assault against the enemy's main airfields and important command institutions of the air force and ground-to-air missile positions; strive hard to effectively weaken and contain the enemy's air superiority strengths; rapidly change our own air posture; and closely organize air cover and support for electronics, reconnaissance, and guidance {引导 yindao}. In this way we can ensure that assault force strengths smoothly penetrate {突防 tufang} and implement precision strikes {准确打击 zhunque daji}.

With regard to the afore-mentioned methods, in applying them to different situations, it is essential for the commander to flexibly make use of them based on each of the aspects relating to the enemy situation as well as our own at the immediate time and in the immediate place. During the course of implementing them specifically, [the commander] should also: carry out tight protection for such valuable targets as our one- and two-strip airfields, command institutions, and the like; prevent the enemy from denying us dominance; and ensure the stability of air operation systems.

(3) Seizing and maintaining campaign sea dominance

Operations to seize and maintain campaign sea dominance are collaborative efforts on the part of the naval force-strengths who take the lead, and other related force-strengths from the branches of the service (or groupings) that are participating. Normally, they fall under the unified command of the joint blockade campaign headquarters and are specifically organized and implemented by the headquarters of the Navy (or naval operations grouping). The start time for this operation is generally chosen at the same time or just after the start of the campaign to seize air dominance. Its main methods consist of ocean-

based search and destroy [activities] {海上寻歼 haishang xunjian} and sea blockade. When we are permitted to strike enemy shore-based targets, one should lose no time in striking the navy's main ports and bases.

1. Ocean-based search and destroy [operations]

Ocean-based search and destroy [operations] refers to the fighting method characterized by the comprehensive use of aviation forces, surface ships {水面舰艇 shuimian jianting} and submarine force-strengths that create and seize opportunities for combat to destroy enemy effective strength on the water through wide mobility. Its main targets for strike are enemy surface-based anti-submarine patrol force-strengths {海上反潜巡逻兵力 haishang fanqian xunluo bingli}, mobile ship formations {biandui}, countermining and submarine force-strengths.

It is because of the enemy's emphasis on concealed dispersal and preservation of fighting power during operations to seize and maintain campaign sea dominance that the crux of the success of ocean-based search and destroy [activities] lies in the combat opportunities for search and destroy [activities]. As a consequence, one should comprehensively utilize various surveillance control strengths and various reconnaissance means to establish an integrated sea-air surveillance control system {tixi} that conducts around the clock air surveillance control for the entire blockade sea area and promptly grasps the enemy's sea dominance [superiority] force-strength activity {huodong} situation; [one should] make a rational arrangement of force-strengths, select a main battlefield for search and destroy operations where we possess air dominance as well as a key-point penetration sea area of the enemy's counter-blockade operations or an important sea area where of the enemy's sea dominance operations, and [with this arrangement] unfold the *bushu* disposition of surface ships and submarine force-strengths, adopting the division of responsibility method while pushing forward the *bushu* disposition of aviation forces at the right time so as to facilitate making prompt and rapid reaction; [one should] broadly apply stratagems, lure the enemy to move forward, and create battle [combat] opportunities. Once we seize upon these combat opportunities, we should quickly organize the force-strengths and implement annihilation attacks against the enemy.

The main method of search and destroy operations is at-sea raid-attacks [raids]. The basic requirements for this are: concentrate force-strengths and weaponry, form localized superiority, and covertly and suddenly implement attacks; dispersed deployments {shusan peizhi}, moving-in along multiple routes, close coordination, and implement saturation attacks {饱和攻击 baohe gongji} against the enemy from multiple directions, while at the same time creating supplemental orthodox-unorthodox momentum {奇正相辅之势 qi-zheng xiangfu zhi shi} against the enemy with cooperative feints; and flexibly apply forces based on the situation, enemy, and location. In sea areas closer to the enemy shore, the enemy's anti-submarine patrol, minelaying and submarine force-strengths constitute a threat to our maritime obstacle-blockade distribution system and submarine force-strengths, and we should concentrate our aviation force and submarine force-strengths to implement concentrated assaults against them; in sea areas further from the

enemy shore, the enemy's naval maneuver {jidong} ship formations constitute the main threat against us, so with the direct aid of the battlefield surveillance control system, we should concentrate the aviation force and surface ship force-strengths to implement annihilation attacks against them so as to facilitate our advantages in attacking their shortcomings and exchange small losses for large combat results.

2. Blockading enemy naval ports and bases

Blockading enemy naval ports and bases consists of a kind of traditional but effective operational method for striving to gain sea dominance. The main goal is to block the enemy's operational strengths on the sea from unfolding, rendering them incapable of exploiting their proper effectiveness.

Blockading enemy naval ports and bases is implemented normally by adopting a combined method of obstacle blockade, a firepower blockade and force-strength blockade by the aviation force, conventional missile force-units, submarine force-strengths, and surface combat ship force-strengths. First of all, we implement minelaying and setups to sink ships {shezhi chenchuan} and establish an obstacle blockade distribution system {障碍封锁配系 zhang'ai fengsuo peixi} that possesses a specified width and depth in the main exit and entry points of the enemy's naval ports and bases or navigational routes they must pass; and then, at the important sea areas or navigational routes outside of the obstacle blockade distribution system, separately setup and establish a firepower blockade distribution system and submarine blockade distribution system, and deploy surface combat ship force-strengths in open waters and sea areas outside the range of enemy shore-based firepower strikes to conduct mobile patrols {jidong xunluo}. In blockading enemy naval ports and bases, we should give prominence to key points, and we should concentrate force-strengths against targets of enemy ship force-strengths, for the most part anchored, as well as comprehensively apply multiple means to implement key point blockade; and against targets of a general nature, we can just adopt obstacle or submarine blockade.

3. Assaulting enemy military ports and bases

Conducting firepower raids against enemy ports and bases is an effective method for seizing campaign sea dominance. Their main goal is to annihilate enemy naval operational strengths at port and in bases while destroying enemy operational backing.

Raids against enemy ports and bases are normally implemented by aviation forces and campaign tactical missile and submarine force strengths. In terms of target selection, the main assault targets are normally the ports and bases with enemy main combat ships {主战舰艇 zhuzhan qianting} at anchor. In terms of specific fighting methods, we should broadly adopt various deception measures, and strive to achieve suddenness {turanxing}; [we should] concentrate force-strengths, form localized superiority, implement concentrated and dense assaults against the enemy, strive for being effective at first penetration, and substantially annihilate the enemy's effective strength; and [we should]

thoroughly organize support activities such as reconnaissance early warning, electronic jamming and air cover so as to safeguard the smooth penetration and precision strikes by the assault force-strengths.

III. Implementing a Sustained Blockade...304

The campaign commander should, either at the same time or just after seizing campaign superiority, organize sustained, three-dimensional blockade operations against the enemy at the right time and sever the enemy's sea-air lanes of communication. The main operational activities are: blockading enemy ports as well as adjacent navigational routes; implementing monitoring, spot inspections, seizure and attacks on the sea; and implement airborne monitoring, expulsion, intercepts and attacks.

(1) Blockading enemy ports and adjacent navigational routes

The main goal in blockading enemy ports and adjacent navigational routes is to impose restrictions on the mobility of enemy anti-blockade force-strengths, and to block enemy transport vessels from entering the port for loading and unloading. Generally this is commonly implemented by the Navy, which is given the lead over the participating forces from the Air Force, Second Artillery, and Army campaign tactical missile units as well as the Navy Militia. Command is specifically organized by the Navy (or naval operational grouping) headquarters based on the unified intent of the campaign commander. The basic method for this consists of mutually integrating the obstacle blockade, firepower blockade and submarine blockade.

1. Obstacle blockade

The obstruction of enemy ports and adjacent navigational routes mainly consists of laying a water mine obstacle area.

In order to ensure that the minelaying activities are carried out smoothly, the campaign commander and his command organ should: organize meticulous minelaying reconnaissance, promptly ascertain the enemy situation as well as the natural geographical-, hydrological- and meteorological situation in the minelaying sea area; organize reliable cover for minelaying, and keep an effective look out and suppress enemy counter minelaying force-strengths; mix the distribution of water mines that are of differing classes, differing detonation, differing timing, and differing [detonation] sequence in order to increase the counter-sweeping capabilities of mine obstacles; expand the adoption of such measures as decoy minelaying and camouflage as well as electronic jamming in order to ensure the concealed nature of minelaying activities; in closely integrating the seizure of campaign dominance operations, fully making use of its effects; hold a specified number of mobile high-speed minelaying force-strengths and reserve mines throughout [the course of the blockade] in order to carry out replenishment minelaying based on the reconnaissance situation. During the minelaying process, when enemy sea-air force-strengths have the intention to block us from laying mines, one must

promptly command screening forces to implement intercepts against the enemy, and make every effort to destroy the enemy before they can make use of their weapons. One must conduct close monitoring of our own mine obstacles that have been set up. When the enemy conducts minesweeping, we should organize force-strengths to wipe out their minesweeping force-strengths and safeguard the integrity of blockade obstacles; and when our blockade mine obstacles are destroyed or dispersed, we should promptly dispatch fast mobile minelaying force-strengths to conduct replenishment mine laying.

2. Submarine blockade

The submarine force-strengths that blockade enemy ports and adjacent navigational routes commonly conduct them in the sea area outside enemy ports where the anti-submarine [activity] is relatively weaker but the shipping activities are relatively more frequent by employing positional ambushes or area hunting methods and dispersed and covert assaults against enemy ships using single vessels or small vessel groups.

In order to achieve the goal of the submarine blockade the campaign commander and his command organ should: adopt all measures to ensure the concealed nature of the submarine force-strength activities; augment intelligence support and promptly report the enemy situation; and thoroughly organize coordination between the submarines and other force-strengths.

3. Firepower blockade

The firepower blockade consists of the implementation of firepower control with conventional guided missiles and other remote warfare directed at enemy ports and shipping lines, deterrence of the enemy fleet from entering or exiting the port, annihilation of enemy transport ships and anti-blockade force-strengths, and a method to seal off enemy ports and sever the navigational routes close by.

In order to fully bring into play the effectiveness of a firepower blockade, the campaign commander should carefully organize reconnaissance, promptly grasp the enemy activity situation {敌活动情况 di huodong qingkuang} and ensure the provision of reliable intelligence support to firepower blockade force-strengths. At the same time, [the commander should] command each firepower cell to implement firepower strikes strictly based on the predetermined firepower blockade area so as not to influence the stability of our water mine obstacles and other blockade force-strength activity {huodong}. When adjusting the firepower blockade area and implementing firepower mobility, [the commander] should notify the force-strengths concerned without delay and clarify their coordination relationships.

(2) Striking the enemy who has made a localized penetration

During the sustained blockade phase, it is possible that the enemy may implement localized penetration operations and the intention to restore connections with the outside

world. The campaign commander should: carry out uninterrupted reconnaissance with all means against the enemy; realistically grasp the trends of the enemy anti-blockade force-strengths; promptly ascertain the enemy's penetration intention, direction, timing, scale and possible activity modes, appropriately set the resolution for smashing the enemy's penetration, covertly and quickly maneuver force-strengths and weaponry, and resolutely prevent the enemy's penetration.

When enemy minesweeping and anti-submarine force-strengths open a penetration, the campaign commander should organize the aviation force to strike enemy minesweeping and anti-submarine force-strengths at the right time, and the blockade force-strengths that have already unfolded out on the sea and in the air must adopt all effective measures to struggle with the enemy to ensure the integrity of the blockade system {tixi}. For blockade mine obstacles that have been dispersed by the enemy, [the commander] should promptly carry out replenishment minelaying.

When one discovers concentrating, loading or screening force-strengths assembling to rendezvous with transport convoys in open seas, the campaign commander should organize conventional missile force-units at the right time to strike enemy vessels that are in the state of concentrating, loading and assembling formations; and he should organize high performance operational aircraft to conduct long range raids against concentrating and assembling formation. At the same time, [the commander] instructs the blockade force-strengths that have already unfolded on the adjacent water and air zones to: rapidly maneuver in the direction of the enemy penetration; promptly determine and report the situation; form a multi-layer and mutually integrated intercept *bushu* disposition underwater, on the surface and in the air; standby [alert] force-strengths within the base should quickly set out and implement assisting-support operations {支援作战 zhiyuan zuozhan}, and strengthen the blockade and strike intensity in the direction of the enemy penetration.

When the enemy transport fleet on the sea or in the air directs a penetration from open water toward the ports or directs a penetration from the ports toward the open water under cover, the campaign commander should: examine the time and measure the circumstances {shenshi duoshi}; strive hard for the initiative; promptly confirm the enemy shipping lines and whether it is possible for the enemy to circumvent the channel; instruct the blockade force-strengths that have already unfolded onto the sea and into the air to implement active intercept-attacks {积极拦击 jiji lanji}; organize the aviation and submarines as well as partial guided missile ships to grab hold of beneficial timing opportunities; and select beneficial sea areas, taking enemy transport shipping vessels as the main targets and carrying out multi-layered attacks. Based on strategic need, [the commander] can also: make use of campaign tactical missiles and long-range aviation forces; make sudden attacks against bases, loading and unloading and transport ports situated in the direction of the enemy penetration as well as traffic arteries on the ground; and resolutely crush the intentions of the enemy to penetrate using enemy escort convoys.

(3) Implementing monitoring, spot-inspections, capture-arrest and attacks on the sea

Monitoring, spot-inspections, capture-arrest and attacks on the sea are the campaign activities that are conducted by the sea blockade force-strengths to sever the enemy's maritime contacts with the outside world. Normally, this is a unified command by the joint campaign commander, and it is specially organized and implemented by the commander of the naval campaign large formation.

The Navy campaign large formation commander and his command organ, once the campaign has been initiated should, in accordance with the intent and orders of the joint campaign senior officer, either at the same time as or just after implementing the blockade against the enemy port and approaching the navigational routes, promptly command his blockade force-strengths to quickly establish an at-sea mobile strike distribution system {jidong daji peixi} and a reconnaissance patrol distribution system {zhencha xunluo peixi} based on the predetermined plan {jihua}, conduct strict monitoring-control of the sea intercept-inspection areas {拦检区 lan-jianqu} and blockade areas. [They should] monitor, capture-arrest or attack the vessels entering into the intercept-inspection area and blockade area depending on the situation.

When we discover ships that are not from our side entering into the sea intercept-inspection area, the sea blockade force-strengths must rapidly react and decisively adopt activities. In normal situations, one must resolutely launch attacks against enemy operational ships and transport ships that are grouped together. One should seize enemy unprotected ships and independently navigating civilian ships; if they resist, one should implement cautionary strikes {警告性攻击 jinggaoxing gongji} and compel them to submit. With regard to third party vessels {第三方船只 disanfang chuanzhi}, those that are sailing away from the blockade area toward open waters may be allowed to pass; those that are sailing into the intercept-inspection area, and have the intent to enter into the blockade area, should promptly be warned against continuing forward or prevented and ordered to change course. When the third party vessels do not heed the prevention, and have the intent to force their way into the blockade area, one should force them to immediately stop the vessel and sail toward an appointed sea area or port to be inspected; and when necessary, one can implement strikes against them, but the strikes must be implemented to the appropriate degree of intensity, and generally one should make every effort to avoid shipwrecking the vessel.

When ships that are hostile to our side are discovered entering the sea blockade area, those other than ships that enjoy special protection, the sea blockade force-strengths should promptly and resolutely be allowed to capture-arrest or attack them. Targets for capturing-arresting are mainly unescorted merchant ships {无护航的商船 wuhuhang de shangchuan}; this activity is carried out in a wider sea area by the surface ship force-strengths. It is permissible to destroy the ships that are difficult to send back to port once they have been stopped and seized on the water. Attacking ships whose activities are in violation of the blockade within the blockaded area is mainly the duty of submarines and aviation forces as well as surface guided missile vessel force-strengths. Submarine force-

strengths typically apply positional ambush {阵地伏击 zhendi fuji} and area hunting {区域游猎 quyu youlie} methods, covertly and suddenly implementing attacks; the aviation force is typically an aerial formation of multiple aircraft types composed of early warning, assault, cover and support aircraft integrated into one covertly approaching the enemy and implementing multi-directional and multiple wave attacks; and water surface guided missile ship force-strengths typically implement guided missile strikes in advantageous sea areas in multiple directions and at long distances following the aviation forces, or independently implement guided missile strikes against ships that violate the ban.

With regard to sea monitoring, spot-inspection, capture-arrest and attack activities, they are sustained for a long period, they are strongly policy-oriented, and they exist in a critical time in the overall campaign situation. As a consequence, the campaign commander and the naval campaign large formation commander should augment command and adjusting-coordination, and allow them to flexibly turn around and form a composite strength; instruct the force-units to strictly execute relevant policies and international laws and conscientiously carry out operating procedures and methods for spot-inspections and capture-arrests; painstakingly organize the shift-changing of support and blockade force-strengths and maintain a sustained and uninterrupted blockade.

(4) Implementing air monitoring, -expulsion, -interception and -attacks

Air monitoring, -expulsion, -interception and -attacks are the major campaign activities to sever enemy air contacts with the outside world. Normally under the unified command of the campaign commander, it is the commander of the Air Force campaign large formation, specifically, that organizes implementation.

The campaign commander, at the start of the campaign and once it has been affirmed that the situation has not significantly changed, should issue orders decisively and promptly to initiate the air blockade. The Air Force campaign large formation commander should promptly command the early warning aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft responsible for air monitoring to enter into the predetermined area to carry out reconnaissance and early warning based on the intentions of the joint campaign commander; the ground (or naval) aircraft warning radar and technical reconnaissance forces turn the machine on to implement search reconnaissance {搜寻侦察 souxun zhencha}; ground-to-air missile forces rapidly assume combat status {zhandou zhuangtai 战斗状态} and implement the tracking of suspicious targets in the air; and a multi-functioning group of aircraft with early warning command aircraft as the nucleus and high-functioning operational aircraft as the backbone enters the intercept zone to conduct security patrols {警戒巡逻 jingjie xunluo}. [The commander should] rapidly erect an air blockade system to implement continuous and uninterrupted monitoring control over the intercept zone and blockade area.

When aviation craft that are not from our side enter into the air intercept zone, ground-based radar and technical reconnaissance forces should rapidly conduct judgment and

recognition of them and aircraft groupings should promptly conduct tracking recognition in order to ascertain their nationality and attributes as early as possible. For enemy transport aircraft and other non-operational aircraft, one should promptly organize air blockade forces to carry out interception and affect a forced landing at a designated airfield where they can be detained; for those that refuse to land, it is permitted to attack out in warning. For enemy operational aircraft or for transport planes escorting operational aircraft, one should rapidly organize aviation forces and ground-to-air missile forces to resolutely shoot them down. For verifying third party aircraft, if they show the intent to enter into the blockade area, air blockade aircraft should implement interception and warning against them and order them to alter their course; if they try to force their way into the blockade zone, one should force them to land at a designated airfield and conduct a ground inspection.

When an aircraft that is not from our side is discovered intruding into the air blockade zone, the air blockade forces should rapidly implement interception and, based on the situation, either attack, expel, or force them to land and detain them. For enemy transport aircraft and other non-operational aircraft, one should force them to land at a designated airfield and detain them; and for any that resist a forced landing, resolutely carry out attacks against them. For enemy operational aircraft, one should rapidly initiate attacks to resolutely shoot them down. For third party aircraft, one should implement expulsion away [from the area] or forced landings and detention; and for those with the intent to penetrate the blockade area, one should resolutely attack them.

With regard to air monitoring, expulsion, interception and attack activities, the duration in which they are sustained is long; they are highly policy-oriented; moreover, it is required that one reacts within an exceedingly short period of time. As a consequence, the commander and his command organ must: comprehensively make use of each kind of intelligence and make an accurate judgment and promptly determine a decision of how to manage [these activities], while the command cell {指挥部队 zhihui budui} reacts rapidly; strictly execute related policies and international laws and regulations; painstakingly organize support, coordination and the rotation of blockade forces {封锁兵力的换班 fengsuo bingli de huanban}; mutually integrate air patrols with airfields servicing the operation, mutually integrate air intercept with ground-based firepower intercept strikes, and multiple methods to control the enemy.

IV. Concluding the Campaign...309

The conclusion of the campaign consists of the final phase in the joint blockade campaign, and is the campaign activity process that is driven to be executed when the campaign goals have already been achieved, or when a change in campaign patterns is necessary.

The time-opportunity for concluding the campaign is, on one hand, dependent on the condition of having completed the campaign mission, and on the other hand, depending on the objective conditions and the basic requirements in the development of the

campaign. The joint blockade campaign commander should at all times grasp the situation of achieving the campaign goals as well as the developing changes to the battlefield situation, make accurate judgments of the final result of the campaign and developing trends, and at the right time, make the recommendation to the higher-level authority to conclude the campaign. In order to smoothly conclude the campaign, the campaign commander should meticulously conduct overall-planning and thoroughly organize. At the same time, he should adopt all measures at the time when the campaign is about to conclude to consolidate and expand the victory and create more favorable conditions for political and diplomatic struggles.

In situations where the joint blockade campaign goals have already been achieved, organizing the withdrawal of the units from the battlefield is the main activity in concluding the campaign. The campaign commander and his command organ should tightly organize campaign reconnaissance, promptly grasp the battlefield situation, and especially pay attention to indications of enemy counterattack; [they should] clarify each operational grouping's missions, the sequence of withdrawing and gathering {撤收顺序 cheshou shunxu} and assembly standby area after returning [to base]; organize dependable air cover and sea screening, and take strict precautions against unexpected assaults implemented by the enemy; organize the controlling-directing of force-strengths returning to base, as well as search and rescue for injured force-strengths {搜索救援 sousou jiuyuan}; organize mop-up of the battlefield, correctly dispose of mine obstacles, and the like for such problems that persist; organize adjustments to replenishment and quickly restore combat power; sum up, verify and report combat results to higher-level authorities, summarize operational experiences, and provide a detailed report of the campaign; make recommendations regarding the timing for announcing the report of the cessation of the blockade based on the course of the campaign activities; and organize the force-units to conduct operational summaries.

Chapter 13

The Landing Campaign...310

A landing campaign signifies sea-crossing offensive operations conducted by Army, Navy, Air Force, and 2nd Artillery Corps troops – with the assistance and cooperation of the People’s Armed Police troops and the Militia, as well as regional forces – according to a unified plan {jihua} and command, against the enemy’s defended seacoasts and islands. This is one of the basic patterns of a joint campaign. A landing campaign normally is implemented primarily by a campaign large formation of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 2nd Artillery Corps, with assistance and cooperation from the other strengths. A landing campaign against large islands [or island groups] is composed of a series of sub-campaigns on land, at sea, and in the air. Their main missions are to disrupt the enemy’s counter-amphibious-landing defense, to eliminate the enemy they face, to seize the campaign landing site (beachhead) or outer islands possessing strategic or campaign significance, and to create favorable conditions for follow-on activities.

In a landing campaign, the missions are arduous, and it has a strong overall situation quality {quanjuxing}. The campaign commander must carefully plan {jihua}, fully prepare, adopt the fighting method of “multiple means, integrated destroy and paralyze {hui tan}, strive for the ‘three dominances’ {san quan}, three-dimensional cutting up {fenge} and assault in multiple directions and with key points, and full-depth seize-occupy the campaign landing site (or surround the outer islands),” and under the conditions of effectively paralyzing the enemy’s defensive system {tixi}, accelerate the speed of the onto land speed of the landing force, so as to rapidly achieve the campaign goals.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...310

I. Characteristics...310

(1) Unfolding before the enemy, and threats facing campaign preparations

In a landing campaign, all preparatory work will unfold in front of enemy. In one respect, concealing an activity’s intention is extremely difficult; in particular, in operations under informationized conditions, reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities are constantly improving, on top of which landing preparations are fairly long in duration, and force-unit {budui} and ship concentrations and maneuver objectives are large, which easily reveals the activity’s intention. In another respect, modern operations emphasize restraining the enemy at the first opportunity; in particular, with the continuous development of weaponry, long-range precision strike capabilities have continuously improved, so that the campaign preparations phase has the possibility to meet with strikes from the enemy’s Navy and Air Force, as well as long-range firepower, which cause amphibious-landing campaign preparations to face a greater threat.

(2) The arduous tasks of strengthening the sea-crossing area and of seizing and maintaining the “three dominances”

In a landing campaign, operational activities unfold in an area with five dimensions: information, and land, sea, air, and space. In particular, large forces conducting sea-crossing operations are greatly dependent on information dominance, air dominance, and sea dominance; only by seizing and maintaining these “three dominances” can one truly gain the initiative in a landing campaign. In a future landing campaign, the opposing sides, in order to strive for the initiative in operations, surely will be involved in a sharply unfolding contention for seizing and maintaining the “three dominances.” In particular, in operations conducted in very large battlefield spaces, and also when waging a landing campaign confronting an enemy with very strong capabilities for information warfare (IW) operations and for control of the air and control of the sea, the task of seizing and maintaining the “three dominances” becomes more arduous.

(3) Assault on a fortified position with one’s back to the sea, and sharp fighting for seizure and establishing the landing site (beachhead)

The landing campaign is fortification-attack warfare with one’s back to the high seas, whether or not one can establish a landing site on the enemy shore, and obtain support for developing the attack onto the island, is the key to the campaign’s success or failure; the fighting for the landing sites has become a focal point of the opposing sides’ countermeasures. During operations, the defending side can use a sea area’s natural obstacles, resort to strategically located places difficult to access, stand fast, and wait at its ease for the fatigued [enemy]; the attacking side then must overcome the sea area [obstacles], assault the fortified position with its back to the water, surmount the waves, and land. The opposing sides will develop sharp fighting – in offshore and coastal waters, in the water-margin beachhead and littoral area – revolving around approach and counter-approach, landing and counter-landing, gaining a foothold and the counter-foothold, and capture and counter-capture, causing the assault onto land and the struggle for seizing and establishing a landing site to become abnormally arduous and sharp.

(4) The complexity and difficulty of joint operations and command coordination

A landing campaign normally is a joint campaign in which all the services and arms participate. Among the participating strengths, not only are there the main large formations of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 2nd Artillery Corps, there are also the local strengths participating in the combat. Among battlespaces, not only are the land, sea, and air involved, one’s own shore and the enemy’s shore are also involved. Among operational modes, not only are there the large-scale regular battles on land, at sea, and in the air, there are also unequal-scale [i.e. asymmetric] irregular operations. In weaponry, not only are there large quantities of ordinary-technology arms and equipment, there are also certain numbers of high-tech weapons and equipment. In addition, during an operation’s course, the command institution will mostly be in a state of motion and in an electromagnetic threat environment, and command countermeasures will be sharp; thus,

the difficulties and complexity of command and coordination will have been additionally increased.

(5) The onerous tasks of a sea-crossing offensive and all its support measures

In a landing campaign, all of its support [measures], owing to the effects of the marine environment, will be more complex and difficult than ground offensive operations. On one hand, in order to support a large force's sea-crossing operation, one not only needs to use ordinary transport vehicles such as landing ships, but also needs to use vertical landing craft, such as transport planes and helicopters, enabling the support mission not only to be large in scope, but also powerful technologically. On the other hand, materiel depletion in landing campaign operations is enormous; support is simultaneously performed on land, at sea, and in the air; there are many stringent requirements on the loading and transfer nodes for materiel and equipment, and the support modes rapidly shift over the course of the operation, which make the logistic and equipment support tasks extremely arduous and complex. In addition, support activities are also subject to the restraints of natural conditions and to the effects of enemy blockade strike activities, thus making all of the support tasks more onerous and difficult.

II. Requirements...312

A landing campaign under informationized conditions possesses several new characteristics, which levy more stringent requirements on a campaign's organization and implementation.

(1) Focus on the strategic overall situation, and meticulously overall-plan the preparations {chouhua zhunbei}

A landing campaign has a strong strategic quality, and is constrained by many factors; moreover, its operational scale is large, the difficulties and risks are great, the operational activities are complex, and countermeasures are abnormally sharp. Whether or not the campaign overall planning {chouhua} is correct and whether or not the preparation work is adequate, have a direct bearing on the campaign's success or failure. Thus, one must pay attention to the strategic overall situation, and meticulously conduct overall-planning and – under conditions which are truly assured (or well understood) – how one can act. This first requires achieving resolute subordination to and service to the strategic overall situation. Setting out from an assurance of reaching the strategic goal and gaining the strategic initiative, one establishes the landing campaign's goal, the scale of the forces, the start and stop times for operations, the spatial scope, the strike targets, and the main operational activities. Second, this requires keeping an eye on the overall situation, and grasping the centers of gravity. On the basis of unified overall planning and consideration for every aspect of the campaign and the full course of the campaign, seize upon the key links having major influences and decisive significance on the strategic and campaign overall situations to overall plan and *bushu* disposition the campaign. Third, this requires fully bringing into play overall power. The essential elements in subduing the enemy –

the campaign strengths, operational space, operational methods, and campaign guidance, as well as political offensives and the abundant war potential of one's own side – are meticulously integrated into a powerful, coordinated operational system. Fourth, this requires overall-planning and preparing for the campaign by setting out from the most difficult, most complex conditions. One must formulate a variety of courses of action, and have in advance many preparations; ensure that the preparations for the strengths, equipment, materiel, and battlefield are adequate; and basing oneself on operations under the most difficult conditions and on reversals in the war situation in an unfavorable posture, strive for victory in the campaign. In addition, campaign preparations must be conducted in a careful, concealed manner; one must not only prevent sabotage from the enemy, but also actively adopt activities to sabotage the enemy's preparations.

(2) Concentration of elite strengths, and formation of superiority to defeat the enemy

Concentration of elite strengths is a law for defeating one's opponent in a localized war campaign under informationized conditions, and is also an important material basis in striving for victory in a campaign. In a future landing campaign, under conditions where the enemy has superiority in high-performance naval and aerial ordnance and in advance development of the battlefield, if one wants to break through the enemy's defenses and win a victory in the campaign, one must concentrate elite strengths – Navy, Air Force, and 2nd Artillery Corps force-units, and the landing assault force-units – to form a dominant position over the enemy. First, in the composition of the landing campaign strengths, one must achieve concentration. This means concentration of weaponry with a relatively high-tech content, especially “trump-card” {sashoujian} weapons; concentration from the entire PLA of troops with high character and high quality; and concentration of the needed national and regional manpower and material resources, especially high-tech talent and commercial ships, civil aircraft, space systems, communications systems, and other technical equipment. Via the “three concentrations,” all of the various strengths within and outside of the military are congealed into a powerful People's War strengths system with the optimal make up, which forms a sufficiently dominant position for the landing operation in overall terms. Next, one must achieve concentration in strength application, i.e., concentrated use of elite strengths in the main direction and key-point area(s) of the landing operation; concentrated use of elite strengths at critical times, especially in the first battle, where one should to the maximum degree commit elite strengths and strive to gain campaign initiative in one blow; and concentration of the elite [strengths] for resisting and defending against an enemy's military intervention. Through “employment of the three concentrations,” at critical-natured times and spaces when campaign victory or defeat is decided, one can form a relatively powerful localized superiority or even absolute superiority and ensure victory.

(3) Adoption of a variety of means to seize and maintain the “three dominances”

In a landing campaign, operational activities will simultaneously develop in the multi-dimensional space of information, land, sea, air, and space. Seizure of information

dominance, air dominance, and sea dominance is of decisive significance; in particular, the complexity and difficulty of a landing campaign has determined that the struggle for the “three dominances” not only is the main operational activity in the early operational phase of a landing campaign, but also permeates the entire course of the campaign. Whether one can seize and maintain the “three dominances” directly affects the campaign’s course and outcome. In a future landing campaign, seizure and maintenance of the “three dominances” must employ a variety of means to restrain the enemy. First, one should: concentrate superior campaign tactical missile strengths, Air Force strengths, special operations strengths, and air defense strengths, and integrate them and alternate them with activities such as missile assaults, air attacks, special [forces] attack, and anti-air strikes; strike against enemy targets, such as early warning detection systems, command and communications systems, air defense systems, air fields and hangars; and focus on damaging enemy air fields and runways, to prevent the enemy’s early warning aircraft and main battle aircraft from being able to take off, and do all one can to keep the enemy’s Air Force on the ground. Simultaneously, one should strike against the enemy aircraft lifted off, strive to first destroy the enemy Air Force, and achieve at one stroke both air dominance and information dominance. After this, one should employ activities such as strikes against enemy harbors and bases, blockades of enemy anchorage areas, efforts to keep the enemy Navy in port, and adoption of sea blockades and sea battles, and combine the blockades with the strikes, to seize sea dominance. By seizing and maintaining the “three dominances,” one creates favorable conditions for completely paralyzing the enemy’s defensive system, and for grasping victory in a landing campaign.

(4) Rapid and continuous assaults, and improve speed of going onto land

The landing force, when assaulting onto land on an enemy shore, is both in a struggle between the opposing sides and in a contest of the speed with which the opposing sides commit force-strengths and weaponry toward the landing area. The landing side can create the important conditions for seizing victory in the landing campaign only by delivering as many of its troops as possible to the enemy shore within a fairly short time, and by forming in the initial landing period a superiority in force-strengths over the enemy countering the landing. In a landing campaign conducted in the future, the enemy not only will have a solid defensive shell, it will also conduct layered resistance along the beach and shore areas, and will have a fairly strong mobile strike strength in a simplified depth *bushu* disposition. [The enemy] will take advantage of when the landing force-units come onto land and have yet secured a foothold to implement continuous counterattacks, with the intention of annihilating the landing force-units on the beach and shore areas so as to stabilize their defensive posture. Hence, exerting all one’s efforts to accelerate the speed of coming onto land during the initial period of the landing, and continuously maintaining strength superiority is clearly especially important. This first requires simultaneous use of a variety of means to amplify the first assault strengths. Based on the maximum effort to achieve surprise in landing, one must employ a variety of amphibious-landing means of transport, accelerate the landing speed of the 1st-echelon [1st-wave] division(s), be able to use standard amphibious-landing means of transport and amphibious vehicles to directly land on the beaches, use hovercraft and other fast landing craft to land, use helicopters and surface-effect craft to execute vertical and over[-the-

beach] {chaoyue} landings, and also be able to use airborne-force cooperation in the landing operation. By adopting this variety of means, one can thus accelerate the landing speed. The second need is adoption of a variety of measures to improve the landing speed of the follow-on echelons. One must collect enough amphibious-landing means of transport to ensure that the follow-on echelons are rapidly embarked for crossing; one must tightly organize sea and air cover, to foil the enemy's sea-air interception of the follow-on echelons; and one must as early as possible seize critical targets such as air fields and harbors, and open up channels for three-dimensional landing, thus accelerating the landing speed of the follow-on echelons. The third need is use of a variety of means to crush the enemy's counterattack. One must use the means of head-on resistance, flanking assaults, raids in depth, and airborne strikes to thwart the land/sea/air joint counterattack activities conducted by the enemy in order to create favorable conditions for seizing and building a landing site.

(5) Emphasis on psychological attacks on the will, on splitting up and collapsing the enemy

Localized wars under informationized conditions fully emphasize strikes on the enemy's psychology: by striking at psychology, so that the enemy loses the will to resist, the course of operations is thus accelerated, and a victory in the campaign is finally won. A landing campaign waged in the future will be conducted on a background of special operations. This has determined that one should – based on executing an awesome military strike, and by enhancing political offensives: isolate, split up, and collapse the enemy; weaken the enemy's operational capability; decrease the intensity of the enemy resistance; make a great effort to reduce both sides' casualties, especially an operation's collateral casualties and damage; and strive to achieve the campaign goal at the least price. First is the need to split up and collapse [the enemy]: one must fully utilize the various contradictions internal to the enemy; enhance by a variety of channels the work of splitting up and collapsing; actively support improving influences {勢力 shili}, vigorously strive for the intermediate strengths; isolate and strike at the die-hard elements; and promote the splitting up of hostile influences. It is especially necessary to give aid to [reactionary] arms-controlling strengths within the enemy, and as much as possible to join with them in political offensives and operational activities. Second is a need for wide-scale launching of psychological warfare. One must employ all means of propaganda to arouse the sense of justice and anti-war sentiment of the enemy masses and soldiers, disintegrate the enemy's heart, struggle for its popular feeling, deprive or modulate the enemy's will to resist, decrease the intensity of its resistance, and strive to achieve the campaign goal as quickly as possible. Third is the need for careful selection of strike targets. One must as much as possible avoid striking and destroying civilian key facilities; as for those military targets intermixed with civilian facilities, when they are really identified and when there is a real need, they should be destroyed or damaged by precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and other highly controllable mean, thus reducing rank-and-file casualties and damage to civilian facilities, and facilitating acquisition of more understanding and support.

(6) Simultaneous application of a variety of means, timely and effective support

In a landing campaign, operational activities are highly dependent on all kinds of support. Whether or not thorough, timely, effective campaign support can be organized is extremely important to winning a victory in the campaign. The participating strengths in a future landing campaign will be numerous and the battlespace will be expansive; only by adopting a variety of means will one be able to realize timely, effective support. First is one must implement integrated-whole support {zhengti baozhang}. Based on the reality of a landing campaign's stringent requirements on campaign support strengths and means, [one must] fully utilize the manpower and material resources of the armed forces {jundui} and local area; establish a sound integrated support system {tixi}; conduct unified-overall-planning and formulate the support plan {jihua}; unify and organize the support strengths; unify and differentiate the support missions; form an optimally combined integrated-whole support capability; and implement the integrated-whole support of military-civilian integration, tri-service joint logistics, and a combination of unified and separate. Secondly, one must give prominence to support key points. On the basis of paying attention to full-scale support {quanmian baozhang}, concentrate the main strengths to key-point support the operational activities having a major effect on the campaign's overall situation, giving priority to support the campaign activities in the main direction, for the main operational groups, for the important operational phases and critical occasions, not only preventing the inability to attend to all things at once, but doing one's best to avoid equal use of support strengths and resources. Third is the need for flexible support modes. According to the different situations, one should adopt different support modes; in particular, one must comprehensively employ all types of support means to implement integrated support for friendly coasts, the enemy shores, and the seas between them. Integration of our coastal fixed support with a 3-D maneuver support at sea and at enemy shores, integration of land transport with sea and air projection, and integration of step-by-step support with support bypassing the immediate chain, will form a coast-to-sea-to-coast interlink and a land/sea/air mutually coordinated overall support mechanism. Simultaneously, one must adopt a variety of measures to enhance defense of the support strengths, support resources, and support hubs, as well as their maneuver routes, and to ensure the implementation of full-course, full-depth, omni-bearing support for the landing campaign.

Section 2: Main Activities...316

A landing campaign, and especially a landing campaign of a large island, normally can be divided into three major phases: advance operations, assembly onto the ships and the sea crossing, and the assault onto land and establishment of the campaign landing site. According to the sequence implemented in the campaign, each phase has major activities suited to its campaign mission and goal.

I. Advance Operations...316

Advance operations is the first phase implemented in a landing campaign. Its goals are to paralyze the enemy operational system and to seize the battlefield initiative in order to create the conditions for landing operations. During operations, the campaign commander must keep the focal centers of gravity on operational activities of decisive significance, such as great reduction of the enemy's resistance capability and seizure of battlefield initiative, and must carefully coordinate operational activities on all battlefields and in all areas, so that the integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli} can strive for success in the operation.

(1) Seizing information dominance

Seizing information dominance in a landing campaign is the crux to seizing air dominance and sea dominance and to having the initiative in one's hands, and is a critical assurance of winning victory in the campaign. The goals in seizure of information dominance are to greatly reduce the operational effectiveness of the enemy's electronic equipment, and to ensure the full realization of the operational effectiveness of friendly electronic equipment. It normally begins before or at the same time as an integrated firepower strike, and permeates throughout the campaign.

The basic principles of seizing information dominance are integration of soft and hard; combination of offense and defense, with offense as primary; and – based on careful organization of information protection – adoption mainly of the following methods: first is implementation of information reconnaissance. Use of friendly electronic-countermeasures reconnaissance equipment to detect, search for, and intercept the enemy electronic equipment's electromagnetic (EM)-wave signals, and – via recording, positioning, analysis, and identification – acquisition of the enemy electronic equipment's relevant parameters, *bushu* disposition, and patterns of use provide a basis for executing jamming and firepower destruction. Implementation of information reconnaissance requires unified application of electronic reconnaissance strengths to execute joint reconnaissance, and should be integrated with other campaign reconnaissance, to achieve as much as possible the integrated application of a variety of reconnaissance means, so as to expand intelligence sources and improve the availability of intelligence data. Second is implementation of information suppression. The main goal of information suppression is reduction of the enemy information systems' functions via concentrated and thus key-point implementation of "soft" strikes, so as to later create conditions for executing "hard" strikes on the enemy information systems. The main activities of information suppression are electronic attacks and network attacks, normally employing anti-radiation weapons, EM bombs, graphite bombs, etc., and key-point implementation of blanket jamming and sabotage against the enemy strategic and campaign information systems' information processing and decision centers, information detection sources and information channels, navigation and positioning systems, communications systems, early-warning detection systems, and antimissile interception systems; this causes their system functions to be seriously degraded, and via the network attacks achieves the goal

of paralyzing the enemy's high-tech weapons and C4ISR system. Third is execution of firepower strikes. Use of long-range PGMs and high-performance operational aircraft to execute strikes against key targets – near-depth preselected command and control (C2) centers, communications hubs, information warfare (IW) operations centers, radar positions, computer network stations, and surface-to-air missiles – and paralysis of the enemy information systems and air defense systems via nodal damage (sabotage), system paralysis, and physical destruction, ensure the normal operation of one's own information systems. Fourth is implementation of information deception. Use of deception transmitters to provide the enemy electronic reconnaissance with false intelligence, and setting up false electronic targets or setting up simple radiation sources to transmit false signals will attract the enemy's attention and disperse his electronic reconnaissance strengths; use of jamming aircraft and ships to perform feinting reconnaissance and interference activities will lure the enemy into switching on his hidden radar and thus revealing it. Fifth is organization of electronic defense. Seizure of information dominance in a landing campaign is accomplished in a complex EM environment. Hence, while executing an electronic offensive, one must also adopt a variety of electronic-defense measures: to prevent the EM signals radiated from friendly electronic equipment from interception, identification, direction-finding, and positioning by the enemy; to defend against the jamming and destruction of one's own electronic equipment by the enemy jamming and firepower systems; and to ensure the normal effectiveness of one's own various electronic systems. Information defense requires laying stress on key points, integrated adoption of technical and tactical measures, stringent [control over] all systems, and ensuring the safety (or security) of the campaign's core information and critical information systems and nodes. Information defense mainly includes such activities as electronic defense, network defense, physical protection, and information security; its main methods are control of EM-wave radiation, rational layout of radar nets, and careful organization of radio communications networks, as well as setting up EM shielding.

(2) Advance integrated firepower assaults {tuji}

Advance integrated firepower assaults signify – at the launch of a landing campaign, with missiles and aircraft firepower as primary, and adopting a surprise, fierce, continuous mode – the execution of comprehensive and key-point strike activities against critical targets, such as the enemy's command institutions, air and naval bases, missile positions, and air defense systems. Their goals are to destroy and damage the enemy's critical targets, paralyze the enemy operational system, weaken the enemy's comprehensive operational capability, and to achieve battle surprise – in order later to seize information dominance, air dominance, and sea dominance, as well as to create favorable conditions for follow-on operational activities. Advanced integrated firepower assaults are normally under the unified command of a campaign commander, and specifically organized and implemented by all the service commanders. Their duration should be set based on the campaign intent, the assault goal, the participating force-strengths, and the assault objectives. Advance integrated firepower assaults are comprised of a series of firepower assault activities, and generally can be divided into a first (initial) assault and follow-on assaults.

The first assault is the most critical assault activity among the advance integrated firepower assaults, and is jointly executed mainly by a missile strike group and an air operations group. Its main missions are: by use of surprise, fierce, continuous firepower, to execute comprehensive and key-point paralysis and suppression of the enemy's major targets, and to the maximum extent, to weaken the enemy's operational capability, so as to create favorable conditions for later strike activities. The first assault's major targets are vital targets: the enemy's military and political heads and organs, electronic warfare (EW) centers, Air Force bases, naval bases, air defense system, and surface-to-surface missile positions. The first assault must be fully prepared, be launched stealthily and suddenly, and strive at the first opportunity to restrain the enemy. Before the assault, the campaign tactical missiles, high-performance operational aircraft and other elite strengths participating in the assault activities must be scientifically organized into groups, and missions rationally assigned to them, so as to magnify the first-assault effects. During the assault, normally with the cooperation of electronic suppression activities, one carefully coordinates the firepower of the missile force-units and the aviation force, so as to execute a concentrated assault of high intensity and high density; correctly selects the assault methods on the basis of the target conditions and assault goals; determines the number of attack waves based on actual requirements, and unifies, coordinates, and carefully plans, to ensure the continuity of firepower; and adopts all effective measures to restrain the enemy at the first opportunity and to take the initiative. Once the goals are achieved, then do not lose the time-opportunity to command the force-strengths to implement follow-on assaults, expand the first assault's results, and achieve the goal of greatly reducing the enemy's operational capability.

Follow-on assaults are the various firepower assault activities continually executed – based on the first assault – against the enemy, in order to achieve the preset operational goal. They are normally conducted close upon the first assault, and are jointly executed by conventional missile force-units, and Air Force and Navy strengths, per the integrated firepower assault plan, until the integrated firepower assault goal is achieved. When executing follow-on assaults, the conventional missile force-units should – based on the first assault: timely conduct force-strength and firepower maneuvers; focus the assaults on targets for which the first assault failed to prove effective, and on newly identified targets inconvenient for aviation forces to attack; and ensure reaching the required kill degree. Simultaneously, implement a key point supplemental assault against enemy air force and naval bases with some missile force-units complementing Air Force and Navy operational strengths. Air Force and Navy aviation forces should utilize the missile assault's results, and, close upon the first assault, concentrate forces to assault the enemy's major targets. Naval ship force-strengths should – based on the missile firepower and aviation firepower assaults – seize a favorable opportunity and assault enemy targets, such as seacoast radar stations, port facilities and ships moored in port, and shore-to-ship missile positions. In the course of the follow-on assaults, the campaign commander should at all times analyze and assess the battlefield circumstances {zhanchang xingshi}, promptly adjust the assault targets, and at the right time commit a portion of reserve strengths; he conduct unified-overall-planning of the overall situation, rationally employ strengths and differentiate missions, and successfully accomplish the preparations for the advance integrated firepower assault and the link-up with seizing air

dominance and sea dominance and other activities; they must coordinate the firepower assault activities of all services, and maintain the intensity of the follow-on assault firepower and the continuity of the assaults; and they must make full use of the first assault's effects, take the enemy at a time of confusion in command and activities, seize all kinds of favorable opportunities to execute assaults, and boost the effectiveness of the follow-on assaults.

(3) Seizing air dominance

Seizing air dominance in a landing campaign means – over the entire course of the landing campaign, or during important campaign phases – the air battlefield initiative acquired over the entire campaign zone or over major operational areas (sea areas). Its goals are to support the main *bushu* dispositions and major targets of our Army, Navy, Air Force, and 2nd Artillery Corps, and the in-air safety of important operational activities, so as to create the conditions for the landing force to assemble, embark, make the sea crossing, and strike onto land. Seizure of air dominance normally begins in the later stage of the advanced integrated firepower strike or slightly after, with the Air Force units as primary, but with the participation of some force-strengths from the Army, Navy, and 2nd Artillery Corps; it adopts restraint of the enemy on the ground as the primary method, along with the method of integrating restraint of the enemy on the ground with annihilation of the enemy in the air, to execute surprise, fierce, continuous, precision strikes against the enemy's air superiority strengths.

Controlling the enemy on the ground means the comprehensive use of a variety of strengths and means to execute surprise, fierce attacks on the enemy Air Force's important targets, via powerful offensive operational activities, and doing all one can – within a relatively short time – to destroy and paralyze on the ground most of the enemy's aviation strengths. The main activities are air assaults and sabotage raids in the enemy rear. Air assault means the use of long-range warfare air raid weaponry, such as bombers, fighter-bombers, and ground-attack aviation forces, with the cooperation of campaign tactical missile force-units, the application of methods such as concentrated assault combined with simultaneous assaults on multiple targets, first assault combined with follow-on continuous assaults, and aviation firepower assault combined with ground-to-ground missile firepower assaults, and the assault on important targets such as enemy airfields, radar stations, air defense weaponry, and communications and command centers. When implementing air assault, one must accurately ascertain the locations of assault targets, fully utilize the results of integrated firepower assault and IW, and, under the cover of fighter aviation forces and with the suddenness of a thunderbolt, rapidly organize the aviation-firepower assault activities. Sabotage raids in the enemy rear mean sabotage-raid operations executed by elite special operations units – penetrating deep behind enemy lines – against key targets, such as enemy airfields, radar stations, command posts, and ammunition depots. Sabotage-raid activities normally occur after air strikes achieve certain effects, in the intervals between air-strike waves, and adopt the methods of airborne and maritime infiltration to stealthily enter the enemy rear, and

execute the sabotage raids on targets against which it is difficult for air strikes to prove effective, so as to achieve the effect of defeating one's opponent by a surprise move.

Annihilating the enemy in the air means rigorous organization of air combat and anti-air operations, and comprehensive use of a variety of strengths and means, to resolutely eliminate enemy aircraft raiding by air. The main activities are air interception, air blocking, and anti-air counterattacks. Air interception means the use of fighter aviation forces, under the command guidance of a command post, to realize interception of raiding enemy aircraft in the air and of other air targets. Normally, this should be implemented with airfield alert as primary, and aerial alert as auxiliary. To improve the air interception effects, one should begin from as long a range as possible, execute tiered interception, and – with the close cooperation of ground air-defense firepower, such as anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) – construct a long/medium/short-range and high/medium/low-altitude integrated anti-aircraft firepower distribution system, which improves the air interception effects. Air blocking means the use of relatively many fighter aviation force force-units, within a designated time and air [tactical] zone {kongyu}, per a layered deployment {peizhi} for the different altitudes, to form an air screen, and to block and annihilate the raiding enemy aircraft and other air targets. Such a method has a relatively strong deterrent effect and reliable screening effect; but if not well controlled, force-strengths are easily wasted, so it is normally used during the most critical operational times and in the direction of the gravest threat from the enemy situation. An anti-air counterattack means the use of ground air defense strengths such as AAA and SAMs to implement strikes against raiding enemy aircraft and other air targets. It is an important method for annihilating the enemy in the air. When organizing implementation of this activity, one must take care to combine together the various strengths of the vital-site air defense, field air defense, and People's air defense and combine together the anti-air resistance and air intercepts, so as to fully bring into play an integrated-whole operational might; one must successfully bring into play the role of high-tech weaponry, adopt flexible and mobile fighting methods, and strike the enemy to catch him unaware; one must tightly successfully organize land-air coordination and guard against mistakenly damaging one's own combat-opportunities.

(4) Seizing sea dominance

Seizing sea dominance in a landing campaign is a maritime offensive operation executed primarily by naval force-strengths, with the participation of some Army, Air Force, and 2nd Artillery Corps force-strengths. Its goals are to control the entire campaign sea area or the main operational area(s) within the campaign sea battlefield, and to ensure the maritime security of activities such as the landing force's assembly/boarding, sea crossing, and assault onto land, as well as minesweeping/obstacle destruction and maritime transport. The main activities in seizure of sea dominance are naval blockades and naval strikes. Naval blockades mainly are blockades of the enemy's bases, harbors, straits, and outer islands. For naval strikes, the main methods are joint assaults, ambushes, maneuverable mine laying, and amphibious sabotage raids.

The joint assault is the joint-attack method implemented in concealed, sudden fashion against the enemy, primarily by naval force-strengths, with the participation of some Air Force, 2nd Artillery Corps, and Army force-strengths. A raid-attack {xiji} against enemy bases and harbors normally should be based upon concealment and suddenness, effective unorthodox raids, unfolding along multiple routes, separate entry-combined attack and combining “soft kill” with “hard destruction.” First, via intense electronic attacks, one creates confusion within the enemy, and then executes firepower and force-unit {budui} strikes; in particular, during the first strike, one definitely must in sudden and fierce fashion attack the enemy and take him by surprise, placing him in a paralyzed state over a relatively long time. Strikes against the enemy’s maritime ship formations should adopt all effective measures, strive for concealment and suddenness, restrain the enemy at the first opportunity, concentrate force strengths and weaponry, form localized (partial) dominant positions, and strive to fight a quick battle and win a quick decision. When anticipating possibly emerging opportunities for battle, and when one’s own raid force-strengths are relatively distant, one should as much as possible organize long-range raids, suddenly occurring at the enemy’s sea areas of activity and striking at the enemy forces, taking them by surprise.

Ambush is the operational method whereby one in advance deploys naval force-strengths in channels which the enemy must traverse, on communications lines, or in their adjacent sea areas, to await times for an enemy ship formation’s passage, and then suddenly launch an attack and rapidly annihilate the enemy as it navigates. The ambush force-strengths must make full use of natural conditions such as the darkness of night or low visibility to act, and strictly adopt measures such as radio silence and blackout. The opportunity for entering the ambush point should be determined by viewing the specific conditions; one can move up the entry, await the enemy ships or lure them into the ambush zone and wipe them out, but one can also enter before the enemy sails through the ambush zone, and then sail away after the strike.

Mobile minelaying {jidong bulei} is normally conducted ad hoc in the enemy’s forward direction of sail, after one grasps the activity intention of the enemy ship formation, so as to impede or destroy an enemy ship formation as it sails, to delay the enemy ship formation’s activity, and to create favorable conditions for force-strength and firepower assault. Maneuverable mine laying is normally assigned to submarines and aviation forces with relatively good concealment, and to surface ships with fast maneuvering speed, but privately owned boats can also assume maneuverable mine-laying missions.

Amphibious sabotage raids are operational methods employing sea-going amphibious special operations force-strengths, which steal into an enemy ship anchorage and raid the enemy’s ships, or stealthily land on an enemy shore and raid a target such as an enemy base, harbor, airfield, coastal observation and communication post, or command organ. Amphibious sabotage raids in the advance operations phase normally are tactical scale.

(5) Advance firepower preparations

Advance firepower preparations in a landing campaign are the firepower assault activities implemented with key points against the enemy's coastal defensive area by Air Force assault force-strengths in the lead with the participation from associated force-strengths of the Army, Navy, and Second Artillery, on the basis of the advance integrated firepower assault prior to the landing force comes onto land. Their goals are: to destroy the major defense works and artillery within the enemy's coast defensive areas, as well as missile launch positions, command institutions, communications hubs, radar stations, etc.; to attack the massive-forces groups and communications hubs in the enemy's depth of defense; and to damage the enemy's rear bases and supply system, and thus weaken the enemy's defense forces, block the enemy maneuvers, and isolate the landing site, so as to create favorable conditions for the landing force's landing. Their main activities are as follows: missile firepower assault, aviation firepower assault, and ship-gun firepower assault.

The missile firepower assault is jointly implemented by the 2nd Artillery Corps' conventional missile force-units and the Army's campaign tactical missile force-units, and is an important component in advance firepower preparations. The missile firepower assault normally is closely complemented by aviation firepower assault, and mainly assault missile launch positions within the enemy coast depth of defense, and at important targets such as the enemy's air defense system, communications hubs, command posts, rear bases, and supply systems {xitong}, so as to create the conditions for the follow-on firepower assaults.

The aviation firepower assault is jointly implemented by Air Force aviation assault force-strengths and naval aviation assault force-strengths, and it is the main assault activity in the advance firepower preparations. They are normally conducted after the missile firepower assault, and mainly assault important targets such as the artillery, missile launch positions, heavy force groups, communications hubs, command institutions, and radar stations outside of ship gun firepower and within the enemy coast defensive area's simple depth. Ship-gun firepower assaults are implemented by integration of naval surface ship force-units with land gunboats, under conditions of assured air dominance and sea dominance. They mainly assault surface area state targets {面状目标 mianzhuang mubiao}, such as artillery positions and defense facilities on the enemy's coastal first-line defense zone.

(6) Advance minesweeping and obstacle destruction

Advance minesweeping and obstacle destruction is an activity conducted by Navy, Air Force, and Army engineers, per a unified plan {jihua}, for advance destruction and clearing of all kinds of obstacles erected by the enemy in the water and on the water margin and beachhead. Its goals are to ensure ship navigation safety and to create favorable conditions for the amphibious-landing means of transport to approach and land against the beach.

In advance minesweeping, the main missions are to sweep channels and development (transfer) zones for the landing formation, channels for the landing force's landing, and maneuver zones for the firepower support ships, in mine and obstacle zones set up by the enemy. To ensure the smooth progress of advance minesweeping, one should: organize thorough minesweeping observation, and timely ascertain the range and types of mines laid by the enemy; concentrate the main force-strengths and weaponry in the main landing direction; and organize reliable minesweeping cover and minesweeping support. During minesweeping, if one discovers enemy naval and air forces executing anti-minesweeping activities, one should promptly organize covering force-strengths to intercept them; when the enemy using coastal defense firepower blocks minesweeping, one should swiftly organize firepower to suppress the blocking; when one finds that the enemy is about to use ships and aircraft to relay mines, one should promptly organize Navy and Air Force units to conduct strikes; and one must maintain close surveillance over already cleared sea areas.

In advance destruction of obstacles, the main missions are to execute key-point destruction of anti-amphibious-landing obstacles laid by the enemy in the water margin and on the beachhead, so as to reduce the density of the obstacles, in order to create the conditions for follow-on direct destruction of obstacles. Under the usual conditions, advance destruction of obstacles is specifically performed by Air Force and naval aviation force-units and Army engineering force-units. The Air Force and naval aviation force force-units use aviation blasting cartridges to bomb the obstacles on the enemy water margin and beachhead, and against relatively solid obstacles such as tracked bulwarks and blocking walls, they should execute key-point destruction. Army engineers or obstacle-destruction units organized by the other service arms, with the Navy's support, stealthily approach the enemy's water-margin and beachhead obstacle zones, and execute key-point destruction of relatively solid obstacles.

II. Embarkation and Sea Crossing...323

Embarkation and sea crossing are conducted on the basis of the advance operations.

(1) Embarkation (assembly and boarding)

The main missions of embarkation are as follows: To organize the landing force-units and the equipment needed for their landing operation, and to safely and in ordered fashion load all types of materiel onto the ships. This mainly includes the following: handling of transport-vessel preparations, selection of the boarding area {diqu}, establishment of the boarding-area command institution, perfecting the boarding area's various facilities, and organization of the boarding-area defense, as well as realization of boarding and loading. Embarkation normally is specifically organized and realized under the unified intent of the campaign commander, by the boarding-area command post, under the coordination of joint landing group (formation) command institution.

Vessel preparations: In a landing campaign, one must transport to the enemy shores a large number of landing force-units and equipment and supplies, and also ensure their uninterrupted supply. This requires that one must have sufficient amphibious-landing means of transport. Vessels are the mainstay of amphibious-landing means of transport; they are the material base for a sea-crossing landing and an essential condition for conducting a landing operation. The quantity and types of vessels should be determined based on several factors: the campaign intention, the landing mode, the landing and *bushu* disposition of the landing force, the vessel situation (quantity and quality), and the landing sea area's natural conditions. The main content of vessel preparations are as follows: recruitment of vessels, refitting, classification by use, training, and assembly. In general situations, first one should concentrate the use of landing ships (craft), transport ships (boats), and hovercraft within the force-unit task-organization. When recruitment of civilian vessels is required, it: must be based on such requirements as sufficient numbers, defense of key points, and attention to maintaining secrecy; must be under the campaign commander's unified *bushu* disposition and leadership, with the responsibility for specific implementation jointly held by the mobilization authorities and the regional authorities concerned; and must be completed within the campaign's preparation phase, on the basis of peacetime preparations. The preparatory work for the civilian vessels mainly includes the following: establishment of the command institution and of a unified plan {*jihua*}, timely recruitment and correct use [of the vessels], reequipment in light of the mission, strict organization of civilian vessel training, and organization of the assembly and grouping of the vessels.

Selection of the boarding area: The boarding area means the littoral zone for the landing force's holding and boarding, as well as its adjacent sea area, and is comprised of the holding area (sea area) for the landing force and for the amphibious-landing means of transport, and the boarding zones. Normally, the boarding area is determined via joint reconnaissance by the joint landing group commander and the Navy's concerned leaders. The selected boarding area must be fairly close to the landing area, shorten the passage as much as possible, and reduce the crossing time as much as possible, so as to lighten the degree of threat from the enemy. Good landing terrain conditions and convenient transportation favor the landing force's concealed dispersal, holding, and maneuvering. Suitable conditions in the shoal and good handling facilities favor the safety and rapid loading of materiel and personnel, and the boarding. Also, maneuvering difficulties on the part of the enemy Navy and Air Force favor our organization of effective air defense and sea defense, ensuring the safety of the holding and boarding areas for the landing force and amphibious-landing means of transport. Good mass conditions facilitate concealment of the intention, and favor organization of military-civilian joint defense, enabling the acquisition of the energetic support of the local manpower and material resources.

Establishing the boarding-area command institution and improving various facilities: Normally, a boarding-area command post is set up using the boarding area as the unit, with several boarding zone {*diyu*} command posts under it. The boarding-area command post should perform the set-up and transformation of the boarding area and the perfection of all facilities per the orders of the campaign commander and the requirements of the

loading and boarding work. Here, the main contents are as follows: perfection and enhancement of command communications facilities, facilities for land transportation, maritime navigation and support facilities, boarding and loading facilities, and rear supply facilities, as well as construction of defense facilities. Establishment of a boarding area is a topic in battlefield construction, and generally the overall planning for its arrangements is handled by the theater and the regional government.

Organization of the boarding area's defense: Defense of the boarding area should have the boarding zones as the basic units, comprising an independent defensive system, and should be brought into the campaign's rear defense system. Its main missions are as follows: to block and crush enemy activities such as air raids, maritime sneak attacks, and special-forces harassing attacks, and to support the safe assembly of the amphibious-landing transport vessels and the landing force, and the latter's boarding. To this end, one should adopt thorough measures for air defense, naval defense, and countering the enemy's special operations. The boarding zones, using civilian vessels as the primary means of transport, should be situated within the range of effective defenses; the personnel boarding points can, based on the distribution situations, as much as possible be situated within the range of the boarding zone defenses. If difficulties arise, one should use the local boarding-point force-unit's own strengths to independently organize a good defense. The boarding zones and boarding points with independently organized defenses must establish a unified command institution, and in a unified manner coordinate the operational activities of all the service arms and militia within the range of the boarding area and boarding points.

Loading onto the ships: Loading of the landing force onto the ships should be under the unified orders of the campaign commander, with the boarding area (zone) commanders having specific responsibility for its execution. The boarding-area loading should be stealthy, rapid, on schedule, and safe, and as much as possible should maintain the integrity of the organizational system of the troops. To this end, one must correctly select the loading method, arrange well the procedures for loading onto the ships, and execute it strictly according to the sequence for loading onto ships. When one discovers an enemy incoming raid from the air and/or sea, one should at the right time conduct intercepts by organizing anti-air and anti-sea cover force-strengths. As soon as one encounters an enemy raid-attack, one should quickly ascertain the situation, and clear up the raid's consequences. In order to confuse and deceive the enemy, and to conceal the landing's intention and true activities, the campaign commander also should – based on the feint plan *{jihua}* – command feinting units to actively conduct feints in a predetermined false boarding area. In addition, the ships, after they have completed loading of their landing units, should rapidly bear off the boarding points, and sail to the designated sea area, disperse in concealed fashion, and await orders, or directly set sail in formation toward the staging area *{huihe qu}*.

(2) Sea crossing

The sea crossing means the activities of all the landing formations sailing from their respective staging areas to their respective unfolding zones {zhankai qu}. It should be specifically organized and implemented by the landing transport group and formation {bianduui} commander on the basis of the campaign commander's intent and under the unified command of the joint landing group commander.

Formation assembly {huihe biandui} refers to, after completing the loading of the landing transport vessels, the minesweeper fleet, firepower support fleet, the direct cover formation, the landing transport formation, etc. all belonging to the landing formation enter the assembly area and compose the getting underway sequencing activity {hangxing xulie de xingdong}. Formation assembly is extremely complex; the ships are concentrated, their maneuvering is restricted, and they easily fall into chaos, so this is one of the best opportunities for the enemy to attack. To this end, first one must successfully select the assembly area {huihequ}. Its location must be just right, as much as possible central to of each boarding zone's staging area, in order to facilitate formation assembly; the sea area must be expansive, with no underwater obstacles to navigation, so as to ensure the navigation safety of the formation assembly's ships; the vicinity must have prominent identification markings, so as to ensure that the formation assembly's ships correctly arrive at their designated positions, and form into formations in order; and friendly coastal-defense firepower and effective screening for sea and air force-strengths must be obtainable to ensure the safety of formation assembly. Secondly, one must clarify the assembly method. Normally there are two assembly methods: concentrated assembly {jizhong huihe} and dispersed assembly {fensan huihe}. Concentrated assembly is simultaneous arrival at the assembly area with the [single file] formation {队 dui} as the organizational-unit {danwei}, then the underway sequence is composed {zucheng} in accordance with the assembly plan {jihua}, and then the formation {biandui} begins to get underway at sea under a unified order {haoling}. Dispersed assembly means that each [single file] formation {dui}, per the assembly plan, successively passes through the designated locations on time and begins to sail [get underway], and during sail, they form the underway sequence. In general terms, one should compose an underway sequence that is broad in front, has key points, and simultaneously advances along multiple routes so as to facilitate maneuver, avoid collisions, one artillery shell cannot damage several vessels, and allows maintenance of close contact between each of the ships.

The sea crossing should be based on the unified campaign plan {jihua} and organized and implemented by all of the joint landing groups. The campaign commander, after they have determined that the situation has had no major changes, should resolutely and punctually issue the order to set sail. After the formations set sail, they must make the sea crossing strictly according to the predetermined sailing sequence and formations, and organize well the defenses during the sea crossing. The accompanying screening forces should rapidly deploy in the direction of the greatest threat posed by the enemy, and seek out and annihilate surprise-attack enemy forces; the rest of the forces should organize

close observation/lookout and strict radio silence and blackout, and should thoroughly and ably make preparations for counterattack, evading an enemy surprise attack, and clearing up the consequences of an attack. When all formations in the campaign's 1st-echelon spearhead are gradually approaching the enemy shores, the commanders should – according to the plan and the development of the actual situation – promptly issue the orders for the vertical landing forces to embark, command the campaign screening forces to enhance the cover for the landing area and adjacent sea areas, and command all advance formations to accurately advance toward the development line.

III. Assault onto Land and Establishment of a Landing Site...326

The assault onto land and the establishment of landing sites are operational activities conducted primarily by all the joint landing groups, in coordination with the operational and support groups of the other service arms, and are the most important operational phases for achieving the campaign goal.

(1) Assault onto land

The assault onto land is the tensest, most intense, most difficult operational time in a landing campaign, and its success or failure has a decisive effect on victory or defeat in the campaign. To this end, the campaign commander should enhance command and coordination, fully bring into play the overall power of the joint operations of all service arms, and adopt all effective methods to ensure that the assault onto land succeeds in one stroke.

Continuous maintenance of the “three dominances:” In the assault-onto-land phase, the enemy, in order to block the landing force's assault onto land and to maintain the stability of its anti-amphibious-landing defensive system, certainly will want to concentrate application of EW forces, and Air Force, Navy, and Coastal Defense forces to execute intense jamming and fierce 3-D firepower strikes against the 1st-echelon landing groups. At this time, whether or not one can maintain information dominance, air dominance, and sea dominance has a major bearing on the success or failure of the assault onto land. To this end, first one must concentrate the use of jamming and attack aircraft and of the jamming forces within the landing force's 1st echelon, in the major areas of the assault onto land by all of the joint landing groups, to suppress and destroy the reconnaissance and fire control systems at the forward position of the enemy they face, to jam the enemy communications systems, and to damage and paralyze the enemy's military command. Second, using campaign tactical missiles and aviation forces, one must execute continuous strikes against enemy airfields and harbors threatening the assault onto land; make every effort to destroy the enemy's operational aircraft or ships, or restrain them on the airfields or harbors; and strive to ensure that they cannot take off or set sail during the assault-onto-land phase. Third, one must organize fighter aviation force force-units and the Navy's and Army's air defense operational force-units to establish a screening airspace in the area of the assault onto land, and to intercept surprise-attack enemy planes and ships. Fourth, adopting methods such as submarine ambushes, swimming hunts {you

lie}, and surface-ship key point patrols, one must enhance the naval blockade of the landing operation's sea area. Fifth, using special operations strengths behind enemy lines, one must assault and damage the reconnaissance, early warning, and C2 facilities of the enemy Air Force and Navy, and sabotage the enemy airfields, hangars, and major port facilities, so as to complement the main force's maintenance of the "three dominances."

Execution of direct firepower preparations and straightforward minesweeping and obstacle destruction: In order to support the 1st-echelon landing force's smooth assault onto land, all the landing groups, normally before the 1st-echelon landing force's assault onto land, and just after the advance firepower preparations, will execute the direct firepower preparations and straightforward minesweeping and obstacle destruction. The direct firepower preparations, in which relevant force-strengths from the aviation force, missile and Navy participate, mainly strike at the enemy's first-line defensive position, damage its defense works, destroy its firearms, wipe out its effective strength, destroy its coastal-defense command institution, and weaken the enemy's capability for resistance; the screening aviation force, Navy minesweepers, and Army engineers perform straightforward minesweeping and obstacle destruction, open up or enlarge channels and highways, and support the campaign 1st-echelon landing force in conducting the tactical development and the assault onto the beach and land. The direct firepower preparations should first strike at targets posing a fairly large threat to the landing force, and then strike at other targets. They must concentrate the application of PGMs to strike at the enemy defense forward edge's coast-to-ship missiles and long-range artillery fortifications, as well as major support points; simultaneously, using large quantities of ordinary bombs and artillery shells, they must strike at relatively exposed planar targets, such as force-unit {budui} assembly areas, artillery positions within simple depth, and transportation hubs. Straightforward minesweeping is assumed by the minesweeper squadrons within the landing formations; its main missions are to conduct mine inspection and clearing from ship-gun and shipborne land-gun maneuver areas, water-area early warning squadron maneuver areas, landing transport ship development areas, and their channels leading to the shore side, and also to set up markers on both sides of the channels, to open up paths among the obstacles on the enemy coast water margin and beachhead, and to support the 1st-echelon landing force to rapidly make the assault onto the beach and land.

Each landing formation conducts tactical unfolding. When the landing formations sail to the unfolding line, under the cover of the direct aviation firepower preparations, they successively conduct tactical unfolding normally according to a sequence of minesweeper ship formations, firepower support vessel formations, and landing transport formations. The minesweeper formations first enter the landing area and sea area, conduct minesweeping of all mooring (maneuver) areas and channels, and perform marking; the firepower support formations successively take up their respective positions, and screen the landing transport formations' unfolding; the landing transport formations should, per the landing corps' operational requirements, move from the development line to the assault line, and gradually develop into a landing sequence and formations; the direct screening formations and water-area early warning formations develop on the two flanks and rear flanks of the landing sequence, and as rapidly as possible form an amphibious-

landing-area water-area early warning line. When adopting the transport mode of “from ship-to-shore”, quickly conduct the transfer in accordance with the predetermined plan {*jihua*} and the specific situation. The landing transport ships having completed the transfer should promptly bear off from the transfer area to facilitate the ingress of the follow-on landing transport formations.

The landing force’s assault onto land: After the landing craft in waves traverse the assault line, under the support of powerful firepower screening and other force-units, the coastal beaches are assaulted at full speed. In order to ensure that the assault onto land succeeds in one stroke, the campaign commander should proceed from reality, give full play to initiative and flexibility, and adopt a variety of means to increase the speed of the assault onto land. The first [means] is combining key-point assault with coming onto land along many directions. One should implement coming onto land along many directions on a broad front, so as to confuse and scatter the enemy, make it difficult for him to determine the main direction of the landing, and prevent him from concentrating force-strengths for key-point resistance. Coming onto land from many directions must have key points, so as to form a fairly large superiority of force-strength. Second is combining sea landing with vertical and bypass landings {*chaoyue denglu*}. In a future landing campaign, simultaneously with the main force strength landing from the sea, [one must] as much as possible expand the scale of the vertical and bypass landings, i.e., implement complementary vertical landing with some force strengths traveling by helicopters, and [some force-strengths] traveling by surface-effect craft to implement a sea-skimming bypass landing. The vertical and bypass landings should be focused in the main direction. First, while one keeps an eye on the race for control of favorable terrain and coordinating with the sea landing, simultaneous attention should be given to prompt seizure of the harbors, docks, and coastal airfields within the landing area, and to open up full dimensional landing channels and docks (havens), to create the conditions for bringing follow-on force-units and important materiel onto land. Third is combining force-strength assault with firepower interdiction. The landing force, in the process of implementing its full dimensional assault, will inevitably meet with a tenacious counterattack by the enemy in the 1st-line defense, and layer upon layer of counterattacks by the reserves in the enemy’s depth. To this end, normally one should concentrate superior firepower on the landing area to effect firepower interdiction, isolate the enemy of the 1st-line defense, and at the same time conduct strikes on and restraint of the enemy’s reserves and smash or delay their counterattack activities. Fourth is combining landing assault with task force raids. This means use of unequal-scale special operations groups to conduct raiding operations on the flanks of the enemy’s fortified areas or in the enemy depth, to actively harass and sabotage the enemy’s major targets, and to pin down and scatter the enemy’s operational strengths, so that they fall into the passive position of being unable to attend to one thing without neglecting the other. Fifth is combining campaign airborne landing with frontal assault onto land. In order to ensure that the assault onto land succeeds in one stroke, one should give full play to the strong points – flexibility, speed, and suddenness – of airborne [landing] operational maneuvers, and at the right time implement campaign airborne landing in predetermined areas, so as to assist and complement landing force operations with active activities. When implementing campaign airborne landing, one must successfully select the targets and successfully grasp the time-opportunities; in

particular, one must fully utilize the results of firepower assault and in accordance with the predetermined plan *{jihua}* and missions, adopt fighting methods such as storming attacks or raid-attacks. [One must] immediately initiate attacks against the predetermined targets, taking advantage of the situation when the enemy situation is unclear and they cannot organize effective resistance in time and the airborne landing force-units have not arrived, to quickly seize-occupy objectives, actively complement landing force operations and accelerate the speed of the assault onto land, ensuring that the assault onto land succeeds in one stroke.

(2) Capture and construction of campaign landing sites

After the landing force's 1st echelon goes ashore, the battlefield posture is jagged and interlocking, and the situation is complicated and confusing; whether or not one can resolutely crush the enemy's counterattacks, as well as counter-amphibious-landing and counter-airborne operations, and – based on consolidation of the effects of the assault onto land – rapidly develop in depth and capture the campaign landing sites, is one key to creating favorable conditions for follow-on activities.

Crushing the enemy's land/sea/air joint counterattack: When the landing force's 1st echelon has broken through the enemy's 1st-line defensive position, or has penetrated this position and is advancing toward the 2nd-line defensive position, with the follow-on echelon still not landed, the enemy can take advantage of our still unstable foothold, employ reserves under the support of aviation firepower and missile firepower, use armored forces and armored helicopters as a backbone, adopt mutual coordination among ground assaults, airborne operations, and counter-amphibious-landing operations, and execute a land/sea/air joint counterattack, in an attempt to blockade and isolate the landing site, sever the connection between the landing units and the sea, pincer-attack the already landed landing force, and restore its defensive posture. From the viewpoint of past military history, a landing campaign's crushing of an enemy's joint counterattack normally adopts the following measures: first is multiple measures, simultaneously taken, to weaken the enemy's counterattack strengths, to disorganize the enemy's counterattack *bushu* disposition, and to delay the activities of the enemy's campaign reserves. Second is the use of captured beaches, harbors, docks, and airfields, and of erected floating docks, to ensure that the 2nd-echelon landing force rapidly lands. Third is integration of frontal counterattacks with flank attacks and air strikes to foil the enemy's ground counterattack. Fourth is synchronized execution of ground, sea, and air strikes which, while foiling the enemy's ground counterattack, simultaneously crush the enemy's counter-amphibious-landing and airborne operational activities.

Bold and powerful strikes to interlink and expand the landing sites: During the operational process of crushing the enemy's land/sea/air joint counterattack, the 2nd-echelon campaign large formation should land soon after the 1st-echelon campaign large formation. After landing, while coordinating the 1st echelon to crush the enemy's land/sea/air joint counterattack or strategic reserves' counterattack, one must employ the main force to strike at the rear flank of the counterattacking enemy, cut up the

counterattacking enemy's *bushu* disposition, with the support of the 1st echelon form an encircling posture toward the counterattacking enemy, and sever the connection between the counterattacking enemy and other operational groups. After most of the strengths have landed, one should promptly organize and execute cutting up, surrounding, and annihilation of the enemy's coastal defense groups, and establish and expand landing sites for the joint landing group. During the operation to interlink and expand the landing sites, one should first attack and occupy key points for checking the advance of reserves in the enemy depth, sever the connections among the enemy coastal defense's various force-units, and then execute a rolling attack in the enemy's simple depth, gradually annihilate the enemy's coastal defense strengths, and interlink and expand the scope of the landing sites. Simultaneously, one should command the aviation force and the campaign tactical missile force-units to strike at the maneuvering enemy, and also command the special operations forces, adopting means such as raids and sabotage, to harass and damage the enemy's maneuvers, and to coordinate with the main force in establishing the landing sites, so as to create the conditions for a later offensive.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 14

The Anti Air Raid Campaign...331

The anti air raid campaign is, under unified command of a joint campaign commander and his command organ, participated in by Air Force, Army, Navy, and Secondary Artillery campaign large formations, and under support and coordination of armed police forces and people air defense strengths, an offensive-defensive integrated campaign for defeating enemy anti air raids according to a unified objective and plan. The basic missions of the anti air raid campaign are to crush the enemy's air raid intention, and defend the anti-air security of the main *bushu* disposition, key point targets, and people and masses in the campaign area. The practice of recent local wars indicates that the air raid has become the enemy's primary means of achieving a strategic and campaign goal, and it is one of the biggest threats that our military faces in the future for organizing and implementing joint operations. Therefore, the anti air raid campaign is an important campaign pattern of our military and its status and function are prominent. Its success or failure is involved in the gain and loss of the operational initiative and even national security and danger.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...331

I. Characteristics ...331

The high-tech weapons and equipment, diversified operational strengths, and multiple operational modes and methods of both warring parties in a future anti air raid campaign make many new characteristics appear in an anti air raid campaign.

(1) The success or failure is involved with national security and danger and the strategic quality is prominent

With the application of a large quantity of advanced aviation weaponry, the operational center of gravity in modern warfare is moving from the ground and sea to the space and air. The air and space battlefields have become the main battlefields that both warring parties contend for. The experiences of recent local wars indicate that using the air and space strengths in the first place and throughout the entire course is a strategic activity for winning the war initiative and even deciding the war victory or defeat. From the perspective of position and role, its success or failure is involved with national security and danger. The anti air raid campaign is a strategic quality defensive campaign. Its success or failure involves major issues such as territorial integrity, sovereignty dignity, and national security and danger. The participating strengths involve the whole people. A future anti air raid campaign will be joint operations that various services and arms participate in and involve the party, government administration, armed forces, and people. National mobilization will be needed for all soldiers and civilians entering the war together. As for operational command, the level of decision-making is high. The decision-making of many major issues in an anti air raid campaign has obviously

exceeded a campaign commander's decision category, requiring a higher level of leadership for decision-making. Looking at operational activities, the strategic activities are prominent. When the enemy initiates air raids, the strike center of gravity will focus on important military, political, and economic strategic targets including the capital. It is obviously strategic to unfold resistance, counterattack, and protection activities for surrounding and defending these important targets.

(2) It is obviously asymmetric to confront the powerful enemy

In a future anti air raid campaign, our main objects of operations will be powerful enemies with high-tech superiority. When power enemies launch an air raid against us, they will concentrate crack troops and sharp weapons to implement continuous and high intensity asymmetric operations against us with superior air strengths. Our anti air raid operations will face stern challenges. The powerful enemies have strong information attack, stealthy penetration, long-distance attack, and precision strike capabilities and can implement non-stop air assault against us for the entire time under all kinds of weather conditions. Compared with the power of the enemies, our anti air raid operational capabilities are seriously unbalanced. In areas such as command and control, anti jamming, counter-stealth assault, anti nighttime assault, and counter-strike outside the defense area, our capabilities are limited, and we are seriously in a circumstance of defeating the superior with the inferior.

(3) The operational space is broad and the offensive and defensive confrontations are intense

In the future, what our anti air raid campaign will deal with is that the enemy will use aviation and space strengths to implement a broad-scope integrated air raid that is omnidirectional, from all altitudes, and in total depth. The range of air raids in vertical height is from the ultra low altitude of several meters and dozens of meters to the ultra high altitude of several thousands of meters and even space. The range of air raids in the horizontal scope, due to the development and application of tanker aircraft, is not limited by geographic coordinates anymore, meaning that the air raids can be from intercontinental to worldwide. The front and rear demarcation lines of the anti air raid battlefield obviously are fading. In a future anti air raid campaign, both warring parties, in order to achieve operational goals, will concentrate crack troops and sharp weapons to unfold fierce confrontations in information warfare, electronic warfare, firepower warfare, etc. in the broad battlespace. In an anti air raid campaign, we need to use means such as air intercept and ground-to-air attack to resist the enemy air raids, organize offensive strengths to counterattack the enemy air raid sources, surround and defend key point targets to organize military-police-civilian integrated protection operations, counterattack and attack at the same time, integrate offense with defense, and present an intense and fierce contention.

(4) Air raids are destructive, making it difficult to protect targets

With the widespread application of high technology in the aviation sphere, numerous precision guidance munitions such as cruise missiles, laser guided bombs, fuel-air explosives, graphite bombs, and electromagnetic bombs continue to emerge, which increase the accuracy and destruction of the air strike a great deal. It is reported that the hit probabilities of cruise missiles, anti radiation missiles, and laser guided bombs are 75%, 87%, and 86%. The shock wave of explosion of a 500 kilogram precision guided bomb is equal to that of the explosion of a small nuclear bomb. 1 to 2 precision guided bombs are sufficient enough to destroy a big tall building. Electromagnetic bombs can destroy electronic parts of command and control, communication, computer, radar, and missile guidance systems within dozens of kilometers instantaneously. According to the statistics, modern aviation fire intensity is 70 times that of WWII. Recent local wars have indicated that in high-tech air raids, no matter whether they are military, political, or economic targets, they will be destroyed once detected. At present, with the rapid development of our economy, the economic and political targets with strategic value are increasing day by day. We are in lack of effective means for protecting these huge targets which are easy to destroy in wartime. If some nuclear power plants and chemical plants are destroyed, this will lead to a secondary disaster. This not only makes protection operations more difficult but also raises a higher requirement for resistance operations and counterattack operations.

(5) Become more passive in campaign operations

With the widespread application of a large quantity of high-tech air raid weapons, the surprise of air raids is increased, making it easier to be passive in anti air raids. Since the air raiding side normally holds the initiative of campaign initiation, it can prepare air raid activities in advance, decide air raid means and modes and force-strengths and weaponry for itself, select the operational space domain advantageous for itself, and the attack opportunity and strike targets, and implement stealthy penetration and long-range precision attack. However, in an anti air raid campaign, we normally await the enemy to move, and rely on the situations we grasp in peacetime and the situations we acquire before an imminent war to analyze and make assessments, making it difficult to make an accurate judgment on the scale of enemy air raid strengths, primary air raid direction, air raid opportunity, and key point strike targets. With the strengthened maneuvering performance of air raid weaponry, the enemy does not have to mass or transfer a large scale of force-strengths before air raid activities. The enemy grasps information superiority and the battlefield is one-way transparent to the enemy. It is difficult for us to be aware of the sign of air raid activities. In addition, the enemy has advanced air raid weaponry and multiple air raid means for implementing stealth assault and strike outside the defensive area against us. By using traditional means, it is difficult for us to detect an enemy who initiates air raids and organize effective resistance. This will definitely make us more passive in the anti air raid campaign.

(6) Integration of air defense and space defense is getting distinct day by day

With the development of space technology, the air battlefield and the space battlefield are more closely related to each other. The air strength and the space strength mutually depend, affect, and restrict. At present, the world military powers are speeding up the development of safeguarding support space strengths to the development of operational space strengths. Looking at the development and operational use of air strengths, the influence has expanded to the space battlefield. In recent years, the world military powers have organized several space warfare simulation exercises, intensified their development of aerospace aircraft with freedom of activity in air space and outer space, and formulated integrated air-space operational theory that can effectively bring into play the operational effectiveness of air strengths and space strengths. Based on this theory, the organizational structure and the structure of military strengths can be adjusted. This indicates that the curtain of space warfare has unveiled. This means that in an anti air raid campaign, it is more difficult for our military to deal with the threats from the air and the space. We can say with certainty that the integration of air defense and space defense will have an important influence on the course and outcome of our anti air raid campaign.

II. Requirements...334

(1) Full preparation and rapid reaction

Under informationized conditions, the surprise of air raids unprecedentedly increases. The preparation time of early warning and imminent battle in our anti air raid operation is very short. The success or failure of a campaign depends on whether to have full preparation and rapid reaction to a large extent.

Full preparation means to successfully accomplish the various items of preparation work before the imminent battle of an anti air raid campaign so as to establish a good foundation for improving rapid reaction capability and ensuring the smooth implementation of an anti air raid campaign. For this purpose, in order to establish and strengthen each system of combat readiness, reinforce combat readiness education, intensify the idea of combat readiness, and always be on the alert, we need to: establish and strengthen the anti air raid campaign system; continue to perfect intelligence early warning networks, command and communication networks, airfield position networks, service support, and engineering protection facilities of complementary parts; formulate each kind of plan and proposal for anti air raid operations in advance; reinforce the study and drill of anti air raid operations under informationized conditions; and increase the campaign commander's and the command organ's capability of organizing command and the forces' fast reaction capability and supportability of carrying out operational missions in emergency situations. After the anti air raid prior order is issued, we need to rapidly complete each kind of preparation for imminent battle within a scheduled time.

The essence of rapid reaction is controlling speed with speed {yikuai zhikuai}. Namely, this is rapidly discovering situations, rapidly and decisively commanding, rapidly

disseminating orders, and force-units rapidly reacting. Only by controlling speed with speed can we prevent being suppressed and destroyed on the ground by the enemy, can we seize and keep the initiative in the initial period of the campaign, and ensure that participating strengths can go into resistance, counterattack, and protection operations by the fastest speed. For this purpose, we need to establish and strengthen rapid reaction mechanisms needed by anti air raid operations under informationized conditions including the command system, the change of combat readiness levels, etc. The participating strengths cannot lower their guard. After accepting missions, the participating strengths must be in combat readiness immediately, closely pay attention to the enemy's dynamic state of air situations, and immediately report to the leadership after discovering situations. According to the characteristics of urgent preparation for imminent battle, we need to arrange time rationally, take scientific preparation methods, increase the time availability to the maximum, snatch time and fight for speed with the enemy, and make a full preparation before the enemy launches air raids.

Full preparation and rapid reaction are the objective requirements for seizing campaign initiative in an anti air raid campaign. Full preparation is the basis for rapid reaction. Rapid reaction is the fundamental start point and goal of full preparation.

(2) Take the initiative and be offensive in operations

To strive to take the initiative and try best to avoid being passive are the general rules we should follow in campaign operations. The anti air raid campaign is an offensive campaign. We await the enemy to move and emphasize seizing the campaign initiative with active operational activities. The practice of recent local wars indicates that in the face of the enemy high-tech and high intensity continuous air raids, defending without striking and resisting without counterattacking will make us come under attack passively and make it difficult to crush the enemy's air raid intention. Only by taking the initiative to create favorable conditions and grabbing favorable combat opportunity to implement offensive activities against the enemy can we destroy the enemy's air raid plan, effectively weaken the enemy air raid strength, and seize the campaign initiative.

To take the initiative means to seize the campaign initiative with positive and subjective efforts based on certain campaign strengths. A certain material basis is an important condition for seizing the initiative, but it is not the only condition. The side with inferior weapons and equipment can bring into play a subjective dynamic quality to seize the campaign initiative. This is especially the case in the anti air raid campaign. Therefore, every officer and man must firmly establish campaign awareness to strive for initiative, run it through the entire process of an anti air raid campaign, and infiltrate it to every aspect of campaign activities and every step of operational activities. This kind of campaign consciousness is reflected not only in combat spirit but also in campaign decision-making and the application of fighting methods. The campaign commander needs to seek momentum {moushi} and create momentum to strive for the campaign initiative. When there is a favorable opportunity, we should take the initiative to annihilate the enemy. When there is an unfavorable opportunity, we should positively

create conditions, take the initiative to seek the combat opportunity, and strive for the initiative. When we are passive, we need to take measures resolutely, get rid of being passive, and resume the initiative.

The offensive operation means to concentrate crack [elite] long-range strike strengths, grasp the favorable combat opportunities to fiercely counterattack the enemy air raid, destroy the enemy air raid plan {*jihua*}, weaken the enemy air raid capability, decrease our pressure in resistance operations and protection operations, and conduct effective defense based on positive defense in an anti air raid campaign. It is an important means for changing from being passive to being active in the anti air raid campaign, and it plays a crucial role in the course and outcome of a campaign. Therefore, we need to: increase the understanding of the importance of offensive operations, reinforce awareness of offensive operations, launch an attack from exterior lines to force the enemy to defend, and decrease the pressure of resistance from interior lines; apply means such as public opinion deception and tactical diversion, and positively create a favorable combat opportunity; according to the enemy situations, our situations, and the development of war situations, promptly seize the combat opportunity and rapidly counterattack the enemy when the enemy is negligent of taking precautions and exhausted, and the rear defense is weak; and grasp the most valuable objective to achieve the anti air raid campaign intention, concentrate the use of strengths, flexibly apply fighting methods, hammer the enemy and attack fiercely, and ensure to hit the enemy deeply.

To take the initiative is a kind of campaign awareness reflected in the combat spirit, campaign decision-making, campaign activities, etc. The offensive operation is the most effective means for seizing the campaign initiative. Only when paying attention to the offensive and attacking the enemy vital areas {*yaohai*} can we seize and keep the campaign initiative.

(3) Unify command and subarea responsibility

In the anti air raid campaign, the participating strengths are various, the battlefield is broad, the forces and weapons are scattered, and the operational activities are complex and diversified. We must have unified command and subarea responsibility so that participating strengths can bring into play their initiative and creativity to form as an organic whole to bring into play the biggest power.

Unified command means to establish and perfect the operational command system of the anti air raid campaign and have smooth command relationships, enabling various participating strengths to operate under the unified command of the campaign commander and command organ. We need to: formulate an anti air raid campaign operational plan {*jihua*}; unify the *bushu* disposition of various anti air raid force-strengths and weapons; unify intelligence support; and unify and adjust-coordinate the operational activities each campaign direction, each service and arm, and the people's air defense strength so that the participating strengths can adjust-coordination of activities under a unified intent.

Subarea responsibility {fenqu fuze} means to organize anti air raid operations based on unified command. The campaign commander should determine limits of authority for handling urgent situations for each air defense subarea (unit) and have delegation mode of command for anti air raid activities of each air defense subarea (unit). In order to strengthen independent operational capabilities of each air defense subarea (unit), the campaign commander needs to decentralize authority, give each air defense subarea commander more autonomy, and fully bring into play the commander's subjective dynamic quality. Based on the principle of integrating departments and regions at different levels and relying mainly on the local leadership, we can build each air defense subarea (unit) into a more complete fire distribution system with independent command and operational capabilities. Each air defense subarea (unit) commander should, according to the higher level's unified intent, command and coordinate the resistance activities, strike the enemy air raid weapons, protect against the air raid in this subarea, and prepare for counterattack operations in this subarea. Each air defense subarea (unit) needs to fully bring into play its activeness, initiative, and creativity to actively, immediately, and resolutely implement independent command without violating the campaign intent and strike the air raid enemy without losing the opportunity.

Unified command is needed in the entire anti air raid campaign operation and subarea responsibility is need for increasing the campaign operational time effectiveness.

(4) Concentrate strength and apply force with key points

There are many targets to cover and protect in an anti-air-raid campaign operation under informationized conditions, but the number of anti air raid strengths is limited. There is a contradiction between needs and possibilities. Therefore, when applying force, we must have overall planning for the overall situation, concentrate force, and give prominence to key points.

To concentrate strength means to strike vital targets or crucial parts that will influence the course and outcome of a campaign the most. In resistance operations, we need to apply force with key points to strike the enemy airborne early warning aircraft, electronic jammers, precision guided munitions carried on the aircraft, and cruise missiles, and damage the entire structure of air raids. In counterattack operations, we need to apply force with key points to strike important targets such as the enemy air raid takeoff (launch) platforms, C⁴ISR systems, and oil depots (ammunition storage), and damage, destroy, and weaken the enemy air raid potential. In protection operations, we should have protection with key points for vital military, political, and economic targets such as command institutions, main airfields, harbors, traffic hubs, and water and electricity facilities.

Concentrating strength and applying force with key points are the important measures for winning a victory in an anti air raid campaign. Concentrating strength is an important prerequisite for applying force with key points and applying force with key points is the stay point for concentrating strength.

(5) Thorough organization and close coordination

In an anti air raid campaign, the confrontation between both sides is intense, the campaign strength composition is complex, the campaign form-states are diverse, and the battlefield situations are constantly changing. We must thoroughly organize and closely coordinate before we can form an integrated-whole combined strength and ensure the smooth implementation of the anti air raid campaign.

To organize thoroughly means to have a meticulous plan and a thorough organization for preparing and implementing the anti air raid campaign. In the phase of campaign preparation, we need to: have careful overall planning; prepare multiple plans for each one situation, multiple proposals for each one plan, multiple fighting methods for each one proposal, and multiple types of support for each one fighting method; closely organize campaign *bushi* disposition of forces, campaign maneuver and unfolding, campaign coordinate, and imminent battle training. In the phase of campaign implementation, we need to organize important operational activities closely such as information operations, resistance operations, counterattack operations, and protection operations.

Close coordination requires that each participating strength in the anti air raid campaign mutually coordinate and organically integrate as a whole to bring into play the power of the entire operation. Therefore, the command commander and command organ must: have a unified operational thought; promptly make clear the operational missions, operational patterns, activity time opportunities, and methods for each service and arm and civil air defense strengths so that the various strengths will have consistently adjusting-coordinated activities under a unified intent; they must establish a sound coordination institution and tightly formulate a coordination plan; they must fully understand the situations of participating strengths; they must fully consider objective conditions that will influence operational activities; and determine the coordination principle and method for each strength according to the predetermined course of a campaign and operational missions of each anti air raid strength. In the process of campaign implementation, the campaign commander and command organ need to grasp the changes of battlefield situations and organize coordination continuously. When the enemy disrupts coordination, we should promptly restore it. When fundamental changes occur to the situation, we must organize new coordination based on the changing situation so as to ensure that the various participating strengths will have consistently adjusting-coordinated activities.

Section 2: Main Activities...339

In an anti air raid campaign, the commander and command organ at each level should, on the basis of the characteristics of the various participating strengths, appropriately delegate operational missions, thoroughly adjust-coordinate the activities of all participating strengths, adopt flexible operational methods, and push forward the development of the war situation. The main operational activities of the anti air raid

campaign include: organize intelligence early warning, information operations, resistance operations, counterattack operations, and protection operations.

I. Organize Intelligence Early Warning...339

To thoroughly organize intelligence early warning and promptly and accurately grasp the dynamic state of air raids are important prerequisites for seizing the anti air raid campaign initiative.

(1) Construct an integrated intelligence early warning system

In order to smoothly implement an anti air raid campaign, we should establish an integrated intelligence early warning system in the land, sea, air, and space spheres to ensure that command institutions and forces at each level can promptly and accurately grasp the dynamic state of the enemy air raids. First, we need to establish an integrated air-space strategic early warning information system. In order to provide early warning for ballistic and cruise missile attack, we should *bushu* disposition the skywave over-the-horizon radar, balloon-borne radar, bistatic/multistatic radar, phased array radar, passive radar, and strategic infrared early warning satellites to form a strategic intelligence early warning system based on air defense early warning and space defense early warning. Second, we need to establish a conventional early warning system based on conventional radar, reconnaissance technical means, and early warning and guiding aircraft, and solve the problems of anti strong electronic jamming and early warning of low-altitude and stealth targets. In the meantime, we should have network integration of radar intelligence systems of each participating service and arm, achieve the rapid intercommunication of intelligence, and increase the air defense early warning capability.

(2) Establish a three-level intelligence reporting system

In order to increase the time effectiveness of transmitting intelligence and information, we should reinforce overall planning for the early warning force of each service, change the independency and self-sufficiency of the three armed services, complete the networking of intelligence and information, and establish one source with multiple channels and information sharing. Based on a radar intelligence reporting system, we should establish a three-level strategic, campaign, and tactical intelligence reporting system. The intelligence main station (substation) at each level directly provides intelligence it collects to commanders in corresponding operational units and decreases the levels of intelligence transmission. The information and other important air situations about ballistic missiles and space targets will be reported to an early warning intelligence institution at a strategic level located in an air force command post. An early warning intelligence institution at the campaign level located in a theater air force command post mainly collects air intelligence information reported by its subordinate radar brigades (regiments), tactical missile early warning phased-array radar stations, airborne early warning aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, and mobile radar units. It also receives the information reported by the early warning intelligence institution at the strategic level.

An early warning intelligence institution at the tactical level located in a forward command post or an air force unit command post mainly collects the information reported by its subordinate radar regiments, large guidance stations, and mobile radar stations, and receives the intelligence information of the early warning reconnaissance institution at the campaign level at the same time.

(3) Closely monitor the dynamic state of enemy air raids and immediately issue air raid alarms

We should apply all kinds of reconnaissance and early warning means in the land, sea, air, and space spheres, have continuous and strict reconnaissance and surveillance for the air raid enemy, and immediately investigate the enemy air raid situation. From the enemy frequent reconnaissance activities, the unusual changes of radio communications, electronic jamming key point areas and intensity, and the exercises and transfers of air raid forces and weapons, we need to investigate the following as early as possible: the composition and number of enemy air raid forces; the air raid intention and scale; the air raid weapon bases; missile launch bases and naval cruise missile launch platforms; air raid directions; assault opportunities; air raid targets; penetration means; air raid routes; and flight altitudes. After making an accurate assessment of the enemy air raid activities and obtaining a conclusion, we should issue air raid forecasts to each unit and people's air defense organizations at the right moment.

II. Information Operations...340

A future anti air raid campaign will be conducted with highly informationized weapons and equipment. The information system, as a main body of an integrated C⁴ISR system and an important information source and information channel, plays a decisive role in confrontations in the information sphere. Information confrontational activities for seizing information superiority, such as reconnaissance and anti reconnaissance, jamming and anti jamming, destruction and anti destruction, will penetrate through the entire process of operations and become important contents of an anti air raid campaign.

(1) Information reconnaissance

Based on reconnaissance in peacetime, information reconnaissance means to have additional reconnaissance and real-time reconnaissance to investigate the technical parameters, number, *bushu* disposition, and possible information attack and defense activities of the enemy electronic information equipment, and provide intelligence information support for us to implement information attack and defense activities. The information reconnaissance strengths {*xinxi zhencha liliang*} include: the space reconnaissance strength composed of reconnaissance satellites and early warning satellites; the aviation reconnaissance strength composed of early warning aircraft and electronic jammers; and the ground reconnaissance strength composed of ground radars, technical reconnaissance, and reconnaissance units. The main activities include:

Detect intelligence and information of the enemy air raid information system. This mainly investigates the number of information sources, channels, and sinks, structure, technical parameters, *bushu* disposition, and usage of the enemy information system and provides comprehensive and accurate intelligence and information for us to organize and implement information attack and defense activities. The main means include: use aerial electronic reconnaissance and imaging reconnaissance to investigate the *bushu* disposition, deployment {peizhi}, frequency band, operating system, and detection areas of the enemy early warning radar networks, location, communication methods, and communication frequencies of the communication centers, and the jamming capability, type of platform, and number of the enemy electronic jamming equipment; use space electronic and imaging equipment to investigate the structure and frequency distribution of the enemy space information links, space instrumentation and command, and the number, distribution and change of communication stations; and use ground radars, technical reconnaissance, and network reconnaissance to investigate the tactical technical characteristics and *bushu* disposition of the enemy electronic equipment, the computer network gateway nodes in the C⁴ISR system, the type, number, guidance method, and the position of the main information weapons.

Detect intelligence and information of the enemy information attack and defense activities. This mainly uses space-based, air-based, and ground-based (sea-based) reconnaissance strengths to investigate intelligence and information about the enemy information attack against us and the information defense activities that the enemy takes for dealing with our information attack, and provide intelligence and information for us to organize and implement information attack and defense activities. When detecting the enemy information attack activities, we should investigate the equipment, number, battlefield deployment {peizhi}, attack targets, means, and possible time of the enemy information attack. When detecting the enemy information defense activities, we should investigate the means and measures that the enemy uses for information defense so that we can adopt measures for information attack and information defense.

(2) Information attack

Information attack means to apply all kinds of information attack operational weapons and equipment to jam, suppress, damage, and destroy the enemy air raid information system. The strengths include: electronic jamming strength, network attack strength, and physical attack strength. The main activities include:

Electromagnetic jamming and suppression. This means to use land-based, sea-based, air-based, and space-based electronic jamming equipment to disturb the enemy air raid information system with “soft” kill. The main methods include: organize suppressed jamming, meaning to take communication jamming, radar jamming, electro-optical jamming, guidance jamming, navigation jamming, fuse jamming, and identification friend-and-foe jamming to jam the enemy airborne warning and command system, airborne radars and fire control systems, and precision guidance/weapon guidance systems; and organize deceptive jamming, meaning to use false information sent out from

our electronic equipment or camouflage equipment to deceive or confuse the enemy in the electromagnetic sphere.

Computer network attack. This means to apply network attack strengths to steal, diddle, delete, deceive, and block information and disturb information attack of the enemy air raid information system computer networks. The main methods include: computer virus attack, meaning to use computer viruses, such as a time bomb virus, a worm virus, a Trojan horse virus etc, to spread across the enemy computer network system through network transmission, virus implantation, and transmission via radio so that the system cannot operate; and invasion by “hackers,” meaning to have computer professionals to invade the enemy computer network system through computer networks, browse, exploit, and change data in computers, and disturb the enemy network system operation.

Fire physical destruction. This means to apply all kinds of precision guided munitions to paralyze the enemy information platforms, information links and nodes, and ground infrastructure with “hard” destruction. The main methods: anti-radiation attack, meaning to use anti-radiation aircraft and missiles to attack the enemy targets such as radars, early warning aircraft, and command and control systems; electromagnetic pulse attack, meaning to attack the enemy information system with electromagnetic pulse weapons; and precision missile attack, meaning to use air-based, sea-based, and land-based missiles to have hard fire destruction at the enemy information platforms and ground infrastructure.

(3) Information defense

Information defense means to take all kinds of measures and activities including anti reconnaissance, anti jamming, anti destruction, and anti network attack for resisting the enemy attack against our information system and supporting the operation of our information system. The information defensive strengths include the information defensive operational strengths such as information camouflage and network defense, and the electronic and network defensive strengths of each operational unit. The main activities include:

Anti enemy information confrontational reconnaissance. We should apply all kinds of active and passive measures to prevent the enemy information confrontational reconnaissance and decrease the enemy information reconnaissance system effectiveness to a maximum degree. The main methods include: take stealth technology and other camouflage measures for all kinds of weapons and equipment and use radio silence to make it more difficult for the enemy reconnaissance and surveillance system to detect, track, and identify; reinforce the management of the electromagnetic spectrum, use hidden frequencies or communication equipment with the low probability of intercept, strictly control electromagnetic radiation and time, and compress and encrypt signals to prevent our information links and signals from being intercepted. Even though the signals are intercepted, it is difficult for the enemy to get useful information. And place a large number of false targets to have electromagnetic diversion and deception, making it

difficult for the enemy to accurately locate our information platforms and ground facilities.

Anti enemy electronic jamming and suppression. We should integrate and apply all kinds of tactical and technical measures to fully bring into play the equipment anti jamming capability and decrease the losses caused by enemy jamming to the minimum with a rational deployment {peizhi} and careful use. The main methods include: enlarge radar power, use a radar system with strong anti jamming capability, and reasonably dispose radars with different frequency bands and in different systems to resist the enemy jamming and suppression to reconnaissance and early warning systems; use secure communication and laser communication with strong anti jamming capability, use frequency hopping, and establish a covert communication network to resist the enemy jamming and suppression to radio communication systems; and increase the anti jamming capability of optical electronic equipment and use composite guidance technology to resist the enemy jamming to optical electronic equipment.

Anti enemy computer network attack. The main methods include: anti virus, meaning to reinforce network system management, scan and kill viruses periodically and non-periodically, insert antivirus hardware, install antivirus chips, use antivirus software, and prevent viruses from invading our own computer network system; and anti network infiltration, meaning to take firewall technology to set up a protective screen between the network and the external world and prevent the enemy possible destructive invasion.

Anti enemy fire physical destruction. This means to take all kinds of protection activities to avoid information system destruction by the enemy or decrease the chances of the information system being destroyed by the enemy. The main methods include: take means such as controlling radar transmission power, using frequency agility, developing a network of bistatic or multistatic radar and multiple sets of radar, decreasing the computer operating time, and preventing the enemy radiation attack; and take measures such as putting the core equipment of the information system underground, reinforcing the camouflage of the information system, reinforcing maneuver and evasion, reinforcing fire cover for information platforms and equipment, and resisting the enemy fire attack.

III. Resistance Operations...343

The resistance operation is the most complex and fiercest operational activity. We should concentrate and use all kinds of air defense strengths such as the air force and naval fighter aviation forces, the anti-aircraft artillery force and the surface to-air missile force of each service, and the militia and reserve anti-aircraft units to have *bushi* disposition in large areas and with dynamic resistance in the enemy main air raid direction and start to intercept the enemy from the farthest long distance level by level.

(1) Integrate three areas and resist level by level

In an anti air raid campaign, the enemy mainly uses a nonlinear and long-range precision strike mode. To deal with this kind of air raid mode, we can organize resistance operations based on the farthest intercept area, the air-land attack area, and the deep anti-annihilation area.

The farthest intercept area is located in the front of the enemy air raid operational battlefield. It is the area where the fighter aviation force resists the enemy. The high performance interceptors and long-range surface-to-air missiles are deployed in the area. In order to expand the intercept range, the interceptors and surface-to-air missile units should be disposed forward as much as possible. In the coastal direction, we try to depend on the surface-to-air missile force disposed on protruding sections of shore and near-shore islands and send out the naval ships with more powerful air defense firepower to move the intercept area to the sea as much as possible. When the enemy aircraft air raids, the interceptors in the forward airbase rapidly take off to farthest intercept the enemy aircraft and cruise missiles with the coordination of long-range surface-to-air missiles and air defense firepower of naval surface ships. We strive to: destroy the enemy air raid; force the enemy to have a dispersed formation; and create conditions for following operations.

The air-land attack area is located in the middle of the enemy air raid operational battlefield. This area has better battlefield conditions and it is the primary operational area that applies the fighter aviation force, surface-to-air missile force, and anti-aircraft artillery force to annihilate the enemy. We should dispose the primary military strengths of the fighter aviation force, surface-to-air missile force, and anti-aircraft artillery force to have an air-land attack against the enemy air raid weapons and intercept with key points. When the air raid enemy penetrates our farthest intercept area and enters the air-land attack area, our air defense force disposed in this area should take fighting methods such as airborne intercept and surface-to-air strike, form a concentrated firepower network, intercept the enemy air raid weapons with key points, block the enemy surprise raid passageways, and stop the enemy from advance in depth.

The deep anti-annihilation area is located in the end of the enemy air raid operational battlefield and it is the last defensive line to resist the enemy air raid. The mid-range and near-range surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and anti-aircraft machine guns, with the coordination of the fighter aviation force, can form a three-dimensional ring-like firepower protective screen and set up all kinds of air float obstacles in different heights and distances to form an omni-directional and all-height closed momentum against the enemy. When the air raid enemy penetrates this area, all kinds of air defense weapons deployed in this area should concentrate firepower to intercept the enemy air raid weapons continuously, keep them off protected targets, and ensure the security of important targets.

(2) Widespread maneuver and dynamic resistance

The anti enemy air raid operation is an operational pattern in which the enemy is active and we are passive. Since the enemy can fully make use of aviation weapons with rapid maneuver and flexibility, flexibly change the air raid direction and strike targets, and flexibly use strike means, we must await the enemy to move in resistance operations. In order to effectively resist the enemy air raid, we must maneuver the air defense force and weapons to have dynamic resistance against the enemy. According to the characteristics and laws of enemy air raid operations and on the basis of accurately grasping and making assessment of the dynamic stage of enemy situations, we should correctly apply maneuver forces, choose a favorable maneuver opportunity and space, and strike objects. This is especially so that when we grasp the information about the enemy air raid, we can rapidly organize air defense strengths to maneuver to where the enemy must pass and spare no efforts to intercept the enemy that air raids or the enemy that returns to base.

The main operational methods include:

Maneuver guerrilla warfare. This means to broadly maneuver air defense force-strengths and weaponry with unpredictable guerrilla operations and annihilate enemy aircraft to catch the enemy unaware in favorable areas. If it is difficult to determine the air raid direction of the enemy weapons, we can organize a guerrilla air defense formation composed of manportable air defense missiles and small anti-aircraft guns to have a full-scale guerrilla operation and destroy the enemy. If we can determine the air raid direction of enemy weapons, we can rapidly assemble nearby air defense formations to maneuver to the direction, form a continuous resistance posture in far, mid, and near depth, and have a multi-level attack against the enemy. When our air defense system is suppressed by the enemy and there is a gap, we should rapidly mobilize guerrilla air defense formations to close the gap immediately.

Lure the enemy and ambush. This means to use camouflage, showing signs of false targets, and diversion to strike the enemy with the ambushed air defense force. We can take the following means: show signs of false targets and ambush. This means to set up false airfields, false positions, false aircraft, false missiles, and false radars to lure the enemy in order to attack and annihilate the enemy with ambushed air defense units, diversion, and ambush. This means to take electronic diversion and force diversion to lure the enemy to attack and wipe out the enemy with ambushed air defense units; and lure and strike the enemy with the air defense force. This means to dispose part of the ground air defense force in the battlefield, and a small number of aviation forces lures the enemy into the ambush area and annihilates the enemy with surface-to-air firepower.

Air route ambush. According to the activity laws of the enemy air raid weapons, part of the air defense force is ambushed on the flight route of the enemy air raid weapons, waiting for an opportunity to annihilate the enemy. The ambush sites are normally close to enemy aircraft route checkpoints, air-to-surface missile launch positions, cruise missile

routes, and the space domain of enemy airborne early warning aircraft, air-to-air tanker aircraft, and electronic jammers.

(3) Concentrate strengths and resist with key points

In anti enemy air raid operations, we resist superiority with inferiority. The contradiction between operational needs and actual operational capabilities is prominent, and we must concentrate our strengths, strike key point targets, and resist with key points. The enemy early warning command aircraft are the center of gravity for the air formation to acquire information and coordinate command. The electronic warfare aircraft are the main force that the enemy uses to implement electromagnetic suppression. The stealth aircraft and cruise missiles are the enemy long-range precision strike weapons with the best penetration capability. Therefore, these “three aircraft and one missile” should become our key-point strike targets in resistance operations.

Strike the enemy early warning command aircraft. We normally strike the enemy early warning command aircraft when it changes shifts, refuels, and neglects to be on the alert, or implement attacks of the selected strikes on enemy early warning [EW] command aircraft during the time opportunities of their air raid wave transitions {boci zhuanhuan} and when they are busy with their mission. Normally, under cover of electronic jammers, the interceptor attack unit remains in cover from multiple directions, part of the interceptors tie down the fighters that cover the enemy early warning command aircraft, and the rest of the force surrounds and annihilates the enemy early warning command aircraft.

Strike the enemy electronic warfare aircraft. The enemy electronic warfare aircraft have strong electronic jamming capability. They are difficult for our radar to detect and our missiles are easy to lose control. Therefore, in order to strike the enemy electronic warfare aircraft, we should deploy early warning command aircraft, balloon-borne radars, and ground radar to form an integrated three-dimensional radar detection network. When the enemy electronic warfare aircraft enter the network, each type of radar starts to operate to detect from different directions or report the location of enemy aircraft from observation posts. When the enemy jams our detection system, we should apply multiple tactical means such as radar cross section to determine the location of the enemy electronic warfare aircraft. After determining the location of the enemy electronic warfare aircraft, we should immediately guide the interceptors to intercept and attack with infrared air-to-air missiles and aircraft guns. When the enemy electronic warfare aircraft enter the ground air defense position, the surface-to-air missile units should attack the aircraft with the primary jamming direction that has been deviated and has less jamming intensity in the opposite direction or side direction, and the anti-aircraft gun units should use their strong anti-jamming capability to block and fire at the enemy electronic warfare aircraft to destroy them at one stroke.

Strike the enemy stealth aircraft. The stealth aircraft has better stealth effectiveness for the centimeter wave radar and worse stealth effectiveness for the meter wave radar and

millimeter wave radar. The front, side, and top of stealth aircraft are easy to detect. When the aircraft opens the hatch door or flies in low attitude, the stealth effectiveness will also decrease a great deal. According to these weaknesses, we should use the equilateral triangle method to dispose radar positions near the enemy possible air raid routes and ensure that no matter from which direction an enemy stealth aircraft enters the radar position, we have two or more radars for detection. In the meantime, we can deploy meter wave, millimeter wave, and long meter wave radars, and early warning command aircraft to detect and track the enemy stealth aircraft. In order to prevent visual detection, the enemy stealth aircraft normally air raids at nighttime. Our high-performance interceptors should detect and aim at the target with an airborne infrared search/tracer and a laser range finder under the guidance of an early warning detection system and attack the stealth aircraft with missiles.

Strike the enemy cruise missiles. The cruise missile normally takes low-altitude penetration, making it difficult for us to detect and track. However, its velocity is slow, flight time is long, and air route is fixed, and it will not maneuver after being attacked. This creates favorable conditions for us to intercept. In order to strike the enemy cruise missiles, we should first apply multiple means such reconnaissance satellites, radars, laser, infrared, acoustics, and vision to grasp the whereabouts of the enemy cruise missiles. Second, according to the activity laws of enemy cruise missiles, we can set up defense with key points and intercept level by level. The flight route of enemy cruise missiles is more fixed so that we can roughly figure out the direction of cruise missiles based on the launch platform of enemy cruise missiles and the targets that the missile may strike and deploy air defense weapons. When the enemy launches a cruise missile attack, our interceptors in air patrol will intercept cruise missiles right away and the ground air defense force will organize a multi-channel, multi-belt, and multi-level fire network to intercept cruise missiles level by level.

IV. Counterattack Operations...347

The counterattack operation is the offensive activity in the anti air raid campaign. It also carries out “offensive air defense” and has a significant influence on the course and outcome of the campaign. According to the higher level’s intent, the development and needs of war situations, and the counterattack capability, we should make decisions carefully, choose an opportunity properly, select targets meticulously, use one’s own forces according to the enemy situations, use fighting methods skillfully, and take the initiative to counterattack the air raid enemy flexibly. In general situations, we can choose the following favorable opportunities in counterattack operations: when the enemy air raids and we are ready to counterattack; when the enemy’s first sortie of air raid aircraft return to base or get ready to dispatch again after landing; after we resist, the enemy air raid force is obviously weakened; when most of the air raid force dispatches, the rear is empty; when the enemy continuously dispatches, feeling tired and slack and being neglectful to be on alert; when the enemy dispatched base force is more concentrated and exposed; and when the weather and climate conditions are bad for the enemy. According to the level of importance of the enemy targets and our counterattack

capability, we should regard the air force base as a primary target for counterattack. For the scale of counterattack, we should act according to our capability. For the use of strengths, we should concentrate crack troops and sharp weapons of each service to implement joint counterattack, ensuring starting no counterattack unless one can win.

The aviation force should be the priority force to attack the enemy air force base and the ship force, conventional missile force, and special operations force coordinate with the aviation force to implement a full-scale continuous, fierce, and surprise joint fire counterattack from different ranges, different directions, different altitudes, and with multiple batches and sorties against the enemy air force bases and destroy the enemy air raid system. The main methods include:

First, the missiles lead the way and integrate jamming with deception. When the enemy has a compact air defense system, we should concentrate fire assault in the first sortie against the enemy air force bases and strive to suppress the enemy airfield runways and air defense system effectively now that conventional missiles and cruise missiles have strong penetration capability and a long strike range, and the weather and climate conditions have little influence on the missiles. In the meantime, we should use unmanned electronic jammers and unmanned attack aircraft to implement strong electronic jamming and deceptive attack against the enemy air force bases, force the enemy air defense system to unfold and go into operations in advance, find out the tactical technical indices of the enemy air defense system, use anti radiation unmanned aerial vehicles to attack the enemy early warning radar system, and create conditions for aviation force penetration thereafter.

Second, penetrate in multiple directions and destroy with key points. The enemy has better air defense capability and our aviation force should penetrate at low altitude and ultra low altitude, penetrate in the blind area or the weak area of the enemy radar detection, penetrate with small formations, in multiple directions, with multiple batches, and with diversion and cover, and open up penetration passageways to quickly penetrate the enemy air defense distribution system. After the assault formation penetrates the enemy air defense distribution system, we should concentrate firepower on vital parts to destroy the structure, strike the enemy's crucial targets with key points such as command and control centers, airfield runways, airfield parking areas, and oil depots, and effectively weaken the enemy air raid capability. We should scientifically and rationally divide the time and space for the aviation force, conventional missiles, and naval ships (submarines) to attack and strike the enemy nonstop with high intensity in a shorter time.

V. Protection Operations...348

In an anti air raid campaign, we face serious air threats and need to protect many important targets. Whether to effectively preserve combat power and decrease the personnel casualties and property losses is very important to stabilize the war situations and society. Therefore, we must think highly of this and meticulously plan and prepare protection operations.

(1) Integrate the military with the people and protect with key points

First, in order to fight in protection operations, we must place emphasis on playing the role of professional protection strengths such as military protection strength and people's air defense strength, fully mobilize the masses to participate in protection, and combine the military with the people for joint defense as an organic whole to obtain good protection effectiveness. Second, we should give prominence to the protection of key point targets on the basis of organizing overall protection. The practice of recent local wars indicates that the targets under air raids include party, government, and army head institutions, strategic command systems, air defense and space defense systems, water and electricity and energy targets related to the national economy and people's livelihood, and military, political, and economic targets with war potential. Therefore, we should concentrate our strengths on protecting these targets.

(2) Reinforce control and ensure battlefield order

When detecting the signs of an enemy air raid, we should immediately release an air raid alarm. When the enemy air raids, we should: reinforce the control of city lights, electromagnetic spectrums, and the flow of crowds and decrease the probability of being detected by the enemy; reinforce traffic management and keep good traffic order; reinforce the control of media such as news, broadcast, etc. and stabilize popular feelings and morale; play the role of forces, armed police, public security, militia, and local governments; reinforce social order management; and keep good social order.

(3) Multiple means and integrated protection

In order to have good protection effectiveness, we should integrate traditional protection means with high-tech means and apply multiple means. The main protection means include the following. *Camouflage*: utilize vegetation and terrain to camouflage fixed facilities such as main engineering projects, positions, communication and transport hubs, and energy bases and the force-unit heavy equipment, and apply means such as natural shielding, color changing or form-changing to decrease or eliminate the features of targets to prevent the enemy from detecting and striking. *Show the false*: utilize the terrain and environment and all kinds of standard and expedient equipment to set up false positions, weapons, and facilities, and use simulated light sources, heat sources, and electromagnetic sources to launch false signals to lure the enemy to strike and bomb the false targets so as to decrease the air raid effectiveness. *Set up obstacles and defilades* {shezhang zhebi}: for large fixed targets such as hydroelectric power stations and energy stations, use loop, multilayer, and cross obstacles such as floating mines, balloons, parachute cables, and smoke screens to block and interfere the enemy's air raid weapon strike. *Be modest in concealment*: implement concealment for personnel, weapons and equipment and operational materiel, etc. by utilizing currently existing protection engineering projects and provisionally constructed protection works. *Disperse deployment* {shusan peizhi}, namely utilize terrain and surface features to disperse the deployment of force-strengths and weapons and to disperse the concealment of personnel

and materiel, so as to lower enemy air raid effectiveness. *Maneuver at the right time:* utilize the time gap between the enemy's reconnaissance of the target and attack of the target to maneuver force-strengths and weaponry at the right time, change position arrays and disrupt the position fix of the enemy's original information, so as to evade the enemy air strike and improve survivability.

(4) Rapidly clear up the air raid aftermath

After the enemy air raid, we should immediately investigate the damage through all channels. According to needs, we immediately organize each kind of professional protection team to rescue and repair. First, we should immediately organize the armed forces and local rescue strengths to rescue personnel and material resources and decrease the casualties and property losses to the maximum degree. Second, we should immediately organize strengths to repair targets under enemy assault. For the repair of military targets, the military professionals are the primary repair strength and the people are the secondary under the guidance of military engineering technical personnel. Non military targets should be repaired primarily by the people under the guidance of local governments. Third, we should immediately clear up secondary nuclear, biological, and chemical disasters. For targets with secondary nuclear, biological, and chemical disaster, we should: organize rescue and decontamination activities based on the several key links of "control, detection, rescue decontamination," meaning to control toxin and contaminated areas, immediately organize detection and chemical examination to investigate the pollution and rapidly notify, immediately rescue the personnel that are poisoned, and immediately decontaminate the contaminated regions, personnel, and equipment. In addition, if the enemy air raid causes fire, we should organize professional fire fighters and the people to put out the fire.

Part III: Army Campaigns...351

An Army {陆军 lujun} campaign is a campaign conducted by an Army large formation either independently or assisted by and complemented by other service force-units (elements).

The difference between an army campaign and campaigns of other services are: its main body strength is the army campaign large formation, its main battlefield is the ground battlefield, its main activities are army operations, it's a unified command of the army campaign large formation command institution, and its main goal is to gain victory of ground operations. An army campaign under informationized conditions normally must obtain assistance from and be complemented by other services and arms; it is a "sub-campaign" within a joint campaign; and it is sometimes implemented independently by an Army large formation.

Chapter 15 Overview...351

The essence of an army campaign under informationized conditions is a series of operational activities for the purpose of achieving a predetermined campaign goal. With development of the integrated {yitihua} joint campaign, the roles of sea, air, and space strengths have gained more prominence, but the status of the army campaign has not diminished and its success still has a decisive quality effect on the overall war. The army campaign not only can achieve a war's localized quality goals, it can also achieve a war's overall situation quality goals.

When organizing army campaigns under informationized conditions, one must thoroughly carry out the campaign's basic guidance thought, comprehensively apply the operational strengths of all services and arms, combine regular operations with irregular operations, combine contact operations with non-contact operations, combine linear operations with non-linear operations, combine annihilation warfare with paralysis warfare, and form an integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli}; one must concentrate the main strength in the campaign main direction and critical occasion, key-point strike the vital area targets {yaohai mubiao} that play a supporting role in the enemy's operational system {tixi}, and implement system destructive-attack warfare {xitong pohuai zhan}; one must actively attack, combine offense and defense, agilely maneuver and strike the enemy, and strive to gain campaign victory at lesser cost.

Section 1: Definition, Status, and Classification of Army Campaigns...352

The definition, status, and classification of army campaigns are the primary content and basic problems of the essential theory of army campaigns, and thus they are the important components of the essential theory of army campaigns.

I. Definition of Army Campaigns...352

An army campaign is a campaign organized and implemented by an army campaign large formation, either independently or with the army campaign large formation in the lead. It can be implemented from within the task-organization of a joint campaign, or it can be implemented individually.

The above definition is a conceptualized expression of the essence and attributes of an army campaign, and is a logical starting point to study army campaigns. This definition includes the following five aspects. First, it makes clear that an army campaign serves as a ranking of armed struggle, it is a layer situated between war and combat, and it is a form-state {xingtai} of the campaign. Second, it makes clear that the basic strength of an army campaign is an army force-strength within the task organization of an army large formation or reinforced by higher level {shangji}. Or, with this former in the lead, it is complemented by various strengths of other services. Third, it makes clear that the main body of army campaign command is the army campaign large formation commander and his command organ. Fourth, it makes clear that the land battlefield is the army campaign battlefield, or with the land battlefield in the lead, it is assisted and complemented by other battlefields. Fifth, it makes clear that the army campaign not only can be individually applied, but it can be conducted within the task-organization of a joint campaign, forming a “sub-campaign” of the joint campaign and subordinate to and in the service of the overall joint campaign situation .

The features {tezheng} of an army campaign are an outward expression of the essence of the army campaign and the special attributes of the army campaign. In addition to having the general features of a campaign, the army campaign also possesses its own unique features. These unique features are expressed in the three aspects of army campaign strength, campaign battlefield, and campaign command.

(1) The campaign strength {liliang} is task-organized with is an army campaign large formation in the lead

The campaign strength {liliang} is the physical basis for implementing the campaign mission and is one of the basic essential elements {yaosu} in forming a campaign. With which service strength to task-organize the campaign large formation is one of the basic indicators distinguishing the campaign form-state {xingtai}. The most essential feature of an army campaign is that the campaign strength of an army campaign is task-organized with an army campaign large formation in the lead. Its basic expression is that the main body portion of the campaign task-organization is an army campaign large formation, and other services and arms are supplemental and secondary. This is because in a modern war, one needs[-requires] {xuyao} to wipe out a defensive enemy or defend-hold important targets and areas, and for these, one must task organize the campaign strength with an army campaign large formation as the main body in order to ensure the accomplishment of campaign missions and the realization of campaign goals. Even though informationized weapons and equipment are massively applied on the battlefield,

and under the informationized conditions of war form-states {xingtai}, goals, operational thought and means having undergone fundamental-quality changes, in order to accomplish campaign missions such as *attacking cities-seizing territory* {gongcheng luedi} or massively annihilating the enemy's effective strength {yousheng liliang}, one still needs-requires {xuyao} to task-organize a campaign strength with an army campaign large formation in the lead and carry out various land campaign activities complemented by the strengths of other services and arms. One can see that the objective needs-requirements {xuyao} of war decides the objective existence where one must task-organize an army campaign with an army campaign large formation in the lead.

(2) The main battlefield is the land battlefield

The campaign battlefield is the spatial arena where both sides conduct a contest of strengths. It is an objective condition for implementing a campaign and it is one of the basic essential elements {yaosu} of a campaign. Generally speaking, the altitude and location of the battlefield space is an important indicator for distinguishing the campaign form-state {xingtai}. A campaign implemented on the land battlefield is an army campaign, a campaign implemented on the air battlefield is an air force campaign, and a campaign implemented on the sea battlefield is a navy campaign. Thus, a battlefield space with the land in the lead is a clearly essential feature of an army campaign and is an important indicator that differentiates the army campaign from other campaign form-states {xingtai}.

The battlefield of the army campaign is mainly on the ground. This is determined by the mission of the army and its authorized equipment. But, army campaign battlefields are not limited to the ground alone. It means while the main area is on the ground, it also includes associated air space, and sometimes it also includes associated sea area. The reasons are as follows. First, modern army campaigns cannot be without the support of the air force. To seize and maintain air dominance is critical to winning the army campaign. Secondly, some of the army campaigns must be expanded to the sea area and must have support of the navy. For example, when an army campaign large formation is carrying out amphibious landing operations or anti-landing operations, the operational space includes the sea area and the operational activities must be supported by the navy. Thirdly, in many countries, the army now has various flying crafts in its inventory, which can be used to directly support and coordinate with land operations in the associated air space. Fourthly, under informationized conditions, when operational activities are carried out on the land battlefield, these activities must be supported by the air, sea, space, and electromagnetic domain. However, even though army campaign battlefields include associated air, sea, space, and electromagnetic domains, fundamentally the battlefield of army campaigns is on the ground and the main campaign activities are carried out on land. Operations in associated air and sea domains are to support and coordinate with land operations, and to serve land operations.

(3) Campaign command is implemented with the army campaign large formation command institution in the lead

Campaign command refers to the activity {huodong} for organizing and leading campaign activities by the commander and his command organ {zhihui jiguan}. It is the foremost main subjective factor in campaign victory. In an army campaign, the main body strength for accomplishing missions is the army campaign large formation, and the main campaign activities are conducted on the land battlefield. Therefore, the organizing and leading activity {huodong} must be the unified responsibility of the army campaign large formation commander and his command organ. Under informationized conditions, it is the unified responsibility of the army campaign large formation command institution to command, and in a non-army-only command with an army campaign large formation campaign command institution in the lead absorbs the participation of relevant command personnel of other services and arms to form an army campaign command institution together and unified implementation of the army campaign command. Because of the increase in services and arms assisting and complementing army campaign operations, the lead in command is complex. Thereby, in order to even better bring into play the roles of the services and arms, not only must one stress the unified responsibility of command by the army campaign large formation command institution, one must also attach importance to bringing into play the roles of the commanders of other participating services and arms, and ensure a consistent adjusting-coordination of activities amongst all services and arms so as to defeat the enemy with an integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli}.

II. Status of Army Campaigns...354

Historically, the army campaign has always been the main campaign form-state {xingtai}. As science and technology develops {fazhan}, the campaign basic form-state has transformed from the traditional army campaign to the all-services joint campaign, and the status of the army campaign is in the midst of changing. With this background in mind, it is very important to clarify [make clear] the status of the army campaign in a future war in order to correctly understand the army campaign and to correctly apply the army campaign large formation.

(1) The army campaign is normally a "sub-campaign" within a joint campaign

The history of human warfare is almost a history of army wars. Because man's productivity level has always been quite low, military operations have been constrained more often by factors on the ground. During many historical periods, the army campaign has all along played the lead role. After WWII, as the operational capabilities of the air force and navy rapidly improved and were widely used, the status and function of ground operations began to change. The enormity of the army campaign large formation system {tixi} and the weak points of weaponry technological content started to become obvious weaknesses. Both in terms of operations and various items of safeguarding-support, the gradually could not be separated from assisting and complementing the other services,

and the campaign form-state started to develop from the single-service army campaign to a combined campaign involving the participation of various services. In recent years, under the backdrop of the massive application of high-tech weapons and equipment in operations, especially in the combination of airborne strike strengths with precision guided weapons, as well as the considerable developments {fazhan} in naval ship and the strategic missile force-units, the operational activities of striking ground targets from sea and air are being ever universally applied, and thus this has resulted in profound changes to the status and role of the army campaign large formation in a campaign. A series of local wars have demonstrated that services such as the Navy and the Air Force have moved away from playing a supporting role to becoming main players, and the all-services joint campaign implemented together with an equal status has become the basic form-state of a campaign. In a future local war under informationized conditions, a situation whereby the army campaign large formation independently accomplishes campaign missions will gradually diminish, and in some joint campaigns, the army campaign large formation may even play a subordinate role.

(2) The army campaign is still an important and irreplaceable campaign form-state in local wars

Under informationized conditions, campaign operations will unfold in multiple dimension spaces, including the land, sea, air, space, and electromagnetic domains. Army campaigns will need-require the participation and assistance {zhiyuan} of the Navy and the Air Force, while the Navy and Air Force campaigns will also need-require the support {zhichi} and cooperation of the Army. Though army campaigns will no longer be in the lead role in wars, all operational activities must have support from the ground and the final conclusion of the war will still be fought on the ground. At the same time, because the Navy and Air Force operational strengths are easily affected by terrain or weather factors, in many situations, their operational capabilities cannot be easily brought into play. The army, on the other hand, is a service that is less affected by the environment. Thus, in many situations, army campaigns will have a positive stabilizing effect on the war or on the overall situation of joint campaigns. From the perspective of the military struggle circumstances {军事斗争形势 junshi douzheng xingshi} faced by China at the beginning of the 21st century, annihilating or expelling an enemy, and defending or restoring motherland territory via army campaign activities are still an irreplaceable military struggle form {军事斗争形式 junshi douzheng xingshi}. In particular, compared with more powerful enemies, the overall level of our weapons and equipment is inferior. By effectively organizing ground operations, fully utilizing advantageous terrain and weather, relying on the support of the masses, demonstrating the People's War tradition, and flexibly applying fighting methods, we will be able to demonstrate the advantage of fighting on our home territory and make up the difference between the capability level of weapons and equipment. Thus in future wars, army campaigns will still occupy an important status and will have an important function. For example, in a future border area counterattack campaign and island offensive campaign, army campaigns may be the decisive-quality campaigns to gain ultimate victory in the war.

III. Classifications of Army Campaigns...355

The classification of army campaigns is based on the attributes and characteristics of army campaigns. Classification is an important part of the theory of the science of army campaigns, and is an important step in the study of the theory of the science of army campaigns.

(1) Classification based on campaign nature {xingzhi}

Based on the nature of the campaign, an army campaign can be divided into an army offensive campaign and army defensive campaign. The army offensive campaign and the army defensive campaign are two different types of operational activities implemented by a campaign large formation on the land battlefield. Amongst these, the main goal of the former is to annihilate enemy groups and attack-occupy important areas or targets; the main goal of the latter is to expend and kill the enemy, frustrate the enemy's offensive, or gain time so as to create conditions for transitioning to counterattack or attack. From the perspective of the general and overall situation of the war, an offensive campaign is the main means for achieving a war's localized or overall-situation quality goals, while a defensive campaign is a supplemental means. It should be pointed out that pure offensive or defensive does not exist, and offensive and defensive operational activities are mutually intertwined. In the offensive, there are defensive postures; in the defensive, there are offensive postures, but in terms of the general nature, the offensive and defensive attributes of an army campaign are clearly recognizable.

(2) Classification based on campaign pattern {yangshi}

Based on campaign patterns {yangshi}, the basic type {leixing} of army campaigns can be further divided. Because the missions and operational conditions undertaken in each army campaign can be different and the requirements of strategy on campaign in different historical periods are different, the patterns of the army campaign are also very different. Under informationized conditions, army campaign patterns mainly include: positional offensive campaign and positional defensive campaign, urban offensive campaign and urban defensive campaign; landing campaign and anti-landing (or coastal defensive) campaign, and maneuver offensive campaign and maneuver defensive campaign, etc.

(3) Classification based on the scale of the campaign

Based on the scale of campaigns, army campaigns can be divided into group army campaigns {集团军战役 jituanjun zhanyi} and army group campaigns {集团军群战役 jituanjunqun zhanyi}. Army campaigns can also be divided into small-scale army campaigns and large-scale (medium-scale) army campaigns.

Campaigns conducted primarily by a single group army are a group army campaign, i.e., a small-scale army campaign. The group army is the basic campaign large formation and has the capability to carry out the basic mission of the army campaign. Campaigns

conducted by the provincial military command {省军区 sheng junqu} also belong to the group army-level campaigns. Group army campaigns are normally carried out within the structure of the joint campaign large formation or the structure of the army group. Sometimes, they can also be conducted independently.

Campaigns that are mainly executed by several group armies are called army group campaigns, i.e., large-scale (or medium-scale) army campaigns. An army group is a higher-level campaign large formation organized temporarily based on operational needs. An army group consists of two or more group armies. It is responsible for strategic missions or operational missions directly assigned by the superior. Army group campaigns are normally conducted within the structure of the joint campaign large formation, or they can also be organized independently.

(4) Classification based on the geographical environment

The two basic types of army campaigns can be further divided based on the geographic environment. Normally there are: plain offensive campaigns and defensive campaigns; hilly area offensive campaigns and defensive campaigns; mountain offensive campaigns and defensive campaigns; desert and steppe offensive campaigns and defensive campaigns; plateau and cold region offensive campaigns and defensive campaigns; tropical mountain and jungle area offensive campaigns and defensive campaigns; river and water network area offensive campaigns and defensive campaigns, etc.

It should be noted that the spatial areas of army campaigns are large and the geographic environments often intersect with diverse topography. Thus, this classification is conceptually relative. As long as the main operational activities of an army campaign are carried out under a particular geographic environmental condition, we can classify it as a campaign under that geographic condition.

Because classification is based on diverse emphases and methods, the classification of army campaigns can be even more numerous. For example, classification based on the form-state of war, we can divide it into an army campaign under full-scale war {quanmian zhanzheng} conditions and an army campaign under localized war {jubu zhanzheng} conditions. Division based on the backdrop of war, we can divide it into an army campaign under nuclear conditions and an army campaign under conventional conditions. If conducting division based on campaign task-organization, we can divide it into an army campaign within a joint campaign task-organization and an army campaign independently implemented by an army campaign large formation, etc.

Section 2: Origin and Development of Army Campaigns...357

The origin of army campaigns and their development is one of the important topics in the theoretical study of army campaigns. Studying the origin and development of army campaigns can help people understand the fundamental causes of army campaigns,

accurately understand the objective patterns of army campaign development, and scientifically predict the future development trend of army campaigns.

I. Origin of Army Campaigns...357

Army campaigns are a historical and social phenomenon. They were not present in time immemorial, but were born in the historical process and developed as a product of historical development. As a specific historical and social phenomenon, army campaigns are the product of history when human warfare reached a certain historical stage.

In the later part of primitive societies, due to the rise of private properties, war appeared in the history of mankind. At that time, war was only a method of struggle for the means and ends of production. War was violent confrontations with simple contents, simple forms, and small in scale. Combat {战斗 zhandou}¹⁰ was the first method of struggle of violent confrontations. During that time, combat was the most fundamental expression and content of war.

After man moved into class-based society, war became "the highest form of struggle in a certain stage of development to solve conflicts between classes, races, nations, and political groups." New means and modes of war developed. For a rather long period of time, combat was the basic means to realize the goal of war. As social history developed and war implemented, a phenomenon occurred: In a war, several large-scale engagements {交战 jiaozhan} needed to occur before the mission of the war could be accomplished; during each large-scale engagement, there were several combats, either consecutively or simultaneous, before the goal of the operation could be accomplished. Thus, an operational level that is between war and combat appeared. That level is the army campaign.

II. Basic History of Development of Army Campaigns...358

During the long history of war, as productivity of society improved and various war factors developed, the army campaign underwent a development process where its scale went from small to large and its types and patterns went from simple to complex.

(1) Army campaigns in ancient times

Ancient Chinese army campaigns began in the 6th century BC and went through a long history of more than 2,300 years, from the late Spring and Autumn period, the Warring period, the Qin, Han, Sui, Tang, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasty, to the 1840 Opium war. The Wu-Chu Battle at Boju in 506 BC was considered by historians as the first more complete army campaign. The main reasons are: First, engagement became an intermediate activity of war. One engagement required several combat activities {战斗行

¹⁰ Translator's note: Combat or it can be translated as battle or fight.

动 zhandou xingdong} to complete. Secondly, the scale of the engagement expanded. The forces involved in an engagement could be more than 200,000 persons. In an engagement, the number of combats increased, mobility improved, and operational offensive-defensive switching became more frequent. Thirdly, the duration of an engagement was longer. Chinese army campaigns in ancient times could be divided into two periods with the Song dynasty as the dividing boundary. There were the cold weapons period, and the cold and hot weapons period. Weaponry, strength scale, operational form-states, patterns and methods, the command system {tizhi} and means, and operational guidance all witnessed continued advancement. The operational guidance theories with unique ancient Chinese army campaign characteristics gradually established.

In foreign countries, ancient army campaigns began in the 5th century BC and ended during the Bourgeois Revolution in England in the mid 17th century, a development history that lasted for more than 2,100 years. Historians believe that army campaigns originated during the Greek-Persia war from 491-449 BC. Campaigns such as the battle of Marathon, the Thermopylae campaign, and the Salamis campaign all possessed the essential attributes and basic essential elements of army campaigns. From 490 BC to the 5th century AD was the developmental period of ancient army campaigns in foreign countries. That was at the peak of the slave trade between Europe and the west Asian continent. Alexander's expedition to the East, the Punic Wars, and the Roman civil war occurred during this period. The scale, patterns, operational methods and operational guidance of army campaigns acquired different characteristics and innovations. From the 5th century to the 14th century was the stagnation period of ancient army campaigns. Europe just experienced the rise of the feudal society and was in a state of racial segregation and feudal division. Many small countries were established. It was difficult for these small countries to organize large-scale unified military activities. As a result, army campaign operations stayed at a standstill. From the 15th century to the 17th century was the rejuvenation period of army campaigns. The appearance of fire arms gave the army campaigns a new boost on the road to further development. The Orleans campaign of the England-French hundred year war, the Granada campaign in the Byzantium-Turkey war, and the Spanish Naval Expedition against England all showed new innovations and development. In particular, research in firearms, and improvement in military organizational systems and operational methods paved the way for weapons and equipment and campaign operations development during the recent times.

(2) Army campaigns in recent times

The history of Chinese modern army campaigns began in 1840 during the first Opium war, and ended in 1919 during the "May 4th" movement. This period was close to 80 years in length and witnessed more than 50 campaigns, large and small. Army campaigns that had major impacts on the development of army campaigns in recent times include the following: the Yong'an campaign of the Taiping revolutionary war (January 1851-February 1866), the Hukou campaign, the Sanhezhen campaign, the Pingrang campaign of the Tianjing defensive campaign, the Sino-Japan war (July 1894 to April 1895), the

Shandong peninsula defensive campaign, the Sichuan campaign of the Self Defense war (December 1915 to December 1916), the Xiangxi [West Hunan province] campaign, the Diangui [Yunnan Guangxi] border campaign, etc. During this period, the development of army campaigns can be broadly divided into three phases. Phase one, from the Opium war in 1840 to the defeat of the Taiping revolt. This was the extension of the ancient army campaigns and the beginning of the modern army campaigns. The second phase began in 1866 and ended in the Sino-Japan war in 1895. During this time, army campaigns evolved and modernized. The third phase was from 1895 to 1919. During this period, the army used modern methods to conduct army campaigns.

In foreign countries, army campaign development in the recent times began in 1640 during the Bourgeois Revolution to 1917 on the eve of the Russian Socialist Revolution, a period of close to 280 years. During this period, the Bourgeois Revolution greatly unleashed productivity of society, and industries developed by leaps and bounds. This greatly raised the combat capabilities of army operations. The scale of the army began to expand, and the authorized strength system was established. Many countries implemented the compulsory military service system. Development in weapons and equipment in particular advanced in great strides. As a result, the scale and ferocity of army campaigns in foreign countries experienced unprecedented growth. Military theories also blossomed. During this period, several tens of wars happened, and more than 20 of them were influential. The more famous of the army campaigns included the following: campaigns during the Independence Wars of the U.S., campaigns in the Napoleonic Wars, campaigns in the Crimean War, and campaigns in the Sino-Russian War.

(3) Contemporary army campaigns

Contemporary army campaigns refer to army campaigns that occurred during and after the two World Wars. Their development went through several important historical periods.

The WWI period. During this period, there were significant changes in the structure of the army campaign large formation. Operational capabilities improved greatly. The importance of service arms such as the tank force and the engineering force increased continuously. Radios were common and were deployed to the division-level operational units. Chemical agents were used in large quantities. The birth of the Aviation force in particular caused the structure of the army campaigns to experience revolutionary change. To a certain extent, army campaigns began to become three-dimensional. These changes directly led to the expansion of the scale of the army campaigns. Army campaigns of the front army-level {方面军 fangmianjun}¹¹ appeared. In one engagement, each side may deploy several tens of group armies.

¹¹ Front army: According to *PLA Military Terms* (1997), p. 151, "A level of military organization in wartime composed of a number of group armies or corps. Ordinarily under the jurisdiction of the supreme headquarters. It is composed of leadership staff and has jurisdiction over a certain number of combat units

The WWII period. The Second World War is a contemporary war of the largest-scale in human history. During this period, contemporary army campaigns went through unprecedented growth. The army campaign patterns diversified and operational methods became more flexible. Encirclement {hewei} became the basic means of the army offensive campaign. The status and function of mobility {jidong} in army campaigns markedly improved. Army campaign command put more emphasis on overall planning {chouhua} and stratagem application {moulue yunyong}. Army campaign theory came to have a more obvious and direct guidance role in army campaign practice.

The local wars period after the World Wars. During the second half of the 20th century after the two World Wars, local wars occurred frequently. The most notable are the Vietnam War and the Middle East War. During the Vietnam War period, helicopters as an important operational means were widely used and expanded from in the tactical areas to the campaign level. The theory of combined operations¹² involving multiple service arms [or branches] further developed, new methods of coordination between branches such as Army Aviation and Infantry Artillery appeared, and special operations became an important part of army campaign operations. During the Middle East War, because a large amount of advanced weapons and equipment were used, new army campaign patterns appeared. The element of suddenness was valued unprecedentedly, and innovative means and methods to achieve army campaign suddenness developed. The duration of army campaigns tended to shorten, but consumption of war material tended to increase.

The high-tech local wars period. After the end of the Cold War, global strategic scenarios markedly changed. In certain areas, "cold peace" under the previous bipolar arrangement collapsed and local wars became frequent. During this period, major wars that had tremendous impact on the development of army campaigns included the following: the Gulf War, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War. During the Gulf War period, electronic warfare began to be an important operational method of army campaigns. Electronic warfare was used throughout the war and applied to different aspects of engagement. The strategic status of air defense operations improved and became an important army campaign pattern. Traditional night combat and close combat were no longer the 'umbrella' protecting the technically inferior. Under high-tech conditions, the contents of night combat and close combat were further enriched. During the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War, the strategic status and function of the army gained new recognition. Army battlefields remained to be an important battlefield in the war. The status of special operations was more prominent. Cooperation between airborne firepower and special operations activities on the ground became closer. The fusion of information, firepower and land operational activities became even more intense, and the degree of integration continues to improve.

and service support unit. It is a strategic campaign large formation composed of combined services and branches/service arms."

¹² Combined operations involving multiple service arms {诸兵种合同作战 zhubingzhong hetong zuzhan}.

(4) PLA army campaigns

Beginning with the Nanchang Revolution on 1 August 1927, the Chinese PLA has gone through the Agrarian Revolutionary War, War of Resistance against Japan, War of Liberation, War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, and struggles to protect the border territories of the motherland, a total of more than 400 army campaigns. These army campaigns were all different due to historical conditions and situations.

During the Agrarian Revolutionary War. As the Chinese army grew from small to large, from weak to strong, and from the initial creation to growing to a considerable size, Chinese army campaigns also went through a transformation from guerrilla warfare {游击战 youjizhan} to guerrilla mobile warfare {游击性运动战 youjixing yundongzhan}. The establishment of the active defensive operational thought {积极防御作战思想 jiji fangyu zuozhan sixiang}¹³ in particular gave unique operational characteristics to Chinese army campaigns.

During the War of Resistance against Japan. During this period, because the contrast of force strength between China and the adversary was very sharp, development of Chinese army campaigns went through some hardship. As the Chinese army campaign strength developed and campaign operational capabilities improved, the operational forms of the army campaign transformed from primarily guerrilla warfare to primarily mobile warfare {运动战 yundongzhan} and positional offensive warfare {阵地进攻战 zhendi jingongzhan}. Guerrilla warfare began to transition into conventional warfare. Army campaign theory was developing at an unprecedented pace.

During the War of Liberation. During this period, the Chinese army campaign force developed by leaps and bounds. At the end of the War of Liberation, the total force strength reached 6 million. In terms of structure, the development process was from a single infantry with a small number of other service arms to a combination of multiple services and service arms. The scale of army campaigns further expanded. An army campaign generally involved more than 100,000 persons. For a river crossing army campaign, it could involve a force of 120,000 persons. Campaign patterns diversified. Mobile warfare, position warfare, and guerrilla warfare were alternately used. The art of campaign command was greatly enriched.

During the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. On the narrow battlefields of the Korean peninsula, facing a U.S. military with absolute superiority in weapons and

¹³ Active defense operational thinking: According to *PLA Military Terms* (1997) active defense: Defense that actively initiates offensive operations to counter an offensive enemy. Usually embodied in the active campaign and battle offensive operations adopted in a strategic defense, or various types of offensive operations adopted in campaign and tactical defenses, such as sallies from the first line defense position, counter-attack by fire, counter-attack, counter-strike, anti-airborne defense, and deep attack, along with using attrition and annihilation of the enemy to create the conditions for a shift to a counter-offensive.

equipment, the Chinese Volunteer army won five offensive campaigns consecutively and gained valuable experience in mountain operations under modern conditions when encountering an enemy with superior weapons and equipment. This prompted the army campaign large formation to develop in order to meet the operational needs of modern army campaigns.

The period after the founding of New China. During the defense of the security of the motherland's borders and operations to resist enemy local invasions, [the PLA] also conducted a series of campaigns and operations that included the scale of the army campaign and the nature of the army campaign. Generally speaking, each event {yichang} of a war was one army campaign. Their main characteristics were: first were the strategic quality of the army campaign and high level overall situation quality. Second were the counterattack quality of the army campaign and their offensive, quickly decisive and decisive battle qualities of the army campaign. Third were the complexity of the army campaign and the arduous quality of the missions. Fourth were the regional quality of the army campaign and their relative independent quality.

From the development process described above we can see the basic laws of army campaigns: the military technology development pushes forward and props up army campaign development; economic and natural conditions affect and constrain pulls along campaign development; military strategy and war goals stipulate and limit army campaign development; the development of military thought guides and tows army campaign development; the real practices of army campaigns and their experiences promote army campaign development.

III. Development Trends of Army Campaigns...363

New development trends of the future army are brought about by advancement in science and technology, their application in the military domain, changes in the form-state of war, development in military strategy and military thought, the widespread use of long-range, rapid maneuver speed, high-lethality and high-precision weapons in particular, and transformation of military internal structures and operational methods.

(1) The space of land battlefields is expanding, becoming full-depth and multi-dimensional.

As a result of development of long-range weapons and space weapons and improvement in the long-range military transport capability, the area of army campaign activities and the range of attack are expanding. The battlefield space is enlarging and the domains of army campaigns are increasing. Most notable is the fact that the army campaign large formation can make use of capabilities in the air, at sea, in space, and in the information domain to support the land battlefield. As a result, this greatly expands the army battlefield in battlefield depth and dimensions. For example, the army campaign large formation can use multiple methods of transportation in the air, at sea, and on land to cross oceans or implement long-range mobility. The army campaign large formation can

cross theaters, mass forces, and deploy in a very short time. The army campaign large formation, supported by strategic weapons, can launch large-scale operations and execute full-depth multi-dimensional attacks in the full campaign depth and even the strategic depth. Army campaign tactical missiles and all kinds of armored ground weapons can mount a multi-direction, multi-layer and multi-dimensional surprise force and firepower attack. Etc.

(2) In future army campaigns, the integrated-whole quality {整体性 zhengtixing} and the level of integration will intensify.

As a result of advancement in weapons and equipment, the components of the army campaign large formation will increase, the operational modes, methods, army campaign types and patterns will further diversify, and battlefield space will further expand. These will make the composition of future army campaigns more complex. Future army campaigns are no longer a strength contest between single strengths, but a confrontation of strengths of an integrated-whole {zhengti liliang}. They will be integrated operations {yitihua zuozhan} conducted by all services and arms in even broader space domains, employing more and more advanced weapons and equipment, applying a variety of operational modes and patterns, and with more consistent adjusting-coordination.

(3) Weapons and equipment will continue to improve. High-tech contests will be more intense.

As science and technology advances, all countries are emphasizing applying the latest results of modern science and technology to transform weapons and equipment of the military. In the army, continued employment of a large number of informationized weapons and equipment that contain mainly precision guidance and information technology has a direct impact on the progression of army campaigns and even on the outcomes of the army campaigns. Continued transformation of weapons and equipment enables weapon systems to be high-energy, diversified, automated, and intelligent. Lethality is higher, firing range is longer, precision is better, and their impact on army campaign operations is greater. The widespread use of these informationized weapons gives army campaign activities a rich flavor of informationization. As a result, the proportion of confrontations that involve high-tech weapons is higher. High-tech weapons will become an important pillar for military survivability and victory. Thus, we can predict that the battlefield of future army campaigns will be filled with high-tech confrontations. The personnel-centric army campaign will be replaced by a technology-centric army campaign. The outcomes of high-tech contests between the opposing sides will have a profound impact on the theory and methods of army campaigns.

(4) Campaign patterns and operational methods will trend towards diversity and gradually become multifaceted and serialized.

Development in weapons and equipment will certainly bring about changes in campaign patterns {zhanyi yangshi} and operations methods. Following the large-scale air warfare,

amphibious landing, airborne, and tank warfares of two world wars, new operational patterns and methods such as electronic warfare, missile warfare, firepower warfare, and raid and long-range surprise raid {yuancheng benxi} operations, etc. have been widely used in the subsequent local wars and have gradually developed towards [being] multi-faceted and serialized. In future wars, as a result of the new military revolution and the development and implementation of army campaigns, and the appearance and use of new weapons and equipment, all types of new operational methods and patterns will emerge. In future army campaigns, diversification in operational methods and patterns will certainly become more pronounced.

(5) The tempo of campaigns will accelerate. The role of maneuver {jidong} will be more notable.

In a future army campaign, because of improvements in the Army's own maneuver capability and its capability to utilize various information resources, the speed and tempo of army campaign activities have accelerated, and this has caused status of the "mobility"¹⁴ factor in campaign operations to further elevate. On the other hand, maneuver can quickly concentrate force-strengths, enhance suddenness, strive for initiative-shake off passivity, spur the army campaign large formation to put forth effort in improving its own mobility, and subsequently result in continuous elevation of maneuver's status in the army campaign. In a future army campaign, the struggle between maneuver and counter-maneuver {jidong yu fanjidong} will be extraordinarily fierce.

(6) Offensive and defensive activities are closely connected. The status of offensive activities will be more prominent.

Under informationized conditions, new weapons that have faster rate of fire, longer range, higher precision, better lethality, and agile mobility provide advantageous conditions to ground operations. Pure defense no longer exists. The key to operational success is for the opposing sides to use all types of offensive activities to fight for battlefield initiative. Though it is still necessary to organize necessary defensive activities in a campaign, the offensive is taking the lead and plays a critical role. In a campaign, during defenses there is offense, and during offensives there is defense. The switch between offensive and defensive becomes quite frequent. Thus, taking the initiative and seeking opportunities to launch offensive operations has become one of the important principles of army campaigns. In future army campaigns, whether it is a defensive or offensive campaign, a necessary option and the development trend is to use aggressive offensive activities to achieve the goal of the campaign.

¹⁴ Translators note: the term *jidong* is interchangeable as maneuver and mobile. When used to indicate movement or action to gain advantage over the enemy, the term is best rendered as maneuver.

(7) The status and function of campaign command will stand out. Requirements on the quality and skills of command personnel will be higher.

Under informationized conditions, informationized command systems are widely used. A necessary trend of operational command is automation and intelligent-ization. Speaking of army campaign command in the future, because the battlefield is wide, there are multiple points, long lines and broad fronts. Many aspects need to be taken into consideration, and blind spots and blind angles may be a source of failure. Situations on the battlefield change drastically, and the progress and tempo of army campaigns hasten; consequently the time effectiveness of decision-making becomes more important. The amount of information input and output is huge and the variables that may affect command decision-making are numerous; consequently there is more uncertainty. The above situation poses greater demand on army campaign command. A commander not only must have superior command skills and solid stratagem depth, but also must be familiar with and able to use advanced command means and tools so as to have the ability to exercise highly effective and high-quality decision-making and command control. The basic quality of the commander and the level of command ability and command skills will directly affect the progress and outcome of the campaign. Thus, there is an urgent need to improve the quality of the campaign commander and his command skills so as to meet the needs of future army campaign operations.

(8) Army campaign's support needs are complex and confrontations are fierce.

In future army campaigns, the opposing sides will concentrate sharp weapons of all service arms in fierce confrontations on the broad and multi-dimensional battlefield. In a short period of time, the amount of consumption, casualties, and damage will increase. A large amount of war material consumption, equipment damage, and personnel casualties will pose a grave challenge on operational support. The campaign support mission becomes more difficult and support structure will encounter change. This is particularly difficult if the opposing sides consider destroying the opponent's support systems as an important means to achieve the strategic and campaign goal. The widespread application of high-tech weapons and equipment not only provides the material conditions for attacking the opponent's support systems, but also makes the means of attack more diversified. As such, the coverage of campaign support expands in an unprecedented manner, the mission of support becomes extremely difficult, the contents of support continue to increase, and the requirements for comprehensiveness and time effectiveness becomes greater. The contest nature becomes prominent, the demand on technology is evident, and the organization work is extraordinarily complex.

Section 3: Characteristics and Principles of Army Campaigns...366

The premise and foundation of studying army campaigns under informationized conditions is to master the characteristics of army campaigns. Correctly determining and adhering to the principles of army campaigns has very important significance for unifying

army campaign thought, understanding army campaign laws, deepening army campaign theory studies and guiding army campaign operational training and practice.

I. Characteristics of Army Campaigns...366

(1) The strategic quality of a campaign is strong and it possesses a decisive ground battle nature

In local wars under informationized conditions, the Chinese military's strategic goal is mainly to realize motherland unity and protect territorial integrity and ocean rights. The main activities to achieve the goal of the local wars are to annihilate the enemy's effective strength and capture the territories occupied by the enemy. The outcomes of the local wars directly affect the fundamental interest of our country and our national dignity. Though army campaigns are mostly carried out within joint campaigns, army campaigns play a lead role in the eventual accomplishment of the strategic mission. The success of army campaign activities directly affects the final outcome of the entire war, and as such army campaigns are highly strategic in nature. In offensive operations, the enemy will not be willing to give up without a fight. Most likely, the enemy will use the occupied advantageous terrain and important cities or townships to fight a final battle. Under such conditions, we must use army campaigns to annihilate the enemy and capture the occupied territories in order to accomplish the strategic mission. In this sense, army campaigns have the attributes of a final decisive attack. Similarly, in defensive operations, the ability of army campaigns to stall the enemy's offensive and turn the situation around will directly affect the progress of the local war and its final outcome.

(2) Campaign battlefields are more "transparent," and suddenness is harder to achieve

On the future informationized battlefield, an enemy that possesses informationized weapons will use various high technologies in battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance. The enemy's various platforms and technical reconnaissance and surveillance equipment will form a multi-dimensional reconnaissance system that is omni-directional, full-depth, and multi-layered, and has all-weather, high-resolution and real-time reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. Battlefields become more "transparent," which poses great challenges to our campaign intention of concealment and suddenness. Firstly, our operational activities will be under the enemy's continuous surveillance. The enemy will be able to detect our targets and activities sooner and in a broader space area. If we do not take effective denial and deception measures, it is very difficult not to be detected by the enemy. Secondly, our army campaign large formation has limited capabilities to resist the enemy's high-tech reconnaissance and surveillance measures. The effectiveness of some of our traditional concealment and camouflage measures is greatly diminished. It is very difficult to resist the enemy's high-tech reconnaissance measures. Thirdly, our army campaign large formation's personnel, equipment and logistics support force is immense in size. Our mobility is slow, and our activities are easily exposed. It is very difficult to achieve "stealthiness." Therefore, a problem army campaigns under informationized conditions must deal with is how to fully

utilize stratagem and various measures to conceal our operational intentions and achieve campaign suddenness, and how to achieve the campaign goal if our intentions are exposed.

(3) Facing multiple enemy threats, battlefield protection becomes difficult

In the campaign operational area, the enemy that has high tech superiority has deployed attack systems that cover different ranges, use different platforms, and possess different attributes. The enemy also stresses early, long-range, and precision attack activities. Our army campaign large formation will encounter serious threats of enemy attacks that are from the air and on land, long-range and short-range, large area and precision, and hard attack and soft destruction combined. Battlefield survival is difficult and battlefield protection becomes a serious problem. Firstly, the enemy's attack area is wide, attack range is far and attack precision is high. And the attack persists throughout the campaign. From the time of combat ready to campaign execution, our army campaign large formation is persistently under the threat of the enemy's long-range precision attack. Secondly, the army campaign large formation has a huge number of personnel and weapons and equipment, and the operational scale is large. It is very difficult to have a keen grasp of the enemy's timing, scale, and target of attack timely and accurately. As a result, it is easy for us to suffer from the enemy's unexpected attack, causing us to lose operational capabilities. Thirdly, our self-defense capabilities are weak and our "arm" is short. When we engage an enemy in a long-range precision attack, we are clearly at a disadvantage. Thus, for the army campaign large formation, an important prerequisite to win campaign victory is to adopt various effective measures to improve field survivability and have close land-air coordination.

(4) Campaign patterns and operational methods are diverse. The proportion of high-tech confrontations is significantly higher

Under informationized conditions, our army campaign large formation is composed of multiple service arms. The degree of combine-ness is high; and multi-dimensional maneuverability, fire attack, rapid assault, and support capabilities are better. In campaign operations, our army campaign large formation can carry out operations of different types, patterns and different nature. Our campaign large formation can implement offensive and defensive, and the transition between offensive and defensive can be very swift. Our army campaign large formation can carry out positional defensive operations and maneuver defensive operations, using multiple depth attack means to unfold the attack against the enemy's full depth simultaneously or alternately. Our army campaign large formation can carry out offensive and defensive operations on land as well as air defense operations. Our army campaign large formation can carry out operations in tangible spaces and offensive and defensive operations in the formless electromagnetic domain. As high technologies are more widely applied to army weapons and equipment, the proportion of operational measures and activities with high technology contents will increase day by day. For example, information operations, air defense operations, precision firepower operations, and command control operations will

persist from beginning to end. They will have direct impact on the survival of the army campaign large formation and success of the campaign.

(5) Campaign activities are more affected by geographic environment

Under informationized conditions, army campaigns will be mainly conducted along the coast and in border areas. Complex battlefield environments will bring about adverse effects on campaign activities. First, the battlefield is in remote areas and the delivery of campaign forces will be difficult. Secondly, the capacity of the battlefield is small, which makes force-strength commitment difficult. Thirdly, the terrain is unfamiliar and the socio-environment is complex. Fourth, the natural environment is unfriendly, which makes it difficult to demonstrate operational effectiveness. Thus, when organizing and implementing army campaigns, we must take into full consideration the influence and constraints of the battlefield environment, and make campaign preparations carefully and thoroughly.

(6) Land warfare modes are changing, command coordination requirements are higher

Under informationized conditions, army campaigns will be supported by multiple services and service arms and will be enhanced by high-tech weapons and equipment. The long range maneuverability of the troops and long-range attack capabilities has improved. Modern land warfare modes have transformed from mainly horizontal and linear operations to full-depth, multi-dimensional, and non-linear operations, which poses greater requirements on campaign command coordination. First, the battle space is multi-dimensional and wide open. Command coordination areas have expanded from the ground and the forward edge {前沿 qianyan} to include the ground, air, sea, electromagnetic domain, and even the space domain. Secondly, the services and service arms taking part in the campaign have multiplied and the number of command objects {zhihui duixiang} has increased drastically. Command coordination not only includes different arms of the army and their weapon systems {xitong}, but also other services and arms and local armed strengths. Thirdly, force strength *bushu* disposition is more dispersed. Operational activities occur at the front and on the flank, on the forward and in depth, on the ground and in space, either simultaneously or alternately. This requires the implementation of precise and highly effective adjusting-coordination between all operational activities as well as between various systems {xitong}. Fourthly, struggle in the electromagnetic domain is getting more intense and command confrontation is getting more ferocious. Coordination actions can be easily disrupted and survival of the command institution faces serious threats. This requires the adoption of various active and effective measures to ensure the stability, promptness and effectiveness of command.

(7) Campaign support mission is arduous

Army campaign support includes operational support, logistical support and equipment support. Under informationized conditions, because of the widespread use of new technology weapons, attack precision has improved and damage level increased.

Operations are more ferocious, and war material consumption has increased unprecedentedly. The status of campaign support becomes more prominent, and the support mission is difficult and arduous. First, the support objectives have increased and the support range widened. Secondly, the mission of technical support is more substantial. Thirdly, the difficulty level to stabilize the support system in the rear has increased. Fourthly, the complexity of the battlefield environment poses many special demands on campaign support. Thus, whether we can maintain the integrity of our support system and ensure the smooth going of campaign support becomes an important factor in determining the success or failure of a campaign.

II. Principles of Army Campaigns...369

Under informationized conditions, focusing on PLA's campaign basic thought, new characteristics of army campaigns, operational capabilities and possible development of the army campaign large formation, situations of the main operational objects, as well as heritage and development of PLA army campaign principles, we firmly establish the following campaign principles:

(1) Know the enemy and know oneself. Match the subjective guidance with objective realities

The foundation of correct decision-making is to gather a large amount of accurate information. Correct decision-making is the condition to guide the campaign large formation to win victory. In particular, under an operational condition where the enemy is superior to us, this principle becomes more critical. On a certain material level, the correctness of the subjective guidance is a decisive factor in campaign outcomes. Actual war experience gave us the proof that knowing the enemy and knowing ourselves and matching the subjective guidance with objective realities is a general principle for all operational activities and is the basic principle that must be obeyed by army campaigns. On land battlefields in the future, swift and accurate information and decisions has a tremendous impact on the progress and outcome of campaigns. Firstly, the means to capture and conceal information have increased, and the struggle between reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance is fiercer. Information warfare is present throughout the entire campaign process and has decisive influence on the campaign. As a result, battlefield confrontations {duikang 对抗}¹⁵ are often expressed as command confrontations. Secondly, campaign situations change rapidly, which poses greater demand on the timeliness of battlefield information gathering and correctness of decision-making. Whichever side can capture the opposing side's information correctly and whichever side can match the subjective guidance with objective realities will gain the initiative. Otherwise, it will be forced into a passive state. Facing these new situations, the difficulty level of knowing the enemy and knowing ourselves and of

¹⁵ Translator's note: Can also be translated as countermeasure, resistance, warfare.

implement correct campaign guidance will double and quadruple, and their impact on the campaign will also increase.

(2) Wipe out {xiaomie} the enemy. Preserve ourselves

The prerequisite condition for effectively preserving ourselves is to wipe out the enemy. Thus, wiping out the enemy comes first, preserving ourselves comes next. In particular, when an overall situation calls for a sacrifice, the part being considered must absolutely not preserve itself and affect the interest of the overall situation. In the campaign process, sometimes it would be necessary to preserve the force. But this must be done from the perspective of the interest of the overall situation, and wiping out the enemy is always of primary importance. There is no exception in wars in the past, present, and future. Under informationized conditions, army campaign operations rely very heavily on weapon systems {xitong}. Military information technology-based high technologies have become the pillar that sustains operational capabilities. Consequently, the meaning of wiping out the enemy has broadened. It is no longer limited to wiping out the enemy's effective strength, but it attaches more importance on striking the enemy's high-tech weapons and equipment and disrupting the whole operational system {tixi}. At the same time, the ways to wipe out the enemy also has changed, not only can it be achieved by eliminating their weapons and equipment and wiping out their effective strength, it can also be achieved by destroying their weapon systems {xitong} and paralyzing their operational system {tixi}. From the perspective of development, the latter can achieve the operational goal of wiping out the enemy and preserving ourselves more easily. Thus, in a future army campaign, we should consider the enemy's ground operational groupings, command and control systems {xitong}, weapons and equipment systems {xitong}, electronic

communications systems {xitong}, and assisting- and safeguarding-support systems {xitong} as the main strike targets. The operational activities of seizing cities, seizing land, holding cities, and holding land should be conducted centering on these targets.

(3) Concentrate strengths and break the enemy one by one

The material basis and the basic method to gain victory in an army campaign are to concentrate superiority of strengths at the right time and annihilate {jianmie} the enemy one by one. To speak more plainly, military struggles are basically confrontations and contests of strengths. Having superiority of strength increases the probability for gaining victory. Concentrating strengths means to form an overwhelming material basis against an opponent by quickly gathering a localized strength and creating superiority in a specified time and space. This is one of the important methods for the PLA to overcome the enemy and gain victory. In a future army campaign, to defeat an enemy, one must still persist in the principle of concentrating the use of campaign strength. What should be noted is that under informationized conditions, the meaning of concentrating strengths has changed. The concentration of force-strength quantity is no longer the only sense of concentrating strengths, and in a certain sense, qualitative concentration [of strengths] has already ascended to an even higher position. Thus, in a future army campaign, at the

same the PLA carries out the principle of concentrating strengths, it must attach importance to concentrate the use of crack forces and cutting-edge weaponry, and attach importance to concentrate strike effectiveness. It must also correctly grasp the relationships between quantitative concentration and qualitative concentration, using this to remedy deficiencies and reduce the gap the superiority and inferiority gap between our two sides.

(4) Full preparations and rapid response

The prerequisite for ensuring army campaign victory under informationized conditions is full preparations centered on mission needs-requirements and rapid response in accordance with activity {xingdong} requirements. In the course of the army campaign, there is an inseparable relationship between full preparations and rapid response. Only when one is fully prepared will one be able to give rapid and correct response under different situations. Moreover, rapid and correct response is an important factor for seizing initiative and preventing passivity. An army campaign under informationized conditions puts forth even higher requirements on campaign full preparations and rapid response. Firstly, unanticipated factors and abruptly occurring reasons that may lead to a campaign are increasing, which requires that the army campaign large formation maintain a high readiness state so that the army campaign large formation can respond rapidly when an incident abruptly occurs. [In this manner,] one can accomplish imminent battle preparations in the shortest time and enter into a combat alert state. Secondly, reconnaissance capabilities have improved and battlefield environment is more transparent. This demands that preparation work of the army campaign large formation must be done in a more concealed manner. Thirdly, operational systems are more complex and essential elements are more numerous. This requires that the army campaign large formation must strengthen its planning quality, apply various effective modes, and even more carefully and fully successfully accomplish campaign preparations.

(5) Conceal and sudden. Take the enemy by surprise

If we can launch a sudden attack at the enemy at an unanticipated time and place, we can achieve the goal of paying a small price to obtain a greater victory. Thus, this is an important principle in army campaign operations. The core of this principle is to take the enemy by surprise and launch a fierce attack against the enemy suddenly, catching the enemy off guard and unable to develop its operational effectiveness. Future army battlefields are more transparent, and operational activities will be more difficult to conceal. However, advanced technical equipment and means have their shortcomings and weaknesses as well. If we can make full use of the complex battle environment, utilize standard denial and deception equipment and expedient camouflage equipment, as well as agile maneuver tactics, we can very effectively weaken the enemy's reconnaissance capabilities, and cause the enemy to make judgmental errors. Therefore, as long as we use the right measures and methods, it is totally possible to achieve operational

suddenness under informationized conditions and launch unexpected sudden attack against the enemy.

(6) Agile maneuverability. Strive to gain the initiative

Capturing and sustaining the initiative is the key to campaign victory. In the past and at present, in China and in foreign countries, the campaign process is always a process of switching between being active and passivity. Whoever can win the initiative will be able to win final victory. Thus, the initiative is the right to freedom of movement of the military. Freedom of movement is the lifeline of the military. In future army campaigns, the impact of informationized weapons and equipment on operational activities will far surpass the impact of weapons and equipment of the past. Generally, which ever side that has superiority in weaponry will have control of the initiative. On the contrary, which ever side that is inferior in weaponry will be difficult to get away from being passive. War experiences in the past demonstrated that superiority or inferiority of the operational strength alone cannot completely determine the outcome of operations. The side that has inferiority of strength can turn the inferior state to superiority and even gain the initiative if it works hard, and is able to flexibly handle situations, employ force-strengths and change fighting methods. Thus, in future army campaign operations, the struggle centering on seizing initiative will be fiercer and will dominate the entire process of the campaign.

(7) Full depth operations. Strike the enemy's vital areas {yaohai}

This means conducting effective strikes in all parts of the campaign battlefield where the key points of strikes {daji de zhongdian} are the key-link points {guanjiedian} and vital area targets {yaohai mubiao} involving the overall campaign situation. Persisting in depth full-dimensional operations, attaching importance to striking the enemy's vital areas, effectively disrupting the structure of the enemy's integrated-whole operations {di zhengti zuozhan jiegou}, and quickly paralyzing the enemy's operational system {tixi} [all] have important significance for decisive annihilation of the enemy. In an army campaign under informationized conditions, in particular, the distance of attack of the campaign large formation has extended greatly, and the demarcation line between the forward and the rear has blurred. The fighting method of pushing forward layer-by-layer {ceng ceng tuijin 层层推进} is out-dated. Conducting effective strikes with key points against the enemy's full-depth and in all directions can cause the enemy to be pressed from the front and from the rear, thus unable to guard its head and tail at the same time. It can also disrupt the enemy's command and paralyze the enemy's system {tixi}. At the same time, this can give a powerful shock to the enemy, interfere and disrupt the enemy's campaign resolution {zhanyi juexin 战役决心}, and cause changes to the enemy's campaign tactics. As a result, this may create a favorable situation for our side, or even a total change in the enemy's strategic resolution or abandonment of its defensive and holding intention.

(8) Unified command. Close coordination

Centralized and unified command and consistently adjusting-coordinated activities are the objective requirements for ensuring the formation of an integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli} of all participating services and arms and other campaign strengths and [the objective requirements] for winning campaign victory. The army campaign is a complete operational system {xitong} constituted from a variety of factors. Its strength structure is complex, its operational forms are diverse, and its battlefield situations are varied. Not implementing unified command and effective control and adjusting-coordination will result in not being able to form an integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli}, and even worse, it can create internal frictions or the situation of a plate of loose sand {一盘散沙 yipan sansha}¹⁶ may emerge. In an army campaign under informationized conditions, in particular, a series of new situations occur in operational command. For example, there are more technical arms and thus constituting the campaign strength is complex; there is an increase in science-technology content of command systems {xitong}, and thus there is stronger reliance on technology; command confrontation grows more acute every day; and the degree of difficulty in unified command and close coordination enlarges daily. These [new situations] puts forth even more requirements on campaign command and coordination. Thus, carrying out unified command and close coordination are requirements of the basic law of army campaigns.

(9) Full scale support, give prominence to key points

In campaign support, one must give prominence to the integrated-whole quality, and by setting out from the overall campaign situation, [one must] fully mobilize and organize various strengths, comprehensively apply various support means, form an integrated-whole support setup {zhengti baozhang geju}, and implement integrated support {yitihua baozhang}. At the same time, one must give prominence to key points {tuchu zhongdian} so as to ensure that support of the campaign's critical-quality activities and links can keep up. War experiences have shown that implementing full-scale and key point support are important conditions for the smooth conduct of a campaign. Especially under informationized conditions, war materiel consumption is immense, and the degree of reliance of operational activities on various types of support has become greater. All support systems {xitong} have become important targets for both sides to strike. Thus, implementing a full scale support as well as with key points becomes particularly important. In this regard, first, we must establish a flexible and reliable support system {tizhi} and support *bushu* disposition; secondly, we must unify and organize all support activities and ensure that the support activities fit the operational activities; thirdly, we must key point support the needs-requirements of the main operational direction, main operational strengths, main operational activities and special technical equipment; fourthly, we must fully mobilize and apply the local assisting-support and safeguarding-

¹⁶ A plate of loose sand: An expression often used to describe a lack of cooperation and coordination, with each element caring for its own interest.

support strengths, combine military and civilian, safeguard the smooth conduct of the campaign and ensure the security of the campaign rear.

(10) Bring into play political superiority. Demonstrate our superior attitude

[We must] bring into play the PLA's political superiority, demonstrate our superior attitude, and strengthen campaign political work. We must use our strength to attack the enemy's shortcomings in order to guarantee our campaign victory. It is our military's magic weapon to use our political dominance to overcome the enemy. It is also our military's honored tradition to emphasize the human factor, unite ourselves, crumble the enemy, and conquer the enemy. In future army campaigns, the impact of informationized weapons and equipment on the progress and outcome of the campaign will be greater. However, because we still use people as the main body for the operations, the fundamental factor that determines victory is still people, not materiel. Our military has powerful political work and demonstrates superior bravery and resolve to win. This will play an even more important role on highly informationized modern battlefields. Because of this, firstly, we must use various means to raise the morale of our military and stimulate their patriotism and heroism so as to form powerful combat capabilities. Secondly, we must persist in the unified leadership of the party committee towards the campaign, and ensure a high degree of unity campaign strength thought and activities. Thirdly, we must thoroughly open-up development {kaizhan} in political mobilization; educate force-units to establish the confidence for *courage to fight-be sure to win* {ganda bisheng}; establish the perspective of overall situation and the thoughts of *complement with initiative* and *closely coordinate*; promote the combat style of being heroic and indomitable, not afraid of sacrifice, continuous operations. Fourthly, we must adopt effective measures, successfully accomplish masses work {qunzhong gongzuo} and strengthen the unity of military-political and military-civilian. Fifthly, open-up-development {kaizhan} of public opinion warfare {yulunzhan}, psychological warfare and legal warfare against the enemy with a variety of modes and channels, collapse the enemy military's will to fight, and divide and the enemy's military strengths {liliang} so as to cause them to weaken or lose their combat power.

Section 4: Army Campaign Preparation and Implementation...374

Army campaign preparation and implementation is, in accordance with higher level intent, the unified overall-planning and organizing of the campaign, the correct application of the campaign strengths, the flexible application of fighting methods and operational means, and on the basis of objective materialism, the fully bringing into play of subjective dynamic quality to seize campaign victory.

Under informationized conditions, army campaign preparations and implementation are constrained by factors such as the overall situation of the joint campaign and politics, etc. The organizing and planning {jihua} work is arduous and the command cycle is shortened. Campaign activities are diverse and control and adjusting-coordination are difficult. Command domain confrontation is intense, and command stability and

command system survival face serious threats. Thus, in the preparation and implementation process, the commander and command organ specifically must: have a footing on the overall situation and meticulously overall-plan; scientifically forecast and have multiple preparations; be adept in stratagems and flexibly apply force; nimbly respond and effectively command; unified control and integrated-whole adjusting-coordination; carefully support and ensure stability.

I. Army Campaign Preparations...374

In army campaign preparation under informationized conditions, the work is complex, the work load is heavy, the time effectiveness quality is strong, and the requirements are high. The campaign commander and his command organ must understand the battlefield situations at all times, have full control of the overall situation, full scale unified overall-planning, look after the key points. They must improve work methods and means, raise command effectiveness, and accomplish meticulous operations research {yunchou}, be prudent in decision-making, and carefully organize.

(1) Establish the campaign command system {tixi}

The campaign command system {tixi} is an organic integrated-whole that is constituted of command institutions at each level and each type in the army campaign. It is the organizing basis for achieving campaign goals, unified will, unified activities and unified command, and it is a necessary condition for effectively implementing campaign command.

Under informationized conditions, battlefield situations are complex and changing constantly. The command system model {zhahui tixi moshi} should be combined with realities to conduct a scientifically constructed structure. From the perspective of army campaign scale, the command system can be divided into two types. The first is the Army army-group campaign command system {jituanjunqun zhanyi zhahui tixi}. Normally one establishes two levels of campaign command institutions {zhanyi zhahui jigou} – Army army-group level and the Army group-army level. This can be independently established by the theater {zhanqu} or established based on a given Army group-army. The theater sends representatives, incorporating and augmenting the participation of service force-unit {junzhong budui} commanders. It normally receives the command of the joint campaign command institution of its operational direction, and sometimes, it can directly receive the command of the Supreme Command {tongshuaibu} and command an Army basic campaign large formation below it. The second is the group-army campaign command system {lujun jituanjun zhanyi zhahui tixi}. Normally, one establishes a group army first-level campaign command institution {jituanjun yiji zhanyi zhahui jigou} that commands the force-units within its campaign task-organization based on organizational system relationships.

The task organization of the command institution refers to composing an organic integrated-whole from Army campaign command strengths on the basis of the needs-

requirements for carrying out different operational command functions. The form of its task organization should combine operational realities and be rationally determined. Normally, one establishes a main command post, an alternate command post, and a rear command post. When necessary, one can establish a forward command post, a directional command post, etc.

—The main command post {jiben zhihuisuo} is normally composed of the command center, intelligence center, communications center, information warfare center, firepower center, etc. The command center is the core of the main command post. It is composed of the army campaign large formation commander, the augmented service commander {jiaqiang junzhong zhihuiyuan}, operations, confidential-security, and other relevant departments and personnel such as military affairs, political, logistics and equipment. It is mainly responsible for conducting campaign decision making, formulating the campaign general plan {jihua} and associated sub-plans {fenzhi jihua}, issuing operational orders and instructions, grasping [understanding] the operational postures, adjusting-coordination of operational activities, and guiding and adjusting-coordinating the planning {jihua} and organizing work of the entire command post. The intelligence center is composed of the reconnaissance office of the campaign large formation and relevant intelligence personnel. The intelligence center is mainly responsible for unified planning and coordination of intelligence reconnaissance of the army forces and forces of other services and service arms that support the operation. It is also responsible for centrally processing the intelligence collected from various sources. The communications center is composed of the communications office of the campaign large formation and relevant personnel of other forces that are responsible for communications and command automation. The communications center is responsible for unified planning and coordination of communications support and organizing and directing the use of the command automation system. The information warfare center is composed of the commander responsible for information warfare and technical engineering personnel. The information warfare center is responsible for unified planning and coordination of the use of various information warfare forces of the campaign large formation and their operational activities. The firepower center is composed of relevant personnel of the artillery, air defense, and army aviation force and relevant personnel of the operational teams [xiao zu] of the services that support the operation. The firepower center is mainly responsible for the unified planning and coordination of ground fire support and ground-to-air operations. The firepower center also supervises and coordinates the use of the air space over the operational area.

—The reserve command post {预备指挥所 yubei zhihuisuo}. The reserve command post is established based on the operational need to ensure stability of campaign command. It is normally composed of the deputy commander of the campaign large formation and other essential personnel. The reserve command post is equipped with the necessary command automation system and communications equipment. The reserve command post is established at the same time the basic command post is established. When necessary, it can take over command from the basic command post. The location of the

reserve command post should maintain a certain distance from the basic command post to ensure that the two command posts will not be destroyed simultaneously.

—The rear command post {后方指挥所 houfang zhihuisuo}. The rear command post is the command structure that provides unified command of logistical and equipment support and is responsible for the defense of the rear. The rear command post is normally composed of the deputy commander of the campaign large formation who is responsible for logistics and equipment, logistics and equipment office(s), local personnel responsible for supporting the frontline, and representatives from the headquarters and political department. The rear command post is equipped with the corresponding command automation system or communications equipment. The rear command post can be organized into the rear command center, the logistics and support center, the equipment support center, and the rear defense center.

—The forward (directional) command post {前进(方向)指挥所 qianjin {fangxiang} zhihuisuo}. This is a supporting command structure to enhance the command of the main operational direction of the campaign. Normally, it is led by the deputy commander of military affairs of the campaign large formation and supported by the staff personnel for operations and administration, and staff personnel of the engineering and artillery force. The advance command center is equipped with the command automation system or communications equipment. Based on the situation, the advance command center can be organized into the command center, the firepower coordination center, and the support center, etc.

(2) Determine the campaign concept {战役方针 zhanyi fangzhen}

The campaign concept is the basic intention of the campaign and the principle formulated to achieve this intention. It is an important content of campaign overall planning and the fundamental basis for organizing and implementing the campaign. The process for determining the campaign concept is in effect the general stratagem-planning process for the activities of the entire campaign. Normally, it is determined according to higher level intent, campaign strengths and missions, battlefield environment, and enemy situation, etc.

Determining the campaign concept is a feature of PLA campaign command, and is the traditional way for the PLA to overall plan a campaign. Historical experiences show that whether the campaign concept is correct or not has a direct effect on the success or failure of the campaign. There are generally three situations for determining the army campaign concept. First, if the army campaign large formation is carrying out a campaign mission within the task-organization of a joint campaign, its campaign concept is normally determined by higher levels. Secondly, if the army campaign large formation is independently carrying out campaign missions, the army campaign commander puts forth the campaign concept and reports it to higher levels for approval. Thirdly, the army campaign commander is formulated through consultations between the campaign commander and higher levels.

The contents of the campaign concept mainly include the campaign goal and the basic methods to attain this goal. Because situations under which a campaign is implemented may differ, there is no fixed content of the campaign concept.

1. Campaign goal

The campaign goal is the anticipated outcome of the army campaign. It is the core content of the campaign concept. Among all the contents of overall planning the campaign, it is of primary importance and plays a lead role. If there is no clearly defined campaign goal, the entire campaign operation will lose its general objective[s]. Thus, the army campaign commander must pay special attention to this problem and focus on solving it. When determining the campaign goal, one not only must take into consideration the military goal, but also the effects on politics, diplomacy, and economics, etc. One must begin with the main objective conditions and rationally determine the campaign goal. If the campaign goal is too high or too conservative, it may bring about undesirable outcomes. If the campaign goal is in conflict with higher level intent, the campaign commander should put forth his own recommendation by seeking truth from reality.

2. Operational direction {作战方向 zuozhan fangxiang}

The operational direction is the direction of activities (or the target area) where the army campaign large formation carries out the operational mission. The operational direction includes the operational direction of the offensive campaign and the operational direction of the defensive campaign. When selecting the operational direction, one should take into consideration the following: The direction must be advantageous to the swift achievement of the overall goal of the campaign. It must be an operational target that facilitates achieving the campaign intention. It must have battlefield conditions that are beneficial to the deployment of the campaign large formation for operational activities. It must allow easy coordination of multiple operational directions. Etc.

3. Operational target {mubiao}

In an army campaign operation, the operational target is the main object selected for the annihilating attack or the location selected to capture or defend. Selecting the operational target is the most important aspect when determining the army campaign concept. The campaign operational target is a hierarchical system which includes the overall target and sub-targets, the current target and follow-on targets, etc. When making target decisions, normally there are three situations. First, if the higher level has already determined the respective level's operational target, the commander of the respective level should divide the operational target determined by the superior into several sub-targets and assign these sub-targets to the subordinating forces rationally. Second, if the higher level has only stipulated the operational area and an outline of the operational mission, then the campaign commander should select the operational targets. Third, if a sudden change occurs on the battlefield and the operational target determined during the initial phase of

the operation is no longer suited to meet the need of the current operation, and time is pressing, at this time, if the higher level has clarified in outline the operational mission and the operational direction, or the higher level did not clarify it in time, the operational target will be provisionally determined by the campaign commander at the respective level. When choosing operational targets, the commander should focus on the needs-requirements of the strategic and campaign overall situation and select targets that are most beneficial to achieving the general goal[s] and that are easy successful and are advantageous to the follow-on development of the campaign. Special attention should be given to the selection of initial battle targets. Normally, the commander should follow the principle of capturing the weaker first before capturing the tougher, gaining operational experience first before gradually expanding the scale of the attack. The commander should take into consideration the enemy's campaign *bushu* disposition and the multi-dimensional nature of the battlefield space, and pay attention to possible change of the targets. In specific, the commander should pay special attention to the high-tech weapon systems that pose the greatest threat to us and consider those as the campaign targets and attack them first.

4. Basic fighting methods {战法 zhanfa}

Basic fighting methods of the army campaign operations refer to general fighting methods. Under informationized conditions, the operational space is wide, and forms of activities complex and diversified. In one campaign, there are often multiple operational forms, methods and means. The campaign commander must start with the actual situation of the battlefield and focus on the overall situation of the campaign and the total process when choosing operational forms and methods. These fighting methods should be most advantageous to overcoming the enemy and demonstrating the strength of the Chinese military. These fighting methods make use of our strength and attack the shortcomings of the enemy. The commander should take care of all domains and all phases, and at the same time put the emphasis on the main operational form that is decisive to the progress and the outcome of the campaign. The campaign commander should use multiple operational methods comprehensively in conjunction with the main operational form and method. He should combine offensive with defensive, integrate the air with the ground, and connect forces with firepower, striving to use a combination of forms and methods to overcome the enemy. The campaign commander should put stratagem into applying fighting methods, striving to win by using surprise methods and obtaining the greatest success with the least price.

5. Campaign steps {buzhou}

Campaign steps {buzhou} are the phase differentiations {jieduan huafen} accomplished for the course of the army campaign. It is an important content in determining the campaign concept. There are differences in differentiating the campaign phases for different campaign types {leixing} and campaign patterns {yangshi}, so the campaign commander should focus on organizing beneficial campaign activities, adjusting-coordination for campaign strengths, and having a grasp of the campaign tempo in

conducting scientific differentiation [of the campaign phases]. In determining the campaign steps, one must pay attention to conform to the course of the campaign, center on the campaign general goal[s] and correctly determine the operational targets that the goals one must reach in every phase; one must closely link each of the campaign phases, look after each from beginning to end and form an integrated-whole; the activity essential elements included in each phase must be appropriate with facilitating organizing command as the principle.

6. Employment of campaign strengths

The employment of campaign strengths is the general vision for applying army campaign strengths. In determining the employment of campaign strengths, one not only should fully bring into play the integrated-whole might {zhengti weili} of all services and arms, but one must also broadly mobilize people and masses in the theater to carry out military-police-civilian integrated operations and to the greatest extent unearth the campaign potential; one must give prominence to the key points of strength employment, concentrate strengths in the main direction, main battlefield, main phases and time-opportunities, form localized superiority against the enemy, push forward the smooth development of the campaign so as to facilitate quick opening of the battle situation; one must focus on the strong points of each force-unit, correctly select and employ operational strengths, and appropriately delegate operational missions; one must have grasp of powerful campaign reserve strengths, maintain sustained operational capabilities and respond to unexpected situations.

In army campaign operations, it is not necessary to put forth a contextually complete campaign concept for each campaign. Sometimes, one can focus on the important aspects described above and select the most prominent aspect and the most critical issue to formulate the campaign concept. Based on the different situations, one can emphasize campaign goals, campaign fighting methods, or campaign steps {buzhou}, as well as adding a simple and to the point formulation. Other times, one can consider combining the determination of the campaign concept and setting of the campaign resolution.

(3) Setting the campaign resolution

[Setting] the campaign resolution is the process of choices made by an army campaign commander for the series of major issues relating to the campaign concept, and [made] on the basis of fully comprehending and grasping the situations such as the enemy situation, our situation, geographical environment, etc. The campaign resolution is the fundamental basis for the planning {jihua} and organizing a campaign.

1. Content of the campaign resolution

The content of the campaign resolution mainly includes: campaign intention, main operational direction and area, basic means, campaign *bushi* disposition, campaign initiation [start] time, and command post set up, etc.

—The campaign intention {战役企图 zhanyi qitu} is the goal to be achieved in a campaign. When the higher level has already determined the campaign intention, the resolution should then clarify how to realize the intention. The campaign intention must conform to the higher level intent. Its expression should be concise and to the point, easy to understand and fulfill, and it should not be ambiguous.

—The main operational direction and operational area {主要作战方向和地区 zhuyao zuzhan fangxiang he diqu}. The main operational direction and operational area is the direction for concentrating and employing force-strengths and weaponry and the area for implementing the main campaign activities. The main operational direction and operational area should be determined in accordance with higher level intent, enemy situation, our situation, geographical environment characteristics, etc. In one army campaign, there can be many operational directions, but at any one time there should be only one main direction and area. In an offensive campaign, it is called the main offensive direction and area to be seized-occupied. In a defensive campaign, it is called the main defensive direction and area to firmly defend. Under informationized conditions, the main operational direction is more likely to change. When determining the main direction, the campaign commander should take into consideration the method to switch the main direction when a situation is fundamentally changed.

—Basic means {基本手段 jiben shouduan}. These are the basic operational modes and methods to conduct army campaigns. Different campaign types {leixing}, campaign patterns, and operational environments and objects have different operational modes and methods. It should be determined on the basis of the campaign intention, force-strength organization, enemy situation, terrain, etc., and it should be flexibly changed during the campaign course on the basis of changes to missions and the enemy situation.

—Campaign *bushi* disposition {战役布势 zhanyi bushi} refers to the mission differentiation, organizational grouping and deployment accomplished for the campaign strengths. The army campaign large formation normally adopts the group-style campaign *bushi* disposition {集团式战役布势 jituanshi zhanyi bushi} or the echelon-style campaign *bushi* disposition {梯队式战役布势}, or a combination of both of the above. The group-style campaign *bushi* disposition means the forces are divided according to the mission. For example, during an offensive, the forces can be divided into the forward attack group {qianyan gongji jituan}, the deep attack group {纵深攻击集团 zongshen gongji jituan}, the delay reinforcement group {阻援集团 zuyuan jituan}, the ground fire group, etc. During a defensive, they are divided into the defense-hold group and the maneuver operations group, etc. The echelon campaign *bushi* disposition is normally differentiated according to the ordering sequence for entry into campaign engagements, and they are generally divided into first echelon, second echelon, reserve {yubeidui} and all-services reserve forces, etc. The organized grouping of the campaign strength should have a rational structure and proper grouping-allocations {bianpei}. The deployment of the campaign strengths should have a rational arrangement, not only must one consider the inter-linking of various organized groupings, but one must fully consider the survival

issue. The campaign *bushi* disposition must facilitate being able to respond to a variety of situations.

—Campaign initiation time {zhanyi faqi shijian}. This means to make clear when a campaign starts. In an army offensive campaign, one should clarify the time for completing offensive preparations and the time for initiating attack. In a defensive campaign, one should clarify the time limit to complete defensive preparations.

—Setting up the command post. This is mainly clarifying the composition of each command post at their respective levels, their set up time and their locations.

2. Process of setting the campaign resolution

Setting the campaign resolution is a process whereby the army campaign commander analyzes, evaluates, and reconsiders the factors that may affect the campaign. It is a process whereby the campaign commander makes logical inferences of the objective situation. The correctness of it directly relates to campaign success or failure. The basic process is as follows:

—Understand the mission. It is mainly to understand the intent of the superior and to clarify the mission of the campaign. Understanding the intent of the superior mainly refers to understanding the operational mission and goal of the superior. Some times it also includes the timing and means of the operational activities the superior has in mind. Normally we should gain an understanding of the mission based on the following: Gain an understanding based on the campaign concept defined by the superior. Gain an understanding based on the political, economic, and diplomatic struggle at the time. Gain an understanding based on the instructions given by the superior and change in the enemy's intelligence. And gain an understanding based on objective realities on the battlefield. Clarifying the campaign mission means understanding the campaign mission at one's respective level and the status of carrying out the mission. If the higher level has already stipulated the operational mission of one's respective level, one should completely comprehend the mission delegated by the higher level. If the higher level has not clarified the operational mission of one's respective level, then one should actively put forth the mission[s] higher level intent and the objective realities and situations of the battlefield and execute after it is reported and approved by higher levels.

—Assess the situation. It mainly means making a comprehensive analysis and assessment of the situation based on enemy situation, friendly force situation, geographical environment, etc. Assessing the enemy situation is mainly to ascertain the enemy's campaign intention, force task-organization, main operational direction, strengths and weaknesses, possible employment time-opportunities and directions of high-tech weapons, time-opportunities and modes of electronic interference, etc. Assessing our situation is mainly to analyze and assess one's own operational capabilities, the strengths of various services and arms, and the capability to complete the campaign mission, etc. Assessing the geographical environment mainly involves analyzing and assessing the

social, economic, and natural conditions of the operational area and their possible effect on our campaign activities. When assessing the various situations, we should pay attention to comprehensive analysis, identify the advantages and avoid the disadvantages, and obtain correct conclusions.

—Listen to recommendations. In order to completely and correctly comprehend situations, during the course of considering the campaign resolution, the army campaign commander should listen to situation reports and recommendations of the campaign command organ and the commanders of subordinate services and arms. The campaign commander not only can concentrate all and listen, he can also listen separately; not only can he listen completely, he can also only listen to the necessary portions; not only can he separately listen to reports from organizational units and departments, he can also have the chief of staff to make a comprehensive report.

—Make a decision. On the basis of the aforementioned process, the army campaign commander should form the campaign resolution step-by-step. If time is pressing and the situation is not quite clear, the campaign commander can first set a preliminary resolution, and then on the basis of developing changes in the situation, step-by-step perfect the resolution proposal {juexin fang'an}. Even when the grasp of various situations become more clear, the campaign commander should still set out from the most difficult and most complex situation, formulate a variety of resolution proposals, compare them and select the optimum proposal. When necessary, he can conduct demonstrations {lunzheng} via computer simulation or various real exercises, and further make modifications and improvements in an attempt to set down a correction resolution.

(4) Formulate the campaign plan {jihua}

The campaign plan {jihua} is a plan formulated to guide campaign preparations and campaign activities in order to accomplish campaign missions. It is the specific reflection of the army campaign commander resolution, and it is the basis for organizing and commanding operational preparations and activities. It is also the most important work of the campaign command organ during the campaign preparations phase. Generally, it includes the campaign operational activity plan {jihua} and the campaign support plan {jihua}.

1. The campaign operational activity plan

The campaign operational activity plan is the core of the entire campaign plan. It can be divided into the general plan {zongti jihua} and the sub plans {fenzhi jihua}.

—The general plan is the army campaign commander's general arrangement and considerations for the campaign operational activities, and it is also the basis for formulating the sub plans {fenzhi jihua}. The main contents include: situation assessment conclusions; higher level intent; campaign concept and principles; campaign missions, friendly force's mission and boundary lines; campaign *bushu* disposition; campaign phase

divisions, situation scenarios, and contingency proposals {chuzhi fang'an}; predetermined campaign initiation time and time to complete campaign preparations and organizing of command, etc. Normally, the chief of staff is in charge of the general plan {zongti jihua}, and with the operational department in the lead, it is jointly formulated with participation from the relevant administrative department and relevant personnel from force-units of augmented reinforcement services and arms.

—The sub plans are concrete arrangements and plans for a particular part of the campaign operational activities. They provide necessary details and supplemental plans to the general plan. The sub plans normally include the following: counter-reconnaissance plan, information warfare and network warfare plan, air defense plan, firepower plan, special operations plan, rear defense plan, etc. The actual contents of the sub-plans vary according to the situation. The sub plans are normally prepared by the command structure (center) in charge of the subject matter area in accordance with the general plan and under the direction of the chief of staff. When time is pressing, the sub plans can be prepared together with the general plan.

2. The campaign support plan

The campaign support plan is a plan and arrangement prepared in advance for various support measures. It is an important part of the campaign plan. The campaign support plan normally includes the following: intelligence support plan, communications support plan, engineering support plan, denial and deception plan, traffic support plan, WMD protection plan, meteorological and hydrological support plan, logistics and equipment support plan, political work plan, etc.

(5) Organize campaign coordination

Campaign coordination refers to coordination and cooperation of activities in the various domains of the campaign operations among all participating services and service arms and other forces taking part in the army campaign in accordance with the unified plan of the army campaign commander and his command organ. The goal is to form an organic whole of all operational activities of the various campaign strengths in the multi-dimensional battlefield space. Based on the unified plan, the participating forces will cooperate and coordinate closely, complement each other's function, demonstrate the total might, and work together to achieve the campaign goal. Normally, after the campaign resolution is set, [campaign coordination] is organized in accordance with the resolution of the army campaign commander and higher level coordination instructions.

Under informationized conditions, the elements of the operations are complex, the battlefield space is wide, and the forms of campaign operations numerous. This raises the prominence of the status and function of campaign coordination. Campaign coordination has the following characteristics: covering a wide range, having rich contents, posing high requirements, requiring time effectiveness, and having fierce confrontations, etc. Thus, when organizing campaign coordination, we must accomplish the following:

scientifically forecast and prepare multiple proposals; focus on the overall situation and integrated-whole adjusting coordination {zhengti xietiao}; give prominence to key points and seize key links {guanjie}; maintain continuity and precision and high effectiveness.

1. Contents of organizing campaign coordination

The contents of army campaign coordination cover a very wide range. They mainly include the following: First, coordination among all operational groups {作战集团 zuozhan jituan} (*juntuan*), for example, between the main attack group (*juntuan*) and the supporting attack group (*juntuan*) {主攻集团与助攻集团 zhugong jituan yu zhugong jituan}, between the annihilating attack group {歼击集团 jianji jituan} (*juntuan*) and the impeding reinforcement group (*juntuan*), between the ground attack group and the airborne attack group, and between the army large formation and the forces supporting the operations such as the Air force, Navy, Second Artillery, etc. Secondly, coordination among the various battlefields and campaign activities, for example, coordination among the frontal battlefield, depth battlefield, flank battlefield, and enemy rear battlefield, as well as campaign activities on the associated space battlefield, sea battlefield, electromagnetic battlefield, etc. Thirdly, coordination between campaign phases. The campaign commander must divide the campaign phases rationally, but also coordinate the activities of different forces during each phase, in particular during the transition of the phases. Fourthly, coordination of special weapons, special operations, and various campaign activities. Fifthly, coordination between operations and various support as well as coordination between military and local support departments.

2. Method of organizing campaign coordination

The basic mode of army campaign coordination is combination of planned {jihua} coordination and ad hoc coordination {suiji xietong}.¹⁷ Planned coordination is conducted with planning and organization according to the targets [objectives], time, and content of campaign coordination. Ad hoc coordination refers to a method of coordination adopted when significant changes occur to the battlefield situation and the original coordination plan cannot be executed or when coordination is encounters severe disruption. Normally, planned coordination has priority, and ad hoc coordination is supplemental. When organizing campaign coordination, the army campaign commander and his organ should conduct it with the following steps and methods:

—Divide coordination phases. Dividing coordination phases is the phase differentiation made for the course of the army campaign. The goal is to adjust-coordinate campaign strengths with key points, control campaign tempo, and organize campaign coordination with order and in separate steps. A campaign coordination phase generally coincides with a campaign operational phase, and the coordination missions also coincide with the operational goals of that phase. In order to make coordination more specific and clear,

¹⁷ In a later section, it is called linji xietong 临机协同.

normally we further divide the campaign coordination phases into a number of operational periods {zuozhan shijie}¹⁸ based on operational needs-requirements. During each phase (period), one also accomplishes anticipated scenarios to respond to major changes in the enemy situation and main activities. The division of the campaign coordination phases is not fixed and unchangeable. The campaign commander, on the basis of scientific forecasts, should accomplish division for the full course of campaign development in accordance with the different campaign intentions, campaign patterns, battlefield postures, enemy situation, our situation, etc.

—Clarifying the coordinating relationships. Clarifying the coordination relationships is the determination of the mutual assisting and complementary relationships {zhiyuan peihe} for all participating strengths in each phase of a campaign. An army campaign under informationized conditions is coordinated operations implemented by all services, arms and other strengths mutually complementing each other, and in objective terms, there exists a relationship of which strength is in the lead and a main-and-secondary relationship {zhuci guanxi} of which strengths are complementing. Only by defining the main and secondary relationships between the participating strengths will we be able to strengthen coordination between operational forces that do not have an existing command-and-subordination relationship, and only then will we be able to fully utilize and bring into play {调动 diaodong}¹⁹ the subjective and assertive role of the commander of different levels. Normally, for the coordination between army force-units and force-units of assisting operational services, one should organize it with the activities of the Army force-units executing the main missions in the lead. For the coordination between each operational group, one should organize it with the operational group executing the main missions in the lead. For the coordination between each operational activity, one should organize it with the main operational activity in the lead. For the coordination between the employment of WMD and other campaign activities, one should organize it with the activities employing WMD in the lead.

—Differentiate operational missions (targets), activity areas (locations) and the sequence of activities. Differentiating operational missions (targets), activity areas (locations) and the sequence of activities means to specify the operational mission, spatial area and time of the activity of the various campaign strengths during each phase (period) of the campaign. The operational mission (target) determines the status of various strengths in the campaign operation and the coordination relation between the forces. This is the basis upon which the army campaign commander and his command organ organize campaign coordination and make campaign coordination plans. Organizing coordination according to the operational mission (target) means we achieve coordination by rationally assigning the operational mission (target). The activity area (location) and the sequence of activities are two basic essential elements in organizing campaign coordination, and they determine

¹⁸ Operational periods: According to *PLA Military Terms* (1997), "The period of time between the beginning and the end of certain combat activity during a certain phase of a campaign or battle. Examples include fire preparation periods and fire support periods."

¹⁹ Translator's note: Use and bring into play. Also, maneuver.

the spatial area and timing of the activities of the participating strengths during different phases of the campaign. Organizing coordination based on the spatial area means we rationally organize the operational activities of force-units in different areas and different directions so as to enable them to cooperate closely and support each other. Organizing coordination based on time means we clearly define the time different forces start the operational activities and the duration of the operational activities so as to achieve close coordination. Some times, we can use time and space as the basis to organize coordination. This means we rationally determine the activity area, starting time, or the time limit to accomplish a certain operational time-occasion according to the campaign needs-requirements and the operational capabilities of the force-units. For army campaigns under informationized conditions, all operational activities are fused and activity spaces often intersect. When organizing campaign coordination, we should rationally differentiate the spatial area where each participating strengths carries out the mission, the sequence of activities and the time limit to accomplish the mission based on the requirement of multi-dimensional depth operations and the characteristic of all services and arms. That is, we should fully bring into play the special merits of all services and arms, at the same time avoid accidental casualties and unanticipated ill effects, allowing the activities in each space and battlefield to form outstanding relationships that are mutually adjusting-coordinated and closely linked.

3. Campaign coordination support

Army campaigns under informationized conditions have fast pace and tempo, short process, and fierce confrontation. When organizing campaign coordination, we must ensure correctness, timeliness, and continuity. For this reason, we must establish a complete campaign coordination support system to guarantee that coordination is smooth and efficient.

—Establish a sound campaign coordination mechanism. At the army campaign command center, one should establish an operational adjusting-coordination institution composed of relevant personnel from the various services and arms to be responsible for formulating the coordination plan and supervising the execution of the coordination plan, and to assist the campaign commander to adjust at the right time or restore disrupted coordination. When implementing an Army army group campaign, one can set separately set up a coordination institution at the army group and the basic campaign large formation command center. During campaign implementation, normally one should exchange coordination command or liaison teams between all force-units of services having coordination relationships responsible for putting into effect the support coordination plan {baozhang xietong jihua} as well as conducting effective ad hoc coordination {linji xietong}.

—Establish multi-function integrated coordination control automation systems {xitong}. We should use the computer as the basis to establish operational coordination databases for all levels. We should save all coordination plans in the databases in advance and use expert systems to conduct simulation and optimization in order to provide assistance to

the commander of all levels and the command organ in command, control, and coordination. We should establish a firepower coordination system which is closely connected to the various fire control systems so as to realize automation of fire control through the computer network. At the same time we should establish battlefield command coordination information terminals at all levels, which should be connected to the campaign monitoring system to facilitate timely transmission of battlefield coordination information.

—Establish an all-services and arms campaign coordination communications network. Coordination communications is a basic condition for achieving consistent adjusting-coordination of activities for the strengths of all-services and arms. We must carry out the principles of *shared use by each service and arm, compatibility between military-civilian, freely linked up-and-down*. We must fully utilize all of the various communication strengths and resources in the operational area and form a stable, reliable, and unobstructed integrated-whole support capability.

—Establish information and network warfare systems {xitong} that are both offensive and defensive. During campaign implementation, the enemy will certainly rely on their superiority of information warfare strengths and implement key point strikes against our critical parts such as coordination communications. We should establish a corresponding command institution on the basis of the campaign large formation information and network warfare capabilities and campaign needs-requirements. [We should] implement centralized and unified command all information warfare strengths and apply information offensive and defensive means to safeguard smooth coordination.

(6) Organize campaign support

Army campaign support is a general term referring to various assurance measures and corresponding activities employed to ensure that the army campaign large formation can smoothly carry out the campaign mission. Army campaign support is an important element of the army campaign operational capabilities and is an important part of army campaign activities. Under informationized conditions, reliance of army campaign operational activities on campaign support has further increased. Progress of the campaign and final outcome of the campaign sometimes are constrained by critical campaign support activities. The contents and methods of campaign support vary as campaigns develop. Strong campaign support is an important basis to win campaign victory.

The army campaign support plan is the basic reliance for implementing campaign support. After setting the resolution, we should quickly organize all relevant departments and separately formulate it [support plan] on the basis of the requirements of higher level intent, senior officer {shouzhang} resolution and the campaign operational activities plan {jihua}, as well as issue the support instructions at the right time so as to completely, thoroughly, and systematically organize the various supports.

(7) Inspect campaign preparations

To inspect force-unit campaign preparations is an important content of overall-planning {chouhua} and organizing a campaign. The campaign commander should give the force-units as much operational preparation time as possible as well as pay attention to concealing the campaign activity intention. The contents of operational preparations should be determined by the operational mission. Normally, these include: organizing preparation work; preparing war materials, weapons and equipment; political mobilization; training for imminent battle; battlefield preparation; maneuver preparation; etc. After each item of preparation is completed, the campaign commander should promptly organize the command organ to conduct inspections on the force-unit preparations situation with key point inspection of subordinate force-unit level of understanding of higher level orders and instructions, whether their resolution and plan {jihua} conform to higher level intent, as well as the completion situation of all preparations work. It [command organ] should promptly resolve problems that are encountered during force-unit preparations work and practically settle each item of campaign preparations work.

II. Implementation of Army Campaigns...387

The implementation phase of the campaign is the process whereby the opposing sides carry out continuous and ferocious confrontations involving force and stratagem. It is also the most important and most critical period of campaign command. During the campaign implementation phase, the commander and his command organ should focus on the following:

(1) Have a full grasp and make predictions of battlefield situations

Having a correct grasp of the battlefield situation is the objective basis for the campaign commander to implement command. Under informationized conditions in particular, the status and function of information becomes more prominent. Thus the campaign commander and his command organ must fully utilize all capabilities and measures to have a full grasp of the development and change of battlefield situations in a timely, correct, comprehensively, and continuous manner, striving to gain battlefield information superiority.

Situations that the commander should have a full grasp of mainly include the following: First, change in the enemy's posture and predetermined operational targets, location of the command structure, disposition of high-tech weapons and their use, direction of activities of the follow-on echelon, etc. Secondly, the location of our force-units and the force-units of the assisting services and arms, the progress situation of the main operational direction, the situations of the air and air defense operations, the situation of personnel casualties and weapons equipment losses, activities of campaign reserves, and in particular the situation of the force-units that are developing {fazhan} smoothly and

those encountering difficulties. Thirdly, the situations of the operational areas, especially situations undergoing changes.

To grasp battlefield situations we must be focused on the key aspects. One should always focus on the areas and troops that have important impact on the overall situation of the campaign. For those situations where one already has a grasp, the campaign commander should use different means to verify the information, and take necessary actions according to the urgency of the situation. If possible, the campaign commander should go to the front line personally to observe the battlefield and obtain intelligence. At the same time, he should take effective measures to actively interrupt enemy's intelligence capturing activities.

Uninterrupted forecasting of the battlefield situation is an important aspect for maintaining an initiative position in campaign command. Because battlefield situations are complex and change frequently, prior to battle forecasts often differ greatly from the actual situations during the battle. New intelligence and information is necessary to enable us to make new forecasts on possible development, and provide correct response based on new assessments. We should strive to adopt effective measures and seize the initiative position before the enemy acts.

(2) Controlling and adjusting-coordination of campaign activities

Controlling and adjusting-coordination of campaign activities is the process of adopting various adjusting-controlling means and modes on the basis of the campaign plan {*jihua*} and battlefield feedback information and adjusting of subordinate force-unit operational activities at the right time by a campaign commander and his command organ. The goals are to bring into play one's own integrated-whole operational might and constrain the enemy's activities, drive the war situation to develop in the direction favorable for us and unfavorable for the enemy, and thus achieve the campaign goals. One should grasp with key points the following.

First, adjusting-control {*tiaokong*} at the right time. During campaign operations, it often happens that a part of or the entire plan may have to change. It is extremely important to the success of the campaign to adjust-control the activities of force-units at the right time. To do this, the campaign commander should strengthen battlefield information feedback, continuously grasp and evaluate the conformity between the original resolution and campaign progress and at the right time, make revisions or set a new resolution. Under normal conditions, as long as battlefield conditions do not change fundamentally, we should insist on thoroughly carrying out the already-made decision even if we encounter some frustrations and urging the troops to act according to the original plan. Thus, the main mission of campaign control and adjusting-coordination should give priority to improving and modifying the original operational plan and realizing the original resolution. Only when significant changes actually occur on the battlefield can a new resolution be set down.

Secondly, key point adjusting-control {tiaokong}. Campaign control and adjusting-coordination needs-requires one to look after many points, a wide area, and complex objects [targets] {duixiang}, and at the same time that the campaign commander and his command organ should be looking after the overall situation and full course of the campaign, they should give prominence to successfully adjusting-controlling the main operational direction, main operational grouping and critical quality operational activities. They should tightly center on the adjusting-control key points, thoroughly organize the various assisting, complementing, and support activities. At the same time, they should adopt effective measures to excite and consolidate the operational will of subordinate participating strengths, and to the greatest extent bring into play the integrated-whole operational might of the campaign large formation.

Thirdly, flexible adjusting-control. Army campaign operations involve a vast space and their operational activities are complex and diverse. In a situation when stable and uninterrupted communications is difficult to maintain, it is hard for campaign control and adjusting-coordination {kongzhi yu xietiao} to take care of all aspects. Thus, the implementation of campaign control and adjusting-coordination must fully bring into play the role of plan {jihua} adjusting-coordination and combine directive-quality adjusting-control {zhilingxing tiaokong} with adjusting-control according to plan {an jihua tiaokong}; it must fully bring into play the subjective dynamic qualities of subordinate level commanders, combine macroscopic adjusting-control with subordinate level commander's self-adjusting-control under a unified intent, and achieve campaign goals with flexible and diverse adjusting-control methods and means. The long-range strike firepower and campaign reserve strengths that are directly under the control of the campaign commander are critical quality strengths that affect the campaign course. They should be strictly controlled and they should be concentrated and employed at time-opportunities and directions of decisive significance.

Fourthly, "bi-directional" adjusting-control. Campaign control and adjusting-coordination includes adjusting one's own activities and restricting the enemy's activities. Only through effective restriction of the enemy's activities will we be able to create favorable conditions for adjusting our own activities. In restricting the enemy's activities, it is crucial to apply stratagems. One must be adept at forcing the enemy to generate slips and trapping the enemy in operations under unfavorable conditions through ingenious application of campaign strengths and campaign deception measures. As a result, we can gain favorable combat opportunities and be in a position of initiative.

(3) Organize transition between campaign phases

A campaign is normally divided into several campaign phases and each phase has a given operational mission to accomplish. To organize campaign phase transition at an appropriate time according to the development of the campaign situation is an important aspect of the command of campaign activities and is a concrete expression of the superior command art [skill] of the campaign commander. Organizing campaign phase transition

carefully has a significant effect in gaining an upper hand over the enemy, in continued development of campaign victory, and in hastening the campaign process.

It is of utmost importance to have a good grasp of the timing of the transition of the campaign phases. The army campaign commander should be good at examining the developmental trend of the battlefield posture from the perspective of the overall campaign and capture an opportune time for the transition. Generally there are several situations: One situation is when the operational mission of the current phase has been accomplished, preparations for the next campaign phase have also been done, and the battlefield posture is favorable. The campaign commander should take the opportunity to transition to the next campaign phase in order to develop the advantage of the success and hasten the progress of the campaign. A second situation is when the operational mission of the current phase has been accomplished, the next phase's preparation work has not been completed, and a favorable opportunity for battle arises on the battlefield. In this situation, the campaign commander should grab a favorable opportunity and decisively transition to the next campaign phase. A third situation is when the operational mission of the current phase has been accomplished, the preparation work for the next phase has not been completed, and the battlefield posture is favorable to the enemy and unfavorable to us. At this time the campaign command should aggressively and rapidly continue the preparation work. On the other hand he should employ various measures and means to change the battlefield posture and create favorable opportunities. At an appropriate time, the campaign commander can implement campaign phase transition. A fourth situation is when the overall strategic situation requires a delay or an early implementation of campaign phase transition. The campaign commander must look at the interest of the overall situation and execute the order of the superior decisively. No matter which situation calls for a campaign phase transition, the campaign commander should pay attention to the main direction and the completion of the main campaign mission. Once the main direction or the completion of the main campaign mission offers an opportunity for campaign phase transition, the campaign commander should decisively make a decision for campaign phase transition.

During the campaign phase transition, there are big adjustments to operational *bushu* disposition. Often it is necessary to redefine the mission, re-organize coordination, and change command relations. Also, since the transition time is finite, there is a greater requirement on the time effectiveness of force-unit {budui} activities. Thus, the army campaign commander must carefully organize, strengthen control and coordination, and strive to organize the campaign phase transition swiftly and in a concealed manner. The campaign commander must calculate the available time accurately, striving to complete troops repositioning rapidly within the available time. The commander must focus on the main direction when coordinating all forces for the transition, and promptly clarify the operational mission of each of the operational groups during the new phase and the basic methods to carry out the operational mission so as to ensure that the main operational groups will smoothly transit into the operations of the next phase. The campaign commander must organize reliable cover according to the level of the enemy threat.

(4) Organize conclusion of the campaign

Concluding a campaign refers to the campaign activities when the campaign goal is basically achieved or when the campaign mission needs to change. Concluding a campaign affects the campaign or even the overall strategic situation. Whether a campaign is concluded appropriately not only affects the transition into the operational mission of the next phase, but also directly affects the operational outcome of the previous phase, or even affects the important question of whether it will create favorable conditions for the political and diplomatic struggle.

The timing to conclude a campaign must be appropriate. Normally, under the condition that the campaign goal has been achieved or has basically been achieved, the campaign should be concluded at an appropriate time. If the battlefield posture is very favorable to us, we can go along with the favorable posture, further develop our success and conclude the campaign after we have expanded the outcome of our victory. If the original campaign goal has not been achieved but the battlefield posture faces significant change which is disadvantages to us, and continued operations will be difficult for us to accomplish the original campaign goal or even lead the overall situation into a passive state, at this time the campaign commander should decisively conclude the campaign in order to preserve our capabilities and regain the initiative.

The method to conclude a campaign is determined according to the posture of the battlefield. When the battlefield posture is favorable, we can adopt the active pull out of the battlefield [主动撤离战场 zhudong cheli zhanchang} method to conclude the campaign. At this time, we should carefully organize the pull out of the troops, clearly specify the sequence, direction and route of the pull out, and organize cover and all types of support. When concluding a campaign between the transition from an offensive operation to a defensive operation, we should carefully organize battlefield cover based on the actual situation of the enemy threat, promptly re-disposition the troops, and make preparation for continuous fight. When concluding a campaign while in a stalemate, we should, as much as possible, maintain the result of the campaign already achieved and safeguard the safety of the main operational group. We should form a battlefield posture that will be beneficial to follow-on operations.

Chapter 16

The Maneuver Warfare Campaign...391

The maneuver warfare campaign {机动战战役 jidongzhan zhanyi} is an offensive campaign by an army campaign large formation being assisted and complemented by the force-units of other services and arms and implemented against an enemy that is either on the move or has not yet established a foothold. They are a development from traditional mobile campaigns {运动战战役 yundongzhan zhanyi} conducted under informationized conditions. The maneuver warfare campaign is one of the main forms of future offensive campaigns to be waged under informationized conditions. Its main mission is to wipe out or wear down the enemy's force groups so as to alter the balance of campaign forces, change the battlefield posture and develop campaign victory.

To accomplish campaign goals, a maneuver warfare campaign often adopts the following as its basic fighting methods: creating conditions through maneuvering, concentrating forces at the appropriate time, and wiping out the enemy through battles of quick resolution. That is to say, we create advantageous battlefield postures and capture campaign initiative through the wide use of campaign maneuvering by stratagem and actively create opportunities for battle. We concentrate forces at the appropriate time to develop a force that is superior to the enemy's force in absolute terms. We launch sudden and ferocious assault against the enemy's critical points and key junctions, fight a quick battle to force a quick decision and annihilate the enemy forces one by one.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...391

I. Characteristics...391

(1) High level of force-unit {budui} mobility. Difficult to conceal operational intention.

Maneuver is an essential feature of maneuver warfare {机动战 jidongzhan}. Through wide maneuvering of forces and firepower, a maneuver warfare campaign provokes the enemy to be on the move, so that we can create and seize combat opportunities, develop situations that are advantageous to us, and annihilate the enemy while in motion. In future local wars under informationized conditions, the opposing sides will widely apply various types of high-tech methods such as space technology, remote sensing and telemetry, and opto-electronic technology on the battlefield to create an all time and space, all azimuth, and full-depth reconnaissance and surveillance system with all-weather, high-resolution and real-time reconnaissance capability. This decreases the effect of the traditional denial and deception methods and increases the transparency of the battlefield. In addition, the troops executing the maneuvering operation missions are often exposed to the scrutiny of the enemy's reconnaissance system. With our limited counter-reconnaissance ability and the large scale of the operations, the opportunities for us to be exposed are many and the difficulty level of concealing our operational intention is more difficult.

(2) Enemy has strong attack capabilities. High requirement on offensive and defensive operations.

The core of a maneuver warfare campaign is to attack. Maneuver warfare campaigns are an operational form of active attack. Only by way of aggressive and active attack will we be able to find operational opportunity on the battlefield, continue to annihilate the enemy, and create conditions for eventual victory. Under informationized conditions, the offensive nature of the maneuver warfare campaign has not changed. However, with continuing advancement in information technology and weapons and equipment, the enemy's attack capability will continue to improve. In a campaign, the status of defensive activities becomes more significant. On one hand, the enemy's reconnaissance and early warning capabilities continue to improve, and the enemy's fire attack system has better ability to conceal, faster operational response rate, longer attack range, higher hit precision, and greater destruction power. This poses a serious threat to the troops carrying out the maneuvering operation mission. On the other hand, the enemy has many ways to deliver forces and has strong operational support capability. The enemy can rapidly alter the balance of force in a local area in a very short time, creating disadvantage posture for the opponent. This indicates that in future maneuver warfare campaigns, we will encounter enemy's threat at all time, and the requirement on defensive activities becomes much higher.

(3) Integrate maneuver with attack. Struggle between maneuver and counter-maneuver is intense.

In maneuver warfare campaigns, both opposing sides conduct operations under maneuver conditions, and this results in a blending together of maneuver and operations. On the one hand, when selecting the operational target, the attacking side strives to attack an enemy that is in the process of being mobile or is stopping temporarily. When engaging a defensive enemy that is firmly defending an urban area or a position, the attacking side would lure or force the defensive enemy to leave the city or the position, striving to annihilate the enemy while it is on the move. In order to create advantageous battlefield posture and capture the opportunity for battle, the troops responsible for the maneuvering mission normally would actively maneuver their force or firepower to lure the enemy to reposition, striving to create and capture the opportunity for battle while maneuvering. On the other hand, on local war battlefields under informationized conditions, the opposing sides' battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance ability, force and weapon mobility, and long-range precision attack ability have greatly improved. This makes it more advantageous for our side to annihilate the enemy while it is on the move, but it also means we would face the same threat from the enemy. Thus, maneuvering continuously and changing locations continuously has become an important method to preserve ourselves and wipe out the enemy. In order to realize the campaign goal, each side will employ ways to limit the opposing side's battlefield maneuverability. This will make the struggle between maneuvering and counter-maneuvering more intense.

(4) Battlefield situations change rapidly. It is highly difficult to create and seize opportunities for battle.

In maneuver warfare campaigns, operational activities normally occur on the ground, in the air, at the front and in the rear. They could even occur simultaneously in space and in the electromagnetic domain. The battlefield space is very wide. In the campaign process, the switching between offensive and defensive and concentration and dispersion is very frequent and battlefield situations change rapidly. The uncertainty of opportunity for battle greatly increases. The force of the opposing sides rapidly concentrates and spreads out, and the balance of force may shift at any time. The process of the campaign progresses rapidly. With full-depth, high-pace, and multi-dimensional overtaking attack, the operational goal can be quickly achieved. All these factors cause the battlefield to change drastically. Opportunity for battle comes and goes instantaneously, which makes it very difficult to seize the opportunity for battle. At the same time, under informationized conditions, the battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance capability of the opposing sides continue to improve, making the traditional way of widespread mobility to create opportunity for battle less effective on a modern battlefield. Thus, in future maneuver warfare campaigns, it will be more difficult to create and seize opportunities for battle.

II. Requirements...393

(1) Conceal campaign intention. Launch sudden attack against the enemy.

Historically, concealed and sudden attack of the enemy is an important principle and a requirement to win campaign victory. This is especially so for maneuver warfare campaigns under informationized conditions. Battlefield transparency is high, the forces participating in the campaign are numerous, maneuver exposure time of the forces and firepower is long and the targets are large. To conceal operational intentions and activities becomes difficult. Thus, all the more we need to meet the requirement of concealment and sudden attack. In order to realize concealed and sudden attack, we should do the following. The first one is to correctly predict the possible development of the campaign and carefully formulate campaign operational plans. In particular, we should formulate multiple operational contingency plans based on the possible development and change so that even in a complex and unpredictable campaign process, we can be well prepared and be one step ahead of the enemy, and able to launch attack against the enemy in a concealed and sudden manner. The second one is to make full use of stratagem and campaign denial and deception. We should use electronic deception, feigned activities of the forces, smoke screens, etc. to deceive the enemy. We should use a series of denial and deception activities to achieve the goal of campaign suddenness. The third one is to choose favorable maneuver opportunities. We should, as far as possible, take advantage of unfavorable weather conditions and make use of the reconnaissance surveillance gaps of the enemy's high-tech equipment and rapidly maneuver. The fourth one is to employ correct maneuver forms and methods and increase the maneuver pace in order to ensure that the troops can reach the designated area rapidly

to develop the attack. The fifth one is to conduct operations continuously, use force extraordinarily, and attack the enemy unexpectedly.

(2) Implement activities agilely and decisively, striving to gain campaign initiative.

For a maneuver warfare campaign, without agility and flexibility means losing the initiative. In future local wars under informationized conditions in particular, the campaign commander must be able to judge the hour and size up the situation. He should evaluate the situations on the battlefield and respond accordingly. He should be flexible and responsive, continue to make use of new measures and methods to win victory. In a campaign, agile and decisive actions must be grounded on the following two aspects: Firstly, we should firmly and resolutely carry out the decision. When serious problems occur, as long as the battlefield situation does not change fundamentally and there are still possibilities to win the campaign, we should firmly work towards the target to realize the operational goal. If there are major changes in the situation, we should promptly modify the decision and adjust the objective guidance according to the subjective situation. If the situation changes fundamentally, we should use the superior's overall intent as the basis and agilely and flexibly accomplish our operational mission. Secondly, we should be good at predicting the development trend of the campaign under complex battlefield conditions. We should give priority to assessing and containing the enemy. If we are in a passive state in particular, when making a decision to retreat or to fight, to call for reinforcement or to reposition, or to change the fighting method, we should be decisive in making a quick choice.

(3) Take the initiative to aggressively attack. Firmly commit to an offensive and defensive combined method.

Offensive is the essence of a maneuver warfare campaign. Without aggressive offensive actions, it will be difficult for us to wear down the enemy or realize a switch from defensive to offensive, and it will be hard to win campaign victory. In maneuver warfare campaigns under informationized conditions, the enemy's attack capabilities continue to improve and our troops executing the mission face serious enemy threats. Thus, while we stress aggressive and active attack, formulate plans with offensive activities as the core, and execute the campaign plan, we must firmly commit to the principle and requirement of combining offensive operations with defensive operations. We should use effective defensive activities to augment offensive operations so that we can better achieve the goal of the campaign. To combine offensive and defensive operations in future maneuver warfare campaigns, we should do the following. First, we should do a good job in combining holding {jianshou} defensive operations with the maneuver warfare campaign. Holding defensive operations should become the powerful basis of the maneuver warfare campaign. With [holding defensive operations], we can inflict heavy enemy casualties, expend the enemy, divide and separate the enemy's campaign *bushu* disposition, and aggressively create conditions for the maneuver warfare campaign. The force-units {budui} implementing the maneuver warfare campaign should aggressively accomplish the mission of annihilating the enemy while maneuvering and fundamentally

achieve the campaign operational goals. Secondly, we must successfully accomplish the combining of offense and defense by the campaign strengths implementing maneuver warfare. Firstly, during the same operational time, the campaign strengths must separately undertake offensive and defensive (mainly to create momentum) operational missions. Secondly, one must successfully accomplish for oneself the thought for transforming from offense to defense and its organizing preparations. In particular, in the areas of the organized grouping of campaign maneuver and campaign operational *bushu* disposition, etc., they should all have the operational functionality of having both offense and defense so as to adapt to the needs-requirements of objective situations.

(4) Perfect the command mechanism, attend to close operational coordination

In operations under informationized conditions, the battlefield space is wide, the participating strengths are numerous, the operational activities are sudden, and the situation changes drastically. Without highly effective organization of command and adjusting-coordinated operational activities, it is very difficult to bring into play an integrated-whole operational effectiveness. In future maneuver warfare campaigns, in order to realize effective adjusting-coordination and control of the participating strengths of all services (arms), firstly, we should perfect our command mechanism. We must establish an authoritative campaign command institution and implement centralized and unified command to all participating services (arms) and local strengths. We must establish a sound command communication and coordination communication systems {xitong}, and make full use of advanced communications equipment and methods to raise command coordination effectiveness. We should formulate a thorough campaign coordination plan and closely organize campaign coordination. We should use flexibly apply command modes and adopt a method of combining centralized command and dispersed command. Secondly, we should give prominence to coordination key points. In coordinated operations with many services (arms), one should give priority to the service (arm) that plays the lead role in the campaign. In multi-direction operations, one should give priority to the activities in the main operational direction. In terms of time, one should give priority to the decisive-quality time or critical time opportunities. In operations on each battlefield, give priority to the main battlefield. When implementing firepower warfare, one should give priority to the main firepower in conducting adjusting-coordination. Thirdly, one must master force-unit situations. The campaign commander should be familiar with all subordinate force-unit situations, comprehend force-unit operational characteristics, operational capabilities, and main weapons and equipment performance {xingneng}, etc. We should strive to achieve accuracy and time-effectiveness in campaign adjusting-coordination. Fourthly, we must accomplish provisional adjusting-coordination {linshi xietiao}. During the operational process, based on developing changes in the situations, the commander must promptly conduct ad hoc adjusting-coordination {suiji xietiao}. Particularly, the commander should establish active adjusting-coordination awareness. Under difficult or dangerous situations, the commander should not wait for orders from the higher level. He should be adept in following the higher level general operational intent, actively accomplish adjusting-coordination with the higher level and friendly forces, and actively complement operations.

(5) Be well prepared. Use a quick battle to force a quick decision and annihilate the enemy.

In operations under informationized conditions, the operational effectiveness of weapons and equipment has improved unprecedentedly, campaign duration has shortened greatly, and the operational tempo has hastened notably. In maneuver warfare campaigns in particular, only through fighting a quick battle for a quick decision {速战速决 *suzhan sujue*} will we be able to: better respond to sudden situations and seize the battlefield initiative; avoid the enemy's reinforcement and fight a quick and decisive fight.; avoid enemy's retaliation; and avoid a situation whereby we "win the initial fight, but lose the battle." In order to implement fighting a quick battle to force a quick decision, we should do the following: The first is to be fully prepared and combat ready. Under the condition that we have gained local electromagnetic and air dominance, we should concentrate superior force-strengths, especially campaign elite strengths, and, at a favorable operational moment, employ an effective operational method, select an appropriate target and battlefield, and launch a sudden attack against the enemy. The second is to implement rapid and effective support. We should fully demonstrate the comprehensive support effect of all services (arms), and, in particular, we should fully utilize the local manpower, material, and technical support strength to implement a military-civilian integrated holistic support. We should establish a joint logistic command and support system that is fitting with maneuvering operations, and we should carefully formulate various support plans and be well prepared. In the main operational direction, for the main operational groups and main operational activities we should emphasize supporting the key points in order to improve time-effectiveness of the support. We should implement agile and correct support command and control and provide continuous support. We should pay attention to protection activities during support operations and use effective methods to raise battlefield survivability of the support strengths. We should use rapid and effective support activities to ensure that campaign activities can be carried out successfully.

Section 2: Main Activities...396

I. Creating and Capturing Opportunities for Battle...396

Opportunities for battle are combat opportunities that are advantageous to us and disadvantageous to the enemy. Opportunities for battle have special functions in maneuver warfare campaigns. They are the pre-requisite and basis for formulating the campaign resolution, and the fundamental assurance to realize fighting a quick battle for a quick decision. Creating and capturing opportunities for battle is an important part of implementing the maneuver warfare campaign. The activities are executed through out the entire process of the maneuver warfare campaign. Based on objective conditions, the commander must make use of his subjective initiative, exercise stratagems, and actively create and capture combat opportunities so as to ensure that we will engage the enemy under favorable conditions.

(1) Create opportunities for battle [or combat opportunities]

To create opportunities for battle refers to the operational activities of the campaign commander who takes the initiative to apply various strengths and means to force the enemy into a disadvantageous position and create opportunities to annihilate the enemy. In operations under informationized conditions, the enemy has better reconnaissance and surveillance capability, rapid maneuverability, and command control capability, which increase the difficulty level for us to create opportunities for battle. The campaign commander must have the campaign total situation in mind and comprehensively use measures such as electromagnetic, firepower, force-strengths, etc. The commander should rely on superior command skills and integrated-whole strengths to aggressively and actively create opportunities for battle.

The main methods to create opportunities for battle include the following: Use blockade and attack alternately to force the enemy to be exposed; forcefully divide and separate, forcing the enemy into isolation; retreat and lure the enemy into depth; attack the enemy to lure the enemy's reinforcement; encircle three sides and leave one side unguarded, prompting the enemy to breakout the siege; use diversionary tactics to prompt the enemy to disperse; use diversionary tactics to weaken the enemy; attack the enemy from the rear and attack vital points; use fire assault to weaken the enemy; use electronic deception to lure the enemy; block and divide the key point, causing the enemy to disperse, etc. When employing the above methods, we must strive to achieve the following: The first is to integrate modern technologies with traditional methods and use diverse methods simultaneously. When we create opportunities for battle, in addition to using traditional methods, we should pay attention to modern technical methods such as electronic technology, stealth technology, simulation technology, etc. to diversify, deceive, and confuse the enemy, making the enemy unable to guard against them thus creating advantageous opportunities to wipe out the enemy. The second is one must consistently adjust-coordinate various operational strengths and jointly create favorable opportunities for battle. We must have unified overall planning {tongyi chouhua} for the various operational strengths so that there is an integrated-whole battlefield working in concert, and the various activities are consistently adjusting-coordinated. Based on the overall operational intent and addressing the main operational goal, we actively create advantageous opportunities to annihilate the enemy. The third is to closely combine advance overall-planning {yuqi chouhua} and ad hoc creation of combat opportunities, and be flexible and responsive. In order to seize initiative, we must scientifically forecast possible operational activities of the campaign and carefully and painstakingly accomplish the advance planning {jihua} and courses of actions {fang'an} to create combat opportunity. At the same time, facing battlefield conditions that are constantly changing, we must be able to be mentally ready to do a good job in creating opportunities for battle at any given moment. Once a situation has essential or critical changed, we should resolutely and decisively make a decision based on the new situation. We should quickly modify or employ new methods to create opportunities for battle, and we should combine the pre-prepared decision with the contingent decision so as we could capture battlefield initiative at any given time.

Creating opportunities for battle is a very complicated process. One favorable opportunity for battle may often call for multiple methods and multiple tries. The campaign commander should be flexible and adaptable, not be constrained by a single mode, and should apply multiple methods to weaken the enemy's strength. In terms of command, he should use obvious methods and obscure methods; in terms of format, he should adopt static format and dynamic format; and in terms of formation, he should vary between converged and dispersed so as to create conditions for maneuvering and annihilation of the enemy.

(2) Capture opportunities for battle

Capturing opportunities for battle is a major decision the campaign commander must undertake to turn the possibility of victory into reality based on the already created opportunity or a pending opportunity. In operations under informationized conditions, the enemy possesses advanced weapons and equipment, which allows the operational activities to have high maneuverability, the assaults to be ferocious, the attack range to be far, and the reaction ability rapid. As a result, in a maneuver warfare campaign, the time effectiveness requirement of combat opportunities is much higher. Once an opportunity occurs, it becomes a critical problem for the commander to determine how to fight for time, how to beat the enemy in speed, and how to rapidly capture the opportunity and annihilate the enemy.

In trying to capture opportunities for battle, the campaign commander should pay attention to the following points: First, we should be able to make scientific estimates and be fully prepared. With preparation, all matters can be accomplished; without preparation, all matters will be wasted. For maneuver warfare campaigns under informationized conditions, even though situations change drastically and opportunities occur randomly for a short duration, they do have a certain pattern and have observable signs which can be detected. Therefore, the operational activities to capture opportunities for battle should be established on the foundation of our advance preparation. First, we must get a grip on the intention of enemy's activities. This is the foundation of making scientific predictions. Next, we must have foresight on the possibilities of the development of the situation and be able to formulate multiple activity scenarios. Finally, we must use the scenarios to formulate detailed plans, and we must make meticulous preparation accordingly. Secondly, we should step up reconnaissance and stay on top of enemy conditions. Stepping up reconnaissance and staying on top of enemy conditions are important pre-requisites to allow the contingency plan to be more objective and practical so that we can detect and capture the opportunities for battle at the right time. During the campaign, we should employ various ways and means and use different channels to reinforce battlefield reconnaissance. We should make full use of modern technologies to rapidly analyze and retrieve enemy intelligence in order to ascertain the enemy's true intent by eliminating false intelligence and discovering the truth. We should use newly acquired information to modify, supplement and improve, or even reformulate a preliminary operational course of action {zuo zhan yu'an}. Thirdly, we should seize the combat opportunity and be decisive at the opportunity. In capturing combat opportunity,

be decisive at the opportunity, do not be too early and do not be too late. Being too early will result in the combat opportunity not maturing, not only making it easy to disrupt the combat opportunity but possibly exposing one's own operational intention; being too late will cause one to lose the combat opportunity altogether. Normally, if the overall situation is advantageous to us and the condition for us to wipe out the enemy is present, we should act resolutely. Fourthly, one must rapidly maneuver and quickly capture [combat opportunity]. Once a combat opportunity appears, the campaign commander should command force-units to rapidly maneuver and annihilate the enemy in the predetermined enemy annihilation area. In order to ensure one grabs the combat opportunity, we can adopt methods such as combining ground maneuver with air maneuver, combining force strength maneuver with firepower maneuver, and combining nearby force application with accelerated maneuver, so as to strive to seize the benefit of first opportunity in front of the enemy. Fifthly, we should adapt to changing conditions and continue to capture opportunities. Opportunities are not fixed and they change as battlefield situations change. In light of changing battlefield conditions, the campaign commander should be adept in seeking and detecting new opportunities and continue to maintain and seize advantageous posture, striving to maintain the campaign initiative. Once the new conditions are favorable and timing is opportune, the commander should strive to capture combat opportunities so as to rapidly wipe out the enemy.

Creating and capturing opportunities for battle are different yet connected. They are an organically connected whole. The campaign commander should be good in creating opportunities for battle, as well as good at detecting and capturing opportunities for battle. He must avoid waiting passively or hesitating and letting the opportunities slip. He should guard against seeking small gains while spoiling the overall outcome.

II. Advancing and Unfolding...398

Advancing and unfolding refer to the activities of the campaign large formation as it moves from the assembly area towards the operations area and completes its operational standby for deployment. Once the campaign commander makes the maneuver warfare campaign resolution, he should immediately organize the force-units {budui} for advancing and unfolding.

(1) Campaign advancing

Advancing is a very important campaign activity that will encounter various modes of obstructions and restrictions. In order to ensure that the campaign large formation can advance swiftly and in a concealed manner, the campaign command institution should formulate the advance plan in accordance with the resolution of the commander. The contents of such plans should mainly include the following: the enemy situation, the advance zone (routes), the advance *bushu* disposition, order of advance, set-out time, deadline for arrival, unfolding area, communications, the command organization during the advance, as well as various support measures, etc. The advance areas should be determined on the basis of the terrain and road conditions of the campaign unfolding area

and the location of the force-unit assembly area. The mode of advance should be a flexible use of the many kinds of mobility modes such as motorized advance, on foot advance, airborne transport, rail transport and waterway transport, based on situations such as the operational mission, equipment conditions, the communication situation and the transportation tools. Campaign maneuvers should be carried out rapidly and in a concealed manner. In terms of methods of advance, the multi-directional, multi-route, multi-echelon and dispersed method is often adopted. During the advance, units assigned with missions to carry out attack and blocking (containing) of the enemy's reinforcement normally should advance separately along different directions, using multiple routes and in multi-echelons. Campaign reserve and attack forces should advance at the same time or after each other. Reserve units of various services and arms should follow behind the attack units. Campaign support units (*fendui*), except for those responsible for advance support, normally move in after the attack units. The timing of the advance should be selected in accordance with weather conditions, battlefield postures, etc. At the same time, we should also do a good job in providing various supports during advancing.

(2) Campaign unfolding

Campaign unfolding must be conducted according to plan and in an orderly and concealed manner. The distance between the area of campaign unfolding and the enemy annihilation area should be determined on the basis of campaign intention, the mission of each force-unit, mobility conditions, battlefield conditions, operational patterns, operational methods, mode of advance, and the predetermined attack initiation time. The distance should facilitate a concealed and sudden initiation of attack. When conditions are favorable and the situation permits, we can directly enter the annihilation area {歼敌地区 *jiandi diqu*} from the assembly area. After a short stay there we initiate the attack. After campaign unfolding, the campaign commander should be on top of developing changes in the battlefield situation and correctly seize the opportunity for battle. If the target of annihilation is advancing towards or approaching the pre-determined annihilation area, that is, we should conduct tactical unfolding at the right time on the basis of the adopted campaign fighting method.

III. Initiating the Attack {faqì gongjì}...399

When the target enters the pre-determined annihilation area, one should launch an attack at the appropriate time. Normally, we should first implement fire strikes, and afterwards, taking advantage of the result of the fire strikes, swiftly launch campaign assaults.

(1) Fire assault

To stage a fire assault is to concentrate army artillery, campaign tactical missiles, and the firepower supporting the operation, including aviation, conventional missile, and naval firepower (during coastal operations) to carry out fire attacks on pre-determined annihilation targets. The focus of the attack should be directed at the enemy's command system, high-tech weapon systems, rapid maneuver force-units, campaign reserves,

artillery and missile positions, and other important targets. The objective is to disrupt the enemy's operational deployment, to take the edge off the enemy's attacks, and to achieve to a certain extent the goal of annihilating the enemy. When necessary, we can conduct repeated strikes against important targets so as to create advantageous conditions to annihilate the enemy.

(2) Force-strength attack

After the fire assault, the attacking force-units should take advantage of its results and launch, wherever appropriate, swift attacks by way of rapid raids {急袭 jixi} (namely, a sudden, rapid, and violent raid on the enemy), an ambush (namely, pre-dispose force-strengths along the route the enemy must pass through and launch sudden attacks when the enemy either enters the ambush area by itself or is lured into it), a diverging advance and converging attack {分进合击 fenjin heji} (namely, attack a common target in multiple columns and from different directions), etc. Under the cover of the support fire of the aviation and artillery forces, various assault groups should attack ferociously and vigorously and penetrate and cut up the enemy forces boldly. Units with outflanking and inserting [penetrating] missions should make use of the gaps in the enemy's forces and resolutely, swiftly, and boldly cut up and divide the target. The force-units operating at the enemy's rear should, working in cooperation with the militia or airborne force, seize the vital points and disrupt the enemy's *bushu* disposition, and resolutely encircle the enemy, not allowing the enemy to escape. If the enemy's maneuver force-strengths outflank our flank rear and carry out counter encirclement {反包围 fanbaowei}, or use air firepower to assault our attack force-units, command posts, and reserves, we should use aviation and artillery firepower to block the enemy's reinforcement, cut off their retreat routes, and crush the enemy's counter-encirclement.

IV. Annihilating Operations...400

(1) Rapidly annihilate the besieged enemy

Upon completing encirclement of the enemy, we should take advantage of the moment when the enemy is confused and dislocated, the enemy's command is disrupted and its firepower is suppressed and strengthen our attack activities and boldly penetrate and cut up the enemy in an effort to prevent the enemy from making adjustments in force-unit {budui} deployment, regain coordination, break out of the encirclement, or organize its defense. Various attack groups should coordinate and work in concert to seize the advantageous moments and penetrate and divide the enemy, striving to fight a quick fight for a quick decision. If the enemy switches to defense on the spot, we should seize the opportunity when the enemy has not taken a solid foothold to swiftly strike the enemy. Before the attack, we should concentrate firepower of the artillery, campaign tactical missiles, and aviation to launch brief, sudden, and violent fire assault and suppression. The attack units should take advantage of the result of the fire assault and use agile fighting methods to launch targeted attack from multiple directions and multiple routes, and bravely penetrate and cut up the enemy's formation before annihilating the divided up

enemy one by one. If our besiegement of the enemy goes smoothly and if the enemy loses hope in receiving reinforcement, we should anticipate the probability of the enemy breaking the siege. We should evaluate the signs of enemy's intention to break out from the encirclement, possible breakout time and direction, and make preparations to prevent the enemy from breaking out. Normally, we reinforce the force-strengths in the direction where the enemy is likely to break out, especially reinforcing antitank fire and surface-to-air fire, so as to block the enemy's retreat route. If the enemy begins to break out the encirclement, we should use firepower to firmly block the escape. The maneuvering force-strengths should rapidly annihilate the escaping enemy. If the enemy attempts to escape by way of airborne means, we should use aviation firepower and surface-to-air firepower to block the airspace. We should resolutely stop the enemy's aircraft from coming overhead, landing, or taking off. When we are annihilating the besieged enemy, we should also organize aviation, artillery, and campaign tactical missile firepower to attack important targets in the enemy's campaign depth, such as missile positions, advance airfields, and follow-on echelons, etc., to work together to annihilate the besieged enemy. During the siege and annihilation operations, if for some reasons a stalemate situation occurs, the campaign commander should correctly reassess the battlefield situation. As long as there is still a possibility to win, we should resolutely carry out the annihilation decision. We should take effective measures to break up the stalemate situation and not easily let go the opportunity to win. If significant change actually occurs, we can change the decision in accordance with the intent of the superior and seek other opportunities for battle.

(2) Resolutely blocking and attacking the enemy reinforcement

When we encircle the enemy in one route or one area, the enemy at other routes or areas must quickly maneuver and provide reinforcement on the ground or in the air. They may also carry out counter-encirclement. When the campaign commander is ordering the troops to annihilate the besieged enemy, he must also resolutely block and attack the enemy's reinforcement. The methods to block and attack the reinforcement should be determined according to the enemy's possible reinforcement direction, force-strengths, distance, terrain, and the operational capabilities of our forces. Normally, we can use methods such as positional defense or mobile defense. If the conditions are right and the situation is advantageous, we can also employ offensive activities or use long-range artillery and aviation firepower to attack the enemy's reinforcement. No matter which method is employed, the units responsible for blocking and attacking the enemy reinforcement must use aggressive and active actions to block the enemy from the ground or in the air in a pre-determined area in order to stop the reinforcement to converge with the besieged enemy, and to support the main force to annihilate the besieged enemy. During the operation, in order to wipe out the besieged enemy, the campaign commander should, at an appropriate time, employ the reserves to enter the engagement. He should clearly define the reserves' direction, mission, time, area of engagement and coordination relationship with other units, etc.

V. Anti-airborne Operations...401

The airborne operation is an important method in modern operations. In a maneuver warfare campaign, possible moments the enemy may implement airborne operations include the following: When the enemy wants to increase the pace of the offensive to cooperate with the ground troops to attack the depth; when the enemy wants to work with the ground troops in counter-encirclement and break out of the encirclement; when the enemy launches assault against the groups blocking reinforcement and breaks into the position where reinforcement has been blocked, etc. To address the enemy's airborne operations, the campaign commander should detect the opponent's signs of airborne operations as early as possible. He should assess the force strength, timing, area, and intention of the airborne operations and quickly make the decision, as well as organize and complete the preparation for anti-airborne operations. If the enemy's airborne forces are flying overhead, we should use the aviation and ground air defense capabilities that support the operations and adopt the divided airspace method {区分空域方法 *qufen kongyu fangfa*} to intercept the enemy layer by layer. At the same time, we should maximize all ground-to-air firepower to target and destroy the enemy's transport aircraft, armed helicopters and to inflict massive casualties on the enemy's effective strength. At the same time, the anti-airborne units should use multiple routes and multiple directions to rapidly advance towards the airborne area and to lay mines or to capture operational key points preemptively in order to restrict the enemy's converge and seize advantageous terrain, as well as create conditions to annihilate the enemy's airborne forces. If the enemy's airborne forces land on the ground, we should concentrate firepower to attack the targets that pose the greatest threat to us, seize advantageous terrain and key points, block the enemy's airborne forces from converging, crush the enemy's intention to meet with the frontal operational force on the ground, as well as to safeguard our main force in the anti-airborne operation. If the enemy's airborne forces have captured the position and transitioned into defensive, we should reposition the deployment promptly and implement storming attack {强攻 *qianggong*}.²⁰ We should first use rapid and violent firepower to attack and suppress and destroy the enemy's temporary works as much as possible. Afterwards, we should rapidly organize our forces to penetrate its defense and separate and divide the enemy before annihilating the enemy.

VI. Continuing Operations...402

Initial battle victory often may cause drastic change in the war situation and could quickly generate new combat opportunities. The campaign commander should be good at making use of the advantageous conditions created by the initial battle and turn local victory into campaign victory. Thus, when the initial battle victory is certain, the commander should, in light of the battlefield development, assess possible intention and

²⁰ Storming attack: According to the 1997 *PLA Military Terms*, "Combat operations in which concentrated, superior forces and firepower undertake a forceful attack against a defensive enemy. Mainly used in offensive combat against defensive enemies in fortified positions, defensive enemies in field positions, and urban defensive enemies."

activities of the enemy nearby and formulate the operational course of action for the next phase. Once the initial battle ends, the commander should capture the opportunities for battle and rapidly shift force-strengths {转移兵力 zhuanyi bingli}²¹ to wipe out the enemy in other areas and to realize the campaign mission. The timing for shifting forces can take place at the following junctures: after wiping out part of the enemy force and seeking to wipe out the rest of the enemy force; after wiping out an encircled enemy force and seeking to wipe out enemy reinforcement; after wiping out the enemy reinforcement and seeking to wipe out a besieged enemy force; after wiping out the enemy's ground forces and seeking to wipe out the enemy's airborne forces that have just landed on the ground; and pursuing the retreating and escaping enemy, etc. During the process of shifting forces and continuing operations, the campaign commander should constantly analyze and assess the situations, make predictions of enemy's development, and aggressively create and capture new opportunities for battle. He should, at the appropriate time, conceal the maneuvering forces, change fighting methods agilely, and coordinate with the troops of all services and arms and local forces in activities. He should also repeatedly conduct political mobilization {政治动员 zhengzhi dongyuan} to maintain heightened fighting enthusiasm.

In achieving continuing operations, during campaign planning, the campaign commander must take into consideration the interconnectedness of and switching between campaign phases, as well as do a good job in organizing coordination and support. The commander must pay attention to conserving the use of forces and bring into full play the total effect of the campaign force. He should aggressively and actively create opportunities for battle, capture opportunities for battle promptly and correctly, and realized the total success of the campaign operations. Unafraid of fatigue and appropriate adjustment are two indispensable aspects of continuing operations. The duration of a campaign is long and the struggle is punishing. Personnel, ammunition, food supplies, and POL, etc. all need to be adjusted and replenished promptly. While we emphasize the spirit of bravery, sacrifice, unafraid of fatigue, and continuing operations, we should make use of gaps and any other down time to rest and adjust the troops so that they will recover and strengthen their operational ability. In future campaigns, battlefield switching will be fast and the requirement for continuing operation will be high. The campaign commander should be good at adjusting and use of forces so that during the entire campaign process the troops will always maintain vigorous assault vitality.

²¹ Shift force-strengths: According to the 1997 *PLA Military Terms*, "Operations in which the operational direction or operational area are switched. Its basic requirements are suitable timing, speed, and concealment."

Chapter 17

The Mountain Offensive Campaign...404

The mountain offensive campaign is offensive operations conducted by an army campaign large formation, complemented by other armed strengths and implemented against an enemy in a mountain defensive. The campaign goal is to annihilate an enemy's effective strength, seize the targets occupied by the enemy, and create conditions for achieving strategic goals.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...404

In a mountain offensive campaign, imminent battle preparation time is hasty, its battlefield is unfamiliar, and in particular, the complex terrain poses great influence on offensive operations. Its unfavorable factors are: first, it is not easy for a large force-unit maneuver and unfolding, and it is especially not easy for heavy equipment force-unit activities such as tanks. Secondly, it is not easy for observation and fire, and it is especially not easy for bringing high tech weaponry effectiveness into play. Thirdly, it is not easy for penetration and developing the offensive, and it is especially easy for the campaign *bushi* disposition to be separated by terrain. It is difficult for each offensive direction to mutually assist the other, and it is difficult to form a composite strength against any given point. Fourthly, it is difficult to organize logistical, equipment and operational support. The advantages include the following: The favorable aspects: firstly, it is easy for us to conceal our operational intention and suddenly initiate sudden-attack [assault]. Secondly, it favors our organizing of small elements {fensdui} to implement insertion {穿插 chuancha}, outflanking {迂回 yuhui}, infiltration, and special operations, and annihilate the enemy via close combat.

I. Characteristics...404

(1) Main operational activities are around the mountain accesses {通道 tongdao} and key points {重点 zhongdian}

In order to ensure stability of mountain defense, the enemy will stress the defense of key points, control of mountain accesses, and prevention of enemy outflanking. Normally, the enemy will deploy the main forces and equipment in advantageous terrain such as river valleys or narrow mountain-passes to form a gateway to control the valleys and the defensive system of the mountain accesses and key points. For our troops to achieve the campaign goal, we must first capture the key points at the enemy's forward, open the gateway to the passes, capture advantageous terrain on either side of the passes, and control important traffic routes. Only then can we rapidly penetrate the enemy depth and divide and break up {割裂 gelie}²² the enemy's defense, and create conditions for our forces to annihilate the enemy who are defending the key points. Thus, the main activities

²² Divide and break up or separate.

of the campaign will always focus on the mountain passes and key points; and the focal points of the struggle between two sides are capturing the key points and controlling the mountain passes.

(2) Offensive directions are independent

In the mountainous area, the terrain is undulating, mountain cliffs are steep and valleys intersect. Offensive activities are often forced into areas broken up by the terrain. Troops carrying out the same mission may be divided into several directions due to the ridges and valleys, and they often have to carry out activities independently. Thus, mountain offensive operations are normally carried out in separated directions and areas and the campaign large formation normally is organized into several offensive groups {攻击集团 gongji jutuan} with independent operational capabilities. They follow a unified plan and carry out the offensive operational mission independently in different directions to realize the same campaign intent. Each offensive direction is highly independent.

(3) Difficulty level of assault to penetrate enemy's fortifications is high

The defensive enemy in the mountainous area uses the advantageous terrain as the backdrop to firmly defend. They are often well prepared and have a well fortified defensive system. At those highly contested key points, in particular, the enemy normally disposes stronger forces and provides them with more fire support. The enemy's main positions are normally set up in complex and strategic terrain. They form a circular-shaped defense and deploy large forces with high density of fire and obstacles. For our troops to seize the enemy's forward key points and penetrate the enemy's defense, we must concentrate our excellent forces and implement multi-directional and multi-route assault to forcefully attack the enemy's strong defense. The mission is very difficult and the operations are extraordinarily intense.

(4) Depth attack gains significance

During mountain operations, when organizing defense, the defensive side can make full use of the advantageous terrain and natural obstacles and has excellent conditions to conceal. Thus, it is more difficult for the offensive side to launch a forceful frontal assault or push forward in a line. On the other hand, the defensive side's force deployment and firepower systems are easily constrained or even isolated by the terrain. This provides advantageous conditions for the offensive side to implement outflanking, inserting, infiltration, enveloping, and to develop its firepower and annihilate the enemy. Thus, in mountain offensive campaigns, in order to penetrate the enemy's defense, it is not only possible but necessary to implement non-linear operations and attack and capture important targets in the enemy's depth. The offensive side often uses long-range fire of the aviation, missile, and artillery force to conduct comprehensive assault. At the same time, the offensive side can use airborne and airlanding units and the special operation units to work in cooperation with the ground troops to implement outflanking, inserting, encirclement, and infiltration activities. The offensive side can also implement multi-

dimensional and overtaking {超越攻击 chaoyue gongji}²³ attack. This way, the offensive side can coordinate forward attack with depth attack, ground attack with airborne attack, and force attack with firepower attack. The offensive side can take advantage of the advantages and avoid the disadvantages, and take control of the campaign initiation. Here we can see that depth operations and multi-dimensional attack are important measures to win victory of mountain offensive campaigns.

(5) Command and coordination is complex and difficult

In mountain offensive campaigns, the operational space is wide, the participating forces are many, the organization is complex, and the campaign deployment is dispersed. The attack groups are normally separated in different directions and areas while they organize campaign activities. Thus, the requirement for campaign overall control and coordination is high and the difficulty level is great. In the campaign process, the progress of activities in different offensive directions and during different operational phases is not balanced. Battlefield situations are complicated, change can be drastic, and communications and command coordination can be interrupted easily. During battles, the requirement for contingent coordination {随即协同 sui'ji xie'tong} is high and the complexity and difficult level of command is great.

(6) Support mission is arduous and difficult

In mountain offensive campaigns, the enemy makes use of a large amount of high-tech weapons and equipment and implements both “soft” and “hard” attack. The level of damage will increase and our communications support and our command system will suffer serious threat from the enemy. In mountain offensive campaigns, the terrain is complex and the enemy’s fortifications are strong. Thus, our tasks to overcome terrain obstacles and destroy enemy’s defensive installations are arduous. Mountainous terrain makes reconnaissance, observation and getting hold of enemy’s intelligence and intended direction of movement very difficult, and battlefield intelligence support is hard. High-tech equipment is widely applied to the battlefield. With a higher degree of automation and better technology, technical support work becomes extremely complex. During assault operations, there are high personnel casualties, high war material consumption, and high damage rate of equipment. In the mountainous area, population density is low and socio-cultural complexity is high. It is difficult to secure provisions and supplies. We have to rely mainly on support of the campaign large formation, and thus the logistical and equipment support tasks are arduous. In sum, in mountain offensive campaigns, the

²³ Overtaking attack: According to the 1997 *PLA Military Terms*, overtaking operations are combat operations in which a unit overtakes the enemy in front of it or one's own combat formation. For example, combat operations which take advantage of a gap in enemy forces or an exposed flank to penetrate the enemy's rear; in pursuit combat, operations to overtake or bypass enemy covering units; combat operations to block the path of a retreating enemy force; the second echelon in combat operations which overtake the first echelon; etc.

necessary support items are many, the range of support is wide, the requirement is high, and the support mission is thus especially difficult.

II. Requirements...406

In mountain offensive campaigns, we must concentrate our excellent forces and sharp weapons to create overall superiority over the enemy, both quantitatively and qualitatively. We must use multiple operational measures agilely and implement full-depth and focused attack. We must use resolute and ferocious assault activities to annihilate the enemy's effective strength in the shortest time possible and capture the area occupied by the enemy. To do this, in campaign guidance we must grasp the following points:

(1) Concentrate superior forces. Together overcome the enemy.

An enemy that is defending a mountainous area has advanced preparation and can afford waiting at ease for an exhausted opponent. The enemy makes use of the advantageous terrain to build a closed defense system. We must concentrate our superior forces and jointly overcome the enemy. That is, we must concentrate the forces of all participating services and arms under a unified command. We must have superiority both in quantity and quality. We must strengthen command coordination among the services and arms so as to form a total power to overcome the enemy and win victory.

Force concentration mainly refers to concentration of forces and weapons in terms of time and effectiveness. To do so, we must concentrate the use of reinforced aviation, airborne, naval, air defense, campaign tactical missile, support artillery, electronic warfare, and special operations force, etc. During the entire campaign or part of the campaign process, we must maintain quantitative and, especially, qualitative superiority. Under normal situations, we must use the combined operational capability of the attack groups to respond to the enemy and build a strong advantageous force. In the main attack direction of the campaign, we must form even greater superiority in order to sustain powerful attack capability.

To concentrate forces does not mean we should employ the method of concentrated deployment. Instead, we should concentrate forces dynamically, that is, we should use battlefield maneuver to concentrate operational forces during the operational process. Mainly, we should swiftly concentrate force-unit {budui} force, fire power, and information capability in order to create campaign total or local superiority. We should break up the enemy's defensive system with a single blow, disrupt the enemy's disposition, and frighten the enemy's psychological state, thus pushing the development of the combat situation.

In mountain offensive campaigns, there are many participating services and arms. We must strengthen the concept of integrated operations, strengthen command coordination,

and use the forces scientifically in order to create a combined total force and launch comprehensive attack against the enemy.

(2) Launch multi-route multi-dimensional attack. Penetrate key points.

The enemy that is defending a mountainous area has already established a complete position, and its defensive system consists of a fortified strong position and various protective works and obstacles. When launching a mountain offensive campaign, we must focus on special attributes of the enemy's defensive disposition and choose its defensive weakness such as defensive gaps, defensive connecting parts, and flanks. We must launch multi-directional, multi-dimensional, targeted attack in order to force the enemy to disperse its forces. Implementing multi-route, multi-directional and multi-dimensional attack can help us conceal our campaign intention and allow us to simultaneously penetrate the enemy's defense from several directions. It enables us to implement inserting and outflanking, dividing and encirclement, and to annihilate the enemy that is defending the mountain position.

When implementing multi-route multi-dimensional attack, we must target key points. We should concentrate the main force and weapons in the main attack direction to penetrate the enemy's key points, and at the same time, we should at the same time choose several support attack and diversion directions {助攻和牵制方向 zhugong he qianzhi fangxiang}. We should concentrate the use of the air, campaign tactical missile, and ground artillery force in order to implement a focused firepower assault. The attack force should make full use of the firepower assault effect and swiftly penetrate the enemy's defense forward at a decisive time and in a decisive sector. The attack force should attack and encircle the enemy's forward key points, divide and break up the enemy's defensive system and control the main access passageway. The follow-on troops should make use of the forward attack effect to rapidly expand the outcome of the operation and maintain a strong offensive posture. If the main offensive direction is frustrated, we should carefully analyze the battlefield posture and decisively change the disposition according to the battlefield situation, rapidly maneuver the forces, and continue to develop along the direction where the offensive is successful.

(3) Full-depth comprehensive attack. Multi-dimension dividing and annihilation.

The main operational measure to rapidly and decisively annihilate an enemy that is defending a mountainous area is to implement full-depth comprehensive attack and multi-dimensional dividing and annihilation. That is, we launch a comprehensive force, firepower and electronic attack against the targets in the full-depth of the enemy's defense system, and use multiple methods to divide, encircle, and annihilate the enemy. When we launch full-depth comprehensive attack, we must fully demonstrate the power of high-tech long-range force and weapon capabilities, especially the operational capabilities of the Second Artillery, aviation, and special operations force. We must strive to overcome the enemy's full-depth with one blow and achieve high-intensity firepower effectiveness within a short time. We should fully utilize all operational forces, methods

and measures to implement multi-dimensional blockade and dividing in order to create conditions to annihilate the enemy. To achieve this, we must concentrate our firepower to target important targets, traffic hubs, and key points along the passageways in the enemy's defensive depth. We must employ firepower blockade, force-unit {budui} force inserting, and electromagnetic interruption to block part of the battlefield and prevent the defensive enemy from establishing contact with the outside. The assault group {强击集群 qiangji jiqun} should make full use of the firepower effect and swiftly and bravely tear an opening in the enemy's forward and resist enemy's counterattack. The depth assault group {纵深突击集群 zongshen tuji jiqun} should rapidly implement inserting, outflanking, and infiltration to divide and break up the defensive enemy. The special operations and airborne force should aggressively sabotage critical targets in the enemy's depth, disrupt enemy's disposition in the depth, and work in conjunction with the frontal main force to attack and annihilate the enemy.

(4) Scientific and rational *bushu* disposition. Command nimbly.

In mountain offensive campaigns, we must rationally determine the campaign *bushi* disposition in light of the characteristics of campaign operations and battlefield environment under informationized conditions, as well as the campaign mission, strength task-organization, operational capabilities, fighting methods, and the enemy's defensive posture. We should establish a multi-directional, focused, and multi-dimensional attack disposition. We should ensure that we have strong assault capabilities in the main attack direction, and at the same time we should make sure that the attack troops in all directions also have strong independent operational capabilities. When we organize operations, we should follow the principle of joint operations of all services and concentrated efficiency {军种联合,集中效能 junzhong lianhe, jizhong xiaoneng} so as to demonstrate the integrated-whole might of all services. We should give special emphasis to the functions of the special operations force and organize several operational forces with special capabilities to implement inserting, outflanking, and infiltration, and to carry out the mission of seizing points, controlling passageways, and dividing, encircling and annihilation.

In mountain offensive campaigns, the campaign *bushi* disposition is rather dispersed and all offensive directions are independent. Battlefield situations are complicated, change can come suddenly, and our command and coordination can easily be disrupted by the enemy. Thus, while stressing concentrated unified command {集中统一指挥 jizhong tongyi zhihui}, we can also employ the dispersed command {分散指挥 fensan zhihui} mode or the delegated command {委托指挥 weituo zhihui} mode to nimbly command. In the main attack direction and during important periods, we should practice primarily unified command and use dispersed command as a secondary mode. In other directions and areas and during other critical periods, we should use dispersed command as the primary mode and use unified command as the secondary mode. We should be able to combine unified command with dispersed command and practice concentrated and dispersed command appropriately. When assigning missions and organizing coordination before combat, the campaign commander should not be too rigid or too inflexible. He

should leave room for flexibility. During combat, when dealing with situations, the campaign commander should give a certain degree of autonomy to lower-level commanders, allowing them to develop their own initiative and creativity and use their own intelligence and talent to find effective ways to overcome the enemy and win victory, and to command decisively and nimbly. In addition, the campaign commander should centrally manage the total situation, strengthen coordination and closely organize coordinated activities of all operational directions, during all operational phases, and among all services and arms. This is to ensure that all services and arms form a joint force, and act cooperatively and in unison in attacking the enemy.

(5) Implementing full scale campaign support and [campaign support] having key points.

In mountain offensive campaigns, all operational activities rely heavily on operational support and logistical and equipment support. Effective support has a great impact on the campaign course and conclusion. At the same time, the support strengths are limited, the support missions are arduous, and the support requirements are relatively high. Thus, we must implement both full scale campaign support and [campaign support] having key points.

Full scale support {全面保障 *quanmian baozhang*} is the base and foundation of good campaign support. It means we should provide support in light of the support objectives, to all battlefields, and during the entire course of the campaign. In terms of the support space, we should take good care of the battlefield's frontage and flank, the depth, on land, at sea, and in the air, and implement all-direction support. In terms of time, we should pay attention to the full course of the campaign, as well as provide continuous support during all phases and periods. In terms of support objectives, we should provide support to all participating services and arms and make adjustment to their unique characteristics and requirement.

Key point support {重点保障 *zhongdian baozhang*} is to reinforce support with key points on the basis of full scale support. It means based on the situation of battlefield realities, we must conduct unified overall- and *guihua* planning for campaign support, rationally organize and *bushu* disposition various support strengths, and concentrate the main strengths to support the operational activities that have a major effect on the campaign overall situation; give priority to supporting the main direction and area, critical time occasions, and operational groups executing the main missions so as to ensure the completion of key point missions.

Section 2: Main Activities...410

Based on the campaign mission and actual situation, in mountain offensive campaigns, we can normally achieve the campaign goal by employing operational activities such as seizing campaign information superiority, seizing local air superiority, comprehensive firepower attack, multi-dimensional penetration, crushing enemy's counterattack, depth dividing and annihilation, etc.

I. Seizing and Maintaining Campaign Information Superiority and Air Superiority...410

In mountain offensive campaigns, seizing and maintaining campaign information and air superiority is critical to getting hold of the campaign initiation and can have major consequences to the process and outcome of the campaign. Thus, we should focus on organizing and implementing seizing and maintaining campaign information and air superiority in light of the battlefield environment and the offensive and defensive capabilities of the opposing sides.

(1) Seizing and maintaining campaign information superiority

Seizing and maintaining information superiority is the prerequisite and foundation of getting hold of the campaign initiation. The main mission is to block the enemy from obtaining information, weaken, interrupt and damage enemy's information transmission, and destroy the enemy's information basic facilities; at the same time, we protect our information capturing, transmission, and processing so as to have information superiority. For the campaign large formation, the core of seizing and maintaining information superiority is to seize and maintain electromagnetic superiority. The main operational methods are network warfare, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare.

1. Organizing battlefield information reconnaissance

Battlefield information reconnaissance means using various reconnaissance measures to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities against the enemy's information operation systems. The focus is on finding out the structure and disposition of the enemy's information operation systems and equipment, their tactical characteristics, technical parameters and patterns of use.

In mountain offensive campaigns, due to the influence of terrain, reconnaissance activities and methods are to a certain extent restricted, and information systems' direction finding and positioning are difficult. To address this, we should establish a multi-dimensional, multi-layered, and all-directional reconnaissance and surveillance system. We should apply various information reconnaissance capabilities and conduct multiple means, multiple methods, and multiple spectral reconnaissance activities. In terms of reconnaissance methods, we should combine close-in reconnaissance with enemy-rear reconnaissance, and ground reconnaissance with aerial reconnaissance, striving to comprehensively obtain accurate information of the enemy information systems. When organizing and implementing reconnaissance, the reconnaissance *fendui* should approach the enemy as close as possible and position at different points to conduct comprehensive reconnaissance on the enemy signal source's technical parameters, operating methods, disposition, and command relationships. In terms of the emphases of reconnaissance, we should focus on the deployment area of the enemy's command and control system, distribution of nodes of the information systems, the disposition of the information systems, such as the weapon control system, guidance system, and early

warning system, and their technical parameters. We should ascertain the key targets, key systems, and the key users, and employ technical means to implement all-time surveillance and learn the characteristics of their activities and change pattern so as to lay a solid foundation for information offensive and hard destruction.

2. Organizing the campaign information offensive

The campaign information offensive is attack operations for the purpose of weakening the enemy's information operation capabilities and reducing the enemy's information capturing and control ability. The key targets of the information offensive include the enemy's operational command communications network, early warning, detection and vectoring radar network, and command control computer network, etc.

In mountain operations, the terrain can be very complex, which poses a certain degree of constraint on the information attack equipment and methods. Our troops' information attack capabilities are limited. Constrained by the terrain conditions, it is difficult for our information capabilities to attack and destroy all the enemy's information systems. The Chinese military possesses preliminary "soft destruction" and "hard destruction" capabilities and has diversified our technical means. Thus, when organizing and implementing the information offensive, we should focus on the following issues:

The first is close-in attack. We should approach the enemy's information systems as close as possible. We should make use of ground and airborne attack equipment to suppress and jam the enemy's information systems in order to achieve the goal of paralyzing the enemy's information system.

The second is key point attack. We should concentrate all information attack forces and weapons of all participating forces on the main attack direction, important areas, and during critical periods. We should implement key point jamming of important enemy electronic equipment such as the radio communications network (stations) and radars in order to delay the enemy's command, reduce system effectiveness, weaken the enemy's ability to conduct battlefield reconnaissance, operational command, communications, and weapons control, and to seize battlefield information superiority.

The third is employing multiple methods. We should follow the principle of "combining the soft and hard method, attacking networks and electronic equipment" and conduct "soft paralysis" and "hard destruction" against the enemy's information systems. In terms of "soft" measures, the key is to carry out electronic jamming and electronic deception against the enemy's wireless information systems, and use high power jamming equipment to conduct suppression jamming against the enemy's wireless command networks and radars, etc. In terms of "hard" measures, in light of the characteristics of the mountain terrain, we should use precision-guided weapons, airborne assault firepower and ground artillery firepower to launch comprehensive attack at the enemy's information warfare systems. We should paralyze and destroy the enemy's information

capturing and information control capability so as to ensure our seizing and maintaining information superiority.

The fourth is emphasizing effective psychological attack and special operations surprise attack. We should bring into full play the deterrence and destruction function of psychological warfare and special operations warfare {特种战 tezhongzhan} in information operations. We should use psychological attack to shatter the defensive enemy's will to resist. When implementing psychological warfare, we should use propaganda attack methods such as positional broadcasting, launching propaganda bombs, and airdropping of propaganda papers in an effort to increase the enemy's anti-war sentiment. By using special operations surprise attack and enemy rear sabotage, we destroy the enemy's important information systems such as the command control, early warning detection, information transmission and processing system in order to weaken the enemy's information control and information dominance capabilities.

3. Organizing the campaign information defensive

The campaign information defensive is activities employed to prevent the enemy from conducting reconnaissance, jamming, damage, and destruction of our information systems. The key points to defend include the operational command communications network, early warning, detection, and vectoring radar network, and command automation network, etc.

In mountain offensive campaigns, for the information defensive we should pay attention to the terrain conditions and scientifically use the natural environment to organize denial and deception. Denial and deception should be set up in a dispersed manner so that it will not attract the attention of and be detected by the enemy. We should employ radar and anti-electronic detection measures and concealment and deception methods. By setting up fake positions, decoys, and fake communications hubs, we deceive and confuse the enemy. We should strictly control electromagnetic radiation, and employ technical and tactical measures to reduce the possibility of being detected and jammed. In particular, we should use information equipment that resists jamming technology for information transmission. When necessary, we should practice radio silence. For the command automation network, we should apply physical insulation, system for itself {自成系统 zicheng xitong},²⁴ fire wall, and identification certification technology to prevent enemy intrusion and virus attack. We should enhance air cover and ground warning to prevent the enemy's precision attack and depth special operations surprise attack against the information systems in order to ensure that our information systems are secure and reliable.

²⁴ System for itself or independent system, stand alone system.

(2) Seizing and maintaining campaign air superiority

Seizing and maintaining air superiority is normally uniformly organized by the superior, with the superior's assigned force being the main force. The campaign large formation can use its own air defense force with assistance from the air force to implement focused ground-to-air operations and to destroy and suppress the enemy's air defense force on the ground. The goal is to protect important targets within our operational area from the enemy's airborne assault, reduce possible damage caused by enemy's airborne assault, and create conditions for our operations on the ground and in the air. Campaign air defense operations should do well both in having tight protection and in aggressive attack. The operations should strive to reduce loss caused by enemy air raid to the minimum and allow our troops to maintain strong and sustained operational capabilities.

II. Comprehensive Fire Assault...413

Comprehensive fire assault means that the campaign large formation uses its own firepower and various enhanced firepower to launch full-depth, key-point, multiple-wave {多波次 duo bo ci}, and high-intensity fire operation activities against the defensive enemy. The main forces the campaign large formation employs to capture the enemy's position are the subordinate suppression artillery and armed helicopter units. The campaign large formation also should utilize the superior's supporting Air Force aviation and the Second Artillery's conventional missile force. The goal is to suppress the enemy's firepower operational units, destroy the enemy's important operational targets, paralyze the enemy's overall defensive system, and cause casualties to a large number of enemy's effective strength so as to constrain the enemy's battlefield activities and provide support to our own campaign assembly, maneuvering in the assault area, and multi-dimensional penetration in order to create advantageous conditions.

There are diverse forms and types of comprehensive firepower assaults. They can be organized in batches based on time sequence, divided into service-based fire plans based on the characteristics of the target, or implemented according to the importance of the sectors. No matter which type of organization is employed, we should make sure that the fire assault is closely connected in terms of timing and space so that we afford the defensive enemy an all-time, all-space, full-depth, and all-domain destructive attack and give the enemy an awe-inspiring mental and psychological shock.

(1) Full-depth comprehensive assault

Full-depth comprehensive assault means that in a relatively short period of time we concentrate the Army's long-range artillery, the Air Force's assault aviation, and the Second Artillery's conventional missile force and electronic warfare force to launch full-depth, multi-layer and high-intensity continuous assault. The goal is to destroy and damage the enemy's critical targets that pose great threat to our offensive operations and support the enemy's overall defense, annihilate part of the enemy's effective strength, and weaken the enemy's comprehensive resistance capabilities.

The targets of attack of the full-depth comprehensive assault normally include the enemy's command center, communications hub, electronic warfare facilities, traffic hubs, firepower operations system, air defense system, logistics supply system, heavy force concentration, defensive key points in the shallow depth, and important targets along the main passageways, etc. Suppression artillery is used mainly to suppress important targets within effective range such as defensive key points at the enemy's first line and shallow depth, command control centers, communications hubs, firepower operations systems, etc. The Army's aviation unit is mainly used to strike enemy's armored vehicles, etc. Air Force's assault aviation unit (fighter-bombers) is mainly used to assault important plane targets such as the enemy's air defense system on the ground, command control system, electronic warfare system, firepower operations system, etc. The Air Force's bomber aviation unit is mainly used against large plane targets such as to block the enemy's traffic hubs, and strike the enemy's firepower system, field helicopter air fields, and heavy force concentrations, etc. The Second Artillery's conventional missile unit is mainly used to attack important campaign targets such as the enemy's firepower system in the enemy's depth, heavy force concentrations, logistics supply system, field helicopter air fields, etc.

Full-depth comprehensive assaults are normally implemented by waves according to the type of the target. The duration of each wave should vary and firepower should be closely connected. The transition between waves is normally executed according to the pre-determined fire plan. Normally we employ saturation assault {饱和突击 baohe tuji} (suppression). That is, we use electronic warfare as the lead, using jamming and suppression first to destroy the enemy's C³I system. We use the artillery unit and the Second Artillery's conventional missile unit to strike the enemy's reconnaissance, early warning and air defense system on the ground in order to open up a corridor for penetration. Afterwards, the missile unit uses the convergent assault {集中突击 jizhong tuji}²⁵ and the collective assault {集群突击 jiqun tuji} method, the aviation unit uses the concentrated strike {集中射击 jizhong sheji} and the simultaneous strike {同时射击 tongshi sheji} method, and the artillery force uses the massed fire {密集射击 miji sheji} and the concentrated fire method to launch assault, and employ time-based or target-based coordination to jointly destroy the enemy's firepower operations system, command system, electronic system, etc. in order to suppress the enemy's full-depth. They execute a high-intensity comprehensive fire to suppress the enemy in a relatively short time and give the enemy a psychologically shock.

²⁵ Convergent assault or concentrated assault: According to the 1977 *PLA Military Terms*, it refers to “concentrated air raid by aviation units using comparatively large amounts of forces against a single target or a group of targets on land or on the water within a short period of time. It is used to destroy thoroughly or seriously damage targets, while shaking the enemy's morale.”

(2) Forward key point assault

Forward key point assault means we use the forward attack group's direct fire and suppression artillery unit as the main force and Army Aviation's armed helicopter as the supportive force to launch a high-density saturation attack against the enemy's important fortified point targets in the first line position so as to ensure that we can thoroughly paralyze the enemy's defense. Normally, forward key point assault is implemented after the concentrated full assault {集中全面突击 jizhong quanmian tuji} or at the same time as the concentrated full assault.

Prior to or at the same time of the concentrated full assault, in an appropriate time, we should order the direct fire and suppression artillery unit to begin developing and swiftly capture the predetermined firing position {发射阵地 fashe zhendi}. When we begin the key point assault, we should use large-caliber direct fire to attack the already identified fortified pillar points of the enemy and accurately destroy them. We should use vehicle-borne antitank missiles and terminally-guided precision artillery shells to perform precision attack at the enemy's exposed armored targets. We should use different types of indirect fire to conduct key point suppression firing against the enemy's command and communications facilities and artillery positions. We should use the Army Aviation's armed helicopters to track and strike the enemy's dynamic targets such as the vehicle-borne firepower operations system and the vehicle-borne electronic warfare system. When carrying out key point assault, we should be swift, accurate, and ferocious, so as to damage the enemy's defense system in the forward and forward depth {前进纵深 qianjin zongshen}.

(3) Depth precision attack

Depth precision attack means we use the Air Force's assault fighter bomber aviation unit as the main force and the Army Aviation's armed helicopters and long-range precision attack weapons such as terminally-guided artillery projectiles to implement destructive attack against the enemy's important point targets in the depth, including the command control system and the electronic warfare system, etc. Normally, this is conducted simultaneously with forward assault activities.

When implementing depth precision attack, Air Force's assault aviation is mainly used to strike the enemy's command control and information warfare system, and bomber aviation is mainly used to carry out precision attack against the logistics supply facilities and traffic facilities such as bridges and tunnels in the enemy's depth. Army Aviation's armed helicopters and guided artillery projectiles are mainly used to launch precision attack against targets such as armed vehicles and all types of radar in the enemy's depth. Supported by our special operations unit in the enemy's rear, the terminally laser-guided artillery projectiles should be actively used to launch precision attack against small point targets in the enemy's depth. The Second Artillery's conventional precision attack unit is used to implement precision destruction of important fixed facilities such as electrical facilities and large cave depots.

(4) Battlefield local blockade

In order to create conditions in local areas at critical periods for the ground attack force to annihilate the mountain defensive enemy, at the same time or after the various operational groups launch attack, we should organize various firepower to implement battlefield local blockade. The main activities include the following:

One of the activities is to launch assault against the enemy's reserve force and block the enemy's reinforcement. During the campaign, the enemy will engage the reverse force in combat at an advantageous moment, or reposition forces to reinforce in order to improve or recover the defensive posture and seize the battlefield initiative. We should concentrate our main forces and weapons and launch assault while the enemy is maneuvering. The timing of the assault is most advantageous when the enemy is maneuvering on bridges, at ferry points, and along narrow paths and mountain passes. In terms of use of force, we should fully demonstrate the strength of the weapons, and we should combine blockade and attack organically so as to resolutely crush enemy's reinforcement.

Another activity is to launch assault against the enemy's traffic and transport route and war material support system, and block the enemy's forward delivery and rear transport. The mountain defensive enemy has strong defensive capabilities. But the enemy's defensive capabilities can be divided and broken up easily, and the enemy has limited ability to sustain the operations. Thus, we should concentrate our forces and launch assault against the enemy's traffic and transport routes and war material support system, in particular, against important targets such as traffic hubs, ferry points, train stations, bridges, tunnels, narrow paths, ammunition depots, POL depots, oil transportation pipes, and war material collection and distribution centers, etc. We should block the enemy from forward delivery and rear transport, interrupt its supplies, and weaken its resistance capability.

The third activity is to blockade key points, narrow paths and block the enemy's maneuver. In order to support the airborne force's multi-dimensional maneuver and the attack troops' dividing and separating activities, we can organize various types of firepower and use firepower to block the key points and narrow paths, and to block and intercept enemy's anti-airborne and counterattack operations, to assure that our airborne force can rapidly assemble and capture key points, and to support our attack troops to divide and annihilate the defensive enemy.

The fourth activity is to attack the enemy's massive force groups {重兵集团 zhongbing jituan} and stop the enemy from launching counterattack. When our attack troops penetrate the enemy's defense, break into the enemy's depth and seize advantageous terrain and key points, the enemy may use maneuver forces to launch force or firepower counterattack in order to improve or recover its defensive posture. We should employ the fighter bomber and assault aviation unit, working in conjunction with the Army Aviation and the Artillery force, to launch surprise and ferocious attacks when the enemy's reserve

unit is developing so as to block its development. At the same time, we should resist the enemy's counterattack by fire. We can ask permission from the superior to use the fighter aviation unit to work in cooperation with the ground air defense force to resist the enemy's fighters and armed helicopters' fire assault against our ground troops and important targets within the campaign area. When necessary, we can also use the fighter bomber and assault aviation unit to assault the enemy's airfield, using the "taking away the firewood from under the cauldron" {釜底抽薪 fudi chouxin}²⁶ fighting method to stop the enemy's counterattack by fire.

III. Multi-dimensional Penetration...416

Multi-dimensional penetration refers to operational activities whereby the subordinate and enhanced forces and firepower launch attacks simultaneously against the defensive enemy from the air and the ground to breach an opening in the enemy's first line position. The goal is to swiftly annihilate the enemy, control important campaign passageways, first line key points, and strategic places so as to create conditions for the follow-on attack units to engage in the operations as soon as possible. Normally, multi-dimensional penetration is implemented when the campaign large formation has basically accomplished the offensive campaign arrangement and the advanced comprehensive fire attack has basically achieved or almost achieves the predetermined effect. Normally, it can start when the forces are stationary or when the forces are traveling.

Multi-dimensional penetration is the most intense and critical set of operational activities in a mountain offensive campaign. We must concentrate superior forces and firepower and launch full-depth, multi-directional, and focused multi-dimensional penetration from the main attack direction. On the basis that we have effectively captured air and information superiority, we should make full use of the operational effect of the comprehensive fire assault and employ the main offensive force to launch ferocious assault in several predetermined attack directions and penetration sectors. We should use a part of the forces to boldly implement inserting and outflanking. We should also implement airlanding operations in the enemy's shallow depth, and use airborne multi-dimensional penetration to support front attack. With support from the Air Force's aviation unit and suppression artillery and conventional missile firepower, we can rapidly penetrate the enemy's defense. When implementing multi-dimensional penetration, we should combine force penetration with fire assault, ground penetration with airborne penetration, and frontal attack with flank insertion and outflanking.

(1) Direct fire preparation

Direct fire preparation means that before launching the attack, we implement high-intensity dense fire assault against the enemy defending the first line. Normally, direct fire preparation is organized and executed by the unit responsible for the forward attack

²⁶ Taking away the firewood from under the caldron or eliminating the threat by removing the source of the threat.

penetration mission when the other forward attack groups {前沿攻击群 qianyan gongjiqun} are capturing the offensive departure position {进攻出发阵地 jingong chufa zhendi} and right before the obstacle removal teams {障碍排除队 zhang'ai paichudui} are about to implement mine clearing and obstacle removal. Normally, we use the direct fire of the forward attack groups as the main weapon to launch annihilation fire and destructive fire. The direct fire weapons are supported by the large-caliber suppression artillery to destroy and damage the enemy's defensive works and armored targets at the penetration point, annihilate the enemy's effective strength, suppress the enemy's technical weapons and firepower operations systems, destroy the enemy's forward obstacles, and provide cover to the mine clearing and obstacle removal activities of the forward attack troops.

The duration of direct fire preparation should be determined flexibly according to the degree of fortification of the enemy's defensive works at the penetration point, remnant obstacles, and attack readiness level of our attack groups (teams). Normally, it is no less than several tens of minutes. This time should be as short as possible on the condition that we have provided the enemy sufficient suppression.

(2) Multi-direction multi-dimension attack

All attack troops should either take turns or simultaneously launch attack according to the predetermined attack starting schedule. Under normal conditions, the various forward attack troops should simultaneously launch attack, giving the defensive enemy intense psychological shock and awe in a very short time. If the terrain variation is marked and the effect of comprehensive fire attack is not sufficiently good, or there is greater concern about the enemy's counterattack firepower, or due to stratagem, we can also launch attack at appropriate times based on need.

1. Fire extension {延伸射击 yanshen sheji}²⁷

The artillery's suppression fire should implement fire extension at a suitable time. The artillery suppression fire, working in cooperation with Army Aviation's armed helicopters and the supporting Air Force aviation, and the Second Artillery conventional missile unit, should continue to implement effective suppression against important targets in the enemy's depth such as the command control system, the information warfare system, and mass force groups. When necessary, a fire interdict area {火力遮断区 huoli zheduanqu} can be established between the enemy's depth and the forward to block and attack the enemy's maneuvering attack and to support our attack troops at the forward so that they can successfully penetrate the enemy's defense.

²⁷ Fire extension or to extend the range of artillery fire, lift fire.

2. Multi-direction ground attack

After the attack is launched, all attack troops should take full advantage of the destruction effect of the comprehensive fire assault and the result of direct fire preparation, and resolutely and fiercely launch attack. We should combine force assault with firepower assault, frontal assault with outflanking insertion, and horizontal push forward {平面直推 pingmian zhitui} with overtake attack {越点攻击 yuedian gongji or 超越攻击 chaoyue gongji}, using multi-dimensional, multi-directional attack to create a well-coordinated campaign offensive posture.

The forward attack groups {前沿攻击群 qianyan gongjiqun} should effectively organize fire assault to provide cover. The first echelon should resolutely penetrate the enemy position, seize and control advantageous terrain, divide the defensive disposition of the enemy's first-line defense and annihilate the defensive enemy inside the penetrated sector. The follow-on echelon should rapidly follow and be combat ready at all time.

The rapid insertion groups {快速穿插集群 kuaisu chuancha jiqun} should take advantage of the penetration effect of the forward attack groups or implement small group, multiple-route, multiple-direction maneuvering along advantageous terrain such as the enemy's defensive gap and flank, and rapidly break into the enemy depth along predetermined routes. They should also be combat ready so as to implement sudden attack against assigned target or be ready for action.

Prior to or at the same time as the launch of the attack, the special operations groups {特种作战集群 tezhong zuozhan jiqun} should resolutely, stealthily, and swiftly enter the designated position in the enemy's depth either along a predetermined route or from the air. [The purpose is] to find out enemy's defensive disposition and detect change in intelligence information, to provide guidance to the fire assault activities of the precision guidance weapons, large-caliber suppression artillery, and Air Force Aviation, as well as to harass the enemy's critical targets with weak defense such as the enemy's command control system, artillery positions, logistical system, etc.

3. Airborne and airlanding operations

After the suppression artillery implements fire extension, the airborne²⁸ (airlanding) attack groups {空降攻击集群 kongjiang gongji jiqun} should fly at low altitude to enter the designated area along the route where the enemy's ground-to-air fire is weak. They implement airborne or airlanding operations at the flank rear of the enemy's first-line defense key point and launch attack at the defensive enemy from the flank or flank rear. [The purpose is] to block the enemy's battlefield maneuver and work in concert with the

²⁸ Airborne operations include paratrooper landing and airlanding by aircraft or helicopters.

forward main attack groups to penetrate the enemy, as well as to ensure that the penetration point on the main attack direction can be secured.

(3) Expand and solidify penetration point

Expand and solidify the penetration point means that after the forward attack groups breach the penetration point of the enemy's first-line position, the follow-on force implements flank roll up at a suitable time to wipe out the remnant enemy and firmly block the enemy's counterattack in order to secure the penetration point and expand operational activities.

After breaching the penetration point, we should maintain strong attack pressure on the penetration point and order the troops to continue to develop and launch attack towards the enemy's depth. We should increase the follow-on pace, shorten the time troops must spend at the penetration point, rapidly capture the enemy's defensive key points in the vicinity of the penetration point, aggressively expand the width and depth of the penetration point, and implement flank roll up at a suitable time. The main direction of flank roll up should be towards the other flank of the campaign passageway {朝向战役通道另一侧 *chaoxiang zhanyi tongdao lingyice*}, or the most successful supportive direction, or the direction where the terrain is most advantageous for us to solidify the penetration point.

1. Reinforce the penetration point. Maintain attack vigor.

After breaking through the penetration point, under the condition that it will not affect the follow-on troops, the engineering *fendui* should quickly widen the passageway and give priority to supporting the rapid passing through of the follow-on force. The main force should be concentrated in the main operational direction. As far as possible, do not disperse the forces in several directions. We can also deploy a part of the force to take control of advantageous terrain. We should maintain the attack intensity and vigor.

2. Rapidly capture and control campaign key points.

After the follow-on troops enter the penetration point, they should place priority on capturing the key points inside the penetration point that have significant campaign values. Normally, we do not pay too much attention to the harassing enemy scattering about, but as far as possible, let the main force capture and control the campaign key points. After capturing and taking control of the key points, we then organize forces to wipe out the remnant enemy.

3. Block enemy's counterattack. Prevent the enemy from blockading the penetration point.

After we break through the enemy's defense forward, the enemy must organize its force to launch a powerful counterattack to re-capture its lost ground and regain its defensive posture. To address this, while we implement fire assault, we should at the same time develop the attack formation, expand the penetration point, and increase the intensity of fire to stop the counterattack. The attack groups should maintain a multi-route, multi-dimension, multi-direction and sustained campaign penetration posture, and maintain high speed and high pressure against the defensive enemy at the first line position. The attack groups should launch attack towards the enemy's shallow depth. They should coordinate their attack direction and attack tempo and, working in conjunction with the airborne force, capture the campaign key points. The follow-on force should increase the follow-up pace to enter into the predetermined deployment position as soon as possible to engage the enemy. The main suppression artillery force should launch attack against the command control system and artillery positions in the enemy's depth, and part of the force should establish a fire interdiction area to attack the enemy's counterattack force. The air defense group, the Army Aviation's armed helicopters, and the supporting Air Force fighter aviation are mainly to attack the enemy aircraft in the air. The Air Force's bomber aviation and the Second Artillery's conventional missile force should continue to assault enemy's massive force groups and field airfields in the enemy's depth.

If the penetration point is blockaded by the enemy and cannot be broken through in a short duration, and if the counterattack force in the enemy position appears to be stronger than ours, the forward attack groups should, depending on the situation, disperse to seize advantageous terrain in the vicinity of the penetration point and create a mutually supportive defensive posture. The airborne force should work with the penetration force as closely as possible. The follow-on force should increase its attack tempo and, under the cover of fire, work in coordination with the friendly force that has breached the enemy position to create a sandwiched attack posture in order to ensure that the penetration point can be re-breached as soon as possible.

IV. Crushing the Enemy's Counterattack...419

While we are penetrating the enemy's defense and developing attack to the enemy's depth, and while we are seizing key points, taking control of the passageway, and dividing and breaking the enemy's defensive disposition, we may encounter ferocious counterattack by the enemy's air and artillery firepower, or counterattack by the enemy's maneuver force such as the depth reserve force and the airborne force, etc. Thus, after we breach the enemy's defense, we should employ various measures and methods to conduct reconnaissance of the enemy's defense full-depth, and take immediate control of the movement of the enemy's depth attack force. We should correctly determine the enemy's counterattack intentions, direction, timing, scale, and possible activities, and then use various effective methods to crush the enemy's counterattack at a suitable time.

(1) Resist enemy's counterattack by fire

When we discover that the enemy is repositioning its forces and may launch counterattack by fire, we should use the suppression artillery force as the main force and the Air Force and Second Artillery's conventional missile fire as the supportive force to organize strong and powerful comprehensive fire assault activities. [The purpose is] is to annihilate the enemy's counterattack effective strength, suppress the enemy's air-to-ground fire, disperse the enemy's maneuver formation, disrupt the enemy's command control, and interrupt the enemy's fire cover. At the same time, the air cover group {对空掩护群 dui kong yanhuqun} should provide air intercept over the local battlefield where we penetrate and divide to destroy enemy's airborne weapons and provide air security to our ground troops. The troops that penetrate the enemy position should quicken their attack pace. When engaging the enemy in close combat, they should make full use of the natural geographic conditions of the mountains such as deep gullies and thick woods to practice denial and deception in order to lessen the power of enemy's high-tech weapons. If the attack groups encounter the enemy's counterattack by fire, they should promptly diminish the results of the enemy counterattack by fire, replenish war materials, rescue casualties, repair weapons and equipment, reposition the troops, and continue to develop and attack the enemy's depth. If the casualties are too severe, we should promptly reinforce the attack group or employ the maneuver attack group (reserve forces) to enter into combat and continue to divide and annihilate the defensive enemy. The attack groups that are not encountering the enemy's counterattack by fire should actively coordinate with the other groups in order to hasten the pace of attack and expand and solidify the result of dividing and annihilation.

(2) Crush the enemy's counterattack by reserve forces

If we discover that the enemy's depth reserve force is maneuvering forward, we should first use firepower to furiously strike the enemy's reserve assembly area and formation of development, cause great casualties to the enemy's effective strength, interrupt the enemy's combat readiness for counterattack, and at the same time order the attack troops to be combat ready for the enemy's counterattack. When necessary, we can use part of the force to land by air ahead of time in the direction where the enemy may launch counterattack, to seize important targets such as mountain paths where the enemy must go through or traffic intersections to stop the enemy reserve force from maneuvering and developing. If the enemy's reserve force launches attack at our attack troops, we should correctly determine the target of our resistance based on the scale of the enemy's reserve force and the form of counterattack, and flexibly select the method to resist the enemy's counterattack. If the enemy launches a frontal counterattack and the enemy's force is not very large, our attack groups should employ fighting methods such as rapid raid {急袭 jixi}, meeting engagement {遭遇 zaoyu}, and ambush to annihilate the enemy in the process of advancing the attack. If the enemy launches counterattack from our flank and the force is relatively large, the attack groups should, under the cover of firepower, use a part of the force to block and hold down the enemy and use the main force to outflank the enemy's flank rear and launch attack in order to divide and encircle the enemy and

annihilate the enemy. If the enemy comes upon us rapidly and the force is very powerful and the attack troops cannot rapidly annihilate the enemy, we can first occupy advantageous terrain and organize temporary defense to resist the enemy's counterattack and delay and wear down the enemy; and when the follow-on echelon enters into the battle, we then divide, encircle, and annihilate the enemy or defeat the enemy. If the enemy launches multi-route, multi-direction counterattack, we can employ methods such as blocking several routes {阻数路 zu shulu}, annihilate one route {歼一路 jian yilu}²⁹ or blocking first then annihilate {先阻后歼 xianzu houjian} to crush the enemy.

(3) Wipe out the enemy's airborne force

If we discover that the enemy's airborne force is assembling and boarding, we should concentrate our air and artillery fire to assault the enemy's assembling and boarding zone, striving to annihilate the enemy on the ground. If the enemy's transport helicopters are in the air overhead, we should order the air cover group to concentrate all fire to assault the enemy's helicopters, striving to annihilate the enemy before the enemy lands on the ground. If the enemy's airborne force lands on the flank rear of our attack troops, we should rapidly maneuver our forces and firepower to attack the enemy. If the enemy's airlanding force is relatively small, we can use the forces nearby to rapidly divide, encircle, and annihilate the enemy. If the enemy's airlanding force is relatively large, we can use a part of the force to capture advantageous terrain and stop the enemy from expanding, and at the same time divide and encircle the enemy. When the follow-on troops enter into combat, we then annihilate the enemy.

V. Depth Dividing and Annihilation...421

Depth dividing and annihilation {纵深割歼 zongshen gejian} means that we use various attack groups to launch campaign dividing and separation in the enemy's defensive full depth to force the enemy in the operational area into several isolated groups that are unable to support one another and then annihilate the isolated groups one by one. The goal is to annihilate the enemy as quickly as possible, seize important areas, breach the campaign passageway, and accomplish the mission of the mountain offensive campaign.

(1) Campaign dividing {战役分割 zhanyi fenge}³⁰

Breaking up and dividing the enemy's defense system is an effective method and activity to rapidly annihilate the enemy. After penetrating the enemy's defense, the various attack groups should use multiple methods and measures to continue to develop and advance into the enemy's defense depth, seize important targets or advantageous terrain in the

²⁹ Annihilate the enemy along one route.

³⁰ Campaign dividing or separation, breaking up: According to the 1997 *PLA Military Terms*, it refers to "combat operations to cut the enemy's combat disposition up into several pieces."

enemy depth, control strategic traffic routes, disrupt the enemy's defensive disposition, and forcefully divide and break up the enemy's defense system.

The method to divide and break up should be flexible depending on the terrain, the enemy's defense disposition and our campaign organization. If the enemy defensive front has several routes going into the depth, we should use several attack groups to launch parallel assault. If the battlefield front has complicated terrain and the enemy defensive flank has passageways going into the hinder land, we should launch assault at one flank or both flanks. If the enemy employs a circular group defense disposition, we should employ multi-route converging attack {向心攻击 xiangxin gongji}. At the same time, we should make full use of the result of assault penetration and the effect of fire assault, and fully develop the total might of joint cooperation of the services and arms. We should employ force dividing and firepower dividing and combine horizontal dividing with multi-dimensional dividing, and agilely use multiple measures such as forceful breakthrough, inserting and outflanking, airborne and airlanding operations, special operations assault, fire blockade, electromagnetic interruption, etc.

1. Frontal assault, breakthrough and dividing

The depth attack groups {纵深攻击群 zongshen gongjiqun} should take advantage of the fire assault effect and use strong forces to forcefully penetrate the enemy's defense system. After that, the depth attack groups should promptly strengthen the offensive and swiftly penetrate into the enemy's defense depth from multiple directions. They should resolutely capture key points along the passageways and advantageous terrain in order to take control of the passageways and create conditions for dissecting and dividing the defensive system in the enemy's depth. When this is achieved, they can roll up on both flanks or on one flank depending on the situation and divide and breakup the enemy.

When executing frontal assault and breakthrough and dividing, we should first use fighting methods such as single-point penetration {一点突破 yidian tupo}, pincer-like penetration {钳形突破 qianxing tupo}, and multi-direction simultaneous penetration {多向并肩突破 duoxiang bingjian tupo} to break through the enemy's outer defense. To achieve this, the various breakthrough groups {突贯集群 tuguān jiqun} should make full use of the fire assault effect of the aviation force, long-range artillery, and campaign tactical missile fire, and advance in small groups from multiple directions and penetrate into the enemy's positions boldly and swiftly in order to breach a path in the enemy's position. Next, they should aggressively implement campaign insertion to thrust widely and rapidly into the enemy's depth in order to divide and encircle the enemy's defense system. During the process of dividing, we should take advantage of all opportunities to develop into the depth as well as expand to the flanks. We should make full use of the terrain, striving to advance and attack from opposite directions {对进突击 duijin tuji}. If the enemy occupies a mountain protruding point, its depth is firmly protected, and the terrain in the enemy's front is strategically located and is difficult to attack, the attack groups {攻击集群 gongji jiqun}, in order to achieve penetration and breakthrough,

should develop and attack simultaneously along the passageway or valley on both flanks into the enemy's depth in order to achieve a dividing, breaking up, and enveloping posture to facilitate annihilation of the enemy in the depth. We should employ different methods according to the situation. If the enemy's force is relatively small and the terrain is to our advantage, we can use the main force to attack and capture [the enemy's position] while advancing. If the enemy's force is relatively strong and the terrain is unfavorable to us, we can use a part of the force to contain the enemy from the front and use the main force to attack the enemy from the flank and capture [the enemy's position.]

2. Outflanking, inserting, and dividing

The attack troops should avoid the enemy's defensive strong points. Instead, they should look for gaps in the enemy's defense disposition, flank, or weak spots. After penetrating the enemy's depth or flank rear, the attack groups should ride their success and annihilate part of the enemy's effective strength, and from multiple directions divide and cut off contact between enemy's forward and depth and between the defensive troops and maneuvering troops. This will topple the overall balance of the enemy, thus allowing us to wipe out the divided enemy groups one by one.

Normally, we use the rapid insertion group {快速穿插群 kuaisu chuanchaqun}³¹ (team) to secretly penetrate the enemy's depth or rear through a weak point in the enemy defense flank or gap or a direction unanticipated by the enemy. Some times, we can also make use of the advantageous conditions created by the penetration of the attack groups and rapidly penetrate into the enemy's defensive depth. After penetrating and reaching the anticipated location, we should quickly attack and wipe out the defensive enemy, seize advantageous terrain, and get ready to resist the enemy's counterattack, as well as work together with the main force to encircle and annihilate the defensive enemy.

3. Fire interdiction and dividing

While the ground troops are implementing dividing, we should formulate a centralized plan for the air and artillery firepower. We should establish multiple layers of fire attack and blockade area at gaps of the enemy's key point or important areas such as the passageway the reserve force must go through or traffic hubs, and at strategic locations that facilitate the attack groups to implement dividing such as narrow paths. [The purpose is] to destroy the enemy's important targets, limit the enemy's depth maneuver, and restrict the enemy from communicating with one another. We should divide and separate the enemy's depth deployment and support the dividing activities of the assault groups. In particular, when we discover that the enemy shows signs of grouping together, we should quickly use air and artillery firepower to implement fire blockade on one flank of the

³¹ Rapid insertion group: According to the 1997 *PLA Military Terms*, 穿插 refers to combat operations that use a gap in the enemy's deployment or a weakness in its position to penetrate its depth or rear.

passageway where the converging troops might pass through in order to firmly stop the enemy from converging.

The characteristics of fire interdiction and dividing include rapid reaction pace, high assault precision, large power, good effect, and little threat from the enemy. The goals of the fire interdiction and dividing activities include the following: Firstly, to block the enemy reinforcement and counterattack. Secondly, to sever the enemy's follow-on replenishment. The assault methods are: The first is to use concentrated fire to simultaneously attack different targets. The second is to converge and concentrate fires to attack one important target. The third is to provide continuous attack at a certain number of targets during a relatively long period of time. The fourth is to implement periodic and irregular attack of a surveillance nature against a certain number of targets according to the pattern of the enemy's activities.

4. Airborne (airlanding) blockade and dividing

If the terrain in the enemy's defensive depth is complex and if we are in control of the battlefield air superiority, based on the operational need, we normally use the airborne operational groups to land unexpectedly in the enemy's defensive depth. The goal is to capture mountain passes, vital traffic routes, entrance to a valley, or vital targets along the passageway in order to strike and contain the enemy, as well as work in concert with the attack groups or rapid insertion groups to divide and separate the enemy's defensive system.

The methods to implement airborne (airlanding) blockade and dividing include the following: The first is to implement paratroop operations so as to capture key points in an important area. The second is to implement airlanding operations so as to continuously capture multiple points. The depth of the airlanding points in the enemy depth depends on the enemy intelligence, terrain and operational need. Normally, the principle is that the depth should be advantageous for us to work in conjunction with the frontal attack or flank attack. We should avoid landing too deep and fall into a passive situation whereby we are unable to receive support and reinforcement, unable to establish a firm foothold or we encounter the enemy's attack from both sides.

The characteristics of airborne (airlanding) blockade and dividing are concealed, sudden, rapid, etc. It often can achieve an extraordinary effect.

5. Special operations sabotage and dividing

We should use special operations units to secretly infiltrate into the enemy's rear to destroy, damage, or seize some of the vital targets in the enemy's defensive depth so as to interrupt the enemy's deployment, weaken the enemy's defensive capability, as well as to collaborate with and support our own dividing and annihilation operations.

Special operations' sabotage and dividing methods include the following: The first method is using small groups to infiltrate in order to attack and harass. That is, we employ crack sabotage groups {破袭群 poxiqun} that are combined {合成 hecheng}³² and nimble to infiltrate into the enemy's hinterland from the enemy's defensive front and flank or from the air, and use different methods to actively disrupt the enemy's defensive deployment, attack the enemy's vital targets, contain the enemy's initiation, interrupt the enemy's operational command, harass the enemy's transportation lines and create confusion and terror. The second method is capturing key points and seizing the "springboard." That is, we use the special operations sabotage groups (teams) to seize the key points and vital locations inside the enemy's defense area in advance, and use these as the bases to penetrate the enemy, harass the enemy, and support our main force in depth separation and dividing. These places thus become the "springboard" for depth operations.

6. Electromagnetic blocking and dividing

Electromagnetic blocking and dividing means we use the information operations groups {信息作战集团 xinxizuo zhan jituan} as the main force, and working with part of the other operational groups, to implement electronic blocking, to damage the enemy's C³I system and destroy the enemy's command control system in order to isolate the enemy and sever any information contact with the outside world.

The methods of electronic blocking and dividing include the following: The first is electronic jamming and blocking. That is, we use jamming equipment on the ground to create a jamming zone and implement ground electromagnetic blocking; and we use jamming equipment in the air and at sea (coastal mountains) to implement air and sea electronic blocking. This way we create effective multi-dimensional electromagnetic blocking. The second method is to actually destroy the enemy's information system. That is, we use various types of firepower, including anti-radiation missiles, anti radiation UAVs, electromagnetic pulse bombs, etc to implement actual destruction of the enemy's important information systems in order to sever the enemy's communications, cause breakdown of their command system, and disrupt their troops' activities. The third method is to damage nodes. That is, we employ special operations troops to enter deep into the enemy rear. Through "hard" attack and "soft" destruction of the enemy's important information systems and facilities, we cause their normal operations to breakdown so as to divide and separate the enemy's command control system.

³² Combined: According to the 1997 *PLA Military Terms*, "A force made up of multiple services or branches/service arms. Also refers to units and elements which are organized with a branch/service arm as the main body, together with other branches/service arms and technical forces, including organic work units and combat organizations at the level of battalion and above."

(2) Encircling and wiping out the enemy

Encircling and wiping out the divided and isolated enemy is an important activity in mountain offensive campaigns. Based on the characteristics of the terrain in the theater, present enemy defensive posture, and our dividing and separating status against the enemy, as well as the operational capabilities of the attack troops, we should appropriately determine the operational goal and agilely choose the operational methods. We can use military assault to wipe out the enemy and seize their position, or use political force to demoralize the enemy and persuade the enemy to surrender; or we can use maneuvering forces to attack and annihilate the enemy, or use converging fire to destroy and annihilate the enemy.

1. Surround and suppress the resisting enemy

If the separated and isolated enemy relies on the strategic terrain and fortified works to stubbornly resist, making it difficult for us to quickly surround and annihilate the enemy, we should converge all firepower to implement ferocious assault in order to destroy the enemy's defensive works, kill the enemy's effective strength, weaken the enemy's resistance, and then use maneuver forces to seize the enemy's position. If the enemy enters into underground tunnels to resist, we should use methods such as blocking, smoking, fire attack, and detonation to block the enemy in the underground facilities and wipe out the enemy.

If the enemy firmly resists and waits for reinforcement, and the reinforcement has already departed and is on its way, we should hasten the pace of encirclement and attack, striving to annihilate the enemy before the enemy's reinforcement arrives. At the same time, we should employ all types of effective methods to delay and destroy the enemy's reinforcement activities, to crush the enemy's intention and accomplish our encirclement and annihilation mission. If conditions allow, we can wipe out the enemy's reinforcement first, or we can attack the enemy and simultaneously attack the enemy's reinforcement. If the defensive enemy has no hope to breakthrough the encirclement to escape, we should enhance the encirclement and the attacking force to firmly block the enemy from breaking through, striving to contain the enemy inside the encirclement and annihilate them. If the terrain condition is favorable, and if our operational capabilities allow, we can also employ the method of encircling three sides and leave one side unguarded. We can set up ambush in the direction where the enemy may breakout the encirclement in order to wipe out the enemy while they are escaping.

2. Pursue and annihilate the escaping enemy

If the divided and isolated enemy abandons the position and escapes, we should resolutely pursue. First, we should use air and artillery firepower to block and strike the escaping enemy, delay the enemy's actions, and incur casualties to the enemy's effective strength. After that, we should use the maneuvering force to follow and pursue the enemy. When necessary, we can also use part of the forces to implement airlanding

operations in front of the enemy, to seize advantageous terrain and, working in cooperation with the pursuing troops, to sandwich and annihilate the escaping enemy. If the enemy's force is stronger than ours, and it is difficult for us to quickly wipe out the enemy, we should first contain the escaping enemy and at the same time quickly reposition our troops and strengthen the attack force. We then attack and wipe out the enemy.

3. Political offensive to demoralize the helpless enemy

If the divided and isolated enemy is waiting for reinforcement or if the enemy has lost hope to breakout of the encirclement and its fear is shaking the morale, we can temporarily stop military attack activities. Instead, we should launch a strong political offensive to carry out political propaganda warfare, forcing the enemy to disintegrate and persuading the enemy to surrender. The methods include the following: The first method is to apply military force. That is, we use strong military attack as the backing to create powerful deterrence, forcing the enemy to give up the attempt to resist. The second method is to use propaganda to create invincibility. That is, we employ various news media to carry out political propaganda offensive and information infiltration in order to induce psychological crisis and speed up collapse of morale of the remnant enemy. The third method is to soften the enemy emotionally. Aiming at the emotional need of the enemy, we carry out a propaganda offensive and use persuasion and brain washing to soften enemy resistance.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 18

The Positional Offensive Campaign...426

Positional offensive campaigns are offensive campaigns undertaken by campaign large formations {战役军团 zhanyi juntuan} against an enemy which is mounting a positional defense. Positional offensive campaigns can be divided into two types: offensive campaigns against an enemy that is defending field positions and offensive campaigns against an enemy that is defending fortified positions. The main mission of a positional offensive campaign is to attack the enemy that is mounting a positional defense for the purpose of seizing strategic areas and objectives. Under informationized conditions, the army campaign large formation can either mount a positional offensive campaign within the established organization of the higher command, or organize its own execution in an independent direction. The scale of a positional offensive campaign should be determined by the enemy's conditions, the terrain, and the combat capabilities of the army campaign large formation.

Positional offensive campaigns normally employ basic combat methods such as paralyzing the enemy's defensive operational system, multi-dimensional penetration, dividing and encircling, and annihilating the divided enemy one by one. That means, concentrate the army campaign large formation's forces and firepower to mount full in-depth, full-dimensional targeted attacks in order to paralyze the enemy's defensive operational system, and mount multi-directional but targeted penetrations in sectors that are closely associated with strategic areas but weakly defended. At the appropriate time, introduce rapid strike groups {快速突击群 kuaisu tujiqun} and the follow-on echelon {后续梯队 houxu tidui}, using swift and ferocious operational activities to divide up the enemy's defensive system, and encircle and annihilate the divided-up enemy.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...426

I. Characteristics...426

(1) Increasingly difficult to penetrate fortified defense

The positional defensive enemy uses advantageous terrain as the basis for defense and is sufficiently ready. The enemy has strong defensive works, a full range of obstacles, and a complete ensemble of firepower. Its main position normally is constructed on difficult and strategic terrain, forming a circular defense system centering on the fortified core position. The outer layer of the multi-dimensional defense system is not only strong, but also flexible and malleable. During operations, the enemy's position can receive fire support and coordination from the air or other domains. If the offensive side wants to divide and encircle the enemy's defensive position, the offensive side must open up one or several points of penetration in the enemy's defensive system. Only through penetrating the enemy's defense would the offensive side be able to continuously introduce fresh forces and ensure the accomplishment of the campaign missions. On the

other hand, in order to maintain stability in its defense, the enemy will concentrate its forces and firepower to mount counterattacks at the sectors of penetration to block the opponent's offensive. Thus, the fight at the points of penetration will be extraordinarily ferocious, and the difficulty level of positional offensive campaigns to make penetrations is increasing.

(2) Heightened importance of deep operations {纵深作战 zongshen zuozhan}

In order to raise the tenacity of defense, the enemy normally will use deep maneuver forces {纵深机动部队 zongshen jidong budui} to mount continuous counterattacks against the strike forces. For the offensive side, in order to achieve the goal of wiping out the enemy, while making a penetration of the enemy's forward line, the offensive side will also deploy rapid insertion units {快速穿插部队 kuaisu chuancha budui} and deep attack groups {纵深攻击群 zongshen gongjiqun} to mount a full in-depth multi-dimensional attack {全纵深立体攻击 quanzongshen liti gongji}. With good coordination between forward line attacks and deep attacks, between ground offensives and air offensives, between force attacks and fire strikes, the offensive side simultaneously mounts full in-depth attacks in the enemy's defensive area. By developing its strength and avoiding any pitfalls, the offensive side will be able to take control of campaign initiative. Thus, the enemy's defensive depth has clearly become the main battlefield for decisive struggles. The status and the role of deep operations will become more and more significant.

(3) More complex command and coordination

In positional offensive campaigns, the battlespace is vast, participating strengths are numerous, operational task-organization is complex, and campaign *bushi* disposition is dispersed. Attack groups normally organize campaign activities in different directions and areas. In the complex electromagnetic environment under informationized conditions in particular, electronic countermeasure struggles have become more intense. Thus, when organizing and commanding positional offensive campaigns, the requirements on overall control and coordination is greater and the difficulty level much higher. During the campaign process, activities in different offensive directions and operational phases progress at an uneven pace, battlefield situations are complicated, and changes are often drastic. Communications and command coordination can be easily disrupted. Thus, the requirement on instantaneous battlefield coordination is greater and command coordination more difficult and complex.

(4) Greater requirements on campaign preparations

In positional offensive campaigns, the defensive opponent one faces is fully prepared. The defensive side may rely on their pre-constructed and well-prepared fortified positions or field positions and advanced weapons and equipment, and use aggressive offensive activities to resist us stubbornly. Thus, the offensive operations will become

extraordinarily brutal and intense. In the positional offensive campaign under informationized conditions in particular, the status of joint operations will be more prominent and operational measures more numerous. Army ground forces of the offensive side normally will be supported by other services. As a result, for positional offensive campaigns, the operational missions are arduous; support, command and coordination of joint operations are more complex; and the requirements on campaign readiness is much greater.

(5) Exceedingly heavy support missions

Positional offensive campaigns often occur in complex terrain conditions. Reconnaissance and observation is not easy and grasping enemy's situation and intent is harder. Thus, it is difficult to obtain battlefield intelligence. Command control systems often suffer from serious "soft suppression" and "hard destruction" threat of the enemy. Thus, to provide campaign communications support is formidably difficult. The defensive works of the enemy are fortified and obstacles are numerous. Thus, to provide engineering support when we sabotage the enemy's defensive facilities is hard. With more high-tech equipment on the battlefield and because the technology level is high, technical support work on the battlefield is more complex. During the offensive operations against fortifications, higher personnel casualties are expected. Thus, it will be difficult to provide medical support. The operational resources consumption level will be huge, and the equipment damage rate will be high. Thus, logistical equipment support will be more difficult. Because operational directions are dispersed and the battlespace wide open, various types of support are primarily carried out according to zones, or organized by oneself or organized by accompanying support groups. In sum, the types of support are numerous, the range of support broad, the requirement of support high, and as a result the support missions are very difficult.

II. Requirements...428

(1) One must meticulously overall-plan campaign activities, and fully accomplish operational preparations.

In the positional offensive campaign, one faces a defensive opponent that is fully prepared. The enemy will rely on fortified positions that are constructed ahead of time or field positions. The enemy will use advanced weapons and equipment and aggressive offensive activities to stubbornly resist. The offensive operations will be exceedingly brutal and intense. At the same time, under informationized conditions, the positional offensive campaigns are joint operations {联合作战 *lianhe zuozhan*} involving multiple arms and services, and campaign command coordination and support are becoming more complex. Thus, one must carefully make plans and be fully ready. First, one must understand the current situation thoroughly. One must use various reconnaissance measures to fully understand the enemy situation and the terrain in the operational area. With regard to the enemy defense situation in the main penetration area, one must carry out continuous reconnaissance and conduct analysis and assessment. Secondly, one must

carefully devise an operational plan. Based on the operational missions, available enemy information and terrain, one must correctly define the campaign resolution and carefully prepare the operational plan. Also, based on changing situations, one should revise and modify operational contingency plans in a timely manner. Thirdly, one should carefully organize campaign coordination. While one carefully organizes campaign coordination of troops under one's own command, one must also carefully organize campaign coordination activities of the supporting forces of other arms to ensure that together a total mighty force is formed to fight the enemy in unison. Fourthly, one must organize preoperational training. According to the operational missions, enemy situation and the terrain of the operational area, one must select an area with similar terrain to set up lifelike targets and possible scenarios to conduct simulation training. The purpose is to familiarize the operational troops with the operational characteristics of the opponent, the operational plan and main combat methods, and the battlefield environment so that the operational troops will be fully operation ready.

(2) Well-selected main offensive direction and points of penetration. Rapid and targeted penetrations.

During the positional offensive campaign, one must correctly select the main offensive direction {主攻方向 zhugong fangxiang} and points of penetration {突破口 tupokou}. This is significant for successful penetration of the enemy's defense and for dividing and encircling the positional defensive enemy. Under normal situations, the main direction should be chosen in a direction that is beneficial for the friendly forces to penetrate and develop into the enemy's depth, a direction that is advantageous for the friendly forces to divide the enemy's overall disposition, a direction where we can rapidly paralyze the enemy's defense system, and a direction where the enemy's defense is relatively weak. [In this direction,] we can mount targeted attack at the enemy's strategic objectives such as the command control center and high-tech weapons. The points of penetration should be selected in the main offensive direction and secondary offensive directions. In the main offensive direction, one should select a primary point of penetration and concentrate absolute superior forces and weapons to mount decisive offensives at this primary point of penetration. The number of points of penetration is mainly determined by the terrain, enemy situation and enemy operational methods, and the offensive directions. The location of the points of penetration should, as far as possible, be at the enemy's defensive gaps, flanks, or linking points, where firepower, defensive works and obstacles are relatively weak. The terrain at the location of penetration should facilitate concealment of deployed troops and should have favorable places for offensive departure positions. After penetration, the location should be easy to solidify, expand and develop offensives into the enemy's depth. Because there are multiple factors that constrain the selection of the main offensive direction and primary point of penetration, the campaign commander should use the actual situation as the starting point, conduct comprehensive analysis and assessment, study the pros and cons, and then make a selection based on the most fundamental condition and requirement. After the main offensive direction is determined, the campaign commander should immediately take active actions to create conditions in order to ensure the establishment of the main offensive direction. During the process of

the campaign, when fundamental changes occur, the campaign commander should review the situation and make a determination, and decisively readjust the deployment in a timely manner. He should either revise or change the main offensive direction to facilitate concentration of forces and weapons and develop an offensive in the direction and accomplish the defined campaign missions.

(3) Nimble application of operational methods. Rapid annihilation of the enemy.

During the positional offensive campaign, one should focus on the enemy's defensive operational characteristics and apply the operational methods in a nimble manner, striving to rapidly wipe out the enemy. First, concentrate firepower to mount paralyzing attacks. That means one should focus on the enemy's defensive characteristics and concentrate one's firepower. One should nimbly apply attack methods such as concentrated all-round strikes {集中全面突击 jizhong quanmian tui}, targeted assaults of the forward line {前沿重点强击 qianyan zhongdian qiangji}, and precision attacks in the depth {纵深精确打击 zongshen jingque daji}. Secondly, mount multiple-point assaults {多点强击 duodian qiangji} and targeted penetrations {重点突破 zhongdian tupo}. That means one should address the enemy's defensive characteristics and select weak locations such as defensive gaps and defensive linking points to mount multiple-route offensives in several directions in order to distract and disperse the enemy's forces. At the same time, one should mount targeted penetrations in the main direction and strategic sectors. Thirdly, mount overtaking offensives {超越攻击 chaoyue gongji}.³³ At the same time or around the time when mounting multiple-point assaults and targeted penetrations, one should apply more powerful forces to pass over the enemy's first-line defensive positions on the ground or in the air and rapidly insert directly into the enemy's defensive depth in order to seize strategic and critical points in the enemy's depth in order to introduce offensive activities and attack forces to the strategic locations of the enemy's defensive depth. This way the enemy faces simultaneous or near simultaneous strikes in the full depth, which will result in the enemy losing its defensive flexibility and overall methodically-arranged defensive capabilities. This will create conditions for the friendly forces to breakup the enemy in the depth and divide up the enemy's defensive system. Fourthly, mount multi-dimensional dividing and isolation, and then wipe out the divided enemy one by one. This means that on the foundation of having penetrated the enemy's defense, one should apply multiple forms and measures in a comprehensive way to divide and isolate the enemy's defensive disposition. [One should] rapidly divide the enemy into several isolated groups, cut off their campaign and tactical contacts {战役战术联系

³³ Overtaking offensives: According to the 1997 *PLA Military Terms*, overtaking operations: "Combat operations in which a unit overtakes the enemy in front of it or one's own combat formation. For example, combat operations which take advantage of a gap in enemy forces or an exposed flank to penetrate the enemy's rear; in pursuit combat, operations to overtake or bypass enemy covering units; combat operations to block the path of a retreating enemy force; the second echelon in combat operations which overtake the first echelon; etc."

zhanyi zhanshu lianxi}, and surround the enemy from all sides. After that, one should concentrate all forces and firepower to wipe out the divided enemy one after the other.

(4) One must rationally determine the campaign *bushi* disposition, and implement decisive and flexible command.

In the positional offensive campaign, one should focus on characteristics of campaign operations under informationized conditions and the battlefield environment, and rationally determine the campaign *bushi* disposition based on the campaign missions, strength task-organization, operational capabilities, fighting method application, and the enemy's defensive posture. One should establish a multi-directional, key-point, full dimensional attack *bushu* disposition. At the same time as ensuring that there is a strong enough assault power in the main attack direction, one should strive to allow the attacking force-units in the various directions to have fairly strong independent operational capabilities. One should pay a high degree of attention to bringing into play the role of special operational strengths {特种作战力量 tezhong zuozhan liliang} and compose an operational strength with certain special functions to facilitate the implementation of insertion, outflanking and infiltration and the carrying out of seizing points, controlling routes, breaking up and surround and destroy missions. In the positional offensive operation, the campaign *bushi* disposition is dispersed and offensive directions are relatively independent. Battlefield situations are complicated, situations can change drastically, and command coordination can be easily disrupted. Thus, while one stresses centralized and unified command, one should also consider the dispersed command method {分散指挥 fensan zhihui} or delegated command method {委托式指挥 weituoshi shihui}, when necessary. One should be able to combine centralized command with dispersed command when appropriate. Before the operations, when assigning missions and organizing coordination, the commander should not be too meticulous and too rigid. The commander should leave ample room for change. During the operations, the campaign commander should give a certain amount of autonomy to lower-level commanders to handle situations, to let them develop initiation and creativity. Let them use their own wisdom to find effective ways to overcome the enemy and win victory. The campaign commander should command decisively but flexibly. In addition, the campaign commander should conduct overall planning, strengthen coordination, and rigorously organize coordinated activities in all operational directions, at all operational phases, and among all arms and services. He should ensure that all forces form a total might to cooperatively and uniformly attack the enemy.

(5) Comprehensive support forces. Effective campaign support.

In operations under informationized conditions, the effect of support on the progress of campaigns is more important and the status of support is more prominent. This is particularly so in future positional offensive campaigns. Future positional offensive campaigns will be joint operations {联合作战 lianhe zuozhan} involving multiple arms and services. Support objectives will increase, and support space is wide open. The types of support are numerous, the amount of support is massive, and the requirement for

support is huge. The composition of the support strength is complex and the support missions are arduous. Thus, there must be close coordination among all campaign support forces to ensure effective support. During the process of providing support, one must look at the actual situation of the battlefield when carrying out overall planning of campaign support, organizing and deploying various support forces, and executing concentrated and unified command. One must concentrate the main support strength to support operational activities that have critical impact on the overall success of the campaign. Give priority to supporting the main direction and area, critical transitions, and troops executing the main missions to ensure the accomplishment of key missions. In terms of support space, one should take care of the front and flanks of the battlefield, the depth, the ground and the air, and provide all-dimensional support. In terms of support time, one should take care of all phases, all transitions, and provide continuous support. In terms of the objectives of support, one should take care of all participating arms and services and provide support that is appropriate to the characteristics and requirements of the arms and services.

Section 2: Main Activities...431

I. Moving In and Unfolding {开进展开 kaijin zhankai}...431

In positional offensive campaigns, the campaign large formation normally moves in from the assembly area, deploys, occupies the offensive departure position first, and then mounts an offensive against the defensive enemy. Sometimes, one can also initiate an offensive while on the march or during a force-on-force confrontation. When initiating an offensive from an offensive departure position, under the premise that there is not yet direct contact with the enemy, the troops responsible for the offensive mission occupy the offensive departure position on the same night or the night before the initiation of the offensive under the cover of the forward line detachments and troops of other relevant arms and services. Under the premise that there is direct contact with the enemy, one normally takes advantage of darkness of the night or inclement weather in making adjustment in *bushu* disposition. Or the troops can occupy the offensive departure position during the time when changing shifts with the original defense unit.

The campaign commander and command organ should devise detailed and thorough moving-in and unfolding plans based on the enemy's conditions, road situations and schedule. At an appropriate time, [the campaign commander] should organize the troops according to the plan to move in the offensive departure position from the assembly area and deploy. When moving in, the troops should take full advantage of darkness of the night and inclement weather to conceal their activities. [The moving-in and unfolding] should be well timed based on the distance to keep the time the troops need to stay at the offensive departure position to the minimum. During moving in, the troops should tighten up the organization, enhance protection and camouflage, pay attention to concealment, and use various support measures to carefully guard against enemy's surprise attacks from the air and from the ground. To conceal force-unit {budui} activities, one can organize part of the electronic warfare force to mount information offensives or make

feint movements to deceive and confuse the opponent. When necessary, one can also organize part of the forces and firepower to launch surprise attacks with cooperation from the supporting arms and services. The air defense units can adopt the follow-on cover {跟进掩护 gengjin yanhu} or fixed point cover {dingdian yanhu 定点掩护} method to directly cover the activities of the troops. Various levels of command organs should enter into the command post ahead of time. After the various forces enter the offensive departure position, they should strengthen their defenses and construct necessary cover works.

In local wars under informationized conditions, in order to seize the combat opportunities and achieve campaign surprise, one should strive to launch an offensive in the course of a march. While launching an offensive in the course of a march, the troops responsible for the offensive should rapidly unfold in accordance with the attack alignment to facilitate a timely initiation of the attack.

II. Multi-dimensional penetrations...432

Multi-dimensional penetrations refer to operational activities that involve flexible use of all subordinate forces to mount full in-depth, full-dimensional, multi-directional offensives. Multi-dimensional penetrations are normally implemented when the campaign large formation has completed the offensive campaign arrangements and when advanced comprehensive fire attacks have achieved or are approaching the anticipated effectiveness. The goal is to rapidly wipe out the enemy one is facing, take control of the important campaign corridors {战役通道 zhanyi tongdao}, and create conditions for the higher-level follow-on forces to enter into the operations.

Penetrations are the most critical operational activities of positional offensive campaigns. One must concentrate absolute superior forces and firepower in the main offensive direction and implement full in-depth, multi-directional, targeted multi-dimensional penetrations. On the foundation of effective capturing of local air and information dominance and taking full advantage of the operational effect of paralyzing fires, one should apply the main offensive forces to mount bold and ferocious assaults in the predetermined offensive directions and penetration sectors. At the same time, one should use a part of the forces to apply bold insertions and turning movements, and carry out airlanding operations in the enemy's shallow deep and execute overtaking operations. With close coordination with the frontal attacks, and with support from the aviation force of the air force, neutralizing artillery firepower, and conventional missile firepower, one achieves rapid penetrations of the enemy's defense. One should make sure to combine ground penetrations with air penetrations, frontal attacks with insertions and turning in the flanks, and forward line penetrations with attacks in the enemy's depth.

(1) Direct fire preparation

Direct fire preparation refers to high-intensity and high-density fire assault operational activities implemented against an enemy's first line defense with the annihilation fire {歼灭射击 jianmie sheji} and destruction fire {破坏射击 pohuai sheji} of the main direct fire weapons of forward edge attack force-units in the lead and supplemented by a portion of the campaign large formation's large caliber artillery force with suppression fire {压制射击 yazhi sheji} and interference fire {妨害射击 fanghai sheji}. It is normally synchronously unfolded with the latter period activities of the campaign large formation integrated fire strike when the forward edge attack force-units have occupied the unfolding area and just as the obstacle elimination forces are about to implement minesweeping and obstacle breaching. Under the unified plan of the campaign large formation, [direct fire preparation] is organized and implemented by the force-units responsible for the forward edge attack and penetration missions. Its main missions are to smash and destroy the enemy's defensive works and armored targets at each breach point; to wipe out the enemy's effective strength; to suppress the enemy's technical weaponry and firepower warfare systems {xitong}; to destroy the enemy's forward edge obstacles; and to cover the forward edge attack force-unit minesweeping and obstacle breaching activities.

When executing direct fire preparations, the campaign commander should have a full grasp if any change in the enemy's defense in each of the offensive directions and main penetration sectors occurs. The campaign commander should have a clear grasp of the effectiveness of direct fire preparation in the main offensive direction, and when necessary should give guidance to adjust the fire plan. The campaign commander should urge the attack groups to enter into predetermined positions and finish attack preparation as soon as possible. The campaign commander should pay full attention to any adjustment of enemy maneuver attack forces in the depth and, when necessary, should transfer a part of the neutralizing artillery forces to launch interfering fire. He should aggressively implement comprehensive protective works and prevent the enemy's counterstrikes by fire and harassing activities.

(2) Multi-route multi-dimension strikes

The offensive forces should initiate attacks according to the pre-defined time, either in sequence or simultaneously. Under normal situations, all forward line attack units should initiate an attack simultaneously to give the defensive enemy a powerful mental shakeup within a short period of time. If the terrain conditions are more varied, effectiveness of the comprehensive firepower is not ideal, when there is greater concern regarding the enemy's counterattacks by fire, or due to application of stratagem, one can also mount separate attacks at appropriate times based on need.

After the attacks have been initiated, each attack unit should take full advantage of the paralyzing effect of the advanced fire and execute attacks firmly and boldly under the cover and support of firepower provided by the ground artillery force, combat helicopters

and aviation force. One should strive to combine formation speed with fire assaults, frontal assaults with inserting and turning movements, and horizontal push forward attacks {平面直推 pingmian zhitui} with overtaking attacks {越点攻击 yuedian gongji} in order to form a well-coordinated campaign offensive posture that is multi-dimensional, orderly, and multi-directional. The forward attack groups {前沿攻击群 qianyan gongjiqun} should form the first echelon to storm into the enemy's position, capture and control favorable terrain conditions, divide up the enemy's first line defensive arrangements, and annihilate the enemy that is defending the penetration sector. After that, the follow-on echelon {后续梯队 houxu tidui} should rapidly follow and be ready to enter into operations at any moment. The rapid insertion groups {快速穿插群 kuaisu chuanchaqun} should take advantage of the penetration effect of the forward line attack groups or take advantage of the terrain features and execute small-group, multi-route, multi-directional maneuvers in the enemy's defense gaps and flanks, and move forward along the pre-assigned routes to rapidly insert into the enemy's depth and divide and encircle the enemy in the depth. For the special operations groups {特种作战群 tezhong zuozhanqun}, before or at the time of the initiation of the offensive, the special operations groups should resolutely, stealthily and rapidly follow the pre-determined routes on the ground or in the air to enter into the assigned locations in the enemy's depth to investigate the enemy's disposition in the depth. [The special operations groups] should guide the long-range firepower to apply precision attacks. [The special operations group] should also harass critical targets in the enemy's depth. For the airlanding strike groups {机降突击群 jijiang tujiqun}, after the neutralizing artillery force has mounted fire extensions, the airlanding strike groups should fly in low-altitude along routes where the enemy's ground-to-air fire defense is weak and land in the assigned area. [The airlanding strike groups] should mount attacks in the enemy's flanks or flank rear or capture advantageous terrain features, obstruct enemy's airfield maneuver operations {机场机动 jichang jidong}, and support the penetration activities of the forward line main attack groups.

During the operation, the campaign commander should have targeted understanding of the development on the main attack direction. If the forward line main attack groups suffer from a defeat and it appears that the attack groups will be unable to make a penetration in a short time, the campaign commander should promptly direct part of the maneuver attack groups {机动攻击群 jidong gongjiqun} to enter into combat in order to reinforce the penetration strength of the main attack groups and open up a point of penetration as soon as possible. The forward line attack groups of other directions should increase the attack speed and intensity and use active actions to support the main attack groups to make the penetration. If the forward line main attack groups suffer from severe defeat and it appears to be difficult for them to make a penetration, the campaign commander should decisively modify the offensive resolution and readjust the attack arrangements. He should reinforce the strike strength in the direction which is closer to the main attack direction and easy to develop and resolutely penetrate the enemy's first line defense. The campaign commander should also promptly transfer fire cover and comprehensive support to the newly established main attack direction.

At the same time, [the campaign commander] should have a comprehensive understanding of the development of offensives in each of the offensive directions and the locations of the follow-on maneuver attack forces and deep attack forces. He should pay attention to the maneuver locations of the operational forces that are entering into the enemy's depth and the airlanding attack forces. The campaign commander should work hard to coordinate the tempo of attack of the various forward line attack groups and maintain powerful strikes by fire and high-velocity multi-dimensional attacks. He should pay attention to readjustments of the enemy's defensive disposition in the depth, promptly discover possible enemy counterattack activities, and destroy enemy's counterattacks by way of battlefield intercepts or sabotage raids. He should actively and effectively organize ground and air warning and protection activities in order to assure air safety of all attack groups and assure normal operations of rear disposition. He should diligently organize all types of campaign support, in particular equipment maintenance support, to ensure that damaged equipment can be repaired, recovered and regain operational functions as soon as possible. The campaign commander should view successful penetration as the basic starting point. He should actively coordinate the operational activities of all forces and make sure the forward line attack groups are able to rapidly and fearlessly penetrate the enemy's position.

(3) Expanding and solidifying points of penetration

When the forward line attack groups open up a point of penetration at the enemy's first line position, [the campaign commander] should keep the attack pressure high at the point of penetration and command the troops to continue to develop and attack towards the enemy's depth. He should command the follow-on forces to hasten their follow-up speed. The campaign commander should make sure that the speed to enter into the enemy's position is hastened up, and the time to stay at the point of penetration is shortened. The [attack groups] should rapidly capture the enemy's key defensive points in the vicinity of the points of penetration, actively expand the depth and width of the point of penetration, and at an appropriate time, mount roll up the flanks attacks. The main direction of the flank roll up attacks {翼侧卷击 yice guanji} should be on the other flank of the attack direction of the campaign large formation, or a secondary attack direction that is developing most successfully, or the direction where the terrain is most advantageous for the friendly forces to solidify the point of penetration.

When expanding and solidifying the points of penetration, one should firmly follow the four principles given below. First principle: Reinforce the force strength inside the point of penetration first and expand the width of the corridor next. After penetration, regarding the use of the corridor in the obstacle area, priority should first be given to supporting the follow-on operational forces to rapidly pass through. The engineering force responsible for widening the corridor should then work along the outer edge of the path and gradually clear outward. Make sure that engineering work will not hamper the main operational forces from entering the point of penetration. Second principle: Maintain attack momentum first and take control of advantageous terrain features next. In order to maintain a high-speed high-pressure offensive momentum, one should concentrate the

main forces in the critical operational direction after penetrating the enemy's defense. Make every effort not to disperse the forces to multiple directions or transfer a part of the forces to control advantageous terrain features. Ensure that the momentum and intensity of the offensive is not weakened. Third principle: first capture-control campaign vital points {yaodian}, and then annihilate the enemy's effective strength. With regard to selecting targets of attack, priority should be given to key points inside the points of penetration that have campaign significance. Generally, attention is not given to those dispersed enemy who are conducting harassing activities. As much as possible, concentrate the forces on capturing and controlling campaign vital points. After the vital points are secured, then organize the forces to wipe out the remaining enemy. Fourth principle: first control-counter {制反 zhifan} with firepower, and then resist-counter {抗反 kangfan} force-strength choke points. If the forward line attack groups that penetrate into the enemy's position are encountering enemy's multi-layer counterattacks, one should mount a concentrated attack at the enemy's counterattacks using neutralizing artillery firepower in the rear as the primary firepower and direct firepower that has penetrated the enemy position as the secondary firepower. Try to apply maximum firepower to quell the enemy's counterattacks in the shortest time possible, striving to annihilate the enemy while they are still on the march. In sum, one should simultaneously apply firepower strikes, deploy the attack formation, expand the space inside the point of penetration, and increase firepower intensity against the enemy's counterattacks. One should avoid having too high a density of forces inside the point of penetration, which could cause the speed of attack to slow down or increase casualties when the enemy increases firepower to blockade the point of penetration.

During the operations, the campaign commander should command all forward line attack groups to continue their attack in the enemy's shallow depth, as well as coordinate the attack directions and tempo with the airborne force to capture key campaign points. The campaign commander should command the neutralizing artillery force to attack the enemy's command control system and artillery positions in the enemy depth, and use a part of the forces to establish a firepower blocking area {火力拦阻区 huoli lanzuqu} to prevent the enemy's maneuver attack force from mounting counterattacks. The campaign commander should command the maneuver air defense groups, combat helicopters, and air force aviation fighters that support the operations to attack enemy's aircraft flying overhead. The campaign commander should coordinate the air force aviation bombers and Secondary Artillery's conventional missile units to continue to strike the massive forces in the enemy's depth and at the airfield. The campaign commander should pay attention to the follow-up speed and the location of the deep attack groups. He should hasten the operational speed of the engineering force to widen the path in the main direction. He should increase the attack speed and force density of the forward line attack groups that are penetrating the points of penetration.

During the activities to counter the enemy's blockade of the points of penetration {封闭突破口 fengbi tupokou}, the campaign commander should emphasize overall coordination and comprehensive use of firepower. As long as the point of penetration is

not effectively blocked by the enemy, one should not sacrifice the friendly forces' attack momentum. One should maintain a multi-route, multi-dimensional, multi-directional and sustained campaign penetration posture. To the positional defensive enemy on the first line, we should maintain high speed and high pressure. The follow-on forces should increase their follow up speed and enter into the pre-determined deployment position to engage the enemy as early as possible. If the enemy is able to successfully blockade the point of penetration and the point of penetration cannot be re-opened in a short time, and the enemy's counterattack forces inside the position are comparatively strong, depending on the situation, our forward line attack groups that have penetrated the enemy position should spread out and seize advantageous terrain features near the point of penetration and form a mutually dependent and mutually supportive defensive posture. The airborne force should work in cooperation with the forces that have penetrated the position. The follow-on forces should hasten their attack tempo, and, under firepower cover, work in conjunction with the friendly forces that have penetrated the enemy position to form a sandwiched attack posture to ensure that the point of penetration can be re-opened as soon as possible.

III. Crushing Enemy's Counterattacks...436

When the forward line attack groups are about to capture the enemy's first-line position or are mounting an attack against the depth of the enemy, the friendly forces' attack groups will definitely encounter the enemy's joint counterattacks from the air and from the ground, involving both forces and firepower. Normally, the enemy's counterattack activities are led by short and rapid firepower strikes. The enemy's main counterattacks are ground maneuver attacks, and the enemy's secondary counterattacks come from airlanding attacks of the flank rear. These counterattacks are multi-dimensional, rapid and ferocious. Thus, after penetrating the enemy's defense, the campaign commander should take aggressive measures to gain an overall understanding of the directions of movement of the enemy's maneuver attack forces in the depth. The campaign commander should promptly determine the enemy's disposition and predict possible timing, routes, scale and direction of the enemy's counterattacks. The campaign commander should take actions before the enemy does, using primarily firepower to neutralize the enemy, which is coordinated with additional troops harassment. If the enemy develops strong and powerful counterattack activities, the campaign commander should give priority to organizing targeted counter-counterattack activities. He should firmly use firepower to counter the enemy's counterattacks. He should strengthen overall coordination, striving to wipe out the enemy while they are on the march. He should pay attention to overall protection and use aggressive offensive activities to decisively crush the enemy's counterattacks.

(1) Controlling the overall situation. Destroying enemy counterattacks as soon as possible.

Based on information gathered from enemy intelligence bulletins from higher levels and satellite photos (aerial photos), the campaign commander should instruct the special

operations forces deep in the enemy's rear to investigate areas in the enemy depth that provide good concealment conditions and can be used for rapid assembly and moving forward. He should instruct the special operations forces to conduct targeted investigation of the deployment location of the enemy's maneuver attack forces, their scale and equipment, and to perform real time monitoring in order to understand the enemy's movements promptly. The main criteria used to assess the enemy's counterattack activities are as follows. The enemy's maneuver attack forces in the depth are rapidly moving away from dispersed and concealed deployment to concentrated deployment along the main corridors. The enemy's transport helicopters are seen in large formations in the air. When the friendly forces' forward line attack groups penetrate the enemy's position and are engaged in close combat, they encounter the enemy's organized large-scale ground and air assaults by fire. The enemy's armed helicopters and surveillance helicopters are encircling over the area near the enemy's first line defensive position and have the potential for airlanding, and the enemy is using artillery fire to open a landing site. The enemy's radio communications are abnormally busy. After discovering signs indicting that the enemy is planning on counterattacks, the campaign commander should order part of the neutralizing artillery force to be responsible for monitoring and firing. This neutralizing artillery unit should conduct targeted harassment of the enemy's maneuver attack forces and monitor areas that the enemy's airlanding units are most likely to take advantage of. This is to ensure that when the enemy's assembled forces are getting ready to mount counterattacks, we are able to grasp the most advantageous opportunity to mount surprise fire attacks at areas where the enemy's forces and weapons are concentrated but defense capabilities are weak in order to kill a large number of the enemy's effective strength and destroy their counterattack activities as early as possible.

(2) Lead with firepower, and control counterattack over the full course.

In order to crush the enemy's joint counterattack activities, one should use the fire of the neutralizing artillery force {压制炮兵 yazhi paobing} as the primary fire and the Air Force and Second Artillery's conventional missile firepower as the secondary fire when organizing powerful integrated fire assault activities. When applying other operational measures, one should also use firepower as the core. In selecting attack objectives, one should first wipe out the effective strength of the enemy's counterattacks, and then neutralize enemy's air and ground firepower. In structuring attack formats, one should use neutralizing fire as the primary format, and precision attacks as the secondary format. In assigning attack missions, one should use the neutralizing artillery force as the primary attack force when mounting counterattacks against enemy's effective strength, and use the firepower of the supporting arms and services as the primary attack forces when counterattacking the enemy's air and ground firepower. In terms of strike times, accomplish strike before the enemy {xiandi daji}, strike as early as possible, and strike over the full course. With the function of integrated fire assault over the full course on the enemy's counterattack activities, disperse the enemy's mobile formations, throw into disorder the enemy's command and control, disrupt the enemy's fire cover, and kill the enemy's effective strength.

After the campaign commander has made a determination of the enemy's general counterattack intention, he should promptly determine the scale, route and direction of the enemy's counterattacks. The campaign commander should command the maneuver air defense groups to quickly move forward. Supported by the air defense firepower of the various attack groups and with help from the Air Force fighter aviation unit, [the maneuver air defense groups] should aggressively launch attacks against the enemy aircraft overhead and secure air safety of the units under attack. The campaign commander should command the neutralizing artillery force to mount high-intensity follow-on strikes by fire, taking full advantage of advantageous moments such as when the enemy is maneuvering and assembling or when the enemy formation is moving in to mount attacks. The campaign commander should instruct the obstacle construction unit to rapidly construct obstacles along the route the enemy must pass through in order to delay enemy's maneuver. The campaign commander should coordinate the efforts of Air Force's bombers and fighter-bombers and the Second Artillery's conventional missile units, and use long-range strike firepower to attack enemy's firepower operational units such as the enemy's artillery positions and airfields in the depth in order to reduce the pressure of enemy's strikes by fire. The campaign commander should command the information warfare force to take proper actions to destroy communications between the enemy who is mounting the counterattacks and the enemy's command control center and fire operational systems. He should also actively adjust firepower to mount attacks against the enemy's counterattack groups nearby so that from the very beginning the enemy that is mounting counterattacks will be under multi-dimensional attacks, and the enemy's command is unsuccessful and coordination not working.

(3) Combine offense with defense and integrated-whole resistance {zhengti kangji}.

Because the enemy's general counterattack activities are well organized and the enemy force strength is superior to ours, we must strengthen the thoughts of *combining offense with defense* {gongfang jiehe} and *integrated-whole resistance* {zhengti kangji}. One must not only diligently organize effective resistance activities, but also implement bold offensive activities in the enemy's full depth. In counter counterattack operations, one must put the priority in organizing resistance activities. As soon as the enemy's counterattack activities are detected, the campaign commander should promptly organize integrated firepower to counterattack the enemy, and at the same time command those attack groups that have penetrated the enemy position to take cover using advantageous terrain to reduce possible casualties caused by the enemy's air and artillery surprise attacks. [The campaign commander] should command the forward line attack groups close to the enemy's main counterattack direction to rapidly occupy advantageous terrain to resist enemy's counterattacks. If the scale of the enemy's counterattacks is relatively large, [the campaign commander] can also command the forward line attack groups or maneuver attack groups from other directions to implement ferocious attacks from the flank or flank rear of the enemy, with offense controlling their movement {yigong zhidong} and active complementation of integrated fire strike activities. If the enemy separates into several routes and mounts separate counterattacks, [the campaign commander] should give priority to attacking the route that poses the greatest threat. After wiping it out, then attack the remaining routes. If the enemy complements general

counterattack activities with aircraft activities {jijiang xingdong}, [the campaign commander] should grasp advantageous opportunities such as when the enemy's airborne units are boarding the aircraft, forming formations in the air or are about to execute airlanding when the forces and aircraft are concentrated but command is relatively chaotic to mount integrated firepower attacks. [The campaign commander] should command the deep attack groups to hasten the follow-up speed and get ready to participate in the counter counterattack operations at any given moment. At the same time, [the campaign commander] should instruct the integrated support forces to rapidly move forward to provide battlefield rescue and repair, as well as to replenish operational materials.

At the same time, the campaign commander must actively organize offensive activities. If the situation indicates that without introducing deep attack groups one is able to crush the enemy's counterattack activities, the campaign commander should command the deep attack groups to hasten their maneuver speed, avoiding the main corridor of the enemy's counterattacks, and pass over the forward line attack groups. At an appropriate location, [the deep attack groups] should deploy and mount ferocious attacks against pre-assigned operational objectives in order to wipe out the enemy's effective strength in the depth and enemy's critical targets. The campaign commander should command the special operations units in the enemy's depth to mount targeted sabotages against enemy's command control system. The campaign commander should command the neutralizing artillery units to transfer a part of the firepower to support the deep attack groups and special operations groups in their attack activities against critical targets in the enemy's rear. If it is necessary to introduce deep attack groups into counterattack activities, the campaign commander should order the forward line attack groups on the front of the counterattacks to rapidly transit into a defensive mode to resist enemy's frontal counterattacks. The campaign commander should order the deep attack groups to rapidly deploy while on the march and enter into the operations from both flanks of the forward line attack groups that are responsible for blocking the enemy. [The deep attack groups] will use multiple routes to mount attacks towards the core of the enemy from the two flanks. The campaign commander should command the maneuver attack groups to deploy at the front of the enemy and mount strikes by fire first. When the friendly force's neutralizing firepower is transferring, the maneuver attack groups should mount ferocious assaults to engage the enemy in close combat. In coordination with the deep attack groups, the maneuver attack groups quickly annihilate the enemy.

IV. Dividing and Wiping Out the Enemy in the Depth...439

Dividing and wiping out the enemy in the depth means using various attack groups to mount campaign dividing operations in the enemy's full defensive depth to isolate the enemy into several operational areas that are independent and unable to provide mutual support. After separating the enemy, the attack groups will wipe out the enemy in their isolated areas one after the other. The goal is to annihilate the enemy as soon as possible and ensure that the higher level follow-on operational forces can enter into the operations as early as possible. The campaign commander should choose the appropriate campaign

dividing methods flexibly based on actual terrain features and the campaign posture of the two sides in order to ensure that dividing and annihilation activities can be executed quickly.

(1) Campaign dividing and isolation

Campaign dividing and isolation {战役割裂 zhanyi gelie} refers to the campaign activities that structurally destroy the enemy's defensive system. The goal is to create advantageous campaign posture for wiping out the enemy area by area. Campaign dividing and isolation are normally carried out when the friendly forces have basically crushed enemy's counterattacks activities and the enemy's higher-level counterattack activities have not yet begun. On the premise that the friendly forces have penetrated the enemy's defense, the various attack groups should use multiple forms and measures to continue to deploy and attack toward the enemy's depth, capture important objectives or advantageous terrain features in the enemy's depth, control critical traffic and communication corridors, disrupt the enemy's defensive disposition, and forcefully divide and isolate the enemy's defensive system. The method of dividing and isolation should be flexibly chosen based on the terrain, enemy's defensive disposition, and friendly forces' campaign organization. If the enemy's defensive front has several roads leading into the depth, the campaign commander should mount parallel strikes using several attack groups. If the terrain of the battle front is more complicated and there are several roads going past the enemy's defensive flank to the hinterland, the campaign commander should mount one flank strikes or two-flank strikes. If the enemy's defensive disposition is of a circular shape, then the campaign commander should mount a multi-route attack towards the center {多路向心攻击 duolu xiangxin gongji}.

When implementing dividing and isolation operations against the enemy's positional defense, one should take advantage of the results of assaults and penetrations and the effects of fire strikes and develop the total might of the arms and services to the fullest extent. One should simultaneously use the forces to divide and use firepower to isolate; one should combine horizontal dividing with multi-dimensional dividing and combine campaign dividing with tactical dividing. One should flexibly apply fighting methods such as frontal penetration and isolation {正面突贯割裂 zhengmian tuguang gelie}, flank turning and dividing {翼侧迂回割裂 yice yuhui gelie}, or multi-dimensional dividing {立体阻断割裂 liti zuduan gelie}, and fire blockade dividing {火力封闭割裂 huoli fengbi gelie} to actively divide and isolate the enemy's defensive disposition.

In the process of the dividing and isolation operations, the campaign commander should fully understand the battlefield situation, promptly take control of the dividing posture of the various attack groups and the rapid insertions of the airborne operational groups. The campaign commander should command the electronic countermeasure units to mount powerful real time electromagnetic interceptions throughout the entire course of the dividing and isolation activities. He should promptly readjust and redefine the directions and objectives of the dividing and isolation operations, and coordinate all operational activities in a timely manner.

(2) Wiping out the divided enemy

When the friendly forces have basically achieved the campaign posture of total isolation of the enemy, the campaign commander should organize the forces to annihilate the enemy in a timely manner. When encircling and annihilating the divided enemy, the campaign commander should correctly define the operational goal and nimbly choose the appropriate operational methods based on the terrain features of the operational area, enemy's defensive posture, results of dividing and isolating the enemy, as well as the operational capabilities of the attacking troops. The campaign commander can use troops to mount assaults to kill the enemy and capture the position. The campaign commander can also use political measures to disintegrate the enemy morale and persuade the enemy to surrender. The campaign commander can use the maneuver forces to strike and wipe out the enemy. The campaign commander can also apply concentrated firepower to wipe out the enemy.

If the enemy that has been divided decides to rely on strategic terrain and fortified defensive works to stubbornly resist and it seems difficult for the friendly forces to rapidly encircle the enemy and wipe it out, one should first apply concentrated firepower to fiercely strike the enemy to destroy their defensive works, kill their effective strength, and weaken their ability to resist, followed by the maneuver forces to capture the defensive position. If the enemy hides and takes protection in trenches and tunnels, one should apply methods such as using troops to block the entrance, using smoke to smoke out the enemy, or using fire to burn or explosives to bomb so that one can wipe out the enemy that is blocked inside the tunnels. If the enemy decides to firmly defend the position and wait for reinforcement to come, and the reinforcement has set off, one should hasten the speed of encirclement and attack, striving to wipe out the enemy before the reinforcement arrives. At the same time, one should employ various effective methods to delay and destroy the enemy's reinforcement activities in order to crush the enemy's intent and accomplish the encirclement and annihilation mission. If the conditions permit, one can wipe out the reinforcement first, or one can simultaneously mount attacks as well as fight the reinforcement. If the enemy decides to firmly defend but has little hope to penetrate the encirclement, one should strengthen the attack forces and firmly block the enemy from penetrating the encirclement, striving to suppress the enemy in the circle and kill them all. If the terrain is advantageous to the friendly forces and the operational capabilities permit, one can also adopt a strategy to encircle the enemy on three sides but leave one side open intentionally for the enemy to escape, and set up ambush in the direction the enemy may penetrate the encirclement in order to wipe out the enemy while they are trying to escape. If the enemy decides to abandon the position and escape, one should firmly implement the follow and pursue operation. One should first use air and artillery firepower to interdict and strike the escaping enemy to delay their activities and kill their effective strength, then use the maneuver forces to follow and pursue. When necessary, one can use a part of the forces to implement airlanding in front of the escaping enemy, to seize advantageous terrain features and, in collaboration with the pursuing troops, to sandwich the escaping enemy in between and attack the enemy. If the escaping enemy's force strength is stronger than the friendly forces and it seems difficult for the friendly forces to rapidly wipe them out, one should

contain the escaping enemy first, and at the same time rapidly readjust the deployment and reinforce the attack forces before attacking and wiping out the enemy. If there is little hope for the divided enemy to receive reinforcement or to penetrate the encirclement, and the fear to be killed has shaken their morale, one can temporarily stop the attack activities and launch strong political offensives and propaganda offensives to divide and disintegrate the enemy, and put pressure on the enemy to surrender.

V. Intercepting Enemy's Reinforcement...441

When annihilating the encircled enemy, in order to capture battlefield initiatives or rescue the encircled troops, the enemy may bring in reinforcement or implement counter encirclement. Thus, during encirclement and annihilation, one must be ready at any moment to resist the opponent's multi-dimensional sustained reinforcement in order to ensure that one will be able to completely annihilate the encircled troops and achieve the campaign goal.

When blocking and attacking opponent's reinforcement, one should apply reinforcement blocking deployment according to the direction of the reinforcement, strength of the enemy's reinforcement, distance of the reinforcement, whether airborne support is present, and terrain conditions, as well as one's own force strength and intent. Normally, one can employ the positional defensive format or maneuver defensive format, using a combination of force strength and firepower to resolutely block the opponent's reinforcement. If the encircled enemy forces are basically annihilated, and the conditions are right to continue to fight and kill the enemy's reinforcement, the friendly side's reinforcement blocking forces should rapidly engage the enemy's reinforcement or deploy to a pre-determined area and rapidly maneuver to encircle the enemy reinforcement and wipe it out. If not wiping out the enemy reinforcement means the friendly forces will not be able to wipe out the encircled enemy, and if the condition is in our favor, then we can also concentrate all forces and wipe out the enemy reinforcement first before wiping out the encircled enemy.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 19

The Positional Defensive Campaign...442

A positional defensive campaign is a defensive campaign conducted by an Army campaign large formation {lujun zhanyi juntuan} complemented by other operational strengths in a pre-constructed position. A positional defensive campaign can be divided into fortified positional defensive campaign {jiangu zhendi fangyu zhanyi} and field positional defensive campaign {yezhan zhendi fangyu zhanyi}. The main missions of a positional defensive campaign are: to hold and set-up defense areas {eshou shefang diqu} and important targets and frustrate the enemy's attack; to cover the main force maneuver and implement attack operations; to consolidate already occupied areas and resist the opponent's counterattack; and to complement operations in the other directions.

Under informationized conditions, especially in border area local wars, the positional defensive campaign has a very important role in holding {eshou} a specified area, crushing the enemy's attack intention, effectively checking the enemy's incursion, safeguarding the security of the border area and territorial integrity, gaining time, and covering the main force's forward advance, maneuver, and implementation of attack operations, etc.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...442

Positional defensive campaigns are one of the basic patterns of defensive campaigns. Under informationized conditions, the operational thought, operational measures, and operational modes have all experienced profound change. Many new characteristics have emerged and at the same time these new characteristics have posed many new requirements for operational guidance.

I. Characteristics...442

The basic characteristics of positional defensive campaigns include the following: the operational mode is relatively passive, the operational area is relatively fixed, the defense-hold target {fangshou mubiao} status {diwei} is important, the operational activities have a holding quality {jianshouxing}, and the duration of the operation is relatively long; preparation time is relatively ample and with an excellent position as the base, the protection conditions are good; in waiting for the enemy to exhaust himself and controlling movement through stillness, our strength expenditure is fairly low; and the defense system {fangyu tixi} is fairly robust when organizing operations on a pre-constructed battlefield {yushe zhanchang}, etc. Under informationized conditions and along with improvements in weapons and equipment, the elevation of information power {xinxili}, firepower, maneuver power {jidongli}, and support capability {baozhang nengli}, and the changes in the thought, principles, and methods of attack operations, many new characteristics will appear in the positional defensive campaign.

(1) The depth and multi-dimensional qualities of defensive operations has grown more evident.

Under modern conditions, as weapons and equipment advance, the ability of the military to implement full-depth, all-directional, multi-dimensional attack has also improved. The attacking side does not need to adopt the methods of going from far to near and gradual attack to implement a layered attack against the defending side. Rather, the attacking side can rely on its equipment technical superiority and comprehensively apply various types of force-strengths and firepower to implement full-depth firepower kill, all-direction multi-point attack, and multi-dimensional simultaneous penetration against the defending side from the ground and air. This way, from the very start of the campaign, the attacking side immediately expands the engagement area to the full-depth, all directions, and all domains of the battlefield. The attacking side thus forces the defensive side into a passive state {beidong jingdi}, having to deal with the opponent from all directions. The intention is to dissolve and paralyze the opponent's defense system {tixi} with one blow and achieve the goal of the attack. This kind of full-depth, all-directional, and multi-dimensional attack method will completely change the traditional linear defense model-form {moshi}. The opposing sides will engage on the ground, in the air, at sea; at front, on the flank or flank rear, either simultaneously or one after the other. Throughout the entire campaign course, we will see paralysis {tanhuan} and counter-paralysis operations, penetration and counter-penetration operations, assault and counter-assault operations, envelopment and counter-envelopment operations {baowei yu fanbaowei}, outflanking and counter-outflanking operations, airborne [landing] and counter-airborne [landing] operations, encirclement and counter encirclement {hewei yu fanhewei} operations, etc. Under such conditions, the status of depth and multi-dimensional defense will be much more significant, the contest with the enemy's long-range weapons and depth attack force-strengths will be critical to defense stability, and anti-air raid operations will become an important content of campaign activities and an important factor that affects campaign progress and conclusion.

(2) Offensive activities {gongshi xingdong} are broadly applied and their status more prominent.

Defensive operations are to a certain extent passive {beidong} in nature, and thus their methods and means are often defined by the course and tempo of the attack. In the defensive campaigns of the past, even though emphases were placed on using active offensive activities {gongshi xingdong} in conjunction with defensive activities, defensive campaigns were only activities of a passive nature {beidongxing}. Under informationized conditions, because of improvements in armed forces {jundui} long-range assault capabilities, battlefield mobility and rapid reaction capabilities, the application of offensive activities {yunyong gongshi xingdong} by the side defending has provided favorable conditions for resisting an enemy's attack. [As] the means of attack {gongji shouduan} become more varied, the application of offensive activities {gongshi xingdong de yunyong} will be even more extensive and its status will be continuously raised.

(3) The variable quality of the center of gravity {zhongxin} of defense increases, and operational modes are more flexible.

In defensive operations in the past, the battle line was relatively fixed, the center of gravity {zhongxin} of the defense was relatively stable, and the use of operational means followed a certain formula. Under informationized conditions, the center of gravity of defensive operations becomes more variable. The main reasons include the following: First of all, the attacking side {jin'gong yifang} possesses the capability for conducting full-depth simultaneous attacks, [the attacking side] has the capability and conditions for carrying out "non-linear style" attack {jin'gong} operations, and the sudden and maneuver qualities of attack have drastically increased; for the defensive side, the pre-determined {yuxian panding} main attack direction {zhuyao jin'gong fangxiang} may change at any time; for the main defensive vital points {yaodian} selected prior to battle {zhanqian xuanding de zhuyao fangyu yaodian}, the attacking side has the capability to outflank and bypass them and implement aerial leapfrog {kongzhong chaoyur}. Next, the enemy's equipment has advanced reconnaissance technology equipment and has strong battlefield reconnaissance capability, so the attacking side has the capability to detect the defensive side's force-strength key points {zhongdian} of *bushu* disposition, avoid the opponent's main direction of defense and implement attack from a direction or place where the defense-holding is relatively weak, thus putting the opponent's pre-determined defensive key points in a place of no regard. Additionally, under informationized conditions, the attacking side has strong concealment and camouflage capabilities and emphasizes initiating an attack {gongji} through rapid maneuver on the ground or in the air. The defensive side has very limited time to organize defense and finds it very difficult to ascertain the attack key points of the attacking side, further increasing the variability of the defensive center of gravity. Under such conditions, the establishment of the defensive system {tixi} should inevitably possess all-directional and variable qualities and [both] the employment of strengths and application of fighting methods should be even more flexible.

(4) The mission of resisting enemy's information attack {jin'gong} and fire assault is more arduous.

Under informationized conditions, the enemy will emphasize implementing full-depth, all-directional, and high intensity comprehensive firepower attack against the defensive opponent in the air, on the ground and at sea, as well as launching powerful information attack. This kind of attack will be a relatively independent operational phase. As soon as the attack begins, first concentrate all types of aircraft, ships, missiles, and artillery firepower, implement large-scale, high-intensity, long-duration full-depth fire assault and various forms of information attack, and the intention is, prior to the attacking force-units making contact with the opponent, to paralyze {tanhuan} the opponent's defense system {tixi} with one blow and massively annihilate the opponent's effective strength. After the attack is initiated, still emphasize assisting and covering the attack activities of the ground force-units without pause and with various soft and hard strike means, and permeate the operational course with information operations and firepower warfare

assaults. Thus, we can see that in the positional defensive campaign under informationized conditions, firepower threats and information threats will increase without precedence, favorable terrain superiority and position protection functions will become less significant, personnel casualties and war material consumption will increase without precedent, and especially the battlefield survival problem of the various types of information systems and facilities that rely on informationized weapons and equipment becomes more prominent. It will be extremely arduous for the defensive side to adopt effective measures and means, successfully accomplish comprehensive protection and ensure the missions of battlefield survival.

II. Requirements...444

In positional defensive campaigns under informationized conditions, we should bring the integrated might into full play, implement full-depth multi-dimensional defense with key points, organically combine tenacious holding [standing fast] {wanqiang jianshou} with active resistance-attack {jiji kangji} and counterattack with initiative {zhudong fanji}, and strive to crush the enemy's attack {jin'gong} intention with active offensive {gongshi} activities. To achieve this, the positional defensive campaign should accomplish the following points.

(1) Rapid reaction {kuaisu fanying}, quickly accomplish imminent battle preparations.

Under informationized conditions, the attacking enemy's activities are concealed and variable, and the enemy's fighting methods are full-depth and all-directional. This puts forth even higher requirements on the rapid reaction ability of the defensive side. In addition, the campaign large formation that is responsible for the defense mission may enter into defense under the situation of advance preparations or it can transition into defense in the situation of encountering the enemy's sudden raids. Thus, defense preparations must be completed within a very short time, and sometimes, one can only fight and prepare at the same time. In a positional defense campaign, one must have a foothold in the most difficult and complex situations, give prominence to key points, tightly seize time, closely organize and quickly accomplish campaign preparations.

In rapid reaction {kuaisu fanying}, we must accomplish change when the enemy changes {dibian wobian} based on changes in the battlefield situation, flexibly react at the right time, and master battlefield initiative. To do this, aside from fully accomplishing operational preparations and rapidly *bushu*-dispose force-strengths, we also should promptly master all of the reliable intelligence, and establish smooth communications. The commander should keenly observe the development of the operations and decisively and agilely command. The force-units must be familiar with technical weapons and maintain a constantly alert will-to-fight and the ability for rapid activities. In terms of operational activities, we must accomplish rapid protection and concealment, rapid firepower counterattack, rapid force-strength maneuver, rapid operational center of gravity {zhongxin} transitions, quick mutual assistance-support, and accurate coordination movements.

Preparation for positional defensive campaigns can be divided into peacetime preparations and imminent battle preparations {linzhan zhunbei}. When organizing defense, no matter what the condition is, we must carry out preparation rapidly and orderly according to the intent of the superior, the mission of the campaign, current enemy intelligence, geographical environment of the operational area, campaign organization, and possible campaign development, etc. In positional defensive campaigns under informationized conditions, we must especially stress doing a good job of preparation for imminent battle, which is normally carried out on the foundation of peacetime preparation. The basic mission is to correctly understand the decision and carefully plan the campaign activities. The main contents [of preparation for imminent battle] include the following: Comprehensively understand the intent of the superior, use multiple reconnaissance means to find out enemy intelligence, correctly analyze and evaluate enemy intelligence, our intelligence, and terrain, etc. in order to make the campaign decision in a timely manner; carefully formulate the campaign plan and organize campaign coordination; and carry out political mobilization {zhengzhi dongyuan} and organize various types of support comprehensively, etc.

(2) Tenaciously holding {wanqiang jianshou} and independent protracted operations.

Not only is tenaciously holding and independent protracted operations a basic requirement put forth for defensive operations, it is also the essential combat spirit of defensive operations, and it even more so is a need-requirement for realizing the objectives of defensive operations.

The basic mission of a defensive campaign is to hold [stand fast] the defensive area so as to contain enemy attack. Thus the basic standard of measuring mission accomplishment is holding a specified area for a stipulated time. If we give up the defensive position too early, even if we cause a huge amount of casualties in the enemy, it is still considered not accomplishing the mission. Using this definition, defensive operations must grow out of tenaciously holding and protracted operations. In addition, defensive operations normally have specified defensive areas {fangqu}, and the defensive areas are independent but mutually supportive. Together they form a complete defensive system {tixi}. Furthermore, in each defensive area, it is very easy to encounter being divided {fenge} and encircled {baowei} by an attacking enemy during operations. In this sense, each defensive area must tenaciously hold and [conduct] independent operations.

The relationship between tenaciously holding and independent protracted operations is one of mode and goal. Only through tenaciously holding and inflicting high casualties and expenditure to the enemy attack strength can we realize independent protracted operations. Conversely, in order to realize independent protracted operations, we must tenaciously hold.

In order to be effective in tenaciously holding, we must first establish the holding thought of *where there is person, there is a position* {renzai zhendi zai}, and through powerful thought political work, we must bring all favorable factors, fully bring into play the thought

superiority of force-units of all participating services and arms, and establish a solid foundation for tenaciously holding. Secondly, we must do a good job in the various preparations of defensive operations. This includes formulating the defensive operations plan, establishing the defensive system {tixi}, and storing of various operational materiel, etc. so as to create favorable material conditions for tenaciously holding and protracted operations. Next, we must have a grasp on powerful maneuver strengths and with a focus on protracted operations, rationally separate the garrison duty strengths and the maneuver strengths {shoubei liliang he jidong liliang}. Not only must we have sufficient strengths to hold [stand fast] positions, but we must also have powerful maneuver strengths as backup, so as to facilitate the basis for campaign progress and needs-requirements, and at the right time augment vital point defense-holding {yaodian fangshou} or implement offensive operations {gongshi zuozhan}, enhancing the flexibility and toughness of defensive operations. In addition, we must flexibly apply fighting methods, fight the enemy with intellect and with courage, fully utilize the favorable conditions of defensive operations, combine offense and defense, and annihilate the enemy one by one; and through various localized tenacious holding, we must achieve protracted operations in the campaign overall situation.

(3) Construct a full-depth, multi-dimensional defensive system with key points.

In operations under informationized conditions, the enemy has the capability to implement full-depth, all-directional, and multi-dimensional attacks {gongji}. The enemy's emphasis is on simultaneous full-depth attack. The enemy's attacking *bushu* disposition is established on the foundation that it can apply constant pressure on the opponent's defense full-depth. And the enemy emphasizes combining frontal penetration, flank penetration, vertical penetration, and depth attack. The attack is always aiming at the opponent's target in the depth in order to achieve the goal of depth encirclement. In spite of this, because the attacking enemy is subjected to constraints of various factors, they may not be able to bring into play its operational effectiveness in the direction and area as they wish but they may only be able to implement with key points. Thus, when we organize the defensive campaign, we should rationally *bushu* disposition our force strengths and weapons and build a defensive system {fangyu tixi} that is full-depth, multi-dimensional and has key points. With this [defensive system] as our backing, we [should] implement resistance with full-depth, multi-dimensional and key points. What is called with full-depth, multi-dimensional and key points is precisely the campaign *bushu* disposition {zhanyi bushu}, position task organization {zhendi biancheng}, firepower distribution system {huoli peixi}, obstacle distribution system {zhang'aiwu peixi}, information operations distribution system {xinxi zuozhan peixi}, and the various support systems within the defensive system. They should all focus on being able to effectively resist the enemy's full-depth, multi-dimensional and key point attack, and form a defensive system with full-depth, multi-dimensional and key points. Not only should the defensive system be able to resist the enemy's implementation of fire power and force strength attack from the ground but also be able to resist the enemy's implementation of fire power and force strength attack from the air; not only should the defensive system be able to resist the enemy's implementation of attack from the front but also be able to resist the enemy's outflanking attack from the side flanks and rear flanks; not only should

the defensive system be able to resist the enemy's implementation of a frontal attack from the forward lines but also be able to annihilate the enemy penetrating the depths or in airborne landing; not only should the defensive system be able to resist the enemy's "hard strike" from the ground, sea, air, and space domains but also be able to oppose the enemy's "soft strike" coming from the electromagnetic domain; not only should the defensive system be able to resist-hold the enemy's full scale strike from the different space domains and directions using integrated means, but also be able to resist-hold enemy's key point strikes in a given space domain and direction.

(4) Utilizing favorable conditions and strengthening comprehensive protection.

Under informationized conditions, the attacking side often concentrates their crack forces and weapons {jingbing liqi} and possesses comprehensive firepower superiority. The attacking side can mount large-scale, all-time and space, high intensity firepower assault against the defensive side. For the defensive side, the most important question related to defense stability and achieving the defensive campaign goal is whether it can effectively conserve its effective strength and operational potential. Thus, for the defensive campaign large formation, one of the most important methods to effectively conserve one's effective strength and operational potential is to make full use of the defensive position which has a designated location on favorable terrain and the advantageous condition of being able to wait for a tired enemy, and to strengthen one's comprehensive protection against the enemy's comprehensive firepower assault. To do so, the basic measure is: combining defense with attack, using attack to support defense and using defense to support attack.

"Strike" {da} is the most active measure to improve survivability. In defensive operations, we must have a good grasp of favorable time opportunities and make full use of various strike means, especially the capability of high-tech weapons and long-range strike weapons, striving to implement preemptive strike, destroy the enemy's attacking {jin'gong} capability, and weaken the enemy's threat to our survivability. To achieve this, the campaign large formation can use the aviation force {hangkongbing}, campaign tactical missiles {zhanyi zhanshu daodan} and long-range artillery {yuancheng paobing} to implement sudden strikes with key points against targets such as enemy airfields, missile firing positions, and the command control systems. [The campaign large formation] can also organize crack force element-teams {jinggan xiaofendui} or special force units {tezhong budui} to penetrate deep into the enemy rear to carry out special operations, damage the enemy's firepower attack systems, weaken the enemy's fire attack superiority, and transform our passivity to gaining the initiative.

"Defense" {fang} is still the main measure to maintain survivability. We should use a wide range of means to improve the results of defense. One is to emphasize firepower resistance. We should pay attention to the protection of important targets such as command hubs, communications hubs, airfields, ports, missile and artillery firing positions, and logistical and technical support bases, etc. We should establish a full-depth, multi-dimensional, network-like *bushu* disposition to resist enemy's strike. The

second is making use of the terrain to enhance concealment. We should fully utilize terrain features such as terrain creases, valleys, rain crevices, and vegetation cover, deploy [position] {peizhi} force-strengths and weapons under concealment, and reduce personnel and equipment exposure indicators in order to increase the difficulty level for the enemy to assess our force-strength *bushu* disposition and lower the accuracy of the enemy's fire assault. The third is to emphasize protective works. When organizing defensive campaigns, as long as conditions allow, we should by all means possible, build a few sheltered fortifications able to be hidden {neng cang}, able to strike {neng da}, able to maneuver {neng jidong} and able to live in {neng shenghuo}. As much as possible, hide personnel, equipment and war materials underground in order to reduce and weaken the might of the enemy's fire assault. At the same time, we should utilize the advantageous conditions of our pre-designated battlefield and already-established position to enhance the effectiveness of comprehensive protection. The fourth is to implement dynamic state *bushu* disposition {dongtai bushu}. When establishing campaign *bushi* disposition, we must properly increase the dynamic-state quality {dongtaixing} of the target. By way of appropriately and cleverly changing the positioning location, we can increase the difficulty level of enemy's reconnaissance detection and fire assault. The fifth is to strengthen battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance, promptly detect the signs that the enemy is to launch fire assault, and do a good job in concealment and protection preparation in order to reduce the effect of enemy's fire assault to the minimum.

(5) Comprehensively apply operational strengths and implement integrated resistance.

In defensive campaigns under informationized conditions, the integrated confrontation of both sides is very prominent. When organizing a defensive campaign, the crux to gaining campaign victory lies in whether one can bring into full play the integrated might {zhengti weili} of one's own strengths and whether one can try its utmost to disrupt the formation of the integrated combined strength {zhengti heli}. When encountering the enemy's full-depth, all-aspect multi-dimensional attack, we must comprehensively use our operational strengths and means to form an integrated combined strength {zhengti heli} to resist the enemy's full scale strikes and key point destruction, as well as to destroy the overall structure of the enemy's attacking {jing'gong} system. The basic measures are to improve the operational system {tixi} and strengthen battlefield adjusting-coordination.

First of all, we must unify the *bushu* disposition of the operational strengths and establish a robust {wanshan} defense system. In an Army defensive campaign, in addition to the various arms subordinate to the root service {junzhong}, normally there will also be assisting-support and cooperation received from the force-units of the Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery {kongjun, jaihun he di'er paobing budui}. The operational space includes the ground, air, and sea. To address this, first we must reasonably assign the operational mission to the participating services and arms based on campaign needs, and technical equipment, operational capability and principle of use of the services and branches in order to bring into full play overall resistance superiority. The second is that

we must establish a robust defense system and form ground, air, and sea integrated multi-dimensional battlefields that are mutually supportive. The third is that we must carefully formulate an adjusting-coordination plan {xietiao jihua} and organize all operational groups {zuo-zhan jituan} to conduct exercise training according to the adjusting-coordination plan prior to the start of war {zhan-qian} in order to modify-improve and become familiar with the adjusting-coordination plan, and thus establish integrated adjusting-coordination on a practical and reliable foundation. Through the above measures, we form the might of a "one plus one is greater than two" system {xitong} and its integrated function on the enemy.

Secondly, we must strengthen battlefield adjusting-coordination. The battlefield situation is complex and variable. In order to achieve an integrated resistance {zheng-ti kang-ji} of the various operational strengths, we should also pay attention to the adjusting-coordination for the various operational strengths during the course of the campaign. And relying on new battlefield situations, we [should] promptly adjust the mission[s] and activities of the various operational groups {zuo-zhan jituan}, establish new adjusting-coordination relationships, and ensure the smooth implementation of the campaign. We must conscientiously strengthen the adjusting-coordination between the strengths {li-liang} of the various services and arms so that we maintain a robust strength system {wan-zheng de li-liang ti-xi} from beginning to the end; we must strengthen the adjusting-coordination for the various operational patterns and means so as to bring into play a maximum operational effectiveness; we must strengthen the adjusting-coordination for the activities of the various battlefields, directions, spaces {kong-jian}, and domains so as to maintain desirable operational results.

(6) Combining attack and hold, dominate the enemy with a variety of means.

In defensive operations under informationized conditions, we should seize all favorable time-opportunities and actively adopt offensive activities {gong-shi xing-dong}. We should build attack into defense, simultaneously use multiple means and thus seize the initiative of the defensive campaign.

Firstly, we must establish the awareness in an offensive defense {gong-shi fang-yu yi-shi} in terms of campaign guidance. From the time we begin to organize a campaign to the conclusion of campaign implementation, not only must we plan {jihua} how to conduct defensive-holding activities {fang-shou xing-dong}, but we should also [conduct] operations research {yun-chou} on how to implement offensive activities {gong-shi xing-dong}, and in a defensive campaign, from formulating the *jihua* plans to implementing the operations, [we should] allow offensive operations to permeate throughout as important activities in defensive operations, as well as accomplish the various necessary preparations. This way, only through the implementation process are we able to smoothly handle everything {dexin ying-shou} and for it to be an integral whole {hun-ran yi-ti}.

Secondly, we must build a defensive system that is adaptable to attacking and hold operations {gongshou zuozhan}. No matter if it is campaign *bushu* disposition, position task organization {biancheng}, firepower distribution-systems {peixi}, obstacle distribution systems, various support systems {xitong}, not only must it be beneficial for defense-holding, it must also be beneficial for attacking {jin'gong}. It must form a defensive system that simultaneously attacks and defends {gongfang jianbei}, is able to attack and able to hold {nenggong nengshou}, is flexible and variable, and concentrates multiple functions into one.

Next, in terms of means application, we must give priority to defense, and simultaneously carry on attack and defense. On the basis of tenaciously resisting and holding the position {wanqiang kangji, jianshou zhendi}, we should fully utilize the favorable conditions created by defense-holding operations {fangshou zuozhan}, seize the favorable time-opportunities such as when the enemy's attack is foiled, when their formations are in chaos, when their activities are out of adjustment, and when there are voids in their rear, at the right time organize the implementation of operational activities such as launching attacks in front of the position {zhenqian chuji}, ambushing the interior of the position {zhennei fuji}, guerilla attack to the enemy rear {dihou youji}, maneuver annihilation attack and force-strength and firepower counterattack not far from the position {buyuan li zhendi de jidong jianji, bingli huoli fanji}, as well as air and naval assaults, etc., actively strike the enemy with initiative {jiji zhudong de daji diren}, truly accomplish combining attack and hold {zhenzheng zuodao gongshou jiehe}, control the enemy with multiple means {duozhong shouduan zhidi}, and realize the goal of gaining victory with an integrated whole {zhengti zhisheng}.

Section 2: Main Activities...450

In the positional defensive campaign, operational activities normally are conducted on the foundation of campaign preparations. During the campaign course, various activities will be unfolded over the entire defense space in succession or simultaneously, and some of the activities may have to be conducted repeatedly.

I. Preemptive strike {xianqi daji} against the enemy...450

A preemptive strike against the enemy is the pre-planned fire strike activities implemented against the enemy before the enemy initiates attack. Its basic goal is to disrupt the enemy's attack preparations, inflict casualties on the enemy's effective strength, weaken the enemy's operational capabilities, delay the enemy's attack activities, and gain time for further accomplishing defensive preparations.

Preemptive strike against the enemy should be implemented by seizing upon the favorable time opportunities before the enemy's initiation of attack. These time opportunities are: first is when the enemy is in the standby area conducting attack preparations. At this time, the enemy's force-strengths and weapons are normally positioned in groups, and targets are exposed and in a relatively static state. Second is

when the enemy is moving-in and unfolding. At this time, because of terrain and road restrictions, the attacking enemy is normally in a moving-in column and maneuvering along several roads. Their advancing formations are long, targets are relatively concentrated and it is difficult to effectively conceal them. If we can get seize these two time opportunities to implement strikes, it will be easy to achieve the anticipated results.

Preemptive strike against the enemy should be directed at vital areas {yaohai} and strike with key points. Its specific targets are: first are the enemy's command system, radar positions, and communication systems. Second are the enemy's traffic lines, fuel transport pipelines, missile and artillery positions, and logistic facilities. Third are the enemy's heavy force group deployment [positioning] {peizhi} areas. Fourth are the enemy's aerial support weapons, especially the attack helicopters, etc.

When implementing preemptive strike, we should bring into full play the integrated superiority {zhengti youshi} of various firepower and ground force-strengths, combine a variety of means, and implement integrated strikes. The first is to implement a comprehensive fire strike against the enemy. As long as conditions permit, we should seize the favorable time opportunities, use aviation and campaign tactical missile force units {hangkongbing, zhanyi zhanshu daodan budui}, long-range artillery forces and army aviation forces {yuancheng paobing, lujun hangkongbing}, implement sudden, fierce, and short duration assaults against enemy's vital area targets {yaohai mubiao}, and inflict heavy casualties and expend the enemy's attack strengths. The second is to implement guerrilla warfare and special operations against the enemy. We should fully bring into play the function of the militia and guerrilla forces which we planted in advance in the enemy's rear to implement raid-attacks, harassment, and sabotage against the enemy; at the appropriate time, we should organize special operations force-units {tezhong zuozhan budui} or secret infiltration force-units {mimi shentou budui} to implement reconnaissance and special operations in the enemy rear and sabotage important targets in the enemy depth and rear in order to inflict heavy damage on the enemy. The third is to implement information operations against the enemy. While we implement firepower and force-strength strikes, conduct powerful information attack operations, disrupt the normal operating of the enemy's information system, weaken their information operations capability, and create conditions for more effectively implementing preemptive strikes.

II. Resisting the Enemy's Firepower Assault...451

In positional defense campaigns, the crux to accomplishing the defense campaign missions is to actively resist the enemy's powerful comprehensive firepower assault and preserve our effective strength and campaign potential. Thus, the campaign large formation must persist in the principle of combining tight protection and active strike, [must] apply various effective means, [must] resist the enemy's comprehensive firepower sudden-raids, and [must] ensure defense stability.

(1) Full scale protection

Full scale protection refers to activities that evacuate, conceal, camouflage and protect the personnel, equipment, and key targets in the defensive area. It is an important measure to preserve combat capability and an important means to resist enemy's firepower assault.

In order to raise protection effectiveness, we can use the following activities:

The first is to strengthen battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance. With the prerequisite that we make full use of strategic intelligence and information, we should organize the participating reconnaissance strengths, adopt various reconnaissance and surveillance technical means, strengthen battlefield intelligence collection, promptly detect and accurately ascertain the indicators, intention, scale and patterns in the enemy's implementation of firepower sudden-raids {huoli tuxi}, [detect and ascertain] the main direction of the sudden-raids and possible targets of the sudden-raids, and further accomplish the preparation work of resisting the enemy's firepower sudden-raids.

The second is to utilize terrain and fortified works protection. When we detect that the enemy is about to implement firepower raid-attacks {xiji} or when we receive a warning from higher levels concerning to defend against the enemy's firepower raid-attack, we should promptly inform the force-units to enhance observation and pay close attention to the enemy's dynamic posture, as well as order the ground-to-air operational force-units {duikong zuozhan budui} to rapidly unfold according to plan and accomplish resistance preparations. Other force-units should quickly utilize favorable terrain and covered works to disperse and conceal. As much as possible, "hide" force-units and weapons underground and reduce the probability of enemy detection.

The third is to conduct interior-position maneuver {zhennei jidong} at the right times. In order to resist the enemy's firepower assault, we should appropriately increase the dynamic state nature of the defensive *bushu* disposition. For those force-units with stronger maneuverability, such as combined reserve forces {hecheng yubeidui}, artillery and missile force (elemental)-units {paobing, daodan bu (fen) dui}, etc., depending on the situation, appropriately conduct maneuver, continuously change positioning locations {peizhi weizhi}, vary activity modes {xingdong fangshi}, and cause the enemy to not easily acquire the target and be unable to implement precision strike.

The fourth is to implement campaign camouflage. On the basis of making full use of favorable terrain and adverse weather conditions, we should use a variety of camouflage and deception means, implement campaign camouflage, set up decoy targets, adopt false activities, combine the real with the false, hide the real and show the false, and cause the enemy difficulty in distinguishing the real and the false, thus achieving the goals of not only concealing the force-units but also hiding the operational intention.

The fifth is to promptly rescue, repair and replenish. When we encounter the enemy's firepower assault, we should promptly rescue casualties and repair damaged position works, communications facilities, important roadways, bridges, rear facilities, etc. At the

same time, we should replenish various operational materials and equipment in a timely manner in order to ensure the smooth progression of the campaign. We should also take necessary electronic warfare measures to ensure continuous communications and uninterrupted command.

(2) Tenaciously resist

Tenaciously resisting refers to using various strike weapons of defensive operations to implement active strike activities against the enemy's raids. While we practice complete protection, we should concentrate fire assault against important targets posing the greatest threat against us such as enemy missile and rocket firing positions, artillery position, forward airfields and command control systems, [and we should] weaken enemy firepower as much as possible and decrease defensive system losses. To achieve this, we can adopt the following activities:

The first is electronic jamming. This is employing electronic equipment and materials and actively conducting reconnaissance and jamming of the enemy's radio communications, artillery reconnaissance and fire correction radars {paobing zhencha jiaoshe leida}, fire control radars and navigational guidance radars so as to cause the enemy's firepower strike weapons to lose control and lower their firepower sudden-raid effectiveness.

The second is counterattack on the ground. This is employing ground long-range strike strengths to implement sudden-raids against important targets in the enemy's depth, such as radar stations, forward airfields, missile firing positions, artillery firing positions, etc. The goal of this is to destroy important weapon systems and important facilities the enemy relies on to initiate attacks, to disrupt the enemy's attack preparations, and to shock the enemy.

The third is joint interception. This is, under the situation of our seizing localized air dominance, employing fighter aviation supporting operations and ground air defense weapons to intercept enemy aircraft and other sudden-raid weapons from the farthest distance and providing continuous strikes and layered intercepts.

The fourth is setting up obstacles and obstructions {shezhang lanzu}. This is utilizing the various airborne obstacles setups in advance {yuxian shezhi} and mobile setups {jidong shezhi}, such as air burst balloons {kongbao qiqiu} and high altitude cables, etc. to effectively block the enemy's raid and complement other resisting activities.

The fifth is sabotage-raids in the enemy's rear. This is, at the right time, organizing special operations force-units {tezhong zuozhan budui}, secretively infiltrating the enemy's rear, comprehensively utilizing a variety of raid-attack modes, and sabotaging-raid with key points main targets such as the enemy's firepower systems {xitong}, rear area ammunition and POL supply lines, and helicopter assembly (standby) areas. [This is also] weakening the enemy's firepower strike strengths, harassing the enemy's fire strike

plan, delaying the enemy's fire strike activities, and lowering the operational effectiveness of the enemy's fire strike systems {xitong}.

III. Block the Enemy's Full-Dimensional Penetration {tupo}...453

These are the critical activities of resisting the enemy's attack activities, frustrating the enemy's attack intention, and ensuring a defensive stability. We must promptly find out the enemy's main attack direction and activities situation and his intention. At the appropriate time, [we must] command the force-units to rely on their positions, make the most of their firepower, resolutely defend vital sites {yaodi} and vital points {yaodian}, combine tenacious resistance and active offensive {gongshi} activities, resolutely frustrate the enemy attack, and crush their attack intention.

(1) Security and screening area operations {jingjie yanhuqu zuozhan}

Force-units responsible for the security and screening {danren jingjie yanhu renwu de budui} mission should, at the appropriate time, occupy the pre-established positions or temporary positions, block-attack and raid-attack the attacking enemy in order to gain needed time, screen the main force to complete defense preparations, and promptly find out the enemy's force-strength and activity situations in each direction of attack.

If the enemy enters our security area {jingjie diqu}, the security and screening force-units should quickly occupy favorable terrain and resolutely block the enemy attack and quickly find out the enemy situation.

If the enemy enters our screening area, we should rely on the favorable terrain and the pre-established positions, adopt fighting methods such as ambush the enemy in front of the position {zhenqian fuji}, and block-attack one after the other {jiejie zuji}, etc., block and delay the enemy attack, force the enemy to unfold ahead of time, and win time for our main force to complete defense preparations.

If the enemy attacks our main defense area, we will shift to force-units in the enemy rear, and we should rely on the guerrilla area {youjiqu} to develop guerilla warfare and adopt methods such as raid-attack, raid-harassment and sabotage-raids to complement main force in operations.

(2) Hold vital points operations {jianshou yaodian zuozhan}

Defense vital points {fangyu yaodian} are important places that function as pillars in the defense system {fangyu tixi}. Holding vital points {jianshou yaodian} is the crux to checking the enemy's penetration and is the number one operational activity for checking the enemy's penetration.

Holding vital points {jianshou yaodian} should successfully deal with the following three relationships: the first is the relationship between “putting” {bai} and “stationing” {tun} of force-strengths at the vital point. We must persist in the principle of “putting less and stationing more, gradually apply force” {shaobai duotun, zhuci yongbing}, namely deploy [position] {peizhi} a smaller portion of force strengths in advance, and enter a larger portion of force-strength into covered fortifications, concealed and on standby. Depending on the situation on the battlefield and operational needs-requirements, adopt the tactic of “adding fuel” {tianyong}, gradually committing to the resistance-attack and maintaining from start to finish the capability of sustained resistance of the enemy attack at the vital point. The second relationship is between “holding” {shou} and “countering” {fan}. On the one hand, with the vital point as the reliance, adopt a variety of methods, inflict heavy casualties and expend the enemy attack strengths, and tenaciously resist the enemy attack; on the other hand, with active offensive {gongshi} activities, implement powerful force-strength and firepower counterattacks against the enemy penetrating the positions, striving to inflict heavy casualties to the enemy at our defensive forward line, frustrate the enemy’s attack intention and maintain a robustness in the vital point defense system. The third relationship is between the vital points. The defense vital point is an important component of the defense system. Each vital point acts as a corner able to mutually assist and complement each other; thereby, when the enemy implements attack against any given vital point, each vital point will closely work together and mutually assist each other. Together they form concentrated intersecting firepower and an attack posture of different angles against the enemy and bring into play the integrated effectiveness of vital point resistance.

(3) Fire blockade operations

Under informationized conditions, the maneuver power and assault power of the armed forces are very strong, and the rapid and full dimensional qualities for penetration are very fast. Thus, in order to check the enemy’s penetration, the crux is to seize and capture the first opportunity {qiangzhan xianji}. To achieve this, when checking the enemy’s penetration activities, one should put various firepower applications in first place, attach importance to bringing the various superior merits of rapid firepower response and powerful assault into play, implement ground surface blockade against the enemy, prompt assaults on the enemy’s attack formations, and delay the enemy’s penetration activities.

If the enemy’s intention is to penetrate from the air, we should employ ground air defense strengths {hangkong liliang}, and depending on the situation, employ fighter and ground attack aviation forces {jianji, qiangji hangkongbing} to implement air blockade and checking enemy aircraft entry.

When the enemy force-units break open a penetration point and the follow-on echelon’s intention is to follow in, we should use campaign tactical missile force-units {zhanyi zhanshu daodan budui}, long-range artillery forces {yuancheng paobing} and air-to-surface attack strengths {kongduidi gongji liliang} to assault the enemy inside the

penetration point and close off the penetration point. At the same time, implement concentrated fire suppression against the enemy's follow-on echelons, delay their activities, sever the communications between penetrated enemies, and divide and separate the enemy attack formation. During coastal area defense, we should stress bringing the roles of all naval firepower into play, match the varieties of firepower, and ensure the effective implementation of fire blockade.

(4) Operations to seal off the penetration point

If the enemy opens a penetration point in our defense position and is complemented at the same time by airborne landing forces, first concentrate aviation force and artillery force firepower {hangkongbing huoli, paobing huoli} to prevent the enemy ground force strengths and airborne forces from entering or expanding the penetration point and actively impede the enemy's follow-on echelons. Next, quickly maneuver a portion of the strengths of campaign reserves {zhanyi yubeidui}, antitank reserves {fantanke yubeidui}, and obstacle setup forces {zhang'ai shezhidui} to seal off the penetration point. Thirdly, command the defense-holding force-units {fangshou budui} flanking two sides of the penetration point to actively complement and maneuver force-strengths to quickly extinguish the enemy's airborne landing. If it is too late to seal off the penetration point, we should decisively occupy the favorable terrain and pre-established positions at the rear flank of the penetration point with reserve forces {yubeidui} and hold [stand fast] to prevent the enemy from advancing towards the depths and expanding to both flanks.

If the enemy penetrates the tactical sectors and engages in combat with their follow-on echelons, complemented by airborne forces and advancing into the campaign depth, we should concentrate artillery and aviation force firepower to assault penetrating and airborne landing enemy; blockade the narrow paths, ferry points, traffic hubs, and destroy bridges and road, lay mines and obstacles, and delay and contain the activities of the enemy's follow-on echelon; quickly reinforce the defense, resolutely hold the vital fortifications {yaosai} and vital points {yaodian} in the depth, and prevent the enemy from penetrating into the depth; organize firepower to continuously support the operations of force-units holding the vital points; and whenever necessary, be prepared to use mobile force-units and nearby force-units to wipe out the enemy's airborne landing forces and crush their intention to complement the ground assault.

If one part of the enemy group enters the depth but has not established a stable footing, we should seize favorable time opportunities and concentrate force-strengths to suddenly implement counterattacks, wipe out the penetrating enemy and restore the defensive posture; our first line garrison groups {shoubei jituan} or first echelon {diyi tidui} should hold the existing positions and vital points, tightly hinder the enemy, inflict heavy casualties and expenditures, and disperse enemy force-strengths; at the right time, employ mobile strengths to implement counterattack and anti-airborne landing, and improve or restore the defense posture with mobile warfare to annihilate the enemy.

(5) Enemy rear sabotage-raid operations

Sabotage-raid in the enemy's rear is an important measure to stop enemy's penetration. When the attacking enemy initiates attacks against our defensive position, our guerrilla forces and militia {youjidui he minbing} in the enemy's rear should, using various active activities, open-up extensive sabotage-raid activities in the enemy's rear, strike the enemy's follow-on echelons, sabotage-raid their command and communications systems {xitong}, destroy their firepower firing positions, delay the enemy's attack speed, disrupt their coordination, and lighten the pressure for our battlefield front.

IV. Disrupt the Encirclement in the Enemy's Depth...455

In the defensive campaign under informationized conditions, because of enhancement to armed forces maneuver and assault capabilities, the possibility of enemy encirclement of the main *bushu* disposition {zhuyao bushu}, strategic fortifications {zhanlue yaosai} and campaign vital points {zhanyi yaodian} in the depths is very high. In order to effectively counter the enemy's encirclement activities, the campaign large formation should promptly ascertain the enemy's encirclement intention, quickly adjust the operational *bushu* disposition, capture and control the vital points, adopt the method of combining holding {jianshou} and offensive {gongshi}, and break the enemy's encirclement activities.

(1) Capture and control vital points, prevent the enemy's outflanking and encirclement

If the enemy penetrates our defensive position, depending on the situation, we should first organize holding vital point groups {jianshou yaodian de jituan}, continue to hold existing positions, bring into play the "nail" {dingzi} role and actively contain the enemy force-strength maneuvering {di bingli jidong}. Quickly organize our maneuver strengths {jidong liliang}, capture vital points in the direction of the enemy's penetration or outflanking and encirclement, implement maneuver defense {jidong fangyu}, and resolutely prevent the enemy's compression encirclement {yasuo hewei} and carving up our defensive *bushu* disposition.

(2) Combine holding and offensive {gongshi} activities, break the enemy's encirclement

When the enemy forms an encirclement posture against any given defense-holding groups, the defense-holding group {fangshou jituan} should persist in independent protracted operations, resist the enemy's encirclement attack and ensure stability of the vital points {yaodian} or vital sites {yaodi}. At the same time, concentrate the employment of campaign maneuver strengths {zhanyi jidong liliang} to implement counter-charge-attacks and counter assault operations, and implement powerful strikes against the weak spots of the encircling enemy. Complement interior and exterior {neiwai peihe}, mutually benefit between attack and hold {gongshou xiangji}, and quickly collapse the enemy's encirclement.

(3) Integrate air and ground, prevent the enemy's vertical encirclement

The attacking enemy normally implements a strategic or campaign airborne landing to complement other ground encirclement activities. Thus, we must make anti-airborne landing operations an important content of our counter-encirclement activities. While we are preventing the enemy's expansion on the ground, promptly wipe out the enemy's airborne landing forces, mutually benefit between ground and air {kongdi xiangji}, and implement full-dimensional counter-encirclement operations. At this time, we should first adopt the fighting method of a combined blocking and encircling. That means that we block and fight the ground enemy, surround and annihilate the airborne (aircraft) landing enemy, and sever the contact between the airborne (aircraft) landing enemy and the ground attacking enemy, rendering them unable to join together, and subsequently annihilate them one by one. If our strengths are not sufficient and it is difficult to simultaneously annihilate the airborne (aircraft) landing enemy and the ground penetrating enemy, we should, based on the severity of the threat to us by the ground and airborne (aircraft) landing enemy, annihilate the greatest threat enemy first, and then shift force-strengths to annihilate the less threatening enemy, annihilating them one by one.

V. Anti-Airborne and Aircraft Landing...456

In a defensive campaign, the enemy's airborne landing operations are normally implemented to complement other ground force-unit penetration and encirclement. Its goal is to seize important targets within the opponent's defensive depth and to form a pincer attack posture {jiaji taishi} with frontal attack force-units, and speed up the progress of the campaign. One can see that whether we can promptly annihilate the airborne landing enemy and whether we can effectively prevent the joining up of the airborne landing enemy and the ground attacking enemy will directly affect the stability of our defense. Thus, while the campaign large formation is annihilating the enemy airborne landing forces, we must closely pay attention to the enemy's ground attack situation, adopt resolute measures to block the ground attacking enemy, and divide, surround and annihilate the enemy airborne landing forces as quickly as possible.

(1) Closely monitor the dynamic state of the enemy airborne landing forces and promptly gather the enemy's airborne landing information.

In a defensive campaign, anti-airborne landing operations possess a definite passive quality {beidongxing}. Therefore, the campaign large formation should attach importance to, through various reconnaissance means, closely monitoring situations such as the transfer and assembling of airborne landing forces and transport aircraft, promptly detecting and ascertaining the enemy's airborne landing intention, force-strengths, time-opportunities, navigation routes and areas as early as possible adopting relevant measures, accomplishing anti-airborne landing preparations, and striving for initiative in anti-airborne landing operational activities.

(2) Actively strike the air transport and overhead enemy.

The most favorable time opportunity to strike the airborne landing enemy is before the enemy airborne landing touches the ground. At this time, firstly, we can take advantage of when the enemy airborne landing force-strengths and transport aircraft groups are assembling and implement firepower assault against the enemy with long range weapons such as aviation forces and campaign tactical missiles {hangkongbing, zhanyi zhanshu daodan}. We can also command enemy rear force units to raid-attack the enemy, smash the enemy's transport instruments, upset the enemy's airborne landing *bushu* disposition, and delay the enemy's airborne landing time. Secondly, we can take advantage of when the enemy's transport aircraft groups are in flight, and promptly employ air defense forces and aviation forces {fangkongbing he handgkongbing} to start implementing layered intercept against the enemy from long distances and annihilating the airborne landing enemy during air transport. Thirdly, when the enemy airborne landing transport aircraft are overhead, we can organize nearby force-units and militia {minbing}, occupy favorable terrain, concentrate the use of various firepower especially air defense firepower to implement fierce strikes, and annihilate the enemy before touching the ground.

(3) Resolutely annihilate just touched ground enemy.

After the enemy airborne force lands on the ground, normally there is an assembly and organizing process. During this time, the enemy's forces are dispersed and disorganized, and its command and coordination is confused. This is the best time to attack the enemy. Firstly, we should use aviation fire, campaign tactical missiles, and artillery fire to mount rapid fire assault against the enemy that has just landed on the ground in order to inflict casualties on its effective strength, and prevent it from assembling, maneuvering and expanding. Next, we should bring into full play the capabilities of the nearby troops, militia, and the masses. We should first occupy advantageous terrain and deploy our forces before the enemy could and fire at the enemy before the enemy could fire at us, striving to annihilate the enemy one by one while the enemy is in a confused state. If we are not ready or are unable to wipe out the enemy, we should capture advantageous terrain, prevent the enemy from retracting or expanding, and encircle and divide the enemy in order to create conditions for the main force to annihilate the enemy airborne force. Next, the anti-airborne reserves or campaign reserves should rapidly maneuver toward the airborne area and rapidly deploy, taking advantage of the time when the enemy has not established a steady foothold to attack and fight a quick battle for a quick solution. If the conditions allow, depending on the situation, we can use helicopters to transport the advance unit to the airborne area ahead of time and control the key points and advantageous terrain. After the anti-airborne force reaches the location, it should assess the posture of the enemy airborne force and employ various fighting methods to kill the enemy. We should annihilate the enemy that poses the most threat to us first, and then annihilate the remaining enemy.

VI. Implementing Campaign Counterattack Against the Enemy...457

Campaign counterattack is an important offensive activity {gongshi xingdong} in the defensive campaign. Its goal is to stabilize the defense posture with *attack to assist holding* [standing fast]. Normally, its specific goals are to: annihilate the penetrated enemy and stabilize the defense; recapture lost ground and restore or improve the defense posture; kill, expend and delay the enemy, lighten the pressure on the defense vital points or the main defense-hold area; and counter cutting-apart and counter-siege operations, etc. Campaign counterattack in a defensive campaign has a decisive battle nature. Its success or failure has a decisive significance for frustrating the enemy attack, for transforming an unfavorable posture, and for striving for initiative from passivity. Thus, in the course of the defensive campaign, the campaign large formation should set out from the interests of the campaign overall situation, examine the time and measure the circumstances {shenshi duoshi}, successfully grasp the three links {guanjie} of time-opportunity, location and force-units, assess situations completely and with key points, and actively and carefully organize the implementation of counterattack operations.

The time-opportunity for implementing campaign counterattack is very critical. Being too early or too late does not benefit the realization of the goal. Based on past operational experiences, the favorable time-opportunities generally are: the penetrated enemy is encountering tenacious resistance and suffering major losses; coordination is disrupted, rear support is interrupted, and the offensive {gongshi} is foiled; or the penetrated enemy rashly protrudes in one part (one route) and is in a dispersed and isolated position, etc. When the penetrating (coming onto land) enemy seriously threatens the stability of the overall defense situation, or in order to complement operations in other strategic campaign directions, or in order to complement the political struggle, we also need to resolutely and decisively implement counterattack. Normally, the favorable time opportunities of counterattack are gradually formed during the course of the campaign, but one even more needs to bring subjective dynamic quality into play, so they [favorable time-opportunities] are created by relying on the development of the campaign, by favorably guiding based on circumstances {yinshi lidao}, and by having plans and step-by-step. Once a favorable time opportunity appears, the campaign large formation commander should be decisive and resolutely implement counterattack. Counterattack targets should be determined according to the battlefield situation and the counterattack goals. Generally, we should select the enemy that poses the greatest threat to our defense stability, benefits crushing the enemy's attack intention, and stabilizes the defense.

The target, area, and main direction of the counterattack should be determined according to the specific situation of campaign development and the goals of the counterattack. Normally, select counterattack targets which pose the greatest threat to us and which may force the enemy into an unfavorable position, for example: a protruding and rash enemy, a dispersed and isolated enemy, and an enemy whose coordination is out of adjustment, whose follow-on is interrupted and whose flanks are exposed, etc. Normally select a counterattack area where terrain is favorable for us. It is best to select an area setup in advance to annihilate the enemy, an area to facilitate our maneuver and unfolding, where

there is powerful fire support, and where we are able to obtain effective complementing from defense-holding force-units. One should select the main direction of counterattack on the flank or rear flank of the target of annihilation, and in order to facilitate severing the contact between enemy front and the rear, cut off and annihilate the penetrated enemy.

The operational *bushu* disposition of campaign counterattack should be determined according to the size and strength of the penetrated enemy. We can adopt a one-echelon *bushu* disposition or we can adopt a two-echelon {tidui} *bushu* disposition. In order to ensure a rapid quality of counterattack activities, we should, as much as possible, employ armored force-units {zhuangjia budui} in the first echelon. During counterattack, normally we should point the main counterattack strength {zhuyao fanji liliang} towards the penetrating enemy's flank or rear flank. Simultaneously, complement from another direction with a portion of force-strengths and form a pincer-form assault posture. If the enemy's penetration front is relatively wide and the depth is relatively shallow, or if our activities are restricted by the terrain and the counterattack direction is not suited for pointing towards the enemy's rear flank, we can implement multi-routed and key point assault from the front. Under the complement of the defense-holding group {fangshou jituan} or the first echelon {diyi tidui}, divide, surround-annihilate the penetrated enemy.

Campaign counterattack implementation should strive for concealment [covertness] and suddenness, and quick battle-quick decision. To achieve this, from the very start of the counterattack we should first concentrate the use of firepower from aviation forces {hangkongbing}, campaign tactical missile {zhanyi zhanshu daodan}, and artillery {paobing} and implement intense assault against counterattack targets. After that, under firepower support and cover, the counterattack force-units {fanji budui} covertly and quickly approach the enemy and initiate unexpected attack, striving to take advantage of the enemy's movement or unstable footing, boldly weaving and dividing, upsetting their *bushu* disposition, and annihilating the enemy one by one. In order to safeguard-support the smooth implementation of the counterattack, we should carefully organize anti-air defense and cover the maneuver, unfolding, and attack of the counterattack force-units; the holding force-units {jianshou budui} and the enemy rear guerilla force-units {youji budui} should actively complement each other; at the same time, we should also organize the various safeguarding-supports, especially communications and road safeguarding-support, and ensure the smooth implementation of counterattack operations. When the counterattack is successful, or if the counterattack is defeated and cannot continue to be implemented, we should quickly adjust the *bushu* disposition and at a suitable time organize the counterattack main force force-units {fanji zhuli budui} quickly to withdraw from the counterattack area, rigorously defending against the enemy fire retaliation.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 20

Anti-terrorism Maintaining-stability Operations...460

Anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are operational activities which involve armed strength such as the armed forces, armed police, and militia, and are supported by the people. These operational activities are to deter and attack terrorism activities based on law for the purpose of maintaining national unity, societal stability, and security of people's lives and properties.

Based on the scale, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations can be divided into anti-terrorism wars, anti-terrorism campaigns, and anti-terrorism battles. Based on the form, they can be divided into quelling armed riots, area blocking, counterassault and destruction, counter-armed hostage taking, and attacking terrorists' base {营地 yingdi}, etc. Based on operational intensity, they can be divided into support and rescue activities, terrorism prevention activities, and attacking terrorism activities.

Anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are the highest form of anti-terrorism struggles, and are an important part of military struggle preparation. They are important measures to assure national security, societal stability and personal and property safety. Thus, they are important contents of military struggles in the new military era. The main missions of anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations include the following: First, to prevent terrorism activities. That is, use measures such as rigorous reconnaissance and surveillance, warning and safeguard forces, and armed deterrence to contain and prevent terrorism activities from happening. Secondly, to attack terrorism activities. These mainly include quelling armed riots, countering terrorists' assaults and destruction, countering armed hostage-taking, attacking terrorist base, and area blocking. Thirdly, to provide rescue and assistance. In light of personnel casualties, facility damages, NBC contaminations, and fire damages as a result of the terrorists' sabotage and attacks, provide support to treat personnel casualties, repair and recover destroyed facilities, and remove and eliminate the outcomes of terrorist attacks in order to reduce the harm to the minimum and assist local governments and the people to cope with the aftermath.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...460

Presently, terrorism organizations that pose threats to China's national security and area stability mainly include the following: the "East Turkistan' terrorism organization, the aggressive posture of the Dalai Lama group, and international terrorism organizations. As a result of expansion of these terrorism organizations, development of forms and methods of terrorism activities, and increase in terrorism activities and scale, many new characteristics of anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations have emerged, which in turn pose new requirements on anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations. To understand these characteristics and these demands is the basic premise of studying anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations.

I. Characteristics...461

Anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are a brand new type of operational activities. Compared with the Chechen war, Afghanistan war, and our own experience in quelling armed riots, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations have the following noticeable characteristics with respect to timing, influence, strength, measures and methods:

(1) Urgency of the mission

Terrorism activities are rigorously organized, secretly carried out, and abruptly executed. The purpose, timing, location, measures, methods, targets of assault, and scale of the activities are difficult to predict and grasp. This gives great uncertainty to the concrete mission, timing, form and location of the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations. Troops are assigned the mission in haste, preparation for imminent operations are hurried, time for the action is pressed, and as a result the difficulty level of execution increases. For example, three days after the "9-11" terrorism event, the U.S. military dispatched the special operations *fendui* {特种作战分队 *tezhong zuozhan fendui*} to Pakistan and began to enter Afghanistan to search for Bin Laden. Nine days after the terrorism event, on 20 September, the U.S. assembled elite Army, Navy, and Air Force forces from different parts of the world and completed the initial deployment of attack forces to Afghanistan. Thus, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability troops must strengthen their readiness and training to achieve rapid reaction and rapid action, and be available to attack any sudden occurrence of terrorism activities.

(2) Complexity of the situation

Terrorism activities are normally planned out secretly, using various measures and of varying scales. They have a high degree of randomness in timing and frequency of execution. As a result, the battlefield of the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations is complex and changeable. For example, terrorists often use ethnic and religious interests as an excuse to carry out terrorism activities. They also agitate and coerce innocent masses that do not know the truth and use them as human shields. The anti-terrorism operational troops have to not only attack the terrorists, but also protect the masses, facing an extremely complex situation. Terrorists may launch different forms of terrorism activities simultaneously in multiple areas. Anti-terrorism operations will also use different forms and are carried out simultaneously in multiple areas. Terrorism organizations are often clad under the cloak of religious freedom, democracy, and human rights. They use religious activities as the front, and ethnic survival and development as the excuse. They may obtain support from some western countries or from individual countries in our border area. Because anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations often involve ethnic and religious problems, they arouse the close attention of the world.

(3) Significance of the effect

Terrorism activities seriously threaten the lives and properties of the people, disturb societal peace and stability, affect normal productive lives, cause extreme anxiety to society, and bring about severe psychological pressure and high degrees of nervousness to the people. Thus, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are closely tied to the interests of the people. Every move of the government and the military is closely watched by society domestically and internationally. If the operations fail, it not only will endanger the interests of the people, but also damage the trust of the people of their government and military. In addition, the image of the country in the international arena will be severely affected. On the other hand, the terrorists might double their efforts and become more rampant. Consequently, regional stability worsens, and societal development, even national unity and stability of the political power will be affected. Thus, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations not only touch on ethnicity, religion, diplomacy, internal affairs, but also are related to the lives and properties of the people, image of the government and military internationally and domestically, long-term peace, prosperity, and development of the society, even stability and consolidation of the political power.

(4) The joint nature of the activities {行动联合 xingdong lianhe}

The joint nature of the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations is demonstrated not only in the jointness of the military, police and civilian forces inside the country, but also the jointness of armed forces among countries, as well as coordination of the application of multiple methods of struggle.

First, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are joint activities among the military, police, and civilians within the country. Because the activities touch on a broad area and are not ordinary, they require coordination and collaboration of various services and service arms of the military, and also support and collaboration of public security, armed police and relevant local specialized forces.

Secondly, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are joint efforts of armed forces among countries. As terrorism organizations become networked, dispersed, and internationalized, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are no longer the affairs of one country or one locality. They demand broad international cooperation and joint activities of armed forces among countries. Only then will they be able to effectively and thoroughly crush the terrorists, remove terrorism power, and uproot the threat of terrorism. For example, in the Afghan war, the U.S. received military assistance of 136 countries and force participation of scores of countries, forming a world-wide anti-terrorism coalition.

Thirdly, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations also demand integration of political, economic, and diplomatic means. Due to the complexity of anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations and interconnectedness of societies, the operations not

only demand firm and decisive military attacks, but also close collaboration of political, economic and diplomatic measures. For example, at the same time the U.S. military was attacking Afghanistan, the U.S. also applied comprehensively political, economic, diplomatic, legal and financial measures to cut off all connections of the Al-Qaeda with the outside world and their financial resources, to totally isolate the Taliban regime and Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda organization. These actions played an important role in hastening the progress of the war.

(5) Asymmetric nature of the operations

Anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are classic asymmetric operations. The operational force, operational measures, and operational methods are highly asymmetric in nature.

First, the operational force is asymmetric. The anti-terrorism maintaining-stability side uses military and armed police as the basic operational force, which is collaborated with public security, militia, and other relevant forces. This force has gone through formal and rigorous military training, has unified operational ideology, operational activities and fighting methods. It is equipped with standard weapons and equipment and has a complete command system and comprehensive support capability. On the other side, terrorist organizations often mainly rely on illegal and temporarily recruited personnel. They generally have not gone through formal training, and have a low level of combat skills, without any uniformed operational activities and fighting methods and without a professional support force.

Secondly, the operational measures are asymmetric. Terrorists often use small arms such as rifles, machineguns, hand grenades, mortars, and explosives. The quality is poor, precision inferior, weapon models incomplete, and weapon types few. Sometimes, they may possess a small amount of advanced weapons such as portable missiles. On the other hand, the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability side possesses a complete assembly of modern high-tech weapons and equipment, including aircraft, helicopters, and precision guided weapons. The operational measures are clearly asymmetric.

Thirdly, the operational methods are irregular. Terrorists often take advantage of terrain and emotions of the people and society to fight irregular guerrilla wars such as sabotage raids, sneak attacks, harassing attacks, ambushes, and sniper attacks. They fight and run, and fight and hide. Their activities are highly irregular. In light of the characteristics of the activities of the terrorists, the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability side must also adopt various flexible and unusual operational methods to the extent of giving up regular operational methods. These methods may include counterassaults, counter ambushes, counter sniper attacks, counter hijacking, blocking, and search and annihilate in order to raise operational effectiveness.

II. Requirements...464

Anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations must be rooted in the most difficult, most complex, and most severe situations. Based on relevant laws and regulations, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations requires unified command of a joint military, police, and militia force, and comprehensive application of multiple measures such as political offensives, military deterrence, and armed attacks. Anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations must strive to contain terrorist activities at their embryonic stage, and implement a rapid, decisive, and thorough attack in order to safeguard societal stability and secure people's lives and properties. Thus, the following requirements are put forth for anti-terrorism maintain-stability operations:

(1) Active prevention

Active prevention means that during the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations one must pay high attention to prevent terrorism activities from happening. One should apply multiple containment measures comprehensively to maximally reduce the probability of occurrence of terrorist activities and intensity of the terrorism activities if they erupt.

Terrorism activities are highly dangerous to a country, society, and people. Once they erupt, their disastrous consequences can quickly spread in a short time. They cause great damage to the country, society and people's lives and properties and increase the difficulty level of attack and rescue. Targeted preventive measures should be taken to effectively prevent the occurrence of the terrorism activities or reduce their intensity, if they occur, in order to maximally reduce the loss of lives and properties. Thus, for anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations, active preventive activities are equally important as effective attack activities, and they should be applied together.

For this reason, participating force-units must attach a high degree of importance to the prevention of terrorism activities. They should study the characteristics, laws and measures of terrorism activities, and collaborate with other participating strengths to closely track the activities of terrorism organizations. They should: strengthen the security of possible targets of terrorist attack and important areas; formulate and implement a variety of security prevention preliminary course of action {yu'an} and specific measures; and leave terrorists no opportunity to exploit. As soon as any indications or clues of terrorism activities are discovered, they should rapidly organize troops and employ multiple methods to capture the terrorists, and destroy their base, striving to eliminate the terrorist activities at its embryonic stage.

(2) Rapid reaction

Rapid reaction means drawing up operational plans ahead of time based on the characteristics and patterns of the terrorism activities. As soon as terrorism activities occur, the participating troops will be able to rapidly react and reach the assigned position

immediately, quickly deploy and develop and control the posture in order to gain initiative of the situation.

Terrorism activities occur suddenly. In particular, when terrorism attack occurs, the terrorists involved will quickly escape from the scene. If reaction is not timely, one may easily lose the optimal time of attack and become passive. Thus, one must rapidly act {xingdong}, reduce the participating force-unit's reaction time to the minimum, grasp the favorable moment of fighting back, take the initiative, contain the terrorist activities and intensity in the shortest time possible, and create favorable conditions for the complete elimination of the terrorism activities.

For this reason, based on the mission, enemy intelligence, and environmental characteristics of the operational area, the participating force-units should carefully draw up several operational courses of action {zuo zhan fang'an} to lay the foundation for taking the operational initiative. The troops should store supplies and equipment, including special materials and equipment to meet the operational needs of anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations. Once terrorism activities such as armed riots and hostage taking occur, the troops should quickly revise the preliminary course of action based on the situation and send troops close by the incident site and forces with better mobility to quickly enter the operational area to control the situation and create favorable conditions for the attack. If terrorist assaults and destructive activities occur, the troops should quickly command nearby engineering, fire extinction, and chemical defense *fendui* to rapidly enter the site and, according to the possible outcome of the terrorist activities, take effective and targeted rescue activities to control the scope of destruction and reduce losses and damages.

(3) Quelling the enemies with joint effort

Using joint effort to quell the enemy means to assemble multiple forces including military troops, public security, armed police, and militia, and act jointly under unified command, using the advantage of a unified force to attack the terrorist activities.

Terrorist activities have a higher level of uncertainty with respect to their nature, scale and area. The situation can be complex and the involved areas and aspects can be broad. On the other hand, the participating forces are constrained by their own characteristics. If only one type of operational force is used, it is difficult to effectively control the posture and implement offensive activities. Assembling multiple forces to launch a joint activity can fully develop the strength of each force in terms of information and intelligence, mobility, and assault capability and form a powerful unified force against the enemy. In addition, when carrying out anti-terrorism operations in special areas, local social and environmental conditions may influence the situation. Being able to utilize public security and armed police force in the early stage will reduce the sensitivity of the anti-terrorism activities to a certain extent. It will play an important role in avoiding negative effect and ensuring smooth implementation of the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations.

For this reason, a coordination mechanism should be established to coordinate multiple forces. A joint command institution that can coordinate military and local operational forces should be established to provide concentrated and unified command and control of military, police, and civilian forces, to enable all forces to fully develop their capability in deterrence, attack and rescue. Anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations that have the military as the main force should use the military for the primary activities, and should have a joint command to provide command and coordination to develop unified actions. For anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations that involve the military in coordination with other forces, all participating forces should follow the command of the joint command institution and aggressively and actively accomplish the operational mission. All participating forces should act in support of the main attack force, and carefully organize and coordinate activities to carry out unified activities. All participating forces should take the initiative to cooperate closely with each other and launch abrupt, fierce and concentrated attacks against the terrorists. They should ensure that among the military, police, and civilian forces, and among all troops, the activities are coordinated and unified. They should launch firm, decisive, and rapid attacks against the terrorism activities.

(4) Acting according to law

Acting according to law means that all activities must strictly abide by the relevant laws, decrees, rules, and regulations. When dealing with a situation, all relevant laws must be followed. Use different measures for different persons.

The hotspots of terrorist activities are often religious and ethnic areas that enjoy special policies. They often have special customs and culture. Compared with other areas, the people and society may have less social and psychological tolerance. At the same time, terrorist organizations often use religious activities protected by the national law as a cover, and use similar characteristics shown during heightened religious or ethnic conflicts to hide the actual intention of the terrorism activities. These activities are highly deceptive. Some of the masses may be coerced or deceived to take part in the terrorism activities. Furthermore, terrorism organizations may also carry out activities or take cover in highly sensitive areas such as foreign diplomatic organizations in China or arenas that involve foreign affairs. This may link anti-terrorism operations and activities directly with international relations and foreign policies. Thus, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations must be particular about strategies and act according to law.

For this reason, all participating troops must vigorously abide by relevant laws and regulations and military rules and regulations and should correctly use their legal authority. They should rigorously differentiate between the terrorists and the masses that have been deceived, and between the backbone elements of terrorist organizations and ordinary terrorists. This is to ensure that the attack is concentrated on the critical point, and that all possible personnel casualties and property losses will be minimized. When carrying out anti-terrorism maintaining-stability missions in areas or arenas that touch on

foreign affairs, close coordination with relevant units must be maintained and diplomatic policies and diplomatic disciplines must be strictly followed.

(5) Combining deterrence with attacks

Combining deterrence with attacks means that in the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations, one should use political offensives, military deterrence, or military attacks in light of the objective, or one should combine the above measures with other methods to accomplish the operational mission.

The composition of terrorist organizations is unique. It includes diehard elements as well as fence-sitting elements and masses that have been coerced. Using measures such as divide and disintegrate, psychological offensive, and warning and attack, one may be able to win back the deceived masses, divide and disintegrate the terrorist organization, and isolate the minority diehard elements. On the contrary, if one only uses military attack, greater collateral casualties and losses may occur, resulting in unnecessary and negative impact. By combining deterrence with military attack, one can reduce the size of the area of attack, target the critical points of attack, and avoid or minimize collateral losses.

To this end, when quelling armed riots and countering hostage taking operations, one must insist on applying deterrence first, followed by military attacks, and combine deterrence with attack. First, work through political offensives to apply propaganda and division and disintegration, striving to separate the diehard elements from the coerced general public. When applying armed measures against the terrorists, one should try to reduce the collateral losses to the minimum.

(6) Removing the roots of all evil

Removing the roots of all evil is in respect to the diehard elements of the terrorist organization. All roots of evil must be eliminated to prevent all future troubles.

The diehard elements of the terrorist organizations, especially the leaders, are highly obstinate and ready to die for the cause. If they ever escape during the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations, they will rise up again when the time is mature and launch fanatical revenge against the country and society. Thus, anti-terrorism operations must use heavy force to hammer down all evil elements, striving to annihilate them completely. At the same time, we must capture or kill the leaders. This will produce powerful deterrence and shock and awe effect on other terrorists.

To this end, all participating troops must concentrate absolute strength, using multiple measures such as blocking, attack, search and annihilate, pursue and annihilate comprehensively to quickly and thoroughly annihilate all terrorists. All participating troops should correctly select the targets of attack, find out the hiding places of the backbone elements of the terrorist organizations, and implement key point attacks. They should stress the use of firepower. Against critical targets firmly defended by the terrorist

organization, the troops should implement lethal fire assaults after encircling the target, striving to wipe out the terrorists on the spot.

Section 2: Main Activities...468

Troops participating in the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations should abide by the order of the higher level. In light of the situations, they should rapidly conduct targeted preparation for imminent operations. They should mobilize to the operational area in a timely manner and use resolute and nimble maneuver activities to quell armed riots, attack terrorists' assaults, destructions and hostage taking activities, and annihilate the terrorists in order to assure people's safety of lives and properties and societal stability.

I. Quelling Armed Riots...468

Quelling armed riots is an important mission of anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations. The success and failure directly affect national security and societal stability, as well as the safety of the lives and properties of the people. One must comprehensively organize all forces, plan and prepare all operational activities, and employ nimble maneuver operational methods to thoroughly annihilate the terrorists in order to win victory.

To quell armed riots, generally the following disposition should be established: First, the periphery blocking and control force. The periphery blocking and control force consists of part of the infantry, electronic warfare troops, as well as public security, armed police and militia. They are deployed on the periphery of the armed riot area and area the terrorists may infiltrate to take up the blocking and control responsibilities such as safeguarding and checking so as to cut off the avenues through which the terrorists could infiltrate or establish connection with the outside. Second, the strike force. The strike force consists of the main operational troops and is deployed based on methods such as multi-approach encircling {多路合围 duolu hewei}, multi-approach converging attack {多路向心合围 duolu xiangxin hewei}, and advancing and encircling from opposite direction {对进合围 duijin hewei}. The main missions include striking the terrorists' base or concentration area, disperse the terrorists, or attack the terrorists. Third, the search and annihilate force. It consists of part of the operational troops and the public security, armed police and militia. They are placed at the rear of the strike force or within the encircling and attack disposition. Their main missions are to safeguard, support, and search. Fourth, the fire attack force. It consists of the firepower troops of aviation and artillery fire. They are deployed in areas that facilitate maneuvering and unleashing firepower. Their missions include launching fire attacks against the terrorists, supporting ground troops in their operational activities, and blocking and controlling areas that are difficult for the force to control. Fifth, the maneuver force. The maneuvering force consists of part of the infantry and armored forces, and is deployed in the vicinity of important targets that terrorist activities may occur or in areas that facilitate maneuvering. They are mainly to handle secondary terrorist events. Sixth, the comprehensive support

force. The comprehensive support force is composed of the engineering force, chemical defense force, communications force, and logistics and weapons and equipment. They are deployed in areas that facilitate support rendering based on their duties. Their main responsibility is to provide comprehensive support.

(1) Blocking and control {封锁控制 fengsuo kongzhi}

Blocking and control is the primary activity of quelling armed riots. It is the key step to cut off the terrorists' connection with the outside and their escape route in order to create a situation whereby the bad elements are confined within an area to be completely wiped out. To implement blocking and control, one should be based on the terrorists' main area and the scale and method of activities, as well as their avenue to connect with the outside, and the surrounding terrain. One should comprehensively use the military, public security, armed police and militia forces, and apply force strengths, firepower and electronic jamming, combined with local and social control methods and measures. One should implement activities such as firepower blocking, force blocking, port control, and information blocking in the periphery of the armed riot area to establish a multi-dimensional multi-layer blocking and control line in order to rigorously block and control the terrorists.

Blocking and control is applicable throughout the entire process of quelling armed riots. During the entire operations, high degree of attention must be given to the blocking and control activities. One should have a good grasp of the terrorists' activities both inside and outside the immediate area, and make necessary adjustments on the blocking deployment when necessary. During the height of intense operations in particular, one should strengthen the blocking and control of the periphery to prevent the terrorists from escaping and outside terrorists from providing reinforcement. This will create the condition for a total wipeout of the terrorists.

(2) Fire attacks

Fire attacks rely mainly on the fire attack force of the aviation and artillery to implement fire strikes against important targets of the terrorists. Fire attacks are an important activity to quell armed riots. They can be a method for the advanced phase of the operation, and also a method for the independent phase of the operation. It can even be a sole operational form, i.e., using fire attacks to achieve the operational goal.

Fire attacks should be timely, accurate, continuous, and effective. They aim to wipe out the effective strength of the terrorists, destroy their operational capabilities, and create conditions for our follow-on operations.

Fire attacks can be divided into several phases. For the initial phase of attack, normally one should look at the operational capabilities of the armed groups of the terrorist organization and destroy targets that have operational potential, targets that have air defense capability and targets that can affect public opinions and have propaganda value.

Based on operational needs, sometimes one can choose targets for the purpose of shock and awe. For the follow-on targets of attack, one should be flexible based on the persistence of the fire attacks, reaction of the terrorists, and progress of the operations.

In order to raise attack effectiveness, fire attacks should be reasonably planned and appropriate weapons and ammo be selected based on the value of the target, available equipment, and terrain. Normally, precision guided weapons are used to attack the terrorists' strategic targets, conventional ammo is used to attack the terrorists' general targets, the artillery force is used to attack the terrorists' area targets, and the aviation force is used to attack the terrorists' point targets.

The methods of fire attack are generally as follows: One method is sudden strikes.³⁴ As soon as the terrorists' riot erupts and before full-scale development happens, we use the aviation and artillery fire to rapidly launch a sudden and ferocious fire attack against their massing area, command center and main positions. The purpose is to disrupt their riot plans, consume their effective strength, destroy their will power and create conditions for our follow-on activities to quell the armed riot. The second method is persistent strikes {突然闪击 turan sanji}. It means we consider fire attacks as an independent operational phase or the sole operational form to organize firepower and implement it persistently. We should look at change in the terrorists' activities and operational needs to constantly modify the means and method of the fire attack. We should have a good grip of the best opportunity to attack; attack ferociously when it is called for, and attack slowly when it is called for. We should combine fire attack closely with military deterrence, political offensives, and diplomatic struggles. At the same time, don't let the terrorists learn the pattern of our fire attacks. We should use our firepower to continue to kill and waste their effective strength. We should continue to apply strong military pressure to destroy their will power and achieve the goal of using fire to win victory. The third method is precision attacks. Very often terrorists hide among the people. On the battlefield, there are not only terrorists' positions, weapons equipment and facilities, but also places where the general public conducts their basic livelihood and daily activities. Thus, when applying firepower, one should use precision firing techniques and precision guided ammunition as much as possible. If one does not have enough precision firing platforms and precision guided ammunition, one should focus on attacking the main and necessary targets. Avoid harming the general public and reduce collateral damages to societal and public facilities as much as possible.

(3) Ground attacks

Ground attacks use powerful ground assault troops to attack the terrorists and is a main phase of quelling armed riots. Ground attacks mainly include: encircling and advancing; dividing, encircling and annihilating; and pursuing and destroying enemy remnants.

³⁴ Sudden strike

1. Encircling and advancing

Encircling and advancing means we use concentrated force strength and firepower to attack and encircle the area occupied by the terrorists, and gradually advance to the center. This is an important step to totally annihilate the terrorists.

The encircling activity should consist of a combination of two-dimensional advancing and three-dimensional maneuvering. Use the "road roller" method to encircle the terrorists from multiple approaches on the ground and compress the terrorists into a predetermined annihilation area. Use the "leapfrog" method such as airlanding and paradrop to rapidly pass over natural obstacles and enter the enemy's depth and cut off the enemy's escape route. In coordination with the ground troops, they attain the goal of encirclement.

Encircling and advancing must be safe and reliable. At the same time one advances, one should also firmly defend and wipe out the enemy. Fight steadily and strike surely; fortify at every step and consolidate as we advance. Avoid advancing in isolation and being rash; avoid being defeated by the enemy one by one, and avoid leaving gaps for the enemy to escape or leaving spaces for enemy activities. Use multiple measures. Mobilize and organize civilians in the area occupied by the terrorists to leave in order to ensure their safety. At the same time, prevent terrorists from hiding among the civilians.

2. Dividing, encircling, and annihilation

Dividing, encircling and annihilation is the most ferocious and most critical phase of battle in quelling armed riots. At this time, psychologically the terrorists are panicking. On the other hand, under their leader's deception and coercion, the terrorists demonstrated determination to die for the cause. Their actions could be rather cunning. Thus, the strike force should take advantage of the weakness of the terrorists and launch assaults abruptly, using agility and maneuver to divide, encircle, and annihilate, and using a quick and decisive fight to annihilate all the terrorists.

When attacking the targets defended by the terrorists, one should examine the enemy's situation, the targets of attack, surrounding terrain, and our force strength and weapons, and then use storming assault {强攻 qiang gong}, surprise attack {袭击 xiji} or a combination of the both in a flexible manner. At the same time, one should knit military attacks closely with political offensives. Pay close attention to using methods such as frontal clamp down and suppress and feint and diversion {正面钳制, 佯动欺骗 zhengmian qianzhi, yangdong qipian} to divert the enemy forces and distract their attention in order to achieve the goal of flank and rear flank attack.

After penetrating the terrorists' defensive position, one should take advantage of the moment when the terrorists are in shock and their deployment is in chaos to boldly and rapidly insert and divide. After dividing the enemy into several blocks, encircle the blocks one by one to isolate them into areas, hamlets, street blocks, or buildings with no

reinforcement available to them. Then concentrate all force strength to wipe out the blocks simultaneously or one after the other.

3. Pursuing and destroying enemy remnants

If the terrorists breakthrough our encirclement and escape, one should first utilize the firepower of the aviation or artillery force to annihilate the escaping terrorists. One should use multiple reconnaissance measures to grasp the directions and routes of the escapees, their number and their positions, and immediately pass on the information to the pursuing troops. One should rapidly organize all forces and deploy them three-dimensionally on the ground, in the air and on water for the pursuit. Pursue all the way until the escaping enemy are thoroughly wiped out. Under normal conditions, one should use a large portion of the forces to pursue in parallel and use a part of the forces to track down the escapees, and use a portion of the forces to pursue vertically onboard helicopters.

The *budui* and *fendui* that are conducting parallel pursuit should follow the roads on the flank and use the fastest pursuit method. They should move from the flank or the gap in between and advance to advantageous terrain on the side of or in front of the terrorists to attack them or block the escaping enemy. The pursuing troops should work in coordination with friendly forces to divide and encircle the escaping enemy.

The *budui* and *fendui* that are conducting tracking and pursuing attacks should use a combination of the fire pursuit and force pursuit method to go after the enemy closely from behind. When necessary, they should call on fire support to help block the retreat route of the terrorists. When the terrorists put up resistance from a newly captured area, the pursuing troops should take advantage of the timing when the terrorists have not established a sure footing to attack them. They should work in coordination with friendly forces to encircle and annihilate the enemy on the run. The airborne *fendui* that are conducting vertical pursuit should rapidly land from the air in front of the escaping terrorists, quickly capture advantageous terrain and control critical points to cut off the enemy's retreat route. They should work in coordination with the parallel pursuit and the tracking and pursuing *budui* and *fendui* to annihilate the escaping enemy and prevent the terrorists from slipping out of the area. Or, they should lay ambush along the corridor where the terrorists must pass through, waiting for the terrorists to come into the ambush area. They should adopt methods such as blocking from the front, cutting off the rear, and attacking the flank, and use sudden and ferocious firepower to annihilate the terrorists.

(4) Searching and eliminating all enemy remnants

Search and eliminate enemy remnants is an important step to thoroughly quell armed riots. It normally involves attacking the front and searching the rear. That is, when the troops responsible for the search and elimination mission have captured the area (target) occupied by the terrorists, the troops should immediately develop and search and eliminate the terrorists in that area (target). Or, the first echelon launches the attack, while

the second echelon or the reserve force immediately develops to search and eliminate the enemy in that area (target). One can also conduct attack and search simultaneously. That is, after the first echelon has captured the area (target) occupied by the terrorists, the first echelon immediately transitions into the search and elimination mode, whereas the follow-on echelon rapidly passes over the first echelon and goes into the enemy's depth to develop and attack in order to expand the successful outcome of the operation. The method of search and elimination should be based on force strength, terrain and characteristics of the target. One can employ the total net casting method, the dividing and sectoring method, and the "fine combing" method {整体拉网式, 分片划段式, "梳篦"式 zhengti lawangshi, fepian huaduanshi, "shubi" shi} to search and eliminate enemy remnants. If the force is large, terrain is continuous, and buildings are concentrated, use the total net casting method. Adopt an all-azimuth deployment {全方位部署 quanfangwei bushu} mode and move from the outside inward. One can use a one-line push-forward method or multiple-approach toward the core method {一线平推, 多路向心 yixian pingtui, duolu xiangxin} to apply "compressed" search to eliminate enemy remnants. If the force is small and terrain is fragmented, employ the dividing and sectoring method. That is, divide the search area into several pieces or sectors, assign missions, and define coordination and signals. Then "fine comb" each piece or sector one by one for the search and elimination operation, leaving no crevices unchecked and blind spots unturned. For areas not searched and cleared, the search and elimination *budui* should dispatch warning and survey troops to watch carefully.

All search and elimination activities should be carried out without warning. While the terrorists are unaware or unsuspected, approach the location suddenly and capture the terrorists at one go. If the terrorists escape, then one should rapidly track and pursue or kill them. During the search and elimination operation, if one encounters suspicious personnel, one should use various methods to carefully investigate to prevent any terrorists from slipping through the net.

(5) Counter guerrilla activities

When quelling armed riots, the terrorists often break up into small groups. They have the advantage of having light weapons, and are familiar with the terrain, people, and social and culture matters. They are easily mobile and are skilled in small group combat. They often carry out guerrilla warfare such as sniper attacks, sneak raids, sabotage raids, or ambushes at our forward position or rear. To address those, we must know how to apply nimble counter sniper attacks and counter assault tactics to crush the enemy's intention.

1. Counter sniper attacks

After the area occupied by the terrorists is captured by us, the terrorists often organize several sniper attack teams {狙击小组 juji xiaozu} to fire at us suddenly from concealed locations using sniper rifles, machineguns, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, or

antitank missiles, causing us greater casualties. To address that, we can employ the following fighting methods.

One method is to overcome the enemy's sniper attacks from a distance. Before sending the troops in to launch an attack, one should first use bombers, armed helicopters, and guns and artillery to apply focused strikes against targets such as buildings the enemy might seize in order to destroy the firing platforms the enemy snipers could use. During the activity, if enemy snipers are discovered, one should quickly call for support firepower to launch precision attacks at the actual location of the enemy snipers. One should make every effort to use an attack method from a distance and avoid close engagement with the enemy.

The second method is to use sniper attacks to counter sniper attacks. Place counter sniper attack teams among the offensive formation. The counter sniper attack teams are formed by the infantry firing backbone, and are equipped with advanced sniper rifles, light communications and observation equipment. They follow the movement of the offensive *fendui* closely and are responsible especially for the attack of enemy snipers. During the quelling armed riot operations in urban areas, we can deploy a part of the sniper teams on either side of the street to fight against the enemy snipers in the underground facilities and inside buildings along the street. We can also deploy part of the sniper teams on each floor of the buildings or in other constructions. They are responsible for killing terrorists inside the buildings or in the surrounding buildings. We can also deploy part of the sniper teams on the roof of buildings we just captured to fire at enemy snipers hiding on the roof or inside the buildings across the street.

The third method is to vigorously search and eliminate the enemy's snipers. During combat, we should conduct a comprehensive search and elimination of the captured area, especially the buildings in the neighborhood and leave the enemy snipers no room for activities. When the enemy's snipers are discovered, the search *fendui* should apply rigorous blocking and control of their hiding area and use all kinds of methods to capture or kill the enemy. If the terrorists use firepower to counterattack us, we can use flamethrowers to drive them out of the hiding places, and then use firepower to wipe them out.

2. Counter sneak raid

Very often, the terrorists will take advantage of opportunities when our deployment is dispersed and our alertness is lagging to launch sneak raids or sabotage raids to disrupt our activities, divert our forces, waste our effective strength, and cause us to be passive militarily and politically. To address this, we can employ the following measures.

One measure is to accomplish counter sneak raid preparations. After our force-units have captured a particular area, they should maintain a high degree of alertness, pay attention to tracking and grasping the movements of enemy remnants, checking the terrain of the surrounding area, formulating thorough counter sneak raid activities, *bushu*

dispositioning counter sneak raid operational strengths, designating counter sneak raid contingency force-units {budui}, clarifying their activity methods, coordination actions {dongzuo}, and items to pay attention to, etc. particularly the assisting counter sneak-raid activities of the aviation and the artillery forces and successfully accomplishing the various counter sneak raid activity preparations with a directed quality.

The second measure is to correctly *bushu* disposition operational strengths. In order to force-unit *bushu* disposition from being dispersed and the flanks exposed, allowing the terrorists to approach us stealthily and raid us, we should do everything possible to concentrate the *bushu* disposition of operational strengths and deploy {peizhi} them on terrain that is open, with good visibility and easy to protect. At the same time, along the approaches where the terrorists may easily get near, we should deploy ambush force in a concealed manner and set up obstacles to impede the movements of the terrorists, forming a multi-route, multi-point counter sneak raid *bushu* disposition.

The third measure is to strengthen alert and patrol. After setting up the quartering area or after capturing an area, the troops should *bushu* disposition alert forces circling around the station and important targets according to the degree of threat of the enemy. They should also strengthen patrol of the surrounding area. When conditions allow, they should also organize three-dimensional alert and patrol. In the main direction that the terrorists may infiltrate and assault and critical targets, they should set up multi-layered in-depth alert and patrol deployment. In the main direction and important sectors, they should make full use of advanced technologies such as ground reconnaissance radar and sensors to raise the effectiveness of reconnaissance and alert. They should strength communications among all alert and patrol points, to have continuous situation reporting and to form a complete protective *bushu* disposition. Once terrorist infiltration is discovered, the alert and patrol *fendui* should immediately report to the higher authority, and employ nimble activities to strike the enemy.

The fourth measure is to rapidly organize counterattack activities. When the terrorists infiltrate into our area and implement sneak raids and sabotage raids, the commander should quickly find out the force strength of the attacking terrorists, their targets and the degree of damage. The commander should command the counter sneak raid rapid reaction *budui* to launch an attack against the enemy. The commander should use the troops nearby to block and control the area under attack and cutoff the enemy's escape route. The commander should use the long-range firepower of the aviation and artillery force and apply precision attacks against the enemy and assist our counter sneak raid force-unit activities. The commander should organize a full-scale counter sneak raid, striving to totally, completely and rapidly wipe out the enemy.

3. Counter ambush

When quelling armed riots, the operational area is wide, combat lines are fuzzy, enemy threat is grave, and maneuvering on the battlefield is easily ambushed by the terrorists. To address this, we should take the following measures:

The first measure is to devise thorough counter ambush plans. Prior to force-unit maneuver, carefully formulate the counter ambush activity plan. Based on the missions and terrain of the maneuver, and the laws of terrorist element activities {huodong}, we should analyze the areas, force strengths and modes one may encounter terrorist element ambush. We should define the safeguarding-support measures such as the main activity methods, reconnaissance and firepower assisting-support, etc. for force-unit counter-ambush, as well as coordination methods. Particularly, we should specifically stipulate the preliminary course of action for handling various situations. With this as the basis during activities, and in accordance with the changing situation, flexibly apply them.

The second measure is to strengthen reconnaissance and alertness during maneuvering. When troops implement battlefield maneuvering, they should reinforce alertness at the front, in the flank and rear of the maneuver formation and strengthen reconnaissance. If the enemy threat is grave, terrain is complex and the distance of maneuvering is farther away, the higher level should dispatch armed helicopters and armored vehicles to escort them on the ground and conduct aerial reconnaissance. When passing through risky sectors, the helicopters and armored vehicles should go ahead of the troops to conduct repeated reconnaissance before the troops pass through the sector. When necessary, we should use the higher level firepower to implement fire attacks against the possible ambush positions of the terrorists.

The third measure is to launch rapid and nimble counterattacks. When encountering terrorist ambush, the commander should quickly command the escort force or the *fendui* being ambushed itself to organize defense on the spot and use firepower to strike the enemy. The commander should ask troops responsible for air cover, such as armed helicopters, to implement ferocious firepower to strike the enemy. The commander should nimbly command force-unit {budui} activities based on the outcome of the ambush.

II. Counter Surprise Attacks and Destruction...475

Counter surprise attacks and destruction can be an independent operational activity or can be composed of several operational activities of similar nature. They can also occur while quelling armed riots or during offensive operations against the terrorists' base. They normally include the following activities: preventive activities against the terrorists' surprise attacks, attacking the enemy's surprise attack and destructive activities, and rescue activities.

(1) Preventive activities against terrorist surprise attacks and destruction

After we have verified the indication or intention of a terror attack, or based on the characteristic patterns of terrorist activities, before major holidays or important events we should take the initiative to implement preventive activities against possible terrorist attacks and destruction. This can effectively deter the terrorists, prevent the inevitable, and reduce loss in lives and properties.

1. Unfold preventive *bushu* disposition

Based on the force strength, terrain, socio-cultural situations of the mission area and situations of the possible targets of terrorist attack, and the means of attack, timing, and goal of the terrorists, we should establish vigorous alert disposition, allot reasonable amount of forces, and define responsibilities and preventive measures. We should establish a *bushu* disposition that has targeted vigilant points and overall control, and is mutually supportive and provide comprehensive prevention in order to ensure security of critical targets and prompt reaction to deal with sudden outbreak situations.

With regard to protection of critical targets on the ground, we normally establish a protective deployment which consists of internal security {内卫 *neiwei*}, external security {外卫 *waiwei*} and maneuver support {机动支援 *jidong zhiyuan*}. Internal security can consist of several fixed and roaming sentry posts. During important times there can also be secret sentry posts, and the area of alert may be expanded to include posts in plain view and secret posts, fixed posts and roaming posts to assure security of the protected target. External security can consist of several roaming sentry posts, observation points or check points to prevent the terrorists from approaching the critical target. The maneuver *fendui* are normally deployed in the vicinity of the critical target, at a position that facilitates maneuvering in multiple directions. The maneuver *fendui* is ready to provide support to internal security or external security at any given moment in pursuit of and to capture the terrorists.

With regard to air protection, normally when it is discovered that the terrorists intend to use aerial vehicles to attack national or regional landmark buildings or political, economic and military targets, we should promptly organize the aviation units of the army, navy, and air force to carry out aerial patrol and alert in the air space over the critical target or area to prevent the aerial vehicles controlled by the terrorists to enter the alert airspace.

With regard to sea (water) protection, normally when it is discovered that the terrorists intend to carry out surprise attacks at sea (or over a large body of water), we should organize naval and army ships to patrol the waters at sea, in the river or lake in the vicinity of the critical target to prevent terrorist attacks.

2. Organizing patrol and checks

Patrol and checks normally involve a combination of methods including check points, observation sentry posts, and patrolling. The purpose is to monitor all aspects and check layer by layer so that the terrorists will not be able to slip through the cracks. Along the roadways, at traffic hubs and in air and sea space at or near the critical target, we should carry out day-and-night, multi-dimensional patrol so that we have total control of the flow of personnel in the area. In the airspace over the critical target or on important days, we should set up no-fly zones to ensure security of the critical target or important events. We should set up check points at main crossroads, train stations, and airfields, and

observation posts at commanding heights to rigorously check and verify the identity of personnel and vehicles in order to prevent terrorists and hazardous commodities from entering the target area. We should isolate and screen suspicious elements.

3. Reinforcing protection of critical facilities

One of the important measures to ensure safety of a critical area and target is to strengthen the protective facilities based on the characteristics of terrorist attacks. Examples of the measure include the following: Install all-time all-space monitoring and detection equipment in the vicinity of the critical target in order to monitor terrorists and detect explosives. Set up automated obstacles at the entrance of the critical target. Set up a buffer zone around the critical target and deploy a certain number of anti-riot vehicles and anti-armor weapons so that during emergencies these weapons and equipment can be used to intercept and kill the approaching terrorists.

4. Launching preemptive searches

The most aggressive and most effective measure is to take the initiative to attack in order to wipe out the terrorists before they can conduct any terror activities. Thus, first of all, the anti-terrorist operational *budui* should strengthen their relation with the intelligence element of public security, armed police, intelligence and law enforcement to establish a joint intelligence reconnaissance system. In addition, they should pay attention to and utilize the intelligence network of the masses. Through these channels, one will be able to detect the overall movements of the terrorists and achieve the goal of "knowing the enemy before the enemy acts, and taking actions before the enemy does." If it is discovered that the terrorists have infiltrated our target area and the moment is ripe, we should concentrate all our forces and launch a surprise attack at the terrorists' hiding place unexpectedly in order to crush their intention to attack and destroy us.

If it is difficult to obtain intelligence of terrorist movements, we can use the characteristic pattern of terrorists launching attacks before important holidays or important events and organize our forces to conduct full-scale check of personnel and vehicles in the critical area. At the same time, we should conduct searches of security blind spots such as underground facilities and warehouses.

(2) Attacking the terrorists' surprise attack and destruction activities

If the terrorists' surprise attacks and destruction occur in a certain area, we should use the preliminary activity course of action {xingdong yu'an} as the base and apply forces nearby, striving to promptly reach the incident site. We should quickly take control of the development of the incident to stop the terrorist activities from further expanding, and securely block and control the border area in order to reduce the risk to the minimum. Normally, we apply a part of the forces to block and control the periphery, use the main forces to conduct search and pursuit, and use the special operations and political units to

launch psychological operations. Whichever unit arrives at the scene first shall deploy first, conduct search first, and attack first to ensure time effectiveness of the operation.

1. Block the incident site

When a terrorist attack occurs, the first group of forces reaching the incident site should rapidly investigate and report the location, nature, scale, cause and result of the terrorist incident to the higher level. At the same time, they should remove and demolish inactivated explosives as fast as possible. They should block the incident site, isolate the terrorists' activity area, rigorously guard other targets that might be attacked, and prevent the terrorists from escaping or expanding the situation until the follow-on troops arrive at the scene.

When the follow-on troops arrive at the scene, based on the results of the work of on site personnel or deployment of the troops on site, they should establish a secure deployment to further block the incident site. They should investigate the nature of the incident and protect evidence. They should organize searches, [interrogate] captives, and disperse people from the threat area. When blocking the area, normally the main forces are used to encircle the area and push inward and checkpoints are established to block the road. A part of the forces are used to capture commanding heights such as high buildings in order to observe and monitor the terrorists from high points. Helicopters are used to carry out aerial patrol, and advanced reconnaissance measures are used to find out the locations of the terrorists and to monitor them closely. Electronic jamming is used to suppress different communication methods of the terrorists. A part of the forces with strong maneuver capabilities are chosen as reserve to be deployed on the periphery of the blocked area at a concealed and easy to maneuver location. They are ready to provide reinforcement to the blocking force at any direction or area at any given time, to kill the terrorists and handle any outbreak situations. By way of multi-dimensional total blocking of the terrorist activity area or area occupied by the terrorist, we can cut off all escape routes of the terrorists and control people from entering or leaving the area.

2. Search and arrest, pursue and exterminate {搜捕追歼 soubu zuijian}

When conducting search and arrest and pursue and exterminate the terrorists during the counter surprise attack operations, the area of search and arrest is small and the distance of pursuit and exterminate is short. There are great time constraints and high requirements. Thus, the *bushu* disposition and activities of search and arrest and pursuit and exterminate should be refined and carefully organized. In the area of terrorist attacks and destruction, we should establish a multi-layer net-casting search and arrest deployment. We should allot the search and arrest tasks by layer and by sector. We should move gradually from the outside to the center to search and exterminate the terrorists. The further inward, the more intense the search and extermination should be. We should emphasize and enhance support in areas where different layers meet and totally and thoroughly exterminate all terrorists.

During the terrorists' attack and destruction activities, normally the targets are dispersed and the exposure time is short. While the terrorists escape, they try to hide. Thus, the search and arrest and pursue and extermination forces must have a clear grasp of the number of terrorists, how they look, which direction they are escaping, and the time and method they escape. We should use such methods as overtaking pursuit and extermination {超越追歼 chaoyue zhuijian}, exterminating while pursuing {边追边剿 bianzhui bianjiao}, relay search and extermination {接力搜剿 jielì soujiao}, and multi-dimensional surveillance. We should strive to achieve the goal of pursuing and exterminating at one blow. The leapfrog pursuit and extermination *fendui* should ride rapid maneuver vehicles and intercept at the front of the escaping terrorists on advantageous terrain to prevent the terrorists from expanding their activities areas. When necessary, they can ambush the terrorists along their escaping route. The tracking and pursuing *fendui* should hotly pursue. If the escaping terrorists suddenly vanish on complex terrain, the tracking and pursuing *fendui* should immediately stop the pursuit and should conduct vigorous search of the surrounding targets in order to exterminate the terrorists. The tracking and pursuing *fendui* of the follow-on echelon should take over from the previous echelon from this point onward, and continue the search and pursuit and prevent the terrorists from escaping. The multi-dimensional observation and surveillance *fendui* should board the helicopters to seize high-rise buildings or outstanding terrain features to observe and monitor the terrorists while they try to escape. They should promptly report to the commander of their findings, or they can directly inform the pursuit and extermination *fendui* and create favorable conditions for the latter to implement rapid pursuit and extermination.

(3) Post-terrorist attack rescue

An effective measure to reduce the outcome of a terrorists' attack and minimize damage is to rapidly deploy the rescue forces and carry out effective rescue activities. To do this, we must use scientific methods and employ multiple forces and measures, count every second to rapidly and effectively carry out the rescue mission so that human casualties and property losses can be minimized as much as possible.

1. Rapidly deploy the rescue forces

When a terrorist attack and destruction event occurs, the commander should immediately deploy and develop the rescue forces. The commander should rationally assign missions, closely coordinate, and intensify on site emergency rescue in order to raise rescue effectiveness. Normally, the chemical defense force is used as the main force to form the decontamination team to eliminate the outcomes of the attack of NBC weapons. They perform detection and decontamination of nuclear, chemical, biological attacks and provide guidance to the decontamination work of the masses. The engineering force is used as the main force to form the ordnance disposal and engineering maintenance and repair team. They are responsible for disposal of unexploded ordnance and ensure roadways are available. The logistical and transport force is used as the main force to form the transport team, which is responsible for delivering goods and personnel to the

frontline and to the rear. The medical force is used as the main force to form the on site medical rescue team, which is responsible for emergency rescue and rear delivery of casualties in critical state. The equipment maintenance *fendui* should work in conjunction with the local technical maintenance force and be responsible for repairing damaged facilities. The fire rescue *fendui* of the armed police is the main force responsible for fire extinguishing and control.

2. Promptly investigate the situation and provide rescue

All participating specialized *fendui* such as the engineering, chemical defense, maintenance, and medical *fendui* should promptly investigate and find out personnel casualties, property losses, NBC contamination, and secondary damages to the attack area, as well as the degree of damage to the critical target. They should promptly develop rescue activities based on the principle of saving live first, helping the most critical first, assisting the most urgent first, and dealing with the simplest first.

With respect to rescuing after an explosive attack, normally the engineering force and the medical units are deployed. Personnel in the affected area are dispersed, and the area within a certain range surrounding the explosion site is blocked. Manual search, technical search, and police canine search methods are used to search the casualties and suspicious items, to clear any danger and assure the safety of the rescue personnel. Technical methods and simple and quick mechanical methods such as hoisting, propping, prying, lifting, sawing are used to rescue trapped personnel. For those trapped persons that cannot be rescued right away, ventilation ports should be created to prevent the trapped personnel from suffocating. When rescuing victims of NBC attacks, normally the chemical defense force and the medical force are utilized. They should use methods such as chemical defense reconnaissance, sample testing, washing and radiation neutralization to decontaminate and control the spread of chemical agents, provide treatment to victims, and ensure safety of the lives of the masses.

3. Take care of the aftermath, reinforce social order

Terrorists' attacks in public places often cause psychological fears and social disarray, which affect the productivity and livelihood of the people. Thus, the troops carrying out anti-terrorism missions should promptly engage in calming the people and recovering social order. To begin with, they should engage in propaganda work, calling the masses not to panic and have faith in the government and armed forces to exterminate the terrorists and safeguard citizen's lives and properties. At the same time, they should persuade the people to actively participate in the anti-terrorism struggle and work together with the armed forces. Secondly, they should obey the order of the higher authorities and implement strict curfew in the "disaster area," reinforce social order, and prevent the terrorists from attacking again. Thirdly, they should actively assist the public in the recovery effort, to engage them in production and rebuilding, and to ensure stability of people's lives and society.

III. Counter-Hostage Taking by Terrorists...480

Counter-terrorist hostage taking operations not only affect the safety of the hostages, but also the reputation of the country and its military, and affect the ability of a country to implement its national strategies. Since counter terrorist hostage taking operations impact the overall situations and have major consequences, they have extraordinary significance and are a major concern of the world and our society.

(1) Unfolding the strength *bushu* disposition

Based on the nature of the hostage taking by the terrorists, its scale, and terrain situation in the vicinity of the location seized by the terrorists, as well as the strength of our counter-hostage taking forces, we normally form units such as the periphery blocking unit, assault unit, reconnaissance unit, psychological warfare unit, and rescue unit.

The periphery blocking unit {外围封控队 *waiwei fengkong dui*} normally consists of the infantry, armored force or special operations force {特种兵 *tezhongbing*}, and electronic warfare force. Based on need, it can also be formed by the aviation force and naval shipmen. The periphery blocking unit is deployed some distance on the periphery of the location (sea area) where the hostages are being taken. The periphery blocking unit forms several blocking lines to control the hostage taking site and prevent the terrorists from escaping. It also disperses the onlookers and cuts off any contact the terrorists may have with the outside in order to create conditions for the counter terrorist hostage taking operations.

The assault unit {突击队 *tujidui*} normally consists of the special operations force and relevant professional troops. It is organized into the assault team (group), cover team (group), and reserve team (group). Based on operational needs, several sniper teams can be organized as well. The assault team (group) should consist of the most nimble *budui* or *fendui* or personnel with the best combat capabilities. It is primarily responsible for launching assaults, rescuing hostages and capturing terrorists. The cover team (group) should consist primarily of armed helicopters with precision attack capabilities and artillery or infantry *fendui*. It is responsible for seizing locations to cover the activities of the assault team (group). The reserve team (group) is formed by a part of the forces and is deployed at locations that facilitate maneuvering to handle incidental situations. The sniper groups consist of snipers, observers and liaison persons. The sniper groups take up advantageous terrain or locations that facilitate firing. They also take up several reserve sniper positions to form a multi-direction, multiple-point cross-firing deployment. The target area of each sniper group is clearly assigned and missions are clearly defined.

The reconnaissance unit {侦察队 *zhenchadui*} normally consists of military reconnaissance personnel and relevant personnel from public security and [national] security elements. Based on need, they are in disguise as different elements and try to approach the terrorists using different methods in order to have a grasp of the number,

location, weapons and activities of the terrorists. This information provides reliable intelligence support to the command personnel so that the commander will be able to devise the counter-hostage taking resolution and the troops will be able to launch effective counter-hostage taking activities.

The psychological warfare unit {攻心队 gongxindui} normally consists of the political department and relevant local forces. The psychological unit is primarily responsible for propaganda and loud speaker communication. It launches psychological offensives in an attempt to break the will of the terrorists.

The rescue unit {救护救援队 jiuhu jiuyuanhui} is mainly composed of the chemical defense force, engineering force, transport force, and medical force. The rescue unit is primarily responsible for rescuing and transporting the hostages, carrying out chemical, biological and engineering rescue, transporting material supplies, and offering medical support.

(2) Encircling and blocking the periphery

The goal of the counter terrorist hostage taking activities is to completely shut off the terrorists' contact with the outside and prevent them from escaping. The following methods are normally used: One of the methods is secret blocking. During the initial phase of a hostage-taking event, the terrorists tend to be nervous, sensitive, impulsive, and anxious, and they are highly guarded. Our intensive blocking activities may cause the terrorists to escape or harm the hostages. Thus, we may use the secret blocking method to encircle the incident site or to have plain clothes personnel to monitor their activities. This is to stabilize the terror situation, conceal our intended activities and create conditions to mount a surprise attack on the terrorists. Another method is plain view blocking. Normally, it is used when our intended activities are exposed. It may also be transitioned from secret blocking to plain view blocking. This demonstrates our firm intention to struggle with the terrorists, to coerce the terrorists, and create conditions for psychological warfare and negotiation. The third method is a combination of secret and plain view blocking. That is, if we apply deception, we can openly block a certain direction or sector in plain view, but we apply secret blocking in other directions and sectors to entice the terrorists to escape, thus achieving our goal of ambushing the terrorists and capturing and killing them.

To ensure success of our blocking activities, we can adopt the following methods: One method is targeted blocking. That means we use advantageous terrain features such as tall buildings around the hostage-taking site and traffic hubs to monitor and control the terrorists' activities. This is normally conducted secretly. Another method is overall blocking. That means we implement comprehensive encirclement to control the area occupied by the terrorists. When implementing overall blocking, we must make use of critical points in the surrounding area and the commanding height, striving to form a multi-dimensional blocking posture. At the same time, we must strengthen coordination among all blocking *fendui* to ensure that the blocking activities are rigorous and uniform.

If blocking takes place at night, the area to be blocked should be as small as possible, and the methods should include primarily warning and alert, observation, and ambush. We should make full use of the capabilities of the night vision and night aiming devices, we should enhance our surveillance of the terrorists, control of lights, and coordination and communication. We should be ready for combat at any given moment. Along the corridors, sectors and intersections where the terrorists might use as the escape route in darkness of the night, we should dispatch our ambush *fendui* to wait and exterminate them.

(3) Negotiation and psychological warfare

Negotiation and psychological warfare is an important phase and are important activities in counter-hostage taking operations. They play an important role. In light of the complex psychological and emotional reactions of the terrorists such as fate, fear of death, as well as their demand and actions, we should carefully examine the situation and aggressively engage them in negotiation and psychological offensives. We should explain our policy to them, persuade them to surrender, and rouse their deep-seated desire to live. We should aim at changing their willful attitude, swaying their will to resist, and pressuring them to release the hostages. Or, we should create in them illusions and confusions, entice them to surrender, or break their relation with fellow terrorists. Or, through negotiation, psychological work, and negotiate with the terrorists, we gain time for our troops to be fully ready for favorable opportunities to attack.

Negotiations are mental games to bargain with the terrorists and offer conditions for the release of the hostages. Regardless of the nature of the hostage taking event, during the initial phase of the operation, one must have a positive attitude to conduct negotiations, using negotiations to seek the possibility of a peaceful resolution, to slow down the pace of the event, to smooth the sharp edge of differences, and to gain time. During the negotiation, one must stick to principles but also be flexible. Through negotiations, we attain the effect of psychological warfare. Through talks and discussions we achieve the goal of dividing and disintegrating the enemy. At the same time, negotiations should be backed by strong military strength so that the terrorists will be under psychological pressure. While the negotiation is going on, we should aggressively get ready for military operations. Once the negotiation cannot achieve the expected results or if there are signs that armed struggles are inevitable, we should firmly launch decisive attacks against the terrorists, to organically combine negotiations with armed attacks. The content of the negotiation should abide by relevant laws and regulations. For example, in the "Law of Fighting Terrorism of the USSR," it is clearly specified that no negotiation shall involve personnel or weapon exchange and other issues that may threaten the lives, health, security, and food supplies of the personnel. And, no negotiation shall be conducted to meet the political demand of the terrorists.

Psychological warfare is a psychological tactic using powerful political offensives to break the will of the terrorists, to psychologically disarm their resistance so that the hostage taking event will have a peaceful resolution. The goal is to use Party and

government policies and laws to persuade the terrorists, to awaken their conscience and give up their opposing stand. At the same time, armed methods are used to win time and create conditions. Psychological warfare activities are adopted according to the attitude of the terrorists and their state of mind. Different methods and contents can be employed to target the terrorists. One method is to use reasoning to persuade. We can use policy propaganda and reasoning to make the terrorists have an understanding of what is right and wrong before they make a choice. Another method is to use emotion to persuade. We can mobilize the terrorists' families, friends, teachers and students to jointly persuade, guide and change them. We use emotion to excite the mental state of the terrorists, calling on their love for their families and friends to willingly give up resistance. A third method is using power to coerce. We use powerful armed blocking and use the might of the military to coerce. At the same time we use psychological offensives to force the terrorists to give in.

(4) Sudden raid-attacks

Sudden raid-attacks are sudden, precise, and ferocious strike activities adopted against the terrorists when negotiations and psychological offensives are not effective and the lives of the hostages are severely threatened. The goal is to instantaneously overcome the terrorists and achieve the mission of rescuing the hostages and exterminate the terrorists.

1. Approaching the target stealthily

The assault unit should take advantage of the opportunities when the terrorists are exhausted, negligent, and careless, or make use of darkness of the night, inclement weather, or results of deception or jamming to rapidly approach advantageous terrain near the target in a concealed manner. The assault unit should seize the assault departure location and get ready for the assault. At other times, the assault unit can use the disguise or infiltration method to approach the target secretly and in concealment. Or, the assault unit can launch the attack directly without seizing the assault departure location first.

2. Suddenly initiating attack

Under the cover of other *budui* or *fendui*, the assault unit should abruptly launch an attack according to the preliminary activity course of action {行动预案 *xingdong yu'an*}. The assault unit should attack the location of the terrorists, fire at the terrorists before the terrorists can fire back, and hit the enemy right on with the first round. They should instantaneously control the enemy and rescue the hostages. If the terrorists seize the hostages indoors, in the car, aircraft cabin, or boat cabin, the assault unit can first throw flare or shock rounds into the enclosed space, using the flash and loud noise as a cover to rapidly and bravely act. If several arms of the services and forces are participating in the counter-hostage taking operations, before the actions, these participants should learn the mission and method of attacking the terrorists and rescuing the hostages and casualties, the timing of the activities, coordinated actions, signals, and issues that need to pay attention to. During the operation, the various assault forces should use the preliminary

course of action as the basis and act at the precise time and coordinate closely in order to achieve the effect of the surprise attack. In a small-scale counter-hostage taking battle, the assault in disguise {化装袭击 huazhuang xiji} method can also be adopted to achieve the goal. According to the situation on site, special operations personnel can use specified identities as a cover to contact the terrorists. They can take advantage of the condition and opportunity to suddenly launch an attack while the enemy is inexpectant and overcome the terrorists instantaneously.

3. Accurate sniper attacks

The sniper groups should take advantage of denial and deception of the cover team (group) and rapidly seize the sniper positions in a concealed manner and get ready. They should also pay close attention to the activities of the terrorists. Once an opportunity for combat is available, they should follow the predetermined course of action or commander's order to fire resolutely. The method of sniping is based on the number of the terrorists, their location, and the strength of the sniper groups. The following methods can be considered: One method is to use concentrated fire on one target. That is, for the most dangerous terrorist, we should concentrate fire of several sniper groups from different directions and from multiple locations to simultaneously attack the terrorist on different parts of his torso. Another method is to fire simultaneously at several targets. Based on the number of the terrorists, their locations and the disposition of the snipers, we decide on the target of each sniper group and coordination among the groups. Then, according to the order of the commander or the prepared plan, the sniper groups simultaneously fire at several terrorist targets from different directions and locations. The third method is to set up ambush and snipe. In a situation when observation and direct firing from concealed locations are difficult, the sniper groups can hide in several directions and locations and set up ambush. As soon as the terrorists are exposed or during their transition time, the sniper groups can rapidly take up firing positions and quickly fire at the terrorists.

IV. Attacking the Terrorists' Base {yingdi 营地}³⁵...485

Attacking the base of the terrorists is an important activity to wipe out the source of terrorism. This activity directly affects the final outcomes of anti-terrorism operations and long-term security of the country. During the operation, the terrorists often rely on protective works to stubbornly resist. Our offensive troops should be prepared to fight a battle against fortifications, to fight guerrilla battles, search and confiscate battles {搜缴战 soujiaozhan}, and pursue battles. Thus, in order to attack the terrorists' base we must be fully prepared, use forces extraordinarily, and respond nimbly.

When launching an offensive against the terrorists' base, one must establish an in-depth, echelon-based, multi-dimensional and targeted offensive disposition in accordance with

³⁵ Translator's note: this term can also be translated as the "camp."

the target base's nature, area, force strength, terrain, etc. Normally, two echelons and a reserve unit are organized, and sometimes the airlanding *fendui* can also be included. Based on need, each echelon can organize the assault *zhidui* {强击支队 qiangji zhidui} or assault groups (teams) {强击群(队) qiangji qun (dui)}. They are primarily used to launch assaults against the terrorists' fortified support points. The assault *zhidui* is normally formed by an infantry battalion and is supported by part of the tank, artillery and engineering troops. The assault group (team) is formed by an infantry company and infantry platoon and is supported by part of the firearms *fendui* {火器分队 huoqi fendui}. There can also be the firing teams {火力队 huolidui} and blasting teams {爆破队 baopodui}. The firing team may be supported by part of the tanks and guns, and its primary mission is to damage or destroy the terrorists' permanent works and firepower points, kill the terrorists' effective strength, as well as support and cover the activities of other groups and teams. The blasting team is formed by part of the infantry and engineering troops. Its primary mission is to breach a lane among the enemy's obstacles and demolish the enemy's fortified targets.

(1) Capturing the peripheral area

The periphery area of the terrorists' base normally has more complex terrain and social background. The terrorists may take advantage of the terrain and construct defensive works either in plain view or secretly. They may deploy some personnel as residents or businessmen to provide warning alert and defense from the periphery and to control the corridor going into the base. In some ethnic minority areas, for a long time some of the residents have been under the influence of ethnic separatism and religious extremism promoted by the terrorists. They may become the cover of the terrorists, which is disadvantageous to our operational activities. We should rigorously block and control the periphery. At the same time, we should adopt multiple measures to strengthen our activities to eliminate the terrorists and create favorable conditions for eventual annihilation of the terrorists inside the base.

One way to do that is to strengthen political propaganda to win the support of local residents. Our military should use preliminary operations to strengthen legal and political propaganda activities among the people living inside the terrorists' base area and around the periphery in an attempt to reveal the crimes and aims of the terrorists to generate terror activities, educate the people to separate themselves from the terrorists, and leave the area controlled by the terrorists. At the same time, urge the people to actively take part in the struggle against the terrorists.

A second way is to seize critical points and create favorable conditions for future operations. If the terrorists seize advantageous terrains such as commanding heights, mountain passes or narrow passages to control the roadways leading to and from the base, we should dispatch an advanced *zhidui* or part of the forces and firepower to launch a sudden and ferocious fire assault at the terrorists who are defending the critical points in an attempt to capture the advantageous terrain and create favorable conditions for our offensives against the terrorists' main base. If the terrain and forces permit, we should use

an encircling deployment to cut off the retreat routes of the terrorists who are defending the critical points and to block reinforcement from the terrorists' base, striving to annihilate the enemy who are defending the critical points.

A third way is to clean up the terrorists in the periphery area to ensure safety of the operational activities. After our troops have captured advantageous terrain features on the periphery of the terrorists' base, we should immediately begin the clean up activities. Use a net-casting method to thoroughly eliminate the terrorists in hiding and other suspicious elements, cut off all connections between the terrorists inside the base and the outside, prevent the remnant terrorists from attacking our offensive disposition from our rear, and ensure safety of our offensive troops.

If the situation is urgent or if there is not much concern with the situation on the periphery, we could forgo the periphery operations and directly mount an offensive against the terrorists' base.

(2) Attacking critical points of the base

To attack the critical points of the terrorists' base, one can employ the storming assault { 强攻 qiang gong} or the surprise attack { 袭击 xiji} fighting method to quickly penetrate the base defense and divide, encircle and annihilate the terrorists.

If the defensive forces of the terrorists' base are stronger and defensive works are fortified, we should use the storming assault fighting method. We should fully develop our strength of having more firearms to attack the fortification, more equipment to clear the obstacles. We should use our ferocious firepower, long firing range, and high precision to destroy the terrorists' fortified works, and cover and support our storming assault *fendui* to penetrate. Normally, we use measures such as firepower and blasting power to attack and destroy the critical targets and fortified defensive works such as permanent works on either side of the critical target and firepower points. We use firepower and blasting power to cover our storming assault *fendui* to rapidly penetrate the terrorists' base, wipe out the enemy on the surface of the position, and divide, encircle and annihilate the terrorists inside the permanent works. If the defensive forces at the terrorists' base are relatively weak and the time for preparation is short, we should adopt the surprise attack fighting method. We should take advantage of the terrain and inclement weather, and use technical measures to enhance concealment and camouflage in order to rapidly and stealthily approach the terrorists' base. We should mount a surprise attack to rapidly and ferociously penetrate the enemy's defense, insert and divide, striving to annihilate the terrorists inside the base at one blow.

If the area of the base is large and the terrain is advantageous, we could implement airlanding operations. We could use the parachute drop or airlanding method to mount a surprise attack at important targets such as the terrorists' vital points and command institution in order to capture their leaders and disrupt their command. At the same time, we use the airborne operations to support offensive activities on the ground.

(3) Eliminating the enemy who are fighting stubbornly with their back to the wall

When terrorists use villages and township or small cities as the base to put up a stubborn fight, they often construct firing, protective and maneuvering works on the periphery of the residential area or inside strong buildings. Or, they may set up obstacles in streets or at road crossings where maneuvering can be carried out easily and set up sniper positions to resist our offensives. To counter these activities, we should first investigate the terrain of the residential area and defensive disposition of the terrorists, and then adopt fighting methods such as rigorous blocking, targeted penetration, dividing and encircling, and annihilating the divided enemy one by one. That is, we use heavy forces to first encircle and tightly block the residential area occupied by the terrorists to prevent them from escaping. Then, we apply targeted penetration at directions that have weak defenses or fewer residents. The goal is to disrupt the defensive disposition of the terrorists and break the enemy into isolated targets. Then we concentrate our forces and eliminate the isolated enemy groups one by one. If there are hidden tunnels or complex constructions in the residential area, we can use the multiple-approach suppression and layer-by-layer peeling fighting method {多路挤压层层剥皮 duolu jiya cengceng bopi}. That is, we press inward from the outside to seize the targets one by one until all terrorists are eliminated. If the terrorists temporarily seize the residential area, we can use the besiege disposition of encircling three sides and leaving one side unguarded {围三阙一的围攻部署 wiesan queyi de weigong bushu} in an attempt to force the terrorists to break the encirclement in order to achieve the ambush goal. One should note that if we launch attack in the residential area, we should make every effort to ensure safety of the residents and minimize collateral damages to the buildings of the residents. We should use different ways to mobilize the residents to leave the residential area within a specified time to retreat to the safety zone. We should consider safety of the residents when selecting the main penetration point and applying firepower.

Terrorists may use multi-story buildings as the backdrop to stubbornly resist. We know that multi-story buildings are better integrated and have better resistance to destruction. The terrorists may rely on a group of multi-story buildings as a fortified defense system and form a multi-dimensional firepower network. On the other hand, in order to defend large multi-story buildings, one has to set up a story-by-story defense; consequently the forces are dispersed. In addition, it is hard to coordinate and command and thus easy to be divided and encircled. To address this, we should establish a storming assault {强攻 qiangong} deployment, and adopt a method that calls for encircling first and fighting later, from the outer layer towards the inner layer, and from both the top and the bottom to seize the building story-by-story and wipe out the enemy in close combat.

When the offensive troops close in on the terrorists who have seized the large multi-story building, we normally use a small amount of forces to mount a frontal attack at the building, use a part of the forces to turn to the flanks or flank rear to encircle the building and eliminate any terrorists that are on guard, and seize adjacent buildings to form a besieged posture. After that, we use firepower to provide cover to the storming assault *fendui* {强击分队 qiangji fendui} to mount a multi-approach assault. The firing team {火

力队 huolidui} should utilize advantageous terrain features and adjacent buildings to block the doorways, windows and firing ports of the building, destroy the terrorists' mid- and lower-story firing points and periphery targets, carve out an opening on the walls of the lower story of the building, suppress the enemy on the roof top and behind covers, as well as launch blinding fire {迷盲射击 mimang sheji} against the terrorists. The blasting team {爆破队 baopodui} should rapidly remove the obstacles surrounding the building, blast an opening on the building, and destroy hidden firing points. The various assault teams {强击队 qiangjidui} should make full use of the advantageous terrain features and firepower cover to rapidly approach the building and charge into the building through doorways, windows or the openings on the wall. The fighting method against the terrorists inside the building is as follows. Normally, we first eliminate the enemy on the bottom floor, block the entrance to the basement, elevators and stairways, then adopt a fighting method that is from bottom to top, from top to bottom, or a combination of the two to eliminate the defensive enemy floor by floor. If the building is rather tall, we can adopt a top-and-down sandwiched fighting method. That is, we first use a part of the forces to enter into the building and to block the entrances of the bottom floor. These troops then work in close coordination with the storming assault *fendi* that has climbed into the building from the top floor or airlanded on the roof top to sandwich the enemy.

The terrorists may use underground construction and facilities in the cities to resist. There are a large number of underground facilities such as large pipes, tunnels, people's defensive projects, and subways. These underground facilities occupy a large area and are dispersed and well hidden. They are hard and sturdy and can be used for force-unit {budui} massing, maneuvering, defense, and storing ammunitions and supplies. We can use fighting methods such as blocking, plugging, blasting, attacking, burning, smoking, flooding, ambush, searching, and psychological offensive according to the nature of the underground facilities and the characteristics of the terrorist activities. Blocking {封锁 fengsuo} means we rigorously block the entrance, cut off any contact of the terrorists underground with other element above ground and cut off water, electricity, and gas in order to restrict the terrorists' activities and exhaust the enemy. We can then use various measures to attack the enemy, weaken their determination, break their will to fight, and then thoroughly eliminate the enemy. Plugging {堵塞 dusai} means we use a part of the forces and firepower to plug up the entrance to the underground facilities. We then organize the engineering force *fendui* to apply explosives to blast and collapse the entrance of the underground facilities, or use tanks or bulldozers to pile rubbles to block the entrances and isolate the terrorists from making any contact with the above ground. At the same time, we can effectively apply electromagnetic jamming to break the communications between the terrorists and the outside world. As a result, they will die without having us attacking them. Blasting {爆破 baopo} means we organize the blasting team and choose weak but critical locations to apply explosives in order to attain the goal of damage and destruction. Attacking {攻打 gongda} means we send several attack *fendui* along the two flanks or sides of the underground facilities to move forward alternately, gradually moving to the enemy depth and launch an attack in order to completely wipe out the defensive enemy. Flaming {喷烧 penshao} means at the terrorists' underground facilities such as their hidden administrative areas, force-unit

{budui} stations, ammunition depots we use our flame throwing *fendui* to throw flames or pour inflammable fuel or pump inflammable gas to set fire to the underground facilities in order to destroy the terrorists in these facilities as well as their weapons, ammunitions and supplies. Smoking {烟熏 yanxun} means at the terrorists' defensive tunnels or underground facilities that have poor ventilation, we first use a part of the forces to block the entrances, and then throw suffocating smokes or fire smoke rounds into the underground facilities to suffocate the terrorists or force them to escape to the surface before wiping them out. Flooding {水淹 shuiyan} means at small or medium underground facilities, we pump water into the facilities from the entrance in order to destroy the equipment, weapons and ammunitions inside the facilities and drown the terrorists. Ambush {伏击 fuji} means we intentionally leave an entrance to the underground facilities unguarded and hide a part of the forces nearby in waiting. We then send another part of the forces underground to attack the terrorists from other entrances, forcing the terrorists to escape. While they escape, we ambush them. Psychological offensives {攻心 gongxin} means we take advantage of the terrorists' psychological vulnerability when being isolated and waiting to die and use measures such as propaganda using loud speakers, broadcasting, and distributing propaganda pamphlets to put psychological pressure on the terrorists, to sway their morale and break their will to fight, cause them to collapse mentally and spiritually and lose their will to struggle, and force them to surrender.

V. Border Closure and Control {封控 fengkong}³⁶...489

Border closure and control is an important measure to prevent terrorists' assaults and ensure security and stability of the country or of a certain area. It is also an important operational activity in other anti-terrorism operations. The goal is to firmly block the terrorists outside the border or within an area before the terrorists could take actions or before they become a threat to us.

When countries or areas bordering China have terrorist activities or conflicts, we can implement border closure and control operations. We normally use forces on the ground to close border corridors and areas that personnel can easily carry out maneuvering. We use force in the air to conduct border area aerial reconnaissance and patrol and to close and control areas that are difficult to close and control by forces on the ground. We use forces such as public security and armed police to enhance port control. We use electronic warfare forces to jam communications of the terrorists within and without the border. When China or a local government organizes important events and needs to apply multi-dimensional border closure and control to the area where the events are taking place, we normally use a part of the aviation force and naval ship forces to take up aerial or sea (water) patrol, and use a part of the aviation forces, surface-to-air missile force and anti-aircraft gun forces to be responsible for air operation duties. We use the infantry and armed police and public security personnel to be responsible for periphery warning and

³⁶ Note that the Chinese characters are the same as for blocking or blockade.

alert, patrol and checking missions. We use specialized forces such as chemical defense and engineering to be responsible for inspection and removal of suspected MBC materials and in rescue missions. We use the technical reconnaissance and security forces to be responsible for the reconnaissance missions in order to have a grasp of terrorist activities in a timely manner. When applying border closure and control during a terrorist offensive, we normally use long-range firepower to block and control remote areas that are difficult to be controlled by forces on the ground. These could be uninhabited mountains and dense forests, remote roadways, mountain passes and narrow passages. If the situation is urgent and our forces cannot reach the area in time, we can first use long-range firepower to block the corridor the terrorist may use to contact the outside world or to escape. Then we use forces to form an enveloping ring on the periphery of the terrorist activities area and set up checkpoints to prevent the terrorists from slipping out of the area. We use public security and armed police to strengthen port and control. We use electronic warfare forces to jam the communications equipment of the terrorists to cut off the terrorists' contact with the outside world.

(1) Border closure and control on the ground

Ground closure and control is the primary activity of the border closure and control operations. It mainly involves the use of firepower and forces to implement effective closure and control of critical traffic corridors and critical areas along the border, using this as the basis to strengthen control of the border and ports.

Border closure and control by fire has the characteristics of rapid reaction, suddenness and poses powerful deterrence. It is normally adopted to block and control armed riot areas. Once we discover that the terrorists are organizing armed riots, we should use long-range firepower of the aviation force or the artillery force to rapidly apply fixed-point, fixed-time or irregular fire attacks at traffic hubs such as roadways, bridges and mountain passes where the terrorists may expand outward, build contacts with the outside world, or escape in order to form a targeted dense firepower area or firepower obstacles. When necessary, one can use the engineering force and the aviation force to lay land mines in critical sectors or set up obstacles in order to firmly pin the terrorists inside the rioting area.

Border closure and control by forces is a main closure and control activity on the ground and plays an important role in various types of closure and control operations. Because the objective, goal and terrain of closure and control vary, the methods are different as well. When we implement border closure and control or apply closure and control during our offensive operations against the terrorists, the closure and control troops on the ground should use rapid maneuver measures such as ground maneuvering, airlanding or paratroop to rapidly capture advantageous terrain where the terrorists may use to infiltrate into or escape from the area. The closure and control troops on the ground should establish a rigorous closure and control disposition with multiple closure and control lines. Normally we use the main forces to form the first blocking line along the outer edge to prevent the terrorists from infiltrating in or escaping out. We use a part of the

forces, supported by other forces such as the armed police, and place them behind the main forces along the corridor where the terrorists may be maneuvering to form the second blocking line. We set up checkpoints and carry out patrols along the second blocking line in order to attack the terrorists that may be infiltrating in and escaping out. We use forces such as the public security and armed police to form the third blocking line some distance behind the second blocking line or along the dividing line in the mountainous area or between cities or townships. We check the people and materials going in or out of the border or the terrorist activity area. We monitor the area, maintain societal security and safety, and attack the terrorists that may slip through. When applying closure and control to border areas where important events are taking place, we should act in accordance with the instructions of the higher level and situations related to force strength, location of closure and control and possible infiltration and attack of the terrorists. We should uniformly organize various closure and control forces and establish a multi-dimensional closure and control disposition. We should combine force control and technical inspection methods to strengthen patrol and inspection in order to ensure security of the important event.

Port control means that in light of the characteristics and patterns of terrorists importing and exporting weapons, ammunitions and equipment through customs and ports, we promptly deploy forces such as public security and armed police to strengthen patrol and alert and control of the border customs and ports in order to block the terrorists' intentions to pass through the ports and corridors through which the terrorists intent to contact the outside world. When necessary, we should also dispatch troops to reinforce the activities.

(2) Border closure and control in the air

In light of terrorists' use of civilian aircraft to strike landmark buildings in metropolitan areas and political, economic and military targets, when we apply closure and control of important event sites or important targets, we should strengthen closure and control in the air and apply vigorous aerial control.

First, we should set up no-fly zones. We should set up no-fly zones in a certain range over important targets to protect the targets. We should restrict entry of any aircraft. Those that must gain entry to the no-fly zone should apply permission from air-control organizations to be included in the daily air defense operational plan.

Secondly, we should adjust the course of civilian airlines. As far as possible, we should adjust the course of civilian airlines to areas further away from the important targets.

Thirdly, we should change the civilian departure reporting method. We should bring the civilian flight departure reporting system directly into the intelligence automatic processing system of the radar force. We should improve the computer automatic analysis and evaluation software, raise the capability of the computer-aided decision-making system, and create conditions for the commander to effectively monitor and control.

Fourthly, we should expand the power of the air control management. Whenever an aerial vehicle such as the hot air balloon, airship, glider, rotary wing, and powered parachute is taking off, it should seek permission from the air control element.

(3) Border closure and control at sea (water)

If the terrorists conduct terror activities at sea (over water) or escape by sea (water) or infiltrate into the inland, we should strengthen closure and control at sea (water). We should establish a multi-layered closure and control disposition from the coast to the coastal waters [and from the coast] to the depth.

First, we should establish the coastal warning and surveillance system. In order to prevent the terrorists from coming onshore and escape and carry out terror activities, we should establish public security, armed police, and border defense stations (posts) along the shoreline to a certain depth, as well as establish an integrated warning and surveillance system involving surveillance radars of the army and the navy, etc. At the same time, we should establish communications in order to report and inform situations promptly. We should form a unified military, police, and civilian reconnaissance and surveillance network to rigorously monitor and control all avenues by which the terrorists may come on shore.

Secondly, we should establish the reconnaissance and warning system at sea (water). We should organize various specialized technical forces, mobilize and organize different kinds of official vessels, and use all types of reconnaissance, observation and communication equipment to build a unified military-police-civilian reconnaissance and warning network. On the basis of this network, we can divide the sea area into several reconnaissance and warning zones, and deploy reconnaissance and warning forces to implement all-time all-space reconnaissance and warning. At the same time, we should carefully coordinate activities among the reconnaissance and warning forces in order to detect terrorist activities as early as possible, report the goal, method and characteristics of the terrorist activities at sea (in water), and promptly coordinate anti-terror activities among the military, police force, and civilians. Once suspicious vessels are discovered, we should promptly embark and investigate. When embarking and investigating vessels, the vessels in the surrounding area should enhance their warning and alert and be ready for combat. The personnel embarking on the suspicious vessels should be highly alert and thoroughly examine all compartments of the vessel so that no terrorists will be slipped away. With respect to foreign vessels and vessels with unknown nationalities, we should act in accordance with relevant international laws.

Thirdly, we should implement interception and search and arrest at sea (water). We should organize maneuver forces in the air and in water that can easily execute the interception and search and arrest missions. These forces should be deployed in a concealed manner in complex sea areas (water), to be ready to intercept, search and arrest terrorists. Once terrorists are discovered, they should rapidly launch an attack and jointly carry out the mission from the air and from the sea (water). They should use multiple

measures and encircle and intercept from the periphery to the center. They should cutoff the terrorists' avenue to retreat, and prevent the terrorists from escaping from the scene.

(4) Information blockade

In anti-terrorism operations, we should uniformly organize and command the electronic warfare force and local telecommunications and radio and TV broadcasting departments to jam the means of communications of the terrorists, cut off their wired and wireless communications systems and radio and TV broadcasting channels. When necessary, we should command the aviation and artillery forces to use precision guided munitions to destroy communications facilities and equipment such as the radio and TV stations and radio relay transmissions to make the terrorists deaf and blind.

VI. Anti-terrorism Special Operations...493

Anti-terrorism special operations {特种作战 tezhong zuozhan} refer to the use of special operations troops or other troops that have undergone special trainings to achieve political, diplomatic, and economic goals in anti-terrorism operations. These troops apply unique means and methods to implement irregular military activities in the depth of the terrorists' activity area. Anti-terrorism special operations occur throughout the anti-terrorism and maintaining-stability operations, and they are the “Assassin's Mace” {撒手锏 sashoujian} of our military's anti-terrorism operations. These operations include special operations reconnaissance, search and arrest in the enemy's rear, sabotage operations, using firepower to lead the way, psychological offensives, battlefield rescue, etc.

(1) Special operations reconnaissance {特种侦察 tezhong zhencha}

Special operations reconnaissance is a unique type of manual and technical intelligence reconnaissance activities implemented in the area occupied by the terrorists or where the critical targets are located. This is one of the important forms of anti-terrorism special operations. It is critical to ensure that the commander can correctly organize command and the troops can smoothly implement operational activities. The main missions include the following: Collect intelligence on the terrorists' force composition, disposition, main direction of activities and intention of activities, as well as situations such as terrain, weather, ethnicity and societal situation of the area occupied by the terrorists. Investigate and find out the command institution and leadership of the terrorists, the amount and location of their weapon and supply depots and their main firearms, and the pattern and methods of terror activities. Investigate and find out the property, precise location, and protective measures of the terrorists' important targets and configuration of the key components.

1. Maneuver reconnaissance

Maneuver reconnaissance {机动侦察 jidong zhencha}³⁷ means using aerial reconnaissance or using long-distance delivered reconnaissance forces to implement rapid and effective reconnaissance of long-distance targets. The methods of reconnaissance include the following: One method is to use aerial reconnaissance measures such as unmanned reconnaissance aerial vehicles or helicopters to implement rapid reconnaissance in the terrorists' depth or rear. Another method is to use long-distance delivered special operations reconnaissance *fendui*. The special operations reconnaissance *fendui* secretly infiltrates to the reconnaissance area to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of a certain area or target. After the mission is completed, the *fendui* moves on to another area or target, or the *fendui* quickly retreats.

2. Alternating reconnaissance

Alternating reconnaissance {交替侦察 jiaoti zhencha} means we divide the reconnaissance region, time and mission based on the nature and characteristics of the various reconnaissance forces and reconnaissance measures in order that the intelligence obtained can complement each other and verify each other. If we divide the reconnaissance mission in one reconnaissance region, we can ask the technical reconnaissance force to be mainly responsible for general search over a large area and targeted reconnaissance of important areas. We can ask the armed reconnaissance force to use the information captured by the technical reconnaissance to approach the important areas or targets, and use the observation or photography method to further verify the intelligence provided by the technical reconnaissance force and find out the precise location of the target, its nature, and intentions. This way various forces can complement each other, and errors and omissions can be prevented.

3. Surveillance reconnaissance

Surveillance reconnaissance {监控侦察 jiankong zhencha} is a reconnaissance method that applies rigorous monitoring and control of the reconnaissance target. Normally it includes fixed-point surveillance, alternating surveillance, and tracking surveillance. Fixed-point surveillance means the surveillance personnel use visual observation and technical equipment to monitor and learn the activities of the target, as well as record the information. At an appropriate time the surveillance personnel report the findings to the higher level. Alternating surveillance is used when change of battlefield targets is fast, but the forces to execute reconnaissance missions are limited or the mission range is relatively broad. We can use the surveillance plan as the basis and implement alternating surveillance of a certain mobile target in a systematic manner. Tracking surveillance uses the aerial or electronic reconnaissance method to track the enemy's target, or special operations personnel are sent to approach an important target such as the terrorists'

³⁷ Maneuver reconnaissance or mobile reconnaissance.

formation or their command institution to conduct surveillance, or the special operations personnel find ways to infiltrate the terrorists and conduct follow-on surveillance {跟随 监视 gensui jianshi} from within.

(2) Search and arrest in the enemy's rear

Search and arrest is a unique combat activity whereby concealed special operations troops perform a sudden search and arrest of an important target in the terrorists' depth or of their personnel. This is an important means to strike the leadership of the terrorists, destroy their organization and command, and shock and deter the terrorists. The main missions include the following: Capture the leaders or important personnel, search an important target, and capture valuable intelligence or equipment. Disrupt the terrorists' activity plan, break their will to fight, and crush their morale.

1. Fixed-point search and arrest

Fixed-point search and arrest means that the special operations force uses the air mobile or ground infiltration method to stealthily enter a specified area or location in the terrorists' depth in order to investigate a suspicious situation or capture their key personnel. It is an activity implemented to catch someone unaware. During the activity, one must act upon seeing the opportunity {见机行事 jianji xingshi} in accordance with the current situation and flexibly subdue the enemy, and with the momentum of not covering the ears in time for a thunderclap, achieve the goal of search and arrest. One should not hesitate to break off the combat, fight quickly and retreat rapidly. Regardless whether the mission is achieved or not, the troops should rapidly leave the site according to the set time or the instruction.

2. Tracking search and arrest

Tracking search and arrest is the activities the special operations force uses in the terrorists' depth to track the target, search and investigate its situation, and choose advantageous terrain and timing to rapidly capture or destroy the target.

3. Luring search and arrest

If the target of search is inside a well-protected location or is frequently moving from one location to another and thus is difficult to capture, we can use multiple methods to capture the enemy target at one blow. These methods include using force maneuver to create situations, using firepower to attack, or spreading false intelligence to lure and coerce the enemy target to enter the capture area we set up beforehand. When using luring search and capture, we must carefully plan and organize. We must have correct information on the characteristics of the target and know his mental state, pattern of activities, as well as the terrain in the surrounding area and protective measures. We must correctly devise a luring plan and stealthily deploy forces in the designated area of

capture, and enhance camouflage and disguise to avoid being detected. When executing the luring activities, we should use the battlefield conditions as the basis and flexibly adopt methods such as deception luring or armed luring. We could use avenues such as telephone or fax, or the command communication network to issue false orders and spread false information. Or we can use forces or firepower to strike the enemy target, lure the target to leave the place and enter our ambush area.

(3) Special operations sabotage

Special operations sabotage is a surprise attack activity by the special operations forces against the terrorists' important target or critical position. The main missions are: Sabotage the terrorists' command, communications, control and intelligence system to achieve the goal of hitting one spot and paralyzing the whole. Sabotage the terrorists' main weapons and equipment, large mobile equipment, and information technology facilities such as radio and TV broadcast station in order to weaken their combat capabilities and create psychological shock. Sabotage rear support systems such as the terrorists' weapon, supply and equipment depots, oil and fuel pipes, and electrical plants in order to paralyze the terrorists' ability to continue the operation.

1. Simultaneous sabotage of multiple targets

When sabotaging relatively isolated point targets such as the terrorists' command organ, ordnance position, and airfield, we normally use a part of the forces to clamp down or eliminate the alert forces on the periphery of the targets. At the same time we divide the main force into several assault teams. Based on the mission, we use a multiple-route, multiple-direction offensive formation to rapidly insert into the target of the mission. At the same time, we can implement multiple-point surprise attacks to destroy the critical position of the target, striving to paralyze the target in a short time and achieve the surprise effect of the sabotage.

2. Rapid maneuver sabotage {快速机动破袭 kaisu jidong poxi}

If the operational area is relatively large, the sabotage targets are numerous and the force to carry out the sabotage is small, we can use a rapid and nimble maneuver method to selectively sabotage the target. For maneuver sabotage, we normally use those personnel capable of carrying out multiple types of sabotage to form an elite combat team. After sabotaging one target, the team quickly moves on to the next target by helicopter or rapid maneuver vehicle on the ground, or they can take advantage of the terrain and stealthily walk. For maneuver sabotage, we should correctly choose the maneuver routes, methods, the sequence of the sabotage targets, and the appropriate timing. Never follow a fixed pattern so that the opponent will find it difficult to assess and take up protection.

3. Air and ground multi-dimensional sabotage

If the enemy threat is relatively high and it is difficult to use forces to sabotage, or if using forces cannot easily achieve the goal of thoroughly destroy the target, we should organize surface-to-air long-range firepower to support the sabotage *fendui* in combat, to clamp down the terrorists, and cover our sabotage activities. Or, we can use the long-range precision attack firepower to directly destroy the enemy target and achieve the sabotage goal. Or, after the sabotage *fendui* has carried out the surprise attack, we again use long-range firepower to destroy the enemy target and eliminate the tracks of the sabotage. When using multi-dimensional sabotage, we must be fully prepared and coordinate the activities of the surface-to-air firepower and the sabotage *fendui* carefully so that we avoid damage by friendly forces and avoid fighting independently.

(4) Guiding the Firepower

Guiding the firepower {火力引导 huoli yindao} is the activity the special operations force uses to guide long-range strike weaponry such as aerial vehicles, artillery and missiles to implement precision attack against the terrorists' targets in the depth. At the same time, the special operations force makes an evaluation of firing effectiveness and performs firing recalibration. The main missions include the following: Investigate and find out the precise location of important targets and the core position in the terrorists' depth in order to provide accurate intelligence to the long-range precision attack weapons. Provide firing data or guidance to the long-range precision attack weapons to launch precision attacks at the enemy's target. Use the terminal guidance method to guide the long-range precision attack weapons for precision attack. Intercept and identify the radio signals of the terrorists in the depth, determine the direction of the transmitting source and provide technical data for our electronic warfare unit to perform jamming. Investigate and find out enemy intelligence and terrain situation at the airlanding site and set up clear markings to guide the airborne force to land. And, provide alert and warning.

1. Observation and positioning, guide by data

The special operations *budui* should stealthily approach the target. At a certain distance from the target, they should use advanced observation, positioning and calculation equipment to measure the precise position of the enemy target or the frequency or frequency spectrum of the enemy's electronic equipment. Then they should transmit guidance command and provide timely error correction to the fire attack *budui* in order to guide the attack *budui* to launch precision firing.

2. Laser illumination, terminal guidance

The firepower guiding personnel should use the laser illumination device to illuminate the center of the target or critical point at a suitable location from the target of attack or from an advantageous terrain feature. The terminal guidance system of the missile

receives the echo signals of the illumination, which guide the missile to accurately attack the target.

3. Continuous surveillance, tracking guidance

Based on the requirements of the higher level or based on the movement of the target, the special operations force should conduct surveillance of the designated target of attack continuously to understand the movement of the target. The special operations force should continue to perform tracking guidance. When providing tracking guidance of a particular target, the guiding *fendui* {引导分队 yindao fendui} not only must provide accurate reconnaissance and report relevant data of the target before the attack takes place, but also conduct continuous observation and report the results of the effectiveness of the attack during the attack. After the attack, they should continue to observe any change and provide timely and continuous intelligence to the firing *budui* in a timely manner.

(5) Psychological offensive

Psychological offensives are a special type of operational activities that use methods such as propaganda and deception to attack and break up the fighting spirit of the terrorists mentally. The main mission is: Using measures such as psychological propaganda, in conjunction with anti-terrorism military attacks, political offensives, and economic battles, to disrupt the organization and command of the leaders of the terrorists, destroy the psychological equilibrium of the terrorists, break up their organization, weaken their combat capability, and win over the hearts and minds of the people in order to create advantageous conditions for the higher level's overall operations.

1. Psychological propaganda

The special operations force can stealthily slip into the area of the armed riot, secretly distribute propaganda leaflets, deliver letters, books and magazines, or drop radios, recorders, audiotapes and videotapes; or use technical means to insert into radio and TV broadcast networks, Internet, or the communication network of the terrorists. They can use these methods to spread information, rebut rumors, weaken the will of the terrorists, and win the hearts of the people. Psychological propaganda must employ different methods based on the environment or customs of the place where the target is in. To address the leadership of the terrorists, methods such as letters, telephone calls, faxes, electronic mails and voice messages can be used. To address the terrorists in general, methods such as the following can be used: distributing propaganda leaflets, photos, newspapers and magazines; dropping off radios, recorders; and breaking into their communication network, etc. To address the local residents, methods such as the following can be used: posting slogans, distributing propaganda leaflets and photos, establishing secret broadcasting stations, and inserting into local radio and TV stations, etc.

2. Psychological deterrence

In the enemy's depth, the special operations force can use different formats and methods to disseminate words about the powerful force strength of our military's anti-terrorism operations, especially how powerful our high-tech weapons and equipment are, as well as our determination to win and favorable news from the battle front in order to impose psychological threats to the terrorists. On the other hand, the special operations force can use anti-terrorism operational activities such as surprise attacks, search and arrest, and destruction to create a tense atmosphere and impose psychological pressure on the terrorists, making them panic, fearful and weary, disrupting their psychological equilibrium, breaking up their morale, and weakening their fighting capabilities.

3. Psychological deception

The special operations force can use means such as disguise to spread rumors among the local residents about our military activities in an attempt to influence the judgment and thinking of the leadership of the terrorists, causing them to hesitate or make wrong decisions. The special operations force can also use activities such as transferring forces at the enemy's forward position or in their depth, radio deception, and surprise attacks to deceive the enemy, leading the enemy into our traps and creating conditions for our operational suddenness. Psychological deception must be as close to reality as possible and fit the logical thinking of the opponent, making the opponent believe it is true or causing the opponent to confuse truth from falsehood. Only then will we be able to achieve the goal of deception.

(6) Battlefield rescue

Battlefield rescue is rescue activity the special operations force conducts in the terrorist's activity depth, using sudden assault methods or measures to rescue specified targets in difficult situations. The main mission is: Rescuing hostages, small groups of besieged targets, or personnel in dangerous situations; recapturing high-tech weapons and equipment, highly secret documents, technical materials, and advanced materials and devices taken by the terrorists.

1. Penetrate from the air, multi-dimensional rescue

If the targets to be rescued are located in the enemy's depth and are isolated, the rescue *fendui* {营救分队 yingjiu fendui} can use helicopters or transport aircraft. Under the support and cover of the aviation force and electronic warfare force, the rescue *fendui* can use the airlanding or parachute drop method to directly enter the rescue target point or advantageous terrain features nearby to rapidly eliminate the warning and alert enemy nearby and control the surrounding situation. Then they can use a part of the force to directly approach the target point and quickly carry out the rescue activities. They can use a part of the force to seize advantageous terrain features to prevent the enemy's

counterattacks and block the enemy's reinforcement. After the mission is accomplished, they should immediately retreat according to the specified method.

2. Surface infiltration, surprise attack and rescue

If the target to be rescued is closer to our forward position and the defensive gap of the terrorists is relatively large, the rescue *fendui* can use concealment and camouflage, taking advantage of inclement weather or the effect of faint movements to secretly infiltrate on the ground to the vicinity of the target of rescue to launch a surprise attack against the enemy's warning and alert *fendui* or personnel and achieve the rescue mission.

3. Denial and deception, seize the opportunity to rescue

When rescuing a terrorist besieged point or rescuing our *fendui* that is inserting or turning or in the enemy's depth, before we carry out the rescue activities, we should employ various feint and deception measures such as purposefully transferring forces, transferring firepower, and radio deception. When necessary, we should launch a storming assault at the enemy's critical point from the vicinity of the terrorist besieged point. By putting more pressure, we force the terrorists to transfer their troops and disperse their besiege force. Then, taking full advantage of the results of feint and deception and the results of the assault performed by the higher level, the rescue *fendui* should take the opportunity when the enemy is not on guard or when their force strength is weak to quickly launch an assault. The rescue *fendui* should work in conjunction with the besieged *fendui* within to breach a path to rescue the besieged *fendui*.

4. Conceal and ambush, intercept and rescue

If the terrorists are getting ready to deliver to the rear the captured hostages or seized high-tech weapons and equipment, the rescue *fendui* can set up ambush at advantageous terrain features along the corridor where the terrorists must pass through to intercept and rescue. The rescue *fendui* should correctly select the area for ambush, set up reasonable ambush deployment, and practice concealment and camouflage. At the same time, the rescue *fendui* should dispatch several observation posts to get a clear understanding of the movements of the terrorists and prevent the terrorists from changing their course. When the terrorists enter into the ambush position, the firing *fendui* should first isolate the escorting terrorists from the targets to be rescued. Then the main force should encircle the terrorists, and a part of the force should rapidly rescue the personnel or materials.

This page intentionally left blank.

Part IV: Naval Campaigns...500

Chapter 21 Overview...500

Section 1: Definition of a Naval Campaign, Classification of Naval Campaigns...500

I. Definition of a Naval Campaign...500

A naval campaign is the sum of a series of interconnected battles and support activities, conducted by a Navy campaign large formation alone, or with the coordination and cooperation of the other service arms, in order to achieve a certain strategic or campaign goal, per a unified intention and plan {*jihua*}, within a certain sea area or certain time.

This definition makes clear that the attribute of a naval campaign mainly is a campaign organized and waged by a Navy campaign large formation. Its basic connotation includes essential elements such as the naval campaign's goal, armed strengths, times, battlefields, and means.

A naval campaign is subject to the guidance of national military strategy, and subject to the restraints of naval strategy. It can be independently organized and waged, and can also be organized and waged within the composition of a joint campaign. In localized wars under high-tech conditions, a naval campaign normally is a critical component of a joint campaign; it is a major means for executing naval operational missions, and plays a major role in the struggles for strengthening national defense, resisting invasion, preserving the unity of the homeland, safeguarding territorial sovereignty, and preserving maritime rights and interests.

II. Classification of Naval Campaigns...500

Naval campaigns are a macroscopic systems concept; based on the differences in operational nature, command relationships, operational goals, and operational scale, they can be divided into different campaign types and patterns {*yangshi*}. The campaign type is the basic classification of campaigns; the campaign pattern is a further division of the campaign type.

(1) Based on operational nature, naval campaigns can be divided into offensive campaigns and defensive campaigns.

A naval offensive campaign grasps the initiative, with a choice of the campaign launch opportunity and mode, operational time, operational sea area, and operational objective, which is favorable to the campaign's suddenness. Its goals are to seize the initiative on the sea battlefield, to control a specified sea area and objective, to wipe out the enemy's effective strength, to destroy the enemy coast's major facilities, to deprive the enemy of

his freedom of sea activities or limit it, and to capture key seacoasts or islands. The main patterns of naval offensive campaign follow: naval blockade campaign; an offensive campaign against the enemy's sea forces groups; a campaign of surprise attacks on the enemy's bases, harbors, and coastal key targets; an offensive campaign in a coral island/reef area; a campaign of sabotage of sea lines; a sea-going nuclear counterattack campaign; etc.

A naval defensive campaign is one means for resisting an enemy offensive campaign. In overall terms, it is a passive position; but, based on peacetime preparations, one can develop in advance a favorable battlefield, and be rested and ready to face the fatigued enemy's attack. Its goals are to thwart the enemy's naval offensive activities, to provide cover for the security of major strategic campaign objectives, to hold coastal key areas and islands, and to strive for freedom of one's own sea activities, so as to create the conditions for changing over to a counterattack. Based on different campaign goals and campaign missions, the main patterns of a naval defensive campaign are as follows: a naval base defensive campaign, a campaign to safeguard sea lines, a naval counter-blockade campaign, etc.

(2) Based on the campaign scale, they can be divided into large-scale campaigns and small-scale campaigns.

A naval large-scale campaign is a large-scale campaign which has a decisive influence on the war's overall situation, or assumes a key role during the war. It generally employs the Navy's main force or even its entire armed strength, and is directly organized by a Navy led institution. It has features such as numerous participating strengths, an expansive battlefield space, diversity in operational methods, a fairly long duration, the interweaving of attack and defense, and greater complexity in organization of command and coordination.

A naval small-scale campaign is a relatively small-scale campaign which changes the campaign situation in a certain direction, in order to achieve a war's localized (partial) goals, and has a certain effect on the war's overall situation. It is normally organized and waged by a Navy campaign large formation along a certain sea direction. Based on the mission requirements, it can be independently waged, and can also be carried out within a joint campaign formation.

(3) Based on the campaign command relationship, naval campaigns can be divided into naval independent campaigns, or naval campaigns within joint campaigns.

A naval independent campaign is a campaign organized and waged by a Navy campaign large formation alone, or with Navy forces as primary. It is commanded by a Navy campaign commander, and its campaign basic mission is fulfilled by Navy forces.

A naval campaign within a joint campaign is a campaign waged by a Navy campaign large formation within the joint campaign composition, for the purpose of accomplishing

a naval operational mission assigned by a high level. It is characterized by subordination, firmness of goal, and complexity of command and coordination.

(4) Based on the campaign space, they can be divided into sea campaigns and littoral {binlu haiqu} campaigns.

A sea campaign normally is a campaign waged over a vast sea area far from an island or coast. Its operational activities mainly are conducted on the sea surface, below the surface, and in the airspace above those waters. Since the battlefield is the vast and boundless sea and the effects of force maneuvers are greatly enhanced, the campaign support mission is arduous, the difficulty of campaign command and coordination is high, and the requirements are stringent.

A littoral campaign is a campaign waged in a sea area bordering dry land. Its operational activities normally are conducted on the coasts and sea areas with a common land-sea border. The participating forces are numerous; besides forces for sea maneuver operations, the Navy coastal defense forces and the Marines – as well as the Army, Air Force, 2nd Artillery Corps, and People’s Armed Police Force – all can participate; geographic conditions in the area of operations are complex, and the application of forces and arms and the operational activities are somewhat affected.

Section 2: Birth and Development of the Naval Campaign...502

I. Birth of the Naval Campaign...502

Naval campaigns have gradually formed and developed in the wake of the continuous development of social productive forces, and especially that of science and technology (S&T) and naval warfare. They are a product of the development of social productivity and S&T standards to a certain stage.

In human history, the earliest naval battles were the 1210 BCE Cyprus Sea Battle and the 549 BCE Wu-Chu Sea Battle during China’s Spring and Autumn Period. However, since productivity standards in the handicrafts era were low, the navigability of the sea battle platforms – flat-bottomed oared ships – was poor, and the sea battle arms – bows and arrows and other cold-steel weapons – were simple and crude, the means of naval warfare were extremely backward, and the scale of naval warfare was greatly restricted. The main method of naval warfare was to line up the ships into a row, to rapidly row toward the enemy, and then use the hard bows to ram the flanks of the enemy ships, in order to destroy the enemy ships by these collisions, and thus to seize victory in the naval battle. A secondary method was to get close to the enemy ships, and engage in flank-to-flank combat and swashbuckling combat, so that the grappling between the combatants would determine victory or defeat in battle. After the 5th century BCE, with the continuous development of social productivity, the forms and scale of naval warfare also continuously and correspondingly developed, as evidenced by the oared-ship era’s relatively large-scale naval battles such as China’s Wu-Qi Yellow Sea Naval Battle and

the Naval Battle of Salamis between Greece and Persia. However, due to limitations in weaponry, the opposing sides very rarely conducted long-range force-unit {budui} maneuvers and evolution; the battlespace was limited to the range of what the eyes could see and ears could hear. In the mid-14th century, ships were equipped with smoothbores, and the naval warfare space began to expand; but its war tactics – other than cannon warfare – still consisted of short-range ramming warfare and flank-to-flank warfare. Operational guidance often lay in spontaneous states, and naval warfare was understood to only involve the most basic operational factors such as allocation of forces, methods of attack, and battle formations. In the 16th century, with the emergence of sailing ship fleets, cannons came into wide application in naval warfare, and gradually became the major weapon determining victory or defeat in naval warfare. By the mid-17th century, the transition from oared-ship fleets to sailing-ship fleets had basically been completed, and battle-line tactics gradually became the main tactics in naval warfare. The status of naval warfare in war had somewhat risen, and there gradually emerged sea battles independently fought for specific strategic goals. However, due to the feudal separationist rule in the politics of that time, self-sufficiency in production, and limitations on handicrafts production standards, naval battles remained the only form of naval operations at that time, almost all forces in the fleets were thrown into battle at once, and via a single battle or a few battles one could achieve naval operational goals. Naval warfare command was still based on visual observation, and was implemented via conventional signals (flags); this combined strategic command with battle command into a whole, with no intermediate-level linkup. The Industrial Revolution of the 2nd half of the 19th century propelled naval warfare into the era of steam power and hot arms. By the time of the First World War, navies had already developed to become composite services comprised of all types of service arms: surface ships, submarines, and aviation forces. The application of each new technology in naval equipment and the continuous development of all the service arms in the Navy enabled sea operational activities to center on a unified goal, and to be simultaneously or successively conducted along several different directions; the patterns of naval warfare multiplied, the scale of forces and the spatial range of sea operations expanded, capabilities for protracted operations were enhanced, and command and coordination became more and more complex. Sea operational activities – no matter whether from the viewpoint of goals, scale, or even means – clearly always exceeded the scope of sea battles. Hence, between naval wars and naval battles, there arose in response to the times a new form of naval military conflict: the naval campaign.

II. Development of Naval Campaigns...503

Naval campaign practice during the First World War did not at all immediately arouse the attention of the military theory circles of that time. Many essential elements of naval campaigns, over a very long period, only spontaneously came into existence. After World War I, the Soviet Union began to seek the Navy's best organizational authorized strength, and to prepare to realize various objective conditions of naval campaigns. In the late 1930s, in the wake of Soviet development of total campaign theory, the Soviet Navy formulated naval campaign principles, and in 1940 issued "Provisional Instructions for

Conducting Naval Campaigns,” signifying the formation of Soviet Navy campaign science.

During the Second World War, the scale of sea battles unprecedentedly expanded; naval campaign practice exhibited a previously unknown development. The opposing sides threw into battle more than 6000 ships of all types and tens of thousands of aircraft, and waged 36 fairly large-scale naval campaigns. These had an enormous influence on the course and outcome of the war. The abundant practical experience of naval campaigns drove the in-depth development of a naval campaign theory system. Naval campaign technique – in regard to the struggle for sea lines, amphibious operations, and surprise attacks, and the theory of base and harbor defense, campaign maneuvers, and the fleet’s routine battle actions – was very greatly enriched in this period.

After World War II, the rapidly advancing development of technical equipment, and the widespread application in navies of advanced technology and equipment – as represented by precision guided munitions (PGMs), nuclear power plants, and automated command and control (C2) [systems] – caused the modes of application of naval forces and the patterns of sea battles to undergo totally new changes. In particular, warfare since the 1960s – Middle East sea warfare, Indian-Pakistani sea warfare, the Falklands sea warfare, the Gulf War, Afghanistan War, and Iraq War – has further demonstrated the totally new feature of modern localized-war sea warfare. This not only infused completely new content into naval campaign theory, it simultaneously also promoted the development of naval campaign practice.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), since its founding in 1949, independently or in coordination with the [PLA] Army and [PLA] Air Force has executed more than 1200 naval operations of varying scale, and has amassed relatively abundant naval warfare experience. PLAN campaign theory is based on the general principles of Army campaign science; following upon Navy building and the course of operational training practice, as well as the beneficial experience from selective assimilation and use of foreign naval experience, via the gradual enrichment and perfection arising in the process from practice to familiarity, and in the repeat process of further practice yielding further familiarity, a complete naval campaign theory system having special characteristics had been formed by the 1980s.

Section 3: Naval Campaign Characteristics and Principles...505

I. Naval Campaign Characteristics...505

With the rapid development of S&T and the social productive forces, various high and new technologies have seen more widespread application in the military field; naval campaign forms {xingtai} are now undergoing hitherto unknown changes, and have assumed the following major development trends and characteristics.

(1) Campaign strengths' grouping for integration and versatility (multifunctionality)

In future wars, in one respect, the joint campaign will become the main campaign form {xingtai}, and a naval campaign will normally be waged within the joint campaign composition; hence, the composition of naval campaign strengths will tend toward a multi-elemental quality, and the campaign mission will be executed often with naval forces as the main body, with the support or enhancement of forces from the other service arms. In another respect, with the development of S&T, new components in the naval force structure will constantly spring up: seagoing information warfare (IW) operational units, special operations units, and psychological warfare units will see widespread application in operations. In yet another respect, naval campaigns under informationized war conditions will no longer be simple confrontations {duikang} involving a certain strength or a certain arm, but instead will be overall contests of all operational strengths and of all weapons systems. The characteristic of multi-elemental, integrated overall warfighting {duikang} in the strength structure assumed by naval campaigns will cause naval campaign strengths grouping to further emphasize integration and versatility (multifunctionality). This will require having operational elements with a variety of functions, and – based on operational requirements and changes in the battlefield situation – will require flexible grouping, to form an overall structure combining multiple functions into a whole.

(2) Battlefield spatial depth and 3-dimensionality

The continuous emergence and wide application of high-tech weaponry have caused constant improvements in naval campaign strengths' reconnaissance and surveillance capability, long-range precision strike capability, and battlefield maneuver capability, and constant expansion of the battlefield's depth. The naval-campaign battlefield space under informationized conditions not only includes the traditional surface, underwater, and air [domains], it has also expanded into new areas: space, land, and the electromagnetic, network, and psychological areas. In particular, the status of the "bipolar" battlefield will become more prominent. First, the status of the space battlefield has become more prominent. With the continuous development of space technology, space reconnaissance platforms, with their characteristic advantages, will further increase the transparency of the sea battlefield. The wide application of various kinds of space arms and space weapons will give naval conflicts their first successes in space, and will make clearer the constraints and effects of the space battlefield on the sea battlefield. Second, the status of the underwater battlefield has become more prominent. With the continuous development of underwater forces and arms, various deep-dive submarines and underwater weapons will bring into play greater effects. The expansion of the naval campaign space into new areas, and the rise in the status of the "bipolar" battlefield, without question will cause the naval campaign battlefield space to become further expansive and 3-dimensional, and to assume the features of a "great battlefield."

(3) Greater rapidity in the course and tempo of a campaign

In future naval campaigns, the wide application of high-tech weaponry, and IW and missile warfare will become the major means to subdue the enemy. Due to great enhancement in the maneuver capability of forces and firepower and in the hit accuracy and destructive power of weapons, unprecedented improvements in the operational effectiveness of the opposing sides, and the discovery of a target meaning the destruction of that target, the duration of campaigns has thus sharply shortened, and the campaign course and tempo will further accelerate. With further acceleration in the course and tempo of campaigns, the status of time factors in naval campaigns will become more prominent. In any battle, the side that cannot rapidly adopt effective measures may find it impossible to retrieve a loss. With several past operational methods which exchanged time for space, it will be difficult to reproduce the effects of former days; use of time to contend for space will become the inevitable choice in naval campaign development.

(4) Greater flexibility and diversity of campaign patterns and means

The continuous development of high-tech weaponry and its wide application on the sea battlefield are now causing naval campaign means to undergo deep changes. The essential elements for winning victory in naval warfare no longer only depend on intelligence, maneuvers, and firepower; instead, operational patterns such as IW, aerospace warfare, firepower warfare, maneuver warfare, network warfare, psychological warfare, and special warfare will simultaneously or alternately be employed, synthesizing and combining superiorities to subdue the enemy. Naval battles will no longer only be grapples between arrays and firepower counterattacks; nonlinear operations, noncontact operations, asymmetric operations, and 3-D surmounting operations will become the main war tactics in naval campaign operations. How to select the most advantageous operational patterns and means, and how to the greatest extent to create unequal conditions on the battlefield, will become the centers of gravity present in campaign guidance.

(5) Greater arduousness and complexity in campaign rear support missions

In future naval campaigns, the participating strengths will be numerous, the technical equipment complex, and the battlefield scope expansive; on top of this are sharp countermeasures, high casualty and equipment loss rates, heavy depletion of materiel, and a rapid and highly continuous campaign tempo – all of these will cause the operational activities' degree of dependence on support to be unprecedentedly increased. The magnitude of rear support capabilities and the highness of the degree of support will directly impact the realization of campaign operational (combat) effectiveness, and on the course and outcome of the operations. The prominence of the rear support status will cause it to become one of the focal points of operations; both opposing sides will spare no effort to ensure the security of their respective campaign's rear and to smoothly execute rear support, and simultaneously will also make every attempt to strike at and damage the enemy's various rear support facilities and transportation lines. Hence, naval campaign

rear support not only will have a wide range, abundant content, and stringent requirements on time effectiveness, but will also assume a tendency toward high difficulty and high intensity. These factors will thus cause the maritime support environment to constantly deteriorate, and the support missions to be more arduous and complex.

II. Principles of Naval Campaigns...507

The basic principles of naval campaigns are the norms guiding naval campaign preparations and operational activities. They are the code of conduct and the overall requirements for a naval campaign commander to correctly realize operational guidance and battlefield control, and to seize the battlefield initiative. Under high-tech conditions, organization and execution of a naval campaign should abide by the following basic principles:

(1) Full preparations

Full preparations are an important condition for obtaining initiative and victory in a naval campaign. Having superiority without preparations, the side taking up battle in haste on the spot will inevitably fall into a passive position and lose superiority. Having inferiority with preparations, quite often one can defeat an enemy with superiority but lacking preparations. In naval campaign operations under high-tech conditions, situations are complex and rapidly changing, with greater suddenness and destructiveness; only by having full preparedness can one subdue the enemy. The main content of naval campaign preparations are as follows: uninterrupted reconnaissance and intelligence collection, accurate analysis and assessment of situations, and meticulous planning and organization of the campaign; stealthy assembly of troops and conducting of battlefield preparations; highly effective conduct of political mobilization and imminent battle training; and comprehensive organization of operational support and materiel reserves. The basic requirements of operational preparations are as follows: unified-overall-planning of the overall situation, giving prominence to key points, and successfully resolving the key point issues affecting the overall situation; take into consideration starting from the most complex and most difficult situations, formulate a variety of courses of action, and have in advance many preparations {zhunbei}; scientifically employ time, and tightly grab onto all preparation work; not only must one secretly and covertly conduct preparations and prevent the enemy's disruptions, but one must also actively adopt measures to ascertain and disrupt the enemy's operational preparations.

(2) Active offensives

Naval campaigns are characterized by shifting battle lines, as well as by high maneuverability and high offensiveness of naval forces, and the unmeasured vastness of the seas, with their lack of a tenable base. Hence, naval operational goals often must be realized by offensive means, via destruction of the enemy ships and other campaign tactical targets. Active execution of offensive operations both is required for giving full

play to the characteristics of naval forces, and is an objective requirement for large-scale elimination of the enemy and effective preservation of friendly forces, and thus for seizing the battlefield initiative. Hence, during naval offensive campaigns, one should – based on the campaign goal and sea battlefield posture – flexibly employ force-strengths, cleverly apply and change the various fighting methods, fully use initiative to initiate campaign superiority, implement effective strikes against the enemy to catch him unaware, and strive for the advantage of first opportunity. During naval defensive campaigns, one should also see that the offensive spirit permeates from start to finish; via attacks with active initiative, expose the enemy's weak points and throw into chaos the enemy's disposition; and achieve the goal of a stable defense by using attack to aid defense.

(3) Concentration of strengths

Concentration of strengths is a general rule in the military. Naval campaigns on a background of high-tech localized war have a highly strategic quality and firm operational goals, require fighting a quick battle to reach a quick decision and thus realize the campaign intention as fast as possible, and even more require concentrated application of strengths to form the momentum of a heavy blow on the enemy. In particular, in the situation of weapons and equipment being in an inferior state, concentration of strengths even more is an important magic weapon for overcoming the enemy and winning victory.

In naval campaigns under informationized conditions, battlefield transparency is high, weapon lethal destructive power is great, and situations change rapidly; concentration of strengths will be faced with several new difficulties. Hence, one must take note of the following few points: the first is to lay stress on the quality of the concentration. Only by having the superiority of quality can one truly have the superior position. Concentration of strengths should be based on sea operational requirements; while ensuring sufficient numerical superiority, one should also stress concentrated application of limited high-tech, high-quality elite forces and weapons, so as to use friendly strong points to attack the enemy's shortcomings. Second is to grasp the scale of the concentration. Concentration of strengths requires paying attention to science, calculating the troops to use against the enemy, and establishing a reasonable superiority in relative strength. On the premise of ensuring superiority over the enemy, one must strive to save on troops, reduce senseless waste, and increase operational benefit. Third is to emphasize the methods of concentration. Concentration of strengths should be covertly and quickly achieved on the basis of maneuver and camouflage. One must achieve mutual integration of force strength concentration and firepower concentration, mutual integration of space concentration with time concentration, and mutual integration of pre-established concentration with mobile concentration. Simultaneously, one must be skilled at sabotaging the enemy's concentrations, and forcing the enemy into a dispersed and unfavorable posture, so as to favor our rapid attainment of superiority over the enemy.

(4) Strike the enemy's vital areas

Striking the enemy's vital areas means concentration of strengths to attack critical quality targets affecting the course and outcome of a campaign, so as to achieve the predetermined campaign goal. Naval campaign operations under high-tech conditions – due to their having the qualities of system confrontation {duikang} and overall confrontation – are good for attacking the enemy's vital areas {yaohai} and critical parts {guanjian buwei}, enabling one to rapidly paralyze the enemy's entire operational system, fundamentally alter the confrontation between the enemy strengths and ours, and achieve the operational effect of yielding twice the result with half the effort. Striking the enemy's vital areas requires achieving an organic unity of key-point force application and selection of vital areas, but the crux lies in precisely selecting the vital areas. When selecting vital areas, one cannot proceed from general and abstract concepts, but must – based on the campaign's nature and the specific conditions in all phases of the campaign, and bearing in mind the strategic and campaign overall situations – assiduously analyze the status, effects, and interrelationships of all types of enemy targets in the campaign, and find out which key links playing a supporting role in the enemy's operational system serve as vital-area targets. Key-point force application requires daring to and knowing how to concentrate and apply forces against vital area targets, comprehensive use of many kinds of strengths and means, selection of favorable opportunities for battle, adoption of the war tactics of flexible maneuvers, implementation of key-point strikes, proving effective at one stroke, and driving the development of the campaign overall situation.

(5) Concealment (stealth) and suddenness

Concealment and suddenness are critical conditions for seizing battlefield initiative and striving for gain at the first opportunity for battle. Concealed, sudden activities enable one to take the enemy by surprise, and thus to create chaos in his command and mistakes in his activities, reduce his weapon effectiveness, sharply weaken his combat power, and moreover enable one to generate intense psychological shock, which is favorable to our winning a relatively great victory at a relatively low cost. In naval operations under high-tech conditions, the tempo of strikes is extremely fast; the side which meets with a sudden strike has very little time to restore the balance and organize a counterattack. This makes the effects of suddenness in naval operations even more prominent, and the struggle to contend for suddenness will become abnormally intense. On one hand, the high-speed maneuver capability and long-range strike capability of modern naval forces have created favorable conditions for achieving suddenness; on the other hand, the use of various kinds of advanced reconnaissance technology has made it more difficult for naval forces to execute stealthy maneuvers. The technical conditions for bringing into play suddenness and limiting suddenness develop almost simultaneously in naval operations, which has caused the struggle for and creation of suddenness in naval operations to become ever more dependent on command skill. In order to strive for and create suddenness, when organizing and waging a naval campaign, one must have thorough overall-planning and full preparations; accurately understand and grasp the enemy

situation, and promptly discover and utilize the enemy's misconceptions and being unaware; strictly guard military secrets and assiduously conceal the campaign intention; make full use of modern means of camouflage and favorable climatic and geographical conditions, to ensure the concealment qualities of force strength activities; be adept at selecting time-opportunities, cleverly feint, and suddenly initiate the campaign at a time and a sea area unexpected by the enemy; and be adept in employing new weapons and new fighting methods, and suddenly strike the enemy. At the same time, one must also adopt effective being on guard measures, and realistically prevent the enemy's possible sudden raids.

(6) Flexibility and multiple stratagems

Flexibility and resourcefulness are the concentrated embodiment of command skill. If one wants to control a war, one must have resourceful and decisive command. The victory of the resourceful and decisive, and the defeat of the brave lacking resourcefulness, is a truth repeatedly verified in the practice of war. Under given material conditions, advanced military thought and its embodied stratagems are levers for accumulating and transforming operational capabilities; the more a military's forces are weakened and its equipment in an inferior state, the more one must to the maximum degree bring into play the wisdom of commanders at all levels, and transform spiritual factors into material forces, so as to create conditions for seizing victory in the campaign. In future naval campaign operations, China has the possibility of operations against a naval great power, under conditions where the enemy is strong and we are weak, on top of which are complex and rapidly changing sea battlefield conditions; these will require commanders to bring into play superb combat skills, to widely apply military strategy, and to artfully formulate clever stratagems. Being flexible means one must flexibly employ force-strengths, flexibly vary fighting methods, flexibly apply firepower, and flexibly change plans {*jihua*}. Resourcefulness means the need to discern what others cannot, to have acute insight, to be able and resourceful, to be courageous and knowledgeable, and to make decisions on the spot. Flexibility and resourcefulness are established on the basis of a comprehensive grasp of the situations, and an understanding of the peculiarities of both sides and of the natural geographic conditions in the operational sea area. They require commanders to have very good character of thinking and relatively high campaign tactical accomplishment, to fully grasp the battlefield situation, to be favorably guided by circumstances {*yinshi lidao*} in dealing with activities, and to flexibly employ force-strengths and fighting methods.

(7) Integrated-whole adjusting coordination

In future naval campaigns, the participating strengths will be numerous, the weaponry unusual, the battlefield spaces intersecting and overlapping, and the operational means multiple and diverse; only by tightly combining the various strengths participating in a campaign, comprehensively using the various operational forms and operational means, and fully bringing into play overall power, can one realize the superiority of system countermeasures and seize the battlefield initiative.

The principle of overall coordination is applicable to the operational and support activities of the Navy's various participating service arms, and also to the same activities of the Navy together with the other service arms participating in the campaign. As for the main measures for achieving overall coordination, one is unified operational thought. Commanders at all levels must comprehensively and deeply grasp the higher levels' intent, and resolutely maintain the centralized unified command of the campaign headquarters. Second is scientific conducting of force grouping. The various forces participating in operations must be scientifically grouped, based on the operational mission requirements and the features of the various forces, to strive for the maximum operational effectiveness of the entire sea operational force. Third is establishment of a rational, integrated battlefield structure, plus proper handling of the different operational areas and of the relationship between the main and secondary operational directions, to facilitate to the maximum degree the realization of the overall superiority of sea operational strengths. Fourth is the need to adopt coordinated, consistent activities. Clear and definite specification of the sequence of activities for all forces and of the methods for their mutual coordination ensures that the campaign strengths will act in coordinated, consistent fashion. Fifth is the need for comprehensive adoption of all kinds of operational modes and operational means. Soft- and hard-kill means such as missile warfare, IW, mine warfare, air raid warfare, meteorological warfare, and psychological warfare, based on the battlefield's different situations, must be comprehensively employed to form a comprehensive strike power. Sixth is close attention to the campaign's evolving situations, timely supervisory guidance and coordination of the activities among all participating forces, mandatory strict coordination of discipline, and prevention of coordinated activities from encountering interference and sabotage. In case coordinated activities undergo a departure, one must immediately perform adjustment and recovery, to ensure that the campaign system is balanced and stable.

(8) Comprehensive support

Comprehensive support in a campaign includes several categories, such as operational support, logistic support, and equipment technical support. The goal of comprehensive support is to ensure that the participating forces can smoothly execute the operational mission and maintain continued operational capability. In naval campaigns under modern high-tech conditions, the support scope is broad, the varieties are numerous, the missions are crucial, and the organization and execution are complex. Moreover, the Navy's specialized support units are small in number and limited in capabilities; the contradictions between requirements and possibilities are exceptionally prominent. To this end, one must – based on the campaign mission and battlefield situations: comprehensively plan {guihua}, unify, adjust, and allocate the campaign support strengths; lay stress on key points, and prioritize the operational requirements for the support's main direction, main forces, critical areas, and key times, avoid by all means dividing one's forces evenly, and make decentralized use of support strengths; do a good job of mobilization and requisition of regional manpower and material resources, and of organizing the coordination work; flexibly employ all types of support strengths and material sources, comprehensively use all kinds of support modes, and enable support activities via various routes to be mutually complementary and supportive, to ensure that

the campaign is smoothly conducted; and pay attention to economic use of support forces and materiel, and leave the corresponding reserve support strengths, in order to deal with suddenly emerging unexpected situations, enhance battlefield construction, and expand various kinds of operational materiel reserves, to ensure having sufficient potential. In addition, one must constantly increase the support system's self-protection capability and survivability, and adopt a variety of measures to reduce the enemy's surprise-attack effectiveness and destructiveness against the support system.

Section 4: Naval Campaign Preparations and Execution...511

I. Naval Campaign Preparations...511

Naval campaign preparations are the process for conducting campaign overall-planning and organizing by the naval campaign commander, and the basis for the activity {huodong} of the naval campaign. Its work includes materiel preparation and spiritual preparation. Of these, the most basic contents are setting of the campaign resolution, determination of the campaign *bushi* disposition, formulation of the campaign plan {*jihua*}, organization of campaign coordination, and conducting the imminent battle preparations.

(1) Setting the campaign resolution

The campaign resolution is the basis for organization and command of a campaign and the foundation for the forces' activities. Setting the campaign resolution is a decisive activity {huodong} of the campaign commander made for the operational goals and main activities, and is a central link of naval campaign command. The general procedure and main operating content in setting of the naval campaign resolution are as follows:

1. Understanding the mission, and grasping the intent

Understanding the mission means getting a clear understanding of what the high-level commanders are requiring the Navy to do, and what goals and benchmarks are to be reached. Grasping the intent means getting a clear understanding of the overall intent of the high-level commanders for the campaign's overall situation, to facilitate keeping the overall situation in mind, and planning and preparing the naval operational activities tightly centering on an operation's overall situation. Understanding the mission and grasping the intent mainly proceed from four respects: one is understanding and grasping the overall mission and overall intent of the current operation. Second is understanding and grasping the naval campaign's mission and nature, goals, and requirements. Third is understanding and grasping the status and role of a naval campaign in an operation's overall situation, as well as the campaign's interconnection with and constraints from political and diplomatic struggles. Fourth is understanding and grasping the missions of friendly forces and their relationship to the naval campaign.

2. Analyzing and assessing the situation

Analyzing and assessing the situation is the activity {huodong} of conducting comprehensive analytic study on all aspects of situations related to carrying out a naval campaign, and the activity {huodong} of obtaining conclusions. Its goal is to make clear the operational environmental factors – the enemy, friendly forces, and the sea – faced in achieving the predetermined campaign objective. The main contents for analyzing and assessing the situation and the conclusions that should be obtained are as follows. First are: the enemy navy's operational intention, task-organization and *bushu* disposition of strengths, operational capabilities and strong and weak points; the firepower warfare, electronic warfare (EW), intelligence warfare {qingbaozhan}, psychological warfare, and camouflage and deception methods and means which the enemy navy can employ; the types, quantities, and directions of high-tech arms that can be employed by the enemy navy; and the assistance and support which the enemy navy may obtain during operations. Second are: the quantities, quality, and operational capability of the PLA Navy force-strengths and arms; the capabilities of the other services' assisting force-strengths carrying out missions, and their activity {xingdong} characteristics; the state and capabilities of the PLA Navy's operational logistic support and technical support; the methods of friendly forces carrying out missions and their [methods'] relationship to naval operations; and the favorable and unfavorable factors for the PLA Navy to complete pre-determined missions, as well as problems that need to be resolved. Third are: the natural environmental characteristics such as the geographical, hydrological, meteorological, day-night light and darkness, and land areas of the operational sea areas and interrelated sea areas, and the effects they may produce on the naval operational activities of both sides; the social environment characteristics of the operational sea area; and the material and technical conditions that can be provided for exploitation, as well as the assisting operational capabilities of the masses. Fourth are: the sustainable time and developing trends of sea operations; the constraining degree of factors such as political, diplomatic, international laws and regulations, etc. on naval operational activities.

3. Hearing reports and recommendations

The naval campaign commander, in the process of considering the resolution, should hear situation reports from the headquarters and from all professional departments. As for modes, these reports can be heard in a concentrated fashion, and can also be heard individually; they can be respective reports from all the professional departments, and can also be a composite report from the Chief of Staff; they can be oral reports, and also can be written reports.

4. Forming decisions

The campaign commander – based on understanding of the mission, grasp of the intent, analysis and assessment of the situation, and hearing of reports and recommendations – should promptly form optimized decisions on the naval campaign goals and on a series of

major problems in achieving those goals, and form decisions. The main contents are as follows:

(i) Determining the campaign intention

The campaign intention is the core part of the campaign resolution, and in concentrated fashion reflects the goals and means which the campaign commander requires to be achieved. The campaign intention normally includes factors such as the campaign goals, operational objectives, main direction, and basic war fighting methods.

—Determining the campaign goals

The campaign goals are the anticipated results that must be achieved by the Navy campaign large formation in order to accomplish the mission assigned by higher levels. The basic requirements in determining the campaign goals are conformance to the high-level intent, conformance to objective reality, and having succinct and clear content. Under ordinary situations, the goals of a naval offensive campaign are to wipe out the enemy's effective strength, or seize enemy-occupied areas (objectives); the goals of a naval defensive campaign are to defend a given area (objective) and to thwart the enemy offensive's intention. In terms of a specific campaign, one should – based on the differing goals, natures, and forms – determine the corresponding campaign goals.

—Determining operational objectives

Operational objectives are the enemy's effective strength, areas, and facilities against which one must execute strikes, in order to achieve the campaign targets. A naval campaign's operational objectives mainly are the enemy navy's force formations, as well as important military facilities – naval bases, harbors, airfields, etc. In a single campaign, one normally selects one main operational objective and several secondary operational objectives. The main operational objective should have a great effect on the strategic campaign, play a supporting role in the enemy's sea operational system, be advantageous to one's own rapid achievement of the campaign goals, be appropriate to the campaign's specific conditions, and facilitate the objective of the campaign's smooth development. The secondary operational objectives are the targets against which one must execute strikes in order to complement the activities of the main operational objective. One normally selects as secondary operational objectives those objectives which are closely linked to the main operational objective or which pose the greatest or most direct threat to the main operational activities.

—Determining the main operational direction

The operational direction is the directional activities area where the campaign large formation executes missions. Selection of the operational direction is the key to forming a favorable campaign posture, and is also the main basis for a campaign large formation's division of missions and organization of campaign coordination. The main operational

direction normally is the activities area for the campaign large formation's main operational force, or the area occupied by the main operational objective. In order to concentrate the application of campaign strengths, there should only be one main operational direction in a single campaign and within the same time. The main operational direction should be: advantageous to direct, rapid achievement of the campaign goals; have a spatial range adapted to the scale of the forces thrown in and to the operational activities, and sea-area natural conditions as much as possible satisfying the features of the activities of all participating forces; and, within the composite operational radius of the main forces and the campaign command and control (C2) range, facilitate maintaining links to all other operational directions, and adapt to possible changes in the battlefield situation.

—Determining the campaign's basic fighting methods

The campaign's basic fighting methods are the main methods and forms of the various battle patterns adopted by the campaign large formation in the course of campaign execution. Their contents normally include the following: a campaign development phase; the campaign's arrangement of the various battle patterns, and the order and methods for their application; linkup and coordination among the various battle patterns; and adoption of the times, directions, sea areas, and objectives corresponding to all kinds of battles. Determination of the campaign's basic fighting methods should be based on the nature and requirements of the naval campaign mission, and should bear in mind what is advantageous to attacking the enemy's weak points and leveraging one's strong points, and what is advantageous to seizing the campaign initiative.

(2) Determining the campaign *bushi* disposition

The campaign *bushi* disposition is based on the campaign intention and the battlefield conditions, bears in mind creation of a favorable battlefield posture, and performs operational grouping and deployment {peizhi} of the campaign strengths.

1. Organized grouping for operations

A naval campaign, based on the mission, normally divides the participating force strengths into groupings – as several force strength groups and reserves. Each force strength group can be composed of an unequal-scale single service arm, or a combined formation {hecheng biandui} of all service arms. The general division of the organized grouping is as follows: main operational force strength group, advance operational force strength group, auxiliary operational force strength group, screening force strength group, support force strength group, and campaign reserves.

The campaign's main operational force strength group is the main body of the campaign *bushu* disposition, and accomplishes the campaign's main missions. It is normally composed of the main strengths participating in the campaign.

The campaign's advance operational force strength group is the force strength group within the campaign *bushu* disposition which creates the conditions for the main operational activities. Its mission is to soften the main operational objective in advance, or to hinder the enemy's main operational force strength group's activities. Force strength task organization is normally determined according to the needs-requirements for accomplishing the mission and battlefield situations.

The campaign's auxiliary operational force strength group is the force strength group within the campaign *bushu* disposition used for assisting and supporting in coordination with the main operational activities. Its missions are to complement the main operational force strength group and to conceal the operational intention so as to create conditions for the smooth development of the main operational activities. Examples include diversionary groups and feinting groups. Force strength task organization normally is determined based on the needs-requirements of the main operational force strength group and on the battlefield situation.

The campaign screening force strength group's main missions are to block the enemy surprise attacks on our campaign large formation's force strengths, to ensure that the campaign is smoothly conducted. Force strength task organization normally is determined by looking at the nature, degree, and scope of the enemy threat that may be faced by the main operational force strength group.

The campaign support force strength group's main mission is to carry out various campaign specialized support. This group is composed of corresponding support strengths.

The campaign reserves' main mission is to handle unexpected situations that may arise in the course of a campaign, and to ensure that the preassigned mission is smoothly fulfilled. They are normally task organized with rapid assault strengths.

2. Force strength deployment {peizhi}

Campaign force strength deployment is the arrangement of participating force-strengths within a certain time and space, and on the basis of the operational organized grouping, it adheres to factors such as the operational phases, the sequence of activities, the situation in the operational sea areas, the force-strength stationing conditions, and the possible activities of the enemy.

Under ordinary situations, all operational force strengths should be near their main activities' sea areas to conceal the deployment {peizhi}, the support force strengths must be allocated according to the corresponding operational force strengths, and the campaign reserves are allocated in a maneuver position convenient to support of all operational directions; long-range force strengths are allocated in depth, short-range force strengths are allocated at the forward edge, and maneuver force strengths are allocated from their original main bases and ports. The requirements of force strength deployment are being

advantageous for accomplishing predetermined missions, being advantageous for concealment and security, and being advantageous for employing maneuver and concentration.

(3) Formulating the campaign plan {*jihua*}

The campaign plan is the specific embodiment of the campaign commander's resolution, and is the basis for organizing and commanding the campaign activities. Hence, formulation of the campaign plan is a critical link in organizing and preparing the campaign, and is also one of the basic duties of the command organ.

The campaign plan includes the following: the campaign operational plan, the campaign rear support plan, and the campaign political work plan. The campaign operational plan also includes the campaign operational activities plan and the campaign operational support plan. Among these, the campaign operational activities plan is the core and main part of the campaign plan.

After the naval campaign commander sets the resolution, they should immediately instruct the Chief of Staff to take charge over formulation of the naval operational activities plan, and issue clear guidance on several major issues related to the overall situation; examples include assessment of and conclusions on the enemy situation, the basic operational resolution, operational *bushu* disposition, division of operational phases, the main objects {*duixiang*}, sea areas and time-opportunities for strikes, and predictions for the main situations in each phase, as well as [gaming-] approach {*duice*} to be adopted. The campaign operational activities plan should make clear the following: the assessment and conclusions on the enemy navy's situation; the higher-level intent and the Navy's operational missions; the operational *bushu* disposition and the methods, means, and steps for completing the pre-determined missions; relationships with friendly force-units, and mutual responsibilities; the initiation time for pre-determined operational activities and the time limit for completing preparations; anticipated situations in each phase of the campaign and activity courses of action {*xingdong fang'an*}; and content such as the organizing and modes of command, as well as measures for controlling and adjusting-coordination of force-unit activities under various situations.

After guiding his command headquarters to successfully formulate the campaign operational activity plan {*jihua*}, the naval campaign commander should also instruct the concerned organs and concerned departments to formulate the naval campaign operational support plan {*jihua*}, the campaign rear support plan, and the campaign political work plan, and provide the necessary guidance.

The basic requirements for formulating a naval campaign plan are as follows: being thorough and detailed, being clear and specific, scientific and rigorous, and allow for unforeseen situations. One must plan in detail for the basic COA, the main direction, and the current mission; the remaining reserve COAs, secondary directions, and follow-on missions can be planned in outline form {*gailüe jihua*}. The mode of formulation of a

naval campaign plan should be somewhat differentiated based on differences in the campaign nature. Under ordinary situations, an offensive campaign is planned according to the mission-fulfillment phases; defensive campaigns are planned according to the operational directions and the operational COA. Their basic forms are: sea-chart notational form, network chart form, tabular form, and written form.

(4) Organizing campaign coordination

Organization of naval campaign coordination normally is transmitted to lower levels by instructions from the naval campaign commander; the Chief of Staff organizes the headquarters and specifically plans and prepares jointly with the subordinate force-group commanders, as well as with the commanders of the service arms concerned. The basic steps in organizing naval campaign coordination are as follows:

1. Issuing the instruction for organizing campaign coordination

When the naval campaign commander is determining the campaign resolution, he should issue the instructions for organizing naval campaign coordination and determine the coordination principles and requirements.

2. Formulating the campaign coordination plan

The naval campaign command organ, based on the senior officer's resolution and the instructions for organizing naval campaign coordination formulates the naval campaign coordination plan under the leadership of the chief of staff. Its contents normally include: division of the campaign phases; the enemy's bushu disposition in each phase and possible activity scenarios {xingdong shexiang}; the missions of each force strength groupings and the activities sequence and methods; friendly force missions and methods for coordinating with them; standard criteria {jizhun} force strengths for campaign coordination or standard criteria activities; command relationships and command post locations; and relevant stipulations for adjusting-coordination and control.

3. Convening the campaign coordination meeting

With the campaign commander in charge, convene the campaign organ leadership, force strength grouping commanders and force-unit commanders of other participating services, and hold a campaign coordination meeting to make clear the campaign coordination plan and specifically study and resolve relevant issues in campaign coordination. Clarify the relevant stipulations of position and role, activities sequence and adjusting-coordination and control for the respective force-units (departments) of participating force strengths in campaign coordination.

4. Implementing simulation inspection-testing for campaign coordination

Employ command automation systems {xitong} to perform computer derivations {weiji tuiyan}, conduct chart derivations, or conduct live force exercises to inspect-test the naval campaign coordination plan, and to obtain substantiation and improvements; at the same time, familiarize participating force strengths with the naval campaign coordination plan.

5. Issuing the campaign coordination instructions

As soon as the naval campaign coordination plan is determined, it is signed by the naval campaign large formation Chief of Staff. After it is approved by the naval campaign commander, the campaign command organ immediately issues it the naval campaign coordination instructions, and makes the naval campaign coordination plan serve as an attachment to the operational plan, and sends it to all participating force strengths.

(5) Conducting imminent battle preparations

Imminent battle preparations are an important work in the campaign organizing and preparation phase, and are a prelude to campaign implementation. The content of naval campaign imminent battle preparations mainly are: battlefield preparation, campaign strength preparation, and organizing the campaign's preparatory [advance] unfolding {yuxian zhankai}.

1. Battlefield preparations

The content of battlefield imminent battle preparations includes battlefield reconnoitering {zhanchang kancha}, battlefield construction, and adding equipment {bujia shebei}.

—Battlefield reconnoitering {kancha}

Battlefield reconnoitering is conducting actual site survey {shidi diaocha} of the predetermined operational area. This is mainly ascertaining the terrain, transport, engineering, and rear facilities, the capabilities for manpower and materiel power mobilization, the situations of harbors and navigational routes, the hydrological and meteorological situations, and assessment of the advantageous and disadvantageous factors on campaign activities.

—Battlefield construction

Battlefield construction is partial (localized) reconditioning and construction performed on the basis of peacetime construction, and according to operational requirements. This mainly involves construction of the necessary observation and communications positions,

coastal defense positions, ship and aircraft stationing system, rear support bases and hangars and supply points, and coastal command posts at all levels.

—Battlefield addition of equipment

Battlefield addition of equipment means the necessary replenishment and enhancement of the original battlefield equipment, performed according to campaign mission requirements. This mainly includes the following: arranging-set up {布设 bushe} and strengthening of various obstacles; augmenting-set up {增设 zengshe} or strengthening sea navigation and channel facilities; unfolding mobile observation communication equipment and radio beacons; setting up temporary mooring and resupply points; repairing-building or modifying addition of equipment such as pipelines and communication lines.

2. Preparations of campaign strengths

The campaign strengths' organizational and preparatory work normally includes political thought preparation, force strength and weaponry preparation, and organizing imminent battle training.

—Political thought preparation

The main contents of political thought preparation are: conducting campaign political mobilization, and enhancing the sense of honor and sense of duty for force-units to complete missions; strengthening education in patriotism and revolutionary heroism, and elevating the battle-seeking sentiment and battle will of the force-units; strengthening education in the collective view and policy discipline, and elevating the force-units' awareness of joint operations, awareness of coordination, awareness of obedience, and policy standards.

—Force strength and weaponry preparation

Force strength and weaponry preparation means adjusting the organization of participating force strengths and weapons and equipment and suit them to operational requirements. First, on the basis of the campaign *bushi* disposition, differentiate and adjust participating force strengths, compose the various force strength groupings, and perfect their organizational systems {xitong}. Second is: successfully accomplish technical and materiel replenishment; improve availability rate of ships, aircraft, and other weapons and equipment; accomplish complete equipment at full strength; and be in a state of readiness.

—Organizing imminent battle training

Imminent battle training is enhancing the operational adaptability of participating force strengths and elevating the effective measures of combat power. Imminent battle training must suit [adapt to] the campaign missions and conditions, and must be conducted in a focused manner on the basis of the specific missions undertaken by each force-unit and the battlefield environment. Imminent battle training should be covertly conducted so as to avoid revealing the campaign intention and being subjected to enemy disruption.

3. Organizing the campaign's advance [preparatory] unfolding

Campaign advance unfolding is precisely commanding all participating force strengths to enter on-station to their getting underway standby sea (land) area from their original station-anchorage sea (land) area so as to prepare to initiate the campaign. Organizing the naval campaign's advance unfolding should pay attention to successfully mastering the following issues:

—The time-opportunity for advance unfolding must be appropriate. Normally one should implement unfolding when the campaign strengths have basically completed the operational preparations, and one has assessed that the enemy situation – especially the enemy situation in the main operational direction – will not have any fundamental changes.

—The position of the getting underway standby sea (land) area of readiness must be suitable. Normally one should select a sea (land) area beneficial for maneuvering towards the pre-determined operational area and beneficial for concealment and safety.

—Strive for concealment, speed and security of the activities of force strength unfolding. Normally, it is conducted utilizing the dark of night and adverse weather conditions, and maintain strict secrecy measures, as well as implement radio silence and blackouts. Carefully organize screening, guarding and various support measures. When necessary, organize feints, and create misconceptions on the enemy side.

—After the force strengths enter the standby sea (land) area, one must strictly perform camouflage, augment protection, and tightly grasp the accomplishment of the operational start-up preparations so as to not lose the time-opportunity to commit forces to combat.

II. Implementation of a Naval Campaign...519

Campaign implementation is the process wherein a naval campaign large formation fulfills campaign missions to achieve the campaign goals, according to the campaign resolution and the operational plan {jihua}, under centralized unified command.

In the naval campaign implementation phase, the campaign commander should: closely monitor the battlefield, and at all times grasp the actual situations of an operation's progress; constantly perform forecasts and maintain an initiative position with control and adjusting-coordination; rigorously supervise and guide force-units in carrying out and executing their orders; closely adjust-coordination of force-unit {budui} activities so that the at-sea force-strengths from start to finish maintain the forming of an operational center of gravity, a sharp offensive momentum, a favorable posture and an integrated-whole power; examine the time-measure the circumstances {shenshi duoshi} and at the appropriate time, modify the operational *bushu* disposition so as to accelerate the course of operations.

(1) Initiation of a campaign

The naval campaign commander should – based on the resolution and plan already set – anticipate, create, and grasp favorable opportunities, and at the proper moment launch the campaign. An offensive campaign in the initial phase is in an active status; based on the campaign plan and battlefield situation, one can autonomously determine the launch time and mode. Normally one employs the mode of an electronic attack integrated with firepower strikes, stealthily and suddenly launched, to seize a victory in the first battle. A defensive campaign in the initial phase is in a passive status; hence, one must do a good job of fully preparing, promptly discover signs of an enemy attack, adopt vigorous activities to thwart the enemy's first strike, throw into chaos his offensive disposition, and struggle for the campaign initiative.

(2) Critical-quality combat [battles]

Critical-quality combat is combat in a campaign which has a decisive battle nature, and which fulfills the main operational missions. It is of major significance for propelling a campaign's development and affecting a campaign's course and outcome. A campaign commander should pay relatively great attention, and at the necessary time even go so far as to directly organize and command the critical-quality battles in the campaign, so as to turn around the war situation or to inflict major damage on the enemy.

In organizing a critical battle, one should – based on the campaign intention, balance of strengths, and battlefield posture: promptly ascertain the situation, and create advantageous conditions; correctly select the strike targets, opportunities, and sea areas; concentrate force strength and weaponry; enhance control of the battlefield and support for operational activities; and coordinate relations with other battle activities, so that they are established on the basis of conforming to the campaign's overall situation and really having an assurance of winning a victory. In a critical battle, one should: strive for implementation according to the assigned time, sea area, and mode; resolutely achieve the assigned battle goal; and not waver due to temporary difficulties and local (partial) losses. Simultaneously, one must adopt all measures for timely blocking and overcoming the occurrence and development of unfavorable situations, and ensuring the success of the key battle.

(3) Campaign phase transitioning

Campaign phase transitioning is the process, via force strength and weaponry maneuvers, of adjusting or modifying the *bushu* disposition and achieving transition-quality changes of each campaign phase and their interlinking. Campaign phase transitioning is conducted during the course of campaign implementation and in accordance with the operational plan and the developing trends on the battlefield, and is an important key-link {zhongyao guanjie} in commanding campaign activities. The naval campaign commander should anticipate the campaign's developing trends, grasp the favorable time opportunities, and at the right time, transition the campaign phase. The time opportunity for campaign phase transitioning is normally when the previous phase's operational missions are basically completed, and the next phase's operational preparations are by and large ready; at such time, the battlefield's general posture is favorable for the next phase's operations. Hence, one should strive to smoothly complete the current phase's missions, to create desirable conditions for transitioning into the follow-on phase, and to organically interlink each campaign phase. Organization of campaign phase transitioning must be based on the campaign's developing trends, prompt adjustment of force strength *bushu* disposition, stipulated operational missions of subordinate force strengths in the follow-on phase and new coordination and support relationships; determination of the transitioning sequence for campaign activities, and prevention of disjointedness in campaign activities; and mandatory adoption of various kinds of camouflage and screening measures, ensuring the concealment and safety of phase transitioning.

(4) Use of campaign reserves

Campaign reserves are the mobile force strength groups, within the campaign composition, that are directly controlled and employed by the campaign commander; they are an important component of campaign *bushu* disposition.

Opportunities for use of campaign reserves normally are: when one enhances the strengths for main battles in order to seize a decisive victory; when victory has developed, to exploit the victory; for missions replacing force groups whose combat power has been severely weakened; when restoring or readjusting the campaign disposition; when striking against an enemy that seriously threatens the overall situation's stability, stabilizing the battlefield situation, and maintaining an active status, so as to ensure the campaign's smooth development; and when handling other unexpected situations.

Requirements on use of campaign reserves mainly include the following: concentrated application, so as to form a local (partial) superiority, and reliably fulfill a mission having decisive significance; close coordination with other forces, to form an overall power and to make full use of a favorable posture, created by other forces, to enter battle; creation of, and striving for suddenness, and, catching the enemy unawares, employment of reserves to strike at the unprepared enemy; and tight organization of support, to ensure that the reserves rapidly, stealthily, and safely execute maneuvers, and at the proper time

enter the battle. Also, once the reserves are used, one must promptly reestablish, so as to adapt to situations that may occur later.

(5) Concluding a campaign

Concluding a campaign is the operational activity of ending a campaign when one has achieved the campaign goals, or when conditions are not advantageous and require changing the operational mission, in order to preserve the initiative, consolidate the results of battle, and preserve forces. The naval campaign commander should ascertain the battlefield situation, anticipate the campaign course, correctly seize an opportunity, and at the proper time conclude the campaign, while avoiding being satisfied with the existing state of affairs or blindly taking risks. The campaign conclusion is executed after it is reported to higher levels and approved; under emergency situations, one can decisively conclude the campaign, and then report it to higher levels.

The main activities in concluding a campaign include the following: organizing tight reconnaissance, realistically grasping the battlefield situation, and close surveillance of the enemy activities' intention; timely discovery of signs of an enemy attack or counterattack, organizing strengths to execute reliable guidance and screening, and strictly guarding against enemy surprise attacks; commanding the units to rapidly, safely, and stealthily move along the assigned routes and in proper order withdraw from the battlefield; clearing the battlefield and emergency rescue; checking on, and reporting to a higher level the results of battle and the battle losses, and proposing recommendations for follow-on activities; replacing personnel losses and materiel/equipment, and repair and maintenance of weaponry; based on the high-level intent, quickly adjusting or modifying the *bushu* disposition, and forming a new advantageous posture.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 22

The Sea Force-Group Campaign to Eliminate the Enemy...523

Sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy are offensive campaigns of sea force groups, comprised of heavy surface ships at the core, to eliminate the enemy on the sea battlefield or to inflict heavy losses on the enemy. Their main missions are to wipe out or weaken the enemy's seagoing main operational strengths, to alter the balance of forces in the sea theater or within the campaign zone, to seize sea dominance in a certain sea area, and to improve the sea battlefield posture, in order to create favorable conditions for the smooth execution of follow-on campaigns.

Sea force groups mainly signify seagoing large formations or battle groups, assuming maneuver operational missions, and comprised of the Navy's medium and heavy surface ships, submarines, and shipborne aviation forces. These heavy-ship formations or battle groups have very strong offensive and defensive operational capabilities and maneuver capability, and are the main strengths for sea dominance within the naval control campaign zone and for fulfilling sea campaign missions. Hence, all naval powers attach extreme importance to construction of their own heavy-ship formations or battle groups, and employ enemy-elimination, heavy-ship formations as the main means in wartime for seizing campaign sea dominance.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...523

I. Main Characteristics...523

Sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy, besides having the general features of naval offensive campaigns, also possess the following prominent characteristics:

(1) The enemy's strong maneuver capability, and the relative difficulty of seizing a favorable opportunity for battle

The enemy sea force groups normally are comprised of medium-to-heavy ships and attack nuclear submarines. Their maneuver speed is high and active range is wide; a formation's navigation speed is generally 15-24 knots, and its 1-day maneuver range is 360-576 nautical miles. Normally, the equipment includes a variety of reconnaissance and early warning (R&EW) systems, electronic countermeasures (ECM) systems, command and control (C2) systems, and firepower systems – all with a complete range of models (types) and all having advanced performance. These systems are able to form core-ship-centered, long/medium/short multi-layered anti-air/anti-surface-ship/anti-submarine R&EW and offensive/defensive operational capabilities. The attacking side's search for and seizure of favorable opportunities for battle are relatively difficult.

(2) The sea area for enemy actions is remote, making difficult the formation of a favorable offensive posture

The enemy's sea force groups have a long R&EW range and a large control range, and normally all carry fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters, as well as medium-range ship-to-surface, ship-to-ship, and ship-to-air missiles. Hence, in the operational disposition, one normally stresses avoiding the enemy's shore-based threatening actions; in operational means, one emphasizes execution from a long range of beyond-visual-range (BVR) precision strikes against targets; and in operational posture, one stresses avoiding short-range contact, and control of personnel, rather than being constrained by personnel. When executing attacks against these enemy groups, one's forces must protractively maneuver far from the coast, and penetrate in great depth; the endless expanse of the battlefield lacks usable cover, so that activities are easily revealed; grasping the situation, and command, coordination and support, are all complex. Hence, formation of a favorable offensive posture is difficult.

(3) Confrontations are sharp, and initiative is easily shifted

In sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy, the attacking side holds the initiative to launch operations; it can fully conduct campaign preparations, and flexibly choose relatively favorable operational sea areas and opportunities. However, since operational target early-warning capabilities are strong, offensive/defensive capabilities are high, and maneuver speed is high, the attacking side, in the process of closing with the enemy, can easily meet with the enemy's counterattack and resistance. On top of this are many factors – high-tech confrontations, the great destructive power of weapons, and imbalances in activities – which cause the situation on the battlefield to change rapidly, and the initiative to very easily be shifted.

II. Basic Requirements...524

(1) Meticulous organization of the plan *{jihua}*, and enhancement of intelligence support

Sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy require assiduous analysis and study of the patterns and possible changes of the enemy's activities, getting a foothold in the most difficult and most unfavorable situations, and formulating a variety of proposals *{yu'an}*; they also require compact organization of every support activity, so that it meets the requirements of battlefield situation changes, and in particular require enhancement of surveillance intelligence support, for a real-time grasp of the battlefield situation. Since the enemy sea force-group activities' sea area is far from our shores, whether one can promptly and accurately discover the enemy force groups is the key to execution of effective strikes against the enemy. One must comprehensively employ a variety of reconnaissance strengths and means, and timely and accurately grasp the changing situation of the enemy's force groups.

(2) Simultaneous use of multiple means, and creation and seizure of opportunities for battle

In sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy, the enemy situation changes rapidly, and favorable opportunities for battle are fleeting; one must adopt multiple means, and – via methods such as maneuvers, harassment, and feints – constantly move troops, deplete and exhaust the enemy, and cause the enemy to reveal his weak links in as many places as possible. Once a favorable opportunity for battle appears or is about to appear, one must resolutely make up one's mind, and immediately act.

(3) Correct selection of strike targets, times, and sea areas

In sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy, one should – based on a full grasp of the situation – determine the strike's targets, times, and sea areas. The strike's targets should be determined based on several factors: the high-level intent, the role played by those targets in the campaign's overall situation, and our strike capability and support capability. Normally, one should select the main ships in the enemy formations as the targets for key-point strikes. The strike times and sea areas should be based on the situation of the enemy's possible maneuvers, and keep in mind times and sea areas unimaginable by the enemy to execute against him unexpected surprise attacks, which make it difficult for the enemy to organize effective resistance, and thus wipe out the enemy in one fell swoop.

(4) Use of elite strengths, and doing all one can to prove effective in one stroke

The enemy sea force groups' weaponry is excellent, their operational patterns change rapidly, and they can timely obtain naval air support. In order to ensure the success of a strike, when executing it, one must concentrate application of elite strengths – high-performance strike aviation forces, and submarines equipped with long-range torpedoes (missiles) – to form a localized (partial) superiority, to execute a multi-directional, multi-layer concentrated strike, and to do all one can so that the main strike proves effective in one stroke.

(5) Laying emphasis on integration of offense and defense, and reduction of losses as much as possible

In sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy, the opposing sides always strive – via energetic offensive activities – to seize the initiative. The side which attacks at the first opportunity may immediately encounter a strong counterattack, and the defending side can also have the possibility to very rapidly shift into an offense. Hence, when organizing an attack, one must actively adopt tight defensive measures, prevent the enemy from striking before we strike, and also prevent his follow-on counterattacks. At the same time, one must enhance assistance, screening, and support for the strike forces. Also, one must make every effort to seize victory with the least possible losses.

Section 2: Main Activities...525

I. Executing Campaign Unfolding...525

Campaign unfolding is an activity that begins with basic force-strength unfolding, and lasts until the basic forces reach the sea area(s) for executing their mission.

Sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy normally are based on the specified main-strike time, and use the time for the campaign's low-speed forces to execute a strike as the benchmark for conducting unfolding. All of the force groups should – based on their assumed missions, the times and order in which they are thrown into battle, and via thorough campaign tactical computations – determine the times for their execution of unfolding, so as to create conditions favorable to enveloping or outflanking the enemy, and to form a favorable posture for attacks on the enemy. In order to enable the campaign unfolding to smoothly proceed, one must organize reliable guidance, screening, and information support; organize air and sea feints; actively conduct a fight with the enemy's reconnaissance; implement strict electromagnetic silence and blackouts; and enhance camouflage and protection. In order to support the unfolding activities of the main strike force groups, the auxiliary strike force groups should promptly execute strikes against the enemy force groups which can impede the activities of the main strike forces.

II. Implementing the Advance Assaults...526

The goal of the advance strikes is to weaken the enemy force groups' combat capability so as to create favorable conditions for the main strike. The objectives of the advance strikes are as follows: one is to directly attack the core ships in the enemy formations to reduce their overall capability; a second is to strike against the warning forces within the [enemy] sea force groups to weaken the enemy formations' protection capabilities; and the third is to strike at the enemy's command and communications facilities and support forces to sabotage the enemy's command and to isolate the enemy formations. The method for the advance strikes normally is small force-group harassment. Using constant, uninterrupted harassment, one weakens, paralyzes, and wears out the enemy, and disorders the enemy's operational tempo and disposition, in order to create the conditions for the main strike.

III. Implementing the Main Assault...526

The main strike is the tensest, and most complex, most important activity in the campaign. Its mission is to destroy the enemy's main targets. In order to ensure the success of the main strike, one must comprehensively grasp the situation, judge the hour and size up the situation, and correctly select an advantageous strike opportunity and strike modes. Strike modes are of two kinds: concentrated strike and successive strikes. When using the successive strikes mode, if the enemy has already entered the submarine forces' strike position, then one should use the submarine forces in the first strike; while

if the enemy is situated near the submarine forces' strike position, the submarines for a time cannot strike, so one can then employ aviation forces for the first strike; surface ships able to view the situation will develop a victory after the strikes by submarine and aviation forces. For a concentrated strike, one should avoid simultaneous selection of multiple main targets, so as not to disperse one's troops and firepower. Since the enemy's defensive capability is strong and his means of resistance numerous, one should as much as possible adopt a multi-directional multi-layer concentrated strike. To ensure that the main strike succeeds, one must enhance coordination and support. A campaign commander, when organizing coordination and support, must at the proper time dispatch interception forces in the directions where the enemy can effect support, and must block that support; he must within a specified time seize and maintain sea superiority and electromagnetic superiority in the theater, and sabotage and jam the enemy's C2 system; they must accurately guide their forces into an attack position; he must suppress the resistance of the enemy's early-warning screening forces to ensure that the main strike's activities are smoothly conducted; he must implement uninterrupted surveillance over the battlefield, grasp the operational course, timely handle the situation, and coordinate the activities in all directions; and he must seize opportunities and directions for use of the campaign reserves, at the right time enhance the strike strengths, and strive to ensure that the main strike is effective in one stroke.

IV. Developing the Victory...527

After the main strike, the campaign commander should immediately ascertain the strike's results and analyze the posture. When the enemy's core ships have suffered damage, their operational capability is reduced, and the campaign circumstances {zhanyi xingshi} are advantageous to us, one should decisively throw in the follow-on forces to execute a second strike, and make every effort to wipe out the enemy; and when the enemy's core ships are destroyed, the circumstances are favorable and moreover one's forces allow it, one should organize forces to conduct strikes against the enemy's early-warning screening ships so as to expand the results of the battle to the maximum extent and develop the victory.

V. Concluding the Campaign...527

When the campaign goal has been achieved, or when the situation undergoes a sharp change so that a continued operation will fall into an unfavorable position, the campaign commander should at a suitable time make the decision to conclude the campaign, issue the orders to withdraw the forces, and command the participating forces to transfer or to return to base.

Withdrawal of forces should be conducted in step-by-step fashion. First, [one should] withdraw the feinting forces and those forces situated in a salient and possibly exposed to a threat; after this, [one should] withdraw the main force. During the withdrawal process, besides requiring that each force enhance its own self-defense, at the necessary time one

should dispatch covering forces to ensure safety; also, one must organize strengths to rescue the damaged ships and to land their personnel.

The withdrawn forces according to plan {*jihua*} should be dispersively allocated or redeployed, forces rapidly made up to full strength and readjusted, ammunition and materiel/equipment replenished, damaged ships and weaponry repaired on a rush basis, and a deadline set for recovery of operational capability. Conclusion of a campaign should be concealed and sudden to make it difficult for the enemy to judge our intention.

Chapter 23

The Sea-Line Interdiction Campaign...528

Sea lines are the navigational system for organizing and implementing sea transport. They are a complete system comprised of loading harbors, unloading harbors, transport ships, and their routes. Campaigns to interdict sea lines are sea offensive campaigns to block and interdict the enemy's seagoing military and economic transport. Their main missions are to interdict the enemy's sea transport and to weaken his military and economic strengths and war potential.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...528

I. Main Characteristics...528

(1) A long duration

Sea-line interdiction campaigns normally are fairly long in duration. The main reasons follow: one is that the enemy's sea transport has a certain sustained quality (continuousness). That is, the enemy, in terms of a single, specified sea crossing, generally requires going through multiple links – loading, assembly of ships into formations, the sea crossing, and unloading; however, sea transport generally involves a relatively long voyage and a limited formation navigational speed, and fulfillment of a mission often requires a specified duration. A second is that the enemy, in order to safeguard the security of the sea lines, will adopt different transport modes and escort modes, and at times will even be able to seize localized sea superiority, so that we will be unable to achieve the campaign goal via the activities of one or two strikes. A third is that a sea-line interdiction campaign normally acts as a joint campaign's sub-campaign implementation, coordinated with other campaign activities on land or at sea. This requires that a sea-line interdiction campaign must begin before other campaigns, and conclude after other campaigns; it permeates a joint campaign from start to finish.

(2) An expansive space

Sea-line interdiction campaigns have an expansive battlefield space. In one respect, enemy sea lines generally are fairly long; sea-line interdiction campaigns often conduct sabotage-raid operations along the enemy's transport lines, and against the enemy's unloading harbors, transport ships, and transport-navigation sea areas. These campaigns have fairly great flexibility and mobility, with fluid battle lines, and operational activities that must be launched over an expansive sea area. In another respect, the enemy can simultaneously possess many sea lines, spread over individual sea areas, and with a wide distribution range. Thus, in terms of any one sea line, in order to defend against sabotage raids, one quite often can make relatively large-scale readjustments, thus causing a sea-line interdiction campaign to normally require being waged over an expansive sea area. From the viewpoint of a sea-line interdiction campaign's requirements, the interdiction

activities may involve the littoral and the high seas, and sometimes also require strikes against targets such as the enemy's loading/unloading harbors and escort vessels, as well as coastal air fields and observation and communications stations. These subjective and objective conditions all cause a sea-line interdiction campaign's operational space to be relatively expansive.

(3) Constraints from the enemy's transport activities and sea-line guarding activities

Sea-line interdiction campaigns serve as naval offensive campaigns, and in overall terms hold the initiative; but in specific operational activities, they are subject to fairly large constraints from the enemy's transport activities and sea-line guarding activities. In one respect, the enemy's organization of transport activities has a certain autonomy {zizhuquan}, so that the beginning and duration of a sea-line interdiction campaign depend on, and are constrained by, the enemy's transport activities. In another respect, the enemy in order to safeguard his sea transport activities will spare no effort to choose sea areas and routes advantageous to them, so that our operational sea areas are fairly greatly limited to the enemy's transport routes. Moreover, the enemy can adopt different modes of transport activities: he can transport in dispersed, sustained fashion, and also can transport in discontinuous, concentrated fashion; he can adopt a sea-area screening mode, and can also adopt an accompanying escort mode; he can weaken our sea-line interdiction capability by offensive activities which strike first to gain the initiative, but can also draw in and pin down our sea-line interdiction forces along other directions. Hence, sea-line interdiction campaign activities are subject to fairly heavy constraining effects of the enemy's transport and sea-line guarding activities.

II. Basic Requirements...529

(1) Timely and comprehensive grasp of the situation

Sea-line interdiction campaigns are faced with expansive sea battlefields and rapidly changing enemy situations. If one wants to promptly seize a favorable opportunity for battle, one must first have a timely and comprehensive grasp of the battlefield situation. To this end, one must carefully organize campaign reconnaissance, and accurately ascertain the enemy's transport intention. Based on the battlefield posture and on the basic situations of the enemy's loading and unloading ports, transport ships, and escort forces, one analyzes the enemy's transport intention, the basic flow direction and flow amount of materiel, and judges possible changes in the enemy's transport organization and defense, in order to lay the foundation for making the correct decisions. In addition, the enemy, to safeguard his transport ships, can adopt deception and feinting measures, so as to avoid attacks. The campaign commander must – based on the viewpoint of the enemy's sea-line guarding operation and on the intelligence data acquired by one's own reconnaissance – conduct a comprehensive analysis, to facilitate from within the changing conditions the prediction of the campaign's development, and to adopt the corresponding countermeasures.

(2) Give prominence to the main sea area and direction

Sea-line interdiction campaigns have an expansive space; in order to effectively apply forces, one give prominence to the campaign's main sea area and main direction. Based on the campaign's specific situations, the main operational sea area can be one among several sea lines, can be a certain loading/unloading harbor, and also can be a certain strait channel. Each sea area often also has several directions, and multiple sea lines coexisting; one must distinguish between main and secondary, and grasp that main direction. The campaign's main direction must be toward the enemy sea-line transport's dense points, towards the vital areas, and towards the weak points. Based on the operational sea area's size and features, it can be one section of an enemy sea line, or can be one of several sea lines; it can be a loading harbor or an unloading harbor, and can also be a sea-route intersection point, a certain strait channel, or ship assembly point.

(3) Focused application of campaign strengths

Since campaigns have a long duration and an expansive battlefield space, a campaign commander when organizing and implementing a sea-line interdiction campaign must – based on requirements of the campaign's overall situation – apply forces in planned *{jihua}*, focused fashion, so as to ensure the requirements of the main direction, key times, and sustained use of troops. When planning the use of forces, one must not only do a good job of detailed planning for current-phase use of forces, but also roughly arrange the follow-on phases' use of forces, and prevent the occurrence of the problems of excessive depletion of earlier-stage forces and of insufficient later-stage forces for use. While assuming responsibility for the campaign's overall situation, one must simultaneously grasp the campaign's key phases and times, and use troops in a focused way, so as to seize a victory in the campaign. When the campaign has several directions, with several sea lines coexisting, a campaign commander must be skilled at distinguishing the primary [thrust] from among numerous and very complex circumstances, and tightly grasp that main direction. One must firmly and unswervingly concentrate the main forces in the main direction, organically integrate the main direction's key-point strikes with widespread harassment along the secondary direction, and use some forces in the secondary direction's sabotage-raid operation coordinated with the main direction's operation.

(4) Correct selection of the main strike's targets

In a sea-line interdiction campaign, the strike targets one can choose are as follows: transport ships, loading and unloading harbors, intermediate harbors, and stevedoring and navigation-aid facilities, as well as sea-line guarding forces. Among these, the main-strike targets normally are transport ships and loading/unloading harbors. Transport ships are the effective strengths tasked with sea transport; they constantly eliminate the enemy's transport ships, and can cause the enemy sea-line transport vehicle links to suffer ruptures, and thus to lose or have reduced transport capability. Loading/unloading harbors are hubs for sea transport; they are the assembly and dispersal points for the

means of transport and for materiel and personnel. Raids against and blockades of enemy loading/unloading harbors will in general make it difficult for the enemy to promptly recover, and will cause relatively great damage to the enemy's entire sea transport system, with significant results. At the same time, since the locations of harbors are fixed, raids and blockades will also facilitate our grasp of the situation and organization and implementation of operational activities.

(5) Flexible use of operational methods

The process of a sea-line interdiction campaign is the process of engaging in a sharp confrontation – over a vast tempo-spatial range – with the enemy's sea-traffic activities and with their protective activities. Based on the specific circumstances, methods for correctly and flexibly choosing combat are the basic conditions for achieving victory in a sea-line interdiction operation. In a sea-line interdiction campaign, one must – in view of differences in situations, such as the scale and mode(s) of the enemy's sea traffic, means for defensive screening, and passage times and regions – correspondingly apply different forces and different arms, strike means, maneuver methods, and command modes; one must integrate underwater, surface, and air assaults; one must integrate attacks at sea with attacks against the coast; one must integrate large-scale concentrated strikes, blockades, and widespread harassment; and one must thoroughly organize reconnaissance support, so as to promptly discover changes in the enemy's actions and correspondingly adjust one's own operational method.

(6) Thorough organization of command and coordination

In order to ensure the smooth fulfillment of the sea-line interdiction mission, one must thoroughly organize the campaign's command and coordination. First, one must establish an authoritative, highly effective campaign command institution: to facilitate in general terms the overall planning for grasping the campaign's overall situation; to decide upon the major activities, such as the campaign's launch and conclusion, and the transitioning between the campaign's various phases; to coordinate the coordinated actions among the various force groups; and to assure the use of the campaign reserves. Next, one must flexibly employ command modes. When executing concentrated sea-line interdiction, one must implement a high degree of centralized command, with the campaign command posts directly commanding the operational activities of the main sea-line interdiction force groups. When conducting systematic sea-line interdiction, one can adopt the delegated {weituoshi} command mode, and transfer the operational principles and requirements to the various participating force groups or to a single ship, while only specifying their respective operational ranges, with the specific operational activities directed by the individual groups or ship. When executing zoned sea-line interdiction, the campaign command posts are mainly responsible for ensuring coordination and cooperation of operational activities among the different directions. The command mission for the specific operational activities along each different direction can be assumed by the command post in a specially established direction. Next, one must thoroughly organize the coordination. Coordination among the activities of all forces in a

sea-line interdiction campaign is organized by the sea-line interdiction campaign commander. The main coordination content is to organize and coordinate well the mutual coordination among sabotage-raid activities, screening activities, and support activities. Coordination among a sea-line interdiction campaign and other campaigns is organized by higher levels. The sea-line interdiction campaign commander should strictly follow the coordination stipulations, and actively handle well the relationship with the other associated campaigns. They must take note of and exploit a favorable posture created by the associated campaigns to conduct the sea-line interdiction campaign, and also must take note of creating favorable conditions for the development of the other associated campaigns. The coordination method for a sea-line interdiction campaign normally is based on the differences in the campaign's basic plays, and involves flexible adoption of the methods of partitioning the time, partitioning the sea area, partitioning the mission, and partitioning the direction, to implement the organization.

Section 2: Main Activities...532

I. Campaign Unfolding...532

The launch of a sea-line interdiction campaign normally is conducted under the condition of an accurate grasp of the enemy's sea transport activities. When the reconnaissance forces find enemy transport ships loading at a dock or in a staging-area formation, the campaign commander then should promptly command all of the strike forces to execute the launch of the campaign. All of the force groups and formations immediately and according to plan *{jihua}* depart from their holding areas or stationing areas, and enter into their operational positions.

When the original mooring area is fairly far from the operational sea area, one generally first conducts an advance launch by commanding all of the forces to enter into and be stationed in their respective departure holding areas. Submarine forces normally stealthily launch from holding areas near the operational sea areas. Surface-ship forces normally launch from frontier islands or havens (docks and harbors) fairly close to the operational sea areas. Strike aviation forces normally launch from airfields in depth toward frontier airfields. Mobile shore-guided forces normally launch from relatively protruding seacoasts and capes. After these, at the proper time, one commands all forces to enter their respective tactical launch sea areas.

In order to avoid disclosing the campaign intention, a campaign launch requires striving for concealment, speed, and timeliness, plus adoption of measures such as feints and electronic countermeasures (ECM). The campaign commander must enhance the cover (screening) for the sea-line interdiction forces, ably organize various kinds of defense, and also prevent the occurrence of severe losses from the enemy striking first. Launch requires having many kinds of proposals, so as to adapt to changes in specific conditions, and ensure the timeliness of the launch. Under the necessary circumstances, one should also organize campaign feints to attract and scatter the enemy's attention, and do all one can to see that the campaign's launch has a sudden quality.

II. Raids On, and Blockades of the Enemy's Loading/Unloading Harbors...532

When one discovers that the enemy transport ships are conducting concentrated loading/unloading in a harbor, the campaign commander should – based on the requirements and possibilities of campaign development – according to plan *{jihua}* organize strike forces to execute a raid against and blockade of the enemy loading/unloading harbor.

Enemy harbor defensive systems generally are always tight. Hence, for a raid on an enemy loading/unloading harbor, one should concentrate strengths to form a relatively large superiority; and one must adopt a variety of measures to implement concealment, and do all one can to achieve suddenness in the raid. When the enemy is simultaneously conducting loading/unloading dispersed over several harbors, one should concentrate the main forces in a raid on a key harbor among those harbors, while using some forces to raid the other harbors. In executing raids on enemy harbors, one should take the in-harbor loading/unloading facilities, materiel depots, and ships as the main strike targets.

The main strike strengths for a raid on an enemy loading/unloading harbor are strike aviation forces and attack submarines. While the aviation forces are raiding the enemy loading/unloading harbor, one normally first employs some forces to suppress and damage the enemy's air-defense radar system; simultaneously, one uses some forces to execute auxiliary strikes against the enemy airfields and reconnaissance and observation systems which can impede the activities of one's own main strike forces, and later concentrates the main forces to strike at the enemy docks, loading/unloading facilities, and transport ships. The submarine forces, normally simultaneously with the aviation forces' raids, will charge into the enemy's harbor area to execute an underwater attack and to conduct offensive mine-laying at the enemy harbor's entry and exit channels, and blockade the enemy harbor.

III. Raids on the Enemy's Transport-Escort Units...533

Raids on the enemy's transport-escort units require ascertaining various circumstances – the enemy transport's opportunity to commence, transport routes, transport mode, and screening mode, as well as the composition of the transport-escort units – so as to facilitate adoption of the corresponding measures.

After reconnaissance forces discover the enemy's transport-escort units, the campaign commander should organize reconnaissance forces to: conduct continuous tracking reconnaissance and surveillance of the transport escorts; promptly command strike forces, under information guidance, to execute strikes against the enemy escort formations, and weaken the defensive capabilities of the enemy formations; and then concentrate the main forces to launch the main strikes on the enemy's transport-escort units. In order to increase the operational effects, the various ship formations and force groups tasked with the main strike mission should effect coordination strictly according to the specified sea areas and the time and sequence of the strikes, and restrain the enemy

with the integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli}. In order to expand the main strikes' effects, the campaign commander may command the campaign reserves to be thrown into battle.

During the process of strikes on the enemy's transport-escort units, to prevent their entry into third-party territorial waters or hiding in intermediate harbors, one should organize a small force group to conduct mobile mine-laying along possible maneuver routes of the enemy's transport-escort units. To ensure the safety of the campaign's main strike forces, one should organize fighter aviation forces to seize air superiority in the main operational sea areas, and enhance sea-air screening and support.

IV. Concluding the Campaign...534

After the strike forces have fulfilled the sea-line interdiction campaign's assigned missions, or when fairly large changes in the enemy situation have occurred in the campaign execution process, and when reliance on use of campaign reserves proves difficult to turn around the war situation, the campaign commander should command the participating force strengths to conclude the campaign in planned {jihua} fashion.

When concluding a campaign under the conditions of having fulfilled the campaign mission and achieved the campaign goals, the campaign commander normally should command all of the force strength groups to conduct the withdrawal – according to plan {jihua} and in ordered fashion – and to return to their designated base ports. In order to prevent the enemy's raids and retaliation, the campaign commander should ably organize screening, rescue, and other types of support for the withdrawing forces. All force groups should enhance their vigilance, and especially should do a good job of preparations to defend against enemy raids.

When the campaign's conclusion is forced under unfavorable conditions, the campaign commander should organize seizure of partial (localized) air superiority, and command the campaign reserves to be thrown into battle, to screen and support all of the force groups' ordered withdrawal from the battle, and to prevent great losses suffered from the enemy's retaliatory raids.

After [all] forces have returned to their bases, one should promptly conduct replenishment of their materiel, reorganization of personnel, and equipment repairs/maintenance, to rapidly return the forces to combat power, so that they can execute new missions.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 24

The Offensive Campaign against Coral Island Reefs...535

Offensive campaigns against coral island reefs consist of having the naval forces take the lead and, with the assistive cooperation from the other branches of the service and service arms as well as from maritime civilians {海上人民 haishang renmin}, carry out an offensive campaign against coral island reef areas {珊瑚岛礁区 shanghu dao jiaoqu} that are far removed from the mainland shore {远离陆岸}. The main mission of offensive campaigns against coral island reefs consists of: serving to drive offensive activities; recapturing enemy-occupied island reefs; improving the state of the military on coral island reef areas; protecting the national sovereignty; and upholding oceanic rights and interests.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...535

I. Main Characteristics...535

(1) Complex operational environments and highly policy-oriented nature

Coral island reef areas are commonly located in the center of international maritime channels {国际海上航道 guoji haishang hangdao} where the interests of politics and reason are mutually intermingled, thereby creating an environment of extreme complexity that the campaign is faced with, and creating campaign guidance and activities that are highly policy-oriented and are highly tactically-oriented. Thus, organizing the implementation of offensive campaigns against coral island reefs necessitates the rigorous execution of the associated policies and laws {政策和法规 zhengce he fagui}; [the implementation] is subordinate to and serves the needs of national political- and diplomatic struggles and averts or decreases unnecessary international disputes and international incidents to the extent possible. In this way, the smooth implementation of the campaign can be guaranteed and so that the predetermined campaign goals can be achieved.

(2) Battlefields are far removed from the mainland shore; and command, cover and support are difficult

Coral island reef areas are far removed from the mainland shore and campaign strengths must elongate their maneuver operations forward {前伸机动作战 qian-shen jidong zuozhan} bringing about a series of disadvantageous effects on organizing the implementation of the campaign. The first [of these] is that it inconveniences the organization of command; the second is that organizing the implementation of campaign cover {战役掩护 zhanyi yanhu} is more difficult, particularly with regard to air cover;

and the third is that the transport distances are remote [requiring] a long duration of time {周期长 zhouqi chang}, and making the campaign logistics- and equipment support missions arduous and complex.

(3) The natural conditions on the battlefield are complex, bearing formidably on the operational activities

The weather in the coral island reef areas is damp and hot; there are blowing winds all throughout the year with even more forceful winds at times; island reefs are scattered through the sea as are stars in the sky; and the formations that rise out of the seabed are complicated. In addition, the area of the island reefs is narrow and small; the topography is indented and sunken; and reefs twist and circle in all directions. Such a complex natural environment can have enormous implications for campaign operational activities. These [implications] primarily manifest themselves as: multiple areas of dangerous navigation, limited leeway for maneuvering and restricted movement for the forces aboard the vessels; difficulty for the landing implements {登陆工具 denglu gongju} and landing forces {登陆兵 denglu bing} to ascend the reef; narrow reef width; the absence of reliable access; greater difficulty in organizing defenses; fierce struggle between seizing and occupying and preventing seizure and occupation; and aspects of [these same] facets that can emerge again and again as a point of contention.

II. Basic Requirements...536

(1) Careful planning and full preparations

In offensive campaigns against coral island reefs, it is essential to insert strengths delivered from long distances, and because of the complexity of the operational environment and the many factors of uncertainty {不确定因素多 buqueding yinsu duo}, only when there are full preparations can it be possible to gain a campaign victory. The preparation work for offensive campaigns against coral island reefs involves myriad aspects and has various components {内容繁多 neirong fanduo}, necessitating that they be carried out first in whole and then by each key point. Based on the operational characteristics, the environment and the factors, it is necessary to first of all: carefully organize the overall planning of the campaign {筹划战役 chouhua zhanyi}; correctly determine the campaign intention {战役企图 zhanyi qitu}, the campaign disposition {战役布势 zhanyi bushi}, the operational targets {作战目标 zuozhan mubiao} and the fundamental fighting methods {基本战法 jiben zhanfa}; and conceal the concentration of forces {集结兵力 jijie bingli} and conduct focused prewar training {临战训练 linzhan xunlian}. It is then necessary to start out from the situation of the greatest difficulty and the most complexity, and from there strengthen reconnaissance, leadership {引导 yindao}, logistics organization and material stores {物资储备 wuzi chubei}. Campaign preparations must be thorough and carried out covertly; necessitating not only the prevention of destruction by the enemy, but also positive actions to destroy enemy preparations.

(2) Unified planning and close coordination

With regard to offensive campaigns against coral island reefs, the battlefield is far removed from the mainland shore, there are many types of combat-participating forces, and there are multiple patterns of operational activities, thus necessitating the implementation of centralized, unified command and the organization of close coordination {周密协同 zhoumi xietong}. In order to conform to the requirements of offensive campaigns against coral island reefs, it is essential to: establish a highly-effective campaign seaborne forward command post {战役海上前进指挥所 zhanyi haishang qianjin zhihuisuo}; implement integration between “shore” and “sea;” and make the “sea” into the lead over command modes {指挥方式 zhihui fangshi}. It is essential to: accurately estimate how each of the objective conditions {客观条件 keguan tiaojian} will influence the operational activities; carefully organize campaign coordination; accurately calculate the times and speeds of the predetermined operational course; give the lead to the force groupings {兵力集团 bingli jituan} that are accomplishing the main operational mission and the main operational phase {主要作战阶段 zhuyao zuozhan jieduan}; and clarify and stipulate the concrete missions {具体任务 juti renwu} and activity patterns {行动程式 xingdong chengshi} for the various forces as well as methods for them to contact and recognize each other.

(3) Organizing reliable support

Implementing offensive campaigns against coral island reefs necessitates keeping their characteristics in view. In addition to the requirements placed on the operational activities by the special operational environment, [offensive campaigns against coral island reefs requires] the close organization of the various items of campaign support. It is particularly essential to focus on organizing such kinds of support as successful intelligence and reconnaissance, signals, hydrology and meteorology, protection, rescue and lifesaving, and the like. It is essential to synthesize the use of the various means of reconnaissance, and establish a perfected intelligence and reconnaissance architecture {情报侦察体系 qingbao zhencha tixi} in order to provide real-time intelligence {实时情报 shishi qingbao} for campaign operational activities. Furthermore, it is essential to: synthesize the use of multiple signals connectivity measures; establish a single organic vessel-, aircraft-, island- and shore signals network body; hold in reserve signals troops as well as a specified quantity of spare signals materials parts; and safeguard the speed, accuracy, secrecy and continuity of campaign communications. Additionally, it is essential to: promptly and accurately carry out hydrological and meteorological forecasting; establish improved navigational guidance systems {航海导航系统 hanghai daohang xitong}; and safeguard the secure navigation and mobility of ships. And lastly, it is essential to: employ support that mutually integrates accompanying support on the sea with regional support; flesh out an aid [structure], on a backbone of specialized defensive aid, that mutually integrates self-aid with mutual aid and specialized defensive aid; decrease losses; and maintain and renew the combat effectiveness {战斗力 zhandouli} of the forces. Campaign logistics and equipment support should be led by sea-borne mobile

support {海上机动保障 haishang jidong baozhang} and should mutually integrate sea-borne mobile support with shore-based support. And when necessary, it should open advanced support bases {前进保障基地 qianjin baozhang jidi} on islands in forward positions.

(4) Strictly implementing policy stipulations

With regard to offensive campaigns against coral island reefs, the operational area and its peripheral surroundings are complex and military struggles follow along with complex political and diplomatic struggles. As a result, during the campaign, the related policy stipulations from the higher-level authority should be strictly implemented; flexible use should be made of international law; and international incidents that break out should be appropriately handled. When the military of a powerful external force intervenes that ignites a chain reaction of other incidents, the handling of them should be based on the principles of rationality, advantageousness, and moral integrity in order to effectively control the war situation and to guarantee that the main campaign goals are implemented smoothly.

Section 2: Main Activities...537

I. Striving for Campaign Superiority...537

Dominance over the operational sea area is a prerequisite condition for being successful in an offensive campaign in the coral island reef areas. The main measures for gaining and maintaining dominance in the operational sea area [are as follows]. The first [measure] is to seek and destroy the enemy's main force {主力 zhuli} in the sea and air. It is essential to actively seize and create opportunities for combat {积极捕捉和创造战机 jiji buzhuo he chuangzao zhanji} to annihilate the enemy effective strength on the sea and in the air. When necessary and when possible, assault and blockade the enemy sea and air military strengths in the areas where they are stationed or at anchor, and restrict the enemy's freedom to move about in the air or on the sea in order to weaken their operational capabilities. The second [means] is to sever the connection between the enemy and the island reef areas. Generally this is done by giving the lead to submarine forces and integrating them with the use of underwater mines and some of the surface vessels, and deploying [this strength] in shipping lines that can be reinforced by enemy troops as well as the neighboring sea areas to: intercept enemy naval reinforcement troops; conduct battlefield interdiction {遮断战场 jieduan zhanchang}; and isolate the operational sea area. The third [means] is to assault enemy-occupied island reefs. Assault enemy-occupied island reefs by using naval gun firepower and aviation firepower and by focusing on assaulting enemy-occupied island reefs that have been designated in advance for recapture and destroying the enemy vessels and troops that are stationed on- or moored there as well as command centers and defensive infrastructure, in order to create the conditions for recovering the enemy-occupied island reefs. The fourth [means] is sealing of the disembarkation sea area. Sealing off the disembarkation sea area consists of

activities to completely seal off the reefs of the islands that have been pre-designated for recapture as well as their sea areas adjacent to them, and its goal is to sever the connection between the enemy-occupied islands and the rest of the world in order to create the conditions for recapturing the reefs of the enemy-occupied islands.

II. Attacking and Occupying Island Reefs...538

Once the island embarkation operational grouping {登岛作战集团 dengdao zuozhan jituan} completes loading onto vessels, it should select the shipping line that is the least threatened by the enemy in which to implement the navigational crossing and standby in the sea area in the vicinity of the island reef prior to launching. Once we have gained campaign dominance, the campaign at-sea commander {战役海上指挥员 zhanyi haishang zhihuiyuan} should, at the right time, issue the operational order to attack and occupy the island-reefs, commanding the island embarkation operational grouping to attack and occupy the enemy-occupied island-reefs by initiating an amphibious landing offensive {liangqi denglu jingong} from the sea area to the enemy-occupied island-reefs. The island embarkation operational grouping should: rapidly move from the standby sea area {待机海域 daiji haiyu} to the island embarkation sea area {登陆海域 denglu haiyu} while at the same time implementing unfolding based on the landing deployment fixed in advance; employ “paralyze first and attack later” {先瘫后攻 xiantan hougong}; use the ‘encircle the island three-dimensionally’ {环岛立体 huan dao liti} pattern to embark on the island; and initiate operations to capture and occupy the island reefs. During the process of seizing and occupying island reefs, it is necessary to: promptly organize firepower support {火力支援 huoli zhiyuan}; suppress the remaining firepower on the enemy-occupied island reefs; maintain dominance over the embarkation sea area; prevent enemy reinforcement; and ensure that activities to seize the reefs are successful in one blow.

III. Consolidating the Defenses {巩固防御 gonggu fangyu}...538

Once the enemy-occupied island reefs have been seized, it is essential to: rapidly adjust the forces; organize defenses for the island reef areas; prevent the enemy from raiding and taking the reefs by force; and consolidate the achievements of the operation.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 25

The Sea-line Guarding Campaign...539

Campaigns to guard sea lines, or sea-line guarding {bao jiao} campaigns, are defensive campaigns waged to ensure the safety of, and free passage {changtong} along sea lines having strategic campaign significance. Their main missions are to ensure the safety of loading/unloading harbors, sea routes, and transport activities, and to assure free passage along the sea lines.

Sea-line guarding campaigns, based on the differences in their goals, can roughly be divided into two types: the first revolves around a launch due to one specific, major transport activity, with the goal of guarding the transport safety of a certain major, strategic asset {wuzi}. This type of sea-line guarding campaign has a relatively short duration, and normally ends with the conclusion of that major transport activity. The second type revolves around a launch due to a certain sea line possessing strategic campaign significance, with the goal of guarding the continuous free passage of this major sea line's channel(s). This type of sea-line guarding campaign normally has a fairly long duration, and can permeate through the full process of the entire war.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...539

I. Main Characteristics...539

(1) Wide space, long times, and numerous objectives

In sea-line guarding campaigns, the enemy holds the initiative for a sea-line offensive; and in particular, owing to the development of modern weaponry, the modes and means of enemy sea-line interdiction operations have become more diversified. The enemy not only can execute strikes against loading harbors, intermediate harbors, and unloading harbors along the sea line, but can also effect a blockade and control of the sea areas crossed along the sea route, and execute strikes against transport ships along the route; he not only can respectively choose the sea-line interdiction mode – concentrated strikes, scattered raids, force blockades, or mine blockades – but also can also employ a variety of forces to execute 3-D, multi-directional, integrated strikes in great depth against the transport activities. In order to effectively guard sea traffic, one must organize a tight, stable defense. From the viewpoint of activities, a sea-line guarding campaign must protect an entire sea line; at times it also requires first conducting offensive operations – using offense to aid defense – against enemy bases and airfields, and the battlefield space involved has a vast scope. From the viewpoint of operational time, sea transport has a sustained quality (continuity); the struggle between guarding a sea line and interdicting a sea line often must be sustained over a relatively long time, making it difficult to achieve the operational goal in one step. From the viewpoint of protecting a target, a sea-line guarding campaign requires both protecting fixed targets – loading/unloading harbors and intermediate harbors – and protecting sea dynamic targets (transport ships), which makes

protection of a target in a sea-line guarding campaign relatively complex. Since in a sea-line guarding campaign the enemy-situation threats are serious, the operational spatial scope wide, the time long, and the targets numerous, the scale of the forces that must be thrown in during the creation of a sea-line guarding campaign is relatively large, and the operational effective strength of the participating forces will be greatly increased, which makes sea-line guarding campaign operational missions especially arduous and strenuous.

(2) High operational intensity

In modern sea-line conflict, the sea-line interdiction means selectable by the interdicting side have increased; and, in light of the sea-line guarding side's force disposition situation, the sea-line interdicting side can select an advantageous sea area and opportunity to concentrate effective strengths to execute key-point sabotage. However, for the sea-line guarding side – due to the long transport line(s) and transport times, the wide scope of the battlefield space, and the numerous targets to be guarded – the operational patterns almost contain all of the aspects of modern sea warfare: air defense operations, anti-surface-ship operations, antisubmarine operations, anti-mine operations, and information warfare (IW) operations. Hence, the quantity of force strength needs is large, and their employment intensity is high. This places even more stringent requirements on scientific, rational application of sea-line guarding operational force strengths, and on maintaining sustained sea-line guarding operational capability.

(3) Seizure of a certain initiative

A sea-line guarding campaign, although by its nature a defensive campaign, since a sea-line guarding campaign's protected targets are certain specific sea transports, while the transport fleet is comprised and appears on an ad hoc basis, loading/unloading harbors only tasked with loading/unloading missions possess significance for the campaign. This means that the enemy's sea-line interdiction activities can only be conducted after our transport activities have commenced and been discovered, and thus causes the sea-line guarding side to seize a certain campaign initiative; it can actively select a materiel loading/unloading harbor and loading and unloading opportunities, as well as select a transport line, set-sail opportunity, sailing time, and transport mode. This characteristic of a sea-line guarding campaign both reflects the main distinction between a sea-line guarding campaign and other defensive campaigns, and explains how the struggle for victory in a sea-line guarding campaign has its basic favorable conditions.

(4) Great restraints on transport activities

In order to ensure the safety of sea traffic, sea-line guarding operational forces during the campaign must adopt their own activities, based on the requirements for protecting transport activity safety; sea-line guarding activities are subject to the tempero-spatial constraints of the harbors along the sea line, the distribution and positions of sea routes, and the navigation of sea transport ships. Regardless of whether the time and space at

these harbors, routes, and transport ships are advantageous to one's own side, sea-line guarding forces all must center on the activities of these several guarded targets. In addition, the navigation speed of sea transports is fairly slow, transport cycles are relatively long, and targets are exposed; in particular, large transport fleets have difficulty maneuvering and weak self-defense capability. All of these factors constrain the effectiveness of the sea-line guarding forces' weaponry and the realization of operational capability, and limit the sea-line guarding forces' use of operational means. For example: the strike forces' opportunity for strikes and the degree of strikes must be determined according to the requirements on transport activities; the time(s) for the area screening forces' seizure and control of air superiority and sea superiority in the sea areas under their jurisdiction must be determined according to the time when the transports transit those areas; and the direct warning forces must – based on the transports' navigation speed and navigation mode – formulate the corresponding plan *{jihua}*, and maintain their line positions throughout. This characteristic of a sea-line guarding campaign not only explains the major differences in terms of application of forces between a sea-line guarding campaign and other campaigns, it also refers to the more stringent requirements on use of sea-line guarding operational forces.

II. Basic Requirements...541

(1) Taking transport activities as the center

Ensuring the safety of sea transport activities is a basic goal of sea-line guarding campaigns, and is also where the benefit resides in the campaign's overall situation. Hence, one must establish a campaign guiding ideology entirely focused on transport activity safety, and – taking transport activities as the center – organize and carry out the campaign. One must take the degree of safety in the transport-protection activities as the benchmark for measuring the campaign's degree of success. One must center on the entire process of the transport activities, unify operations research *{yunchou}*, and plan *{jihua}* the various operational activities in the campaign. When conducting a sea-line guarding campaign's overall planning, one should – based on the distribution of loading/unloading harbors and sea lines – assiduously analyze the enemy's sea-line interdiction operational capability and possibly adopted sea-line interdiction means and modes, and make a correct assessment of the main threatened directions of friendly sea lines, and then from this assessment reach a basic decision on execution of the sea-line guarding operations and on the optimal course of action (COA), so as to ensure the smooth execution of the sea-line guarding operations. When determining the sea-line guarding campaign resolution and the various defensive and screening COAs, one must especially lay stress on defense of loading harbors, unloading harbors, and intermediate harbors. In particular, one must give prominence to anti-aircraft, anti-missile, and anti-mine defenses of harbors lying within the enemy strike aviation forces' operational radius and within range of the enemy's mid-to-long-range missiles, and ensure the security of the harbor facilities and free passage along the sea routes. One must – based on the enemy's sea-line interdiction operational characteristics, capability, and possible sea-line interdiction mode(s) – flexibly select an escort mode for the sea line and the transports.

(2) Use of forces with key-points

A sea-line guarding campaign has a wide space, long times, and numerous targets; unfocused (non-key-point) application of forces inevitably creates a passive situation where it is impossible to defend effectively. Hence, one must – based on a correct assessment of the directions, times, and sea areas of the main threats posed by the enemy to transport activities, as well as the use of forces and arms and the strike method(s) – determine the main defensive direction and main operational targets, key screening objectives, and screening times, and on this basis assign the different missions and allocate the sea-line guarding forces, so as to establish and maintain a favorable campaign posture. Under the conditions of insufficient sea-line guarding forces, one must also concentrate forces, and in key-point (focused) fashion apply them to the critical times and sea areas, to deal with the main threats and to protect key targets. When the situation undergoes a change, one must also lay stress on the key points for application of forces, and at the proper time revise the operational disposition.

(3) Integrated use of a variety of means

The characteristics and historical experience of sea-line guarding campaigns have shown that it is very difficult to achieve campaign goals by use of a single means; one must implement the operational ideology of active defense, and integratively use a variety of means, to deal with a variety of threats from the enemy, and to ensure the safety of sea transport. First, one must establish a tight reconnaissance and early warning (R&EW) system, organize and implement sea-air R&EW in great depth, continue to grasp the dynamic situation of the enemy's sea-line interdiction forces, and promptly discover the enemy's offensive operational intention. Next, one must integrate defensive activities with offensive activities. Sea-line guarding campaigns in overall terms are campaigns of a defensive nature. Defense is the most basic means in a sea-line guarding operation; one should – with a focus on the enemy's main threats – organize for the protected targets a 3-D, multi-directional defense in great depth, so as to avert the enemy's raids or to reduce the effects of enemy raids. Simultaneously, one must fully utilize all exploitable conditions and means, and not lose the opportunity to adopt offensive operational activities, so as to sabotage the enemy's sea-line interdiction preparations, disorganize the enemy's sea-line interdiction disposition, weaken the enemy's sea-line interdiction capability, alter a passive situation for sea-line guarding operations, and strive for the initiative in sea-line guarding operations. Third, one must integrate screening activities with transport activities. Based on a campaign's specific conditions, sea transport activities should adopt the corresponding transport mode and passage mode, as well as the scale of grouping. The activities of the sea transport-screening ships should – based on the characteristics of the assigned transport activities – flexibly employ a variety of modes, and – according to the time, place, and enemy situation – integrate the direct-passage and segmented-passage modes with the accompanying-escort, area-escort, and integrated-escort modes of escort, so as to obtain the optimal sea-line guarding effects.

(4) Maintaining the concealed quality of transport activities

Maintaining the concealed quality of transport activities is a basic requirement of wartime sea transport. Achieving this point not only enables the transports to avoid the enemy's raids during a certain phase of the campaign or even over the entire course of the campaign, and to improve the degree of safety in sea traffic, but also can increase transport effectiveness. The sea-line guarding side can adopt measures in various respects – selection of the transport line, opportunity, and mode – and, via mutual coordination between active feints and camouflage activities, confuse and deceive the enemy, in order to conceal the transport intention and activities; or it can cause the enemy to reach a mistaken judgment, and undertake mistaken activities, so as to assist the execution of a [friendly] sea-line guarding operation, and thus achieve the goal of increasing sea-line guarding operational effectiveness.

When determining the transport COA, one should break with convention, and flexibly change the loading/unloading harbors, lines, and transport mode, so as to make it difficult for the enemy to grasp one's own transport pattern. One must as much as possible choose multiple loading harbors and unloading harbors, as well as intermediate harbors, so as to conceal materiel loading and unloading activities, and increase the probability that the enemy judgment is incorrect. One must as much as possible select a transport line(s) in a sea area where enemy control is weak, but also near friendly [shores], so as to lower the possibility that transport activities and sea shipping of materiel will encounter enemy raids. One must as much as possible arrange materiel loading and unloading times, as well as sea transport times, to be placed within times unfavorable to the enemy's execution of reconnaissance and sea-line interdiction operations, so as to increase the difficulty of the enemy's sea-line interdiction operations. One must – with a focus on the transport sea areas, the enemy situation faced, one's sea-line guarding capabilities, and the nature of the transport mission – flexibly select the transport mode; or break up the whole into parts, and decentralize transport; or aggregate the parts into a whole, and centralize the transport; or travel by night and conceal oneself by day, and segment the passages; or travel by both day and night with all possible speed, for rapid arrival. Flexible and rapidly changing transport modes must be employed to deal with the enemy's sea-line interdiction activities, so as to reduce the possibility that the transport activities will encounter enemy strikes.

(5) Thorough organization of coordination

When conducting a sea-line guarding campaign, one must assiduously organize well the coordination among the activities of all forces. First, one must organize well the coordination between the sea-line guarding campaign and the associated campaigns. One must – based on the status and function of the sea-line guarding campaign in the operation's overall situation – manage well the relationship to the previous campaign and to the next campaign, as well as to the campaigns of friendly forces. This requires not only paying attention to creating favorable conditions for the waging of friendly force campaigns or follow-on campaigns, but also paying attention to favorable postures

created by previous campaigns and friendly force campaigns in order to launch and conduct the sea-line guarding campaign. Second, one must organize well the coordination among all forces within the sea-line guarding campaign. In particular, one must organize well the coordination between strike activities and transport activities, the coordination between area screening and accompanying screening, and the coordination among the various area screening [forces]. When the sea-line guarding campaign has the participation and support of the Air Force and 2nd Artillery Corps, one should also organize the operational coordination between the Navy and the Air Force and 2nd Artillery Corps.

The various types of coordination in a sea-line guarding campaign should be organized by taking transport activities as the center. All participating forces must coordinate their mutual activities according to the lines and times of the transport activities, as well as the transport activities' requirements on all types of support. To enable the active, close, and rapid coordination among the activities of all forces, the campaign commander – besides making clear the missions of all force groups – should also make clear the basis for coordination among the activities of all forces, on the basis of the differences in operational directions, times, and sea areas. Situations in sea-line guarding campaigns change unendingly; one must anticipate the many situations that can possibly occur, and formulate corresponding coordination proposals, to facilitate all participating forces' maintenance of close coordination according to the proposal.

Section 2: Main Activities...544

I. Initiating the Campaign...544

The campaign commander should at the proper time resolutely launch the campaign on the basis of the enemy situation faced, the set-sail time for the transports, and the campaign preparations situation.

Modes for a sea-line guarding campaign's launch are of two types: forced launch of the campaign, and concealed launch of the campaign.

When the balance of forces [shows that one] occupies a relatively greatly superior position, one can have a forced-launch campaign that actively strikes at the activities of the enemy's sea-line interdiction forces, to facilitate – via sudden, fierce strikes and effective blockade activities – eliminating the enemy's sea-line interdiction forces, or blockading them in their bases, airfields, or preassigned sea areas, and seizing air superiority and sea superiority in the campaign sea area(s), so as to create an extremely favorable initial posture for the sea-line guarding campaign.

When the conditions for executing an active strike against the enemy are not present, one should employ the hidden-launch mode for the campaign. In particular, one must: enhance efforts to maintain secrecy; adopt a variety of measures for camouflage,

concealment, and feints; seize a favorable opportunity; and suddenly launch the sea transport activities.

II. Organization and Screening of Transport Loading and (Port) Clearance...544

The campaign commander, after determining that no major changes in conditions have occurred, should at the proper time pass down the order to begin loading. The loading-harbor commander, after receiving the order, should immediately assemble the materiel and ships, per the pre-designated loading plan *{jihua}*, and – based on the principles of screening and dispersal – rapidly organize loading at all pre-designated points. Transports that have completed loading should stealthily clear the port or await an opportune moment within port. After all transports have completed loading, they should according to plan *{jihua}* conduct the assembly into formations, compose the transport fleet, and form a certain sailing sequence.

To ensure the safety of the transports' loading, clearing [or] awaiting an opportune moment to clear, and formation time, first one should adopt a variety of camouflage measures, deceive and paralyze the enemy, and do all one can to see that the loading, clearing, and assembly into formations are not discovered by the enemy. Next, one should enhance vigilance, at the proper time deploy the loading harbor's operational forces, do all one can to find the raiding enemy as soon as possible, and eliminate them or rout them outside the harbor area, or before the enemy adopts activities against us.

When the transports encounter enemy raids, one should: actively organize various kinds of protection and resistance; promptly make urgent repairs to, and replace damaged transports and loading facilities; and, for channels blockaded by enemy mines, promptly organize minesweeping forces for clearing, or start using reserve channels, and ensure that the transports set sail on time.

When loading harbors cannot be used due to having suffered heavy damage or being blockaded by the enemy, one should promptly employ reserve loading harbors, and make the necessary adjustments to all transport activities.

III. Organization and Screening of Transports During the Sea Crossing...545

After the transports are assembled into the sailing formation, one should commence the sea transport, per the time(s), line(s), and speed(s) specified in the plan *{jihua}*. During the transport, one should effect tight camouflage, and enhance air and sea surveillance. When the enemy attacks, one should in organized fashion conduct resistance and evasion. When evading enemy attacks, one should take care to maintain the formation(s), and avoid the creation of chaos. During the sea transport, the direct warning forces should be launched per the specified positions, and – based on the differences in the enemy situation's degree of threat – should maintain the corresponding degree of combat readiness. The accompanying screening forces should launch searches along directions from which the transports are subject to enemy threats. The area screening forces should

– based on maintaining control over the screening area – enhance sea/air patrol warning for key directions. Any screening force finding enemy sea-line interdiction should immediately execute an attack, and at the necessary time the screening forces can call each other and jointly execute an operation.

The transport fleet should alter formation at any time, based on different threats: normally, a very wide, short-depth formation is used in enemy submarine threat areas; when traversing a mined area, a single-line {danzongdui} or double-line formation is employed; to resist enemy conventional-weapon strikes, under the premise of ensuring navigation safety, one should reduce the formation(s); during a nuclear-strike threat, a dispersed formation should be adopted.

When the enemy-situation threat is severe, the campaign commander should – based on the battlefield situation – promptly dispatch supporting forces coordinating with the escort forces’ and screening forces’ operations. At the required time, they should at the right moment throw in the reserves, and resolutely annihilate or drive off the enemy sea-line interdiction forces present.

When some of the ships have suffered damage from enemy raids, the campaign commander should organize strengths to tow and repair damaged ships that cannot steam by themselves. Ships that have completely lost the possibility of rescue, after their personnel are withdrawn, should be self-destroyed to avoid their falling into enemy hands; and for ships that cannot navigate persistently, some forces should be designated to escort them to a nearby harbor. When one has ascertained that it is difficult to ensure navigation safety, due to enemy-situation threats or to sudden changes in weather, commanders should promptly instruct the escort formation to alter the route or steam toward a port of refuge.

IV. . Organization and Screening of the Transports’ Entry into Port and Unloading...546

The unloading harbor’s defensive forces, before the transports’ arrival, should take special care to organize mine-defense observation and to inspect channels in order to ensure free passage through the channels. When the transports arrive at the unloading harbor, they should disband the sailing sequence per the preassigned procedure, enter the harbor in order, steam to their respective unloading points, and rapidly unload. As the transports are conducting unloading, special care should be taken to enhance anti-aircraft defenses. The direct warning forces or accompanying screening forces can be used as strengths to enhance protection of the unloading harbor, or per orders can assume a new operational mission.

V. Concluding the Campaign...546

After the campaign goal is achieved, the campaign should be concluded at the proper time. To ensure the safety of the forces’ withdrawal, one must tightly fix an eye on the

enemy's dynamic state, and enhance protection for the returning transports and operational forces; at the required time, one can dispatch specialized forces to welcome and escort them. One should pay close attention to ship resupply and repair tasks, and rapidly and ably continue the transport preparations. Based on experience and lessons in operations, one should further revise and perfect the operation plan *{jihua}*, and at the required time one should readjust the disposition, so as to prepare for further battle.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 26

The Naval Base Defense Campaign...547

A naval base defense campaign is a defensive campaign conducted to resist an enemy offensive against a naval base; to smash the enemy's intention to destroy, blockade, and seize the naval base; to guard the safety of the forces stationed on the base and of its main facilities; and to ensure the normal realization of the base support functions. The missions of naval base defense are to protect the safety of the base system, stationed forces, major facilities, and the sea maneuver forces' freedom of movement into and out of the base, as well as the free passage of sea transport; and to smash the enemy's intention to paralyze or capture the naval base. This includes antisubmarine defense, anti-surface-ship defense, anti-mine defense, anti-aircraft defense, anti-ground defense, and defense against attacks using nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. A naval base defense campaign can be an independent naval campaign, and also can be a major component of a joint campaign, and is normally organized and conducted independently or primarily by the Navy.

A naval base is the institution and site providing comprehensive security especially for the stationing, training, and operational activities of naval forces. Most naval bases are situated at important sectors on the coast, or on large islands, and are the forwardmost military bases along State maritime strategic campaign directions. A naval base generally has a certain coastal land area, offshore sea area, and adjacent islands, and possesses fairly complete ship berthing, supply, and defense facilities; most naval bases have also constructed nearby a certain number of airfields, as well as a Navy or Fleet operational command institution. In peacetime, naval bases provide naval forces with excellent garrison and training facilities. In wartime, naval bases are the major supports and base areas for naval forces to execute sea offensive operations, and are also major strongholds for naval forces to execute sea-direction defensive operations; they have extremely significant strategic campaign status. Thus, in future military conflicts on the seas, naval bases normally will be the main targets for enemy raids. Hence, organization of an active, staunch naval-base defense – ensuring our naval forces' survival and capability for sustained operations – are important conditions for seizing the sea battlefield initiative, and are important measures for ensuring the security of the land battlefield's littoral flanks.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...548

I. Main Characteristics...548

Naval base defense campaigns have the qualities and features of a typical strategic-point war to hold and defend a position. Under modern high-tech conditions, due to the full-speed development of offensive operational weaponry, offensive operations against naval bases have undergone major changes. Naval base defense campaigns under modern conditions have the following main characteristics:

(1) Strongly sudden quality {tufaxing} of operations, and the extreme ease of falling into passivity

In naval base defensive operations, the enemy has an active, offensive status, and can flexibly choose the targets, opportunities, modes, and forces/arms for the attack. At the same time, [the enemy] fully emphasizes the adoption of a variety of deception measures – secrecy, camouflage, feints, etc. – and strives to achieve suddenness {turanxing} in the attack. Confronted with the enemy's concealed, sudden attack, which strikes first to gain the initiative, base defense will be faced with a variety of unimaginable difficulties, and very easily falls into passivity. This requires that naval bases must have very strong information warfare (IW) operational capability, rapid response capability, and emergency handling capability.

(2) Complex and rapidly changing situations, and sharp combat

In a naval base defense campaign, the enemy will be able to make integrated use of a variety of forces and arms, and many kinds of means and forms, and will launch the attack from different layers and directions: air, sea surface, underwater, and ground. The enemy can employ conventional mine weapons to effect a blockade of the naval base, so that it loses the necessary operational and support functions; he can simultaneously use a variety of long-range, very powerful high-tech precision guided munitions (PGMs) to execute “surgical” precision strikes against major targets within the naval base, so as to rapidly paralyze our defensive system, destroy the base's main facilities, and wipe out the forces stationed on base. Simultaneously, the enemy also will certainly adopt a variety of activities such as IW and feint deception activities in order to: support, assist, and coordinate with the attacking forces' operational activities; to the maximum extent weaken our defensive capability; and improve offensive operational effectiveness. The diversity of the enemy's offensive means will make the future battlefield situations complex and rapidly changing. Surprise attacks and counterattacks, blockades and counter-blockades, capture and counter-capture, jamming and counter-jamming will be simultaneously or alternately conducted in the multi-dimensional space, and the struggles will be abnormally fierce.

(3) Special operational space, limitations on force strength *bushu* disposition

The battlefield space in a naval base defense campaign normally is a relatively concentrated, fixed land area or offshore sea area, with important targets within the naval base as the center. This area faces the sea, backs against land, has a broad defense front but a shallow depth, and has numerous targets. For a special operational space such as this, although it is advantageous for supporting island and coastal defenses, it is beneficial for obtaining the assistance and complement of the masses. However, it also presents a certain unfavorable effect for force strength *bushu* disposition in base defense operations. One is the shallow depth, making it difficult to form a relatively large defense in depth; the second is that the battlefield capacity is limited, making it difficult to *bushu* disposition more defensive force strengths and weaponry to form a powerful superiority.

(4) Support for island and coastal operations, and ease of obtaining support/assistance

Operations supporting one's own islands and coasts are major features of naval base defense campaigns, and are favorable conditions richly endowed by nature. In one respect, there are fairly many established defensive facilities that one can use. Naval bases generally always have constructed a fairly complete observation and early warning system, an anti-ship and anti-aircraft defensive firepower system, a force garrison system, and an operational command system. All of these are favorable battlefield conditions that can be exploited to conduct a naval base defense campaign. In another respect, they support island and coastal operations, which can obtain the widespread support of, and coordination with friendly force units, [People's] Armed Police, militia, and the broad masses, to hold fast for long periods, and to execute sustained operations.

II. Basic Requirements...549

(1) Integration of military-civilian, and integrated-whole operations

In waging a base defense campaign, one will be confronted with the enemy's multi-layer, multi-directional, multiple-means, high-intensity integrated attack. Under these conditions, with any single operational strength, operational means or weapon system, and in any single-area, single-layer battle, it will be difficult to effectively crush the enemy attack. One must establish the thought of "integration of military-civilian, and integrated-whole operations" {junmin yiti, zhengti zuozhan}

In "integration of military-civilian, and integrated-whole operations," one must emphasize a high degree of centralized, unified command. A naval base defense campaign normally is organized and conducted mainly by a naval campaign large formation, but can also acquire the support of, and coordination with other service branches, [People's] Armed Police forces, and the militia. As for the various strengths within the task-organization, they must – based on a unified campaign intention – realize consistently adjusting-coordinated activities, so that each part of the campaign is subordinated to the overall situation, serves the overall situation, and brings into play the integrated-whole might {zhengti weili}. As for the other various strengths within the operational area, as well as all related factors, they should all be incorporated into the campaign's general plan {guihua}, so as to ensure the smooth implementation of the campaign.

In "integration of military-civilian, and integrated-whole operations," one must form a complete, integrated defensive system {tixi}. This is critical for base defensive operations. Only by emphasizing the organic combination and advanced-level cohesion of each campaign essential element can one enhance the integrated-whole might of defensive operations. First, one must tightly combine all battlefield spaces – air, water surface, underwater, and land – in campaign operations, so that they are joined into one, and can support one another, forming an integrated-whole structure. Second, one must: unify the organization of the participating naval strengths and the assisting and

complementing strengths of other services and arms, Armed Police and militia; conduct unified-overall planning of the *bushu* disposition, so as to form an integrated-whole defensive strength structure of tri-services as one body, and integration of military-civilian; and establish a scientific integrated-whole defensive posture. Third, one must: comprehensively apply various operational means and forms; organically combine together the naval base defense campaign with coastal defense, urban defense, and island defense; and – taking counter-raid, counter-blockade, and counter-capture as the main line – fuse the various operational means and forms into one, to strive for obtaining the optimal operational effects.

(2) With defense in the lead, combine offense and defense

“With defense in the lead, combine offense and defense” is a specific embodiment and application of the active defense ideology in a naval base defense campaign. Faced with an enemy large-scale sudden attack, the desire to fully achieve resistance of the enemy outside the guarded areas and targets is unrealistic. One must persevere in organizing tight protection and active resistance, with defense as primary; thus, when the enemy attacks, one can to the greatest extent preserve one’s forces and reduce losses, and also decrease the operational effects of the enemy attack. “With defense in the lead, combine offense and defense” is not passive, waiting, pure defense. With the continuous growth in the number of defensive means, offensive activities in defensive operations will significantly increase, with attack aiding defense, and offense integrated with defense; and they have already become important contents of modern defensive operations. The campaign commander must firmly establish the concept and awareness of active defense, and – based on the campaign missions and the compositional circumstances of the campaign strengths – organically fuse offensive activities into the base defense campaign, not losing the opportunity to conduct active-initiative offensive operational activities against the enemy, and – catching the enemy unaware – actively striking against the critical links in the enemy’s offensive *bushu* disposition.

(3) Comprehensive defense, and key-point *bushu* disposition

Under modern conditions, the enemy will employ a variety of means to execute multidirectional, multilayer, key-point-based sudden attacks. Hence, a naval base defense campaign must be firmly grounded in the complex situation of the threats which can be simultaneously posed – leading edge and in depth, frontal and flank, sea and ground, as well as air; it must correspondingly organize an all-around, 3-D, in-depth, echelon-type comprehensive defensive system centering on the base area, including all screening targets. Simultaneously, the campaign must grasp the key points of defense, tightly center on the main guarded targets and areas, dispose forces and arms in key-point fashion, concentrate the main forces and firepower to cover the main targets, and strike at the enemy along the main direction of his attack. First, one must correctly distinguish the main screening targets from the secondary screening targets. For targets having critical value and significance, one certainly must *bushu* disposition defensive force strengths and weaponry with key points and provide them with key-point warning and guarding, to

ensure their security. For ordinary targets, one can appropriately give them consideration – while concentrating strengths to guard key-point targets – avoiding by all means a lack of key points and an equal division of forces. When the guarded targets are relatively concentrated, one can also organize an area defense with key points, so as to improve the operational effectiveness of the defensive forces, and optimize the make-up of the defensive system. Second, one must – based on the compositional features of the enemy’s campaign strengths and on the enemy’s operational intention – analyze and determine the enemy’s main attack forces, main attack means, and main attack direction, and thus determine the targets, main-defense direction, and main-defense mode for the key-point defense required by the base defense campaign. One must: dispose multiple lines of defense; execute multilayer interception and strikes in great depth against the invading targets; and ensure the effective interception of, and strikes on the [enemy’s] main defensive targets. One must defend against air strikes by the enemy’s missile weapons and aviation forces, treating this as the main mode of defense, while simultaneously giving consideration to defense against the enemy by means of mines and missile firepower, and by blockades of the various forces arrayed against the naval base. One must – based on conditions in the operational sea area and the relative position between the enemy and us, and with key-point guarded areas as the center – determine the enemy’s most likely direction of raiding, and *bushu* disposition force strengths with key points along this direction, to increase interception and strikes in depth. Simultaneously, one should appropriately enlarge the defense sectors, and give consideration to defense along the secondary raiding direction.

(4) Full preparations, and holding fast for the long term

Full preparations are basic assurances of gaining the campaign operational initiative and a victory. Naval base defense campaigns are conducted on the basis of a naval base’s routine defense and peacetime operational preparations. Serving as permanent stationing areas for naval forces, naval bases are built over long periods, and their defensive systems and various operational facilities are fairly complete; this has laid a certain foundation for our completion of campaign preparations within the shortest possible time. However, in naval base defense campaigns under modern conditions, the suddenness of the enemy attack is great, the tension in operational activities is sharp, and the battlefield is complex and rapidly changing. Hence, the mission of campaign preparations is extremely arduous, and their content is broader. Doing a good job of full campaign preparations requires establishing the ideology of being constantly prepared, of maintaining at all times a high degree of vigilance, and of regularly doing a good job of battle preparations, so as to facilitate effectively crushing the enemy’s sudden attack. One must lay stress on analyzing and studying the enemy situation, promptly discovering and discriminating among the signs of an enemy attack, at the right time improving the units’ degree of combat readiness, and constantly improving the rapid response capability. One must: be firmly grounded in the most complex, most difficult situations; formulate in advance a realistic operational course of action (COA); do a good job of multiple preparations; and – according to the situation’s development and changes – constantly perfect the operational COA, and make great efforts to improve the emergency response capability. One must integrate peacetime battlefield preparations, and further readjust, enhance,

complement, and perfect various types of facilities; simultaneously, one must build up the stores of various kinds of materiel so as to ensure the requirements for long-term holding defensive operations.

Section 2: Main Activities...552

I. Implementing the Campaign Initiation...552

When one has already found signs of an enemy attack on the base, the campaign command post should sound the alarm to all staff and force groups within the base and to the protection system, and organize and push forward the [campaign] launch as fast as possible per the operational COA. The fighter aviation forces and ship units assuming the resistance mission should raise their degree of combat readiness, and organize all forces on airfields, in the air, and at sea holding points, ambush positions, and roving/hunting areas to go on alert. Ground air-defense forces and coastal sea-operations forces should enter their pre-established positions and complete their firing preparations. All units not tasked with a resistance mission should per the plan *{jihua}* be dispersed, concealed, and camouflaged; and commanders at all levels and command post personnel should enter battle positions and commence their work.

II. Resisting the Enemy's Sea/Air Assault...552

The enemy's sea/air-raid operations normally are wide-front, multi-bearing, multilayer, multi-batch penetrations, which execute key-point-based comprehensive strikes against critical targets within the base. The base-defense campaign commander must concentrate superior forces and firepower along the main direction and at critical times, and strike at the enemy posing the greatest threat; in particular, he must strike at the aviation forces carrying high-precision, massively powerful weapons.

When resisting the enemy's sea/air surprise attacks, one must take care to first organize some forces to wipe out all of the enemy's operational support forces, such as AWACS planes, jamming aircraft, and radar sentry ships, and then use the main resistance forces to attack all of the enemy's strike force groups. When the enemy raid forces approach the base's anti-aircraft/anti-ship firepower range, one should correctly organize all firepower groups in the selection of their strike targets, rationally allocate the missions, and flexibly employ firepower. The basic requirement is to concentrate firepower strikes against the highest-threat targets, such as aviation forces carrying air-to-ground missiles or ships carrying cruise missiles – these must be annihilated at any cost. In order to more actively and effectively wipe out the invading enemy, one may organize some ground defense forces – such as surface-to-air missile (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), and mobile coastal-defense missile and coastal artillery forces – to execute maneuver operations within the base area; in the first phase, these should be shifted toward ambushes along the enemy's possible invasion route(s) or direction(s), toward seeking opportunities for battle, and toward elimination of the enemy. At the right time, one should modify the

bushu disposition, and avoid suffering major losses in the enemy strikes, in order to maintain sustained operational capability.

The aviation forces stationed at [nearby] airfields and the ship forces berthed at the base's harbor and mooring sites should at all times: ably conduct the preparations for resisting the enemy strikes; continuously receive and analyze the enemy situation; organize tight anti-aircraft and anti-ship reconnaissance; improve their reserve channels {*beihang*} and degree of combat readiness; and enhance the on-duty system. After receiving the alarm of an enemy strike, one should immediately conduct dispersed or local camouflage/concealment, per the predetermined plan {*jihua*}. When a direct threat is received, the ship formation commanders can command ship weapons to fight off those targets that have posed the greatest threat, and [must] strive to wipe out the enemy before he can use his weapons.

III. Countering the Enemy's Sea Blockade...553

In countering an enemy's sea blockade of a naval base, the major activity is to crush the enemy's mine blockade and forces' blockade.

(1) Crushing the enemy's mine blockade

To crush the enemy's mine blockade, first one must actively wipe out the enemy's mine-laying forces. This means organizing various forces and arms, and promptly discovering and actively eliminating the enemy mine-laying forces (aviation forces, submarines, and surface ships), while making every effort to eliminate them before they lay mines or while they lay mines. Next, one must actively eliminate the enemy's already laid mine obstacles. Under ordinary circumstances, one should first concentrate minesweeping forces and equipment; clear the key sea areas, harbors, and channels of the mine obstacles impeding us the most; and then, depending on the situation observed, gradually expand to comprehensive clearing. Since minesweeping activities normally are conducted under enemy sea and air threats, when organizing minesweeping, one should thus conceal the intention, enhance camouflage, and adopt a variety of defensive measures, to ensure that the minesweeping forces fulfill their mission according to plan {*jihua*}. The basic method for clearing enemy mine obstacles is – based on the enemy mines' performance and the sea area's hydrological/geological conditions, and adopting measures suiting local conditions – to make integrated use of a number of means, such as sweeping, explosion, disposal, hunting, detection, and avoidance, to bring into play composite effectiveness. Next, depending on the situation observed, one should force a path through the mine obstacles. A forced crossing of mine obstacles is an emergency measure adopted when time is pressing and the mission critical, and when one cannot dredge a channel and at the same time has no reserve channel that can be used. The ship formations can – under the direct guidance of the minesweepers and mine-disposal ships – force a path through the mine obstacles. When forcing through a mined area, one should as much as possible choose a line through a mined area with relatively short depth, or as much as possible choose from the excessively thinned mined areas a deep-water point to pass through, and

as much as possible going within the screening and observation range of our coast-based air defense and coastal defense forces and observation and communication posts.

(2) Crushing the enemy forces' blockade

Crushing the enemy forces' blockade means crushing a blockade of a PLA Navy base by enemy aviation forces, submarines, and surface ships. This mainly includes the following activities:

1. Organizing sea patrol searches

In order to ensure that the counter-blockade forces in a relatively remote sea area strike the enemy blockade forces, one should organize maneuver forces to conduct sea patrols. The forces employed mainly are early-warning planes, antisubmarine patrol planes, antisubmarine helicopters, surface ships, and submarines. The above forces – centered on the base's main harbor, and according to their respective performance, characteristics, and missions – comprise a multilayer patrol system in great depth along the sea direction. When organizing sea patrols, one should integrate antisubmarine patrols with anti-surface-ship patrols, and – according to the varying circumstances – place particular emphasis on some of them. The sea patrols should be able to ensure that our strike forces perform the launch and execute the strike(s) in the predetermined sea area(s). The patrol lines should be able to control the entire sector over which the enemy blockade forces can operate, and be able to obtain fighter aviation forces' cover and timely support from the strike forces.

2. Emplacing (under)water obstacles

The goal in emplacement of (under)water obstacles is to block or restrict enemy submarines and surface ships from approaching our base's harbor and mooring sites. The naval base should – based on the sea area's natural conditions, using mine obstacles as the mainstay, and with the base harbor as the key point – emplace (under)water obstacles of various types and in multiple layers, along the sea direction. The (under)water obstacles should have a certain depth, width, and density, and a fairly high obstructing efficiency and anti-sweeping capability; [they should be placed so as to] strive to restrict the enemy outside the range where he can use torpedoes and ship gun weapons to strike at the base's targets. At the same time, one should unify the planning {guihua} for emplacement of the (under)water obstacles, so that the emplacement does not impact the security and operations of friendly ships, and so that the main obstacles and inter-obstacle passages are positioned within the range of our coastal observation and firepower control.

3. Annihilating the blockade forces

In naval base counter-blockade operations which only rely on coastal defense firepower and sea patrol forces, it is difficult to resist the blockade activities of the enemy

submarines and surface ships. To fulfill the mission of countering the enemy forces' blockade, one must concentrate strikes against the enemy's blockade forces.

Strikes on the enemy surface ships are normally executed by combined forces: strike aviation forces, surface combat ships, coastal defense force groups, and submarines. The basic requirements are as follows: to concentrate forces so as to form a superior position; to deploy along multiple paths and from many directions in a converging attack; and to strive for concealment and surprise, in order to constrain the enemy at the first opportunity. For strikes on the enemy submarines, normally the attacks are executed first by search strike groups of antisubmarine planes or helicopters, while later attacks are executed by surface-ship strike groups or combined sea-air strike groups. Combined strikes on the enemy's blockade forces must ably organize coordinated actions – not losing the opportunity for battle, and at the same time not causing accidental casualties to one's forces – and must strive by using the integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli} to restrain the enemy.

IV. Defending Against the Enemy's Surprise Attacks Using Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Weapons...555

(1) At the first opportunity, striking against the enemy's NBC operational strengths

When one discovers signs of the enemy's use of NBC weapons in a surprise attack on a naval base, the campaign commander – possibly based on the actual capabilities of the naval-base force composition, or by requesting higher levels to order the necessary activities – [must] strive to execute effective strikes on the enemy before he can use NBC weapons. The targets of these strikes mainly are the storage sites, launch positions, and launch vehicles for the enemy's NBC weapons; the strike means are long-range strike forces, airborne units, and special-forces units, and one can also employ electronic warfare (EW) forces to jam the enemy's weapons guidance and control systems. The opportunity for the strikes as much as possible [should be] before the enemy uses his weapons, or during their launch. When resisting the enemy strikes against the naval base, in particular one should identify – and lay stress on resistance against – the enemy's aircraft, ships, and missiles which carry NBC weapons.

(2) Ascertaining the circumstances of an enemy raid using NBC weapons

After a naval base has suffered an enemy raid using NBC weapons, one should immediately organize radiological, chemical, and biological reconnaissance. Its missions are as follows: to determine the areas, yields, modes, and degree of lethality/destructiveness of the enemy raid with NBC weapons; to ascertain the scope of the contaminated sea area and land area, the types of radiological clouds, contaminants, and biological weapons, and the scope of the possible threats, and to mark their boundaries; and to open up detours around and channels through the [contaminated] sea area and land area. The campaign command organs should rapidly report the reconnaissance results to a higher level and transmit them to all units.

(3) Eliminating the consequences of an enemy raid with NBC weapons

After a naval base has suffered an enemy raid using NBC weapons, it should rapidly adopt measures to eliminate the raid's consequences. The missions of this activity are as follows: to restore the command system and campaign coordination; to ascertain the circumstances of the damage; to adjust the operational *bushu* disposition; to organize emergency repairs, fire extinguishing, and disinfection/sterilization; to perform decontamination of contaminated personnel and weapons; to blockade key contaminated areas and infected areas; and to conduct inspections and sanitary processing of military supplies and water supplies.

After the consequences of the enemy raid are eliminated, all units should organize self and mutual medical aid. The specialized units (elements) directly controlled by the campaign command organ are mainly used for supporting the command organ, critical targets, and the main direction's force groups. Units in the process of operations should continue to fulfill their assigned battle missions, and must not break off from battle because of the elimination of the raid's consequences.

Part V: Air Force Campaigns...557

Chapter 27 Overview...557

Section 1: Definition and Classifications of the Air Force Campaign...557

I. The Conceptualization of the Air Force Campaign...557

The Air Force campaign is a series of operational activities conducted by an Air Force campaign large formation in order to achieve specific strategic and campaign goals in accordance with a unified intention and plan {jihua} and within a specific time and space.

The Air Force campaign is normally an important component of the joint campaign, and it is normally conducted with the Air Force campaign large formation in the lead and in coordination with other services and arms. Under special situations, it can also be independently implemented by an Air Force campaign large formation.

The Air Force campaign is guided by the national military strategy and restricted by the Air Force strategy. It achieves specific military goals through a series of air-to-air, air-to-ground, and ground-to-air operational activities. It determines the nature, goals, missions and activities of combat, and it directly serves a given part of the war or even the overall war situation. Its success or failure directly affects the war's course and conclusion.

II. The Classifications of the Air Force Campaign {kongjun zhanyi fenlei}...557

The Air Force campaign is the general designation of the Air Force's various campaign types and patterns. The PLA's Air Force campaign is normally divided into the air offensive campaign {kongzhong jingong zhanyi}, the air defense campaign {fangkong zhanyi}, the air blockade campaign {kongzhong fengsuo zhanyi}, and the airborne campaign {kongjiang zhanyi}, etc. Of these, the air offensive campaign and the air defense campaign are the basic patterns of the Air Force campaign. The air force campaign large formation supports the campaign operations of the Army, Navy, and Second Artillery with various operational activities. It possesses campaign operational qualities and it generally is brought into the category of Air Force campaign research.

The air offensive campaign is series of airborne sudden-attack activities {tuji xingdong} implemented by an Air Force campaign large formation in coordination with other services and arms against an enemy within a fixed space and time. The air offensive campaign in a joint campaign is normally a unified command by an Air Force campaign large formation commander based on the intent of the joint campaign commander; an independent air offensive campaign is a unified command by an Air Force campaign large formation commander based on the intent of the supreme headquarters. The basic

missions of the air offensive campaign are: wipe out or weaken the enemy's aviation forces and ground air defense forces [in order to] seize air dominance; wipe out or weaken the enemy's heavy force groupings; destroy the enemy's communications and transport systems in order to create conditions for ground and sea campaigns; and sudden-attack the enemy's political, military and economic targets [in order to] weaken the enemy's war potential or obtain specified strategic goals.

The air defense campaign is a series of operational activities implemented by the Air Force campaign large formation in coordination and cooperation with other services, service arms, local force-units and people's air defense strengths, in accordance with a unified intention and plans, and in order to frustrate the enemy's air raids. Its basic goal is to smash the enemy air raid intention and safeguard the security of important targets. Its basic missions are: closely monitor the dynamic state of the enemy air raid, promptly discover and ascertain the enemy's implementation of air raid activities and time opportunities, as well as notify various force-units and people's air defense organizations; resist-attack {kangji} the enemy's air raid against our military, political and economic targets and reduce the harm of the enemy's air raids; organize the counterattack operations and wipe out and weaken the enemy air raid strengths; organize information warfare and seize information dominance; and organize the protection work and reduce the losses of personnel and war resources {zhazheng ziyuan} brought about from encountering enemy air raids.

The air blockade campaign is a series of offensive operational activities implemented with the Air Force campaign large formation in the lead and in coordination {xietong xia} with the strengths of other services and service arms in order to disrupt and restrict the enemy's external economic and military relationships {lianxi}. The basic missions are: seize and maintain air dominance; implement deny of flight {kongzhong jinfei} and sever the enemy's air passages with the outside world; sudden-attack the enemy's anti-blockade operational system and weaken their anti-blockade operational capability; and blockade the enemy's sea, land (island) traffic from the air.

The airborne-assault campaign is an operational activity conducted by airborne landing forces in the lead and in coordination with aviation forces and the force-units of other services and arms; [it is conducted] via air mobility to directly arrive at the enemy's depth areas in order to achieve specific strategic or campaign goals, and in accordance with a unified intention and plans. Its basic missions are: seize and occupy enemy political, military, and economic centers or other strategic vital areas and implement operations in the enemy's rear; seize and occupy important areas and targets in the enemy's campaign depth, separate the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition, cut-off the enemy's retreat route, block enemy reinforcement, and complement frontal force operations; implement rapid reinforcement, and alter the enemy-to-friendly strength ratio and battlefield posture, etc.

Air Force operations in coordination with Army, Navy and Second Artillery campaigns are an important component of the joint, Army, Naval and Second Artillery campaigns.

They [Air Force operations] appear as combat- [battle] scale, permeate the entire course of the campaign, and possess campaign qualities. Their basic missions are: seize and maintain local air dominance, and cover {yanhu} the main *bushu*-deployment of Army, Navy and Second Artillery and important operational activities; implement in-depth air sudden-attacks, smash and destroy the important targets within the enemy's campaign depth, and promote the development of the Army, Navy, and Second Artillery campaigns; implement close-in aviation fire support and sudden-attack enemy shallow-depth battlefield targets in order to create favorable conditions {wei...chuangzao youli tiaojian} for Army and Navy offensive and defensive activities; implement airborne-assault operations and complement {peihe} the critical operational activities of the Army and Navy campaigns; implement aviation reconnaissance and help the Army, Navy and Second Artillery to promptly grasp the battlefield situations; implement electronic warfare and participate in the struggle to seize electromagnetic dominance; and implement air transport and safeguard-support³⁸ air mobility, supply and rescue of Army, Navy, and Second Artillery forces.

Section 2: The Main Characteristics and Principles of the Air Force Campaign...559

I. The Main Characteristics of the Air Force Campaign...559

(1) A compatible coexistence between seizing information dominance and air dominance, and both permeating from start to finish

Speaking from a certain sense, Air Force campaign operations under informationized conditions are first a contest between the information warfare strengths of both sides. The sudden quality of Air Force operational activities, the effective quality of operating operational platforms, the precision quality of precision guided weapons, the continuity of command and control, and the timeliness of various campaign supports all rely {jun yilaiyu} on the effective control of battlefield information superiority; [thus] “information” has already penetrated to all links of Air Force campaign operational activities. In future Air Force campaign operations, there will be a consistent coexistence of seizing information dominance and air dominance, and it will permeate the Air Force campaign from start to finish. Only by seizing information dominance can we safeguard-support fully bringing into play weapons system effectiveness and seize air dominance. Moreover, losing information dominance means losing air dominance.

³⁸ Translator's note: the Chinese term *baozhang* {保障} is often translated as *support*, but it also carries with it a connotation of *ensure* or *safeguard*, or in other words, ensure something is achieved through support means. Because there are other terms for *safeguard*, *ensure* and another term that is also translated as support - *assisting-support* {支援 zhiyuan}, safeguard-support should be distinguished from these other terms.

(2) Unprecedented improvements in operational effectiveness and increases in the quick decision quality of the campaign

Along with the continuous application of high and new technologies {gaoxin jishu}, Air Force operational effectiveness has notably strengthened and campaign tempo has clearly accelerated. So, now and then, an Air Force campaign of a not too big scale can not only achieve specific strategic goals, but in a short period of time, a relatively large-scaled Air Force campaign can disrupt or wipe out an enemy's defense system and war capabilities.

It is for this reason that first, the widespread use of integrated intelligence early warning systems and long range precision guided weapons on the battlefield greatly improve the precision quality and destructive strength of air strikes, and constitutes a severe threat against any important target within the scope of the entire battlefield depth; secondly, it improves the mobility performance {jidong xingneng tigao} of aviation force weapons, it continuously improves penetration means, and increases the suddenness quality of the campaign; third, continuous increases to aircraft bomb loads result in notable increases to operational kill and destruct might. Thus, the time period of Air Force campaign activities has greatly shortened and quick decision quality has increased.

(3) The diversity of campaign activities and interwoven attack and defense

The future campaign conducted {weilai jinxing de zhanyi} by the PLA is mainly the joint campaign. Its geographical environment is special, not only are there high plains frigid areas, but there are coastal areas; its operational objects are multi-variant; its main pattern can be an island blockade campaign, an island offensive campaign, a border area counterattack campaign or an anti-air raid campaign, etc. The Air force campaign large formation normally carries out campaign operational tasks under these kinds of backdrops. Not only must {yao} it [campaign large formation] organize and implement the Air Force campaign, it must also {youyao} assist-support and cover the full course of operations of the Army, Navy and the Second Artillery. These operational activities may include air situation early warning, seizing and maintaining air dominance, air cover {kongzhong yanhu}, air sudden-attack {kongzhong tuji}, anti-air resistance-attack {duikong kangji}, aviation fire support, air transport, electronic warfare, etc. Furthermore, the aforementioned activities are organized and implemented under a definite air situation threat, so attack will have defend, defend will have attack, and attack and defense are interwoven. Thus, the missions [tasks] of the Air Force campaign large formation in a joint campaign are extremely strenuous.

(4) The airspace of the campaign operations is exceedingly broad

The air strengths possess special qualities of high speed mobility and long range operations, so along with the development of aviation technology, the air battlefield has rapidly expanded and already possesses the qualities {juyou...de xingzhi} of full depth, omni-directional, all-altitude and integrated air and space {kongtian yiti}. In terms of a horizontal scope {shuiping fanwei}, at present, the operational radius of third generation

aircraft has universally reached over a thousand kilometers and bombers have reached several thousand to nearly {shang} ten thousand kilometers; advanced medium- and long-range air-air missiles can be launched from several tens of kilometers to several hundred kilometers out, and air-to-ground missiles and air-launched cruise missiles can implement precision attacks from nearly 100 kilometers to even several thousand kilometers. In terms of vertical scope, from the development and use of space weapons and helicopters, the activity height {huodong gaodu} of Air Force campaign activities can be from “tree-level” all the way to cosmos space. This has resulted in the campaign battlefield having multi-layered full-dimensional forms such as outer space, super high altitude, high altitude, medium altitude, low altitude and super-low altitude, and the trend of integrated air-space is already very evident.

(5) The missions of campaign support are arduous

The elevation in status of the air battlefield has resulted in more and more missions and more strenuous [work] shouldered by the Air Force, and this has increased the arduousness and difficulty of Air Force campaign support missions. The tremendous materiel depletion and rapidity of campaign progress requires that logistics and equipment support be fast and prompt and for the Air Force campaign large formation to have sufficient support strengths and flexible support modes. The total aviation munitions input amount in a near-future local war has already reached most of the total depletion amount of the war. Along with the continuous increases to the technical content of Air Force weapons equipment, the dependence on technical support in Air Force operations will also increase daily. Without good technical support, the Air Force will not have higher failure-free rates {lianghaolyu} and sortie rates {chudonglyu}. The quality level of Air Force mission accomplishment is a concern for {shiguan} the overall war situation. Therefore, in order to better adapt to high intensity {gao qiangdu} continuous operations and ensure the Air Force has a higher campaign sortie intensity, not only is it necessary for the Air Force campaign large formation to closely plan and organize for itself, but it is also necessary to make unified acquisitions from across the PLA {cong quanjun tongyi choucuo}.

II. Basic Principles for Air Force Campaigns...561

(1) Focus on the overall situation, be prudent in decision-making

The Air Force campaign commander should stand at the strategic height, focus on the overall war situation and the overall campaign situation, deeply comprehend higher level strategic intent and the requirements of political, diplomatic, and military struggle circumstances on campaigns, and fully recognize the status and role of the Air Force campaign in the overall war situation. On the basis of complete mastery of the enemy situation, our situation and the battlefield situation, seize upon the main problems of campaign overall planning {zhanyi chouhua} and be prudent in decision-making. Correctly select the campaign’s main operational direction and strike targets, accurately grasp the campaign launch time opportunity and campaign phase transitions,

scientifically use force-unit {budui} strengths, and ensure the set campaign goals are reached.

(2) Carefully plan, fully prepare

The situations of an Air Force campaign are sudden, have high intensity and large depletion, and the initial battle {shouzhan} can be the decisive battle {shouzhan}. Campaign success or defeat to a large extent depends on full campaign preparations {chongfen de zhanyi zhunbei}. The campaign commander must, on the basis of the missions entrusted from higher levels, take into consideration the situations from the most complex and most difficult, carefully plan, and fully prepare. In peacetime, he must attach importance to grasping and accumulating various intelligence data and strengthen the study against the operational object {zuozhan duixiang}; on the basis of developing changes in the situations such as the enemy situation and the battlefield environment, at the right time revise and improve the operational preliminary scenarios {zuozhan yu'an}; with key points conduct battlefield construction and materials storage; strengthen adaptability training {shiyingxing xunlian}, know well the plans, preliminary scenarios, and the battlefield environment. Prior to imminent battle, conduct necessary adjustments according to the missions and situations, and accomplish all preparations with concealment and speed {yinbi xunsu} within the stipulated time.

(3) Attach importance to the offensive, combine offense and defense

The offensive is the most basic and most effective means and mode for winning and maintaining initiative in the Air Force campaign. Air Force campaign operations must diligently create and capture combat opportunity and strike the enemy with active initiative. During the offensive campaign, one must implement a powerful and fierce first sudden-attack {shouci tuji} against the enemy as well as continuous offensive-momentum activities {lianxu de gongshi xingdong} and render [the enemy] no way to organize an effective return attack {youxiao huanji}. At the same time, one should organize an effective anti-air defensive {duikong fangyu}, to assist offense with defense {yifang zhugong}, and ensure the stability of the offensive posture {gongshi taishi}. During the air defense campaign, one must establish the thought for offensive-momentum air defense {gongshi fangkong}, actively organize counterattack activities of unequal scales {guimo budeng}, and with offense assisting defense {yigong zhufang}, thoroughly crush the enemy's air raid intention.

(4) Integrated operations, close adjusting-coordination {miqie xietiao}

In an Air Force campaign, each of the campaign strengths, each of the operational directions, and each type of operational activity must be closely complementary {miqie peihe}; only if we scientifically organize the allocation {kexue bianpei} and rationally deploy the various force-units of the service arms and various weapon systems in accordance with mission needs-requirements and operational effectiveness under a unified intent can we form an integrated net strength {zhengti heli}. In order to ensure a

consistent adjusting-coordination of participating force-units, one must implement a unified command of the campaign strengths, carefully formulate the coordination plan, appropriately differentiate the operational missions, clarify the coordination relationships, and strictly organize {yanmi zuzhi} campaign coordination; [one must] establish the institution for adjusting-coordination {xietiao jigou} and strengthen the coordination safeguard-support {xietong baozhang}; [one must] strictly monitor the battlefield situation and promptly adjust and adjust-coordinate {xietiao} the operational activities of the various strengths within the campaign task organization {zhanyi biancheng}; the various force-units must establish the view of integration {zhengti guannian}, set out from the benefit of the overall campaign situation, submit to the unified command, resolutely execute the campaign plan, support each other with confidence, and closely complement each other with initiative.

(5) Concentrate crack [troops], strike enemy vital areas {yaohai}

In Air Force campaign operations, one must firmly establish the thought of concentrating the use of force-unit {budui} strengths. [One must] use crack forces and high-new technical equipment offensively in the main direction and defensively in the direction encountering the biggest threat. In the critical phases of carrying out the missions that play a decisive role for the overall situation, [one must] emphasize strikes on the enemy's vital targets, implement structural destruction {jiegou pouhuai}, and strive for superiorities to subdue the enemy {zhidi}. In concentrating campaign strengths, one should not only stress {bujin yingdang qiangdiao} the concentration of quantities, but stress more {gengying qiangdiao} the concentration of crack troops and cutting-edge weapons {jingbing liqi}, the concentration of firepower and information warfare strengths and to the greatest extent possible, enhance the capability to confront a powerful enemy.

(6) Conceal suddenness, gain victory with the unorthodox

Concealed and sudden activities can result in an enemy not being able to quickly make an effective response. They can remedy the inferiority of our equipment technology and before the enemy's superiority has yet to be effectively brought into play, with one blow [we can] achieve operational goals and win fairly large battle results at a relatively small price. In terms of guidance and force-unit {budui} strength application, the campaign commander should use all means and fighting methods and strive to achieve suddenness and gain victory with the unorthodox. [The campaign commander] must organize campaign preparations and campaign mobility with concealment, ingeniously select the time-opportunities, direction and locations for activities, broadly implement electronic jamming, organize campaign diversions, fully utilize natural conditions such as weather and terrain, and strike the enemy with surprise.

(7) Rapid flexibility, preemptively {xianji} subdue the enemy

The Air Force campaign is intense and violent. It is only through rapid response and mobile flexibility can one capture favorable time-opportunities, preemptively subdue the

enemy, and seize campaign initiative. To this end, the campaign commander should accomplish: rapid gathering of intelligence, rapid setting of the decision, rapid organizing of the plan, and rapid implementation of activities. [He should] also be adept at relying on the battlefield situation, fully bring into play a subjective dynamic quality, study and weigh circumstances, flexibly use and alternate fighting methods, at the right time select and revise the operational directions and strike targets, and compel the enemy into being passive.

(8) Full scale support and give prominence to key points

The operational intensity {zuozhan qiangdu} of the Air Force campaign is high and there are frequent mission transitions {renwu zhuanhuan pinfan}. Material expenditure and personnel/equipment battle losses are great and support is extremely complex. It is necessary to take all factors into consideration and organize all matters of support on a full scale. Establish a scientific support system {baozhang tixi} and rationally employ the various support strengths. Comprehensively utilize various support means and promptly provide the information, materials and technology needed in campaign operations. Safeguard-support [or ensure] campaign command and force-units to safely and smoothly accomplish the campaign missions. At the same time as full scale support, it is necessary to give prominence to the key points, concentrate the main support strengths and the superior support equipment, and support with key points the main operational force-units in operational activities in the main direction and critical time-occasions.

(9) Strengthen political work and bring good traditions into play

The superiority of our military and politics and our fine traditions are the fundamental support for vanquishing the enemy. During a campaign, it is necessary to enhance the strategic awareness {zhanlue yishi} of the combat-participating forces during the campaign, to resolutely implement the orders and instructions from higher-levels, to uphold the absolute leadership of the Party over the armed forces, and to ensure the command and the activities of participating force-units are highly centralized and unified; [it is also necessary to] thoroughly conduct education in patriotism, revolutionary heroism, and the necessity of winning a just war, enabling all personnel to establish the confidence and the resolution of *winning if you have the courage to fight* and to make full use of the fine style of combat with bravery, selfless sacrifice and continuous operations; [it is necessary to] fully exploit the role of condensed power of political work, to firmly establish the view of the overall situation and the integrated operational thought of complement with initiative, mutual assistance, and close coordination; [it is necessary to] combine together the roles of political education and the vanguard model of various levels of leadership and party members, promote the unity between internal portions of force-units and the military-civilian side, and stimulating an intense combat passion; [it is necessary to] direct-guide the officers and soldiers in studying their professional work in depth and proficiently grasping the weapons at hand; [it is necessary to] make full use of democracy in military affairs, continuously study and be innovative in new fighting methods; [and it is necessary to] resolutely struggle against the enemy's psychological

warfare, and actively open-up-develop a political offensive and disintegrate the morale of the enemy military.

Section 3: Air Force Campaign Command and Coordination...564

I. Air Force Campaign Command...564

(1) The command system {zhihui tixi}

Based on different missions and actual situations, the Air Force campaign large formation should adhere to the principles of unified command, reducing the administrative levels, and beneficial coordination to organize and build the command system. One normally builds a bi-level command system of a campaign large formation command institution {zhanyi juntuan zhihui jigou} and a campaign direction (air defense sub-area {fangkong fenqu}) command institution. In a joint campaign, the Air Force campaign command system {kongjun zhanyi zhihui tixi} is an important component of the joint campaign command system, the Air Force campaign large formation commander commands the Air Force campaign activities based on the intent of the joint campaign commander. The Air Force campaign large formation command institution establishes coordination relationships with the relevant service campaign large formation. When independently carrying out an Air Force campaign, the Air Force campaign large formation commander and the command organ command the operational activities of the Air Force campaign large formation based on the intent of the Supreme Command.

The Air Force campaign large formation commander and the command organ [conduct] unified command of the various operational strengths within their formation {biancheng nei} and [conduct] unified organization of various campaign supports; they put forth the assisting-support needs of the other service campaign large formations assisting in operations and they adjust-coordinate the assisting-support activities of the air strengths of other services and air defense strengths.

The campaign direction (or air defense sub-area) command institution [conducts] unified command of the operational activities and various supports of subordinate and attached force-strengths based on the orders and instructions of the campaign large formation command institution.

In order to facilitate command and maintain the stability of command, the Air Force command headquarters {kongjun zhihuibu} will normally set up a main command post {jiben zhihuisuo}, an alternate command post {yubei zhihuisuo}, and based on needs and requirements, it can set up a forward command post {qianjin zhihuisuo}, a direction command posts {fangxiang zhihuisuo}, and an airborne command post {kongzhong zhihuisuo}, etc.

The main command post is the Air Force operation command center for the joint operation. It is normally set up with the commander, general duty personnel, and

departments such as operations, intelligence, communications, classification-security, navigational, electronic warfare, ground air defense, aviation monitoring, weather, and radar departments. Personnel are normally composed of the commanding officer of the Air Force campaign large formation, the political commissar, the chief of staff, the leadership of the command, political, logistics, and equipment departments and the commanders of other services and arms deployed and in support of or representatives for adjusting-coordination and liaison. Also attached are the necessary services support personnel {qinwu baozhang renyuan}.

The main command post is responsible for mastering the complete situation and the activities of a unified command of force-units. The main duties are: mastering and reporting on the complete situation of the joint operation; based on the intent of the joint command headquarters {lianhe zhihuibu} and operational resolution {zuo-zhan jue-xin}, command the unfolding of the various subordinate force-units; determining the operational mission for all force-units; implementing effective control of the operational activities of the various Air Force force-units {budui}; commanding the reserve forces to enter the operation at the appropriate time; commanding and controlling the transition between offensive and defensive operations at the right time; adjusting-coordination between the operational activities of other services; and organizing the various supports.

The alternate command post {yubei zhihuisuo} is a spare command institution established to replace the command of the main command post, and it can be unfolded [deployed] at the same time as the main command post. It is normally composed of the deputy commander {fuzhihuiyuan} of the Air Force campaign large formation and other essential personnel, and it is allocated with essential service and support strengths {qinwu baozhang lilian}. Prior to replacing the main command post, it normally only receives situation reports {qingkuang tongbao}, so at all times, there is an understanding in the progress situation of the operation in order to facilitate taking over command as necessary. If there is excess command capacity {zhihuiliang} at the main command post or in other situations, it is also possible for it to shoulder certain partial command missions in accordance with the instructions of the main command post.

The forward command post {qianjin zhihuisuo} is a command institution established to strengthen the command of the main direction or to facilitate command of Air Force force-units assisting in ground (sea) armed forces operations. It is normally deployed in the main direction fairly close to the forward positions or in the vicinity of army or naval forward command posts coordinating operations. It can also be replaced by subordinate level command posts based on needs and requirements. Generally it is composed of the deputy commander of the Air Force campaign large formation leading the necessary personnel.

The air command post {kongzhong zhihuisuo} is a command institution set up aboard an aircraft. The airborne early warning command aircraft has good mobile performance and its radars and communication equipment receive little effect from the ground. It has a long functional range and it can implement complete airspace surveillance from a fairly

long range. It can promptly discover enemy air targets and command and control-guide our own aircraft and it can independently assume command of a specific area. Thus, the air command post is generally established aboard an airborne early warning aircraft. The airborne early warning aircraft {kongzhong yujing zhihuiji} is mainly under the control of the Air Force campaign large formation commander and normally the deputy commander or deputy chief of staff leads a small amount of command and control and specialized personnel to implement command. Based on the performance and number of airborne early warning command aircraft, the area and extent of early warning command is normally divided according to operational direction or operational mission. In order to implement uninterrupted air surveillance and command, the airborne early warning command aircraft must normally take turns in the air to conduct its activity.

(2) Command mode {zhihui fangshi}

Air Force operations in a joint operation {lianhe zuozhan kongjun zuozhan} normally use directive-style command {mingling shi zhihui} and delegation-style command {weituo shi zhihui} modes. Directive-style command is also called directive-quality command {zhilingxing zhihui} or procedural-style command {chengxu shi zhihui}. Based on its nature, directive-style command can be divided into centralized command {jizhong zhihui} and dispersed command {fensan zhihui}. Centralized command is the main mode and basic requirement of Air Force operational command. Dispersed command is when Air Force force-units are in dispersed activities and the commander independently implements command based on the intent of the higher-level authority. When Air Force aviation forces carry out missions to assist ground- and sea operations, this command mode is generally adopted.

Directive-style command, based on its methods, can be divided into level-by-level command and skip-echelon command. Level-by-level command refers to Air Force combat-participating force-units implementing a level-by-level command based on subordinate relationships and issuing the employment force-strengths, dispatch time-opportunities, strike targets and coordination stipulations, etc., from subordinate level to subordinate level to all subordinate force-units. Skip echelon command is implementing command by skipping a level or several levels. The skip echelon command of the Air Force is being extensively applied in a localized war. A high-level decision-making organ {gaoceng juece jiguan} will sometimes directly command the activities of a small formation of aviation force.

The main characteristics of directive-style command are: clear and specific orders, and higher-level authorities not only give detailed stipulated missions to subordinates, but they also specifically stipulate the methods and time for accomplishing the missions as well as associated coordination matters. This command mode is able to effectively safeguard-support the implementation of the operational intent and benefit the safeguarding-support of a balanced overall situation and the consistently adjusted-coordination of operational activities. It is a basic mode for implementing operational

command under modern conditions, and it is also a frequently used command mode by a campaign commander during Air Force operations.

Delegation-style command is also called guidance-quality command. The main characteristics of this kind of command mode are: the higher level authority normally uses summary-quality instructions to implement macroscopic command over subordinates. When entrusted [delegated] with a mission, one mainly stipulates the major problems of the operations such as the basic operational intent {jiben zuozhan yitu}, the operational target {zuozhan bubiao}, the main operational direction, the force-strengths and weapons, etc. to be reinforced, the specific methods and steps, etc. to accomplish the mission, and then allows subordinate commanders to independently on their own conduct decision-making according to higher level commander intent. When there are two or more operational directions, the Air Force senior officer {kongjun shouzhang} can delegate a subordinate commander in a given direction to implement a unified command of the Air Force force-units in the aforementioned direction based on a general operational intent {zong de zuozhan yitu}. This kind of command mode is favorably suitable for various complex environments and is able to fully bring the initiative, flexibility and creativity of a subordinate commander into play. [Delegation-style command] is an important mode for implementing operational command under high-tech conditions.

II. Air Force Campaign Coordination {kongjun zhanyi xietong}...566

(1) The main content of campaign coordination

Air Force campaign coordination is precisely the adjusting-coordination of complementary activities conducted by the various strengths participating in an Air Force campaign, [conducted] in the various domains of campaign operations and in accordance with the unified plan of a campaign commander and command organ. The main contents include: the coordination of force-strength activities {bingli xingdong} in the campaign main direction and auxiliary directions {fuzhu fangxiang}; the coordination of force-strength activities for each phase of the campaign; the coordination between air offensive force-strengths and force-strengths of air defense operations; the coordination between information operation force-strengths and firepower strike force-strengths; and the coordination between campaign operations and campaign support, etc. Not only is there campaign coordination, there is also tactical coordination {zhanshu xietong}; not only is there internal coordination of the Air Force campaign large formation, there is also the coordination between the other services and arms supporting operations {zhiyuan zuozhan}; not only is there coordination according to the plan, there is also ad hoc coordination. During the course of organizing the implementation of the campaign, the campaign commander and the command organ must correctly and successfully handle the various coordination relationships. In principle, one should: give priority to campaign coordination with tactical coordination as subsidiary; give priority to planned coordination with ad hoc coordination as subsidiary; give priority to the main campaign direction with the secondary direction as subsidiary; establish coordination relationships

by giving priority to the activities of force-units carrying out the main mission and with the activities of force-units carrying out complementing and assisting missions as subsidiary. Also specifically conduct adjusting-coordination in the operational areas (air), strike targets, activity times and methods, etc. of the force-units of various formations {bingtuan}.

(2) The basic methods of campaign coordination

The basic methods commonly used in Air Force campaign coordination are: coordination based on mission, coordination based on target, coordination based on time, coordination based on space {kongjian}, coordination based on phase (time segment), etc.

Coordination based on mission is the conduct of coordination to achieve mission sequencing on the basis of conducting a rational allocation of campaign missions. This normally includes the two situations of the prioritization of accomplishing different operational missions by various groupings (force-units) and the accomplishing of the same mission at the same time by various groupings (force-units). In coordination based on mission, first divide the general mission of campaign operations into missions for each phase (time segment), then rationally allocate the missions of each phase (time segment) to the relevant force-units, while clarifying the coordination methods between each grouping (force-unit) and other groupings (force-units).

Coordination based on target refers to adjusting-coordination of the operational activities of each grouping (force-unit) according to strike targets. In a campaign, sometimes the targets one wants to strike are relatively concentrated and sometimes they are relatively dispersed, so in coordination based on target, the key point is to clarify the main targets each grouping (force-unit) will strike and the degree of destruction. When implementing a repeat strike against a given key point target {zhongdian mubiao}, one can clarify the strike time, the altitude and entry direction {gaodu he jinru fangxiang} for each grouping (force-unit).

Coordination based on time refers to conducting coordination in accordance with the initiation time, the sustained period and activity sequence for each grouping (force-unit). This is generally adopted when organizing the coordination of carrying out strikes on the same targets in the same space by various operational groupings (force-units). Based on the enemy situation, the operational characteristics of the various groupings (force-units), the battlefield environment, etc., clarify coordination relationships, centering on the main battle groupings {zhuzhan jituan} (force-units), organize the coordination actions, and accurately grasp the activity speed {xingdong sudu} and the operational results {zuozhan xiaoguo} of each of the operational groupings (force-units). Based on changes in the battlefield situation and campaign progress {zhanyi jincheng}, adjust the sequence and time of activities and ensure that the time for the activities of the various operational groupings (force-units) are tightly linked in terms of time.

Coordination based on space refers to conducting coordination according to the operational area (air zone), operational direction and operational altitude {zuozhan gaodu}. Generally this is adopted when organizing the implementation of simultaneous operations by various operational groupings (force-units). The campaign commander and command organ should conduct rational division of the activity space for each operational grouping (force-unit), and clarify with key points the operational missions for each operational grouping (force-unit) in different battlefields, different directions, different areas (air zones) and different altitudes based the operational missions, characteristics, battlefield environment, etc. of the operational groupings (force-units).

Coordination based on phase (or time segment) refers to clarifying the basic mission of each operational grouping (force-units) in each phase and stipulating the content and methods of coordination based on the different phases of the campaign progress. Coordination based on phase (or time segment) is precisely a further differentiation of the various campaign phases and an organization of coordination based on every small phase and activity step. Coordination based on phase (time segment) must: grasp the center of gravity of each phase (time segment) of the operation {zuozhan de zhongxin}, and while centering on the center of gravity, employ the campaign strengths and assign operational missions; and closely pay attention to the situation of accomplishing the operational mission in each phase (time segment), and at the right time, transition to the next phase (time segment) of the operation in order for each phase (time segment) of the operation to be closely linked and each loop be closed, ensuring smooth implementation of the campaign.

Section 4: Air Force Campaign Preparation and Implementation...568

I. Air Force Campaign Preparations...568

Air Force campaign preparations refer to the process of the Air Force campaign commander conducting overall planning {zhanyi chouhua} and organization of the campaign, and it is the basis for the activity of the campaign {zhanyi huodong}. Its main contents are: setting the campaign resolution; formulating the campaign plan; organizing campaign coordination; organizing the various kinds of support; concentrating the campaign strengths; guiding and inspecting the campaign preparations; and organizing the training for imminent battle {linzhan xunlian}.

(1) Set the campaign resolution

The campaign resolution {zhanyi juexin} is the basic decision {jiben jue ding} made by the Air Force campaign commander for the goals and activities of the campaign. Setting the campaign resolution is normally determined according to higher level intent, the campaign concept {zhanyi fangzhen}, the operational mission, the enemy situation, our own situation and the situations such as the battlefield environment and weather, and [determined] on the basis of correct situational assessment. Its main content includes: the campaign intention, the main operational direction, the campaign *bushi* disposition, the

basic fighting methods, the coordination actions {xietong dongzuo}, the setting up of command posts, campaign initiation and the time limits for accomplishing campaign preparations, etc.

The campaign intention is namely the goal that the campaign must achieve. Determining the campaign intention must adhere to higher-level intent, the campaign mission, the enemy situation, the battlefield environment, etc. The expression of the campaign intention should be concise and accurate; and it must avoid ambiguity and being difficult to understand and grasp.

The main operational direction is namely the direction for implementing the Air Force main campaign direction. In selecting the main operational direction, one must focus on the overall situation of the campaign and what is beneficial for direct strikes against the enemy's campaign centers of gravity and effectively defending the security of our own main targets. During the Air Force campaign, there are several operational directions {shuge zuozhan fangxiang}, but during any given phase, there should only be one main operational direction. Once the main operational direction has been chosen, it cannot be changed rashly. During the process of implementing the Air Force campaign, when changes of a fundamental nature occur in the battlefield situation, only then should one resolutely make a change, and quickly adjust the main operational direction.

The campaign *bushi* disposition is namely the division, task-organization and deployment {qufen, bianzu yu peizhi} conducted for the operational strengths. To determine the campaign *bushi* disposition, one must focus on creating favorable postures and concentrating strengths in the main direction, in the key point areas and at the critical time segments based on the battlefield conditions.

The basic fighting method {jiben zhanfa} is namely the basic means and ways {jiben shouduan he tujing} for carrying out the campaign. Determining the basic fighting methods should adhere to situations such as the campaign intention, the forming of the force-strengths, the enemy situation, the military geographical environment, etc. It should benefit the development of our strong points and attack the enemy's shortfalls, and it should benefit the seizing of campaign initiative. During the process of the campaign, one should flexibly alter fighting methods according to changes in mission and the enemy situation, etc.

Coordination actions {xietong dongzuo} are the consistent adjusting-coordination activities of force-units carrying out campaign missions based on mission, time and location. One should clarify the coordination relationships and coordination actions, and put forth the principles and requirements of coordination.

For setting up the command posts, this is mainly clarifying the location and time, etc. for composing and setting up each command post at the root level.

For campaign initiation time, the offensive campaign should clarify the time limits for accomplishing offensive preparations and the initiation time; the air defense campaign should clarify the time limit for accomplishing air defense preparations.

(2) Formulate campaign plans

The campaign command organ should adhere to the campaign commander's resolution and promptly formulate the campaign plan. This mainly includes: the general plan for campaign activities {zhanyi xingdong zongti jihua}, the branch plans {fenzhi jihua}, the coordination plans {xietong jihua}, as well as the campaign operation safeguarding-support plan {zhanyi zuozhan baozhang jihua}, the logistics safeguarding-support plan {houqin baozhang jihua}, the equipment safeguarding-support plan {zhuangbei baozhang jihua}, and the political work plan {zhengzhi gongzuo jihua}.

The content of the campaign plan mainly includes: situational assessment and conclusion, the higher-level intent and root-level operational missions, the friendly force missions, the organization, deployment and mission of each operational grouping, the divisions of the campaign phases and the expected situations in each phase, the activity courses of action for each operational grouping in each phase, the coordination events {xietong shixiang}, the organizing of command, the predetermined campaign initiation and conclusion time, and the time limit for accomplishing preparations.

To formulate the campaign plan, one must carry out the commander's operational intent, [one must] establish a footing in handling the most difficult situations, [one must] formulate multiple activity courses of action, and one must make detailed planning {xiangxi jihua} for the initial battle phase and the main operational direction while the follow-up phases can be outline planned {gailue jihua}; centering on the campaign goal[s], look after the relationships between the various campaign directions, campaign phases and campaign activities; as much as possible, use advanced means such as computers, integrate the use of a combination of methods such as parallel exercises, joint exercises and sequential exercises, and to the greatest extent possible, reduce the time for plan formulation while strictly maintaining secrecy.

After the Air Force campaign plan has been formulated, one should conduct simulation derivations {moni tuiyan} on maps or sand tables. One can also utilize computer simulation systems {jisuanji moni xitong} to conduct testing and optimize an optimum course of action.

After the Air Force campaign plan has been formulated, the campaign commander and command organ should promptly adjust and deploy {bushu} the campaign strengths based on the campaign plan. Adjusting the *bushu* disposition of campaign strengths should be conducted in an ordered fashion. Normally, one first adjusts and positions the air defense operational strengths and campaign safeguarding-support strengths, and then adjusts and positions the other campaign strengths. When organizing campaign maneuver {zhanyi jidong}, the campaign commander should select the time opportunity for

maneuver, determine the mode of maneuver as well as the routes and navigational routes for maneuver based on the operational mission, operational conditions, transport support capabilities and maneuver capabilities of each of the force-units. In normal situations, one should use multiple kinds of traffic implements and quickly, safely and covertly implement maneuver from different directions; aviation forces possessing long-range maneuver capabilities {yuancheng jidong nengli} may directly implement maneuver from the depths forward during campaign implementation.

(3) Organize campaign coordination

The campaign commander should promptly guide his command organ to organize campaign coordination based on higher-level relevant coordination instructions and the Air Force campaign activity plan, and [guide his command organ] to clarify the key points and requirements of coordination. When time is pressing, one can clarify the relevant events of campaign coordination at the same time as issuing the operational orders. In organizing campaign coordination, one normally formulates the campaign coordination plan, convenes the coordination meeting, issues the coordination instructions, and organizes the conduct of the basic sequence of coordination drills, [all] on the basis of organizing the important coordination events.

(4) Organize campaign safeguarding-support

The Air Force campaign commander should carefully organize the various support items of the campaign. The campaign command organ should thoroughly formulate the various safeguarding-support plans, promptly issue the safeguarding-support instructions to lower levels, and tightly organize the various safeguarding-support items based on the commander's resolution and the campaign plan.

To organize campaign safeguarding-support, one must actively create and fully utilize various favorable conditions, bring into play the overall combined power of the armed forces and local safeguarding-support strengths, and comprehensively utilize the various safeguarding-support modes and methods. [One must] prepare in advance, [have] unified planning for all considerations, [have] total adjusting-coordination, organize at a full-scale organization, and safeguard-support key points.

(5) Organize imminent battle training {linzhan xunlian}

The campaign commander and the command organ should thoroughly organize imminent battle training. Organize the formation and force-units to gain familiarity of the battlefield environment, activity methods and coordination methods. Raise the capability to organize command by the commander and command organ at each level and further test and improve the operational preliminary courses of action {zuozhan yu'an}. Prewar training is normally conducted under concealment, and when necessary it is possible to organize its implementation by combining deterrence and feints, but one must conceal the campaign intention.

(6) Inspect campaign preparations

The campaign commander and the command organ should inspect and guide the campaign preparation situation of the subordinate units at the right time. The key points are: the level of comprehension of higher-level orders and instructions by force-units; whether the resolution, *bushu* disposition of subordinate commanders and the operational plans are correct; whether [everyone] is familiar with the coordination plan; the preparation situation of the various items of campaign support; and problems needing to be clarified and resolved.

II. Campaign Implementation...571

Air Force campaign implementation is the entire process of conducting operations by the Air Force campaign large formation in order to accomplish campaign missions. From campaign initiation to campaign conclusion, the main links {zhuyao huanjie} include initiating the campaign, pushing forward the development of the campaign, the transitions of the campaign phases, concluding the campaign, etc.

(1) Initiate the campaign

The Air Force campaign commander should determine the time opportunity for campaign initiation based on the higher-level intent, the campaign resolution and plan, and the actual situation of both sides as well as situations such as weather {tianhou} and meteorological {qixiang}. When organizing the offensive campaign, one should closely attend to the dynamic state of the battlefield {zhanchang dongtai}, conscientiously analyze the weather situation, grasp favorable combat opportunities {zhanji}, and initiate the campaign at the right time based on the campaign mission conferred by the higher-level authority. When organizing the defensive campaign, one must use all measures to the extent possible to ascertain the time, force-strengths, main air raid means and targets of the enemy air raids. For example, when the situation permits, one should act before the enemy acts, upset the enemy's air raid plan and strive for the campaign initiative.

The activities of the Air Force campaign normally start from information warfare {xinxi duikang}; sometimes the seizing of information dominance, air dominance, and sea dominance are initiated simultaneously.

(2) Master the battlefield situation {zhangwo zhanchang qingkuang}

The Air Force campaign battlefield is multi-dimensional and the situation is intricate, the Air Force campaign commander and command organ must rigorously master the battlefield situation and promptly adjust-coordinate campaign activities. When there are no fundamental changes occurring in the battlefield situation, they must supervise and urge each of the formations and force-units to implement operations based on the already established resolution and plan. When major changes occur in the battlefield situation and in accordance with specific situations and the requirements of the higher-levels, they

should appropriately adjust the resolution and revise the plan, issue new missions, adjust and re-organize the coordination actions, and ensure the achievement of already established goals.

The methods for mastering the battlefield situation mainly consist of: first, fully utilize intelligence networks {qingbao wangluo} to obtain the battlefield situation; second, utilize battlefield surveillance systems {zhanchang jianshi xitong} to master the battlefield situation; third, obtain battlefield situations via higher level briefs; fourth, adopt means of reconnaissance in the enemy rear area {di hou zhencha de shouduan} to obtain changes to the situations in the enemy depth.

(3) Grasp the campaign centers of gravity {bawo zhanyi zhongxin}

Air Force campaign centers of gravity refer to the critical links {guanjian huanjie} that have decisive significance on the success or failure of the campaign, and are also the central problems that the Air Force campaign commander pays a high level of close attention to and should resolve. The Air Force campaign centers of gravity change along with the development of the campaign. The Air Force campaign commander must firmly grasp the campaign centers of gravity and strengthen command of the critical operational activities that influence the overall situation. [He must] pay close attention to the developing trends of the critical operational activities and promptly adjust unit-force activities or commit new operational strengths. [He must] concentrate force-strengths to the maximum degree, and strengthen support for the main force-units {zhuyao budui} and the main operational activities, ensuring the accomplishment of the critical-nature operational missions {guanjianxing zuozhan renwu}.

After the Air Force campaign commander accurately finds the campaign centers of gravity, he must center on the centers of gravity to coalesce the various participating strengths and concentrate the main strengths to successfully resolve the main contradictions {zhuyao maodun}; [he must] conduct adjusting-coordination with critical operational activities as the core and allow a tight fit between the main battlefield and other battlefields, the main direction and other directions, and between the strengths executing the main mission and other strengths, melding them into a single body and forming a single board of chess. At the same time, in order to push forward and promote the development of the entire war situation, [the commander] should also center on the centers of gravity and successfully resolve other problems related to the centers of gravity.

(4) Actively create and seize combat opportunities

The Air Force campaign commander must tightly grasp the battlefield situation, seek and create combat opportunities {zhanji} with active initiative, and push forward the development of the overall war situation. First and foremost, one must be adept in seeking out and grabbing combat opportunities. During Air Force campaigns under informationized conditions, the battlefield situation is ever-changing, all the services

(arms) of both sides unfold the confrontation in a multi-dimensional battlefield and operational activities are exceedingly complex. During the course of the campaign, a mistake by the enemy {diren de shiwu} provides us with a weakness to exploit. The campaign commander should courageously and resolutely seize the favorable time opportunities, concentrate the strengths to give towards strikes, expand on any slips by the enemy, trap the enemy in unfavorable conditions, and thereby grasp the initiative in campaign development. Secondly, one must create combat opportunities. The campaign commander must adopt various methods, create enemy mistakes {diren de shiwu} by hook or by crook, and force the enemy into disadvantage. For example: through campaign deception, create enemy mistakes in judgment; implement extensive maneuvers to shift the enemy and force the enemy into a disadvantageous position; strike the enemy's main operational systems; disrupt the enemy's capabilities for integrated operations; and actively create favorable time opportunities for promoting campaign development.

(5) Conduct transitions of campaign phases and campaign patterns

The Air Force campaign must achieve the current objectives and subsequent objectives with separate steps; thus campaign progress appears as a certain number of compactly linked phases. There are fairly large differences in the specific objectives in each phase, the main battlefield and operational direction, and the use of strengths {shiyong liliang}. There are also notable differences in the operational patterns {zuo zhan yangshi} and operational methods {zhanfa}. The Air Force campaign commander should master the campaign progress, grasp the time opportunities, and promptly organize the transitions of campaign phases.

The time opportunities of campaign phase transitions are typically: when the goals of the preceding phase of the campaign have basically been achieved; the conditions for the next phase of the campaign already exist; the combat opportunity for operations in the next phase has already emerged; and not transitioning to the next phase of the campaign may result in the appearance of an unfavorable situation for us.

Campaign phase transitions indicate shifts in campaign centers of gravity, so one must meticulously organize [them], act before the enemy acts and prevent disjointed campaign activities during the transition process. Thus, the campaign commander must promptly organize the replenishment or rotation of force-strengths and weapons based on the situation of the progress of the previous phase and based on the needs and requirements of the follow-on campaign mission; [he must] adjust the missions and campaign *bushi* disposition of the relevant force-units, stipulate new coordination relationships, and he must especially clarify ad hoc command relationships and methods to handle unforeseen situations during the course of transitions; [he must] scientifically determine the sequence of the transition to benefit the adjusting-coordination activities of the overall situation; and adopt the various types of camouflage and deception measures and conceal the intention. When the transitions between campaign phases cannot be implemented as preplanned, it must be reported to the higher-level authority.

(6) Organize the conclusion of the campaign

The campaign commander should promptly set the resolution for concluding the campaign based on the needs and requirements of the overall situation, the situation of campaign mission completion, the battlefield circumstances {zhanchang xingshi}, as well as the development trends, etc., and then report to the higher levels for approval. The basic requirement is to make every effort to conclude the campaign under a situation favorable for us and unfavorable for the enemy.

The time opportunities for concluding the campaign are normally: when the campaign goal has already been reached or already essentially reached; when the originally set campaign goal has not been reached but the development of the campaign has already reached an impasse; and when combat losses are excessive and there is no way to complete the originally set campaign mission. [In this latter case] one should resolutely conclude the campaign in order to preserve force-strength and strive for initiative.

When organizing the campaign conclusion, one must consolidate the battle results already achieved, closely monitor enemy activities, promptly organize the adjustments to force-strengths, and accomplish combat preparations or maintain the stipulated readiness states.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 28

The Air Offensive Campaign...575

An air offensive campaign is a campaign conducted per a unified intention and plan {*jihua*} by an Air Force campaign large formation independently or with the coordination of other service arms, primarily employing air strikes, in order to achieve strategic and campaign goals. An air offensive campaign is a campaign pattern with extremely strong initiative, and is also the campaign pattern most able to bring into play the strong points of the air strengths' rapid long-range maneuvers and awesome precision firepower strikes. In localized war under informationized conditions, an air offensive campaign is a major means whereby our Army seizes the initiative in war, and achieves strategic and campaign goals. According to the operational mission and goal, air offensive campaigns can be divided into several patterns: air offensive campaigns to seize air superiority, air offensive campaigns for weakening the enemy's war potential, air offensive campaigns to isolate a battlefield, air offensive campaigns to annihilate the enemy's massive-force groups, and air offensive campaigns to achieve special goals.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...575

I. Characteristics...575

The rapid development of air raid arms, the diversification of air raid means, and the gradual perfection of anti-aircraft defensive systems have caused modern air offensive campaigns to assume new characteristics.

(1) Strong policy, highly hierarchical decision-making

In localized wars under informationized conditions, air offensive campaigns normally are not purely for achieving military goals, but quite often are for achieving political objectives pursued by the State. The politically sensitive nature of campaign activities is very strong, the areas affected are large, and decision-making authority for many major problems in campaigns often is held in the hands of the strategic decision-makers. For example, the campaign intention, campaign scale, campaign launch opportunity, and the designation of strike targets, as well as the requirements on destruction of targets, all must be carefully decided – based on the requirements of political and diplomatic struggles – by the highest command decision-making level.

(2) Seizure of the initiative for operations, facilitating grasping the first opportunity for gain

An air offensive campaign is a kind of active offensive operational activity, which grasps the initiative in a number of areas: the campaign scale, the application of forces and arms, the operational direction, the operational opportunities, the strikes on targets, and the degree of damage. This provides favorable conditions for the campaign commander and

command organ to organize, plan, and prepare the campaign. A campaign commander and command organ will use the relatively sufficient time available to: analyze the enemy situation, our situation, and the battlefield circumstances; painstakingly plan and prepare the campaign; select the most favorable opportunity and direction; employ the most appropriate forces and arms; adopt the most effective war strategies and tactics; execute strikes on targets in the enemy's vital areas; and seize the first opportunity to restrain the enemy.

(3) Operations penetrating into the enemy's depth, and complex battlefield situations

Air offensive campaigns are air operational activities conducted by penetrating into the enemy's strategic campaign depth. Since our reconnaissance strengths and means are limited, and since the enemy in order to protect his own safety inevitably must adopt a variety of measures for concealing the true and displaying the false, we will thus find it difficult to accurately grasp information on the enemy area's terrain, meteorology, air defense *bushi* disposition, and operational posture, and also find it difficult to make accurate, comprehensive forecasts of changes in the battlefield situation – all of which have increased the difficulties of for a campaign commander and command organ to organize, plan, and prepare a campaign.

(4) The enemy's tight antiaircraft defense, highly difficult to penetrate

The targets that must be struck in air offensive campaigns mostly are situated in the enemy's strategic and campaign depth. The enemy possesses high-tech superiority, and not only has powerful air offensive capabilities, but also has established a tight antiaircraft defensive system. The enemy has constructed a high-efficiency, tight reconnaissance and early warning (R&EW) system comprised of many kinds and forms of radar, airborne warning and control system (AWACS) planes, and early-warning satellites; and by using a tight air-defense firepower system comprised of various models of fighters, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), and employing a computer-based command and control (C2) system with a very high degree of automation, the enemy has greatly boosted the overall effectiveness of his air defense operations, which has made the task of operational penetration extremely arduous. Faced with a structurally complex, functionally powerful, highly resistant modernized air defense system – under conditions where our Army's high-tech content in air offensive weapons is still not high, the informationized degree still relatively low, the equipment complement not strong, and the means of penetration basically single – the need to smoothly penetrate the enemy's antiaircraft defenses will have an [associated] extremely high difficulty.

(5) High operational intensity, great depletion, and arduous support missions

Air offensive campaigns have expansive battlefields, a wide distribution of strike targets, many quantities, and extremely arduous missions. In order to fight a quick battle to form a quick decision, to achieve the operational goals as fast as possible, to emphasize

execution of a powerful first strike against the enemy, to seize control over the battlefield, and thus to execute high-intensity and continuous strikes against the enemy, the campaign from first to last is conducted with a rapid tempo, amid high-intensity, sharp confrontations; campaign consumption/depletion is enormous, which makes the campaign support missions extremely arduous.

II. Requirements...577

(1) Full preparations

“A superior position without preparedness is not true superiority, while an inferior position with full preparedness often can defeat an enemy with the superior position.” Although an air offensive campaign in respects such as the launch opportunity and the selection of the main attack direction seizes a certain initiative, nevertheless – owing to fairly distinct uncertainties in operations penetrating into enemy areas and in the battlefield situation, and to a greater number of chance factors impacting operational activities – one thus must carry out full preparations. To this end, in peacetime one must lay stress on acquiring and accumulating data, and enhance research on the enemy targets; one must formulate a scientific, thorough, feasible campaign plan {jihua}, and at the proper time revise and perfect it, according to the enemy situation and the developing changes in the operational environment; one must in key-point fashion perform battlefield construction and storage of materiel; and [one must] enhance adaptive training, conduct repeated drills, become intimately familiar with the operational plan {jihua}, and seek effective methods for vanquishing the enemy.

(2) Concealment and suddenness (surprise)

Concealment and suddenness are critical means for achieving surprise attacks, and for seizing the operational initiative. In air offensive campaigns, fulfilling the requirements for concealment and suddenness enables one to shorten the enemy’s early warning time, increase his difficulty in organizing antiaircraft defenses, limit his realization of the effectiveness of high-tech weaponry, create chaos among the enemy, minimize our losses, and achieve the ideal operational effectiveness. In particular, under conditions where the enemy’s antiaircraft defensive system is fairly tight, the means for friendly penetration scarce, and the capabilities insufficient, one should even more stress suddenness in campaign activities. In order to achieve concealment and suddenness, one must adopt a variety of measures to contend with the enemy’s various reconnaissance activities, and to see that one’s own various activities are conducted in a state of secrecy, and not discovered by the enemy; one must strictly limit the personnel in contact with the operational plan {jihua}, as much as possible shorten the campaign preparation time, and enhance camouflage for materiel and equipment; one must [enforce] strict communications discipline, so as to avoid disclosing the operational intention; one must enhance research on the enemy’s operational patterns, and seek out enemy defects that can be exploited; and one must formulate a plan {jihua} for lifelike feints and deception, conduct large-scale force-unit {budui} feints and electronic feints, employing a variety of

methods and means such as the news media to deceive, paralyze, and confuse the enemy, and to create “time differences” and “spatial differences” in the enemy’s judgment, so as to achieve the goal of concealing the intention.

(3) Active initiative

Initiative is a freedom of military activities; it is the most effective means for gaining and maintaining the initiative. The campaign commander must, based on objective conditions, want to bring into play subjective initiative actions and create the spirit – amid the complex rapidly changing air battlefield environment, particularly under conditions where weaponry is in an inferior position – for active initiative, for boosting one’s strong points, and for attacking the enemy’s weak points. One must focus on the differing situations, judge the hour and size up the situation, grasp the key links, seize opportunities for battle, and actively attack. One must integrate offense with defense, and simultaneously with the active offensive, skillfully make preparations for defending against an enemy counterattack, and all along seize the campaign initiative.

(4) Striking vital areas

Striking vital areas is the main way to gain the upper hand in an air offensive campaign. In the air offensive campaigns we organize and wage in the future, what we will contend against will be a large-scale system, organically comprised of a reconnaissance and detection system, a firepower strike system, and a C2 system; and the enemy’s realization of operational capability mainly will be dependent on the coordinated operation of this large-scale system. In this large-scale system are present many strategic-point targets for which “pulling out one hair affects the whole body,” and which involve the overall situation. Examples include communications hubs, reconnaissance and early warning systems, Air Force bases, C2 centers, the industrial and energy facilities supporting the nation’s economy and war potential, etc. Concentrated strengths executing key-point strikes against these targets can exert the effect of yielding twice the result with half the effort, rapidly leading to the collapse of the enemy’s operational system, shaking his force-unit {budui} morale and popular sentiment, and accelerating the operational course. Hence, if one wants to rapidly achieve the goals of an air offensive campaign, one must adhere to the principle of striking vital areas. To this end, first, one must precisely select the strategic-point targets. One should meticulously select strike targets which occupy the strategic commanding heights and those of the campaign overall situation, and which center around realizing strategic and campaign goals; one must precisely select the strike targets from the starting point of sabotaging the enemy’s operational architecture; based on one’s own operational capability, one must precisely select the strike targets, ensuring that the strikes will yield results, and that they cannot fail; and one must at the proper time shift the key-point strike targets, according to the developing changes in the war situation. Next, one must apply forces with key-points. One should concentrate the application of a variety of airborne long-range precision strike strengths along the main direction, in the key point areas, and at the critical occasions; strive for forming

superiority against the enemy's vital area targets; and ensure that the destruction is achieved.

(5) Fighting a quick battle to form a quick decision

Fighting a quick battle to form a quick decision is a characteristic of localized wars under informationized conditions, which is an objective requirement for air offensive campaigns. Operations in localized wars under informationized conditions are subject to constraints from many factors, have a strong politically sensitive nature, involve enormous depletion, and require fighting a quick battle to form a quick decision, so as to strive for the initiative in strategic and campaign respects. To this end, the first need is to do a good job of full preparations. A campaign commander and command organ should – based on the enemy's operational intention and possibly adopted activities, and on our side's operational missions and capability, as well as on possibly developing changes in the battlefield situation: organize their subordinate units in timely and concealed fashion to ably carry out all the preparatory work; achieve the issuing of orders at one stroke; be able to immediately throw the forces into operations; and not fight a battle without preparations. The second need is to strive for fighting the first battle well. The goals of future air offensive campaigns will be limited, and operational times will be brief; the enemy side and our side, in order to seize the initiative, both will devote extreme attention to the first battle, so that this opening battle will have a decisive nature, and will have a major impact on the course and outcome of operations. To this end, one must meticulously plan, meticulously prepare, grasp well an opportunity for battle, concentrate strengths, execute a powerful first strike, accomplish the whole task at one stroke, and strive for a first battle one will certainly win. The third need is to concentrate elite troops and efficient weapons. One should concentrate application of various types of elite air strengths, strive to form an overwhelming superiority over the enemy along the main direction and in key areas, and execute nodal strikes on the enemy's strategic-point targets, to paralyze the enemy's operational system in one stroke. The fourth need is to grasp well the inherent links among the various battles. One should cleverly, rationally, and capably arrange the ties and coordination between battles, and see that all of the battle activities are mutually coordinated and mutually complementary; this boosts overall operational effectiveness, accelerates the course of the campaign, and achieves the goal of fighting a quick battle to form a quick decision.

Section 2: Main Activities...579

In an air offensive campaign, the confrontations between the enemy and us will be tense and sharp; a campaign commander and command organ should correctly understand the higher level intention, accurately predict the war situation's development, grasp the campaign's center(s) of gravity, implement the correct guidance, and ensure the realization of the campaign goals.

I. Organizing Information Operations...579

Information operations in an air offensive campaign normally are launched before air offensive activities, but permeate through the entire course of the campaign; at times in the early stage of the campaign they also can become a relatively independent phase.

(1) Organizing information reconnaissance

Information reconnaissance is a prerequisite for the smooth execution of information operations, and should be launched [per] a unified plan {*jihua*}, as early as possible. A campaign commander and command organ should use all reconnaissance strengths – space, air, sea, and ground – and adopt various means and measures to widely collect intelligence information on the enemy’s information operations, and to ascertain the composition and allocation of enemy information systems, the enemy’s main means for executing information operations, and the enemy information systems’ command hubs and computer network nodes, as well as the quantities and performance of information weaponry. In particular, they should devote attention to properly organizing information reconnaissance activities prior to the launch of the campaign, and lay stress on ascertaining the target parameters of the enemy early-warning system, antiaircraft command guidance system, SAM and AAA guidance systems, airborne fire control system, and command communications system, in order to create favorable conditions for attacking well in the opening of the campaign.

(2) Organizing an information offensive

An information offensive means the application of a variety of information operation weapons in “soft”-“hard” integrated assault activities conducted against the enemy’s information systems. Its goal is to sabotage (damage) or interrupt the pathways of enemy information systems so as to create the conditions for seizing information superiority.

Jamming and deception. Under conditions where our jamming strengths and means are limited, jamming activities normally are conducted in combination with air offensive activities. One should: concentrate various jamming forces along the main direction of the air offensive, at key times such as the air strike formations’ departure, penetration, and strikes; conduct intense jamming suppression of the enemy’s electromagnetic (EM) targets; emphasize jamming of targets such as the enemy’s R&EW satellites, AWACS planes, ground-based long range early warning radar, interception and guidance radar, and SAM guidance radar, as well as command guidance system; and weaken the enemy’s information operations capability, so as to create favorable conditions for the penetration and strike activities of the air strike formations. Simultaneously, one must actively adopt a variety of electronic feint measures, and conduct electronic deception against the enemy, to confuse and move the enemy troops, and to create misconceptions among the enemy, causing him difficulty in distinguishing between the true and the false.

Firepower destruction. The main means are as follows: (a) using anti-radiation unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), anti-radiation ballistic missiles, anti-radiation cruise missiles, and airborne anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) to execute anti-radiation strikes on the enemy's important EM targets, such as early warning radars and missile guidance radars, and to cripple and blind the enemy's air defense system; (b) before the strike formation takes off, using some of the strike forces with high penetration capability to first execute strikes against the enemy's C2 centers, R&EW system, and nodal targets in his air defense firepower system, thus opening up gaps in the enemy's air defense system and causing the enemy difficulty in organizing effective interception activities; and (c) using some high-performance fighters, taking off in concealed fashion, to execute sudden (surprise) attacks on the enemy's AWACS planes, and [thus] sever the enemy's major information support.

Computer network attacks. This means use of computer units (elements) – adopting methods such as information theft, tampering, deletion, deception, and blocking – to execute attacks against the computer networks of the enemy's information system, and thus paralyze them and weaken the enemy air defense operational capability so as to create the conditions for the air strike operations.

(3) Organizing information defense

Simultaneously with execution of an information offensive against the enemy, a campaign commander and command organ must also tightly organize a good information defense and ensure the security of one's own information system.

Defending against enemy information reconnaissance. A campaign commander and command organ should comprehensively and in key-point fashion organize counter-enemy-information-reconnaissance activities which center on the concealment of the campaign intention and critical targets. They must make integrated use of many methods and means – such as defilades, dispersion, camouflage, establishment of dummy targets, release of false information, feint deception, maintaining secrecy to defend against traitors, control over the news media and EM radiation sources, and protection for computer network security – to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's reconnaissance.

Countering enemy jamming [i.e. ECCM]. Countering enemy jamming is a core element in organizing information defense. One should – with radar counter-jamming and communications counter-jamming as the key points – make integrated use of a variety of counter-jamming (anti-ECM) tactics and technical means to resolutely defeat the enemy's execution of jamming activities against us, and to ensure the normal operation of our information system.

Countering enemy firepower destruction. When the enemy executes firepower strikes against our information system, one should make integrated use of several methods and means – control of radiation, multi-station interchange of operations (or “shuffling,”

{jiaohuan gongzuo}), mobile evasion, and firepower cover – to evade or lessen the enemy firepower’s destruction or sabotage of our information system.

Defending against enemy network attacks. One should rigorously enforce computer network management, especially management of core network stations. One must strictly limit privilege (access) at all levels, and must take strict precautions against theft of network codes, passwords, and addresses; one must wall off (compartmentalize) computer operations, and as much as possible reduce or not set up external interfaces, in order to defend against enemy network intrusions; and one must enhance defense of network systems, to prevent enemy agents from conducting physical sabotage or virus sabotage against [our] networks.

II. Implementing Air Penetration...581

Air [i.e. airspace] penetration is an activity in which an aviation forces strike group (formation), executing an air offensive operation, breaks through an enemy air defense system. Penetration of the enemy’s anti-aircraft defense is a prerequisite for conducting an air offensive campaign, and its success or failure has a major impact on the campaign’s course and outcome. At present, for our main operational targets, we have established a long/medium/short-range, high/medium/low-altitude integrated tight air defense system; but our high-performance attack aircraft are limited in numbers, have weak overall penetration capability, and have relatively great difficulty if they must penetrate the dense resistance of the enemy aircraft bombs/missiles and cannon. Hence, one must flexibly employ a variety of penetration modes and means to ensure that the strike forces smoothly break through the enemy’s anti-aircraft defense.

(1) Concealment of the true and display of the false, and stealthy penetration

Stealthy penetration, also called surprise penetration, means an unexpected penetration of an enemy air defense system by an aviation forces strike formation adopting a variety of measures to conceal the true and hide the false, and to confuse and move the enemy, with the aid of secret activities. This penetration method has the advantages of high concealment, low losses, a high success rate, and economy of force. If this method is adopted properly, one can often achieve the effect of yielding twice the result with half the effort. In localized wars under future informationized conditions, the enemy will have established an advanced intelligence and early warning system, and will be able to realize omni-bearing, omni-temporo-spatial reconnaissance and surveillance over battlefield targets, with unprecedented enhancement of battlefield transparency, which will magnify the difficulty of our execution of stealthy penetration. Hence, if one needs to achieve stealthy penetration, one must – while keeping the character “qi” [surprise] always in mind – defeat the enemy with a surprise raid.

First, one must select a stealthy route for the penetration. In order to achieve stealth in the penetration activity, the air strike formation’s route should as much as possible avoid the enemy’s tight areas of air defense firepower, and penetrate from the relatively weak areas

of air defense firepower – the enemy air defense *bushu* disposition’s fringes and sparse areas. By exploiting blind zones in the enemy radar and detecting weak spots, one reduces the probability of being discovered by the enemy. One may also adopt a route full of twists and turns, and be constantly changing, causing the enemy difficulty in accurately ascertaining the intention of our activity.

Second, adopt an advantageous flight profile for penetration. If conditions permit, the air strike formation normally should adopt a flight profile with low-altitude/ultralow-altitude flight toward the target, to shorten the detection range of the enemy’s early warning system and reduce the enemy anti-aircraft system’s probability of resistance. When the strike target range is relatively long, one may also adopt a medium/ high-altitude profile when taking off, switch to low altitude and ultralow altitude when approaching the target, and switch back to a medium/high-altitude flight profile for the return flight after the strike on target is completed, so as to increase the attack radius of the strike formation.

Third, exploit favorable meteorological conditions for penetration. Since our aviation forces’ night operational capability is not high, air strike formations normally take off before dawn, strike at daybreak, exploit an opportunity when the enemy easily relaxes its vigilance and neglects to take precautions, and thus damage the enemy air defense system.

Fourth, adopt deception measures to execute the penetration. One may use various means for concealing the true and displaying the false, such as feints and false communications; this confuses and moves the enemy, creates distortion of enemy intelligence, causes the enemy faulty judgment and mishandling, draws the enemy air defense firepower toward other directions, and screens the main strike formation’s smooth penetration of the enemy air defense system.

In addition, one may also adopt technical and tactical measures such as control of the strike formation’s use of airborne electronic equipment, and use of stealth techniques, to improve the air strike formation’s penetration capability. The above penetration measures each have their advantages and disadvantages; a campaign commander and command organ should – setting out from the actual circumstances of an operation – weigh these advantages and disadvantages, pursue gain while avoiding harm, and apply in integrated fashion many types of penetration methods and means, so as to obtain the optimal penetration results.

(2) “Soft” suppression with “hard” destruction, for storming penetration

Storming penetration means integrating electronic “soft” suppression with firepower “hard” destruction, forcing and breaking open gaps in the enemy’s air defense system, and opening up air penetration corridors, ensuring that the strike forces smoothly penetrate the enemy air defense system and execute the strike on the preassigned target(s). The strong points of storming penetration are little effect from external factors, the ability to directly destroy the enemy’s effective strength and damage the enemy’s air

defense system, and the ability to create favorable conditions for follow-on strike activities. During storming penetration, one should – based on circumstances such as the scale of the strike forces and the position of the strike targets – determine and open up one or more air defense [penetration] corridors. To ensure that the strike forces smoothly penetrate, one should organize a joint air fleet comprised of formations for reconnaissance, jamming, suppression, screening, strikes, and support, to storm and break through the enemy’s air defense system.

Organizing air reconnaissance. An air reconnaissance formation, before the strike formation’s activities, conducts detailed reconnaissance of the preassigned penetration route and target areas, and ascertains the exact positions of the enemy air defense *bushu* disposition and targets, so as to create favorable conditions for follow-on jamming activities and strike activities.

Organizing jamming suppression [blanket jamming]. One should concentrate the application of air jamming forces, adopt the method of area jamming integrated with escort jamming, and conduct integrated jamming suppression of the enemy’s EM targets. Simultaneously, one should execute anti-radiation attacks, using anti-radiation attack weapons, against the enemy’s major EM targets, such as early warning radars and air-defense missile guidance radars, and open up one or more strong jamming zones in the enemy air defense system. This creates confusion and blind zones in the enemy radar, communications interrupts, loss of effectiveness in air defense weapons, ineffective command, and reduced operational effectiveness in the enemy air defense system.

Organizing firepower suppression. The forces tasked with suppression missions should make full use of the effects of electronic suppression, concentrate firepower to destroy the enemy SAMs and AAA positions in the vicinity of the air strike formation’s strike route, form one or more ground air-defense firepower blank zones, and establish a penetration corridor(s). For fairly high-threat enemy combat aircraft airfields, one should watch the situation and suppress and blockade them using firepower. In an operation where one has the support of the Army, Navy, and 2nd Artillery Corps, targets within the firepower ranges of Army artillery and Navy ship guns can be suppressed by Army and Navy support forces tasked, while the 2nd Artillery Corps should fully bring into play its powerful penetration capability, and mainly use it to suppress targets such as the enemy airfields and major air defense missile positions.

Organizing assault force strength penetration. The air assault formation should [fly] along the penetration corridor(s) opened up by the jamming and suppression forces, and using an advantageous formation, rapidly penetrate the enemy’s air defense firepower zone. When encountering an air defense firepower block by enemy remnants, the formation should adopt maneuver measures to evade the block; and when encountering interception by enemy combat aircraft, the formation must guard against entanglement with the enemy combat aircraft, and, under the cover of screening forces, should rapidly disengage and fly toward the preassigned strike target(s).

Organizing air cover. The air cover formation should adopt the method of area screening integrated with escort screening, to wipe out or drive away the enemy combat aircraft posing the highest threat to our strike formation. When the enemy air interception force is fairly small, not posing a high threat to our strike formation, the air cover formation as much as possible should avoid engaging that enemy force; but when the enemy air interception is ferocious, posing a fairly high threat to the strike formation, the air cover formation should resolutely initiate an air battle with the enemy, and wipe out or drive away the intercepting enemy. During such a battle, the air cover formation should avoid too many entanglements with the enemy planes, so as to prevent the strike formation's prolonged loss of air cover.

Stealthy penetration and storming penetration are the two basic means of penetration in an air offensive operation, and each has its strong points. In future air offensive campaigns, one should integratively apply these two penetration methods, make best of the advantages to offset the disadvantages, and complement one's superiorities, so as to achieve the optimal penetration results.

III. Implementing the Air Assault...584

Execution of the air strikes is the most major, most critical operational activity of an air offensive campaign, and directly impacts whether the operational goal can be achieved. The development of air weaponry has maximally enriched the means of air offensive operations; traditional air strike modes – such as air strikes by a single service and using a single aircraft type, and close air {linkong} bombing – will be replaced by modes such as joint strikes by multiple services and aircraft types, long-range air raids, and beyond-defense-area (“standoff”) strikes. At the same time, the destructive capability of air strikes will also see unprecedented enhancement; one will be able to use precision guided munitions (PGMs) such as laser guided bombs to execute pinpoint precision strikes on the enemy, will be able to use surface antipersonnel agents such as cluster bombs to execute covering strikes on the enemy, and further will also be able to use new-concept munitions such as EM-pulse (EMP) bombs and graphite bombs to execute incapacitating strikes on the enemy. In order to achieve the optimal strike effects, one should integratively apply a variety of strike and destruction modes and methods. Air strikes include the first strike and follow-on strikes.

(1) First assault

The first assault is the first assault activity conducted against the enemy, within a certain time in the operation's initial phase, by concentrated strengths in several waves. Its goals are – by executing surprise, fierce assaults on key and strategic targets within the enemy's full depth – to effectively weaken the enemy's overall operational capability, and to paralyze the enemy's operational system, in order to create conditions for the follow-on assault activities. In air-raid operations under informationized conditions, the first battle will in fact have a decisive nature; victory or defeat in the first battle will have a major effect on the course and outcome of the entire campaign, and if the first battle is

fought well, sometimes it will be able to exert the effect of setting the tune with one stroke. For example, the U.S. military's air raid on Libya and Israel's air raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor both were accomplished with a single assault, thus achieving the operational goal. In order to fight the first battle well, one must have the resolve to fulfill the whole task at one stroke, and go beyond the normal use of forces and arms; one should employ most, or even all of the assault forces in the first assault so as to achieve the optimal strike effects.

Concentrate strengths to strike at vital targets. The enemy's air defense system and air counterattack operational system pose the highest threats to our execution of an air offensive campaign, and should be attacked in concentrated fashion during the first assault. One must adopt a method integrating beyond-defense-area ("standoff") long range attacks with close air bombing, carpet bombing, and precision assaults, to conduct concentrated assaults and continuous assaults – in multiple directions and multiple waves – against critical targets, such as the enemy's command centers, operational aircraft-basing airfields, early warning radar, SAM positions, and communications hubs, so as to seize battlefield air superiority. If the scale of the assault forces is fairly large, one can also execute assaults against: the enemy's political, economic, and cultural centers; war-potential targets such as those in the enemy's major energy-resources and hydroelectric infrastructure; and other major targets, such as military bases and military facilities. Based on differences in the assault targets and battlefield environments, one should flexibly apply forces and arms. For targets in the strategic interior, as well as targets in a tight anti-aircraft defense, one mainly employs airborne long-range PGMs to execute beyond-defense-area ("standoff") long-range precision assaults, or uses stealth aircraft to execute stealth assaults. For targets where the enemy anti-aircraft defense is relatively weak, the assault formation, under cover of intense electronic suppression, conducts close-air bombing or semi-close-air bombing against the enemy. To ensure that the first assault has fairly high intensity, one can apply methods such as initiating use of reserve airfields, guard(ed) airfields, and old airfields, and expropriating civilian airports, to increase as much as possible the number of aircraft takeoff/landing platforms within the theater; and one can also apply the method of roll-outs of forces inside and outside the theater to launch an attack, which resolves the problem of not enough airfields and increases the assault density.

Closely coordinate the activities of all air formations. In order to ensure the smooth fulfillment of the first assault's mission, one should closely coordinate the activities of all air formations. The various air formations should – under the unified command of the AWACS plane – execute the assaults on targets per the preassigned plan {*jihua*}. The jamming formation uses multiple means to conduct jamming and suppression of the enemy's various radar and command and communications facilities; the suppression formation conducts effective suppression and destruction of enemy ground-based air defense weapons surrounding the target area(s) and of airfields whose combat aircraft pose a fairly high threat to us, and clears away obstacles so that the assault formation can smoothly launch the assault activity; the cover formation captures a favorable position in a direction from which the enemy aircraft are likely to attack, patrols for alert, and at any time is ready to wipe out the counterattacking enemy. All assault formations, after

completing their assault missions, should rapidly disengage and fly back along a direction that will not affect the follow-on formations' activities.

(2) Follow-on assaults

The follow-on assaults mean the assault activities conducted after the first assault. Their goals are to execute assaults on targets which the first assault was unable to destroy, on targets not yet struck, and on newly discovered targets; to consolidate and expand the gains of the first assault; and to comprehensively achieve the operational goal.

Promptly ascertain the results of the first assault. A campaign commander and command organ should employ many means – space reconnaissance, air reconnaissance, sea reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, and radio technical reconnaissance – to promptly ascertain the results of the first assault and the changing situation of the enemy force strength *bushu* disposition, and, on that basis, modify the follow-on assaults' resolution and organize units to handle further preparations to be initiated.

Fully exploit the first assault's gains, flexibly apply war fighting methods, and organize continuous assaults. In the follow-on assaults, one should fully exploit the gains of the first assault; as much as possible shorten the time interval after the first assault; before the enemy has recovered from the shock of having suffered our first assault, concentrate forces and arms to execute supplemental assaults, concentrated assaults, and continuous assaults against the enemy's major targets; and maintain continuous, uninterrupted pressure against the enemy until the preassigned goal has been achieved. Normally, for those major targets which have already suffered damage to a certain degree, one should organize strengths to strike them with priority, strive to thoroughly destroy them, and then again concentrate forces to assault against the follow-on assault targets within the plan *{jihua}* and against newly found targets. The targets that must be attacked in the follow-on assaults include not only political targets, such as government bodies, [radio] broadcasting stations, and TV stations, but also economic targets, such as transportation hubs, energy resources, and hydroelectric infrastructure, and moreover military targets, such as command centers, Air Force and Navy bases, missile positions, and logistics facilities. In the end, the kind of targets that serve as key points for the strikes should be flexibly determined based on the requirements of the strategic and campaign overall situation and on our assault capabilities. The follow-on assaults normally have a fairly long duration, and should scientifically and rationally employ forces and arms to enhance the logistical and equipment technical support and to maintain the capability for successive strikes.

IV. . Operations to Resist the Enemy's Air Counterattacks...586

Operations to resist the enemy's air counterattacks are major operational activities in an air offensive campaign, and are defensive operations during an offensive. Their goals are to ensure the stability of the air offensive campaign *bushi* disposition, the security of major targets within the theater, and the smooth launch of the air offensive activities. In

localized wars under informationized conditions, the battlefield has a high degree of transparency; in organizing and conducting an air offensive campaign, it is difficult to avoid its activities being discovered by the enemy. Hence, in the process of organizing and conducting the campaign, the enemy inevitably wants to execute fierce air counterattacks against us. Enemy air counterattack activities normally can occur at two opportunities: one is when the campaign preparations are detected by the enemy, who will then adopt activities to strike first to gain the initiative, and sabotage our campaign preparations; the other is during the process of executing the strikes, when the strike forces have still not returned, or [just] after the return landing. As for the targets of the enemy counterattack, the enemy will first direct its focus toward our airfields for basing the strike forces, C2 centers, and communications hubs, as well as other major targets. In order to ensure the smooth execution of the air offensive campaign, a campaign commander and command organ should attach high importance to, and spare no effort in, organizing operations to resist enemy air counterattacks.

(1) Actively organize the counterattack operations

In the preparations phase of an air offensive campaign, the campaign commander and command organ should as early as possible establish a resistance operational *bushi* disposition centering on the key-point guarded targets, such as the major airfields, command institutions, conventional missile positions, and early warning system, and defend first those targets not yet attacked. When the enemy executes an air counterattack against us, one should organize strengths to execute a determined counterattack against the incoming enemy, to ensure the security of our air-offensive operational *bushu* disposition and major targets, and to ensure the smooth conduct of the air offensive campaign.

Air interception. Along the direction of the enemy's possible counterattack, using some of one's fighter aviation forces, one should adopt an air alert mode, capture a favorable airspace for patrol alert, and when the enemy aircraft attack, rapidly press forward and intercept them as far away as possible. The fighter aviation forces units on alert at airfields should fully exploit the gains of the interception as far away as possible, set off in echelons, execute continuing interception of the attacking enemy aircraft, strive to annihilate the enemy's main force strengths in the air, and disorganize the enemy air raid *bushi* disposition, so as to create conditions for the ground resistance.

Ground interdiction. One may use some of the mid-to-long-range SAMs in a protrusive {qianshen} *bushu* disposition, to execute maximum-range interception of the enemy. Using the main ground-based air defense forces – centering on the enemy's main incoming direction and key-point guarded targets – one should establish a long/medium/short-range, high/medium/low-altitude integrated resistance *bushi* disposition with key points; execute layer-by-layer interception of the attacking enemy aircraft; strive to annihilate the enemy aircraft before they can drop their bombs; and intercept the [enemy] cruise missiles outside the area of the guarded targets.

(2) Tightly organize protective activities

Protective activities mean protective measures – for concealment, dispersion, and camouflage – adopted to evade or minimize the damage created by the enemy air raids. In localized wars under informationized conditions, the battlefield has a high degree of transparency, the destructive capability of air raid arms is extremely high, and protection missions are extremely arduous; thus one must pay a high degree of attention to tight organization.

When organizing protective activities, one must unify the organization and application of the protective strengths of all the service arms and the [People's] Armed Police, and widely mobilize the masses; treat defense against the enemy's high-tech reconnaissance and PGM strikes as the key points; with planned renovation of various protective defense works as primary, supplement those works with means such as dispersion, concealment, and camouflage; achieve integration of defense-works protection with protection exploiting natural conditions, and integration of concealing the true with displaying the false; integrate high-tech means with conventional measures; and actively organize military-civilian integrated rush repairs and rescue crews to treat the wounded as fast as possible, thus restoring the air-offensive operational capability. Via effective protection, one ensures the stability of the campaign *bushi* disposition and the smooth conduct of the air offensive campaign.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 29

The Airborne Campaign...589

Airborne campaigns {空降战役 kongjiang zhanyi}³⁹ are operational activities that are carried out primarily by the airborne force and are supported by and coordinated with the aviation force and other military services and arms. Through air mobility, the airborne force carries out operational activities in the enemy's depth in accordance with unified intentions and plans in order to achieve specified strategic and campaign goals.

According to the Chinese authorized structure, the airborne force is subordinate to the Air Force. All aviation units responsible for air transport and support missions are also dispatched by the Air Force. Thus, airborne campaigns are an important type of Air Force campaigns. Normally, airborne campaigns are an important component of the joint campaign, but some times they can be independently organized as well. As operational capabilities of the Chinese airborne force improves, and as operational methods and forms such as vertical dividing {垂直分割 chuzhi fenge}, enveloping, encirclement, and long-distance assault and attack in the enemy's depth are widely used, airborne campaigns have become an important means for the Chinese military to implement multi-dimensional offensives under informationized conditions. They have a significant impact on the joint campaign and on the progress and outcome of a war.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...589

I. Characteristics...589

Airborne campaigns are a special type of campaign with unique characteristics.

(1) Air delivery of force strengths and long-distance attack

In airborne campaigns, the airborne force directly arrives at a predetermined area in the enemy's depth by way of airborne mobility in order to carry out offensive and defensive operational missions. Thanks to the fast pace and long distance of modern air transport vehicles, and their ability to fly over geographical and man-made obstacles and carry out missions under different weather conditions, the airborne force is able to implement long-range assault in the enemy's campaign depth or against important targets in the strategic rear, launching sudden attacks at locations unexpected by the enemy. The airborne force can rapidly arrive at a critical area from a greater distance and promptly bring in fresh forces so as to form a favorable campaign posture. The airborne force can implement all-aspect full-depth mobility and carry out operational missions in areas not easily accessible to ground forces. On the other hand, air mobility requires the support of a large number of transport aircraft, and transport aircraft groups become easy targets. Their operational intentions are difficult to conceal, their self-defense capabilities are weak, and consequently, they are susceptible to attacks by the enemy's aviation force and surface air

³⁹ Airborne operations include airlanding and paradrop operations.

defense fire. Thus, it is of vital importance to have accurate information on enemy conditions in the aviation area, especially on the deployment of the enemy's aviation and air defense force, and enhance cover of the transport formations in the air in order to ensure that the airborne force will successfully arrive at the airlanding zone {空降地域 kongjiang diyu}.⁴⁰

(2) Campaign engagement in enemy's depth, an unstable battlefield environment

The main mission of an airborne campaign is to mount a deep attack. By way of paratroop {伞降 sanjiang} or airlanding {机降 jijiang}, the airborne operation forces can suddenly appear in the enemy's strategic campaign depth and swiftly launch attacks. They can annihilate the enemy's massive forces, hold off the advance of enemy reserves, divide the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition, destroy the enemy's important facilities, and create strong shockwaves in the spirit and morale of the enemy forces. Because of this, airborne campaigns play an important role in coordination with the frontal force-units {正面部队 zhengmian budui} in offensive and defensive campaigns or in supporting operations on the frontal battlefield. They can have a major impact on the progress and outcome of a campaign. On the other hand, because airborne campaigns are carried out in the enemy's depth, the battlefield environment is very complex, changes in the enemy's conditions are hard to keep up with, and threats from the enemy's forces and fire are grave. In addition, the airborne force is operating independently, being far away from the main force. With no support from friendly forces nearby and with limited heavy weapons and war materiel, the airborne campaign forces have relatively weak capabilities for sustained operations. Thus, it is critical to the success of the campaign to strengthen air cover and fire support.

(3) Complex command and coordination

An airborne campaign has participants from multiple services and arms, involves a wide area, and possesses high requirements on air cover and materiel support. The organization of such a campaign is highly complex. From the concentration of forces, standby, boarding, air transport, and airlanding, to seizing and holding captured targets, the airborne force cannot operate without the support of and coordination from other services and arms. Any slip in coordination at any link could impact the activities of the entire campaign, or even result in the failure of the campaign. Thus it is critical to have good coordination between the airborne force and the aviation force, the campaign tactical missile force, and the air defense force, as well as between the airborne force and the frontal offensive forces. It is critical to the success of the airborne campaign to have unified coordination of the operational activities of all battlefield spaces in order to ensure that the overall operational capabilities can be fully developed.

⁴⁰ This is not the equivalent of a "drop zone."

(4) No rear area to depend on and difficult to support

In an airborne campaign, the airborne force operates deep in the enemy's area with no support from friendly forces in the neighboring areas and no rear area to depend on. The supply channels for war materiel are few. After airdropping, the airborne force has to swiftly transit between offensive and defensive. The battles are intense, fierce and merciless, and the losses of personnel and consumption of materials are high. The war materiel that can be carried is limited, yet the follow-up replenishment mission is very difficult. During the campaign, the replenishment of war materiel depends primarily on airdrop. Once the air channel is cut off by the enemy, the airborne force will be forced into an isolated situation with no food or ammunition. Offensive or defensive activities cannot be carried out. Therefore, in order to ensure smooth progression of the airborne campaign, one must be sure to have strong and follow-up support.

II. Requirements...591

(1) Thorough preparation and meticulous planning

An airborne campaign involves multiple participating services and arms, a wide battlefield, and complex operational activities. The operational goal eventually has to be realized by the offensive and defensive activities of the airborne force in the enemy's depth. Because there are an increasing number of unpredictable factors and greater difficulty level of organizing and implementation, one must be thoroughly prepared and meticulously devise the campaign plan. For this reason, one should use various means to collect intelligence, achieving the state of 'knowing the enemy and knowing oneself.' One should carry out campaign planning based on the most difficult and most complex scenarios. For those operations that could have a decisive impact on the progression of the campaign such as air mobility, seizing the command of information and the air, ground offensive and defensive, one should prepare multiple scenarios. One should scientifically organize all the participating forces into a whole, with the airborne force as the core. One should objectively analyze the battlefield situation and scientifically postulate possible campaign development. One should carefully organize coordination between the airborne force and the aviation force and other support units. One should address the high difficulty level in providing support for operations conducted in the enemy rear and carefully organize various kinds of support, especially logistic materiel reserves and supplies. In an airborne campaign under high-tech conditions, the time for imminent battle preparation is short, thus we must give prominence to key points on the basis of full-scale preparations, and combine this with peacetime readiness work.

(2) Unified command and close coordination

An airborne campaign under high-tech conditions in most cases is jointly executed by multiple services and arms. Since the composition of campaign forces is complex and there are multiple links of activities involved, it is of vital importance to campaign

victory if all participating forces of different services and arms can coordinate with each other in concerted actions and bring into full play the collective power.

Unified command is an important prerequisite for bringing into play the power of collective operations. In order to enhance effective and uninterrupted command and control of various participating service and arm forces, one must set up a unified, joint and highly effective campaign command institution. In the course of the campaign, in light of changing battlefield conditions, at appropriate times one should make necessary adjustments in force-strength and weaponry *bushu* disposition. Under the principle of concentration and unity, one should strive to achieve integration between centralized command and dispersed command, and to bring into full play the initiative and creativity of commanding officers at various levels.

Close coordination is an objective requirement for bringing into play collective capabilities. An airborne campaign should be based primarily on the operations of the airborne force. One should organize operational coordination among various service and arm forces accordingly. One should closely coordinate operational activities between the air and ground, and between the airborne units and support and frontal units. One should carefully organize the connections between various campaign stages and various activities so that the activities of the preceding stage create conditions for activities of the following stage, and so that the activities of the following stage can fully capitalize on the results of activities in the preceding stage. One should keep a tight control of the main links in activity coordination, and especially should strengthen coordination at the juncture of loading, air transport, airlanding, and ground operation, so as to ensure that the airborne force arrives at the operational areas safely and carries out the combat missions successfully. One should strengthen the monitoring and control of coordination, make prompt adjustment when coordination appears maladjusted, and restore coordination in a timely manner when coordination is disrupted.

(3) Concealed and sudden, winning by surprise

Surprise attack is one of the keys to airborne campaign victory. Thus, the concentration of the airborne force and the preparations of the air transport force must be carried out in secret. In addition to selecting unexposed locations in the rear for secret concentration and preparations, one may also set up bogus areas of concentration {假定集结地区 *jia jijiediqu*} and carry out deceptive ferry exercises {假转场 *jia zhuanchang*}, and implement fire preparation at false airlanding sites as well as electronic diversions, so as to deceive and confuse the enemy, creating misjudgment on the part of the enemy. One should, through pre-combat exercises, study and select the best air transport routes and air transport formations, and familiarize oneself with command and coordination in the operation. The airborne force should strive to shorten the time spent at departure airfields

{chufa jichang 出发机场}.⁴¹ Air transport should, as much as possible, take advantage of darkness of the night and inclement weather. The airborne force should conceal its operation by maintaining radio silence and carrying out electronic jamming and feint demonstration, so as to ensure safe arrival at the airlanding site. When carrying out airlanding, one should land as close as possible to the targets so as to reduce the time needed for assembly before engagement. One should strive to launch swift and sudden attacks by catching the enemy unprepared, thus realizing the objective of winning through surprise attack.

(4) Concentrating strengths, attacking enemy's vital points

Concentrating strengths mean forming the largest operational capabilities at any local time and in any local space throughout different stages of the campaign with the goal of accomplishing the main mission. To do this, one should scientifically organize the campaign strength. One should strive to transport the airborne units to the target area using one single flight, and as far as possible, air land the main force strengths in the main direction. One should bring into play the mobility capability of the airborne force and aviation force. One should concentrate the forces and fire power at the main target of assault, striving to form superiority over the enemy. In airborne campaigns under informationized conditions, concentrated use of force not only means numerically but also qualitatively. One should emphasize concentration of the airborne force, but also concentration of the support and logistical force, particularly various types of firepower.

Striking the enemy's key-links {guanjie} starts with disrupting the integrated-whole structure of the enemy's operational system {tixi}, striking with key points the vital area targets that sustain the campaign progression and outcome. To do so, the campaign commander and the command organ should take the total situation into consideration. The commander and the command organ should carefully analyze the internal structure of the enemy's operational systems, select those vital targets that play a decisive role in realizing the campaign intention, and launch an attack. The purpose is to shake up the enemy's defensive system, block the enemy's mobility, tie down the enemy's heavy force groupings, and hasten the progress of the campaign. The commander should fully utilize the swiftness and suddenness nature of the airborne operation, and use the vertical *bushi* disposition {垂直布势 *chuishhi bushi*} method to launch a direct attack at the enemy's vital points. The commander should integrate methods such as force assault and firepower assault, striving to achieve the goal of the campaign with a single strike.

(5) Comprehensive support, give prominence to key points

Airborne campaign support is an important component that makes up campaign operational capabilities. Thus one must organize each item of support completely and

⁴¹ Elsewhere, "出发 departure" has been translated as "launching" such as in the "airborne launching zone" [airborne departure area].

with key points. Airborne campaign support has a rich content, wide scope, and high requirements, and requires complex organization. The campaign commander and command organ, on the basis of providing comprehensive campaign support, should focus on the following tasks. First is to strengthen air cover. One should curb enemy air reconnaissance, air raids, intercepts and anti-air resistance. At the critical time, one should seize air superiority of the airborne operation area so as to ensure safety of our airborne force activities. Second is to strengthen fire support. Before the airborne operation, one should suppress the enemy air defense weapons along the airborne operation air route, and open up an air corridor to ensure safe air transport of the airborne force. Immediately before the airborne assault, one should also carry out fire suppression against the enemy in the airlanding zone so as to ensure the safe landing of the airborne force. After the airlanding, one should try to stop the enemy from maneuvering to the airlanding zone so as to ensure the airborne force complete its designated missions. Next is to strengthen logistical and equipment support. From the moment the airborne force lands, one should continuously deliver ammunition and other war materiel in order to raise persistent operational capabilities of the airborne force. Finally is to strengthen weather support. One should accurately forecast the weather conditions in the airlanding zone, and possible changes in such conditions, to ensure that during the planned airborne operation period, the weather conditions are conducive to the execution of airlanding and follow-up support.

One should note that the support for the airborne force is almost exclusively dependent on air channels. Hence among all the supports, the most important is to seize air superiority of the local air space. Without air superiority, all other support would not only be difficult to carry out but also much less effective. In a sense, one can say that without the necessary air superiority, there will not be any victory in an airborne campaign.

Section 2: Main Activities...594

I. Seizing Campaign Information Superiority and Air Superiority...594

Under informationized war conditions, information superiority and air superiority are basic prerequisites for ensuring the smooth execution of an airborne campaign. Gaining information and air superiority constitutes important operational activities in an airborne campaign and run through the entire campaign. The campaign commander should employ various capabilities and means in an effort to obtain information and air superiority.

(1) Seizing information superiority

The primary means to seize information superiority include information reconnaissance, information attack, and information defense. Before the launch of the campaign and during the campaign process, one should fully utilize campaign electronic reconnaissance equipment and various reconnaissance forces to detect, search for, and intercept electromagnetic signal emissions from enemy electronic equipment operating in the airborne operation area or in related areas. One should determine their locations,

deployment, technical data and patterns of use, in order to create conditions for us to implement effective electronic jamming and firepower destruction. For the purpose of disrupting the enemy's command and coordination, weakening and restraining its information warfare capabilities, and seizing the initiative in the information struggle, one should concentrate forces and weapons to carry out soft kill and hard destruction against important nodes in the enemy's information warfare systems. The purpose is to degrade and disrupt the enemy's operational effectiveness and to break up the overall structure of the enemy's information warfare systems. In order to guard against enemy information attacks, one should adopt various effective measures and tightly organize campaign information defense. The main measures include: tightly control radio communications, practice electronic camouflage and diversions, conceal networks, vary the operating mode, and utilize terrain and fortified works to strengthen protection.

(2) Seizing air superiority

To seize air superiority, one should first of all carry out fire assault and sabotage in the enemy rear in an attempt to control the air from the ground. One should concentrate the main force of the air assault group {空中突击集团 kongzhong tuji jituan}, with support from the missile assault group {导弹突击集团 daodan tuji jituan}, and carry out sudden and fierce fire assault on important enemy airfields, air defense surveillance systems, command and control systems, and air defense fire systems. In particular, one should carry out targeted assault on the enemy air defense force and weapon systems along the designated air routes and in the airborne operation zone. For those key targets that are difficult to destroy with firepower and yet may pose a major threat on airborne operations, one may organize sabotage *fendui* {破袭分队 poxi fendui} to enter the operational areas through air drop or ground (sea) infiltration and carry out destruction through raids. Secondly, one should organize air escorts and air blockades. The air cover group {空中掩护集团 kongzhong yanhu jituan} executing the air escort may opt for accompanying cover {伴随掩护 bansui yanhu} or zone cover {区域掩护 quyu yanhu}. The air cover group destroys or expels incoming enemy aircraft in order to ensure safety of the air transport formation. The emphasis of the air blockade is the airfields of the enemy combat aircraft. The key is to stop the operational activities of the enemy's aviation force and reduce or remove enemy aviation threat to our air transport group {空中运输集团 kongzhong yunshu jituan}. Thirdly, one should organize air patrols {空中巡逻 kongzhong xunluo} and zone air defense {quyu fangkong 区域防空}. Air patrol is a cover activity undertaken by the air cover group at a designated time and in a designated air space to provide cover for the safety of the airborne operation group {空降集团 kongjiang jituan or 空降作战集团 kongjiang zuozhan jituan} and aviation group {航空兵集团 hangkongbing jituan}. Air patrol can be divided into security air patrol {警戒性空中巡逻 jingjiexing kongzhong xunluo} and screening air patrol {屏护性空中巡逻 pinghuxing kongzhong xunluo}. In carrying out security air patrol, the air cover group normally uses a smaller force to conduct security patrol at a stipulated time and air space to closely monitor the peripheral air space. If an enemy situation is detected, the air cover group immediately reports the discovery to the command post, and, depending on the

situation, engages in combat to support ground air defense weapons to destroy incoming enemy aircraft. When implementing screening air patrol, the air cover group is normally a larger force that forms an airborne barrier at a stipulated time and air space. The air cover group destroys and drives away enemy aircraft and clears the air space in order to form local air superiority and provide reliable cover for ground and air operational activities. Zone air defense is an anti-air defense activity organized by the airborne operation group. The airborne operation group should establish a focused zone air defense support system, using air defense missiles and anti-aircraft guns to form an integrated air defense fire network. This zone air defense support system works in coordination with the combat activities of the fighter aviation force to destroy incoming enemy aircraft and ensure air superiority over the airborne operation zone.

II. Carrying out Fire Preparation...595

Fire preparation is a fire assault operation aimed at clearing obstacles for the airlanding and entry into battle by the airborne operation group. It includes advance fire preparation and direct fire preparation.

(1) Advance fire preparation

Advance fire preparation is mainly carried out jointly by the bomber aviation unit, fighter-bomber aviation unit, and ground attack aviation unit of the air assault group, with the support of the missile assault group. Its objectives include the following: annihilate the enemy massive forces and their supportive weapons; suppress and destroy the enemy's air defense systems; weaken the enemy's anti-airborne capabilities; and isolate the airborne operation area. The primary targets of assault in the advance fire preparation include the following: the enemy's airfields, radar stations and ground air defense fire support systems that could pose a threat to one's airborne operations; the enemy's defensive positions in the airborne operation area, and tank and mechanized units and force groups in the vicinity of the airborne operation area; and the enemy's command and control systems, electronic warfare systems, supply and support systems, transport hubs, and anti-airborne facilities. The duration of advance fire preparation should be determined by the number of enemy targets located in the airborne operation area, the level of fortification of these targets, and the capabilities, requirements, and effectiveness of one's own fire assault. The duration should range from a few days to a few weeks. If the enemy's defense in or around the designated airborne operation area is weak, or if effective damage and suppression of the enemy have been achieved in advance operations, one may opt not to carry out advance fire preparation so as to achieve greater surprise.

(2) Direct fire preparation

Direct fire preparation is carried out on the foundation of advance fire preparation and preliminary isolation and blocking of the airborne operation area. Direct fire preparation is the fire assault carried out in the designated airborne operation area before the

execution of airlanding, depending on the repositioning of the enemy's forces and the recovery of the enemy's defense. The objective of direct fire preparation is to create conditions for the successful landing of the airborne operation group, for its capturing and establishment of airborne landing base, and for its ground combat operations. Direct fire preparation is primarily carried out jointly by the fighter-bomber aviation unit and the ground attack aviation unit of the air assault group, with the support of the missile assault group. The missions of this operation include the following: provide targeted attack and suppression of the enemy's effective forces and air defense weapons located in the airlanding area; destroy and damage the enemy's defense works and anti-airborne operation obstacles; blockade roads and bridges leading to the airlanding area; and attack the enemy's anti-airborne operation reserves, especially its tank and mechanized units. The timing of direct fire preparation should be determined by the enemy's conditions, the nature of the targets, one's own intention in carrying out the airborne operation, and the effectiveness of the assault. It is generally initiated a few dozen minutes or a few hours before the airlanding operation by the airborne operation group, and generally ends before the advance echelon {先遣梯队 xianqian tidui} of the airborne operation group reaches the air space over the airlanding area. This is to ensure that the airborne operation group can fully utilize the outcome of direct fire preparation and land safely with condensed landing {密集着陆 miji zhaolu}, while avoiding friendly fire. When airlanding is carried out in coastal areas, naval ships may also participate in direct fire preparation.

In implementing fire preparation, one should make comprehensive use of air and ground (sea) firepower to effect continuous, accurate and focused assaults. Direct fire preparation should be linked with advance fire preparation. The campaign commander should be continuously informed of developments in fire preparation, and give timely instructions on enemy targets to the air assault group and to the supporting missile assault group and naval ships and put forward requirements. The campaign commander should closely coordinate activities of different units to affect collective strikes. The campaign commander should focus on and assure the effects of fire preparations in the primary airlanding area, and, when appropriate, make timely adjustments to fire assault plans. When necessary, the campaign commander may affect fire feint demonstration and other deceptive measures to conceal the intention of airlanding operation and mislead the enemy.

III. Air Transport...596

Air transport is the most intense, most critical and most complex moments of the airborne campaign, and determines whether the airborne forces can safely and successfully reach the airlanding area. Air transport should be carefully organized. The main activities include loading and boarding, opening up air corridor, air transport, and airlanding.

(1) Organizing loading and boarding

The airborne operation group is normally organized according to organized airborne units, which enter the waiting areas {待运地区 daiyun diqu}⁴² and departure airfields in concealment during the darkness of the night or under favorable weather conditions. The war materiel, equipment, vehicles, ammunition and heavy equipment of the airborne operation group are generally shipped directly to the departing airfields for loading. Loading and boarding of the airborne operation group normally begins 2~3 hours before taking off and ends 20~30 minutes before taking off. The boarding should be executed in the following order: advance echelon {先遣梯队 xianqian tidui}, assault echelon {突击梯队 tuji tidui}, rear echelon {后方梯队 houfang tidui} and follow-on echelon {后续梯队 houxu tidui}. For each unit, heavy equipment is loaded first, followed by boarding of personnel. The joint commander of the departure airfield is responsible for organizing and implementing the loading and boarding according to a unified plan. The campaign commander should accurately adjust and control the timing of entry into the waiting area or departure airfield of the airborne operation group and air transport group. The campaign commander should promptly learn and master the loading situations of all departure airfields, supervise and foster the close cooperation between the airborne operation group, the air transport group, and the air station, and execute strictly according to the loading plan.

(2) Opening up air corridor

In order to ensure that the airborne operation group and the air transport group can smoothly enter the designated airlanding zone, generally one should open up an air corridor along the designated air routes based on [the principle of] seizing superiority of the air. The operation of opening up an air corridor is normally undertaken by the fighter-bomber aviation unit and the ground attack aviation unit of the air assault group, with the support of the campaign tactical missile units of the Second Artillery and the Army. The primary targets of the assault include the enemy's air defense systems along the air routes, such as enemy warning radars, guidance radars, gun-fire control radar, surface-to-air missile positions, and anti-aircraft artillery positions. The operation of opening up an air corridor can be undertaken in conjunction with fire preparation or independently. The width of the air corridor depends on the number of air transport routes needed. After the opening of the air corridor, the campaign commander should closely monitor enemy conditions along the air corridor and promptly adopt effective measures to prevent the enemy from shutting it down.

(3) Organizing air transport

In order to ensure the safe air transport of the airborne operation group, its on-time arrival at the airlanding zone, and the execution of the airlanding, after taking off and before

⁴² Translator's note: Also translated as the standby area elsewhere.

arriving at the starting point of the air route, the various formations should form an air operation *bushi* disposition according to their respective missions, with the campaign transport formation {战役输送编队 zhanyi shusong biandui or 输送编队 shusong biandui} as the core. In the course of air transport, the reconnaissance formation {侦察编队 zhencha biandui} should provide weather condition reports along the air routes and over the airborne landing zone in a timely manner, as well as reports on developing enemy conditions. The jamming formation {干扰编队 ganrao biandui} should carry out jamming activities against detected electronic equipment of the enemy's air defense system. The suppression formation {压制编队 yazhi biandui} should attack and suppress the enemy's radars, and air defense missile and anti-aircraft artillery positions. The cover formation {掩护编队 yanhu biandui} should provide accompanying cover and zone cover, as well as annihilate and expel incoming attacking enemy aircraft. The transport formation, under the cover and support of various other formations, should follow the designated air corridor to head for the airlanding zone. The early warning and command aircraft should direct various formations in their actions from a vantage position in the air. Before arrival at the starting point of the airlanding air route, the cover formation should proceed to the air space over the airlanding zone or the direction that may witness the biggest threat from enemy aircraft and clear up the air space. The suppression formation should impose air blockade over important enemy airfields, as well as suppress the enemy's air defense fire in the airlanding zone to ensure the safety of the transport formation in executing the airlanding. Various tactical transport formations, after reaching the starting point of the airlanding air routes, should follow the original plan and fly towards their respective airlanding sites to carry out airlanding. In the course of air transport, the campaign commander should closely monitor the enemy's developments and changes in weather conditions, issue timely notices on air and ground conditions, accurately control the locations of various formations, coordinate uninterruptedly the activities of various formations, and resolutely carry out the original plan unless there are other major developments.

(4) Airlanding

Airlanding is the process between the time when the airborne forces leave the aircraft and the time they land on the ground. This is a critical transition from the air operation to the ground operation. Thus, the airborne operation group should exploit the element of surprise and the effects of fire assault, and minimize the duration of the airlanding operation. In order to assure safety of airlanding of the airborne forces, the various support groups should strengthen their fire support and air cover for the airborne forces, and annihilate the enemy's forces in the air and on the ground that are mounting an attack at the airborne operation group.

IV. Ground Operations...598

Ground operations are main operational activities of the airborne campaign, and are the critical link to finally achieving the goal of the airborne campaign.

(1) Capturing airlanding sites

After landing on the ground, the advance echelon of the airborne operation group should rapidly launch an attack according to the initial plan under the support and cover of the aviation force. Their missions include: annihilate the enemy's effective strength at the airlanding site; take control of tactical key points at and around the airlanding site, and take control of bridges, river-crossings and major traffic routes in order to block the enemy's mobile units from approaching the airlanding site; swiftly deploy lead equipment, report weather conditions, mark the location of the airlanding site, remove obstacles at the landing site that may seriously affect airlanding; provide guidance to the air formations; and safeguard landing of the assault echelon. If the advance echelon airlands at an airfield, the advance echelon should rapidly seize ground facilities, air defense positions, and important targets such as POL and ammunition depots at the airfield, and take control of the airfield's command and communication facilities. The advance echelon rapidly organizes focused perimeter defense, removes obstacles on the runways, and makes preparation to direct and safeguard airlanding of the assault echelon.

(2) Establishing the airlanding base

An airlanding base is set up on the ground of the seized airlanding site. After the assault echelon of the airborne operation group lands on the ground, the assault echelon, working in conjunction with the advance echelon, should take swift actions to annihilate the remnant enemy forces at the airlanding site, control designated area and key points within the airlanding zone, crush the enemy's counterattacks, consolidate, expand and combine the landing sites, and rapidly restore the function of the captured airfield or repair and recover the field airfield. The goal is to set up an airlanding base in the shortest time possible and safeguard the paradrop or airlanding of the rear echelon and follow-on echelon. After the airlanding base is established, while setting aside a part of the forces for defense, the primary forces should follow the initial plan and rapidly transit into offensive or defensive operations. The rear echelon, after landing, should quickly collect air dropped war materiel, swiftly set up a forward support base on the foundation of the airlanding base, and make preparations for forward and backward shipment so as to ensure the operational activities of various units. The follow-on echelon of the airborne operation group generally carries out paradrop or air landing after the airlanding base is established. The follow-on echelon should enter into attack or defense immediately after landing in accordance with the original plan. When the airborne operation group is tasked to carry out sabotage operations in the enemy rear, the airborne operation group may establish the airlanding base after completing the mission, depending on the situation.

In the course of the airlanding operation and while setting up the airlanding base, the commander of the airborne operation group should swiftly establish communication with all the units, be well informed about and keep under control the conditions of the units, and direct and control the combat activities of these units. The airborne campaign commander should stay on top of combat developments, give additional orders to the airborne operation group and clarify missions. At the same time, the main force of the air

assault group, with the support of the guided missile assault group, should carry out intense fire assault against the enemy's tank and mechanized force in order to weaken the enemy's anti-airborne operation capabilities, attack key traffic routes and bridges, and block the airborne landing zone. The main force of the air cover group should provide cover for the operations of the airborne operation group.

(3) Implementing ground offensives

After landing, the airborne operation group should rapidly form offensive *bushu* disposition, complete preparations for attack, launch an attack at the enemy and seize important targets or strategic places. Before the first echelon of the airborne operation group launches an attack, the engineering *fendui* should use the demolition method or the manual search and removal method to clear remnant obstacles in the obstacle field. The attack units of the first echelon, after receiving the order to attack, should immediately follow the initial plan and start the attack against the designated targets. The commander of the airborne operation group should give order to the subordinate artillery unit to destroy the enemy's defensive works and fire points. The air assault group should transfer firepower towards targets in the enemy's depth such as the command post, artillery positions, and reserves. The air cover group should, working in conjunction with the ground air-defense force of the airborne operation group, annihilate the assaulting enemy and support the first echelon to complete its mission.

When the first echelon completes its mission, or when the enemy engages its reserve team to launch a counterassault, the airborne operation group should engage its second echelon or reserve team at an appropriate time to counter the enemy's counterattack and consolidate the already seized positions. The first echelon should use positive actions to cover the second echelon in combat. When the counterattacking enemy is annihilated or defeated, at an appropriate time the commander of the airborne operation group should organize the troops to deploy to and attack the enemy's depth, to encircle and kill the enemy in the depth and to seize the designated targets.

In the process when the airborne operation group is deploying for ground offensives, the airborne campaign commander should pay full attention to the development of enemy situations at the airlanding zone and promptly coordinate the activities of the various groups. The air assault group and the missile assault group should use firepower to intercept or suppress the enemy's massive forces that are maneuvering towards the airlanding zone. The air cover group should strengthen its air cover over the airlanding zone, and working in conjunction with the ground air-defense fire, maintain air superiority of the airlanding zone, and safeguard the air safety of the airborne operation group. The rear support group should strengthen the replenishment of war materiel for follow-on operations and to meet the operational needs of the airborne operation group.

(4) Transition into defensive

Transition into defensive occurs when the airborne operation group has completed the offensive mission or when the offensive is unsuccessful and the forces are forced into defensive operations. The operation has the following characteristics: operating independently, facing grave enemy threats, situations developing rapidly, an incomplete defensive system, great difficulties in getting support and assistance, and limited capabilities to sustain long and continuous operations. Its basic missions include: to stubbornly hold on to the captured areas and targets; to break up the enemy's operational *bushi* disposition and suppress the enemy's mobility; to impede the enemy's maneuver; to tie down and draw out in-depth enemy forces; and to support frontal operations in winning campaign victory.

The commander of the airborne operation group should follow superior instructions and make judgments based on the postures of the two sides as well as terrain conditions. The commander should make a decisive determination, putting priorities first in the primary defensive direction and next the secondary defensive direction, first on the periphery and then the depth, striving to complete defensive preparations in the shortest time possible.

When the enemy is advancing towards the defensive area, the air assault group and the missile assault group should, working in conjunction with the artillery unit of the airborne operation group, use the obstacle blocking {设障拦阻 shezhang lanzu} method and the fire blocking {火力拦阻 huoli lanzu} method to seal the roadways and halt the enemy's mobility. When the enemy launches an assault, the various units of the airborne operation group should use the defensive position as the base and bring into play the full force of firepower to firmly resist the enemy's assault, hold the vital points and maintain the stability of the defensive system. If the enemy penetrates our defensive position, the air assault group and the missile assault group should use fierce firepower to seal the penetration point and block the assault of the enemy's follow-on echelon. Supported by the aviation firepower and missile firepower, the airborne operation group should launch a ferocious counterassault against the enemy who has penetrated our defensive position to resolutely seal the penetrating point and regain and maintain the stability of the defensive system.

In the course when the airborne operation group makes transition into the defensive mode and during defensive operations, the campaign commander should organize the air assault group, the missile assault group, the air cover group, and the rear support group to provide support, cover and protection in a timely manner in order to ensure that the airborne operation group can successfully accomplish the defense mission.

Chapter 30

The Air Defense Campaign...602

An air defense campaign is a series of operational activities conducted by an Air Force campaign large formation, with the support and coordination of the other service arms, regional forces, and People's Air Defense strengths, per a unified intention and plan {*jihua*}, for the purpose of thwarting the enemy's air raid. Its basic goals are to smash the enemy air raid intention, and to guard the security of major targets. Its main missions are as follows: tight surveillance of air-raid dynamics, timely detection and ascertainment of the activities and opportunities for an enemy air raid, and alerting of all units and the People's Air Defense organization; resistance against enemy air raids on our military, political, and economic targets so that we do not suffer or only lightly suffer damage from the enemy air raid; organization of a counterattack operation to wipe out or weaken the enemy air raid strengths; organization of information warfare (IW) to seize information superiority; and organization of protection to reduce the personnel and war-materiel losses created by encounter with an enemy air raid.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...602

I. Characteristics...602

In an air defense campaign under informationized conditions, the widespread application of informationized weaponry has triggered revolutionary changes in the modes and methods of air raid and air defense operations, and has also caused the air defense campaign to assume a number of new characteristics.

(1) Imminent battle preparations are of very short duration, making it easy to fall into passivity

The very short duration of imminent battle preparations, making it easy to fall into passivity, is an important characteristic of an air defense campaign as distinguished from other campaigns. This characteristic is determined by the initiative and suddenness of an air raid, and by the passive quality of an air defense operation. In particular, in the initial stage of the campaign, this feature is more prominent. Since the side executing the air raid normally grasps the initiative during the campaign launch, it can in advance conduct meticulous preparations for the air raid activities, and can autonomously select the air raid means, modes, and forces/arms; it can also select an operational airspace, opportunity, and strike targets favorable to itself, and conduct stealthy penetration and long-range precision strikes. In particular, the maneuver capability of air raid arms has improved; the enemy need not conduct large-scale concentration and movement of forces before the air raid activities, and [if] the enemy seizes information superiority, the battlefield to the enemy will be unidirectionally transparent, the signs of his air raid activities will be very difficult to detect, and the suddenness will be greatly enhanced. The air defense side must seize the initiative in the campaign's early phase; it must rush

to do a good job of preparations before the enemy launches the air raid; and in particular, under conditions where advanced early-warning detection means are lacking, it is more difficult to timely and accurately grasp the enemy air raid's direction of movement, and it extremely limits the time provided to the campaign commander and command organ for judging the situation and making decisions. Since early warning time is short, all participating strengths in an air defense campaign have a very short time for imminent battle preparations; under ordinary circumstances, they will unfold while preparing, while being thrown into battle, and operational activities [thus] can very easily fall into passivity.

(2) The defended space is expansive, and the missions are arduous

The defended space in a modern air defense campaign has unprecedentedly enlarged both in vertical airspace and in horizontal airspace. From the horizontal airspace viewpoint, the air raid side has powerful long-range strike capability, and possesses trans/intercontinental and even global air strike capabilities; its strike range will extend over the entire campaign and the strategic depth. From the viewpoint of vertical airspace, air raid weapons can be used in actions from "treetop" ultralow altitude up to ultrahigh altitudes of several 10,000 meters (several tens of kilometers), and continuing directly into outer space. In order to achieve the operational goal as fast as possible, the air raid side will employ concentrated long-range strike arms to execute omni-bearing, full-depth, omni-altitude air raids. Our air defense campaign will be conducted within an expansive battlefield space; its range can involve several theaters, up to a million square kilometers. Within this huge battlefield space, the air defense side not only must organize active resistance and protection activities, and guard the security of key military, political, and economic targets, but must also organize strengths to execute counterattacks against the enemy's air-raid arms takeoff bases and missile launch platforms; it not only must resist air raid arms coming from the skies, but must also resist ballistic missiles and space attack arms coming from outer space. This makes the air-defense operational missions arduous and organization of air-defense operational activities abnormally complex.

(3) Participating strengths are multi-elemental, and coordination is complex

An air defense campaign is a [series of] large-scale campaign operations undertaken by all of the service arms and the People's Air Defense strengths. In addition to the Air Force's fighter aviation forces, surface-to-air missile (SAM) forces, antiaircraft artillery (AAA) forces, electronic countermeasures (ECM) forces, and their corresponding support forces, this campaign normally also has Navy fighter aviation forces, Army and Navy SAM forces, AAA forces, and electronic warfare units (elements), and People's Air Defense AAA forces. These several forces – with different organizational systems and different natures – are scattered over the entire range of the theater and assume different operational missions. During operations, not only is there coordination between the Air Force and the Army, Navy, and People's Air Defense forces, there is also coordination between the Air Force's internal fighter aviation forces and ground air defense forces, coordination among all fighter aviation forces units, and coordination between hard-kill

arms and soft-kill arms, as well as coordination between the operational forces and the various support forces. Moreover, not only is there coordination between theaters, there is also coordination between air defense subareas (zones); there is coordination of resistance operations, and also coordination of counterattack operations, and still more, coordination of protection operations. Due to the numerous participating service arms, and the complex composition and subordination relationship of strengths – on top of which are the passive quality of operational activities, and limited means for cooperation – unusual complexity has been created in organization of air-defense campaign coordination.

(4) Contention for the information realm is sharp, and information confrontation penetrates throughout the campaign

With the improvement in the informationized degree of weaponry, information confrontation has become a major operational activity in air raid and air defense operations, and permeates the entire course of an operation; information strength has become the first essential element in gaining the upper hand in an operation. In future localized wars under informationized conditions, the enemy will rely on his superiority in technology, and will first employ IW weapons to conduct an information offensive against targets such as our intelligence and early warning systems, operational command centers, and communications networks; then, in integrated fashion, he will use a variety of soft-kill and hard-kill means to comprehensively blanket-jam our air defense system, and seize battlefield information superiority. The contention between us and the enemy in the information realm will be unprecedentedly sharp, and will permeate the entire course of the air defense campaign. Before battle, we will as early as possible establish and deploy an integrated reconnaissance and early warning (R&EW) system, and timely ascertain the enemy's air raid forces, air raid direction, and air raid opportunities, as well as the intention that must be achieved. During the campaign implementation process, we will concentrate the application of various kinds of IW weaponry; simultaneously with resistance against the enemy's information offensive, we will execute a determined information counterattack against key targets in the enemy's information system, and strive for seizure of localized (partial) information superiority. The resistance operations, counterattack operations, and protection activities will all be accompanied by intense information offensive-defensive confrontations, which will have a decisive effect on the success or failure of resistance, counterattack, and protection activities.

(5) System confrontations are sharp, and offense and defense are interwoven

With the development of new-technology weaponry, several new service arm units have emerged as the times require, and have caused the force composition in air raid and air defense operations to manifest an ever stronger multi-elemental quality and integrated quality. Future air raid and air defense operations will no longer be confrontations fought by a single service arm, with a single operational system, and on a single battlefield space; the warring sides in integrated fashion will employ the various weapon systems of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Space Force to launch comprehensive confrontations in

the land/sea/air/space/electromagnetic (EM) multidimensional space, manifesting a prominent feature of system confrontation. In this kind of system-versus-system confrontation, we not only must organize fighter aviation forces, SAM forces, and AAA forces to execute continued interception of the air raiding enemy, but must also organize all service arms and protection strengths, as well as the People's Air Defense strengths, to implement effective protection of major defended targets, and to eliminate the consequences of the enemy air raid. Simultaneously, we must also concentrate elite long-range strike strengths, to execute determined counterattacks against the enemy's Air Force bases and naval air takeoff (launch) platforms. When that time comes, air defense operations will take on a quality of offense within defense, defense within offense, and offense interwoven with defense; combat will have abnormally tense, sharp aspects.

II. Requirements...605

(1) Enhanced vigilance, and rapid response

Recent localized war experience shows that a strong enemy normally exploits opportunities such as the dark of night or festivals/holidays, and – relying on its high-tech superiority – stealthily and suddenly launches the air raid. This will greatly reduce our early warning and imminent battle preparations time, even to the point where we will be forced to accept battle in haste; and the boundary between air defense operational preparations and implementation is blurring day by day. One must seize the initiative in air defense operations, and ensure the smooth conduct of resistance, counterattack, and protection activities; and one must enhance vigilance, and rapid response. To this end, the first need is constant vigilance. One should: establish a sound system for all preparations, enhance education on preparedness, strengthen the concept of preparedness, and maintain the will to fight with constant vigilance; establish a sound air defense campaign system; formulate in advance a variety of plans *{jihua}* and proposals for the air defense campaign; strengthen drills for air defense operations under informationized conditions; and enhance the organizational command capabilities of a commander and command organ, as well as the capabilities of units to fulfill their operational missions in critical situations. The second need is timely acquisition of battlefield information. This means: integrated application of the various information detection strengths – land, sea, air, space, and EM; adoption of various means of reconnaissance and detection; comprehensive perception of the battlefield posture; and acquisition of operation-related information. In particular, one must ascertain with key points the enemy air raid intention, strength task-organization, operational *bushu* disposition, main air-raid direction, and possible activities to be adopted, so as to provide a basis for rapid decision making. The third need is accurate judgment of the battlefield situation. One should use various means – especially information acquired by automated information processing equipment – to: sift the true from the false, and to screen the essential from the dross; compare the information via mutual corroboration and comprehensive analysis; and arrives at an accurate assessment of/conclusion on the battlefield situation, so as to lay the foundation for correct decision-making. The fourth need is resolute decision-making. A campaign commander and command organ should be resourceful and decisive, and

make full use of command automation systems and computer-aided decision support systems, to shorten the decision-making process; and they must grasp the main contradictions involving an air defense operation's overall situation, make decisions on the spot, and resolutely make decisions. The fifth need is rapid activities. One should give full play to the advantages of the rapid and agile activities of airborne strengths, rapidly unfold, rapidly act, effect changes based on the enemy, make changes before the enemy does, employ change to control the [enemy's] changes, and strive for the initiative in the campaign.

(2) Concentrated application of forces, and system sabotage

In air defense campaigns under future informationized conditions, conditions wherein the enemy's weaponry is superior to ours will be relatively prominent. If we want to achieve victory in a campaign, we must adopt concentrated application of various participating strengths, strive to form a localized (partial) superiority in the main direction and at key times, and execute key-point strikes against the enemy to paralyze the enemy's operational system.

Concentrated application of forces is a general rule that should be followed in all campaign operations. Air defense campaigns under future informationized conditions will assume a number of new features, and have provided several new requirements for implementing the principle of concentrated application of forces: The first need is to attach importance to qualitative concentration. One should ably handle the relationship between concentrated quantity and concentrated quality; simultaneously with emphasis on numerical concentration and formation of a numerical superiority, one should also attach importance to concentration of various types of elite forces and high-tech arms to create qualitative superiority. The second need is to attach importance to concentration of information and firepower. Information and firepower will be the critical essential elements in gaining the upper hand in future air defense operations; one should: ably handle the relationship between concentrated force strength and concentrated firepower, and especially attach importance to the concentrated employment of various types of air defense firepower and strive to form firepower superiority; and scientifically combine various information soft-kill capabilities with hard-kill capabilities, and concentrate their application, to create an information superiority. The third need is to attach importance to dynamic-state concentration. One should: give full play to the long-range maneuver and rapid maneuver advantages of airborne strengths; adopt modes of static-state dispersed *bushu* disposition and dynamic-state concentrated employment; and implement ad hoc concentration and transient concentration along the main direction, in the key areas, and over major targets, to create a "counterweight" effect. System sabotage means – starting out from sabotage of the overall structure of the enemy's operational system – selection of, and execution of strikes on strategic targets which play a supporting role in the enemy's operational system and which have a major influence on the course and outcome of operations, in order to achieve the operational goal. In system sabotage, the first need is to select correctly. One must, starting out from the air defense campaign's overall situation, analyze in depth the internal structure of the enemy's operational system,

ascertain the nature and interrelationship of all types of targets, select those strategic positions and key links which enable rapid paralysis and dismemberment of the enemy operational system, and execute precision strikes on them. Counterattack operations should lay stress on strikes against the enemy's Air Force bases, aircraft carriers, and cruise-missile sea launch platforms. The second need is to destroy effectively. This means concentrated application of various elite forces and high-tech weapons, working hard to create superiority over the enemy within a local time and space, integrated use of various operational methods and means, concentration of force against the correctly selected strategic targets, ensuring an attack against their vital points, paralyzing their stretches, and rapidly bogging down the enemy operational system into a state of paralysis.

(3) Unified command, and a composite strength to gain victory

In air defense campaigns under future informationized conditions: the participating strengths will be multi-elemental, each element having different functions; the operational range will extend over all of the battlefields – land, sea, air, space, and EM; all operational activities will be interwoven; without unified command, it will be difficult to form an integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli}; and thus it will also be difficult to seize the operational initiative in confrontations where the integrated quality is very prominent. Hence, subduing the enemy with unified command and a composite strength is a critical principle that must be followed in organizing and conducting an air defense campaign. To this end, the first need is to establish a highly efficient, authoritative command system. In air defense campaigns under informationized conditions, battlespaces are expansive, *bushu* dispositions are highly dispersed, operational tempos are fast, and situations are rapidly changing; this levies more stringent requirements on command efficiency. Thus, one must establish a command system with few command levels, vertically and horizontally interlinked, with a simple, clear, and smooth relationship which can flexibly meet emergencies. The second need is to fully utilize command automation means. One should establish an integrated command automation system – with a rational computer-based structure, flexibility of use, and high survivability – to realize faster information transfer and processing, a scientific decision-making method, and improved command efficiency. The third need is to ably handle the relationship between centralized control and decentralized implementation. Considered from the viewpoint of an operation's overall situation, in order to closely coordinate the various participating strengths, all the battlefield spaces, and the various operational activities, and to form an integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli}, one must realize centralized control over an air defense campaign, and one must – based on the general intention of the air defense campaign – have unified stratagem-planning {mouhua} of the various operational activities, realize centralized control over elite air defense strengths, and unify the employment of the plans {jihua}. At the same time, one must also consider the features of the multidimensionality of the air-defense campaign battlefield, the highly dispersed *bushu* disposition of force strengths and weaponry, and the complexity and diversity of operational activities and methods. In order to bring into play the zeal and initiative of the various participating strengths, improve rapid response capability, and enhance the flexibility of operations, specific missions and activities

should be conducted in decentralized fashion by the various operational groups and air defense subareas (zones).

(4) Integration, diversity, and enhanced support

Air defense campaigns under informationized conditions have features of high depletion, high technology, and high time effectiveness. This makes the support work more complex, and the relationship between support activities and operational activities closer, and has an increasingly greater effect on the success or failure of the operation. Hence, one must ensure the smooth conduct of the air defense campaign, and must carry out the principle of integration, diversity, and enhanced support. One should lay stress on grasping the following points: the first need is to implement integrated support. One should fully exploit favorable conditions for homeland operations and People's War; rely on theater scientific/technical and economic potential to establish a unified, high-efficiency command system and military-civilian integrated support mechanism; and form a military-civilian multi-layer support system with the military as primary. The second need is to implement diversified support. One must – with a focus on the features of the various types of support targets – develop multiple channels, employ multiple means, and formulate multiple measures. In terms of support methods, one should achieve mutual integration of area support and organizational system support, mutual integration of unified supply with specialized supply, mutual integration of base support and escort support, and mutual integration of air-transport air drops and ground support. The third need is to lay stress on the support key points. One should deploy with key points the support strengths along the main direction and in the main areas to facilitate the wartime ability to rapidly concentrate the application of support strengths, materiel, and equipment at key times, and to ensure the fulfillment of the main missions. As for the support content, one should focus on information support in the areas of intelligence, communications, and electronic warfare, and build up stores of camouflage and protective equipment. The fourth need is to improve rapid support capability. The campaign commander and command organ should: deliberate in advance on the possibly occurring changes; formulate a thorough support plan *{jihua}*, based on missions that may be assumed by the air defense strengths; and guide the support strengths per plan in the storage of operational materiel and in execution of drills according to the support proposal. Simultaneously, they should increase the quantities of transport aircraft, transport vehicles, and equipment to enhance mobile support capability. The fifth need is to implement support during battles. In future air defense campaigns, the support-versus-countersupport struggles will be abnormally sharp, and the boundary between these activities and operational activities will tend to blur. Hence, one should enhance the battle functions of the support system, and improve the self-defense capability of the support strengths.

Section 2: Main Activities...608

I. Grasping the Enemy Air Raid's Dynamic State, and Issuing Air Raid Alarms...608

The campaign commander and command organ must: thoroughly plan *{jihua}*; apply in integrated fashion the various types (space, air, sea, and ground) of reconnaissance modes, reconnaissance means, and reconnaissance equipment; and implement omni-temporo-spatial, continuous, tight reconnaissance and surveillance of the air raiding enemy. From various signs – the enemy's conduct of reconnaissance activities, unusual changes in radio and signal communications, the initiation of jamming, and air-raid force-unit *{budui}* movement conditions – they must as early as possible ascertain the enemy air raid circumstances. The main contents [of this intelligence] are as follows: the enemy air raid's force composition, numbers, air raid intention, and scale; the air raid arms' departure bases, missile launch positions, and sea-based cruise missile launch platforms; and the air raid's direction, strike opportunities, targets, and penetration means, as well as the air raid's route and flight altitudes. The campaign commander and command organ should – based on the intelligence acquired by reconnaissance – rapidly make an assessment of the enemy air raid activities, and, depending on whether the enemy air threat is constantly intensifying or easing, issue air raid forecasts, air raid alarms, and [later] all-clear signals to all units, as well as to the People's Air Defense organization.

II. Integration of Aircraft, SAMs, and AAA, to Resist the Enemy's Air Sudden Raids...608

A resistance operation means an operational activity with integrated application of the air defense strengths of all the service arms and the air defense strengths of the militia and reserves, along the main direction of the enemy air raid, to establish an aircraft/SAM/AAA integrated, large-area, dynamic-state resistance *bushi* disposition, in order to annihilate or retard the air raiding enemy via air battles and antiaircraft operations. It is the most important operational activity in an air defense campaign. Based on the course and goals of the enemy air raid operation, counterattack operations are normally organized according to resistance against the enemy's strike on [our] air defense system, resistance against the enemy's strike in depth on [critical] targets, and resistance against the enemy's continued strikes.

(1) Resistance against the enemy's sudden attack on [our] air defense system

When the enemy launches an air raid against us, it will surely concentrate its elite strengths to first suppress or destroy our air defense system, which will cause us to lose resistance and counterattack capabilities and will ensure the smooth realization of the air raid intention. Hence, resisting the enemy's strikes against our air defense system is a core mission of the first battle in the air defense campaign. Resistance against the enemy strikes on the air defense system may adopt the following activities.

First is rapidly pressing forward and interception at maximum range. When the invading enemy comes within [our] early-warning and maximum interception range, the Air Force and Navy fighter aviation units assuming the interception mission adopt a method mutually integrating aerial alerts with airfield alerts, rapidly press forward to engage the enemy, and strive at the greatest possible range to effect interception of the enemy air raid formations, and to block the enemy from continuing the invasion. One should: use some forces to pin down the enemy's air escort formation; drive away or wipe out the enemy's airborne warning and control system (AWACS) planes, jammers, and in-air refueling planes (tankers); sabotage the integral structure of the enemy air raid formations; and disorganize the enemy air *bushi* disposition. Simultaneously, one should concentrate the first-line forces along the enemy's main air raid direction, attack in echelons, and carry out sustained interception of the enemy strike forces at the longest possible range – to disorganize the enemy air raid formation, and to force the enemy to drop its bombs ahead of time. The ground-based air defense units deployed at the forward edge and the sea-based ship-to-air weapons should be closely coordinated with the fighter aviation forces, to wipe out the enemy air-raid arms coming within their firepower range.

Second is continuing to launch attacks, and sparing no effort to blockade. When the air raiding enemy breaks through our maximum-range interception zone and continues the raid, one should concentrate mainline fighter aviation forces units to continuously launch attacks and execute key-point strikes against the enemy air raid arms along the main direction, and spare no effort to blockade the enemy air-penetration corridor. When these forces suffer relatively high losses from the enemy air raid, one should rapidly organize second-line forces or campaign reserves to rapidly press forward and provide support so as to bolster the main-direction resistance operation. When the enemy alters the main air raid direction, one should rapidly adjust the *bushu* disposition, organize mobile force strengths or campaign reserves to implement resolute strikes against the enemy along the main direction of the air raid, as fast as possible close off the enemy's invasion route, and block the enemy from an invasion into our depth. When some forces of the enemy break through our first-line defense and implement full scale strikes against our air defense system, one should organize a fighter aviation forces' follow-on force strengths to take off from many points, enter from many directions, complemented by ground-based air defense firepower, resolutely wipe out the penetrating enemy, protect the stability of our air defense system, and smashes the enemy's intention to seize battlefield air superiority.

(2) Resistance against the enemy's sudden attack in depth on important targets

The air raiding enemy, after breaking through our air defense system, will inevitably concentrate elite air raid arms to execute high-intensity air strikes on critical military, political, and economic targets in our depth. In order to smash the enemy air raid intention, one should – based on resisting the enemy's strike against our air defense system – concentrate the resistance forces of all the service arms and the People's Air Defense units, flexibly employ war strategies and tactics, and execute layer-by-layer interception of the enemy, to guard the safety of critical targets in our depth.

Air-ground integration, layer-by-layer interception. When the enemy breaks through our long-range interception, and executes an air raid against targets in our depth – command and control (C2) systems, massive-forces groups, Air Force and Navy bases, communications hubs, telecommunications facilities, and people’s livelihood facilities – one should fully exploit the long-range interception effects, apply forces in echelons, and adopt a method mutually integrating aerial interception with an anti-aircraft block, to effect layer-by-layer interception of the invading enemy. When organizing aerial interception, one should employ fighters in groups (high-, medium-, and low-performance), scientifically composed, which along all directions rationally divide the interception sectors, to ensure the ability to execute sustained interception of the air raiding enemy. When the enemy breaks through our aerial interception and comes within firepower range of ground-based air defense forces, the air defense units of all service arms, as well as of the militia and reserves, should: fully exploit the aerial interception gains; employ sudden, dense firepower to execute an omni-altitude blockade of the invading enemy; and strive to wipe out the air raiding enemy at the periphery of the defended targets. To resist the enemy’s incursion into our depth, one must lay stress on key points; one should concentrate superior forces and firepower along the main operational direction, and emphasize strikes on targets posing the greatest threat to us. The enemy AWACS planes are the centers of gravity for their air formations’ acquisition of information and command coordination, their electronic warfare aircraft are the main strength for executing EM suppression, and stealth aircraft and cruise missiles are the enemy’s long-range precision strike weapons with the strongest penetration capability; hence, these “three [types of] aircraft and one [type of] missile” should become the targets for key-point strikes in resistance operations.

Wide-ranging maneuvers, dynamic resistance. The resistance operation is an operational pattern in which the enemy is active and we are passive; the air raiding enemy can flexibly alter the air raid direction and strike targets, and flexibly apply strike means, while our resistance operations must await the enemy action before we act. In order to effectively resist the enemy’s air raid, on the basis of using fixed *bushu* disposition air defense forces to execute layer-by-layer attacks on the enemy, one must also extensively maneuver the air defense forces and arms to execute dynamic resistance against the invading enemy. According to the enemy air raid operation’s characteristics and laws, and based on an accurate grasp and assessment of the enemy situation dynamics, one should correctly apply mobile forces, select a favorable opportunity and space for maneuvers, and choose the strike targets. In particular, under circumstances where one has acquired accurate intelligence on the enemy air raid, one should: rapidly organize air defense strengths to maneuver into positions which the enemy must cross; adopt war strategies and tactics such as in-array guerrilla warfare, luring [the enemy] into an ambush, and set an ambush along the route; and with all one’s strength intercept the enemy during the air raid or during his return flight to base.

(3) Resistance against the enemy's implementation of continuous strikes

The air raiding enemy, after executing the first strike against us, will – in order to exploit the victory – use organized strengths to execute unequal-scale [i.e. asymmetric] continued strikes on targets not destroyed in the first strike, and on newly found targets, until the operational goal is achieved. To this end, a campaign commander and command organ should fully exploit the intervals between enemy air raids to rapidly complete the preparations for resisting the enemy's continued air raids, execute a determined attack against the invading enemy, and crush his intention.

Enhancement of R&EW, and timely detection of signs of the enemy's next air raid. After we repulse the enemy's first air raid, on the one hand we must continue to organize strengths to resist the enemy's small-scale harassing air raids. On the other hand we must: exploit all exploitable reconnaissance and surveillance means and methods; closely observe the dynamics of the enemy's next launched air raid; and lay stress on ascertaining the circumstances of the enemy forces' assembly, movements, and replenishments (replacements), as well as the scale, direction, and targets of, and opportunities for, the enemy's next air raid.

At the right time, adjustment of the replenishment strengths. After the enemy's first air raid, one should – based on the circumstances of the air defense strengths' losses – at the right time conduct adjustment and replenishment. When the main resistance direction suffers severe losses from the enemy air raid, one should rapidly adjust the strengths in the secondary direction and other directions, and give them supplementary enhancement, and one may also adjust the replenishments for the strengths in the forward-lead depth {qianyi zongshen}, to ensure having sufficient strengths to resist the enemy's continued air raids.

Rapid organization of continued resistance. When the air raiding enemy again executes a strike against us, the campaign commander and command organ should organize resistance strengths to conduct continued resistance against the invading enemy. When the air raiding enemy with a small number of forces executes continued strikes against us, one should concentrate superior resistance forces, execute continued strikes against the enemy, strive to inflict a lethal strike on the enemy, and force the enemy to abandon the air raid intention. When the enemy with relatively large forces executes a large-scale, high-intensity air raid against us, one should concentrate all of the resistance strengths, at the necessary time throw in the reserves, call forth all one's energy, and resolutely repulse the enemy's continued air raids.

III. Grasp an Opportunity for Battle, and at the Right Time Organize a Counterattack...611

Counterattack operations are the assault activities implemented with initiative against the enemy's air raid weaponry bases and other targets and employing the long range strike strengths within the campaign task organization. They are offensive operational activities

in an air defense campaign, and have far-reaching effects on the campaign's course and conclusion. The campaign commander and command organ should – based on situations such as higher level intent, battle situation development needs-requirements and counterattack operational capability – carefully conduct decision making, be adept at selecting time opportunities, precisely select target(s), measure the enemy to apply force, cleverly use fighting methods, and actively and flexibly implement counterattack against the air raiding enemy.

(1) Careful selection of the counterattack time opportunity

The counterattack time opportunity is an important content which must be made clear in organizing and executing a counterattack operation. The time opportunity for a counterattack operation should be carefully chosen based on higher level intent, the enemy situation, our situation, and the situation of battlefield realities. For a counterattack operation, one normally can choose the following time opportunities: when there are clear signs of an enemy air raid, the enemy is making preparations to sortie, and one's own side has the conditions for an immediate counterattack; when the enemy invades from one direction, which is advantageous to one's own counterattack from a different direction; when the [enemy's] main strike formation, after its return flight, conducts preparations at its base for the next sorties, and [thus] finds it difficult to take off and meet us head-on; and when the enemy air raid strengths have suffered significant weakening, their disposition is leaky (has loopholes), and there is a loophole that one can take advantage of, or when meteorological conditions are favorable for one's own side and unfavorable for the enemy.

Favorable counterattack time opportunities and unfavorable counterattack time opportunities are not static and unchanging; they can be altered. Hence, the campaign commander and command organ must stand at the height of the campaign overall situation in order to overall-plan counterattack operations, strengthening the predictability of counterattack operations. They must actively create and seize a favorable counterattack time opportunity, and once the time opportunity is ripe, immediately organize the counterattack.

(2) Careful selection of targets

Determination of counterattack targets is the key to organizing and executing counterattack operations, and has a direct bearing on the results of a counterattack operation. Counterattack targets should be carefully chosen based on several factors: the high-level intent, our counterattack capabilities, and the disposition of the enemy's air raid forces and arms. This means one must focus on sabotaging the enemy's air raid plan {jihua} and on weakening the enemy's air raid capability; at the same time, one must also consider the losses one's own side can suffer, and strive to win a great victory in exchange for a small cost. Under ordinary circumstances, in a counterattack operation one should mainly select the following targets: the enemy's C2 systems, takeoff and

launch platforms such as Air Force bases and aircraft carriers, and the enemy's logistical and supply systems.

The campaign commander and command organ when choosing counterattack targets should lay stress on grasping the following: the first need is to firmly abide by the requirements of national political and diplomatic struggles, to ensure that the counterattack operation is on just grounds and with restraint; the second need is to precisely strike vital areas, and to strike with key points against targets which can generate intense shock among the enemy and which can effectively weaken the enemy air raid capability, and on the fact that it is inappropriate to attack too many targets in a single counterattack; and the third need is to select strike targets which are concentrated, exposed, easy to detect and destroy, and easy to penetrate.

(3) Simultaneous application of multiple methods, and implement counterattacks

Flexible application of fighting methods is an important way for gaining victory in counterattack operations. The campaign commander and command organ should rationally determine the counterattack methods on the basis of the battlefield conditions, the enemy's anti-air defensive situation, the situations of the counterattacked targets, and our counterattack operational capability.

Organizing a missile counterattack. A missile counterattack is primarily executed mainly by the 2nd Artillery Corps' conventional missile and cruise missile units, as well as by the Army's campaign tactical missile units. Under ordinary circumstances, a missile counterattack should lay stress on strikes against large, planar, fixed targets such as enemy airfields and C2 systems. When the missile counterattack is jointly executed with an air counterattack, the missile counterattack should be executed first, to suppress and destroy the enemy air defense system, so as to create conditions for the aviation forces' penetration.

Organizing an air counterattack. An air counterattack is primarily executed mainly by units of the Air Force and Navy bomber aviation forces, fighter-bomber aviation forces, and ground-attack aviation forces; it lays stress on striking targets such as the enemy's C2 systems, Air Force bases, aircraft carriers, and logistical/supply systems. When the air counterattack is jointly executed with a missile counterattack, one should fully exploit the results of the missile strike, and organize air strike strengths to execute continued strikes and supplementary strikes on the predesignated targets, to further exploit the battle gains. In order to ensure the smooth progress of the air counterattack, one should tightly organize good air penetration. When executing the first air counterattack or a small-scale harassing air counterattack, one should take stealthy penetration as primary, and storming penetration as supplementary. One should adopt methods such as deception, jamming, exploiting time differences, selection of concealed routes, and low-altitude and ultra-low-altitude invasion; swiftly penetrate the enemy's air defense system; and execute the strikes on targets. When organizing a large-scale counterattack operation, due to the enemy's advance preparations, it will be difficult to achieve suddenness (surprise); here,

one should take storming penetration as primary, and stealthy penetration as supplementary. To this end, one should scientifically group the counterstrike strengths; construct an air raid armada comprising multiple functions – jamming, suppression, cover, and strikes – fused into a whole; and, with the coordination of electronic and force-unit {budui} feints, force open breaches in the enemy’s air defense system to ensure that the main strike formation smoothly penetrates into the enemy’s depth and launches the assault on the predetermined targets.

Organizing a sea counterattack. A sea counterattack is primarily executed mainly by the Navy’s surface ship units and submarine units. Its strike targets mainly are the enemy’s aircraft carrier battle groups, cruise missile launch platforms, and transport/supply ships. A sea counterattack normally is integrated with an air counterattack and missile counterattack, but if conditions are favorable it can also be executed separately. Normally, one first conducts the missile and aviation firepower strikes to disorganize the structure of the enemy formation and then concentrates surface ship and submarine forces to fully exploit the gains of the missile and aviation firepower strikes by executing a fierce strike on the predetermined counterattack targets. The submarine forces may also adopt ambush methods to strike against the predetermined enemy sea targets.

Organizing a special counterattack. A special counterattack mainly employs elite special operations detachments, employing an airborne (parachute-drop) mode or the mode of directly slipping in and infiltrating from the sea or land to execute a surprise attack on and sabotage or harass the enemy. The strike targets mainly are targets such as the enemy’s C2 centers, radar stations, and fuel and munitions depots.

IV. . Tightly Organize Protection, to Minimize Air Raid Losses...614

Protection operations mean various measures, means, and activities adopted to mitigate the enemy air raid effects, to minimize casualties and target losses, and to maintain the stability of the war situation and sustained operational capability. The strengths participating in protection operations are mainly as follows: military protection strengths, including the specialized protection strengths within the campaign composition, and the participating units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 2nd Artillery Corps; and regional protection strengths, including the specialized protection strengths under the regional governments in the various provinces (municipalities) and autonomous regions within the theater, and the masses. The key-point protection targets include the following: the leading offices and strategic command systems of the Party, Government, and PLA; air defense systems; targets associated with the national economy, people’s livelihood, and war potential, such as power plants, refineries, military-industrial enterprises, and city water plants; and targets which can easily undergo secondary nuclear, biological, and/or chemical (NBC) damage, such as nuclear power stations and chemical plants.

(1) Enhancing battlefield control, to maintain battlefield order

Enhancement of battlefield control and strict battlefield discipline are very important to ensuring battlefield order and enhancing the protective effects. In particular, the military-civilian integrated character and mass character of a protection operation place more urgent needs on enhancing the capabilities for control over protection operations. To this end, the first need is to enhance urban and EM-spectrum blackouts and control over crowd flows to maximally reduce the probability of being detected by the enemy. The second need is to enhance transportation-route control, maintain good traffic order, and ensure the transport requirements of the military, industry, and society at large. The third need is to enhance control over the news and broadcast media, and firmly strike at the spread of rumors and at those who seduce the people so as to stabilize popular sentiment and morale. The fourth need is to: enhance control over public security in society; fully bring into play the effects of the troops, [People's] Armed Police, public security, the militia, and regional governments; widely mobilize the masses' strengths to uphold public security in society; and maintain good social order.

(2) Focusing on the weak points of the enemy's high-tech air raid arms, integratively adopting protection means

In air defense campaigns under high-tech conditions, we are confronted with very severe airborne threats. Organizing a protection operation requires: fully employing various modes and methods; mutually integrating static protection and dynamic protection; mutually integrating protection of defense works with concealment, dispersal, and camouflage; mutually integrating conventional protection and modern protection; mutually integrating technical protection and tactical protection; and mutually integrating specialized protection and mass protection, so as to obtain good protection results. The main measures are as follows. First, one must rely on defense works, to seek survival by concealment. One should employ modern protection engineering and ad hoc-constructed protective fortifications to achieve concealment of personnel, weaponry, and materiel, and to defend against the enemy's high-precision, high-intensity strikes. Several critical arms and facilities should as much as possible be hidden in cave depots or transferred underground for concealment. The second need is to conceal the true and display the false, to seek survival by deception. Based on the characteristics of the enemy air raid, one should adopt methods such as natural camouflage, artificial camouflage, spreading of false information, and creation of dummy targets, to cause the enemy difficulty in distinguishing the true from the false, to lure the enemy into attacking the dummies and bombing the dummies, and to reduce the effects of the enemy air raid. The third need is to maneuver at the right time to seek survival through movement. This means reducing the effects of the enemy air raid by conducting wide-ranging maneuvers. It means organizing force-units and weaponry for rapid maneuvers, and modifying the deployment locations, to evade the enemy's air strikes. The fourth need is widespread dispersal to seek survival by dispersal. This means dispersing the disposition of forces and arms, and dispersing and concealing personnel and materiel, so as to reduce the effects of the enemy air raid.

(3) Integrating the military and civilians to eliminate the consequences of the air raid

Eliminating the air raid consequences is a critical element in organizing a protection operation. After we encounter an enemy air raid, the campaign commander and command organ should fully bring into play the synergism among the various specialized units and the masses, and in intense but ordered fashion organize emergency repairs and the rescue work. They should: organize strengths to ascertain the battle losses situation; rationally allocate the missions; and lay stress on the losses to airfields, air defense positions, weaponry, command and communications facilities, and critical operational materiel, and on the particulars of casualties. For important targets such as airfields, air defense positions, and intelligence, communications, and command facilities, they should organize specialized strengths to make repairs as soon as those targets are bombed, and promptly restore [their functions]. As for the other targets, they should mobilize the masses to effect emergency repairs and rescue. Equipment that has suffered severe air-raid losses and cannot be repaired should be promptly replaced according to the need. When the enemy air raid uses NBC weapons, or creates NBC leakage, the campaign commander and command organ should rapidly organize the chemical defense corps and specialized technical personnel to conduct decontamination, and take strict precautions against the spread of NBC hazards over a large range. When the enemy air raid causes fires, the campaign commander and command organ should rely primarily on specialized firefighting strengths, but also organize and mobilize supplementary units and the masses, to rapidly cut off the fire paths, launch fire-quenching efforts to save lives and property, and prevent the fires from continuing to spread and from causing major losses to the lives and property of the masses.

Part VI: Campaigns of the Second Artillery...616

Chapter 31 Overview...616

Second Artillery campaigns are an important component of the PLA campaign system {tixi}. Studying Second Artillery campaign ideas {gainian}, characteristics, principles, command coordination, and organizing-implementation is beneficial for mastering the essence of a Second Artillery campaign and thereby promulgating its intrinsic laws.

Section 1: Second Artillery Campaigns, Defined and Classified...616

Accurately defining and scientifically classifying Second Artillery campaigns consists of the major premises of the fundamental theoretical research of campaigns; it is the fundamental theory perfecting the campaign and guidance for campaign practice, having major theoretical significance.

I. The Definition of a Second Artillery Campaign...616

In adhering to the fundamental tenets of our military's campaign studies and the overall analysis of the intrinsic properties of a Second Artillery campaign, a Second Artillery campaign can be defined as: the execution of a series of nuclear strikes or conventional missile strikes as well as the actions that are associated [with them], by a Second Artillery campaign large formation, so as to form operational activities in order to achieve the goals of the war, either in part or overall, based on the operational intentions of the higher-level authorities.

This definition indicates the essential elements {要素 yaosu} of the strengths, goals, command and composition of a Second Artillery campaign. From the standpoint of the campaign strengths, the campaign participating strengths consist of a Second Artillery campaign large formation, and only if the force grouping is the scale of a missile base and above, can it be possible to achieve the campaign operational mission. From the standpoint of the campaign goals {战役目的 zhanyi mudi}, on account of the Second Artillery's use of ground-to-ground missile weaponry, the assaults on strategic campaign targets within the other side's depth, and the major effects of the operational activities on the overall course of the war and on the final result, the campaign normally achieves the goals of the war either partially or overall. From the standpoint of campaign command, the Second Artillery is a strategic long-range strike strength that directly receives its command from the highest command authority {最高统帅部 zuigao tongshuaibu}, and it executes the orders from the highest command authority by applying them extremely rigidly and exceedingly accurately. As a consequence, a Second Artillery campaign stresses unified command {统一指挥 tongyi zhihui} to an even greater degree and all activities must be carried out according to a unified plan {统一的计划 tongyi de jihua}. From the standpoint of the composition of a campaign, the weaponry that is used by the

Second Artillery is medium- and long-range and intercontinental missile weaponry {洲际导弹武器 zhouji daodan wuqi}, and it is a campaign that is composed of a series of nuclear strikes {核突击 he tuji} or conventional missile strikes {常规导弹突击 changguan daodan tuji}, as well as their associated actions {相关活动 xiangguan houdong}.

II. The Classifications of Second Artillery Campaigns...617

A Second Artillery campaigns can be differentiated into a certain number of different classifications based on the nature of the use of weaponry and the scale of the forces used.

(1) Based on the nature of the use of weaponry, they can be divided into nuclear strike campaigns and conventional missile strike campaigns

1. Nuclear strike campaigns {核反击战役 he fanji zhanyi}

Nuclear strike campaigns refer to the sum total of the series of nuclear missile strikes and the associated operational activities of a Second Artillery nuclear campaign large formation that are strictly carried out under the direct command and control of the Supreme Command and are carried out based on the intentions of the Supreme Command in order to achieve specially designated strategic goals. A nuclear counterstrike campaign {核反击战役 he fanji zhanyi} is a type of major operation for the Second Artillery; not only can it be implemented independently, but it can also be a major compositional part {重要组成部分 zhongyao zucheng bufen} of the joint nuclear counterstrike campaign {联合核反击战役 lianhe he fanji zhanyi}.

2. Conventional missile strike campaign {常规导弹突击战役 changgui daodan tuji zhanyi}

The conventional missile strike campaign refers to the sum total of the series of conventional missile strikes and related operational activities implemented by the Second Artillery conventional campaign large formation under unified command in order to achieve the goals of the war either partially or completely. Normally the Second Artillery conventional missile strike campaign is a major compositional part in a joint campaign, and under special situations, it can also be independently implemented.

(2) Based on the scale of the use of forces, they can be divided into missile base group campaigns {导弹基地群战役 daodan jidiquan zhanyi}, conventional missile brigade

group campaign {常规导弹旅群战役 changgui daodan lüqun zhanyi} and missile base campaigns {导弹基地战役 changgui jidi zhanyi}.

1. Missile base group campaigns

The missile base group campaign refers to a campaign large formation composed of two (included) or more missile bases under the operational orders from the Supreme Command or joint campaign headquarters to achieve a series of missile strike campaign activities, based on the campaign commander's unified plan {jihua} and his command institution and under their organized command. Owing to the relatively large scale of this kind of campaign, it is generally the commanders and the command organs of the campaign large formations that structure the Second Artillery who organize the command activities. This type of campaign large formation is also called a high-level campaign large formation {高级战役军团 gao-ji zhanyi jituan}.

2. Conventional missile brigade group campaign

The conventional missile brigade group campaign is a campaign large formation that is composed of a certain number of conventional missile brigades that accomplish a series of missile strike operational activities. These fall under the unified planning {jihua} and organized command of a Second Artillery campaign commander and his command institution and are based on the operational orders of the Supreme Command or the joint campaign headquarters. By virtue of the fact that there are many different models that constitute the conventional missile equipment of the Second Artillery, their conventional missile brigades, respectively, are subordinated as different cells within a hierarchy. Thus, all of the campaign strengths that are used in conventional missile brigade group campaigns are commonly unitary cells {部队 budui} that are composed of a certain number of conventional missile brigades that are subordinated to different hierarchies and can be unitary cells composed of a certain number of conventional missile brigades in the same hierarchy.

3. Missile base campaigns

Missile base campaigns consist of campaign large formations that are composed of an individual missile base and that achieve a series of missile strike operational activities under the concrete planning and organized command of the missile base campaign commander and his command organ, and are based on the operational orders of the higher-level authorities. Owing to the fact that this type of campaign is organized and implemented by a basic organizational-unit of the Second Artillery {第二炮兵基本战役单位 di'er paobing jiben zhanyi danwei}, this type of campaign large formation is referred to as the basic campaign large formation {基本战役军团 jiben zhanyi juntuan}.

Section 2: Characteristics and Principles of a Second Artillery Campaign...618

The characteristics and principles of a Second Artillery campaign consist of the objective reflection {客观反映 keguan fanying} of the basic laws {基本规律 jiben guilü} of a Second Artillery campaign. In carrying out conscientious inquiry and study into [these characteristics and principles], there is extremely important significance with regard to profound promulgation of the internal laws of a Second Artillery campaign and to correctly guiding the Second Artillery operations.

I. Characteristics...618

The characteristics of the campaign consist of all of the characteristics and properties of the campaign itself, and they are the major basis for formulating the campaign principles. In addition to the characteristics that the Second Artillery has in common with modern campaigns, they also have several distinctive characteristics of their own.

(1) There is a great overall effect on operational effectiveness and a strong strategic nature

A Second Artillery campaign is the application of strategic missile nuclear weapons {战略导弹核武器 zhanlüe daodan he wuqi} and conventional missile weapons {常规导弹武器 changguai daodan wuqi} in operational activities that consist of striking important strategic- or campaign targets such as enemy political, economic and military targets [located at distances] beyond several hundred-, several thousand- and even beyond 10,000 kilometers. The functioning of missile weaponry not only has the power to cause great physical destruction {巨大的物理摧毁 juda de wuli cuihui}, but it also can cause far-reaching psychological deterrence {心理威慑效应 xinli weizhe xiaoying} and sociological effects {社会效应 shehui xiaoying}, directly affecting national politics and the overall situation of military and diplomatic struggles, and will affect developing changes in the international strategic circumstances {国际战略形势 guoji zhanlüe xingshi}. For this reason, the Second Artillery has a strong strategic quality, and in its operational application, it is strictly controlled in the strategic overall situation. The goals, scale and timing for the initiation of a Second Artillery campaign, and the like, must be subordinate to and serve the strategic overall situation and satisfy the needs of the overall situation of national political and diplomatic struggles.

(2) Strongly integrated operational system and high requirements for a synthesized self-contained set

The Second Artillery missile forces: apply strategic and campaign missile weaponry; collect the various kinds of highly technical weaponry into a single body; have weapons systems that are complex; and are highly technical and highly integrated. Launching a missile involves dozens of vehicles and dozens of specialized trades, and only if the activities are consistently coordinated, can it be possible to form an integrated-whole

composite strength {zhengti heli} and accomplish the operational mission. Speaking from a personnel standpoint, it is necessary to merge together the launch forces, technical support forces and logistics support forces; speaking from an operational capabilities and key factors standpoint, this includes the synthesis of key factors such as command, support, rapid response, and defense penetration; while speaking from a contents standpoint, not only do [the Second Artillery missile forces] have technical synthesis, they also have tactical synthesis, and not only do they have combat force synthesis, they also have support force synthesis. Thus, the Second Artillery operational system is complex, the technical content is high, and there is strong synchronization. This raises a very high requirement for a synthesized self-contained set for the operational system. Only if the optimal integration is constituted through essential elements, and a continuous self-contained set is promoted throughout the overall system, can it be possible to form an integrated system of strengths.

(3) Operations in nuclear conditions {核条件 he tiaojian} or nuclear deterrence conditions {核威慑条件 he weizhi tiaojian}

Based on the standpoint of our nation's principle of no first use of nuclear weapons, only after the enemy implements a nuclear strike against us first can it be possible for the Second Artillery strategic nuclear strengths to implement a nuclear counterattack against the enemy upon the orders from the Supreme Command. For this reason, from the overall standpoint of the nuclear counterattack campaign, it will be implemented in nuclear conditions. In the event that the enemy implements a nuclear strike against us, the Second Artillery operational positions and missile weapons systems will inevitably become their key point targets {重点目标 zhongdian mubiao}. After the Second Artillery operational area suffers an attack, the battlefield conditions will be abnormally complex, the environment will be extremely harsh, and our personnel, weapons and equipment, position engineering, roads and bridges as well as such things as our reconnaissance-, communications- and command and control systems will suffer serious destruction and damage. As a result, the battlefield conditions for the Second Artillery nuclear counterattack campaign will be abnormally arduous and complex.

With regard to the Second Artillery conventional missile strike campaign, it will be carried out under nuclear deterrence conditions. Despite the fact that future wars primarily will be conventional local wars, in the global [community,] those that have nuclear weapons are primarily nations with strong militaries, and have not promised no first use of nuclear weapons; moreover local wars that erupt in the near future will implement nuclear deterrence many times. As a result, under highly technical conditions, the Second Artillery will inevitably suffer the nuclear deterrence of the militaries of the nuclear powers in completing the conventional missile strike campaign. Regional conflicts or local wars that can erupt on our periphery pose even more of an actual nuclear threat.

Consequently, no matter if it is a nuclear counterattack campaign or whether it is a conventional missile strike campaign, both are seriously threatened by nuclear weapons.

The Second Artillery must successfully handle preparations for nuclear strike and nuclear deterrence, and must be rooted in nuclear conditions or operations under nuclear deterrence conditions.

(4) The battlefield is broad, *bushu* disposition is dispersed, command is synchronized and support is difficult

The operational activities of the Second Artillery missile forces are highly dependent on the battlefield; and the deployment of their strengths is established during peacetime and is based on the strategic intentions of the Supreme Command. In order to facilitate concealment and camouflage for the forces and prevent multiple positions from being destroyed by the enemy at the same time, the deployment of their operational positions is generally dispersed throughout a broad area within the strategic depth. Although the many points and broad area of the operational deployment facilitates the increase of survivability, it brings about a great deal of difficulty in providing campaign command, [providing] the various items of support and in synchronizing the campaign. A Second Artillery campaign is a non-contact operation with vast operational space, particularly when achieving the missile base group campaigns. There is a very great span of battlefield area, causing abnormal fluctuations in the coordination for the operational activities in each operational area; and unusual difficulty in each item of support, added to wartime enemy electronic jamming and firepower destruction, thus making communications extremely easy to sever and creating even greater difficulty in survival. As a consequence, missile forces must: be rooted in the most difficult of situations; successfully make abundant preparations; formulate advance plans for handling each of the complex aspects; adopt effective measures; and guarantee the smooth implementation of the campaign.

(5) Achieving campaign goals through missile firepower strikes, and prioritizing firepower

Long-range firepower warfare is the prominent characteristic of the Second Artillery operation. The Second Artillery is the implementation of firepower strikes of a specified scale at campaign targets at distances greater than several hundred, several thousand and even over several tens of thousands of kilometers through the use of strategic and campaign missile weaponry in order to achieve campaign goals. Whether or not they create a certain degree of damage or destruction to targets is the only standard to judge the campaign operational effects; commanders at all levels only have to painstakingly organize missile firepower strike activities and put their main energies into ensuring strike effects before they can ultimately achieve the goals of the campaign. When organizing the implementation of the missile firepower strike, scientific decision-making should be carried out based on strategic intention. Operational intentions should be established, strike targets should be designated, strengths should be applied, and the various support strengths should be allocated during [the] decision-making [process], all revolving around the nucleus of applying firepower. As a result, the overall planning and

application of missile firepower is the core content of campaign command and decision-making.

(6) The campaign defensive operations and information operations permeate the entire course of the campaign

The Second Artillery missile forces and operational positions are the key point targets {重点目标 zhongdian mubiao} for enemy assaults. In peacetime, during the process for establishing positions, there is a lot of machinery and equipment and a great amount of excavation in rows for engineering projects, especially as regards the clearly evident traits of launch silos {发射井 fashe jing} and platforms {场坪 changtai}, which makes it extremely easy for the enemy to detect them with reconnaissance, whereas it creates a great degree of difficulty in their [own] attempts at concealment; [while] in wartime, during the course of achieving the operational mission, there is a lot of equipment that the unitary cell puts to use, that, coupled with the frequent activity {活动 huodong} in the operational area, makes it easy for the enemy to detect them. In addition, the self-defense capabilities {自身防卫能力 zisheng fangwei nengli} of the missile forces are weak, and there is a great degree of difficulty in defending against enemy surprise raids {敌突然袭击 di turan xiji}, thus posing a serious threat to their survival. As a result, strengthening campaign defenses and electronic warfare seems to be of particular importance. On one hand, the Second Artillery is faced with this kind of situation in organizing campaign activities and it must tightly weave their protection successfully by: synthesizing the application of various means, and adopting all effective measures and preventing enemy satellite or aviation reconnaissance; preventing enemy precision guidance weaponry strikes {精确制导武器打击 jingque zhidao wuqi daji}; and preventing surprise raids by enemy aviation weaponry. On the other hand, they must also: prevent harassing attacks by enemy special forces {特种部队 tezhong budui}, and avoid or decrease, to the furthest possible extent, losses sustained in enemy surprise attacks; and effectively preserve nuclear counterattack strengths and conventional missile strike strengths. At the same time, following along with the wide-spread use of information technology as the core of new high technology in the military, information warfare {信息战作 xinxi zuozhan} will emerge on the modern battlefield as a complete and new operational form {全新的作战形式 quan-xin de zuozhan xingshi}; moreover, intense trials will be carried out in realms such as intelligence reconnaissance, electronic warfare, communications warfare, photoelectric warfare, computer network warfare, and the like. As a result, the defensive operations and information operations of the Second Artillery must permeate through the entire course of a Second Artillery campaign.

II. Basic Principles...621

The basic principles of a Second Artillery campaign consist of the fundamental activity standards {基本行动准则 jiben xingdong zhunze} for guiding a Second Artillery campaign activity {第二炮兵战役活动 di'er paobing zhanyi huodong} and are the concrete incarnation of the guiding thought {指导思想 zhidao sixiang} behind a Second

Artillery campaign. Based on the guiding thought behind a Second Artillery campaign, the characteristics of a Second Artillery campaign are integrated, giving rise to the following campaign basic principles.

(1) Unified command and centralized use

The Second Artillery is a branch of our military's strategic strike strengths. As such, a relatively centralized unification must be achieved for the right to use them, for their policy-making power, and for command authority [over them]. This is the crux of the strategic goal that must be achieved by the Second Artillery. Regardless of whether it is a nuclear counterstrike campaign or a conventional missile strike campaign, it typically falls under the command of the higher-level authorities, and is organized by a Second Artillery campaign command institution. For a nuclear counterstrike campaign, the campaign activities must be strictly organized in accordance with the orders from the Central Military Commission {中央军委 zhongyangjunwei}; [whereas the activities] in a conventional missile strike campaign must be in accordance with the orders from the higher-level authorities, through the unified command of the Second Artillery conventional campaign large formation commander {第二炮兵常规战役军团指挥员 di'er paobing changgui zhanyi juntuan zhihuiyuan}. Commanders at each level must conduct operational activities such as campaign *bushu* dispositions, campaign camouflage, campaign support, campaign coordination and campaign assaults and ensure that missile force-units and other campaign strengths join together to form an integrated-whole superiority under the unified plans of the General Headquarters or the joint campaign command institution. In order to guarantee unified command, a perfected campaign command system {完善的战役指挥体系 wanshan de zhanyi zhihui tixi} must be established; command relationships and responsibilities must be clarified; unified campaign plans {jihua} must be formulated; and advanced command measures must be adopted, all for operation under unified orders and strict controls.

In order to fully exploit the operational effectiveness of missile weaponry, the use of campaign strengths must be centralized, and for this reason, the marshalling of campaign strengths must be scientifically combined in accordance with the operational needs and with the types of missile weaponry. On the basis of the use of strengths, superior strengths must be centralized for the main direction and for crucial timing opportunities, and key point strikes against vital enemy strategic or campaign targets {敌战略或战役要害目标 di zhanlue huo zhanyi yaohai mubiao}. Furthermore, on the basis of firepower, it is essential to: meticulously plan and prepare; carefully select strike targets; optimize the course of action for firepower; organize firepower maneuver at the right time; ensure the coordination of unanimity in strike targets and times; and increase the integrated operational effectiveness.

(2) Tightly-woven protection and rapid reaction

Tightly-woven protection and safeguarded existence is the prerequisite for the smooth implementation of missile strikes; without tightly-woven protection, effective

preservation of strengths cannot be possible, and furthermore, implementation of effective strikes cannot be possible. Thus, it is essential to allow campaign protective activities to permeate through the entire Second Artillery campaign from initiation to completion. In order to increase battlefield survivability, the plan {jihua} (or course of action {方案 fang'an}) to resist enemy surprise attacks must be perfected, establishing a tightly-woven protective architecture {防护体系 fanghu tixi}, relying on pre-established protective infrastructure {既设的防护设施 jishe de fanghu sheshi}, adopting effective measures for concealment and camouflage, organizing active defense operational activities {积极的防卫作战行动 jiji de fangwei zuozhan xingdong}, handling the aftermath of an attack in a timely manner, and preserving and restoring operational capabilities to the maximum possible extent.

Rapid reaction is a major factor in striving to gain the campaign initiative. Based on the operational intentions of the higher-level authorities as well as on the state of battlefield conditions, Second Artillery campaign commander and his command organ must: judge the hour and size up the situation; fully exploit the subjective dynamic role; be adept at seizing opportunities; and rapidly determine the campaign resolution. Furthermore, [they must] rapidly organize the campaign unfolding and complete missile strikes on schedule. When unforeseen conditions emerge during the course of carrying out the campaign, the campaign commander should rapidly and decisively handle [the situation] with an accurate comprehension of the intentions of the higher-level authorities. When indications of an enemy attack emerge, [commanders] can rapidly organize unit concealment to effectively protect themselves; and after suffering an enemy surprise attack, they can rapidly handle the aftermath of the attack and can rapidly restore their operational capabilities.

(3) Integrated operations and close coordination

Integrated operations {整体作战 zhengti zuozhan} refer to the necessity of standing at the height of the strategic overall situation and have unified overall-planning and organizing of the campaign. Close coordination refers to the necessity for successful internal coordination {内部协同 neibu xietong} and external coordination {外部协同 waibu xietong} for the operational activities of the missile force-units.

Integrated operations and close coordination is a main principle for the independent operations of the Second Artillery or for joint campaign operations in which they participate. Coordination for a Second Artillery campaign should adhere to the campaign resolution and the campaign plan {jihua} and on the basis of the campaign patterns and phases, it should be organized and implemented by centering on the main campaign activities and the campaign strengths executing the main missions. When the Second Artillery participates in a joint campaign, it must successfully achieve coordination within the other branches of the services and service arms. In the sequence of a firepower strike, they are closely ranked together with the Army, Navy and Air Force; when implementing campaign maneuver, it is necessary to coordinate with other maneuvering forces; and during the entire process of the campaign, not only must they coordinate with

the air defense strengths {防空力量 fankong liliang}, they must also coordinate with the electronic warfare forces, communications forces, engineering forces, chemical protection forces as well as with the local armed police. When the Second Artillery independently implements a campaign, coordination between each of the various missile bases must be led by the missile bases that implements the main operational mission; when coordinating between missile bases {导弹基地 daodan jidi} and warhead bases {弹头基地 dantou jidi}, coordination must be led by the missile bases; when coordinating between launch forces {发射部队 fashе budui} and support forces, coordination must be led by the launch forces; and when coordinating the operations of the other branches of the service and service arms, it is necessary to successfully coordinate the forces that drive and execute the main mission.

(4) Having advanced preparations and comprehensive support

Having advance preparations is the basis for organizing the implementation of a Second Artillery campaign. Owing to the fact that a Second Artillery campaign is technical, is strongly integrated, has multiple components to the preparations work for operations, and has a long cycle, it is necessary for the Second Artillery to start out during peacetime with the most complex and most difficult of situations and to fully make target data preparations, operational position preparations, weapons and equipment preparations, operational material storage, combat readiness training and operational course of action preparations {作战方案的准备 zuozhan fang'an de zhunbei}, while at the same time accomplishing the corresponding combat readiness requirements. Moreover, once orders are issued, only with this form can it be possible to give power to-, join-, unite- and synthesize [everything] together, and strike the targets.

Comprehensive support is an important condition for the smooth implementation for a Second Artillery campaign. Hence, a Second Artillery campaign must establish and perfect a comprehensive support system {综合保障体系 zonghe baozhang tixi} and form an integrated support capability {整体保障能力 zhengti baozhang nengli}. On the basis of the overall planning and arrangement of the operational mission, it must thoroughly plan, underscore the key points, and painstakingly organize support at each level. Further, it must adopt flexible and effective support modes {保障方式 baozhang fangshi}, and effectively implement support at the right time. And finally, it must: rely on theater joint logistics support {战区联勤保障 zhanqu lian qin baozhang}; rationally make use of support strengths; fully exploit its own system for self-support {自身保障体系 zisheng baozhang tixi}; make use of local support-the-front strengths {支前力量 zhi-qian liliang}; and increase synthesized support effectiveness.

Section 3: The Preparation for and Implementation of a Second Artillery Campaign...624

For the operations of the Second Artillery under future high-tech conditions, the operational missions will be of an arduous nature, with battlefield environments of a

complex nature, raising the requirements for campaign preparation and implementation even higher. The campaign commander and his command organ must be rooted in the most difficult and complex situations, painstaking preparations, and the implementation of thorough organization.

I. Campaign Preparations...624

With regard to a Second Artillery campaign preparations, they typically start from when the campaign commander receives the warning order for the operation {作战预先号令 zuozhan yuxian haoling}, and extends through the conclusion of the order to launch the first batch of missiles. There are many projects for campaign preparations work, a long period of sustainment, and a great possibility that they [each] may encounter raids by the enemy; thus the campaign commander and his command organ must attach a high degree of importance to them, and at the same time thoroughly plan and tightly organize to achieve safety and reliability with no danger of having anything go wrong.

(1) Receiving and issuing warning orders {预先号令 yuxian haoling}

With regard to the operational warning orders from the Supreme Command or joint operations headquarters, they are the fundamental basis for the launch of the campaign as organized by the campaign commander and command organ. Once the campaign commander receives the warning order, he must correctly understand the operational intentions of the higher-level authorities. [He must further] comprehend: the mission he is about to fulfill; the limits and requirements of the operational preparations; the position of the campaign activities within the overall strategic situation; and the function of the various items of coordination with other branches of the service and service arms. [He must also] analyze and judge enemy operational intentions and what activities [the enemy] can adopt, as well as their influence on Second Artillery operations. [And finally, he must] analyze the situation of enemy targets and the weapons and [analyze] the situation that is specific to the equipment, the operational positions, the command facilities, the various kinds of support, and the various personnel in our own missile forces. [In this way] he realizes the clarification of intentions, the comprehension of the mission, knowing the enemy and knowing thyself, and making advance preparations.

In order to launch campaign preparations as early as possible and based on the warning orders from the higher-level authorities, the campaign commander must issue the warning order (or operational preparation-grade orders {作战准备等级命令 zuozhan zhunbei dengji mingling}) to the immediate level, specifically clarifying the mission they are about to fulfill, and such components as the grade, time limits and requirements for accomplishing operational preparations.

(2) Determining the campaign concept {战役方针 zhanyi fangzhen} and defining the campaign resolution {战役决心 zhanyi juexin}

As a basis for the campaign commander to understand the operational intention and clarify the operational missions, [the commander] must promptly organize the analysis and judgment of the situation, formulate the campaign concept, and define the campaign resolution so as to establish the correct principles for campaign guidance in order to provide the fundamental basis for organizing campaign activities.

The campaign concept is the creed {纲领 gangling} for guiding {指导 zhidao} the campaign activities. There are three situations in which a Second Artillery campaign concept is generally determined: one is that it is determined by the higher-level authority; the second is that it is jointly determined by the higher-level authority and the Second Artillery; and the third is that it is determined by a Second Artillery campaign commander based on the strategic intentions of the higher-level authority and based on the mission with which [the commander] has been granted. When [the campaign concept] is determined by a Second Artillery campaign commander, he should: have a profound understanding of the intentions of the higher-level authority; perform comprehensive analyses of the enemy situation, our own situation and the battlefield environment as well as political and diplomatic factors that can produce an effect on the campaign; have a grip on key problems {关键问题 guanjian wenti} with the campaign; proffer the basic method for the campaign; and clarify effective ways of achieving campaign goals, among other things.

The campaign resolution is the basis for implementing the campaign; and it is the foundation for formulating the campaign plan {jihua}, issuing campaign orders, and organizing campaign coordination. The campaign resolution must comply with the intent of the higher-level authority, rendering the campaign activities and political and diplomatic struggles an inseparable, concerted effort {紧密配合 jinmi peihe}. Fixing the campaign resolution necessitates a foundation of conscientiously analyzing the enemy situation vis a vis ourselves as well as vis a vis the battlefield and must be, above all, based on the strategic intent and proffering multiple courses of action for the campaign mission and the like. Subsequently [it necessitates] the selection of the optimal course of action from among those that have undergone full evaluation and verification {评估论证 pinggu lunzheng}. The campaign resolution commonly includes: the campaign intention {战役企图 zhanyi qitu}, the strike targets {打击目标 daji mubiao}, the campaign deployment {战役部署 zhanyi bushu}, major fighting methods {主要战法 zhuyao fangfa}, and the time limits for completing campaign preparations; standing up the campaign command institution {战役指挥机构 zhanyi zhihui jigou}; and organizing every kind of support.

(3) Formulating the campaign plan

Once the campaign resolution has been fixed, the campaign commander should promptly organize the command organ in formulating the campaign plan {jihua}, with the key point being the carrying out of clarification for such weighty problems as situational judgment and conclusion {情况判断结论 qingkuang panduan jielun}, the campaign concept, and basic fighting methods. A Second Artillery campaign headquarters organ {战役司令部机关 zhanyi silingbu jiguan} should earnestly grasp the campaign resolution, and, on the basis of making advance preparations, should: fully consider difficult and complex situations; scientifically forecast the course of the campaign; appropriately arrange the activities of each of the phases of the campaign by centering on the campaign resolution; and carefully draft their plans {jihua}. The campaign plan {jihua} should include the campaign activity plan {战役行动计划 zhanyi xingdong jihua} and the campaign support plan {战役保障计划 zhanyi baozhang jihua}. The campaign activity plan {jihua} serves as the overall plan {总体计划 zongti jihua} and individual event (or branch) plans {单项(分支)计划 danxiang (fenzhi) jihua}. The primary components of the overall plan {jihua} include such things as: enemy situation judgment and conclusions, campaign intentions, campaign missions, campaign arrangement and deployment {战役编成及部署 zhanyi biancheng ji bushu}, campaign phase differentiation and main activities {战役阶段划分及主要行动 zhanyi jieduan huafen ji zhuyao xingdong}, command organization and coordination, and time limits for accomplishing campaign preparations. Individual event (or branch) plans {jihua} are divided into firepower plans {jihua}, campaign defense plans {jihua}, electronic warfare plans {jihua}, and the like. Campaign support plans {jihua} typically include operational support plans {jihua}, logistics support plans {jihua}, equipment technical support- and political work plans {jihua} and the like.

(4) Organizing campaign coordination

Once the campaign plan {jihua} has been set, the campaign commander should promptly instruct the command organ to formulate campaign coordination plans based on the campaign resolution and the campaign plan {jihua}, carefully organizing campaign coordination. The campaign coordination plan {战役协同计划 zhanyi xietong jihua} not only can be formulated independently, but it can also be formulated concurrently with the campaign plan {jihua}. Its components should primarily clarify: the differentiation between operational missions, the delineations between operational phases, the connections in command coordination, the principles of coordination, the substance of coordination, the timing of coordination, coordination methods, coordination requirements, and the measures used to reestablish coordination that has been put out of balance. The key points in organizing campaign coordination are: firepower coordination between the various assault groupings {突击集团 tuji jituan} and between each of the assault waves {突击波次 tuji boci}; coordination between [the Second Artillery] and the other branches of the service and service arms; coordination between the missile bases, warhead bases and support forces; coordination for the air defensive; coordinating ground

defense; and reconnaissance coordination between strategic early warning and battlefield intelligence targets. Organizing campaign coordination requires an overall view, and emphasis on [the following] points: anticipation of all complex situations and formulating various courses of action for them; clarification of coordination relationships and stipulation of the coordination discipline; the careful planning and organization of coordination support; adoption of various methods for coordination; and the maintenance of stability in coordination.

(5) Organizing campaign support

There are many items and high requirements in supporting a Second Artillery campaign. Thus campaign commander should: instruct their command organ at the right time to promptly organize operational support such as intelligence reconnaissance, targeting, all the primary calculations, correspondence, engineering, campaign camouflage, meteorology, logistics support and equipment support; and clarify the support mission, key points and requirements. In organizing campaign support, from a basis of advance preparations, it is essential to: fully make use of every beneficial factor; scientifically marshal support strengths; synthesize the use of the various support modes; under the assistance of theater joint logistics support and local support strengths, conduct unified planning with consideration for all concerned; and emphasize the key points.

II. Campaign Implementation...626

The implementation of the Second Artillery campaign begins when the campaign commander issues the launch order {发射命令 fashe mingling} and concludes when the campaign missions are completed. The time for the campaign implementation phase {战役实施阶段 zhanyi shishi jieduan} is tight; the mission is important; there are many elements that are exposed; and there is a great threat posed by the enemy. Hence, the campaign commander must grasp the key links {关节 guanjie} and master the centers of gravity {重心 zhongxin} to guarantee that the campaign develops in the predetermined direction.

(1) Organizing the implementation of missile strikes

1. Issuing the launch order {发射命令 fashe mingling}

Issuing the launch order is the major indication for initiating the implementation of the campaign; thus the campaign commander should issue their launch orders at the right time, based on the operational time limits stipulated in the operational orders from the higher-level authority. This is to specifically clarify such things as: the times that operational units occupy launch positions {占领发射阵地 zhanling fashe zhendi}; the time limit for each unit to launch missiles; and the post-launch activities and announcements for the units. The campaign headquarters typically formulates the launch order and it is endorsed and issued by the campaign commander; when necessary, it may

bypass the immediate leadership to be issued further, while at the same time notice is given to the command organ of the immediate level that is being bypassed. Transmitting the launch order requires speed, accuracy, secrecy and timeliness, otherwise the operational intention could be easily discovered or it could influence the operational mission being accomplished on schedule by the forces.

2. Organizing missile strike activities {导弹突击行动 daodan tuji xingdong}

Missile strikes are a central link {中心环节 zhongxin huanjie} in campaign activities; the campaign commander and his command organ must promptly grasp the launch preparations and implementation situation of the forces. In order to increase the reaction speed of the forces and the continuous properties of support for missile strikes, at the same time that the strengths are concentrated to organize first time strikes {首次突击 shouci tuji}, it is essential to make a link between making preparations for continuous follow-on strikes and successfully organizing each of the strikes. [It is essential] to: organize the entry of forces into new operational positions following the accomplishment of the strike mission, while promptly revising force-unit {budui} and material replenishment; restore operational capabilities; and successfully implement preparations for follow on strike missions.

When organizing the implementation of missile strikes, it is essential to: pay close attention to the enemy situation; promptly issue bulletins to the forces; circulate missile forces conditions to the forces participating in coordination and [circulate notices] of the enemy situation to operational forces under the greatest threat from the enemy; and organize security support {安全保障 anquan baozhang} for the air and ground to guarantee the smooth implementation of the missile strikes.

(2) Organizing strike effect reconnaissance and assessment {打击效果侦察与判定 daji xiaoguo zhencha yu panding}

The extent of the airspace in which a Second Artillery campaign is carried out consists of distances from the enemy [that range] from several hundred to over a thousand and even over ten thousand kilometers. Strike effect reconnaissance and assessment is organized in order to comprehend and ascertain: whether or not missiles that are fired will be intercepted by enemy anti-missile defensive systems {反导防御系统 fan-dao fangyu xitong}; whether or not the missiles will hit the target; as well as whether or not the degree of damage to targets reaches anticipated requirements. As a consequence, strike effect reconnaissance and assessment is an important foundation for the campaign commander and command organ to implement effective command. At the same time that the campaign commander and his command organ issue missile launch orders, they should issue instructions for intelligence reconnaissance forces (or elements) to organize the implementation of missile strike effect reconnaissance and assessment. At the same time, they should promptly organize the processing, verification, analysis, and assessment by the intelligence reconnaissance forces (or elements) and furnish strike effect reports of

missiles to targets based on the survey data {探测数据 tance shuju} provided by the intelligence reconnaissance department at the higher level and the survey data reported to the higher levels by subordinate monitoring units (or elements). The main contents [of the reports] include such things as: actual survey outcomes; analysis, judgment and assessment; and recommendations for supplementary strikes. The forces (or elements) that are charged with the strike effect survey mission {打击效果探测任务 daji xiaoguo tance renwu} should coordinate the unanimous implementation of reconnaissance and assessment of missile strike effects under the unified organization of the campaign command organ.

(3) Managing special situations

During a Second Artillery campaign, there is a rapid campaign tempo {战役节奏 zhanyi jiezou}, a grim battlefield environment, and a great threat of being subject to reconnaissance and air raids; and during the course of campaign maneuver and firepower strikes, it is possible to be encounter the threat of such situations as electronic jamming, precision strikes and special harassing attacks. Furthermore, such special situations as communication breakdowns and strikes on major targets can occur. In handling special situations, special situations such as weapon systems failures can occur, missile strikes can be unsuccessful, and strike targets can change. Thus the campaign commander and his command organ should: be quick-witted and resolute and organize force activities in accordance with the regulations and requirements for managing special situations; rapidly restore operational capabilities; and smoothly complete the campaign mission. Their main methods consist of the following. One [method] is that they should adopt positive and effective methods to implement protection when sustaining enemy sudden surprise raids {突然袭击 turan xiji} based on advanced plans that have been predetermined. The second [method] is that they should adopt circuitous correspondence or bypass command methods {越级指挥的方法 yueji zhihui de fangfa} when communication connection breakdowns occur, so that they can maintain continuous command over the forces. The third [method] is that they should adopt the firepower maneuver method {火力机动的方法 huoli jidong de fangfa} and promptly carry out adjustments to firepower {火力调整 huoli tiaozheng} when there are temporary alterations in the strike direction or temporary changes in strike targets. The fourth [method] is that they should promptly adjust the deployment, revise the firepower plan, and issue new launch orders at the right time when there are temporary changes in operational positions, revisions to the strike time, or ad-hoc changes to the strike sequence. The fifth [method] is that they should rapidly organize force evacuation to a concealed area in the event that there is no way to carry out the launch within the stipulated time limits, meanwhile resolutely applying the campaign reserve strengths to replace the original operational forces to complete the missile strikes.

(4) Concluding the campaign

Once the predetermined campaign goals have been achieved to the satisfaction of the higher-level authorities, [the higher-level authorities] should issue the order to conclude the campaign. During the process of concluding the campaign, the campaign commander and his command organ should: promptly organize the forces in rapidly and covertly shifting toward predetermined areas; strictly monitor the air; and prevent enemy precision strikes. At the same time, they must promptly: understand the situation of losses sustained by the forces; organize the personnel, adjust the replenishment of weapons and equipment and resources; successfully do rush repairs to launch positions, roads and bridges; organize the campaign summarization {战役总结 zhanyi zongjie} carried out by the forces; and draft and submit the report of campaign essentials and the detailed report to the higher levels.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 32

The Second Artillery Conventional Missile Assault Campaign...629

The Second Artillery conventional missile assault campaign is a campaign implemented with the Second Artillery conventional missile assault campaign large formation in the lead. Normally a conventional missile strike campaign composes part of a joint campaign, but it can also be independently implemented by the Second Artillery. This chapter primarily introduces the missions, characteristics and main operational activities of the Second Artillery conventional missile assault campaign.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...629

The basic mission of the Second Artillery conventional missile assault campaign consists of such things as: to independently implement firepower strikes against important enemy strategic targets within the campaign depth; to coordinate with Air Force operations and capture campaign air dominance; to coordinate with Navy operations to capture campaign sea dominance; to coordinate with Army operations and capture dominance in ground operations; to resist the military intervention of a powerful enemy; and to deter conventional enemy implemented threats.

The basic mission in a Second Artillery conventional missile assault campaign consists of: jointly implementing a land campaign with the Army- and Air Force campaign large formations, and strike the vital area targets {要害目标 yaohai mubiao} within the enemy campaign depth; coordinating with the Navy- and Air Force large formations to implement sea blockades and island blockades, striking such important targets as enemy naval bases, ports, air bases, and the like, and capturing localized campaign sea dominance; implementing amphibious landing and counter amphibious landing campaigns with Navy-, Air Force- and Army campaign large formations; and jointly implementing air offensive campaigns with air Force campaign large formations, striking enemy air fields, ground-to-ground missile forces, air defense systems and other important targets, and capturing localized campaign air dominance. In addition, based on need, it can also be to satisfy other special operational missions {特殊的作战任务 teshu de zuozhan renwu}.

I. Characteristics...629

Owing to the strong points such as long range of fire, flexibility in use, the well-concealed nature, mobile nature and strong defense penetration capabilities of conventional missiles, consequently the Second Artillery conventional missile assault campaign, in addition to having the same general characteristics as a high-tech local war campaign, also possesses the following main characteristics:

(1) Strong in-depth strike capabilities and operational capabilities that greatly effect the overall war situation

All the ground-to-ground campaign tactical missiles used by the Second Artillery conventional missile forces have such characteristics as long firing range, high degree of precision, a great threat, rapid reaction speed, strong penetration capabilities, and the like, and they are an important remote warfare strength {远战力量 yuan-zhan liliang} with which our military implements modern campaigns. During modern campaigns they are conventionally used to strike the enemy campaign and even important targets within the strategic depth. These targets function as an important prop to the enemy operational set up; implementing strikes against these targets, from a military viewpoint, can not only directly annihilate or weaken enemy military actual strength, thereby seizing the campaign initiative and creating the conditions for winning a campaign victory, but they can also shock the enemy psyche and their will to wage war, in order to speed the course of the campaign. From a standpoint of making use of timing opportunities, commonly when Second Artillery conventional missile forces are used first, they act as the trailblazer and bear the responsibility for the important strike missions, and as a result, have an important influence on the course and final outcome of the campaign.

(2) There are multiple restricting factors on campaign activities and they are strongly cohesive

There are multiple aspects of the factors that restrict the operational activities of the Second Artillery conventional campaign large formations. Firstly, missile weapons systems are technical in nature and strongly cohesive. The measuring and testing of a missile launch necessitates different specialized divisions making use of specialized equipment and materials and strict implementation based on stipulated processes and regulations. Each of the operations and the parameters for measurement and testing must conform to tactical and technical requirements {战术技术要求 zhanshu jishu yaoqiu}; a discrepancy of even the smallest iota can directly effect operational activities and strike effectiveness. In addition to this, there are high battlefield condition requirements such as the stockpiling of missile weapons as well as the maneuvering of missile forces to positions and roads, the timing for operational activities is strongly sequence-oriented, and there is heavy dependence on such things as operational support, equipment technology support and logistics support. Only if such operational factors as personnel, equipment, position, operational command, the various items of support, and the like, are organically united into a single body, can it be possible to form integrated operational capability {整体作战能力 zhengti zuozhan nengli}. Moreover, the conventional missile forces from the Second Artillery commonly participate in joint campaigns, and during joint campaigns, in addition to each of the items of coordination and support internally, they also have extremely close coordination and support relationships with the campaign strengths from the other branches of the service. Therefore, it is essential for the Second Artillery campaign commander to cultivate an intense “integrated operations” consciousness, and while organizing command for the campaign, not only must he give

prominence to the key points, but he must also take note of keeping an eye on the overall campaign situation.

(3) The battlespace is vast and the environment is abysmal

The campaign battlefield for a Second Artillery conventional missile campaign large formation is constituted of operational positions of missile units, the trajectory zone {弹道区域 dandao quyu} of the missiles, and the zone for striking the target. The operational position for a missile unit is dependent on the range of fire for the weapon {武器的射程 wuqi de shecheng} and the operational direction, and assumes an echelon dispersed position {梯次疏散配置 tici shusan peizhi} in the campaign depth. The scope of control for missile firepower extends from several hundred to more than a thousand kilometers. Normally the flight trajectory of the missile cuts across outer space. As a result, the battlespace for a Second Artillery conventional missile assault campaign is abnormally wide, bringing many new characteristics and difficulties for providing operational command and the various kinds of support.

Owing to the important position and function of the Second Artillery conventional missile units in modern campaigns, it has thereby been decided that they will be targets for enemy key point strikes {敌重点打击 di zhongdian daji}; added to the fact that powerful enemies have advanced highly technical reconnaissance early warning systems {侦察预警系统 zhencha yujing xitong} and long-range precision guidance weaponry {远程精确制导武器 yuancheng jingque zhidao wuqi}, these [two factors] will result in an extremely harsh battlefield environment for the Second Artillery conventional missile campaign large formations. As a result, it is essential that the campaign commander attach a high degree of importance to the self-protection of the missile forces.

(4) The complexity of organizing command and the various items of support

Owing to the technical complexity of the weapons systems of the Second Artillery conventional missile forces, the breadth of the battlespace, and the sequence-oriented timing of the operational activities, it is necessary to tightly coordinate the operations between them and other services during the joint campaign, thereby making it extraordinarily complex to organize command as well as the various items of support during the campaign. As an example, whether or not targeting data is comprehensively and precisely captured in its entirety, whether or not the strike effects are reconnoitered and judged promptly during the operation, how the missile forces implement reliable and highly effective command and control while maneuvering during the operation, how the missile units obtain air-to-ground security support from related units from the various branches of the service and service arms, how the missile forces implement close coordination and the like with related units from the branches of the service while implementing the joint operation: all of these questions directly effect the exploitation of the operational effectiveness of the missile units and the process of the joint campaign.

As a consequence, it is essential to attach a high degree of importance to the command of-, coordination of- and support for the conventional missile forces.

II. Requirements...631

(1) Unified command and closely-knit coordination

Unified command in modern campaigns consists of implementing centralized command and control for major operational issues for Second Artillery conventional missile forces. On one hand, conventional missile forces are a major remote firepower strike strength {深远火力突击力量 shenyuan huoli tuji liliang}, the course of their participation greatly influences the campaign and even in the overall war situation, and only by standing at an altitude to view the overall campaign situation, and only if the application of the missile campaign large formation is integrated into the overall planning, can it then be possible to fully exploit its greatest operational effectiveness. Thus, as an objective requirement, it is essential to implement centralized unified command over the missile forces. As for closely-knit coordination, it consists of the necessity to successfully coordinate between each of the essential elements of the operation for the conventional missile forces and the other branches of the service. During the joint campaign, there are wide-ranging coordination relationships that exist between the Second Artillery conventional missile campaign large formation and the other campaign strengths from the various branches of the service; only if there is successful campaign coordination between [the missile forces] and the other branches of the service can it be possible to form comprehensive operational power {整体作战威力 zhengti zuozhan weili}.

(2) Concentrated employment, and strike the enemy's vital areas

Concentrated employment [use] {jizhong shiyong} consists of taking the main strength of the conventional missile campaign large formation and concentrating its employment [use] in critical time occasions and on critical targets in the campaign. The Second Artillery conventional missile forces are a high tech arm; owing to the limits on their quantity and scale {数量规模 shuliang guimo}, it is only if one persists in concentrating their application can it then be possible to exploit their operational effectiveness to the maximum extent. Striking the enemy vital areas {打敌要害 da di yaohai} consists of selecting the most critical, most threatening, most easily effective vital area targets to implement missile firepower assault in accordance with the needs-requirements of the joint campaign's overall situation, the weapon tactical technical characteristics of the missile and the *bushu* disposition situation of the missile force-units and on the basis of a full-scale analysis of the situations such as the enemy's campaign *bushi* disposition and important targets, so as to paralyze the enemy's operational system {tixi} and create conditions for seizing a campaign victory.

(3) The integration of attack and defense and rapid reaction

The integration of offensive and defensive consists of the need to establish and use an operational mechanism {作战机制 zuozhan jizhi}, with both attack and defense, to achieve attack within defense-, resistance within defense- and attack-defense integration. During joint campaigns in the future, attack and defense will alternately predominate and blend together during different phases and in different directions. As a consequence, it is essential that missile forces successfully organically integrate attack with defense. Rapid reaction consists of promptly making the corresponding countermeasures and activities based on the situation of battlefield changes. Modern campaign battlefield situations are even more complex and ever-changing, presenting an even greater need for missile forces to rapidly react. It is essential that the missile forces, from having a basis of having full preparations in advance, augment their continuous reconnaissance and judgment of the battlefield situation, resolutely make decisions, and rapidly react and make changes to match enemy changes.

Section 2: Main Operational Activities...632

In accordance with the mission and characteristics of the Second Artillery conventional missile assault campaign, its main operational activities include: implementing missile deterrence operations; implementing missile firepower sabotage raids {导弹火力破袭 daodan huoli poxi}; implementing missile firepower blockades {导弹火力封锁 daodan huoli fengsuo}; implementing missile firepower harassing attacks {导弹火力袭扰 daodan huoli xirao}; implementing missile forces and firepower maneuver operations, and the like.

I. Implementing Missile Deterrence Operations...633

Missile deterrence operations are the operational activities to contain enemy strategic intentions or major military risky operations through the specific use of forces and firepower from the Second Artillery conventional missile campaign large formation in order to demonstrate firm will and formidable actual strength against the enemy side's implementation of containment. All the ground-to-ground missile weapons used by the Second Artillery conventional missile campaign large formation: present characteristics of having a long range of fire, being highly accurate, being high-speed, and posing a great threat; are highly technical strengths that have exceedingly rich deterrent qualities; implement missile threat operations that are a kind of significant operational form for the Second Artillery conventional missile campaign large formation; and have a significant positing and use in future high-tech local wars. In implementing missile deterrence operations, it is essential to grasp the following several points.

The first necessity is to implement concentrated command. Commonly missile deterrence operations serve to achieve strategic goals; they are a kind of military operation with strategic properties; they are closely connected with politics and diplomatic struggles;

and at the same time they have a profound influence on politics, diplomacy and military struggles. As a consequence, with implementing missile deterrence operations, it is necessary to stick to centralized command. It is essential that the commander, and even the supreme command, directly implement command and control for such major questions as the operational methods they adopt, the intensity of the strengths they use, and the timing for implementation.

The second necessity is coordinating consistency between politics and diplomatic struggles. Missile deterrence is a kind of significant military means. One should integrate it with the use of such means as politics and diplomacy; it is essential to submit one's self to and give service to the needs of politics and diplomatic struggles, in order to achieve strict enforcement of orders and prohibitions.

The third necessity is to flexibly apply operational methods. Missile deterrent operations are permeated with stratagem qualities and artistry. Their essence lies in the ingenious selection of targets, ingenious choice of timing opportunities, ingenious use of forces and firepower, and the ingenious application of operational methods. The campaign commander and the command organ must fully anticipate all the situations that might emerge during the campaign, while formulating multiple deterrence operational methods and advance plans. When implementing the missile deterrence operation, one should flexibly employ deterrence operational methods based on the strategic intentions of the higher-level authorities and the dynamic state of the enemy side and make every effort to achieve the goals of deterrence.

II. Implementing Missile Firepower Destruction Raids...633

Missile firepower destruction raids {导弹火力破袭 daodan huoli poxi} consist of using concentrated and powerful missile firepower to carry out raids of a destructive nature that occur within a relatively short period of time against enemy vital area targets. The main characteristics of this kind of operational activity are the concentrated use of missile forces and firepower and resolute goals, and they are a main operational mode of the conventional missile forces. This kind of operational activity commonly achieves important campaign goals, and they are used in crucial phases of the campaign. When implementing missile firepower destruction raid operations, it is necessary to stress the grasp of the following several points.

The first necessity is to make full preparations and to painstakingly select targets. For conventional missile forces [engaged] in missile firepower destruction raids, they face great demands, arduous missions, urgent timing, and abundant preparations as the basic prerequisite for making successful strikes in the missile firepower destruction raids. The conventional missile forces should, from a basis in peacetime advance preparations, successfully make thorough preparations for all of such aspects as the force strength *bushu* disposition, weapons and equipment, operational position, intelligence support, and the like. At the same time, the missile firepower raid is mainly through destroying the vital area targets within the enemy operational system {tixi} that they achieve the goal of

paralyzing the enemy operational hierarchy. As a result, it is essential to want to earnestly conduct analysis of the enemy situation, analyze and assess the enemy's important target systems {xitong}, and scientifically select {科学选择 kexue xuanze} enemy's vital area targets {敌要害目标 di yaohai mubiao}.

The second necessity is to concentrate firepower and surprise raids. With missile firepower destruction raids, the scale of the missile forces that are used is large, there are many targets to be assaulted, the missions are difficult, and it is essential to maintain concentrated application {集中使用 jizhong shiyong}, and focal point application {重点使用 zhongdian shiyong}, to use the main missile firepower in the main time segments-, main direction- and against the main targets of the joint operation. As a result, the missile force commander must implement highly centralized control {高度集中的控制 gaodu jizhong de kongzhi} over missile forces activities, enabling each of the units to synchronize the sequence of unanimous activities. In addition, due to the great scope of the strengths applied in the core activities, an easily exposed operational intent, it is necessary to adopt effective measures to: successfully camouflage the units; guard against enemy reconnaissance monitoring; conceal the operational intent; implement surprise raids at times when they are unexpected by the enemy from positions unexpected by the enemy; and rapidly seize the joint operational initiative.

The third necessity is to intensify support and successive operations. During missile firepower destruction raids there are many assault targets for the conventional missile forces, a great rate of missile consumption, and high requirements for each support item, necessitating intensification for each of the items of support during the operation. It is necessary to adopt such unorthodox measures as follow on support for multiple missiles in a single frame and adjacent launches, to reduce to the maximum possible limit the reload and fire time {装弹再战的时间 zhuangdanzaizhan de shijian} for the missile units, and increase the succession of missile firepower. While implementing the operation, it is necessary to organize reconnaissance to judge the results of the assault without delay; supposing the predetermined degree of damage was not achieved or if new targets have emerged, it is necessary to organize supplementary assaults without delay. In addition, missile firepower destruction raids are used in conjunction with other long-range operational strengths. Thus, with the above-mentioned activities in the process of organizing preparation and implementation, it is essential to necessitate a focus on successful and interrelated operational coordination for the strengths from the arms of the services.

III. Implementing the Missile Firepower Blockade...634

The missile firepower blockade {导弹火力封锁 daodan huoli fengsuo} consists of preventing or destroying the maneuver and supply of enemy troops and materials by implementing a missile firepower assault of a lower intensity. The goal of the missile firepower blockade is typically to sabotage enemy ground-, air-, ocean- (or water-) maneuvering activities. The basic method for the missile firepower blockade consists of

implementing missile firepower assault or firepower harassment attacks against important targets that the enemy depends on for ground-, aerial- or oceanic- (or water-) based maneuvering. The above-mentioned activities have characteristics such as operational activities that are strongly time-oriented and intelligence support that is difficult [to provide]. Implementing a missile firepower blockade necessitates the grasp of the following several points.

The first necessity is to accurately judge the enemy's intention to maneuver and successfully make full preparation for blockade operations. Promptly ascertaining the enemy's intention to maneuver is a major prerequisite for implementing a missile firepower blockade. Once the campaign commander receives his orders to implement a missile firepower blockade mission, it is necessary for him to: gain a profound understanding of the operational intent of the higher-level authorities and clarify the mission he is charged with; conduct comprehensive analysis and judgment of the enemy situation; focus on grasping the enemy's intention to maneuver, the maneuver methods, the routes for maneuver, the timing for maneuver and the scale of maneuver; capture accurate data for such targets necessary for enemy maneuvering such as airfields, ports, traffic hubs, bridges, and the like; and conduct overall planning to [develop] a basic course of action {基本方案 jiben fang'an} to implement a missile firepower blockade. From this basis, it is necessary to organize rapid revisions to the operational plan {jihua} for the missile forces and fully make operational preparations.

The second necessity is to accurately seize combat opportunities and implement the key links {关节 guanjie} of the blockade. To blockade key links at an appropriate opportunity is an important principle of missile firepower blockade operations. As a result, it is essential for the campaign commander to: implement thorough reconnaissance of the enemy; comprehensively analyze such factors as the enemy's intention to maneuver, the battlefield terrain, weather, and the like; and determine the beneficial timing for implementing a missile firepower blockade and crucial targets for the blockade. It is on this basis that suitable opportunities for action and blockade key link targets are organized for the forces.

IV. . Implementing Missile Firepower Harassing Attacks...635

Missile firepower harassing attacks are the interruption and destruction of enemy normal activities, and are missile firepower assaults that are implemented against the enemy on a smaller scale and of a random nature. The above-mentioned activities have characteristics such as being highly random operational activities and having a smaller scale use of strengths. In implementing missile firepower harassing attacks, it is necessary to capture the following several points.

The first necessity is to flexibly apply firepower against the situation of the targets. In order to create and apply great psychological pressure to the enemy, based on the goals of the operation, it is possible to implement multiple sudden and concealed as well as random missile firepower assaults against the enemy, making flexible and constantly

changing missile firepower harassing attacks, and making the enemy [think] that no rules apply, thereby achieving the maximum effectiveness of the harassing attacks.

The second necessity is to shoulder ballistic missile forces with the responsibility to fix relatively regular harassing attack missions at regular intervals. Due to the highly random nature of missile firepower harassing attacks, the capability of forces to rapidly react must be high, and the stronger reaction capabilities of ballistic missile forces to use their strengths in normal primary operations satisfy the harassing attack mission.

The third necessity is to strictly control the rate of missile consumption {导弹的消耗量 daodan de xiaohao liang}. Due to the strength of the elements of surprise and shock associated with missile firepower, by employing only a small number of missile forces and firepower during a single unit of time, it is possible to achieve the effects of a harassing attack. Consequently, it is necessary that missile firepower harassing attacks use as their standard the ability to effectively “control” targets within a specified period of time; thus it is not easy to adopt a mode of concentrated firepower assaults to reduce the amount of unnecessary waste of firepower.

V. Implementing Missile Force Strength Maneuver...636

Missile force strength maneuver {导弹兵力机动 daodan bingli jidong} is the implementation of the regular missile force-unit shifting of force strengths and weaponry based on the goals and missions of the operation. The maneuvering of missile force strengths is an effective means to increase the existing missile force-unit survivability on the battlefield and it is an important measure for adjusting the operational *bushu* disposition and creating and maintaining a favorable posture. In implementing missile force strength maneuver, one must emphasize mastering the following points.

The first necessity is to accurately grasp the timing opportunities for maneuver. Accurately determining the timing opportunities for maneuver is the crux of accomplishing the mission for maneuvering. The timing opportunities for regular missile forces to maneuver toward the operational area are separated into imminent war maneuvering and wartime maneuvering. When maneuvering during imminent war [conditions], it is necessary to organize a location for approach by which the forces can maneuver at one time to the operational area; the operational forces within the depth must rapidly maneuver to the operational build-up area and successfully make operational preparations. Based on the operational needs on the battlefield, when maneuvering during wartime, the commander must: make use of conditions on the battlefield that favor our side; take advantage of enemy operational power that is of no use, and of timing opportunities for when it is difficult for them to organize large scale strengths to implement counter maneuver operations; and rapidly organize maneuver toward the operational area.

The second necessity is to successfully conduct maneuver support. For the sake of handling complex situations during maneuvering, it is essential for the commander to:

adopt multiple support methods to implement uninterrupted support; be adept in basing himself in the actual situation of maneuver; make flexible use of multiple methods such as planned support {计划保障 jihua baozhang} and random support {随机保障 sui ji baozhang}, centralized support {集中保障 jizhong baozhang} and decentralized support {分散保障 fensan baozhang}, fixed point support {定点保障 dingdian baozhang} and follow-on support {跟进保障 genjin baozhang}, and level-by-level support {逐级保障 zhuji baozhang} and skip-echelon support {越级保障 yueji baozhang}; and increase the reliability of maneuver support.

The third necessity is to successfully conduct maneuver camouflage. To conduct camouflage while maneuvering is a meticulous task that involves a broad assortment of aspects, and has a great and complex influence on maneuvering. Above all, maneuvering first must adopt measures to maintain strict secrecy and meticulously seal off maneuver information; secondly, it is essential to organize the wide adoption of measures such as artificial and technical camouflage and concealment activities among units; next, it is essential to organize the adoption of multiple kinds of decoy measures among units to conceal the actual maneuver direction and activities of the units, making it difficult for the enemy to ascertain our intent.

Postscript...637

After *The Science of Campaigns* (First edition. National Defense University Press, May 2000) was published, the book took the fancy of numerous readers in the internal and external military and become the most popular basic teaching material for learning and studying campaign theory.

Six years has passed. In the past six years, profound changes have occurred to the forms of wars and campaigns with the continuous progress of information technology. In order to meet the needs of situation development and fully reflect the achievements of teaching and scientific research of our department in the past six years, our development recompiled the *Science of Campaigns* based on original achievements.

During the compilation, we focused on new characteristics of campaigns under informationized conditions, and did all we could to make this book theoretical, systematic, epochal, and foresighted.

This book includes 6 volumes and 32 chapters. Major Zhang Yuliang, the Director of the Campaign Teaching and Research Department at the National Defense University, is the chief editor. The Deputy Director Major Yu Shusheng and Major Zhou Xiaopeng are the associate editors. Those who participated in the compilation are: Yu Liming, Yu Guohua, Ma Xiushan, Wang Yiping, Wang Renzong, Wang Jun, Wang Jiyu, Wang Xuejin, Wang Houqing, Liu Xiaoli, Liu Shubin, Liu Shengru, Sun Jingwei, Li Tangjie, Li Jinglong, Lu Jianfei, Yang Yueqiang, Yang Gongkun, Yang Guochuan, Zhang Yuliang, Zhang Xingye, Zhang Zhanli, Yu Shusheng, Fan Chengbin, Zhou Guiliang, Zhou Xiaopeng, Zhou Xinsheng, Jia Junming, Yuan Jingwei, Tao Qian, Xu Jingnian, Zhan Xuexi, Tang Xuqi, Huang Bin, Cao Xiumin, Peng Xiwen, Dong Lianshan, and Xiong Jiben.

The compilation of *the Science of Campaigns* was not an overnight job. It is an outcome that several generations of people at the Teaching and Research Department made great efforts to achieve. It is the painstaking work of many leaders and cadres. As successors of campaign teaching and scientific research, we will always remember them.